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4.2. Dualism (Dualism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Chakraborty, Alpana (1997). Mind-Body Dualism: A Philosophical Investigation. D.K. Printworld.   (Google)
Fontaine, Petrus Franciscus Maria (1986). The Light and the Dark: A Cultural History of Dualism. J.C. Gieben.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1. Dualism in the Archaic and Early Classical periods of Greek history -- v. 2. Dualism in the political and social history of Greece in the fifth and fourth century B.C. -- v. 3. Dualism in Greek literature and philosophy in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. -- v. 4. Dualism in the ancient Middle East -- v. 5. A cultural history of Dualism -- v. 6. Dualism in the Hellenistic world -- v. 7. Dualism in the Palestinian-Syrian region during the first century A.D. until. ca. 140 -- v. 8. Gnostic dualism in Asia Minor during the first centuries A.D. (2 v.) -- v. 10. Dualism in Roman history: 1. Imperialistic dualism -- v. 11. Dualism in Roman history: 2. Dualism in interior politics and social life -- v. 12. Dualism in Roman history: 3. The Christian church in conflict with the Roman Empire and with Judaism -- v. 13. Dualism in Roman history: 4. The struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the early Christian church -- v. 14. Dualism in Roman history: 5. Enemies of the Roman Order -- v. 15. Imperialism in medieval history I : dualism in Byzantine history, 476-638 and dualism in Islam, 572-732 -- v. 16. Imperialism in medieval history II : dualism in German history I -- v. 17. Imperialism in medieval history III : dualism in German history II -- v. 18. The dualism of the Christian and Muslim worlds during the middle ages -- v. 20. Gnostic-dualistic tendencies in the history of medieval Europe -- v. 21. Dualism and non-dualism in medieval theology and philosophy
Holman, Emmett (2006). Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128:229--56.   (Google)
Abstract: Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
Lycan, William (forthcoming). Giving dualism its due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind-body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few if any defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered
Prokhovnik, Raia (2002). Rational Woman: A Feminist Critique of Dichotomy. Distributed Exclusively in the Usa by Palgrave.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is a comprehensive, analytical study of the way the mind/body dichotomy has perpetuated social hierarchy on the basis of gender. It challenges the tradition of dualism and argues that the term “rational woman” is not a contradiction in terms. Having investigated the two major dualisms contained in the term “rational woman”, the author develops an argument for a new relational conception of all the terms involved in “rational woman”, emphasizing the relationship of interdependence of reason and emotion, man and woman, rather than placing these terms in hierarchical and polarized opposition
Sirswal, Desh Raj (2009). The Official Doctrine and its Relevance Today. PARISHEELAN.   (Google)
Abstract: This seminar is an attempt to show that “official doctrine” is dead in only one of its ontological aspects: substance dualism may well have been repudiated but property dualism still claims a number of contemporary defenders. Here we will discuss Ryle’s explanation of Descartes’ dualism and also about its relevance. This doctrine of separation between mind and body is referred by Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Ryle argues that there is no ghostly, invisible entity called ‘the mind’ inside a mechanical apparatus called ‘the body’. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to him this assumption is a basic ‘category mistake’, because it attempts to analyze the relation between mind and body as if they were terms of the same logical category. Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic ‘category-mistake’ by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that materialism makes a basic ‘category-mistake’ by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality. The Ontological commitments: The ontological commitment of the view is that there are two different kinds of things, body and mind, that are somehow harnessed together. The view that mind and body are somehow fundamentally different or distinct, but nonetheless interact, leads to the philosophical conundrum known as the mind-body problem. Thus two ontological aspects of the official doctrine – finding a place for the mental in the physical world and the problem of mental causation – still survive today. The Epistemological Commitments: According to the traditional view, bodily processes are external and can be witnessed by observers, but mental processes are private, “internal” as the metaphor goes. The epistemological commitments of the official doctrine lead to the philosophical conundrum known as the problem of other minds. Descartes was contributing to the field of cognitive science hundred of years before it was officially established. Descartes changed the way rational thinkers believed then and continues to influence people now. Most modern philosophers have rejected the view that mind and matter are different substances, but many remain realists about the mind. It is fair to say that Descartes is as an integral part of cognitive science as anyone, despite the fact that he didn’t ever know it.
Small, Jacquelyn (1994). Embodying Spirit: Coming Alive with Meaning and Purpose. Harpercollins.   (Google)
Vesey, Godfrey Norman Agmondisham (1954). Inner and Outer: Essays on a Philosophical Myth. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Wade, David (1991). Crystal & Dragon: The Cosmic Two-Step. Green Books.   (Google)

4.2a Interactionism

Addis, Laird (1984). Parallelism, interactionism, and causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:329-344.   (Google)
Abstract: One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem : (1) There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
Athens, Lonnie (2007). Radical interactionism: Going beyond Mead. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (2):137–165.   (Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. & Keating, Bernard (1981). Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90 (January):102-7.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Batthyany, Alexander & Elitzur, Avshalom C. (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.   (Google)
Beloff, John (1994). Minds and machines: A radical dualist perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):32-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Beloff, John (1976). Mind-body interactionism in light of the parapsychological evidence. Theoria to Theory 10 (May):125-37.   (Google)
Bonner, Kieran (1994). Hermeneutics and symbolic interactionism: The problem of solipsism. Human Studies 17 (2).   (Google)
Bricke, John (1975). Interaction and physiology. Mind 84 (April):255-9.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brodbeck, May (1966). Objectivism and interaction: A reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.   (Google | More links)
Buncombe, M. (1995). The Substance of Consciousness: An Argument for Interactionism. Avebury.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Burbank, Patricia M. & Martins, Diane C. (2010). Symbolic interactionism and critical perspective: Divergent or synergistic? Nursing Philosophy 11 (1):25-41.   (Google)
Abstract: Throughout their history, symbolic interactionism and critical perspective have been viewed as divergent theoretical perspectives with different philosophical underpinnings. A review of their historical and philosophical origins reveals both points of divergence and areas of convergence. Their underlying philosophies of science and views of human freedom are different as is their level of focus with symbolic interactionism having a micro perspective and critical perspective using a macro perspective. This micro/macro difference is reflected in the divergence of their major concepts, goals and basic tenets. While their underlying philosophies are different, however, they are not necessarily contradictory and areas of convergence may include the concepts of reference groups and looking glass self within symbolic interactionism and ideological hegemony within critical perspective. By using a pragmatic approach and combining symbolic interactionism and critical perspectives, both micro and macro levels come into focus and strategies for change across individual and societal levels can be developed and applied. Application of both symbolic interactionism and critical perspective to nursing research and scholarship offers exciting new opportunities for theory development and research methodologies. In nursing education, these two perspectives can give students added insight into patients' and families' problems at the micro level while, at the same time, giving them a lens to see and tools to apply to problems at the macro level in health care. In nursing practice, a combined symbolic interactionism/critical perspective approach assists nurses to give high-quality care at the individual level while also working at the macro level to address the manufacturers of illness. New research questions emerge from this combination of perspectives with new possibilities for theory development, a transformation in nursing education, and the potential for new practice strategies that can address individual client and larger system problems through empowerment of clients and nurses
Chalmers, David J. (unknown). How cartesian dualism might have been true. .   (Google)
Abstract: We could have been characters in a huge computer simulation. It is a familiar idea that the whole world might be simulated on a computer, and things would seem exactly the same to us (and indeed, who is to say that we are not)
Eccles, John C. (1980). The Human Psyche. Berlin: Springer.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Abstract: The Human Psyche is an in-depth exploration of dualist-interactionism, a concept Sir John Eccles developed with Sir Karl Popper in the context of a wide...
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1989). Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1995). Consciousness can no longer be ignored. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58.   (Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1990). Neither idealism nor materialism: A reply to Snyder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 303:303-307.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
Garrett, Brian J. (2000). Defending non-epiphenomenal event dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.   (Google)
Gaviola, E. (1936). The impossibility of interaction between mind and matter. Philosophy of Science 3 (2):133-142.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to the non-specialist reader
Holman, Emmett L. (1984). Continuity and the metaphysics of dualism. Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.   (Google | More links)
Holbrook, Daniel (1992). Descartes on mind-body interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.   (Google)
Horvath, Christopher D. (2000). Interactionism and innateness in the evolutionary study of human nature. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   While most researchers who use evolutionary theory to investigatehuman nature especially human sexuality describe themselves as ``interactionists'', there is no clear consensus on the meaning of thisterm in this context. By interactionism most people in the fieldmean something like, both nature and nurture ``count'' in thedevelopment of human psychology and behavior. Nevertheless, themultidisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology results in a widevariety of interpretations of this general claim. Today, mostdebates within evolutionary psychology about the innateness of agiven behavioral characteristic or over its development turn as muchon which conception of ``innateness'' and ``interactionism'' theresearcher holds as on any empirical data they might derive
Jackson, Frank (1980). Interactionism revived? Philosophy of Social Science 10 (September):316-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Koksvik, Ole (2007). Conservation of energy is relevant to physicalism. Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE
LaRock, Eric F. (2001). Dualistic interaction, neural dependence, and Aquinas's composite view. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):459-472.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Larmer, Robert A. (1986). Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (September):277-85.   (Annotation | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1994). A testable theory of mind-brain interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:119-26.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. & Arhem, P. (1996). Mind as a force field: Comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1920). Pragmatism as interactionism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (22):589-596.   (Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level
Lowe, E. J. (1993). The causal autonomy of the mental. Mind 102 (408):629-44.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1992). The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):263-76.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Thomas E. (1997). Selves and brains: Tracing a path between interactionism and materialism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):489-495.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A dialog between Donald MacKay and Mario Bunge, printed in the journal Neuroscience over the course of two years beginning in 1977, provides a conscise summary of MacKay's views on the mind-body relationship. In this dialog, MacKay contrasts the dualistic interactionism theory of Popper and Eccles with Bunge's emergentist materialism theory, and then builds a case for a third alternative based on the notion of mental events embodied in, but not identical to, brain events. Although neuroscience has made tremendous progress in the past two decades, MacKay's attempt to trace a path between interactionism and materialism is still worth considering
Margolis, Joseph (1966). Objectivism and interactionism. Philosophy of Science 33 (June):118-123.   (Google | More links)
McCauley, Robert N. & Lawson, E. Thomas, Interactionism and the non obviousness of scientific theories.   (Google)
Abstract: Levine's discussion of Rethinking Religion (1990) and "Crisis of Conscience, Riddle of Identity" (1993) includes some rash charges, some useful comments, and some profound misunderstandings. The latter, especially, reveal areas where we need to clarify and further defend our claims. In the second section we shall discuss the epistemological and methodological issues that Levine raises. Then we shall turn in the third section to theoretical and substantive matters. In fact, Levine remains almost completely silent on substantive matters (except to say that our claims are "obvious" and "trite.") Levine claims, in effect, (1) that religion is outside of the scope of scientific analysis, (2) that our competence approach to theorizing is not necessary for generating the theoretical claims that we make, and (3) that the substantive consequences of those theoretical claims are obvious and trivial. We unequivocally reject the first and third claims and, Levine's profound misunderstandings about the competence approach to theorizing notwithstanding, completely agree with the second. Identifying the confusions in Levine's discussion that inform item (3) will clarify our position. We turn first, though, to matters of epistemology and method (as these bear on items (1) and (2))
Mealey, Linda (1998). Testosterone-aggression relationship: An exemplar of interactionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):380-381.   (Google)
Abstract: Mazur & Booth provide life scientists with an example of the multilevel biopsychosocial approach. Research paradigms have to become more flexible and multidisciplinary if we are to free ourselves from the nature–nurture dichotomy that we have long agreed was simplistic and shortsighted. I point out a variety of kinds of interactions that may be the next frontier for behavioral scientists
Mills, Eugene O. (1996). Interactionism and overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
Mills, Eugene O. (1997). Interactionism and physicality. Ratio 10 (2):169-83.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1997). Interactionism, energy conservation, and the violation of physical laws. Physics Essays 10 (4):651–665.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1999). The physics of interactionism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):165–184.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is another hard problem, in addition to the problem of how anything material can have the subjective, first-person phenomenology of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). It is the problem of how anything material can have freedom. By ‘freedom’ I mean a person’s ability to behave in a purposive, non-random fashion that is not determined by neurophysiological structure and physical law.
Montero, Barbara (2006). What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism? Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's monist interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Neunhäuserer, Jörg (ms). Panmentalism.   (Google)
Abstract: In this short note we develop an unorthodox panmentalistic and libertarian dualism. Especially we skech a mental-physikal law of free will. Our aim is to to provoke the contemporary scentific common-sense.
Popper, Karl R. (1955). A note on the body-mind problem. Analysis 15 (June):131-35.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Popper, Karl R. (ed.) (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper here examines the problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality and the relationship between human beings and their actions. In this illuminating series of papers, Popper suggests a theory of mind-body interaction that relates to evolutionary emergence, human language and what he calls "the three worlds." Rene; Descartes first posited the existence of two worlds--the world of physical bodies and the world of mental states. Popper argues for the existence of "world 3" which comprises the products of our human minds. He examines the interaction between mental states--hopes, needs, plans, ideologies or hypotheses--and the physical states of our brain. Popper forcefully argues against the materialism forwarded by many philosophers which denies the existence of mental states. Instead, he demonstrates that the problem of the interaction between mental and physical states remains unresolved. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem is based on Popper's never-before published lectures at Emory University in 1969. Popper has extensively revised the lectures but has retained their accessible format. He has also incorporated some of the discussions which followed the lectures, providing an engaging exchange between the philosopher and his audience
Popper, Karl R. (1953). Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism. Proceedings of the XI International Congress of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: It is not a paper on linguistic analysis (the analysis of word-usages). For I completely reject the claim of certain language analysts that the source of philosophical difficulties is to be found in the misuse of language. No doubt some people talk nonsense, but I claim (a) that there does not exist a logical or language-analytical method of detecting philosophical nonsense (which, by the way, does not stop short of the ranks of logicians, language analysts and semanticists); (b) that the belief that such a method exists -- the belief more especially that philosophical nonsense can be unmasked as due to what Russell might have called 'type-mistakes' and what nowadays are sometimes called 'category-mistakes' -- is the aftermath of a philosophy of language which has since turned out to be baseless.
Popper, Karl R. (1978). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32:339-55.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Popper, Karl R. & Eccles, John C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Springer.   (Cited by 130 | Google)
Abstract: Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical...
Richardson, Robert C. (1982). The 'scandal' of cartesian interactionism. Mind 91 (January):20-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Robb, David (2003). Dualism. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 1. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1955). A case for dualism and interactionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (June):451-76.   (Google | More links)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1947). Second thoughts on causation, dualism, and interaction. Mind 56 (January):60-71.   (Google | More links)
Rosenkranz, Sven (1994). A review of Eccles' arguments for dualist-interactionism. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1954). A note on Popper's argument for dualism. Analysis 15 (October):23-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Shanker, Stuart G. & King, Barbara J. (2002). The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):605-620.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years we have seen a dramatic shift, in several different areas of communication studies, from an information-theoretic to a dynamic systems paradigm. In an information processing system, communication, whether between cells, mammals, apes, or humans, is said to occur when one organism encodes information into a signal that is transmitted to another organism that decodes the signal. In a dynamic system, all of the elements are continuously interacting with and changing in respect to one another, and an aggregate pattern emerges from this mutual co-action. Whereas the information-processing paradigm looks at communication as a linear, binary sequence of events, the dynamic systems paradigm looks at the relation between behaviors and how the whole configuration changes over time. One of the most dramatic examples of the significance of shifting from an information processing to a dynamic systems paradigm can be found in the debate over the interpretation of recent advances in ape language research (ALR). To some extent, many of the early ALR studies reinforced the stereotype that animal communication is functional and stimulus bound, precisely because they were based on an information-processing paradigm that promoted a static model of communicative development. But Savage-Rumbaugh's recent results with bonobos has introduced an entirely new dimension into this debate. Shifting the terms of the discussion from an information-processing to a dynamic systems paradigm not only highlights the striking differences between Savage-Rumbaugh's research and earlier ALR studies, but further, it sheds illuminating light on the factors that underpin the development of communication skills in great apes and humans, and the relationship between communicative development and the development of language. Key Words: apes; ape language research (ALR); brain development; co-regulation; communication; dynamic systems; language development; symbols
Snyder, Douglas M. (1990). On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the physical world. Journal of Mind and Behavior 297:297-302.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). Body and soul. Think 5.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). The soul. In Timothy O'Connor & David Robb (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thilly, Frank (1901). The theory of interaction. Philosophical Review 10 (2):124-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Vandervert, Larry R. (1991). A measurable and testable brain-based emergent interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 201:201-219.   (Google)
Van Rooijen, Jeroen (1987). Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):87-92.   (Google | More links)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2009). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its colloraries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of "local interactionism" (compatible with causal closure) is proposed.
Wilson, D. L. (1999). Mind-brain interactionism and the violation of physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Cited by 11 | Google)

4.2b Epiphenomenalism

Bailey, Andrew R., Zombies and epiphenomenalism.   (Google)
Abstract: RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est rarement formulés et l’autre nouveaux—sont plus persuasif. Le résultat, cependant, est que le zombist pourraient en effet être confronté à un engagement indésirables à l’epiphenomenalism de conscience
Bailey, Andrew R. (2006). Zombies, epiphenomenalism, and physicalist theories of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4).   (Google)
Beyer, Jason A. (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the eliminative strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.   (Google)
Bieri, Peter (1992). Trying out epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Birnbacher, Dieter (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2000). Against Chalmers' epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.   (Google)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1910). Huxley's epiphenomenalism: A criticism and an appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.   (Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Campbell, Neil (1998). Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Keith (1974). Comments on: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2005). Explanatory epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2001). What was Huxley's epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism is in factdifferent from the forms usually attributed to him
Capek, Milic (1954). James's early criticism of the automaton theory. Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
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Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2009). Still epiphenomenal qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.   (Google)
Abstract: Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (1997). Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Dempsey, Liam & Shani, Itay (2009). Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
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Gadenne, Volker (2006). In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
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Baumgartner, Michael (2010). Interventionism and epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):pp. 359-383.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.   (Cited by 566 | Annotation | Google | More links)
James, William (1879). Are we automata? Mind 4 (13):1-22.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (1987). Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1980). Imitation-man and the 'new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (September):479-487.   (Annotation | Google)
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Lachs, John (1963). The impotent mind. Review of Metaphysics 17 (December):187-99.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Lyons, Jack C. (2006). In defense of epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible
McGilvary, Evander Bradley (1910). Huxley's epiphenomenalism: A criticism and an appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.   (Google | More links)
Mclaughlin, Brian P. (2006). Is role-functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1989). Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Megill, Jason (2007). Naturalism, physicalism and epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):681 – 686.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism
Menzel, Paul T. (1970). Epiphenomenalism and metaethical non-naturalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1).   (Google)
Muller, Hans (2009). More troubles for epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized
Nagasawa, Yujin (2010). The knowledge argument and epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson’s position is what I call the ‘inconsistency objection’. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson’s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is ‘the most powerful reply to the knowledge argument’ he knows of, it has never been discussed critically. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the objection and to identify and consider its implications. The objection is alleged to be based on a causal theory of knowledge. I argue that the objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that it is either false or does not support the inconsistency objection. In order to defend my argument, I offer a hypothesis concerning phenomenal knowledge
Newen, Albert & Cuplinskas, Rimas (2002). Mental causation: A real phenomenon in a physicalistic world without epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):139-167.   (Google)
Abstract: The so-called problem of mental causation as discussed in the recent literature raises three central challenges for an adequate solution from a physicalist perspective: the threat of epiphenomenalism, the problem of externalism (or the difficulty in accounting for the causal efficacy of extrinsic mental properties) and the problem of causal exclusion (or the threat of over determination). We wish to account for mental causationas a real phenomenon within a physicalistic framework without accepting epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The key ideas of our proposal are an internal realism of causation combined with a relative notion of individuating events. We are arguing?contra Davidson?tha there is no absolute notion of events (neither as types nor as tokens) but rather one which is relative to explanatory interests and our intuitions concerning a relevant spatial and temporal overlap. Furthermore, we are presupposing a metaphysics of internal realism: We can only characterize entities by means of concepts produced within our epistemological framework. Physical concepts and mental concepts crossclassify the world as it is. Relying on this framework we try to explain how mental causation can be adequately described: Although mental concepts are not reducible to physical concepts and mental event-tokens may be different from "underlying" physical event-tokens, mental events are real phenomena that are realized by physical phenomena in special context conditions
Noordhof, Paul (2003). Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pauen, Michael; Staudacher, Alexander & Walter, Sven (2006). Epiphenomenalism: Dead end or way out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.   (Google)
Pauen, Michael; Staudacher, & Walter, S. (2006). Editors' introduction -- epiphenomenalism: Dead end or way out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):7-19.   (Google)
Pecnjak, D. (1989). Epiphenomenalism and machines: A discussion of Van rooijen's critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (September):404-8.   (Google | More links)
Plantinga, Alvin (2004). Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pockett, Susan (2004). Does consciousness cause behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (2002). Consciousness, adaptation and epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Popper, Karl R. (1977). Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Power, Nicholas P. (1996). Fodor's vindication of folk psychology and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Physicalism and the evolution of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:171-83.   (Google)
Randrup, Axel (ms). Conscious experience, existence and behaviour.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If consciousness has no influence on my behaviour,what shall I do with it ? In this paper it is contended, that even if neuroscience is right, if some conscious experiences such as emotional experiences have no influence on our behavior, they still constitute a significant part of our world, our existence. For understanding the significance of conscious experiences we should go beyond behaviour, biology and biological evolution. This paper and its understanding of consciousness and natural science is based on an idealist philosophy maintaining, that only conscious experience is real. Conscious experience is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it cannot be explained. Key words: Consciousness as existence; behaviour; communication; language; free will; idealist philosophy; collective conscious experience; cognition
Raymont, Paul (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto   (Google)
Rivas, Titus & van Dongen, Hein (2001). Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (online). Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Robinson, William (2007). Evolution and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on 'explanation'. Finally, an argument by Plantinga (2004), which applies to beliefs rather than phenomenal qualities, is stated and rebutted
Robinson, Daniel N. (1993). Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, William S. (2006). Knowing epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things
Robinson, William S. (2004). Perception, affect and epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism
Rudd, Anthony J. (2000). Phenomenal judgment and mental causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):53-69.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sabatés, Marcelo H. (2003). Being without doing. Topoi 22 (2):111-125.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2006). Emergence, epiphenomenalism and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):21-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Causation can be regarded from either an explanatory/epistemic or an ontological viewpoint. From the former, emergent features enter into a host of causal relationships which form a hierarchical structure subject to scientific investigation. From the latter, the paramount issue is whether emergent features provide any novel causal powers, or whether the 'go' of the world is exhausted by the fundamental physical features which underlie emergent phenomena. I argue here that the 'Scientific Picture of the World' (SPW) strongly supports the claim that ontological causation is exhausted in the elementary physical features of the world. A method is developed for distinguishing 'emergent ontological causation' from the epistemological emergent explanatory patterns sanctioned by the SPW, and it is argued that the SPW implies that all emergence is mere epistemological emergence. However, this leads to a paradox when applied to consciousness itself, which turns out to be both epiphenomenal and viewpoint dependent
Seager, William E. (ms). Generalized epiphenomenalism.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem that, once granted, generalized epiphenomenalism is fairly innocuous, since its threat is too diffuse to provoke traditional worries about the epiphenomenal nature of mental states. If mental states are epiphenomenal only in the same sense that the putative powers of hurricanes, psyche- delic drugs or hydrogen bombs are epiphenomenal, then probably there is not much to worry about in the epiphenomenalism of the mental. I agree that the epiphenomenalism of hurricanes and the like is manageable, but it will turn out that ensuring manageability requires that mental states have an ontological status fundamentally different from that of hurricanes, drugs and bombs, a status that is in fact inconsistent with the SPW. So I’ll argue that generalized epiphenomenalism does have some seriously worrying consequences after all
Segal, Gabriel M. A. (2009). The causal inefficacy of content. Mind and Language 24 (1):80-102.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper proceeds to argue against Kim's ( Kim, 2000, 2005 ) attempt to articulate a plausible version of reductionism. It is then argued that psychological properties, along with paradigmatically causally efficacious macro-properties, such as toughness, are causally inefficacious in respect of their possessor's typical effects, because they are insufficiently distinct from those effects. It is finally suggested that the distinction between epiphenomenalism and overdeterminationism may be more terminological than real
Seth, James (1894). Are we 'conscious automata'? Philosophical Review 3 (3):278-288.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. & Sober, Elliott (forthcoming). Epiphenomenalism - the do's and the don'ts. In G. Wolters & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Agent causation, functional explanation, and epiphenomenal engines: Can conscious mental events be causally efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.   (Google)
Sleutels, Jan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.   (Google)
Slors, Marc (2003). Epiphenomenalism and cross-realization induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation does what none of the currently available ones can: combine the generally accepted ideas that (i) folk-psychology is a successful means of predicting, explaining, and understanding human behaviour and (ii) that mental states are multiply realized. Given these two steps, it is relatively safe to say that there is no epiphe-nomenalism-threat to nonreductive physicalism
Smith, Peter K. (1984). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism: A reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, Nick (ms). EPIPHENOMENALISM Keith Campbell and Nicholas J.j. Smith december 1993.   (Google)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both the feeling and the yawning are effects of an underlying neural state
Sober, Elliott (ms). Epiphenomenalism – the do's and the don'ts.   (Google)
Abstract: When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann’s experimental arguments against the inheritance of acquired characters. This conception of how epiphenomenalism ought to be developed helps clarify some mistakes in two recent epiphenomenalist positions – Jaegwon Kim’s (1993) arguments against mental causation, and the arguments developed by Walsh (2000), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002), and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that natural selection and drift are not causes of evolution. A manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003) leads naturally to an account of how macro- and micro-causation are related and to an understanding of how epiphenomenalism at different levels of organization should be understood
Spät, Patrick (2006). A pill against epiphenomenalism. Abstracta 2 (2):172-9.   (Google | More links)
Laurie, S. S. (1894). Reflexions suggested by psychophysical materialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (9):56-76.   (Google | More links)
Staudacher, Alexander (2006). Epistemological challenges to qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge which does not invoke causation at all. Michael Pauen has argued extensively (this volume of Journal of Consciousness Studies), however, that this line of defence doesn't work because it presupposes the existence of psychophysical laws connecting qualia with physical phenomena which cannot be established under epiphenomenalist presuppositions. It is argued that Pauen's arguments lead to sceptical consequences which threaten not only interactionist alternatives to epiphenomenalism but finally his own account
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van Gulick, Robert (1992). Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.   (Google)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2009). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its colloraries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of "local interactionism" (compatible with causal closure) is proposed.
Vendler, Zeno (1991). Epiphenomena. In Certainty and Surface in Epistemology and Philosophical Method. Lewiston: Mellen Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wallhagen, Morgan (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark ([2001]) does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. 1 Introduction 2 Clarifying EBC 2.1 Control and guidance 2.2 Fine-tuned activity 3 The empirical case against EBC 4 Conclusion
Walter, Sven (2009). Epiphenomenalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Walter, Sven (online). Epiphenomenalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Wasserman, G. D. (1982). Materialism and mentality. Review of Metaphysics 35 (June):715-30.   (Google)
Wassermann, Gerhard D. (1979). Reply to Popper's attack on epiphenomenalism. Mind 88 (October):572-75.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Welshon, Rex (1999). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism
Wisdom, John O. (1954). Is epiphenomenalism refutable? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):303-306.   (Google | More links)
Woodhouse, Mark B. (1974). A new epiphenomenalism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):163-69.   (Google | More links)

4.2c Psychophysical Parallelism

Addis, Laird (1984). Parallelism, interactionism, and causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:329-344.   (Google)
Abstract: One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem : (1) There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
Balz, Albert G. A. (1935). Some historical steps towards parallelism. Philosophical Review 44 (6):544-566.   (Google | More links)
Bergson, Henri (2005). Psychophysical parallelism and positive metaphysics. In Continental Philosophy of Science (Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy). Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.   (Google)
Gregson, Robert A. M. (2000). Chaotic dynamics and psychophysical parallelism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):541-542.   (Google)
Abstract: An impressive review of brain neurophysiology provides the basis for modelling the dynamics of transmission in neural circuits, using appropriate nonlinear mathematics. The coverage is unbalanced, however: the parallel dynamics at the level of behaviour and sensory-cognitive processes are sparsely addressed, so the final chapter fails to indicate the complexity and subtlety of relevant modern work
Heidelberger, Michael (2003). The mind-body problem in the origin of logical empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychophysical parallelism. In Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the debate that has continued to this day" (Kim 1998, 1). Nonetheless, it is not at all obvious why these particular articles sparked a debate, nor why Feigl's work in particular came to play such a prominent part in it, nor how and to what extent Feigl's approach rests on the logical empiricism he endorsed
Heidelberger, Michael (2003). The mind-body problem in the origin of logical empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychophysical parallelism. In Cogprints.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the 19th century, "Psychophysical Parallelism" was the most popular solution of the mind-body problem among physiologists, psychologists and philosophers. (This is not to be mixed up with Leibnizian and other cases of "Cartesian" parallelism.) The fate of this non-Cartesian view, as founded by Gustav Theodor Fechner, is reviewed. It is shown that Feigl's "identity theory" eventually goes back to Alois Riehl who promoted a hybrid version of psychophysical parallelism and Kantian mind-body theory which was taken up by Feigl's teacher Moritz Schlick.
Jonas, Hans (1986). Parallelism and complementarity. In Marjorie G. Grene & Debra Nails (eds.), Spinoza And The Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kambartel, Friedrich (1999). Remarks on psycho-physical parallelism. In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Lloyd, Alfred H. (1911). Dualism, parallelism and infinitism. Mind 20 (78):212-234.   (Google | More links)
Lloyd, Alfred H. (1917). Psychophysical parallelism: A psychological episode in history. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (21):561-570.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mehlberg, Henryk (1995). On psychophysical parallelism. Axiomathes 6 (1).   (Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1984). Gustav Bergmann's psychophysiological parallelism. Behaviorism 12:41-70.   (Google)
Smith, Kendon (1985). A note on Natsoulas on psychophysiological parallelism. Behaviorism 13:83-84.   (Google)
Solomons, Leon M. (1899). The alleged proof of parallelism from the conservation of energy. Philosophical Review 8 (2):146-165.   (Google | More links)
Trumbull Ladd, George (1903). Brief critique of "psycho-physical parallelism". Mind 12 (47):374-380.   (Google | More links)
Wise, R. B. A. (1982). The parallelism of attributes. Philosophical Papers 11 (October):23-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

4.2d Dualism, Misc

Almog, J. (2001). What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop into Descartes's main philosophical preoccupation: the Mind-Body distinction. How can Mind and Body be independent entities, yet joined--essentially so--within a single human being? If Mind and Body are really distinct, are human beings merely a "construction"? On the other hand, if we respect the integrity of humans, are Mind and Body merely aspects of a human being and not subjects in and of themselves? For centuries, philosophers have considered this classic philosophical puzzle. Now, in this compact, engaging, and long-awaited work UCLA philosopher Joseph Almog closely decodes the French philosopher's argument for distinguishing between the human mind and body while maintaining simultaneously their essential integration in a human being. He argues that Descartes constructed a solution whereby the trio of Human Mind, Body, and Being are essentially interdependent yet remain each a genuine individual subject. Almog's reading not only steers away from the most popular interpretations of Descartes, but also represents a scholar coming to grips directly with Descartes himself. In doing so, Almog creates a work that Cartesian scholars will value, and that will also prove indispensable to philosophers of language, ontology, and the metaphysics of mind
Barnes, Gordon (2001). Should property-dualists be substance-hylomorphists? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. (1982). Taking vitalism and dualism seriously: Towards a more adequate materialism. Nature and System 4 (March-June):23-44.   (Google)
Beloff, John (ms). The mind-brain problem.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Beloff, John (ms). What are minds for?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Two positions on the mind-body problem are here_ _compared:__Materialism__, which is here taken to mean the thesis_ _that mind plays no part in the determination of behaviour so that,_ _for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as_ _insentient automata, and_ _Ineractionism_ _which is here taken as its_ _contradictory._
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1996). Locke, property dualism and metaphysical dualism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4:223-245.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bestor, Thomas W. (1976). Dualism and bodily movements. Inquiry 19 (1-4):1-26.   (Google)
Campbell, Keith (1993). Swimming against the tide. Inquiry 36 (1-2):161-177.   (Google)
Caruso, Gregg (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. Metapsychology 5 (46).   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh (ms). Fuzzy Minds.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2003). Mental substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states – but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicitly acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’.2 Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons: The view I have long defended is that the mind is not a thing; talk of our minds is talk of world-involving capabilities that we have and activities that we engage in. As Dewey succinctly put it, “Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situation in which we find ourselves. Unfortunately, an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of action into an underlying substance that performs the activities in question. It has treated mind as an independent entity which attends, purposes, cares and remembers”. But the traditional view, by treating mental states as states of the “underlying substance”, makes them properties of something “inside”, and, if one is a materialist philosopher, that means properties of our brains. So the next problem naturally seems to be: “Which neurological properties of our brains do these mental properties ‘reduce’ to?” For how could our brains have properties that aren’t neurological? And this is how materialist philosophers saw the problem until the advent of such new alternatives in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language as Functionalism and Semantic Externalism
Descartes, Rene (2004). Meditations on First Philosophy. Caravan Books.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1917). Duality and dualism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (18):491-493.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dilley, Frank B. (2003). A critique of emergent dualism. Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):37-49.   (Google)
D'Oro, Giuseppina (2005). Collingwood's solution to the problem of mind-body dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.   (Google)
Efron, Arthur (1992). Residual asymmetric dualism: A theory of mind-body relations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):113-36.   (Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (2009). Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist’s confession. In A. Batthyany & A. C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposi¬tion of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the “Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theo¬ries that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Ar¬gument,” which is this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 critically dis¬cuss attempts to dismiss the Bafflement Argument by the “Baf¬flement=Mis¬perception Equation.” Section 12 offers a refutation of all such attempts in the form of a concise “Asymmetry Proof.” Section 13 points out the bearing of the Bafflement Argument on the evolutionary role of consciousness while section 14 acknowledges the price that has to be paid for it in terms of basic physical principles. Section 15 summarizes the paper, pointing out the inescapability of interactionist dualism.
Evans, Suzette M. (1981). Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:313-332.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Forrest, Peter (1996). Difficulties with physicalism, and a programme for dualists. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Foster, John A. (2000). The case for dualism. In Theos, Anthropos, Christos: A Compendium of Modern Philosophical Theology. New York: Lang.   (Google)
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Goetz, Stewart C. (1994). Dualism, causation, and supervenience. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):92-108.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Granger, Herbert (1994). Supervenient dualism. Ratio 7 (1):1-13.   (Google | More links)
Haldane, John J. (1992). An embarrassing question about reproduction. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):427-431.   (Google)
Abstract: Standard objections to dualism focus on problems of individuation: what, in the absence of matter, serves to diversify immaterial items? and interaction: how can material and immaterial elements causally affect one another? Given certain ways of conceiving mental phenomena and causation, it is not obvious that one cannot reply to these objections. However, a different kind of difficulty comes into view when one considers the question of the origin of the mental. Here attention is directed upon the case of intentionality. It might seem that the transition between non-intentional and intentional phenomena could be dealt with by adopting a version of Dennett's discharging strategy, but this is argued against. Several responses to the origination problem are identified, including a creationist one
Harrison, Jonathan (1985). A Philosopher's Nightmare: And Other Stories. Nottingham: University Of Nottingham.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hart, William D. (1988). The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Hawthorne, John (2007). Cartesian Dualism. In Peter van Inwagen & D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this short paper, I shall examine some key structural features of Descartes’s metaphysics, as it relates to mind–body dualism. The style of presentation will partly be one of rational reconstruction, designed to present the Cartesian system in a way that will be of maximal interest to contemporary metaphysicians. Section 1 focuses on five key Cartesian theses about principal attributes. Sections 2 and 3 examine how those theses play themselves out in Descartes’s discussion of mind–body dualism
Herbert, Robert T. (1998). Dualism/materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-75.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Himma, Kenneth E. (2005). When a problem for all is a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):81-92.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hinzen, Wolfram (2006). Dualism and the atoms of thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.   (Google)
Abstract: Contemporary arguments for forms of psycho-physical dualism standardly depart from phenomenal aspects of consciousness ('what it is like' to have some particular conscious experience). Conceptual aspects of conscious experience, as opposed to phenomenal or visual/perceptual ones, are often taken to be within the scope of functionalist, reductionist, or physicalist theories. I argue that the particular conceptual structure of human consciousness makes this asymmetry unmotivated. The argument for a form of dualism defended here proceeds from the empirical premise that conceptual structure in a linguistic creature like us is a combinatorial and compositional system that implicates a distinction between simple and complex, or 'atomic' and 'molecular' concepts. The argument is that conceptual atoms, qua atoms, are irreducible to anything else. If so, and if the atoms are essentially semantic, a form of dualism follows: though positively inviting naturalistic inquiry into the semantic and mental aspects of nature, it requires that we look at the mental as a primitive domain of nature. Schematically, then, the argument is as follows: (1) Human consciousness/thought is conceptually structured. (2) The human conceptual system is a 'particulate' system at a syntactic and semantic level of representation (the notion of a 'particulate' system is developed in Section 2). (3) This implies the existence of conceptual 'particles', concepts that have no further semantic decomposition ('atoms'). (4) A conceptual atom cannot be explained in terms of anything that does not involve its own intrinsic properties (Section 3). (5) Physicalism as normally conceived is inconsistent with (3) and (4) (Section 4)
Hodges, Michael P. (1974). Criteria and dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 12:191-199.   (Google)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1998). Dualism in action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:377-401.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
James, Edward W. (1991). Mind-body continuism: Dualities without dualism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 233:233-255.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jehle, D. (2006). Kim against dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central challenge of explaining how souls and bodies are uniquely paired, allowing for them to enter into specific causal relationships, forming a singular soul–body unit
Kim, Jaegwon (2001). Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualism. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kistler, Max (2005). Lowe's argument for dualism from mental causation. Philosophia 33 (1-4):319-329.   (Google | More links)
Kraemer, Eric Russert & Sayward, Charles (1980). Dualism and the argument from continuity. Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.   (Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2001). Strategy for dualists. Metaphilosophy 32 (4):395-418.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Landesman, Charles (1965). The new dualism in the philosophy of mind. Review of Metaphysics 19 (December):329-345.   (Google)
Lenzen, Victor F. (1939). The hypothesis of dualism. Philosophy of Science 6 (2):254-256.   (Google | More links)
Levison, Arnold B. (1986). Metalinguistic dualism and the mark of the mental. Synthese 66 (March):339-359.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I argue against the view, defended by some philosophers, that it is part of the meaning of mental that being mental is incompatible with being physical. I call this outlook metalinguistic dualism (MLD for short), and I distinguish it from metaphysical theories of the mind-body relation such as Cartesian dualism. I argue that MLD is mistaken, but I don't try to defend the contrary view that mentalistic terms can be definitionally reduced to nonmental ones. After criticizing arguments by certain philosophers which purport to establish MLD, I formulate a criterion for a phenomenon's being mental. I then show that this criterion is neutral between monistic and dualistic theories of the mind-body relation. Since if MLD were true it should be impossible to construct such a criterion, I conclude that it is false (i.e., if it is intended as a descriptive thesis about our language). The significance of my paper is that if I am right then I remove one important type of objection to aposteriori, noneliminative forms of the identity theory of mind, namely that such theories ought to be rejected merely on the basis of semantical considerations about the word mental. Beyond that, I believe that my criterion of mental phenomena correctly captures our intuitions about the nature of the distinction between mental and nonmental phenomena
Lycan, William G., Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?   (Google)
Abstract: During the last quarter-century, mind-body dualism has been doing surprisingly well: Campbell (1984), Swinburne (1986), Madell (1988), Robinson (1988, 2004), Hart (1988), Foster (1991), Seager (1991), Strawson (1994), Chalmers (1995), Taliaferro (1996), Bealer (1997), Stubenberg (1998), Griffin (1998), Hasker (1999), Rosenberg (2004), and others. But, with the notable exceptions of Swinburne, Hart and Foster,1 these dualists are merely property dualists rather than Cartesian substance dualists. They hold that some of our mental states have immaterial properties, but not that we ourselves are immaterial Cartesian souls entirely distinct from our bodies. The prevalent idea is that property dualism is tenable (or even demonstrated), but we are not crazy. I reject this disparity. I think that most of the standard objections to Cartesian dualism (CD) count as effectively against property dualism (PD), and that PD is hardly more plausible, or less implausible, than CD. Granted, assuming that a Cartesian ego would eo ipso have some immaterial mental properties, you might suppose that CD is logically stronger than PD; so one would need a reason for accepting CD over and above PD, and there must be at least one objection that applies to CD but not to PD. However, as we shall see, nonCartesian property dualism (PD & CD) faces at least two objections that CD does not
Margolis, Joseph (1966). Reply to a reaction: Second remarks on Brodbeck's objectivism. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):293-300.   (Google | More links)
Matthews, Gareth B. (1971). Dualism and solecism. Philosophical Review 80 (January):85-95.   (Google | More links)
Miller, Hugh (1934). Return to dualism. Journal of Philosophy 31 (24):645-654.   (Google | More links)
Oderberg, David S. (2005). Hylemorphic dualism. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):70-99.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis of the problem of consciousness has had an unhealthy effect on recent debate, claiming instead that we should emphasize the concept of form. Then I bring in the concept of identity by means of the notion of substantial form. I continue by analyzing the relation between form and matter, defending the traditional theses of prime matter and of the unicity of substantial form. I then argue for the immateriality of the substantial form of the human person, viz. the soul, from an account of the human intellect. From this follows the soul's essential independence of matter. Finally, although the soul is the immaterial bearer of personal identity, that identity is still the identity of an essentially embodied being. I explain how these ideas are to be reconciled. Footnotesa I am grateful to Stephen Braude, John Cottingham, John Haldane, David Jehle, Joel Katzav, Eduardo Ortiz, and Fred Sommers for helpful comments and discussion of a draft of this essay. I would also like to thank Ellen Paul, whose suggestions have helped greatly to improve the essay's style and content
Odegard, Douglas (1977). Materialism and the contingency of dualism. Personalist 58 (April):135-137.   (Google)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John & McDonough, Jeffrey K. (1998). Numbers, minds, and bodies: A fresh look at mind-body dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:349-371.   (Google)
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Abstract: Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think
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Pietroski, Paul M. (1994). Mental causation for dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-66.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
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Abstract: Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes, and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being's mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which contemporary thinkers find more acceptable, human beings are physical substances but have mental properties, and those properties aren't physical. This view is known as property dualism, or the dual-aspect theory
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Abstract: Through the ages, Christians have almost automatically been Mind-Body dualists. The Bible portrays us as spiritual beings, and one obvious way to be a spiritual being is to be (or to have) an immaterial soul. Since it is also evident that we have bodies, Christians naturally have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two substances—a material body and a nonmaterial soul. Despite the historical weight of this position, I do not think that it is required either by Scripture or by Christian doctrine as it has developed through the ages. So, I want to argue that there is a Christian alternative to Mind-Body Dualism, and that the reasons in favor of the alternative outweigh those in favor of Mind-Body Dualism
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Abstract: This is a revised and updated version of Swinburne's controversial treatment of the eternal philosophical problem of the relation between mind and body. He argues that we can only make sense of the interaction between the mental and the physical in terms of the soul, and that there is no scientific explanation of the evolution of the soul
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Abstract: That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness is not even realized by or supervenient on physical properties. Where Descartes argued he could clearly and distinctly conceive mind and body as existing separately, contemporary anti-physicalists hold that the conceivability of worlds in which actual world correlations between physical and phenomenological properties fail shows that these correlations are contingent rather than logically or metaphysically necessary. Together with Descartes, they conclude from conceivability that identity, as well as strong supervenience, is false.1 If the argument of this paper is correct, however, then there is an argument for dualism that arises from the epistemological distinction, is grounded in the Meditations, and is yet distinct from the
conceivability arguments pursued both by Descartes and contemporary anti-physicalists. Furthermore, the argument is immune to the standard objections to conceivability arguments: its conclusion follows even if there are a posteriori identities between physical and phenomenal properties
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Zimmerman, Dean W. (2004). Should a Christian be a mind-body dualist?: Christians should affirm mind-body dualism. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 1 | Google)