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Metaphysics of Mind :: Physicalism

See also:

4.1a Formulating Physicalism

See also: 1.2f. Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment, 1.4g. Panpsychism, 1.4h. Russellian Monism, 4.1e. Physicalism, Misc, 4.4b. Supervenience and Physicalism, 4.5b. Nonreductive Materialism, 4.6a. Emergence.

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4.1b Identity Theory

See also: 1.3c. Kripke's Modal Argument, 1.4g. Panpsychism, 4.1d. Anomalous Monism, 4.5a. Reduction and Multiple Realizability, 4.6c. Token Identity.

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