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4.1d. Anomalous Monism (Anomalous Monism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Antony, Louise M. (1989). Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Antony, Michael V. (2003). Davidson's argument for monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.My guess is thatif you want to get a lot of physicalism out [ofDavidson's argument], you're going to have to put a lot of physicalism in.Jerry Fodor 1989, 159
Antony, Louise M. (1994). The inadequacy of anomalous monism as a realist theory of mind. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Basile, Pierfrancesco (2005). Whitehead's ontology and Davidson's anomalous monism. Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.   (Google)
Benbaji, Hagit (2005). The nomological principle and the argument for anomalous monism. Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.   (Google)
Bickle, John (1992). Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bieri, Peter (1993). Mental concepts: Causal because anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Brandl, Johannes L. (ed.) (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...
Brooks, David (1980). The impossibility of psycho-physical laws. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):21-45.   (Google)
Callaway, H. G. & Gochet, Paul (2007). Quine's Physicalism. In Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. We argue that the details of the relations of particular sciences, disciplines and domains of discourse depend on empirical evidence and empirical-theoretical developments and that the generalized approach of reduction by explication is also subject to related empirical-theoretical constraints. So understood, physicalism lacks much of the controversial force and many of the implications sometimes associated with it.
Campbell, Neil (online). Anomalous monism.   (Google)
Abstract: identity theory , usually attributed to J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959) and U.T. Place (Place, 1956), claimed that kinds of mental states are identical to kinds of brain states. Sensations of pain, for instance, were said to be identical to the firing of C-fibres or some such type of neurological state. According to this view, then, pain, conceived as a _kind_ of mental state, is said to be _reduced_ to a certain kind of neurological state. The reduction envisaged here was modelled on the kind of reduction seen in other areas of the sciences. For instance, lightning can be said to be reduced to a rapid discharge of electrons in the atmosphere. When such a reduction is made scientists are not saying that there are two phenomena that are correlated, but rather that lightning is
Campbell, Neil (1998). Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2003). Causes and causal explanations: Davidson and his critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (1997). The standard objection to anomalous monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (1997). Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Child, William (1993). Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review 102 (2):215-245.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cooper, W. E. (1980). Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):36-40.   (Google)
Daniel, Steven G. (1999). Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):225-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1233 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1995). Laws and cause. Dialectica 49 (2-4):263-79.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 390 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1974). Psychology as philosophy. In S. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. Harper & Row.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1987). Problems in the explanation of action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1993). Reply to Peter Bieri's Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Davidson, Donald (1992). Thinking causes. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1999). The emergence of thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A phenomenon “emerges” when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less powerful the conceptual resources of the object language
Davidson, Donald (1973). The material mind. In Patrick Suppes (ed.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. North-Holland.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
de Pinedo, M. (2006). Anomalous monism: Oscillating between dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the mental and the absence of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory practices
Drai, Dalia (1994). What is a physical event? Philosophical Papers 23 (2):129-135.   (Google)
Elgin, Catherine Z. (1980). Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Garrett, Brian J. (1999). Davidson on causal relevance. Ratio 12 (1):14-33.   (Google | More links)
Gibb, Sophie (2006). Why Davidson is not a property epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a linguistic sense. Anomalous monism cannot plausibly be accused of either. The first cannot legitimately be applied to anomalous monism as it is incompatible with Davidson's ontology. And accusations of predicate epiphenomenalism, although consistent with Davidson's ontology, are ungrounded regarding Davidson's anomalous monism. Philosophers of mind have mislocated the problem with Davidson's anomalous monism, which in fact lies with the implausible theory of the causal relata upon which it rests
Glannon, Walter (1997). Semicompatibilism and anomalous monism. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):211-231.   (Google)
Glaister, Steven Yalowitz (1998). Semantic determinants and psychology as a science. Erkenntnis 49 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally misconceived. There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and it explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants
Godow, Rew A. (1979). Davidson and the anomalism of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:163-174.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goddu, G. C. (1999). Is anomalous monism inconsistent after all? Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.   (Google | More links)
Goldberg, Bruce (1977). A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hancock Slonneger, Nancy (2001). Anomalous monism and physical closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.   (Google)
Heckmann, Heinz-Dieter (1992). Mental events again--or what is wrong with anomalous monism? Erkenntnis 36 (3):345-373.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Herstein, G. L. (2005). Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws. Synthese 145 (1):45-63.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility
Hess, Peter H. (1981). Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41 (March):77-81.   (Annotation | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1983). Anomalous monism: Reply to Smith. Analysis 43 (June):147-149.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1984). Smith and the champion of mauve. Analysis 44 (2):86-89.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1982). The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Hum, D. D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1998). Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind. Philosophy Documentation Center.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it
Johnston, Mark (1985). Why having a mind matters. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (1987). Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Katz, Bernard D. (1977). Davidson on the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.   (Google)
Kernohan, Andrew (1985). Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1989). Honderich on mental events and psychoneural laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1985). Psychophysical laws. In Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Philosophy of mind and psychology. In Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1990). Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85 (November):339-52.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Klee, Robert (1992). Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (1998). A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504.   (Google)
Latham, Noa (1999). Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws. Synthese 118 (2):121-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion
Leon, Mark . (1980). Are mental events outlaws? Philosophical Papers 9 (October):1-13.   (Google)
LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1987). Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 84 (November):630-642.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
McDowell, John (1985). Functionalism and anomalous monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & LePore, Ernest (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1985). Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Melchert, Norman P. (1986). What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1993). Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):335-44.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Nasrin, Mehdi (2004). Anomalous monism in Carnap's aufbau. Erkenntnis 60 (3):283-293.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to putan end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemologyby using what he calls `construction theory'. According tothis theory, one or more constructional systems can be designedin which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logicallymade out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introducessome options for the basis of this system and chooses thedomain of the autopsychological, i.e., the domain of privateelementary experiences, among them and tries to construct all theconcepts out of them. This phenomenalistic reduction sometimes isseen as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body or even amentalistic monism. However, in this paper, I shall try to showthat the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputesthat the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show thatCarnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close towhat Davidson later termed as `Anomalous Monism' and that thisis why Carnap fails to complete his logical construction at a crucial step. Whenever possible, logicalconstructions are to be substituted forinferred entities
Nickles, Thomas (1977). Davidson on explanation. Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Noren, Stephen J. (1979). Anomalous monism, events, and 'the mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1996). The anomalism of psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:37-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Preyer, Gerhard (2000). Primary reasons: From radical interpretation to a pure anomalism of the mental. Protosociology 14:158-179.   (Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (2001). Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, A. (1985). Davidson's unintended attack on psychology. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Rowlands, Mark (1990). Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 20 (3):295-310.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Salami, Yunusa K. (1991). Anomalous monism and the mind-body problem. Quest 5 (2):106-114.   (Google)
Savitt, Steven F. (1979). Davidson's psycho-physical anomalism. Nature and System 1 (September):203-213.   (Google)
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Shea, Nicholas (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Silcox, Mark (online). Mind and anomalous monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1985). Davidson's minimal materialism. In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1984). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism: A reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1982). Bad news for anomalous monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Sommerville, Stephen (1980). The inten(t/s)ionality of Davidson's mental. Philosophical Papers 9 (October):46-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Stanton, W. L. (1983). Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):72-9.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
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Tiffany, E. C. (2001). The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   If mental anomalism is to be interpreted as a thesisunique to psychology, the anomalousness must begrounded in some feature unique to the mental,presumably its rational nature. While the ground forsuch arguments from normativity has been notoriouslyslippery terrain, there are two recently influentialstrategies which make the argument precise. The firstis to deny the possibility of psychophysical bridgelaws because of the different constitutive essences ofmental and physical laws, and the second is to arguethat mental anomalism follows from the uncodifiabilityof rationality. In this paper I argue that bothstrategies fail – the latter because it conflates primafacie and all things considered rationality and theformer because it rests on a false premise, theprinciple of the rational character of belief. Idistinguish four different formulations of thisprinciple and argue that those formulations which areplausible cannot support the argument for mentalanomalism
van Gulick, Robert (1980). Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
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Vermazen, Bruce & Hintikka, Merrill B. (eds.) (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action."
Walsh, Denis M. (1998). Wide content individualism. Mind 107 (427):625-652.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content
Welshon, Rex (1999). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism
Yalowitz, Steven (online). Anomalous monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1998). Causation in the argument for anomalous monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1997). Rationality and the argument for anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):235-58.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (2006). Daydreams and anarchy: A defense of anomalous mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. I begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us
Zangwill, Nick (1993). Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)