Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

4.1b. Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Mind-Brain Identity Theory on PhilPapers)

See also:
Abelson, Raziel (1970). A refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 18 (December):85-90.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R. (1979). Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory. Eidos 1 (December):153-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Appel, K. I. (1959). Horn sentences in identity theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (4):306-310.   (Google | More links)
Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). A new argument for mind-brain identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I undertake the tasks of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality, and of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental/physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favour of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
Armstrong, David M. (1973). Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1968). The headless woman and the defense of materialism. Analysis 29:48-49.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Aune, Bruce (1966). Feigl on the mind-body problem. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baier, Kurt (1962). Smart on sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):57-68.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Baldner, Steven (2006). Neither brain nor ghost: A nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory. Review of Metaphysics 60 (2):419-421.   (Google)
Baldwin, Thomas (1991). The identity theory of truth. Mind 100 (1):35-52.   (Google | More links)
Beall, JC (2000). On the identity theory of truth. Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. & McCauley, Robert N. (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience. In Martin Hahn & S.C. Stoness (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Abstract: Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research
Beloff, John (1965). The identity hypothesis: A critique. In J. R. Smythies (ed.), Brain and Mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Blumenfeld, J-B. (1985). Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Borst, Clive V. (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Borst, Clive Vernon (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..   (Google)
Abstract: Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain processes? by J. Shaffer.--The identity of mind and body, by J. Cornman.--Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes, by R. Coburn.--Mental events and the brain, by J. Shaffer.--Comment: mental events and the brain, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism and the mind-body problem, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism, by J. J. C. Smart.--Scientific materialism and the identity theory, by N. Malcolm.--Professor Malcolm on scientific materialism and the identity theory, by E. Sosa.--Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa, by N. Malcolm.--Mind-body identity, privacy and categories, by R. Rorty.--Physicalism, by T. Nagel.--Mind-body identity, a side issue? by C. Taylor.--Illusions and identity, by J. M. Hinton.--Bibliography (p. [259]-261)
Brandt, R. (1960). Doubts about the identity theory. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, brain-processes, and colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):385-93.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bradley, M. C. (1969). Two arguments against the identity thesis. In Robert Brown & C.D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy In Australia. London: Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
Brandt, R. & Kim, Jaegwon (1967). The logic of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):515-537.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (1998). Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: A difficulty for the token identity theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24.   (Google)
Abstract: We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one caused her reaching out and grasping for it. This tells us how the action came about and makes sense of why it happened. At least, something broadly along these lines strikes me as a fairly crude and partial regimentation of our pretheoretic understanding of everyday action explanation
Brodbeck, May (1966). Mental and physical: Identity versus sameness. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Campbell, Neil (1999). Putnam on the token-identity theory. Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Candlish, Stewart (1999). A prolegomenon to an identity theory of truth. Philosophy 74 (2):199-220.   (Google)
Abstract: Most recent discussions of truth ignore the fact that a few philosophers, past and present, have flirted with and sometimes openly subscribed to an identity theory, according to which a proposition's being true consists in its identity with the reality it is supposedly about. This neglect is probably due to the theory's counter-intuitiveness: it faces obvious and fundamental objections. The aim of this paper is to consider these objections and decide if there is a version of the theory which can escape them, thereby becoming an at least initially plausible candidate for an account of truth. In this way the metaphysical price exacted by commitment to an identity theory can be assessed
Candlish, Stewart (1999). Identifying the identity theory of truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):233–240.   (Google | More links)
Candlish, Stewart (1970). Mind, brain, and identity. Mind 79 (October):502-18.   (Google | More links)
Caruso, Gregg (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. Metapsychology 5 (46).   (Google)
Carney, James D. (1971). The compatibility of the identity theory with dualism. Mind 80 (January):136-140.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carney, James D. (1971). The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism. Mind.   (Annotation | Google)
Casullo, Albert (1982). Phenomenal properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (June):165-169.   (Google | More links)
Chakrabarti, Chandana (1975). James and the identity theory. Behaviorism 3:152-155.   (Google)
Clatterbaugh, Kenneth C. (1972). A reply to an attempted refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):111-112.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, J. J. (1971). Mental structure and the identity theory. Mind 80 (October):521-30.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Desmond M. (1973). Two arguments against the identity theory of mind. Philosophical Studies 21:100-110.   (Google)
Coburn, Robert C. (1963). Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Coder, David (1973). The fundamental error of central-state materialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (October):289-98.   (Annotation | Google)
Cornman, James W. (1962). The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):486-92.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Crittenden, Charles (1971). Ontology and mind-body identity. Philosophical Forum 2:251-70.   (Google)
Danto, Arthur C. (1973). Representational properties and mind-body identity. Review of Metaphysics 26 (March):401-411.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
De Anna, Gabriele (2000). Mind-world identity theory and semantic realism: Haldane and Boulter on Aquinas. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):82-87.   (Google | More links)
de Boer, R. (1976). Cartesian categories in mind-body identity theories. Philosophical Forum 7:139-58.   (Google)
Dodd, Julian (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory , while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth
Dodd, Julian (1999). Hornsby on the identity theory of truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):225–232.   (Google | More links)
Dodd, Julian & Hornsby, Jennifer (1992). The identity theory of truth: Reply to Baldwin. Mind 101 (402):319-322.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1981). Central state materialism. Philosophical Studies 28:229-37.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1976). The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.   (Google)
Enc, Berent (1983). In defense of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 80 (May):279-98.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Engelhard, Kristina (2010). Categories and the ontology of powers: A vindication of the identity theory of properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.   (Google)
Engel, Pascal (2001). The false modesty of the identity theory of truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.   (Google)
Abstract: The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name
Epstein, Fanny L. (1973). The metaphysics of mind-body identity theories. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (April):111-121.   (Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1958). The 'mental' and the 'physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Feldman, Fred (1974). Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fish, William & Macdonald, Cynthia (2009). The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: Where Dodd goes wrong. Analysis 69 (2).   (Google)
Frances, Bryan (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
Garnett, A. Campbell (1965). Body and mind: The identity thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (May):77-81.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
García-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). Ostensive signs: Against the identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):253-264.   (Google | More links)
Gert, Bernard (1967). Can a brain have a pain? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (March):432-436.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Globus, Gordon G. (1972). Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity. Philosophy of Science 39 (September):291-300.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Globus, Gordon G. (1989). The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In M. Maxwell & C. Wade Savage (eds.), Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell. University Press of America.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Godbey Jr, John W. (1975). Central-state materialism and parapsychology. Analysis 36 (October):22-25.   (Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. I argue against the existence of a posteriori identities.
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1971). The mind-brain identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):247-254.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Green, O. Harvey (1975). Sensations, brain states, and behavior. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6:123-129.   (Google)
Grunbaum, A. (1972). Abelson on Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):119-21.   (Google | More links)
Gustafson, Donald F. (1963). On the identity theory. Analysis 23:30-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hannan, Barbara & Lehrer, Keith (1989). Compatibilism, determinism, and the identity theory. Inquiry 32 (March):49-54.   (Google)
Hanratty, Gerald (1972). The identity theory of Herbert Feigl. Philosophical Studies 20:113-23.   (Google)
Harrison, Frank R. I. (1971). Remarks on Smart's identity theory. Darshana International 11 (April):58-62.   (Google)
Harris, Errol E. (1966). The neural identity thesis and the person. International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (December):515-37.   (Google)
Hay, M. (2002). An identity theory of truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):242 – 243.   (Google)
Abstract: Book Information An Identity Theory of Truth. By Dodd Julian. Macmillan. Basingstoke. 2000. Pp. ix + 199. Hardback, £42.50
Heil, John (1970). Sensations, experiences, and brain processes. Philosophy 45 (July):221-6.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (ms). The identity theory.   (Google)
Abstract: Identity theory The doctrine that mental states are identical with physical states was defended in antiquity by Lucretius and in the early modern era by Hobbes. It achieved considerable prominence in the 1950s as a result of the writings of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place, and J. J. C. Smart. (See, e.g., Smart (1959). These authors developed reasonably precise formulations of the doctrine, clarified the grounds for embracing it, and responded persuasively to a range of objections. More recently it has been defended systematically by Hill (1991) and Papineau (2002). Other contemporary advocates include Loar (1990), McLaughlin (2004), and Polger (2005). The doctrine also figures explicitly or implicitly in the writings of dualists, who are of course concerned to oppose it. Thus, for example, it plays an important role in Kripke’s influential defense of dualism (Kripke 1980)
Hinton, J. Michael (1967). Illusions and identity. Analysis 27 (January):65-76.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hockutt, M. (1967). In defense of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (June):366-85.   (Google | More links)
Hoffman, Robert R. (1967). Malcolm and Smart on brain-mind identity. Philosophy 42 (April):128-136.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Holmstrom, Nancy (1972). Some comments on a version of physicalism. Philosophical Studies 23 (April):163-169.   (Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (1994). Functionalism, identity theories, the union theory. In Tadeusz Szubka & Richard Warner (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: The Current State of the Debate. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. & Tye, Michael (1985). Against the token identity theory. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1997). The presidential address: Truth: The identity theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.   (Google | More links)
Hyslop, Alec (1970). The identity theory and other minds. Philosophical Forum 2:152-153.   (Google)
Jaeger, Robert A. (1979). Notes on the logic of physicalism. Mind 88 (July):424-429.   (Google | More links)
Jones, Mostyn W. (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly do so, it must first clear up its own deep obscurity about what brains are like behind appearances, and how they create the mind’s privacy, unity and qualia – all of which observable brains lack. (2) This can ultimately be done with a clear, simple assumption: our consciousness is the physical substance that certain brain events consist of beyond appearances. For example, the distinctive electrochemistry in nociceptor ion channels wholly consists of pain. This rejects that pain is a brain property: instead it’s a brain substance that occupies space in brains, and exerts forces by which it’s indirectly detectable via EEGs. (3) This assumption is justified because treating pains as physical substances avoids the perennial obscurities in mind-body theories. For example, this ‘clear physicalism’ avoids the obscure nonphysical pain of dualism and its spinoffs. Pain is instead an electrochemical substance. It isn’t private because it’s hidden in nonphysical minds, but instead because it’s just indirectly detected in the physical world in ways that leave its real nature hidden. (4) Clear physicalism also avoids puzzling reductions of private pains into more fundamental terms of observable brain activity. Instead pain is a hidden, private substance underlying this observable activity. Also, pain is fundamental in itself, for it’s what some brain activity fundamentally consists of. This also avoids reductive idealist claims that the world just exists in the mind. They yield obscure views on why we see a world that isn’t really out there. (5) Clear physicalism also avoids obscure claims that pain is information processing which is realizable in multiple hardwares (not just in electrochemistry). Molecular neuroscience now casts doubt on multiple realization. Also, it’s puzzling how abstract information gets ‘realized’ in brains and affects brains (compare ancient quandries on how universals get embodied in matter). A related idea is that of supervenient properties in nonreductive physicalism. They involve obscure overdetermination and emergent consciousness. Clear physicalism avoids all this. Pain isn’t an abstract property obscurely related to brains – it’s simply a substance in brains. (6) Clear physicalism also avoids problems in neuroscience. Neuroscience explains the mind’s unity in problematic ways using synchrony, attention, etc.. Clear physicalism explains unity in terms of intense neuroelectrical activity reaching continually along brain circuits as a conscious whole. This fits evidence that just highly active, highly connected circuits are fully conscious. Neuroscience also has problems explaining how qualia are actually encoded by brains, and how to get from these abstract codes to actual pain, fear, etc.. Clear physicalism explains qualia electrochemically, using growing evidence that both sensory and emotional qualia correlate with very specific electrical channels in neural receptors. Multiple-realization advocates overlook this important evidence. (7) Clear physicalism thus bridges the mind-brain gulf by showing how brains can possess the mind’s qualia, unity and privacy – and how minds can possess features of brain activity like occupying space and exerting forces. This unorthodox nonreductive physicalism may be where physicalism leads to when stripped of all its reductive and nonreductive obscurities. It offers a clear, simple mind-body solution by just filling in what neuroscience is silent about, namely, what brain matter is like behind perceptions of it.
Joske, W. D. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:157-60.   (Annotation | Google)
Kallestrup, Jesper (2008). Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.   (Google)
Abstract: Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each response does not fully withstand scrutiny, and so Kripke's conclusion is hard to resist. Section 1 lays out Kripke's argument, and Sections 2 to 4 then discuss responses to each of the three premises respectively
Kampe, Cornelius (1974). Mind-body identity: A question of intelligibility. Philosophical Studies 25 (January):63-67.   (Google | More links)
Katz, Bernard D. (1977). Davidson on the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.   (Google)
Kekes, John (1966). Physicalism, the identity theory, and the concept of emergence. Philosophy of Science 33 (December):360-75.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kekes, John (1970). Theoretical identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 8:25-36.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1966). On the psycho-physical identity theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (July):227-35.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1972). Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory. The Monist 56 (April):178-92.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Kitcher, P. S. (1982). Two versions of the identity theory. Erkenntnis 17 (March):213-28.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Klein, Barbara V. E. (1976). Mind-body identity relativized. Philosophical Forum (Boston) 7:126-138.   (Google)
Lewis, David (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.   (Cited by 127 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Li, Chenyang (1994). Mind-body identity revised. Philosophia 24 (1-2):105-114.   (Google | More links)
Livermore, Robert L. (1982). Introspection versus the identity theory: An unnecessary conflict. Noûs 16 (September):387-398.   (Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1984). Einstein and the identity theory. Analysis 44 (January):22-25.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Lubow, Neil (1978). Mind-body identity and irreducible properties. Philosophy Research Archives 4.   (Google)
Luce, David R. (1966). Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophy of Science 17:1-7.   (Google)
Lucey, Kenneth G. (1975). The testability of the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (August):142-147.   (Google | More links)
Lurie, Yuval (1979). Inner states. Mind 88 (April):241-257.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Macdonald, C. (1989). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Routledge.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1963). Comments on J. J.c. Smart's materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (October):662-663.   (Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue 3:115-25.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1963). Scientific materialism and the identity theory: Comments. Journal of Philosophy 60 (22):662-663.   (Google | More links)
Mannison, D. S. (1972). A note on S. Noren's "logical types and the identity theory". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):569-572.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Robert M. (1972). A reason to believe in mind-body identity. Personalist 53:80-83.   (Google)
Margolis, Joseph (1965). Brain processes and sensations. Theoria 31:133-38.   (Google)
Martin, Robert M. (1976). Materialism and evolution: A reconsideration. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (March):127-138.   (Google)
Marsh, Leslie (2006). Review of Teed Rockwell's neither brain nor ghost: A nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].   (Google)
Abstract: Review of Teed Rockwell’s Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory
McGoldrick, P. M. (1984). Causes, correlations and mind-brain identity. Philosophical Studies 30:230-232.   (Google)
McMullen, C. (1984). An argument against the identity theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87.   (Annotation | Google)
Meehl, Paul E. (1966). The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Miller, Alexander (2003). Review: An identity theory of truth. Mind 112 (445).   (Google)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1973). Comment: Feyerabend on the identity theory. Mind 82 (January):111-112.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). The identity theory and criteria for the mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):167-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). The possibility of type-materialism. Metaphilosophy 5 (April):133-150.   (Google | More links)
Munsat, Stanley (1969). Could sensations be processes? Mind 78 (April):247-51.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Munsat, Stanley (1972). Logical types and the identity theory--a reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):565-568.   (Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1965). Physicalism. Philosophical Review 74 (July):339-56.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Nathanson, Stephen L. (1972). Abelson's refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):116-118.   (Google | More links)
Nathan, George J. & Wolfe, Julian (1968). The identity thesis as a scientific hypothesis. Dialogue 7 (December):469-472.   (Google)
Nelson, Raymond J. (1974). Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):365-86.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Nelson, R. J. (1976). Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 73 (13):365-385.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1973). A note on Smart's identity theory and the replacement thesis. Philosophia 3 (January):97-101.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Identity, materialism, and the problem of the danglers. Metaphilosophy 4 (October):318-44.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1972). Logical types and the identity theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):559-564.   (Google | More links)
Norton, Richard (1964). On the identity of identity theories. Analysis 24:14-16.   (Google)
Noren, Stephen J. (1972). Smart's identity theory, translation, and incorrigibility. Mind 81 (January):116-120.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Smart's materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):31-43.   (Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1970). Smart's materialism: The identity thesis and translation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):54-66.   (Google | More links)
Pepper, Stephen C. (1975). A split in the identity theory. In Charles L. Y. Cheng (ed.), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.   (Google)
Pitcher, George (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (August):150-7.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (ms). Is consciousness a brain process.   (Google)
Place, Ullin T. (ed.) (2003). Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighboring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness
Place, Ullin T. (1989). Low claim assertions. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer.   (Annotation | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69 (January):101-4.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (1972). Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat. Mind 81 (January):106-112.   (Google | More links)
Plantikow, Thane (2008). Surviving personal identity theory: Recovering interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction
Place, Ullin T. (1989). Thirty five years on--is consciousness still a brain process? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1988). Thirty years on -- is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):208-19.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Pluhar, Evelyn Begley (1977). Physicalism and the identity theory. Journal of Critical Analysis 7:11-20.   (Google)
Polten, Eric P. (1973). Critique Of The Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. The Hague: Mouton.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Potrc, Matjaz (1995). Consciousness and connectionism--the problem of compatability of type identity theory and of connectionism. Acta Analytica 13 (13):175-190.   (Google)
Presley, C. P. (ed.) (1967). The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Neural plasticity and the location of mental events. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):154-162.   (Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). Ontology vs ontogeny: A dilemma for identity theorists. Dialogue 17:128-131.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). Pearce on behalf of the materialist. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (March):157-162.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1976). Reply to Martin and Rosenberg. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (March):139-141.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1978). The refutation of materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (April):157-62.   (Annotation | Google)
Richardson, Robert C. (1981). Disappearance and the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (September):473-85.   (Google)
Ripley, Charles (1969). The identity theory and scientific hypotheses. Dialogue 2 (September):308-10.   (Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (1982). The disappearance theory. In Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Rocca Della, M. (1993). Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):101-112.   (Annotation | Google)
Rocca, Michael Della (1993). Kripke's essentialist argument against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1).   (Google)
Rockwell, W. Teed (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Rocca, Michael Della (1993). Spinoza's argument for the identity theory. Philosophical Review 102 (2):183-213.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1994). The identity theory. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional
Rosenbaum, S. (1977). The property objection and the principles of identity. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):155-164.   (Google | More links)
Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. (1966). On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):87-110.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schneider, Steven (online). Identity theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Schmidt, Andreas (2009). Substance monism and identity theory in Spinoza. In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Schlagel, Richard H. (1977). The mind-body identity impasse. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):231-37.   (Google)
Scriven, Michael (1966). The limitations of the identity theory. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1965). The identity approach to the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 18 (March):430-51.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1974). Criteria for mind-body identity: A rejoinder. Behaviorism 2:120-123.   (Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1963). Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):160-6.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shirley, Edward S. (1974). Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 25 (January):73-75.   (Google | More links)
Silkstone, Thomas (1982). Body and mind. International Philosophical Quarterly 22 (September):169-184.   (Google)
Simon, Michael A. (1970). Materialism, mental language, and the mind-body identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (June):514-32.   (Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70.   (Annotation | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1961). Further remarks on sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 70 (July):406-407.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist 56 (April):177-92.   (Annotation | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (October):651-62.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1994). Mind and brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophy And Scientific Realism. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 142 | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.   (Cited by 232 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: SUPPOSE that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting?l One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy orange patch of light On the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellowy orange patch on the wall (though I may know that there is not such a patch on the wall). This is perhaps Wittgenstein's view in the Philosophical Investigations (see paragraphs 367, 370). Similarly, when I "report" a pain, I am not really reporting anything (or, if you like, I am reporting in a queer sense of "reporting"), but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince. (See paragraph 244: "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and docs not describe it." Nor docs it describe anything else?)2 I prefer most of the time to discuss an afterimage rather than a pain, because the word "pain" brings in something which is irrelevant to my purpose: the notion of "distress." I think that "he is in pain" entails "he is in distress," that is, that he is in a certain agitation-condition.3 Similarly, to say "I am in pain" may be to do more than "replace pain behavior": it may be partly to report something, though this something is quite nonmysterious, being an agitation-condition, and so susceptible of behavioristic analysis. The suggestion I wish if possible to avoid is a different one, namely that "I am in pain" is a genuine report, and that what it reports is an irreducibly psychical something. And similarly the suggestion I wish to resist is also that to say "I have a yellowish orange after-image" is to report something irreducibly psychical
Smart, J. J. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to dr Pitcher and mr Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (December):252-54.   (Cited by -57467 | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1965). The identity thesis: A reply to professor Garrett. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):82-3.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smythies, J. R. (1994). Requiem for the identity theory. Inquiry 37 (3):311-29.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1965). Professor Malcolm on "scientific materialism and the identity theory". Dialogue 4:422-23.   (Annotation | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1977). Spinoza's identity theory. Inquiry 20 (1-4):419 – 445.   (Google)
Abstract: Of the two main interpretations of Spinoza's theory of the identity of the attributes, in particular those of Thought and Extension, the objective interpretation is now almost universally preferred to the subjective. Rejection of the subjective interpretation, according to which the attributes are merely our ways of cognizing a reality whose real essence remains unknown, is certainly justified, but the objective theory comes too near to replacing the identity by a mere correlation of diff rents to be quite satisfactory. Is it not better to say that Thought and Extension represent two complementary conceptions of reality which are both correct? Yes, but in saying so some commentators ascribe to mind, as Spinoza conceives it, an unplausibly abstract status. An alternative proposal is made as to a way in which Spinoza might be right in essentials, though it requires that a certain tension in Spinozism as to the nature of body be resolved in a particular direction
Srzednicki, Jan (1972). Some objections to mind-brain identity theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.   (Google | More links)
Stets, Jan E. & Biga, Chris F. (2003). Bringing identity theory into environmental sociology. Sociological Theory 21 (4):398-423.   (Google | More links)
Stern, Robert (1993). Did Hegel hold and identity theory of truth? Mind 102 (408).   (Google | More links)
Stevenson, John T. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A reply to J.j.C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69 (October):505-10.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Sterling, Marvin C. (1978). Topic-neutrality and the identity theory. Southwest Philosophical Studies 3 (April):41-48.   (Google)
Stevens, Blamey (1936). The Identity Theory. Manchester, Eng.,Sherratt & Hughes.   (Google)
Stoutland, Frederick M. (1971). Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):491-509.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1997). Austria vs. australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Swartz, Norman M. (1974). Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17.   (Google)
Swinburne, Richard (1993). Are mental events identical with brain events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):173-181.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Tannenbaum, Jerrold (1971). In defense of the brain process theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):552-563.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review 76 (April):201-13.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Teichmann, J. (1967). The contingent identity of minds and brains. Mind 76 (July):404-15.   (Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1978). A novel approach to mind-brain identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1969). The identity theory. In Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Mary Terrell White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. St.   (Google)
Tomberlin, James E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):295-99.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Wadia, Pheroze S. (1972). On a refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):113-115.   (Google | More links)
Wallner-Ahmad, Ingrid (1975). The identity theorist's solution to the mind-body problem. Gnosis 1:28-38.   (Google)
Washington, Corey (1992). The identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy 89 (11):582-605.   (Google | More links)
Watkins, J. W. N. (1982). A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Weismann, D. (1965). A note on the identity thesis. Mind 74:571-77.   (Google)
White, Alan R. (1972). Mind-brain analogies. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (June):457-472.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Whitely, C. H. (1970). The mind-brain identity hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July):193-99.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Stephen (1978). Pains, brain states and scientific identities. Mind 87 (January):77-92.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, Jessica M. (2002). Review of John Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Philosophical Review 111:598-601.   (Google)
Abstract: Perry, in this lucid, deep, and entertaining book (based on his 1999 Jean Nicod lectures), supposes that type-identity physicalism is antecedently plausible, and that rejecting this thesis requires good reason (this is
Windes, James D. (1975). Intentionality, behavior, and identity theory. Behaviorism 3:156-161.   (Google)
Wolfe, J. & Nathan, George J. (1968). The identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Dialogue 7:469-72.   (Google)
Ziedins, R. (1971). Identification of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (January):13-23.   (Google)