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4.1. Physicalism about the Mind (Physicalism about the Mind on PhilPapers)

See also:
Armstrong, David Malet (1968). The headless woman illusion and the defence of materialism. Analysis 29:48--9.   (Google)
Kirsh, Marvin E. (ms). What Happened? Are We Asking or Telling?   (Google | More links)

4.1a Formulating Physicalism

Callaway, H. G. & Gochet, Paul (2007). Quine's Physicalism. In Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. We argue that the details of the relations of particular sciences, disciplines and domains of discourse depend on empirical evidence and empirical-theoretical developments and that the generalized approach of reduction by explication is also subject to related empirical-theoretical constraints. So understood, physicalism lacks much of the controversial force and many of the implications sometimes associated with it.
Crane, Tim (1993). Reply to Pettit. Analysis 53 (4):224-27.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Crane, Tim (1991). All God has to do. Analysis 51 (October):235-44.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Crane, Tim & Mellor, D. H. (1990). There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99 (394):185-206.   (Cited by 96 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Crook, S. (2001). Why physics alone cannot define the 'physical': Materialism, metaphysics, and the formulation of physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-360.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Daly, Chris (1995). Does physicalism need fixing? Analysis 55 (3):135-41.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Daly, Chris (1998). What are physical properties? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):196-217.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John; Hook, Sidney & Nagel, Ernest (1945). Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 42 (September):515-530.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Diaz-Leon, Esa (2008). We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl). Teorema 27 (3):85-101.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived
Dowell, Janice (2006). Formulating the thesis of physicalism: An introduction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dowell, J. L. (2006). Formulating the thesis of physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perhaps more controversial than whether physicalism is true is what exactly would have to be true for physicalism to be true. Everyone agrees that, intuitively at least, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the physical. The disagreements arise in how to get beyond this intuitive formulation. Until about ten years ago, participants in this debate were concerned primarily with answering two questions. First, what is it for a property, kind, relation, or individual to be a physical one?
Dowell, Janice (2006). The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are miracle-performing angels.[9] Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are ways the world could turn out to be such that physicalism is false. For example, if there are miracle-performing angels, then physicalism is false. So there are worlds considered as actual in which physicalism is false.[10] For short, call this ‘the a posteriority constraint’.[11]
Earman, John (1975). What is physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):565-567.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Francescotti, Robert M. (2000). Ontological physicalism and property pluralism: Why they are incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2009). What is physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.   (Google)
Abstract: Although 'most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world' (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, 'Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self-Knowledge', Erkenntnis , 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because 'the claim is hopelessly vague' (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction', Journal of Philosophy , 72 (1975), p. 552). I argue that physicalism in fact should be the thesis that every existing particular essentially exemplifies properties the exemplification of which does not conceptually entail the existence of conscious beings. Physicalism thus is a purely philosophical thesis with no intrinsic relation to physics. 1
Gillett, Carl & Witmer, D. Gene (2001). A "physical" need: Physicalism and the via negativa. Analysis 61 (272):302–309.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Carl (2001). The methodological role of physicalism: A minimal skepticism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (1999). Procrustes probably: Comments on Sober's "physicalism from a probabilistic point of view". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):175-181.   (Google)
Hawthorne, John (2002). Blocking definitions of materialism. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):103-13.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is often thought that materialism about themind can be clarified using the concept of supervenience. But there is a difficulty. Amaterialist should admit the possibility ofghosts and thus should allow that a world mightduplicate the physical character of our worldand enjoy, in addition, immaterial beings withmental properties. So materialists can't claimthat every world that is physicallyindistinguishable from our world is alsomentally indistinguishable; and this is wellknown. What is less understood are thedifferent ways that immaterial add-ons can maketrouble for supervenience-theoreticformulations of materialism. In this paper, Ishall present a problematic kind of add-on thathas been ignored and look at threesupervenience-theoretic attempts to formulatematerialism in that light
Horgan, Terence E. (2006). Materialism: Matters of definition, defense, and deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions
House Vaden, D. & McDonald, Marvin J. (1992). Post-physicalism and beyond. Dialogue 31 (4):593-621.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (2006). On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothing. Philsophical Studies 131 (1):227-249.   (Google)
Abstract: Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto
Judisch, Neal (2008). Why 'non-mental' won't work: On Hempel's dilemma and the characterization of the 'physical'. Philosophical Studies 140 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis
Kirk, Robert E. (1979). From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 29 (July):229-37.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kirk, Robert E. (2006). Physicalism and strict implication. Synthese 151 (3):523-536.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose P is the conjunction of all truths statable in the austere vocabulary of an ideal physics. Then phsicalists are likely to accept that any truths not included in P are different ways of talking about the reality specified by P. This ‘redescription thesis’ can be made clearer by means of the ‘strict implication thesis’, according to which inconsistency or incoherence are involved in denying the implication from P to interesting truths not included in it, such as truths about phenomenal consciousness. Commitment to the strict implication thesis cannot be escaped by appeal to a posteriori necessary identities or entailments. A minimal physicalism formulated in terms of strict implication is preferable to one based on a priori entailment
Kirk, Robert E. (1982). Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24 (December):131-41.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1996). Physicalism lives. Ratio 9 (1):85-89.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Latham, Noa (2001). Substance physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Latham, Noa (2003). What is token physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than substance physicalism, and as a good statement on its own or in conjunction with other theses of minimal physicalism.[i] It is also generally simply assumed to be true, though Davidson has offered a famous argument for its truth, and some have argued against it. Many of those arguing against it are substance physicalists, indicating that they believe token physicalism to be a strictly stronger view.[ii]
Levine, Joseph & Trogdon, Kelly (2009). The modal status of materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible
Melnyk, Andrew (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A Physicalist Manifesto is the fullest treatment yet of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in unprecedented detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid, and exceptionally clear style, this book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science
Melnyk, Andrew (2008). Can physicalism be non-reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.   (Google)
Abstract: Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better
Melnyk, Andrew (1996). Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions. Synthese 105 (3):381-407.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Two ways are considered of formulating a version of retentive physicalism, the view that in some important sense everything is physical, even though there do exist properties, e.g. higher-level scientific ones, which cannot be type-identified with physical properties. The first way makes use of disjunction, but is rejected on the grounds that the results yield claims that are either false or insufficiently materialist. The second way, realisation physicalism, appeals to the correlative notions of a functional property and its realisation, and states, roughly, that any actual property whatsoever is either itself a physical property or else is, ultimately, realised by instances of physical properties. Realisation physicalism is distinctive since it makes no claims of identity whatsoever, and involves no appeal to the dubious concept of supervenience. After an attempt to formulate realisation physicalism more precisely, I explore a way in which, in principle, we could obtain evidence of its truth
Melnyk, Andrew (1997). How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):622-637.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Melzer, Heinrich & Schachter, Josef (1985). On physicalism. Synthese 64 (September):359-374.   (Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (2006). Realization and the formulation of physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising
Montero, Barbara (2001). Post-physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Montero, Barbara (2006). Physicalism in an infinitely decomposable world. Erkentnis 64 (2):177-191.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenomena, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world
Montero, Barbara (1999). The body problem. Noûs 33 (2):183-200.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Montero, Barbara (2005). What is the physical? In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nagel, Ernest (1949). Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 46:515-53.   (Google)
Nathan, N. M. L. (1996). Weak materialism. In Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Ney, Alyssa (2008). Defining physicalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.   (Google)
Abstract: This article discusses recent disagreements over the correct formulation of physicalism. Although there appears to be a consensus outside those who discuss the issue that physicalists believe that what exists is what is countenanced by physics, as we will see, this orthodoxy faces an important puzzle now frequently referred to as 'Hempel's Dilemma'. After surveying the historical trajectory from Enlightenment-era materialism to contemporary physicalism, I examine several mainstream approaches that respond to Hempel's dilemma, and the benefits and drawbacks of each
Ney, Alyssa (2008). Physicalism as an attitude. Philosophical Studies 138 (1).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely noted that physicalism, taken as the doctrine that the world contains just what physics says it contains, faces a dilemma which, some like Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor have argued, shows that “physicalism is the wrong answer to an essentially trivial question”. I argue that both problematic horns of this dilemma drop out if one takes physicalism not to be a doctrine of the kind that might be true, false, or trivial, but instead an attitude or oath one takes to formulate one’s ontology solely according to the current posits of physics
Nimtz, Christian & Schutte, M. (2003). On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57 (4):413-22.   (Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2003). Not old... But not that new either: Explicability, emergence, and the characterisation of materialism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Oliver, W. Donald (1949). Can naturalism be materialistic? Journal of Philosophy 46 (September):608-614.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Papineau, David & Huttemann, A. (2005). Physicalism decomposed. Analysis 65 (285):33-39.   (Google)
Pettit, Philip (1993). A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53 (4):213-23.   (Cited by 25 | Annotation | Google)
Pettit, Philip (2009). Consciousness and the Frustrations of Physicalism. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pettit, Philip (1995). Microphysicalism, dottism, and reduction. Analysis 55 (3):141-46.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Pettit, Philip (1994). Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws. Analysis 54 (4):253-57.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Pineda, David (2006). A mereological characterization of physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):243 – 266.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Physicalism is usually understood as the claim that every empirical entity is or is determined by physical entities. The claim is however imprecise until it is clarified what are the physical entities in question. A sceptical argument in the form of a dilemma tries to show that this problem of formulation of physicalism cannot be adequately met. If we understand physical entities as the entities introduced by current physics, the resulting claim becomes most probably false. If we instead understand physical entities as those entities introduced by some future ideal physics, the claim then becomes indeterminate in content. Both horns seem equally bad. In the first part of the paper, I survey the strengths and weaknesses of different proposed solutions to this problem of formulation. In the second part, I lay out a new formulation of physicalism, partly based on a mereological principle, which overcomes the dilemma, and argue that it is a correct formulation of physicalism to the extent that it rules out clear antiphysicalist scenarios and is compatible with clear physicalist scenarios
Ravenscroft, Ian (1997). Physical properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):419-431.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Schroer, Robert (forthcoming). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly.   (Google)
Abstract: : It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties; specifying the nature of this dependency, however, has proven a difficult task. The dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties also presents a challenge to the thesis of Physicalism: If the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study and if dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, then it appears that there will be kind of property—categorical properties—that will escape description by the physical sciences. This paper argues that a new theory of dispositional and categorical properties, a theory put forth by C.B. Martin and John Heil, solves both of these problems: It presents a way of understanding the sense in which dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties that has major advantages over more popular accounts of this dependency and it also provides a new and interesting Physicalist response to the challenge presented by categorical properties.
Schroder, Jurgen (2006). Physicalism and strict implication. Synthese 151 (3):537-545.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of Robert Kirk’s strict implication thesis as an explication of physicalism and its relation to Jackson and Chalmer’s notion of application conditionals, to the notion of global supervenience and to a posteriori identities. It is argued that the strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience. Furthermore, reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make the thesis vacuous. Third, Kirk’s claim that the strict implication thesis does not entail reduction of the mental to the physical (excluding phenomenal properties) is untenable if a functional model of reduction is preferred over Nagel’s classical model. Finally, Kirk’s claim that the physical facts entail in an a priori way the fact that certain brain states feel somehow seems to be unfounded
Seager, William (ms). Concessionary dualism and physicalism.   (Google)
Sheldon, W. H. (1946). Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 43 (April):197-209.   (Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1978). The content of physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (October):339-41.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Sober, Elliott (1999). Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):135-74.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Spurrett, David (2001). What physical properties are. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):201-225.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (2009). Response to Alter and Bennett. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):775-784.   (Google)
Wilson, Jessica M. (1999). How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):33-52.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The standard formulations of the supervenience relation present the supervenience of one set of properties on another in terms of property correlations, without placing any constraints on the dependency relation concerned. As Horgan notes, this does not ensure that properties supervening upon physicalistically acceptable base properties are not themselves emergent in a way at odds with materialism; hence he concludes that what physicalism needs is "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that, where supervenient and base properties are instanced in the same individuals, Horgan's requirement of robust explanation is neither sufficient nor necessary for superdupervenience. In particular, his paradigm case is compatible with the supervenient property's being emergent. This and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by means of a metaphysical constraint on the supervenience relation: each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property must be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. Satisfying this condition is all that is needed to render supervenience superduper. I go on to show that a wide variety of physicalist accounts, both reductive and non-reductive, are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem
Wilson, Jessica M. (ms). Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong.   (Google)
Abstract: Nearly all accounts of emergence take this to involve both broadly synchronic dependence and (some measure of) ontological and causal autonomy. Beyond this agreement, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety, reflecting that the core notions of dependence and autonomy have multiple, often incompatible interpretations. Luckily for philosophical purposes, however, much of this apparent diversity is superficial---or so I argue in this paper. I start by considering a notorious problematic associated with special science entities---namely, the problem of higher-level causation (a generalization of the problem of mental causation). As we will see, of the various strategies for addressing this problem there are two which plausibly accommodate both the dependence and the ontological and causal autonomy of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence, which I call 'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. The two schema are similar in that each imposes a (different, specific) condition on the powers of entities taken to be emergent, relative to the powers of their dependence base entities. (Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically almost entirely neutral, primarily reflecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may---perhaps only contingently---bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features.) But the conditions, and accounts, are also crucially different; in particular, one is compatible with physicalism, while the other is not. I go on to consider the main accounts of emergent dependence and emergent autonomy, showing how, properly understood and (in some cases) diambiguated, these aim to instantiate one or the other schema.
Wilson, Jessica M., Non-reductive physicalism and degrees of freedom.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some claim that NRP is an unstable position, either collapsing into reductive physicalism (so denying Non-reduction) or expanding into emergentism of a robust or “strong” variety (so denying Physicalism).2 I argue here that this claim is unfounded. NRP occupies a viable middle ground between reductive physicalism and robust emergentism, according to which some phenomena are (as I will sometimes put it) ‘weakly..
Wilson, Jessica M. (ms). Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based Subset Strategy.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers'. In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that occasion. Accounts of non-reductive realization conforming to this condition are implementing what I call 'the powers-based subset strategy'. I focus on the crucial case involving mental and brain states; the results may be generalized, as appropriate. I first situate and motivate the strategy by attention to the problem of mental causation; I make the case, in schematic terms, that implementation of the strategy makes room (contra Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, and elsewhere) for mental states to be ontologically and causally autonomous from their realizing physical states, without inducing problematic causal overdetermination, and compatible with both Physicalism and Non-reduction; and I show that several contemporary accounts of non-reductive realization (in terms of functional realization, parthood, and the determinable/determinate relation) are plausibly seen as implementing the strategy. As I also show, implementation of the powers-based strategy does not require endorsement of any particular accounts of either properties or causation---indeed, a categoricalist contingentist Humean can implement the strategy. The schematic location of the strategy in the space of available responses to the problem of mental (more generally, higher-level) causation, as well as the fact that the schema may be metaphysically instantiated, strongly suggests that the strategy is, appropriately generalized and instantiated, sufficient and moreover necessary for non-reductive realization. I go on to defend the sufficiency and necessity claims against a variety of objections, considering, along the way, how the powers-based subset strategy fares against competing accounts of purportedly non-reductive realization in terms of supervenience, token identity, and constitution.
Wilson, Jessica M. (2006). On characterizing the physical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. Ultimately, I motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components: The physics-based NFM account: An entity existing at a world w is physical iff (i) it is treated, approximately accurately, by current or future (in the limit of inquiry, ideal) versions of fundamental physics at w, and (ii) it is not fundamentally mental (that is, does not individually either possess or bestow mentality)
Wilson, Jessica M. (2005). Supervenience-based formulations of physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The many and varied formulations of physicalism instantiate the following schema: Physicalism: All entities are nothing over and above physical entities. Supervenience-based accounts of “nothing over and aboveness” also instantiate a schema: Supervenience-based Nothing Over and Aboveness: The A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The four main approaches to filling in the latter schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that a physicalism based on the associated account of nothing over and aboveness is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable.
Witmer, D. Gene (2001). Sufficiency claims and physicalism: A formulation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Worley, Sara (2006). Physicalism and the via negativa. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):101-26.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some philosophers have suggested that, instead of attempting to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the physical, we should adopt the ‘via negativa.’ That is, we should take the notion of the mental as fundamental, and define the physical in contrast, as the non-mental. I defend a variant of this approach, based on some information about how children form concepts. I suggest we are hard-wired to form a concept of intentional agency from a very young age, and so there’s some reason to believe that our concept of the physical does include, as part of its content, a contrast with the mental
Yarvin, Herb (1978). Criteria of the physical. Metaphilosophy 9 (April):122-132.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

4.1b Mind-Brain Identity Theory

Abelson, Raziel (1970). A refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 18 (December):85-90.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R. (1979). Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory. Eidos 1 (December):153-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Appel, K. I. (1959). Horn sentences in identity theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (4):306-310.   (Google | More links)
Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). A new argument for mind-brain identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I undertake the tasks of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality, and of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental/physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favour of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
Armstrong, David M. (1973). Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1968). The headless woman and the defense of materialism. Analysis 29:48-49.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Aune, Bruce (1966). Feigl on the mind-body problem. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baier, Kurt (1962). Smart on sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):57-68.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Baldner, Steven (2006). Neither brain nor ghost: A nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory. Review of Metaphysics 60 (2):419-421.   (Google)
Baldwin, Thomas (1991). The identity theory of truth. Mind 100 (1):35-52.   (Google | More links)
Beall, JC (2000). On the identity theory of truth. Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. & McCauley, Robert N. (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience. In Martin Hahn & S.C. Stoness (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Abstract: Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research
Beloff, John (1965). The identity hypothesis: A critique. In J. R. Smythies (ed.), Brain and Mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Blumenfeld, J-B. (1985). Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Borst, Clive V. (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Borst, Clive Vernon (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..   (Google)
Abstract: Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain processes? by J. Shaffer.--The identity of mind and body, by J. Cornman.--Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes, by R. Coburn.--Mental events and the brain, by J. Shaffer.--Comment: mental events and the brain, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism and the mind-body problem, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism, by J. J. C. Smart.--Scientific materialism and the identity theory, by N. Malcolm.--Professor Malcolm on scientific materialism and the identity theory, by E. Sosa.--Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa, by N. Malcolm.--Mind-body identity, privacy and categories, by R. Rorty.--Physicalism, by T. Nagel.--Mind-body identity, a side issue? by C. Taylor.--Illusions and identity, by J. M. Hinton.--Bibliography (p. [259]-261)
Brandt, R. (1960). Doubts about the identity theory. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Bradley, M. C. (1969). Two arguments against the identity thesis. In Robert Brown & C.D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy In Australia. London: Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
Brandt, R. & Kim, Jaegwon (1967). The logic of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):515-537.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (1998). Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: A difficulty for the token identity theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24.   (Google)
Abstract: We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one caused her reaching out and grasping for it. This tells us how the action came about and makes sense of why it happened. At least, something broadly along these lines strikes me as a fairly crude and partial regimentation of our pretheoretic understanding of everyday action explanation
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Candlish, Stewart (1999). A prolegomenon to an identity theory of truth. Philosophy 74 (2):199-220.   (Google)
Abstract: Most recent discussions of truth ignore the fact that a few philosophers, past and present, have flirted with and sometimes openly subscribed to an identity theory, according to which a proposition's being true consists in its identity with the reality it is supposedly about. This neglect is probably due to the theory's counter-intuitiveness: it faces obvious and fundamental objections. The aim of this paper is to consider these objections and decide if there is a version of the theory which can escape them, thereby becoming an at least initially plausible candidate for an account of truth. In this way the metaphysical price exacted by commitment to an identity theory can be assessed
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Candlish, Stewart (1970). Mind, brain, and identity. Mind 79 (October):502-18.   (Google | More links)
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Carney, James D. (1971). The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism. Mind.   (Annotation | Google)
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Clarke, Desmond M. (1973). Two arguments against the identity theory of mind. Philosophical Studies 21:100-110.   (Google)
Coburn, Robert C. (1963). Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Coder, David (1973). The fundamental error of central-state materialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (October):289-98.   (Annotation | Google)
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Crittenden, Charles (1971). Ontology and mind-body identity. Philosophical Forum 2:251-70.   (Google)
Danto, Arthur C. (1973). Representational properties and mind-body identity. Review of Metaphysics 26 (March):401-411.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
De Anna, Gabriele (2000). Mind-world identity theory and semantic realism: Haldane and Boulter on Aquinas. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):82-87.   (Google | More links)
de Boer, R. (1976). Cartesian categories in mind-body identity theories. Philosophical Forum 7:139-58.   (Google)
Dodd, Julian (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory , while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth
Dodd, Julian (1999). Hornsby on the identity theory of truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):225–232.   (Google | More links)
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Double, Richard (1981). Central state materialism. Philosophical Studies 28:229-37.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1976). The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.   (Google)
Enc, Berent (1983). In defense of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 80 (May):279-98.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Engelhard, Kristina (2010). Categories and the ontology of powers: A vindication of the identity theory of properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.   (Google)
Engel, Pascal (2001). The false modesty of the identity theory of truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.   (Google)
Abstract: The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name
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Feigl, Herbert (1958). The 'mental' and the 'physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Feldman, Fred (1974). Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fish, William & Macdonald, Cynthia (2009). The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: Where Dodd goes wrong. Analysis 69 (2).   (Google)
Frances, Bryan (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
Garnett, A. Campbell (1965). Body and mind: The identity thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (May):77-81.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
García-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). Ostensive signs: Against the identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):253-264.   (Google | More links)
Gert, Bernard (1967). Can a brain have a pain? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (March):432-436.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Globus, Gordon G. (1972). Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity. Philosophy of Science 39 (September):291-300.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Globus, Gordon G. (1989). The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In M. Maxwell & C. Wade Savage (eds.), Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell. University Press of America.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Goldstein, Irwin (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. I argue against the existence of a posteriori identities.
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1971). The mind-brain identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):247-254.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Green, O. Harvey (1975). Sensations, brain states, and behavior. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6:123-129.   (Google)
Grunbaum, A. (1972). Abelson on Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):119-21.   (Google | More links)
Gustafson, Donald F. (1963). On the identity theory. Analysis 23:30-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hannan, Barbara & Lehrer, Keith (1989). Compatibilism, determinism, and the identity theory. Inquiry 32 (March):49-54.   (Google)
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Harrison, Frank R. I. (1971). Remarks on Smart's identity theory. Darshana International 11 (April):58-62.   (Google)
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Abstract: Book Information An Identity Theory of Truth. By Dodd Julian. Macmillan. Basingstoke. 2000. Pp. ix + 199. Hardback, £42.50
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Abstract: Identity theory The doctrine that mental states are identical with physical states was defended in antiquity by Lucretius and in the early modern era by Hobbes. It achieved considerable prominence in the 1950s as a result of the writings of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place, and J. J. C. Smart. (See, e.g., Smart (1959). These authors developed reasonably precise formulations of the doctrine, clarified the grounds for embracing it, and responded persuasively to a range of objections. More recently it has been defended systematically by Hill (1991) and Papineau (2002). Other contemporary advocates include Loar (1990), McLaughlin (2004), and Polger (2005). The doctrine also figures explicitly or implicitly in the writings of dualists, who are of course concerned to oppose it. Thus, for example, it plays an important role in Kripke’s influential defense of dualism (Kripke 1980)
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Honderich, Ted (1994). Functionalism, identity theories, the union theory. In Tadeusz Szubka & Richard Warner (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: The Current State of the Debate. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Hornsby, Jennifer (1997). The presidential address: Truth: The identity theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.   (Google | More links)
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Jones, Mostyn W. (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly do so, it must first clear up its own deep obscurity about what brains are like behind appearances, and how they create the mind’s privacy, unity and qualia – all of which observable brains lack. (2) This can ultimately be done with a clear, simple assumption: our consciousness is the physical substance that certain brain events consist of beyond appearances. For example, the distinctive electrochemistry in nociceptor ion channels wholly consists of pain. This rejects that pain is a brain property: instead it’s a brain substance that occupies space in brains, and exerts forces by which it’s indirectly detectable via EEGs. (3) This assumption is justified because treating pains as physical substances avoids the perennial obscurities in mind-body theories. For example, this ‘clear physicalism’ avoids the obscure nonphysical pain of dualism and its spinoffs. Pain is instead an electrochemical substance. It isn’t private because it’s hidden in nonphysical minds, but instead because it’s just indirectly detected in the physical world in ways that leave its real nature hidden. (4) Clear physicalism also avoids puzzling reductions of private pains into more fundamental terms of observable brain activity. Instead pain is a hidden, private substance underlying this observable activity. Also, pain is fundamental in itself, for it’s what some brain activity fundamentally consists of. This also avoids reductive idealist claims that the world just exists in the mind. They yield obscure views on why we see a world that isn’t really out there. (5) Clear physicalism also avoids obscure claims that pain is information processing which is realizable in multiple hardwares (not just in electrochemistry). Molecular neuroscience now casts doubt on multiple realization. Also, it’s puzzling how abstract information gets ‘realized’ in brains and affects brains (compare ancient quandries on how universals get embodied in matter). A related idea is that of supervenient properties in nonreductive physicalism. They involve obscure overdetermination and emergent consciousness. Clear physicalism avoids all this. Pain isn’t an abstract property obscurely related to brains – it’s simply a substance in brains. (6) Clear physicalism also avoids problems in neuroscience. Neuroscience explains the mind’s unity in problematic ways using synchrony, attention, etc.. Clear physicalism explains unity in terms of intense neuroelectrical activity reaching continually along brain circuits as a conscious whole. This fits evidence that just highly active, highly connected circuits are fully conscious. Neuroscience also has problems explaining how qualia are actually encoded by brains, and how to get from these abstract codes to actual pain, fear, etc.. Clear physicalism explains qualia electrochemically, using growing evidence that both sensory and emotional qualia correlate with very specific electrical channels in neural receptors. Multiple-realization advocates overlook this important evidence. (7) Clear physicalism thus bridges the mind-brain gulf by showing how brains can possess the mind’s qualia, unity and privacy – and how minds can possess features of brain activity like occupying space and exerting forces. This unorthodox nonreductive physicalism may be where physicalism leads to when stripped of all its reductive and nonreductive obscurities. It offers a clear, simple mind-body solution by just filling in what neuroscience is silent about, namely, what brain matter is like behind perceptions of it.
Joske, W. D. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:157-60.   (Annotation | Google)
Kallestrup, Jesper (2008). Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.   (Google)
Abstract: Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each response does not fully withstand scrutiny, and so Kripke's conclusion is hard to resist. Section 1 lays out Kripke's argument, and Sections 2 to 4 then discuss responses to each of the three premises respectively
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Nelson, R. J. (1976). Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 73 (13):365-385.   (Google | More links)
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Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Identity, materialism, and the problem of the danglers. Metaphilosophy 4 (October):318-44.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1972). Logical types and the identity theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):559-564.   (Google | More links)
Norton, Richard (1964). On the identity of identity theories. Analysis 24:14-16.   (Google)
Noren, Stephen J. (1972). Smart's identity theory, translation, and incorrigibility. Mind 81 (January):116-120.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Smart's materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):31-43.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Smart's materialism: The identity thesis and translation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):54-66.   (Google | More links)
Pepper, Stephen C. (1975). A split in the identity theory. In Charles L. Y. Cheng (ed.), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.   (Google)
Pitcher, George (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (August):150-7.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (ms). Is consciousness a brain process.   (Google)
Place, Ullin T. (ed.) (2003). Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighboring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness
Place, Ullin T. (1989). Low claim assertions. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer.   (Annotation | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69 (January):101-4.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (1972). Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat. Mind 81 (January):106-112.   (Google | More links)
Plantikow, Thane (2008). Surviving personal identity theory: Recovering interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction
Place, Ullin T. (1989). Thirty five years on--is consciousness still a brain process? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1988). Thirty years on -- is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):208-19.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Pluhar, Evelyn Begley (1977). Physicalism and the identity theory. Journal of Critical Analysis 7:11-20.   (Google)
Polten, Eric P. (1973). Critique Of The Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. The Hague: Mouton.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Potrc, Matjaz (1995). Consciousness and connectionism--the problem of compatability of type identity theory and of connectionism. Acta Analytica 13 (13):175-190.   (Google)
Presley, C. P. (ed.) (1967). The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Neural plasticity and the location of mental events. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):154-162.   (Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). Ontology vs ontogeny: A dilemma for identity theorists. Dialogue 17:128-131.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). Pearce on behalf of the materialist. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (March):157-162.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1976). Reply to Martin and Rosenberg. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (March):139-141.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). The refutation of materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (April):157-62.   (Annotation | Google)
Richardson, Robert C. (1981). Disappearance and the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (September):473-85.   (Google)
Ripley, Charles (1969). The identity theory and scientific hypotheses. Dialogue 2 (September):308-10.   (Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (1982). The disappearance theory. In Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Rocca Della, M. (1993). Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):101-112.   (Annotation | Google)
Rocca, Michael Della (1993). Kripke's essentialist argument against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1).   (Google)
Rockwell, W. Teed (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Rocca, Michael Della (1993). Spinoza's argument for the identity theory. Philosophical Review 102 (2):183-213.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1994). The identity theory. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional
Rosenbaum, S. (1977). The property objection and the principles of identity. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):155-164.   (Google | More links)
Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. (1966). On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):87-110.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schneider, Steven (online). Identity theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Schmidt, Andreas (2009). Substance monism and identity theory in Spinoza. In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Schlagel, Richard H. (1977). The mind-body identity impasse. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):231-37.   (Google)
Scriven, Michael (1966). The limitations of the identity theory. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1965). The identity approach to the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 18 (March):430-51.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1974). Criteria for mind-body identity: A rejoinder. Behaviorism 2:120-123.   (Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1963). Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):160-6.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shirley, Edward S. (1974). Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 25 (January):73-75.   (Google | More links)
Silkstone, Thomas (1982). Body and mind. International Philosophical Quarterly 22 (September):169-184.   (Google)
Simon, Michael A. (1970). Materialism, mental language, and the mind-body identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (June):514-32.   (Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70.   (Annotation | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1961). Further remarks on sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 70 (July):406-407.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist 56 (April):177-92.   (Annotation | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (October):651-62.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1994). Mind and brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophy And Scientific Realism. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 142 | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.   (Cited by 232 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: SUPPOSE that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting?l One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy orange patch of light On the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellowy orange patch on the wall (though I may know that there is not such a patch on the wall). This is perhaps Wittgenstein's view in the Philosophical Investigations (see paragraphs 367, 370). Similarly, when I "report" a pain, I am not really reporting anything (or, if you like, I am reporting in a queer sense of "reporting"), but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince. (See paragraph 244: "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and docs not describe it." Nor docs it describe anything else?)2 I prefer most of the time to discuss an afterimage rather than a pain, because the word "pain" brings in something which is irrelevant to my purpose: the notion of "distress." I think that "he is in pain" entails "he is in distress," that is, that he is in a certain agitation-condition.3 Similarly, to say "I am in pain" may be to do more than "replace pain behavior": it may be partly to report something, though this something is quite nonmysterious, being an agitation-condition, and so susceptible of behavioristic analysis. The suggestion I wish if possible to avoid is a different one, namely that "I am in pain" is a genuine report, and that what it reports is an irreducibly psychical something. And similarly the suggestion I wish to resist is also that to say "I have a yellowish orange after-image" is to report something irreducibly psychical
Smart, J. J. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to dr Pitcher and mr Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (December):252-54.   (Cited by -57467 | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1965). The identity thesis: A reply to professor Garrett. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):82-3.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smythies, J. R. (1994). Requiem for the identity theory. Inquiry 37 (3):311-29.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1965). Professor Malcolm on "scientific materialism and the identity theory". Dialogue 4:422-23.   (Annotation | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1977). Spinoza's identity theory. Inquiry 20 (1-4):419 – 445.   (Google)
Abstract: Of the two main interpretations of Spinoza's theory of the identity of the attributes, in particular those of Thought and Extension, the objective interpretation is now almost universally preferred to the subjective. Rejection of the subjective interpretation, according to which the attributes are merely our ways of cognizing a reality whose real essence remains unknown, is certainly justified, but the objective theory comes too near to replacing the identity by a mere correlation of diff rents to be quite satisfactory. Is it not better to say that Thought and Extension represent two complementary conceptions of reality which are both correct? Yes, but in saying so some commentators ascribe to mind, as Spinoza conceives it, an unplausibly abstract status. An alternative proposal is made as to a way in which Spinoza might be right in essentials, though it requires that a certain tension in Spinozism as to the nature of body be resolved in a particular direction
Srzednicki, Jan (1972). Some objections to mind-brain identity theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.   (Google | More links)
Stets, Jan E. & Biga, Chris F. (2003). Bringing identity theory into environmental sociology. Sociological Theory 21 (4):398-423.   (Google | More links)
Stern, Robert (1993). Did Hegel hold and identity theory of truth? Mind 102 (408).   (Google | More links)
Stevenson, John T. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to J.j.C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69 (October):505-10.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Sterling, Marvin C. (1978). Topic-neutrality and the identity theory. Southwest Philosophical Studies 3 (April):41-48.   (Google)
Stevens, Blamey (1936). The Identity Theory. Manchester, Eng.,Sherratt & Hughes.   (Google)
Stoutland, Frederick M. (1971). Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):491-509.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1997). Austria vs. australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Swartz, Norman M. (1974). Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17.   (Google)
Swinburne, Richard (1993). Are mental events identical with brain events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):173-181.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Tannenbaum, Jerrold (1971). In defense of the brain process theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):552-563.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review 76 (April):201-13.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Teichmann, J. (1967). The contingent identity of minds and brains. Mind 76 (July):404-15.   (Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1978). A novel approach to mind-brain identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1969). The identity theory. In Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Mary Terrell White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. St.   (Google)
Tomberlin, James E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):295-99.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Wadia, Pheroze S. (1972). On a refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):113-115.   (Google | More links)
Wallner-Ahmad, Ingrid (1975). The identity theorist's solution to the mind-body problem. Gnosis 1:28-38.   (Google)
Washington, Corey (1992). The identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy 89 (11):582-605.   (Google | More links)
Watkins, J. W. N. (1982). A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Weismann, D. (1965). A note on the identity thesis. Mind 74:571-77.   (Google)
White, Alan R. (1972). Mind-brain analogies. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (June):457-472.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Whitely, C. H. (1970). The mind-brain identity hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July):193-99.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Stephen (1978). Pains, brain states and scientific identities. Mind 87 (January):77-92.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, Jessica M. (2002). Review of John Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Philosophical Review 111:598-601.   (Google)
Abstract: Perry, in this lucid, deep, and entertaining book (based on his 1999 Jean Nicod lectures), supposes that type-identity physicalism is antecedently plausible, and that rejecting this thesis requires good reason (this is
Windes, James D. (1975). Intentionality, behavior, and identity theory. Behaviorism 3:156-161.   (Google)
Wolfe, J. & Nathan, George J. (1968). The identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Dialogue 7:469-72.   (Google)
Ziedins, R. (1971). Identification of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (January):13-23.   (Google)

4.1c Eliminative Materialism

Aaron, R. I. (1952). Dispensing with mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:225-242.   (Google)
Austin, James W. (1975). Rorty's materialism. Auslegung 3 (November):20-28.   (Google)
Bernstein, R. (1968). The challenge of scientific materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (June):252-75.   (Google)
Bush, Eric (1974). Rorty revisited. Philosophical Studies 25 (1-2):33-42.   (Google | More links)
Cam, Philip (1978). "Rorty revisited", or "Rorty revised"? Philosophical Studies 33 (May):377-86.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carter, William R. (1974). On incorrigibility and eliminative materialism. Philosophical Studies 28 (2):113-21.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1968). On the elimination of 'sensations' and sensations. Review of Metaphysics 22 (September):15-35.   (Google)
Donovan, Charles F. (1978). Eliminative materialism reconsidered. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June):289-303.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Doppelt, Gerald (1977). Incorrigibility, the mental, and materialism. Philosophy Research Archives 3.   (Google)
Everitt, Nicholas (1981). A problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 90 (February):428-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Everitt, Nicholas (1983). How not to solve a problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 92 (October):590-92.   (Google | More links)
Feyerabend, Paul K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 17 (September):49-67.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
Feyerabend, Paul K. (1963). Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):295-6.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Feyerabend, Paul K. (1969). Science without experience. Journal of Philosophy 66 (November):791-795.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Globus, Gordon G. (1989). The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In M. Maxwell & C. Wade Savage (eds.), Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell. University Press of America.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Godow, Rew A. (1976). Eliminative materialism and denotation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36.   (Google)
Goodman, Russell B. (1974). A note on eliminative materialism. Journal of Critical Analysis 5 (January-April):80-83.   (Google)
Hiley, David R. (1978). Is eliminative materialism materialistic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):325-37.   (Google | More links)
Hiley, David R. (1980). The disappearance theory and the denotation argument. Philosophical Studies 37 (April):307-20.   (Google | More links)
Leon, Mark . (1996). Sensations, error, and eliminative materialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):83-95.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1976). Quine's materialism. Philosophia 6 (March):101-30.   (Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. & Pappas, George S. (1972). What is eliminative materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (August):149-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Quine, Willard V. (1966). On Mental Entities. In W.V. Quine (ed.), The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Random House.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Richardson, Robert C. (1981). Disappearance and the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (September):473-85.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1970). In defense of eliminative materialism. Review of Metaphysics 24 (September):112-21.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Rorty, Richard (1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. Review of Metaphysics 19 (September):24-54.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1980). Keeping matter in mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:295-322.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Savitt, Steven F. (1974). Rorty's disappearance theory. Philosophical Studies 28 (6):433-36.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shirley, Edward S. (1974). Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 25 (January):73-75.   (Google | More links)
Sikora, Richard I. (1974). Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):191-93.   (Google)
Sikora, Richard I. (1975). Rorty's new mark of the mental. Analysis 35 (June):192-94.   (Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1982). Eliminative materialism. Mind 91 (July):438-440.   (Google)
Steiling, Kevin (1976). The elimination of sensations and the loss of philosophy. Auslegung 3 (November):20-28.   (Google)
Wallace, Megan (online). Mental fictionalism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract: Suppose you are somewhat persuaded by the arguments for Eliminative Materialism, but are put off by the view itself. For instance, you might be sympathetic to one or more of the following considerations: (1) that folk psychology is a bad theory and will be soon replaced by cognitive science or neuroscience, (2) that folk psychology will never be vindicated by cognitive science, (3) that folk psychology makes ontological commitments to weird or spooky things that no proper science will admit the existence of, (4) that folk psychology seems to lead to a sort of epiphenomenalism (which is yet another thing that’s weird and spooky), and (5) that folk psychology seems to lead to the conclusion that mental content is either determined by things outside the head or is completely indeterminate, neither of which is appealing. Yet in spite of your sympathy for any one of (1)-(5), you may nonetheless cringe at the consequence of them—that is, you may be unwilling to accept the Eliminative Materialist’s radical claim that (i) there are no beliefs, desires, etc., and (ii) we should stop all talk to that quantifies to the contrary. To relieve the conflict, I propose Mental Fictionalism: the view that we are fictionalists about mental states

4.1d Anomalous Monism

Antony, Louise M. (1989). Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Antony, Michael V. (2003). Davidson's argument for monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.My guess is thatif you want to get a lot of physicalism out [ofDavidson's argument], you're going to have to put a lot of physicalism in.Jerry Fodor 1989, 159
Antony, Louise M. (1994). The inadequacy of anomalous monism as a realist theory of mind. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Basile, Pierfrancesco (2005). Whitehead's ontology and Davidson's anomalous monism. Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.   (Google)
Benbaji, Hagit (2005). The nomological principle and the argument for anomalous monism. Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.   (Google)
Bickle, John (1992). Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bieri, Peter (1993). Mental concepts: Causal because anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Brandl, Johannes L. (ed.) (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...
Brooks, David (1980). The impossibility of psycho-physical laws. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):21-45.   (Google)
Callaway, H. G. & Gochet, Paul (2007). Quine's Physicalism. In Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. We argue that the details of the relations of particular sciences, disciplines and domains of discourse depend on empirical evidence and empirical-theoretical developments and that the generalized approach of reduction by explication is also subject to related empirical-theoretical constraints. So understood, physicalism lacks much of the controversial force and many of the implications sometimes associated with it.
Campbell, Neil (online). Anomalous monism.   (Google)
Abstract: identity theory , usually attributed to J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959) and U.T. Place (Place, 1956), claimed that kinds of mental states are identical to kinds of brain states. Sensations of pain, for instance, were said to be identical to the firing of C-fibres or some such type of neurological state. According to this view, then, pain, conceived as a _kind_ of mental state, is said to be _reduced_ to a certain kind of neurological state. The reduction envisaged here was modelled on the kind of reduction seen in other areas of the sciences. For instance, lightning can be said to be reduced to a rapid discharge of electrons in the atmosphere. When such a reduction is made scientists are not saying that there are two phenomena that are correlated, but rather that lightning is
Campbell, Neil (1998). Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2003). Causes and causal explanations: Davidson and his critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (1997). The standard objection to anomalous monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (1997). Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Child, William (1993). Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review 102 (2):215-245.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cooper, W. E. (1980). Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):36-40.   (Google)
Daniel, Steven G. (1999). Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):225-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1233 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1995). Laws and cause. Dialectica 49 (2-4):263-79.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 390 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1974). Psychology as philosophy. In S. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. Harper & Row.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1987). Problems in the explanation of action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1993). Reply to Peter Bieri's Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Davidson, Donald (1992). Thinking causes. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1999). The emergence of thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A phenomenon “emerges” when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less powerful the conceptual resources of the object language
Davidson, Donald (1973). The material mind. In Patrick Suppes (ed.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. North-Holland.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
de Pinedo, M. (2006). Anomalous monism: Oscillating between dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the mental and the absence of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory practices
Drai, Dalia (1994). What is a physical event? Philosophical Papers 23 (2):129-135.   (Google)
Elgin, Catherine Z. (1980). Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Garrett, Brian J. (1999). Davidson on causal relevance. Ratio 12 (1):14-33.   (Google | More links)
Gibb, Sophie (2006). Why Davidson is not a property epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a linguistic sense. Anomalous monism cannot plausibly be accused of either. The first cannot legitimately be applied to anomalous monism as it is incompatible with Davidson's ontology. And accusations of predicate epiphenomenalism, although consistent with Davidson's ontology, are ungrounded regarding Davidson's anomalous monism. Philosophers of mind have mislocated the problem with Davidson's anomalous monism, which in fact lies with the implausible theory of the causal relata upon which it rests
Glannon, Walter (1997). Semicompatibilism and anomalous monism. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):211-231.   (Google)
Glaister, Steven Yalowitz (1998). Semantic determinants and psychology as a science. Erkenntnis 49 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally misconceived. There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and it explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants
Godow, Rew A. (1979). Davidson and the anomalism of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:163-174.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goddu, G. C. (1999). Is anomalous monism inconsistent after all? Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.   (Google | More links)
Goldberg, Bruce (1977). A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hancock Slonneger, Nancy (2001). Anomalous monism and physical closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.   (Google)
Heckmann, Heinz-Dieter (1992). Mental events again--or what is wrong with anomalous monism? Erkenntnis 36 (3):345-373.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Herstein, G. L. (2005). Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws. Synthese 145 (1):45-63.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility
Hess, Peter H. (1981). Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41 (March):77-81.   (Annotation | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1983). Anomalous monism: Reply to Smith. Analysis 43 (June):147-149.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Smith and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44 (2):86-89.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1982). The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Hum, D. D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind. Philosophy Documentation Center.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it
Johnston, Mark (1985). Why having a mind matters. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (1987). Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Katz, Bernard D. (1977). Davidson on the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.   (Google)
Kernohan, Andrew (1985). Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1989). Honderich on mental events and psychoneural laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1985). Psychophysical laws. In Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Philosophy of mind and psychology. In Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1990). Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85 (November):339-52.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Klee, Robert (1992). Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (1998). A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504.   (Google)
Latham, Noa (1999). Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws. Synthese 118 (2):121-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion
Leon, Mark . (1980). Are mental events outlaws? Philosophical Papers 9 (October):1-13.   (Google)
LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1987). Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 84 (November):630-642.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
McDowell, John (1985). Functionalism and anomalous monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & LePore, Ernest (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1985). Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Melchert, Norman P. (1986). What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1993). Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):335-44.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Nasrin, Mehdi (2004). Anomalous monism in Carnap's aufbau. Erkenntnis 60 (3):283-293.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to putan end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemologyby using what he calls `construction theory'. According tothis theory, one or more constructional systems can be designedin which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logicallymade out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introducessome options for the basis of this system and chooses thedomain of the autopsychological, i.e., the domain of privateelementary experiences, among them and tries to construct all theconcepts out of them. This phenomenalistic reduction sometimes isseen as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body or even amentalistic monism. However, in this paper, I shall try to showthat the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputesthat the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show thatCarnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close towhat Davidson later termed as `Anomalous Monism' and that thisis why Carnap fails to complete his logical construction at a crucial step. Whenever possible, logicalconstructions are to be substituted forinferred entities
Nickles, Thomas (1977). Davidson on explanation. Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1979). Anomalous monism, events, and 'the mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1996). The anomalism of psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:37-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Preyer, Gerhard (2000). Primary reasons: From radical interpretation to a pure anomalism of the mental. Protosociology 14:158-179.   (Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (2001). Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, A. (1985). Davidson's unintended attack on psychology. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Rowlands, Mark (1990). Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 20 (3):295-310.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Salami, Yunusa K. (1991). Anomalous monism and the mind-body problem. Quest 5 (2):106-114.   (Google)
Savitt, Steven F. (1979). Davidson's psycho-physical anomalism. Nature and System 1 (September):203-213.   (Google)
Seager, William E. (1991). Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51 (March):93-98.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Seager, William E. (1981). The anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:389-401.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Shea, Nicholas (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Silcox, Mark (online). Mind and anomalous monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1985). Davidson's minimal materialism. In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1984). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism: A reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1982). Bad news for anomalous monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Sommerville, Stephen (1980). The inten(t/s)ionality of Davidson's mental. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):46-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1993). Davidson's thinking causes. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Stanton, W. L. (1983). Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):72-9.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Suppes, Patrick (1985). Davidson's views on psychology as a science. In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Suzman, Jonathan (1980). Davidson dualised. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):14-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tiffany, E. C. (2001). The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   If mental anomalism is to be interpreted as a thesisunique to psychology, the anomalousness must begrounded in some feature unique to the mental,presumably its rational nature. While the ground forsuch arguments from normativity has been notoriouslyslippery terrain, there are two recently influentialstrategies which make the argument precise. The firstis to deny the possibility of psychophysical bridgelaws because of the different constitutive essences ofmental and physical laws, and the second is to arguethat mental anomalism follows from the uncodifiabilityof rationality. In this paper I argue that bothstrategies fail – the latter because it conflates primafacie and all things considered rationality and theformer because it rests on a false premise, theprinciple of the rational character of belief. Idistinguish four different formulations of thisprinciple and argue that those formulations which areplausible cannot support the argument for mentalanomalism
van Gulick, Robert (1980). Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (2005). Supervenience and anomalous monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Vermazen, Bruce & Hintikka, Merrill B. (eds.) (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action."
Walsh, Denis M. (1998). Wide content individualism. Mind 107 (427):625-652.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content
Welshon, Rex (1999). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism
Yalowitz, Steven (online). Anomalous monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1998). Causation in the argument for anomalous monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1997). Rationality and the argument for anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):235-58.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (2006). Daydreams and anarchy: A defense of anomalous mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. I begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us
Zangwill, Nick (1993). Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

4.1e Physicalism about the Mind, Misc

Bishop, Robert C. (2006). The hidden premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism
Black, Max (1946). Some questions about Donald Williams' defense of materialism. Philosophical Review 55 (September):572-579.   (Google)
Carrier, Leonard S. (2006). Aristotelian materialism. Philosophia 34 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a functionalist. His functionalism should instead be given a materialistic interpretation, since he holds that only the appropriate sort of matter can realize the human psyche. Aristotle’s functionalism is therefore best viewed as a “causal functionalism,” in which functional descriptions enable us to find the right sort of material embodiment. By sidestepping dualistic assumptions, Aristotle also avoids having to deal with any further notion of consciousness
Caruso, Gregg (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. Metapsychology 5 (46).   (Google)
Chrucky, Andrew (1990). Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism. Dissertation, Fordham University   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, Brian (1967). Physical monism. Synthese 17 (June):141-161.   (Google | More links)
Esfeld, Michael (1999). Physicalism and ontological holism. Metaphilosophy 30 (4):319-337.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, realization of higher-order properties by basic physical properties, and reduction. Keywords: physicalism, holism, relations, space-time, quantum physics, Humean supervenience
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Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). Reply to professor Zaitchik on physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):292-293.   (Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1998). Defining "physicalism". Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Garnett, A. Campbell (1948). Naturalism and the concept of matter. Journal of Philosophy 45 (August):477-488.   (Google | More links)
Gates, Gary (2001). Physicalism, empiricism, and positivism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gillett, Carl & Loewer, Barry M. (eds.) (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives on this important doctrine and brings new depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical genesis and present justification of physicalism, its metaphysical presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness
Goldstein, Irwin (1996). Ontology, epistemology, and private ostensive definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
Green, O. Harvey (1973). Some supposed advantages of materialism. Analysis 33 (March):124-129.   (Google)
Guleserian, Theodore (1971). Contemporary materialism and epistemological values. International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (September):403-426.   (Google)
Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. (1977). Physicalist materialism. Noûs 11 (November):309-45.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. (1975). Physicalism: Ontology, determination and reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):551-64.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Hook, Sidney (1944). Is physical realism sufficient? Journal of Philosophy 41 (September):544-550.   (Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. (2009). The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism. Nous 43 (2):315-345.   (Google | More links)
Huttemann, A. (2004). What's Wrong with Microphysicalism. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (1994). Finding the Mind in the Natural World. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
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Kim, Jaegwon (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 49 | Google)
Abstract: "This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
Kirkham, Richard L. (1993). Tarski's physicalism. Erkenntnis 38 (3):289-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Hartry Field has argued that Alfred Tarski desired to reduce all semantic concepts to concepts acceptable to physicalism and that Tarski failed to do this. In the two succeeding decades, Field has been charged with being too lenient with Tarski; but it has been almost universally accepted that an objection at least as strong as Field's is telling against Tarski's theory. Close examination of the relevant literature, most of it printed in this journal in the 1930s, reveals that Field's conception of physicalism is anachronistic. Tarski did succeed in furthering the sort of physicalist program he had in mind
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Liz, Manuel (2001). New physical properties. In Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 10: Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Google)
Loewer, Barry M. (2001). From physics to physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Abstract: The appeal of materialism lies precisely in this, in its claim to be natural metaphysics within the bounds of science. That a doctrine which promises to gratify our ambition (to know the noumenal) and our caution (not to be unscientific) should have great appeal is hardly something to be wondered at. (Putnam (1983), p.210) Materialism says that all facts, in particular all mental facts, obtain in virtue of the spatio- temporal distribution, and properties, of matter. It was, as Putnam says, “metaphysics within the bounds of science”, but only so long as science was thought to say that the world is made out of matter.1 In this century physicists have learned that there is more in the world than matter and, in any case, matter isn’t quite what it seemed to be. For this reason many philosophers who think that metaphysics should be informed by science advocate physicalism in place of materialism. Physicalism claims that all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution of the fundamental entities and properties –whatever they turn out to be- of completed fundamental physics. Later I will discuss a more precise formulation. But not all contemporary philosophers embrace physicalism. Some- and though a minority not a small or un-influential one- think that physicalism is rather the metaphysics for an unjustified scientism; i.e. it is scientistic metaphysics. Those among them that think that physicalism can be clearly formulated think that it characterizes a
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McGinn, Colin (1980). Philosophical materialism. Synthese 44 (June):173-206.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A Physicalist Manifesto is the fullest treatment yet of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in unprecedented detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid, and exceptionally clear style, this book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science
Melnyk, Andrew (1994). Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. Philosophical Studies 74 (2):221-241.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (2002). Physicalism. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (1995). Physicalism, ordinary objects, and identity. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:221-235.   (Google)
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Abstract: that the properties of science are purely extrinsic with the metaphysical principle that substances must also have intrinsic properties, the arguments reach the conclusion that there are intrinsic properties of whose natures we cannot know. It is the goal of this paper to establish that such arguments are not just ironic but extremely problematic. The optimistic physicalist principles that help get the argument off the ground ultimately undermine any justification the premises give for acceptance of the conclusion. Though I do find these arguments unsound, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider them in order to see more clearly what should be the methodology of the philosopher inclined to take the discoveries of physical science as having ontological authority. And, I hope, what follows will prompt the physicalist to ask herself – what room _is_ there for metaphysics once physical science is complete?
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Abstract: In this paper I want to discuss the way in which physical science has come to claim a particular kind of hegemony over other subjects in the second half of this century. This claim to hegemony is generally known by the name of "physicalism". In this paper I shall try to understand why this doctrine has come to prominence in recent decades. By placing this doctrine in a historical context, we will be better able to appreciate its strengths and weaknesses
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Abstract: A consideration of the benefits of taking physicalism to be necessarily true if true, against the standard view that physicalism is at best contingently true. Presented at the 2006 Central Division meeting of the APA, in the session Themes from Jaegwon Kim, sponsored by the Society for Asian and Asian-American Philosophy
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Raatikainen, Panu, The return of reductive physicalism.   (Google)
Abstract: The importance of the exclusion argument for contemporary physicalism is emphasized. The recent attempts to vindicate reductive physicalism by invoking certain needed revisions to the Nagelian model of reduction are then discussed. It is argued that such revised views of reduction offer in fact much less help to reductive physicalism than is sometimes supposed, and that many of these views lead to trouble when combined with the exclusion argument
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Abstract: Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner
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Abstract: In common with other forms of nonreductive materialism, emergent materialism of this sort is accused of trying to have its cake and eat it. Ontological physicalism, it is said, necessarily implies reductionism which rules out the idea that there are irreducible emergent mental properties and laws. For according to such physicalism, everything is composed of physical constituents whose behaviour is governed by the laws of physics and mechanics. It follows that, in theory at least, every particular mental process is describable and explainable in purely physical terms, without recourse to mental descriptions. Description in terms of emergent properties and laws seems superfluous. Nothing save the complexity of the task prevents us from describing and explaining everything that exists or happens in purely physical terms
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Abstract: The present work is focussed on the completeness of physics, or what is here called the Completeness Thesis: the claim that the domain of the physical is causally closed. Two major questions are tackled: How best is the Completeness Thesis to be formulated? What can be said in defence of the Completeness Thesis? My principal conclusions are that the Completeness Thesis can be coherently formulated, and that the evidence in favour if it significantly outweighs that against it. In opposition to those who argue that formulation is impossible because no account of what is to count as physical can be provided, I argue that as long as the purpose of the argument in which the account is to be used are borne in mind there are no significant difficulties. The account of the physical which I develop holds as physical whatever is needed to fix the likelihood of pre-theoretically given physical effects, and hypothesises in addition that no chemical, biological or psychological factors will be needed in this way. The thus formulated Completeness Thesis is coherent, and has significant empirical content. In opposition to those who defend the doctrine of emergentism by means of philosophical arguments I contend that those arguments are flawed, setting up misleading dichotomies between needlessly attenuated alternatives and assuming the truth of what is to be proved. Against those who defend emergentism by appeal to the evidence, I argue that the history of science since the nineteenth century shows clearly that the empirical credentials of the view that the world is causally closed at the level of a small number of purely physical forces and types of energy is stronger than ever, and the credentials of emergentism correspondingly weaker. In opposition to those who argue that difficulties with reductionism point to the implausibility of the Completeness Thesis I argue that completeness in no way entails the kinds of reductionism which give rise to the difficulties in question. I argue further that the truth of the Completeness Thesis is in fact compatible with a great deal of taxonomic disorder and the impossibility of any general reduction of non-fundamental descriptions to fundamental ones. In opposition to those who argue that the epistemological credentials of fundamental physical laws are poor, and that those laws should in fact be seen as false, I contend that truth preserving accounts of fundamental laws can be developed. Developing such an account, I test it by considering cases of the composition of forces and causes, where what takes place is different to what is predicted by reference to any single law, and argue that viewing laws as tendencies allows their truth to be preserved, and sense to be made of both the experimental discovery of laws, and the fact that composition enables accurate prediction in at least some cases
Steward, Helen (1996). Papineau's physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):667-672.   (Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (online). Physicalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
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Sturgeon, Scott (1998). Physicalism and overdetermination. Mind 107 (426):411-432.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that our knowledge of the world's causal structure does not generate a sound argument for physicalism. This undermines the popular view that physicalism is the only scientifically respectable worldview
Taylor, Charles T. (1969). Two issues about materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):73-79.   (Google | More links)
Vicente, Agustín (2006). On the causal completeness of physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics
Wilson, Jessica M. (2006). On characterizing the physical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. Ultimately, I motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components: The physics-based NFM account: An entity existing at a world w is physical iff (i) it is treated, approximately accurately, by current or future (in the limit of inquiry, ideal) versions of fundamental physics at w, and (ii) it is not fundamentally mental (that is, does not individually either possess or bestow mentality)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1973). Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
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Abstract: Perry, in this lucid, deep, and entertaining book (based on his 1999 Jean Nicod lectures), supposes that type-identity physicalism is antecedently plausible, and that rejecting this thesis requires good reason (this is
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Witmer, D. Gene (2006). How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What has come to be known as “a priori physicalism” is the thesis, roughly, that the non-physical truths in the actual world can be deduced a priori from a complete physical description of the actual world. To many contemporary philosophers, a priori physicalism seems extremely implausible. In this paper I distinguish two kinds of a priori physicalism. One sort – strict a priori physicalism – I reject as both unmotivated and implausible. The other sort – liberal a priori physicalism – I argue is both motivated and plausible. This variety of a priori physicalism insists that the necessitation of non-physical truths by the physical facts must be underwritten in a certain fashion by a priori knowledge, but the a priori knowledge need not amount to a simple deduction of the non-physical truths from a complete physical description of the world. Further, this sort of liberal a priori physicalism has the advantage that it offers hope for a genuinely satisfying account of how the physical facts manage to necessitate the facts about phenomenal consciousness – thereby in effect solving the “hard problem” of consciousness. The first half of the paper sets out the motivation for liberal a priori physicalism and its superiority to the strict version; the second half presents one strategy available to the liberal a priori physicalist for showing how consciousness can be accommodated in a purely physical world
Witmer, D. Gene (2000). Locating the overdetermination problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Physicalists motivate their position by posing a problem for the opposition: given the causal completeness of physics and the impact of the mental (or, more broadly, the seemingly nonphysical) on the physical, antiphysicalism implies that causal overdetermination is rampant. This argument is, however, equivocal in its use of 'physical'. As Scott Sturgeon has recently argued, if 'physical' means that which is the object of physical theory, completeness is plausible, but the further claim that the mental has a causal impact on the physical is no longer so evident. In this paper I assess the damage due to the ambiguity of 'physical' and provide a repair to the overdetermination strategy