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Metaphysics of Mind :: Physicalism :: Anomalous Monism

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Antony, Louise M. (1989). Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Antony, Louise M. (1994). The inadequacy of anomalous monism as a realist theory of mind. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Antony, Michael V. (2003). Davidson's argument for monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.My guess is thatif you want to get a lot of physicalism out [ofDavidson's argument], you're going to have to put a lot of physicalism in.Jerry Fodor 1989, 159
Basile, Pierfrancesco (2005). Whitehead's ontology and Davidson's anomalous monism. Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.   (Google | Edit)
Benbaji, Hagit (2005). The nomological principle and the argument for anomalous monism. Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.   (Google | Edit)
Bickle, John (1992). Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bieri, Peter (1993). Mental concepts: Causal because anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google | Edit)
Brandl, Johannes L. (ed.) (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Brooks, David (1980). The impossibility of psycho-physical laws. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):21-45.   (Google | Edit)
Campbell, Neil (online). Anomalous monism.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: identity theory , usually attributed to J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959) and U.T. Place (Place, 1956), claimed that kinds of mental states are identical to kinds of brain states. Sensations of pain, for instance, were said to be identical to the firing of C-fibres or some such type of neurological state. According to this view, then, pain, conceived as a _kind_ of mental state, is said to be _reduced_ to a certain kind of neurological state. The reduction envisaged here was modelled on the kind of reduction seen in other areas of the sciences. For instance, lightning can be said to be reduced to a rapid discharge of electrons in the atmosphere. When such a reduction is made scientists are not saying that there are two phenomena that are correlated, but rather that lightning is
Campbell, Neil (1998). Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Campbell, Neil (2003). Causes and causal explanations: Davidson and his critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Campbell, Neil (1997). The standard objection to anomalous monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (1997). Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Child, William (1993). Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review 102 (2):215-245.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Cooper, W. E. (1980). Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):36-40.   (Google | Edit)
Daniel, Steven G. (1999). Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):225-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1233 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1995). Laws and cause. Dialectica 49 (2-4):263-79.   (Cited by 23 | Google | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 390 | Google | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1974). Psychology as philosophy. In S. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. Harper & Row.   (Cited by 58 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1987). Problems in the explanation of action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell.   (Cited by 24 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1993). Reply to Peter Bieri's Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1992). Thinking causes. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google | Edit)
Davidson, Donald (1999). The emergence of thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   A phenomenon “emerges” when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less powerful the conceptual resources of the object language
Davidson, Donald (1973). The material mind. In Patrick Suppes (ed.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. North-Holland.   (Cited by 22 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
de Pinedo, M. (2006). Anomalous monism: Oscillating between dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the mental and the absence of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory practices
Drai, Dalia (1994). What is a physical event? Philosophical Papers 23 (2):129-135.   (Google | Edit)
Elgin, Catherine Z. (1980). Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Garrett, Brian J. (1999). Davidson on causal relevance. Ratio 12 (1):14-33.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Gibb, Sophie (2006). Why Davidson is not a property epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407–422.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a linguistic sense. Anomalous monism cannot plausibly be accused of either. The first cannot legitimately be applied to anomalous monism as it is incompatible with Davidson's ontology. And accusations of predicate epiphenomenalism, although consistent with Davidson's ontology, are ungrounded regarding Davidson's anomalous monism. Philosophers of mind have mislocated the problem with Davidson's anomalous monism, which in fact lies with the implausible theory of the causal relata upon which it rests
Glaister, Steven Yalowitz (1998). Semantic determinants and psychology as a science. Erkenntnis 49 (1).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally misconceived. There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and it explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants
Goddu, G. C. (1999). Is anomalous monism inconsistent after all? Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Godow, Rew A. (1979). Davidson and the anomalism of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:163-174.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Goldberg, Bruce (1977). A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Hancock Slonneger, Nancy (2001). Anomalous monism and physical closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.   (Google | Edit)
Heckmann, Heinz-Dieter (1992). Mental events again--or what is wrong with anomalous monism? Erkenntnis 36 (3):345-373.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Herstein, G. L. (2005). Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws. Synthese 145 (1):45-63.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility
Hess, Peter H. (1981). Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41 (March):77-81.   (Google | Annotation | Edit)
Honderich, Ted (1983). Anomalous monism: Reply to Smith. Analysis 43 (June):147-149.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44.   (Google | Edit)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Smith and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44 (2):86-89.   (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)
Honderich, Ted (1982). The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.   (Cited by 35 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Hum, D. D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Google | Edit)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind. Philosophy Documentation Center.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it
Johnston, Mark (1985). Why having a mind matters. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (1987). Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.   (Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Katz, Bernard D. (1977). Davidson on the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.   (Google | Edit)
Kernohan, Andrew (1985). Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google | Edit)
Kim, Jaegwon (1989). Honderich on mental events and psychoneural laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.   (Google | Edit)
Kim, Jaegwon (1985). Psychophysical laws. In Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Philosophy of mind and psychology. In Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Klagge, James C. (1990). Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85 (November):339-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Klee, Robert (1992). Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Abstract: Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (1998). A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504.   (Google | Edit)
Latham, Noa (1999). Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws. Synthese 118 (2):121-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion
Leon, Mark . (1980). Are mental events outlaws? Philosophical Papers 9 (October):1-13.   (Google | Edit)
LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1987). Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 84 (November):630-642.   (Google | Annotation | Edit)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 10 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
McDowell, John (1985). Functionalism and anomalous monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 60 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & LePore, Ernest (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1985). Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 12 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Melchert, Norman P. (1986). What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.   (Cited by 6 |