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3.8c. Perceptual Reports (Perceptual Reports on PhilPapers)

See also:
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1980). Reference, reality and perceptual fields. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53 (August):763-823.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Crawford, Dan D. (1974). Propositional and nonpropositional perceiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):201-210.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Doppelt, Gerald (1979). The Austin-Malcolm argument for the incorrigibility of perceptual reports. Dialectica 33:59-75.   (Google | More links)
Dore, Clement (1965). Seeming to see. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):312-318.   (Google)
French, Peter A. (1975). Seeing' and 'seeing that', 'observing' and 'observing that. American Philosophical Quarterly 9:89-97.   (Google)
Goodman, Russell B. (1976). An analysis of two perceptual predicates. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7:35-53.   (Google)
Higginbotham, James T. (1999). Perceptual reports revisited. In K. Murasugi & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Higginbotham, James T. (1983). The logic of perceptual reports: An extensional alternative to situation semantics. Journal of Philosophy 80 (February):100-127.   (Cited by 87 | Google | More links)
Kvart, Igal (1993). Seeing that and seeing as. Noûs 27 (3):279-302.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (1975). Two senses of 'appears red'. Philosophical Studies 28 (September):199-205.   (Google | More links)
Marques, Teresa (2006). On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts. Disputatio 2 (26).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.
Martin, Michael G. F. (2010). What's in a look? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Maund, J. Barry (1986). The phenomenal and other uses of 'looks'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (June):170-180.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mcclatchey, John B. (1972). Some uses of 'appearance'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10:463-469.   (Google)
Muskens, Reinhard (1993). Perception Verbs. In R.E. Asher & J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The semantics of a sentence containing a perception verb such as see or hear depends to a high degree on the exact syntactic form of the perception verb’s complement. Let us compare sentence (1), where the complement is tenseless, with (2), where the complement is a tensed clause
Schlagel, Richard H. (1962). Language and perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (December):192-204.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Severens, Richard H. (1967). Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):213-221.   (Google | More links)
Sibley, Frank N. (1955). Seeking, scrutinizing and seeing. Mind 64 (October):455-478.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Soltis, Jonas F. (1966). Seeing, Knowing And Believing: A Study Of The Language Of Visual Perception. Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Tomberlin, James E. (1996). Perception and possibilia. Philosophical Issues 7:109-115.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Trebilcot, Joyce (1970). Dr Kenny's perceptions. Mind 79 (January):142-143.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John O. (1949). Perception-statements. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:47-64.   (Google)