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3.8a. Illusion and Hallucination (Illusion and Hallucination on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alston, William P. (1993). The Reliability of Sense Perception. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). Silencing the argument from hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what exactly is the problem? We can approach it via one of the central arguments against realism – the argument from hallucination. The argument is intended as a proof that in ordinary, veridical cases of perception, perceivers do not have an unmediated perceptual access to the world. There are many versions of it; I propose the following1: 1. Hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible. 2. If two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature. 3. The contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects. 4. Therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects. The key move is, I believe, from the fact that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of veridical perception are possible to an alleged common element, factor, or nature, in the form of a mental state, in the two cases – that is, premise 2. Disjunctivism, at its core, can be taken as simply denying this move, and arguing that all that follows from the premise stating the possibility of hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases veridical perception is that there is a broader category, that of “experience as of...”, which encompasses both cases..
Armstrong, David M. (1955). Illusions of sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ben-Zeev, Aaron (1984). What is a perceptual mistake? Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:261-278.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Binet, Alfred (1884). Visual hallucinations in hypnotism. Mind 9 (35):413-415.   (Google | More links)
Bokil, S. V. (2005). The argument from illusion: All appearance and no reality. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1-2):147-158.   (Google)
Bretzevonl, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.   (Google)
Bretzel, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6).   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (2008). How to account for illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.
Brown, Jason W. (2004). The illusory and the real. Mind and Matter 2 (1):37-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This contribution explores the psychological basis of illusion and the feeling of what is real in relation to a process theory (microgenesis) of mind/brain states. The varieties of illusion and the alterations in the feeling of realness are illustrated in cases of clinical pathology, as well as in everyday life. The basis of illusion does not rest in a comparison of appearance to reality nor in the relation of image to object, since these are antecedent and consequent phases in the same mental state. The study of pathological illusions and hallucinations shows that the feeling of realness in an object depends on its coherence within and across perceptual modalities. Illusion is shown to be not the taking of the phenomenal for the real, but the overlooking of the real in the phenomenal, since all things exist, i.e. are real, as categories of intrinsic relations in the unique mode of their conception. Finally, the implications of the account are discussed in relation to moral conduct, self-realization, acceptance, and the will to enjoy a world of 'brain-born' mental phenomena
Burock, Marc (ms). Falsehood: An Analysis of Illusion's Singularity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a common tactic, going back to the beginnings of religion and philosophy, to presume that we are enveloped in a world of untruth and illusion, thereby fueling our movement toward truth. In more modern times, Descartes demonstrates this process clearly with his Meditations. This work extends the Cartesian skeptical position by challenging the concept of illusion itself, asking those who have ever called something ‘an illusion’ to question the meaning of these assertions. This broader skepticism partially annihilates itself without completely collapsing under the weight of self-contradiction.
Byrne, Alex (2009). Experience and content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1950). The theory of appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.   (Google)
Coates, Paul (2000). Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the anti-causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call
Dancy, Jonathan (1995). Arguments from illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Dorsch, Fabian, Experience and introspection.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued by M. G. F. Martin and others that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot — and need not — be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or ‘na¨ıve realist’) disjunctivism — the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapater, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential disjunctivism called experiential intentionalism. This view does not only enjoy some advantages over its rival, but also can hold on to the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations. First of all, I try to spell out in a bit more detail in which sense hallucinations may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, and why this leads us to erroneously judge them to be perceptions (cf. sections I–III and VIII). Then, I raise three challenges each for experiential disjunctivism and its orthodox intentionalist counterparts (cf. sections IV and V), notably in respect of the need to explicate why a perception-like hallucination still makes the same judgements reasonable from the subject’s perspective as the corresponding perceptions. And, finally, I propose my alternative both to experiential disjunctivism and to orthodox intentionalism. Experiential intentionalism takes perceptions and perception-like hallucinations to share a common character partly to be spelled out in intentional — and, hence, normative — terms (cf. sections VI and VII). The central thought is that the hallucinations concerned are intentionally — and erroneously — presented to us as perceptual relations to the world. I aim to show that the resulting view can meet all six challenges (cf. sections VI–VIII). I end..
Dorsch, Fabian, The phenomenological unity of hallucinations.   (Google)
Abstract: When philosophers speak or write about hallucinations, they usually have perceptual (or ’true’) hallucinations in mind - that is, hallucinations which the subject mistakes for genuine perceptions and which have the same impact on his mental lives as the latter.1 One reason for this is the fact that philosophers tend to address the topic of hallucination, not for its own sake, but only in the context of some wider issues. Thus, when they are discussing hallucinations, they are primarily interested in other topics, such a how - or whether - we are able to acquire knowledge about the external world, in which sense our mental states are directed at objects and properties, how best to account for what our experiences are subjectively like, which features suffice for something to count as a conscious experience, and so on. Especially the epistemic question, but also the connected issues in the philosophy of mind, lead them first of all to the phenomenon of genuine perception. For perceptions are precisely those mental episodes which point us to, and bring us into contact with, the world; and they also constitute the paradigm examples of conscious episodes with a distinctive phenomenal character. Hallucinations, on the other hand, do neither. Instead, they become relevant for the epistemic and related considerations only in so far as they give rise to sceptical scenarios and cast doubt on the common-sense (or naive) conception of the nature of perceptual experiences. And, in both cases, only those hallucinations matter which are indistinguishable from genuine perceptions with respect to their content and character.2 In the cognitive sciences (broadly understood as ranging from, say, neuroscience to developmental or evolutionary psychology), by contrast, hallucinations are much more prominent objects of study, and moreover objects of study in their own right. From the perspective of empirical investigations of the brain and mind - whether they utilise neuroimaging, observe behaviour, or examine verbal reports - hallucinations simply form one class of mental phenomena among many, all of which are ultimately in the same need of being studied and accounted for as part of our attempt to come to a full understanding of how our psychology works and is neurally realised..
Dunn, Jeffrey (2008). The obscure act of perception. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):367-393.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism
Firth, Roderick (1964). Austin and the argument from illusion. Philosophical Review 73 (July):372-382.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Furlong, E. J. (1954). Memory and the argument from illusion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54:131-144.   (Google)
Greenberg, A. R. (1977). Defending the argument from illusion. Personalist 58 (April):124-130.   (Google)
Grossberg, Stephen (2002). Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost
Gunther, York H. (2001). Content, illusion, partition. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2
Gurney, Edmund (1885). Hallucinations. Mind 10 (38):161-199.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1885). Supplementary note on hallucinations. Mind 10 (38):316-317.   (Google | More links)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Haymond, William S. (1969). The argument from illusion. Modern Schoolman 46 (January):109-134.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Johnston, Mark (2004). The obscure object of hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory.
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Krishna, Daya (2003). Illusion, hallucination and the problem of truth. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.   (Google)
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Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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