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3.9. Philosophy of Perception, General (Philosophy of Perception, General on PhilPapers)

Aaronson, Isaac (1914). Perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (2):37-46.   (Google | More links)
Aranyosi, Istv (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.   (Google)
Ardley, Gavin (1958). The nature of perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (December):189-200.   (Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 51 | Google)
Audi, Robert N. (2004). Perception and consciousness. In Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Baird, Bryan (2006). The transcendental nature of mind and world. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):381-398.   (Google)
Baylis, Charles A. (1966). Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4:117-122.   (Google)
Baylis, Charles A. (1959). Professor Chisholm on perceiving. Journal of Philosophy 56 (September):773-790.   (Google | More links)
Ben-Zeev, Aaron & Strauss, Michael (1984). The dualistic approach to perception. Man and World 17:3-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1993). The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective. New York: Lang.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Blatti, Stephan (2006). No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment. Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.   (Google)
Abstract: ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is a distinction between two (sometimes overlapping) ways in which S may feel x as an impediment to his movement: as an influence on a movement state of S, or as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement. After demonstrating the primacy of the former sense, I argue that Fricke and Snowdon’s counter-examples only undermine a version of the standard account that glosses ‘impediment’ as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement.
Blosser, Philip (1986). The status of mental images in Sartre's theory of consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:163-172.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Perception. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 84 (1):157-167.   (Google)
Abstract: The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti-individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or 'essence' on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal perceptual systems, especially visual systems, are similar, it criticises a dominant view of the last century, in both philosophy and large parts of psychology, according to which a range of sophisticated supplementary abilities have to be learned before a child can perceive objective features of the physical world.
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1948). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 173 | Google)
Clark, Austen (1994). Contemporary problems in the philosophy of perception. American Journal of Psychology 107 (4):613-22.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Imagine, if you will, that the entire community of investigators interested in the problems of perception all lived together in the same town. Some continual shuffling of neighbors would be inevitable, and there might be occasional episodes of mass relocation and energetic bulldozing, but after a while the residents would probably settle down and find themselves living in districts defined roughly by disciplinary boundaries. The experimental psychologists would occupy the newer part of town, laced with superhighways, workshops and factories, machines and measuring instruments, computers and overhead display units. But the town also has an Old City, marked by the complete absence of highways and factories, where the streets are lined with ancient hovels. There are, to be sure, some colossal palaces and museums in this part of town, breathtaking monuments to the grandeur of past centuries, but the current residents lack the inclination to construct such buildings, and many of the old palaces have been boarded up and condemned as unfit for human habitation. The somewhat scraggly and irascible inhabitants of this district have few viable economic enterprises, and no free markets, but rather organize themselves in units resembling nothing so much as medieval guilds. Congratulations. You have stumbled into the neighborhood where the philosophers live
Clark, Austen (2003). Philosophical issues about perception. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (2003). Perception, philosophical issues about. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Abstract: the philosophical regions. I will identify three: three obvious zones of The first and third of these kinds of problem are studied almost tectonic conflict within contemporary cognitive approaches to exclusively within departments of philosophy. Applied to perception
Clark, Austen (1984). Seeing and summing: Implications of computational theories of vision. Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: Marr's computational theory of stereopsis is shown to imply that human vision employs a system of representation which has all the properties of a number system. Claims for an internal number system and for neural computation should be taken literally. I show how these ideas withstand various skeptical attacks, and analyze the requirements for describing neural operations as computations. Neural encoding of numerals is shown to be distinct from our ability to measure visual physiology. The constructs in Marr's theory are neither propositional nor pictorial, and provide a counter example to many commonly held dichotomies concerning mental representation
Davidson, Thomas (1882). Perception. Mind 7 (28):496-513.   (Google | More links)
De Clercq, Rafael & Horsten, Leon (2004). Perceptual indiscriminability: In defence of Wright's proof. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):439-444.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
deVries, Willem A. (2006). McDowell, Sellars, and sense impressions. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):182–201.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1925). The naturalistic theory of perception by the senses. Journal of Philosophy 22 (22):596-605.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). The ambiguity of 'in here/out there' talk: In what sense is perception 'out in the world'? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):82-87.   (Google)
Fair, Frank K. (1976). Two problems with Roderick Chisholm's perceiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (June):547-550.   (Google | More links)
Firth, Roderick (1950). Radical empiricism and perceptual relativity (I). Philosophical Review 59 (April):164-183.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1966). Could there be a theory of perception? Journal of Philosophy 63 (June):369-380.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Forman, David (2008). Autonomy as Second Nature: On McDowell's Aristotelian Naturalism. Inquiry 51 (6):563-580.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The concept of second nature plays a central role in McDowell's project of reconciling thought's external constraint with its spontaneity or autonomy: our conceptual capacities are natural in the sense that they are fully integrated into the natural world, but they are a second nature to us since they are not reducible to elements that are intelligible apart from those conceptual capacities. Rather than offering a theory of second nature and an account of how we acquire one, McDowell suggests that Aristotle's account of ethical character formation as the acquisition of a second nature serves as a model that can reassure us that thought's autonomy does not threaten its naturalness. However, far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian model of second nature actually generates an anxiety about how the acquisition of such autonomous conceptual abilities could be possible.
Foster, John A. (2000). The Nature of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Foster addresses the question: what is it to perceive a physical object? He rejects the view that we perceive such objects directly, and argues for a new version of the traditional empiricist account, which locates the immediate objects of perception in the mind. But this account seems to imply that we do not perceive physical objects at all. Foster offers a surprising solution, which involves embracing an idealist view of the physical world
Fotinis, Athanasios P. (1974). Perception and the external world: A historical and critical account. Philosophia 4:433-448.   (Google)
Fumerton, Richard A. (1985). Metaphysical And Epistemological Problems Of Perception. Lincoln: University Nebraska Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallagher, Kenneth T. (1964). Recent Anglo-american views on perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 4 (February):122-141.   (Google)
Garnett, A. Campbell (1965). The Perceptual Process. Madison: University Of Wisconsin Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gasson, J. A. (1963). The internal senses--functions or powers (part I)? Thomist 26 (January):1-14.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar & Hawthorne, John (2006). Introduction. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar (2006). Introduction: Perceptual experience. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Much contemporary discussion of perceptual experience can be traced to two observations. The first is that perception seems to put us in direct contact with the world around us: when perception is successful, we come to recognize— immediately—that certain objects have certain properties. The second is that perceptual experience may fail to provide such knowledge: when we fall prey to illusion or hallucination, the way things appear may differ radically from the way things actually are. For much of the twentieth century, many of the most important discussions of perceptual experience could be fruitfully understood as responses to this pair of observations
Gillett, Grant R. (1988). Learning to perceive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):601-618.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gregory, Joshua C. (1921). A comparison of strong's theory of perception with Reid's. Philosophical Review 30 (4):352-366.   (Google | More links)
Hardie, W. F. R. (1963). Austin on perception. Philosophy 38 (July):253-263.   (Google)
Hartnack, Justus (1950). Analysis Of The Problem Of Perception In British Empiricism. Munksgaard.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hartshorne, Charles (1961). Professor hall on perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):563-571.   (Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (2005). Rationalist theories of sense perception and mind-body relation. In A Companion to Rationalism (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hausheer, Herman (1928). A theory of perception. Journal of Philosophy 25 (24):645-651.   (Google | More links)
Heil, John (1983). Perception and Cognition. University of California Press.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Hinton, J. M. (1967). Experiences. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (66):1-13.   (Google | More links)
Hirst, R. J. (1951). Perception, science and common sense. Mind 60 (240):481-505.   (Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. & Fantl, Jeremy (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:371-383.   (Google)
Jewell-Lapan, Waldo (1936). Perception and reality. Journal of Philosophy 33 (14):365-373.   (Google | More links)
Johnston, Mark (ms). The manifest: Chapter.   (Google)
Judd, Charles H. (1909). What is perception? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (2):36-44.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Knox, John (1969). The problems of perception. Personalist 50:254-267.   (Google)
Lean, Martin E. (1953). Sense-Perception And Matter: A Critical Analysis Of C. D. Broad's Theory Of Perception. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Macdonald, Margaret (1953). Linguistic philosophy and perception. Philosophy 28 (October):311-324.   (Google)
Maclachlan, D. L. C. (1989). Philosophy of Perception. Cliffs Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Machamer, Peter K. (1970). Recent work on perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (January):1-22.   (Google)
Mailloux, Noel (1942). The problem of perception. Thomist 4 (March):266-285.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (2005). Perception. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). The shallows of the mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society:80--98.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (ms). Uncovering Appearances, chapter four.   (Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan (2010). On the diversity of auditory objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas a composite visual object is a spatial composite). Many composite objects are directly heard in the sense just mentioned. There is a great variety of such composite auditory objects—melodies, harmonies, sequences of phonemes, individual voices, meaning-carrying sounds, and so on. This diversity of auditory objects has an important application to aesthetics. Perceivers do not naturally or easily attend simultaneously to auditory objects that overlap in time. Yet, aesthetic appreciation depends on such an allocation of attention to overlapping objects
Matthen, Mohan (2008). Reply to Egan and Clark. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):415–421.   (Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His work will be a stimulating resource for a wide range of scholars and students across philosophy and psychology
Matthen, Mohan (2008). Seeing, doing, and knowing: A précis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.   (Google | More links)
McDowell, John (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 693 | Google | More links)
Mcdowell, John (2007). What myth? Inquiry 50 (4):338 – 351.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In previous work I urged that the perceptual experience we rational animals enjoy is informed by capacities that belong to our rationality, and - in passing - that something similar holds for our intentional action. In his Presidential Address, Hubert Dreyfus argued that I thereby embraced a myth, "the Myth of the Mental". According to Dreyfus, I cannot accommodate the phenomenology of unreflective bodily coping, and its importance as a background for the conceptual capacities exercised in reflective intellectual activity. My paper responds to this accusation. Dreyfus misreads my invocation of Aristotle, and is thereby led to suppose, wrongly, that I conceive rationality as detached, brought to bear on practical predicaments from a standpoint other than one of immersion in them. I urge that even unreflective bodily coping, on the part of rational animals, is informed by their rationality. Dreyfus mentions Heidegger's distinction, which is picked up by Gadamer, between being oriented towards the world and merely inhabiting an environment. But he sets it aside, whereas it is crucial for the issue between us. Engaged bodily coping involves responsiveness to affordances, and responsiveness to affordances on the part of rational animals belongs to their relation to the world. I explain how the idea that conceptual capacities are actualized in our perceptual experience is connected with the thought that our perceptual experience opens us to the world. Finally, I suggest that the real myth in this area is the conception of rationality underlying Dreyfus's resistance to my picture
Miah, Sajahan (2006). Russell's Theory of Perception 1905-1919. New York: Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: This book focuses on Russell's work from 1905 to 1919, during which period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge.
Millar, Boyd (2006). The conflicted character of picture perception. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):471–477.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often assumed that there is a perceptual conflict in looking at a picture since one sees both a two-dimensional surface and a three-dimensional scene simultaneously. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to think that looking at pictures requires the visual system to perform the special task of reconciling inconsistent impressions of space, or competing information from different depth cues. To the contrary, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that the perception of depth in pictures is achieved in much the same way as is the perception of depth in any ordinary case.
Montague, William P. (1907). Contemporary realism and the problems of perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (14):374-383.   (Google | More links)
Mos, Leendert P. (1980). Perception (I). Methodology and Science 13:168-190.   (Google)
Mulligan, Kevin (1995). Perception. In Barry C. Smith & David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1963). Perception and the sentience hypothesis. Mind 72 (January):111-120.   (Google | More links)
Noë, Alva (online). Real presence.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Nudds, Matthew & O'Callaghan, Casey (eds.) (2010). Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). Audition. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Provides the theoretical and psychological framework to the philosophy of sounds and audition. I address auditory scene analysis, spatial hearing, the audible qualities, and cross-modal interactions.
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). Introduction: The Philosophy of Sounds and Auditory Perception. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (forthcoming). Perception. In W. Ramsey & K. Frankish (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish
O'Callaghan, Casey (2007). Sounds: A Philosophical Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ... ISBN0199215928 ... Abstract: Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science traditionally has focused on a visual model. This book presents a systematic treatment of sounds and auditory experience. It demonstrates how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships among multiple sense modalities enriches our understanding of perception. It articulates the central questions that comprise the philosophy of sound, and proposes a novel theory of sounds and their perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, and against the scientific view that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium such as air or water, the book argues that sounds are events in which objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium. This does not imply that sounds propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near their sources. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures of time and situates sounds in the world. Sounds are not ethereal, mysterious entities. It also provides a powerful account of echoes, interference, reverberation, Doppler effects, and perceptual constancies that surpasses the explanatory richness of alternative theories. Investigating sounds and audition demonstrates that considering other sense modalities teaches what we could not otherwise learn from thinking exclusively about the visual. This book concludes by arguing that a surprising class of cross-modal perceptual illusions demonstrates that the perceptual modalities cannot be completely understood in isolation, and that a visuocentric model for theorizing about perception — according to which perceptual modalities are discrete modes of experience and autonomous domains of philosophical and scientific inquiry — ought to be abandoned.
Park, Désirée (1983). Elements and Problems of Perception. Alden Press.   (Google)
Pastin, Mark (1983). Philosophy of perception. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Nijhoff.   (Google)
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Russell, Luke (2006). See the world: McDowell and the normative trilemma. Dialogue 45 (1):69-88.   (Google)
Abstract: McDowell argues that the shortcomings of recent theories of experience are the product of the modern scientistic conception of nature. Reconceive nature, he suggests, and we can explain how perceptual experience can be an external constraint on thought that, moreover, has conceptual import. In this article I argue that McDowell’s project is unsuccessful. Those wishing to construct normative theories, including theories of perceptual experience, face the normative trilemma—they must choose one of three styles of theory, each of which exhibits a distinctive weakness. If we view McDowell’s approach in light of this choice, we see that he cannot adequately explain the link between experience and the world itself. I conclude that the real problem with theories of experience flows not from scientistic naturalism, but rather from the inconsistent demands we place on normative theories in general.McDowell soutient que les défauts des théories récentes sur l’expérience sont engendrés par la position scientifique moderne sur la nature. En reconcevant la nature, suggère-t-il, on est en mesure d’expliquer comment l’expérience sensorielle peut être une contrainte extérieure sur la pensée, contrainte qui joue, de plus, un rôle conceptuel. Je soutiens dans cet article que le projet de McDowell se solde par un échec. Ceux qui souhaitent élaborer des théories normatives, y compris des théories sur l’expérience sensorielle, font face au trilemme normatif — ils doivent choisir un type de théorie parmi trois types qui trahissent tous une faiblesse particulière. Si l’on envisage la démarche de McDowell dans la perspective de ce choix, on s’aperçoit qu’il ne peut expliquer de manière satisfaisante le lien entre l’expérience et le monde lui-même. J’en conclus que le véritable problème des théories sur l’expérience ne découle pas du naturalisme scientifique, mais plutôt des exigences incohérentes auxquelleson soumet les théories normatives en général
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Abstract: In this paper, I explore and defend the idea that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to our visual searches, responsibilities that are far more fine-grained and interesting than the trivial responsibilities to keep our eyes open and “look hard”. In order to have such responsibilities, we must be able to exert fine-grained and interesting forms of control over our visual searches. I present both an intuitive case and an empirical case for thinking that we do, in fact, have such forms of control over our visual searches. I then show how these forms of control can be used to aim the visual beliefs that result from our searches towards various epistemic goals.
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Abstract: In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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Abstract: Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a safe haven for individualists. Here I want to put a little more pressure on such a view of visual experience, as well as to offer a more constructive, positive argument in defense of the idea of extended vision.
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