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 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
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4.2. Dualism

See also:

4.2a Interactionism

48 / 49 entries displayed

Averill, Edward W. & Keating, Bernard (1981). Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90 (January):102-7.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Beloff, John (1994). Minds and machines: A radical dualist perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):32-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)
Bricke, John (1975). Interaction and physiology. Mind 84 (April):255-9.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Brodbeck, May (1966). Objectivism and interaction: A reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Buncombe, M. (1995). The Substance of Consciousness: An Argument for Interactionism. Avebury.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Eccles, John C. (1980). The Human Psyche. Berlin: Springer.   (Cited by 43 | Google | Edit)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1989). Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1995). Consciousness can no longer be ignored. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58.   (Google | Edit)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1990). Neither idealism nor materialism: A reply to Snyder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 303:303-307.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Foster, John A. (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links | Edit)
Garrett, Brian J. (2000). Defending non-epiphenomenal event dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.   (Google | Edit)
Gaviola, E. (1936). The impossibility of interaction between mind and matter. Philosophy of Science 3 (2):133-142.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | Edit)
Holman, Emmett L. (1984). Continuity and the metaphysics of dualism. Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Holbrook, Daniel (1992). Descartes on mind-body interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.   (Google | Edit)
Jackson, Frank (1980). Interactionism revived? Philosophy of Social Science 10 (September):316-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Koksvik, Ole (2007). Conservation of energy is relevant to physicalism. Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE
LaRock, Eric F. (2001). Dualistic interaction, neural dependence, and Aquinas's composite view. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):459-472.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Larmer, Robert A. (1986). Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (September):277-85.   (Annotation | Google | Edit)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1994). A testable theory of mind-brain interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:119-26.   (Cited by 44 | Google | Edit)
Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. & Arhem, P. (1996). Mind as a force field: Comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22.   (Cited by 14 | Google | Edit)
Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level
Lowe, E. J. (1993). The causal autonomy of the mental. Mind 102 (408):629-44.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)
Lowe, E. J. (1992). The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):263-76.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Ludwig, Thomas E. (1997). Selves and brains: Tracing a path between interactionism and materialism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):489-495.   (Google | Edit)
Margolis, Joseph (1966). Objectivism and interactionism. Philosophy of Science 33 (June):118-123.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Mills, Eugene O. (1996). Interactionism and overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Mills, Eugene O. (1997). Interactionism and physicality. Ratio 10 (2):169-83.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1997). Interactionism, energy conservation, and the violation of physical laws. Physics Essays 10 (4):651–665.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1999). The physics of interactionism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):165–184.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)
Montero, Barbara (2006). What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism? Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's monist interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.   (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)
Popper, Karl R. (1955). A note on the body-mind problem. Analysis 15 (June):131-35.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Popper, Karl R. (ed.) (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge.   (Google | Edit)
Popper, Karl R. (1953). Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism. Proceedings of the XI International Congress of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)
Popper, Karl R. (1977). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica.   (Cited by 66 | Google | Edit)
Richardson, Robert C. (1982). The 'scandal' of cartesian interactionism. Mind 91 (January):20-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1955). A case for dualism and interactionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (June):451-76.   (Google | Edit)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1947). Second thoughts on causation, dualism, and interaction. Mind 56 (January):60-71.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Rosenkranz, Sven (1994). A review of Eccles' arguments for dualist-interactionism. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google | Edit)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1954). A note on Popper's argument for dualism. Analysis 15 (October):23-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Snyder, Douglas M. (1990). On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the physical world. Journal of Mind and Behavior 297:297-302.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). Body and soul. Think 5.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). The soul. In Timothy O'Connor & David Robb (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Thilly, Frank (1901). The theory of interaction. Philosophical Review 10 (2):124-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Vandervert, Larry R. (1991). A measurable and testable brain-based emergent interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 201:201-219.   (Google | Edit)
van Rooijen, K. (1987). Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (March):87-92.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Wilson, D. L. (1999). Mind-brain interactionism and the violation of physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)

4.2b Epiphenomenalism

Beyer, Jason A. (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the eliminative strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.   (Google | Edit)
Bieri, Peter (1992). Trying out epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)
Birnbacher, Dieter (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Braddock, Glenn (2000). Against Chalmers' epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.   (Google | Edit)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1910). Huxley's epiphenomenalism: A criticism and an appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Campbell, Keith (1974). Comments on: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Campbell, Neil (2001). What was Huxley's epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism is in factdifferent from the forms usually attributed to him
Capek, Milic (1954). James's early criticism of the automaton theory. Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Caston, Victor (1997). Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modern. Philosophical Review 106 (3):309-363.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)
Creel, Richard E. (1980). Radical epiphenomenalism: B.f. Skinner's account of private events. Behaviorism 8:31-53.   (Google | Edit)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.   (Annotation | Google | Edit)
Double, Richard (1979). Taylor's refutation of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8:23-28.   (Google | Edit)
Eilan, Naomi M. (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Fries, Horace S. (1929). Some attitudes and considerations and a biological argument for epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (23):626-634.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Gadenne, Volker (2006). In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google | Edit)
Gjelsvik, Olav (1999). On mind and matter. In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google | Edit)
Hodges, Michael P. (1979). Meaning and the impotence hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):515-29.   (Google | Edit)
Horowitz, Amir (1999). Is there a problem in physicalist epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Huxley, T. (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. Fortnightly Review 95:555-80.   (Cited by 38 | Google | Edit)
Hyslop, Alec (2000). Methodological epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Jackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.   (Cited by 566 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
James, William (1879).