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3.8d. Sensation and Perception (Sensation and Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1974). The subjectivity of sensation. Ajatus 36:3-18.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Barnes, Winston H. F. (1954). Talking about sensations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54:261-278.   (Google)
Baylis, Charles A. (1966). Foundations for a presentative theory of perception and sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:41-54.   (Google)
Ben-Zeev, Aaron (1984). The passivity assumption of the sensation-perception distinction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Budd, Malcolm (1986). Wittgenstein on sensuous experiences. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):174-195.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Austen (2007). Sensory and perceptual consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally thinks that his or her usage is, of course, the correct one. Notice that we have already partially vindicated Mary McCarthy: even the word "the" cannot always be trusted
Cornman, James W. (1975). Chisholm on sensing and perceiving. In Analysis And Metaphysics. Reidel.   (Google)
Crossley, David J. (1978). A question about sensations. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June):355-360.   (Google)
Culbertson, James T. (1942). A physical theory of sensation. Philosophy of Science 9 (April):197-226.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cummins, Phillip D. (1990). Pappas on the role of sensations in Reid's theory of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):755-762.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, William L. (1881). Definition of "sensation". Mind 6 (24):551-557.   (Google | More links)
de Laguna, Grace A. (1916). Sensation and perception II: The analytic relation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (23):617-630.   (Google | More links)
de Laguna, Grace A. (1916). Sensation and perception. I: The genetic relationship. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (20):533-547.   (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2003). Sensation and perception (1981). In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Google)
Dretske, F. (1988). Sensation and perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1984). Wittgenstein on sensation and 'seeing-as'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Flint, Richard C. (1877). On some alleged distinctions between thought and feeling. Mind 2 (5):112-118.   (Google | More links)
Greenway, A. P. (1973). Psychological findings and sensory experience. International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (March):99-110.   (Google)
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Hartshorne, Charles (1963). Sensation in psychology and philosophy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1:3-14.   (Google)
Henry Lewes, George (1876). What is sensation? Mind 1 (2):157-161.   (Google | More links)
Higginson, Glenn D. (1935). Stimulus, sensation, and meaning. Journal of Philosophy 32 (24):645-650.   (Google | More links)
Hinton, J. Michael (1974). This is visual sensation. In Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean Dorrance (2008). Content and constancy: Phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.   (Google | More links)
Levine, Michael W. & Shefner, Jeremy M. (1991). Fundamentals of Sensation and Perception. Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.   (Google)
Lingis, Alphonso F. (1981). Sensations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):160-170.   (Google | More links)
Madary, Michael (2008). Specular highlights as a guide to perceptual content. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is a contribution to a recent debate in the philosophy of perception between Alva Noë and Sean Kelly. Noë (2004) has argued that the perspectival part of perception is simultaneously represented along with the non-perspectival part of perception. Kelly (2004) argues that the two parts of perception are not always simultaneously experienced. Here I focus on specular highlights as an example of the perspectival part of perception. First I give a priori motivation to think that specular highlights are experienced at the same time as non-perspectival properties, which challenges Kelly's position. Then I discuss psychophysical work by Andrew Blake and Heinrich B lthoff (1990) which seems to show that specular highlights are not represented in the way that Noë (2004) would suggest. In the third section I suggest a compromise between Noë and Kelly: specular highlights are not represented, but rather play an evidentiary role in the representation of perspective-independent properties, like gloss and shape. I conclude with some thoughts about how this study can generalize to other kinds of experience
Malinas, G. A. (1975). Sensations and understanding. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):28-35.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1966). Awareness of sensations and of the location of sensations. Analysis 26 (October):29-32.   (Google)
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Meiland, J. W. (1964). Meaning, identification and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (December):360-374.   (Google | More links)
Mursell, James L. (1922). The concept of sensation. Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):684-690.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). A rediscovery of presence. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):17-41.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Nelkin, Norton (1987). How sensations get their names. Philosophical Studies 51 (May):325-39.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Nunn, William A. (1971). Margolis and Vesey on sensations. Mind 80 (October):583-588.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (forthcoming). Perception. In W. Ramsey & K. Frankish (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish
Odegard, Douglas (1967). Sensations as qualities. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (October):308-316.   (Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1989). Sensation and perception of Reid. Noûs 23 (April):155-167.   (Google)
Pappas, George S. (1989). Symposiums papers: Sensation and perception in Reid. Noûs 23 (2):155-167.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (2008). Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to reject. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence or otherwise of sensational properties is pivotal in assessing functionalism, representationalism, and many other conceptions of mental states and the nature of our ability to think about them. Instead of engaging in extended sentence- by-sentence dissection of these many discussions, I hope that the theses I formulate will, taken together, comprise a positive conception of sensational properties that can be drawn upon in assessing those debates. My main aim is to articulate that conception
Persson, Ingmar (1985). The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. C.W.K. Gleerup.   (Google)
Pillsbury, Walter B. (1911). The role of the type in simple mental processes. Philosophical Review 20 (5):498-514.   (Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (1971). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):158-166.   (Google | More links)
Potrc, Matjaz (1992). Sensory and perceptual. Acta Analytica 8 (8):73-90.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2006). Beyond appearances: The content of sensation and perception. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally
Rockwell, Teed (2001). Experience and sensation: Sellars and Dewey on the non-cognitive aspects of mental life. Education and Culture (Winter).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sellars and Dewey each isolated and critiqued different aspects of the atomistic epistemology of the logical positivists: Dewey labeled his target "Sensationalistic Empiricism", and Sellars labeled his "the Myth of the Given." The main theme of this paper will be the similarity and differences in their responses to this kind of philosophy, and how both responses can be clarified and strengthened by considering recent discoveries in Cognitive Neuroscience. What we have recently learned about neural architecture accounts for a distinction between knowledge and experience that is a recurrent theme in both Sellars and Dewey. Dewey, however, made a sharper break from the positivists by seeing all experience as shaped by skills and abilities which were designed to acheive certain goals and were colored by emotions. The connectionist architecture used in Cognitive Neuroscience supports this view, as does the psychological research of J.J. Gibson. Once we consider the ways in which connectionist cognitive abilities differ from linguistic ones, Sellars' distinction between thoughts and sensations, and Dewey's distinction between knowledge and experience, can both be plausibly accounted for
Sellars, Roy Wood (1959). Sensations as guides to perceiving. Mind 68 (January):2-15.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Siegel, Susanna (2006). Direct realism and perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.   (Google | More links)
Singer, M. (2003). Sentience: Companion to Reason. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Spruit, Leen (1994). Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Brill.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1. Classical roots and medieval discussions -- v. 2. Renaissance controversis, later scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern philosophy.
Voelkel, Theodore S. (1973). Sellars' treatment of sensation. Personalist 54:130-148.   (Google)
Winn, Ralph B. (1946). Reflections on causation and perception. Philosophical Review 55 (January):77-80.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. (1913). The belief in sensations. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (22):599-608.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)