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4.2a. Interactionism (Interactionism on PhilPapers)

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Addis, Laird (1984). Parallelism, interactionism, and causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:329-344.   (Google)
Abstract: One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem : (1) There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
Athens, Lonnie (2007). Radical interactionism: Going beyond Mead. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (2):137–165.   (Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. & Keating, Bernard (1981). Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90 (January):102-7.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Batthyany, Alexander & Elitzur, Avshalom C. (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.   (Google)
Beloff, John (1994). Minds and machines: A radical dualist perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):32-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Beloff, John (1976). Mind-body interactionism in light of the parapsychological evidence. Theoria to Theory 10 (May):125-37.   (Google)
Bonner, Kieran (1994). Hermeneutics and symbolic interactionism: The problem of solipsism. Human Studies 17 (2).   (Google)
Bricke, John (1975). Interaction and physiology. Mind 84 (April):255-9.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brodbeck, May (1966). Objectivism and interaction: A reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.   (Google | More links)
Buncombe, M. (1995). The Substance of Consciousness: An Argument for Interactionism. Avebury.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Burbank, Patricia M. & Martins, Diane C. (2010). Symbolic interactionism and critical perspective: Divergent or synergistic? Nursing Philosophy 11 (1):25-41.   (Google)
Abstract: Throughout their history, symbolic interactionism and critical perspective have been viewed as divergent theoretical perspectives with different philosophical underpinnings. A review of their historical and philosophical origins reveals both points of divergence and areas of convergence. Their underlying philosophies of science and views of human freedom are different as is their level of focus with symbolic interactionism having a micro perspective and critical perspective using a macro perspective. This micro/macro difference is reflected in the divergence of their major concepts, goals and basic tenets. While their underlying philosophies are different, however, they are not necessarily contradictory and areas of convergence may include the concepts of reference groups and looking glass self within symbolic interactionism and ideological hegemony within critical perspective. By using a pragmatic approach and combining symbolic interactionism and critical perspectives, both micro and macro levels come into focus and strategies for change across individual and societal levels can be developed and applied. Application of both symbolic interactionism and critical perspective to nursing research and scholarship offers exciting new opportunities for theory development and research methodologies. In nursing education, these two perspectives can give students added insight into patients' and families' problems at the micro level while, at the same time, giving them a lens to see and tools to apply to problems at the macro level in health care. In nursing practice, a combined symbolic interactionism/critical perspective approach assists nurses to give high-quality care at the individual level while also working at the macro level to address the manufacturers of illness. New research questions emerge from this combination of perspectives with new possibilities for theory development, a transformation in nursing education, and the potential for new practice strategies that can address individual client and larger system problems through empowerment of clients and nurses
Chalmers, David J. (unknown). How cartesian dualism might have been true. .   (Google)
Abstract: We could have been characters in a huge computer simulation. It is a familiar idea that the whole world might be simulated on a computer, and things would seem exactly the same to us (and indeed, who is to say that we are not)
Eccles, John C. (1980). The Human Psyche. Berlin: Springer.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Abstract: The Human Psyche is an in-depth exploration of dualist-interactionism, a concept Sir John Eccles developed with Sir Karl Popper in the context of a wide...
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1989). Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1995). Consciousness can no longer be ignored. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58.   (Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1990). Neither idealism nor materialism: A reply to Snyder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 303:303-307.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
Garrett, Brian J. (2000). Defending non-epiphenomenal event dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.   (Google)
Gaviola, E. (1936). The impossibility of interaction between mind and matter. Philosophy of Science 3 (2):133-142.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to the non-specialist reader
Holman, Emmett L. (1984). Continuity and the metaphysics of dualism. Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.   (Google | More links)
Holbrook, Daniel (1992). Descartes on mind-body interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.   (Google)
Horvath, Christopher D. (2000). Interactionism and innateness in the evolutionary study of human nature. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   While most researchers who use evolutionary theory to investigatehuman nature especially human sexuality describe themselves as ``interactionists'', there is no clear consensus on the meaning of thisterm in this context. By interactionism most people in the fieldmean something like, both nature and nurture ``count'' in thedevelopment of human psychology and behavior. Nevertheless, themultidisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology results in a widevariety of interpretations of this general claim. Today, mostdebates within evolutionary psychology about the innateness of agiven behavioral characteristic or over its development turn as muchon which conception of ``innateness'' and ``interactionism'' theresearcher holds as on any empirical data they might derive
Jackson, Frank (1980). Interactionism revived? Philosophy of Social Science 10 (September):316-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Koksvik, Ole (2007). Conservation of energy is relevant to physicalism. Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE
LaRock, Eric F. (2001). Dualistic interaction, neural dependence, and Aquinas's composite view. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):459-472.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Larmer, Robert A. (1986). Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (September):277-85.   (Annotation | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1994). A testable theory of mind-brain interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:119-26.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. & Arhem, P. (1996). Mind as a force field: Comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1920). Pragmatism as interactionism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (22):589-596.   (Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level
Lowe, E. J. (1993). The causal autonomy of the mental. Mind 102 (408):629-44.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1992). The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):263-76.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Thomas E. (1997). Selves and brains: Tracing a path between interactionism and materialism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):489-495.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A dialog between Donald MacKay and Mario Bunge, printed in the journal Neuroscience over the course of two years beginning in 1977, provides a conscise summary of MacKay's views on the mind-body relationship. In this dialog, MacKay contrasts the dualistic interactionism theory of Popper and Eccles with Bunge's emergentist materialism theory, and then builds a case for a third alternative based on the notion of mental events embodied in, but not identical to, brain events. Although neuroscience has made tremendous progress in the past two decades, MacKay's attempt to trace a path between interactionism and materialism is still worth considering
Margolis, Joseph (1966). Objectivism and interactionism. Philosophy of Science 33 (June):118-123.   (Google | More links)
McCauley, Robert N. & Lawson, E. Thomas, Interactionism and the non obviousness of scientific theories.   (Google)
Abstract: Levine's discussion of Rethinking Religion (1990) and "Crisis of Conscience, Riddle of Identity" (1993) includes some rash charges, some useful comments, and some profound misunderstandings. The latter, especially, reveal areas where we need to clarify and further defend our claims. In the second section we shall discuss the epistemological and methodological issues that Levine raises. Then we shall turn in the third section to theoretical and substantive matters. In fact, Levine remains almost completely silent on substantive matters (except to say that our claims are "obvious" and "trite.") Levine claims, in effect, (1) that religion is outside of the scope of scientific analysis, (2) that our competence approach to theorizing is not necessary for generating the theoretical claims that we make, and (3) that the substantive consequences of those theoretical claims are obvious and trivial. We unequivocally reject the first and third claims and, Levine's profound misunderstandings about the competence approach to theorizing notwithstanding, completely agree with the second. Identifying the confusions in Levine's discussion that inform item (3) will clarify our position. We turn first, though, to matters of epistemology and method (as these bear on items (1) and (2))
Mealey, Linda (1998). Testosterone-aggression relationship: An exemplar of interactionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):380-381.   (Google)
Abstract: Mazur & Booth provide life scientists with an example of the multilevel biopsychosocial approach. Research paradigms have to become more flexible and multidisciplinary if we are to free ourselves from the nature–nurture dichotomy that we have long agreed was simplistic and shortsighted. I point out a variety of kinds of interactions that may be the next frontier for behavioral scientists
Mills, Eugene O. (1996). Interactionism and overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
Mills, Eugene O. (1997). Interactionism and physicality. Ratio 10 (2):169-83.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1997). Interactionism, energy conservation, and the violation of physical laws. Physics Essays 10 (4):651–665.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (1999). The physics of interactionism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):165–184.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is another hard problem, in addition to the problem of how anything material can have the subjective, first-person phenomenology of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). It is the problem of how anything material can have freedom. By ‘freedom’ I mean a person’s ability to behave in a purposive, non-random fashion that is not determined by neurophysiological structure and physical law.
Montero, Barbara (2006). What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism? Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's monist interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Neunhäuserer, Jörg (ms). Panmentalism.   (Google)
Abstract: In this short note we develop an unorthodox panmentalistic and libertarian dualism. Especially we skech a mental-physikal law of free will. Our aim is to to provoke the contemporary scentific common-sense.
Popper, Karl R. (1955). A note on the body-mind problem. Analysis 15 (June):131-35.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Popper, Karl R. (ed.) (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper here examines the problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality and the relationship between human beings and their actions. In this illuminating series of papers, Popper suggests a theory of mind-body interaction that relates to evolutionary emergence, human language and what he calls "the three worlds." Rene; Descartes first posited the existence of two worlds--the world of physical bodies and the world of mental states. Popper argues for the existence of "world 3" which comprises the products of our human minds. He examines the interaction between mental states--hopes, needs, plans, ideologies or hypotheses--and the physical states of our brain. Popper forcefully argues against the materialism forwarded by many philosophers which denies the existence of mental states. Instead, he demonstrates that the problem of the interaction between mental and physical states remains unresolved. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem is based on Popper's never-before published lectures at Emory University in 1969. Popper has extensively revised the lectures but has retained their accessible format. He has also incorporated some of the discussions which followed the lectures, providing an engaging exchange between the philosopher and his audience
Popper, Karl R. (1953). Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism. Proceedings of the XI International Congress of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: It is not a paper on linguistic analysis (the analysis of word-usages). For I completely reject the claim of certain language analysts that the source of philosophical difficulties is to be found in the misuse of language. No doubt some people talk nonsense, but I claim (a) that there does not exist a logical or language-analytical method of detecting philosophical nonsense (which, by the way, does not stop short of the ranks of logicians, language analysts and semanticists); (b) that the belief that such a method exists -- the belief more especially that philosophical nonsense can be unmasked as due to what Russell might have called 'type-mistakes' and what nowadays are sometimes called 'category-mistakes' -- is the aftermath of a philosophy of language which has since turned out to be baseless.
Popper, Karl R. (1978). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32:339-55.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Popper, Karl R. & Eccles, John C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Springer.   (Cited by 130 | Google)
Abstract: Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical...
Richardson, Robert C. (1982). The 'scandal' of cartesian interactionism. Mind 91 (January):20-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Robb, David (2003). Dualism. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 1. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1955). A case for dualism and interactionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (June):451-76.   (Google | More links)
Roelofs, Howard D. (1947). Second thoughts on causation, dualism, and interaction. Mind 56 (January):60-71.   (Google | More links)
Rosenkranz, Sven (1994). A review of Eccles' arguments for dualist-interactionism. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1954). A note on Popper's argument for dualism. Analysis 15 (October):23-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Shanker, Stuart G. & King, Barbara J. (2002). The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):605-620.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years we have seen a dramatic shift, in several different areas of communication studies, from an information-theoretic to a dynamic systems paradigm. In an information processing system, communication, whether between cells, mammals, apes, or humans, is said to occur when one organism encodes information into a signal that is transmitted to another organism that decodes the signal. In a dynamic system, all of the elements are continuously interacting with and changing in respect to one another, and an aggregate pattern emerges from this mutual co-action. Whereas the information-processing paradigm looks at communication as a linear, binary sequence of events, the dynamic systems paradigm looks at the relation between behaviors and how the whole configuration changes over time. One of the most dramatic examples of the significance of shifting from an information processing to a dynamic systems paradigm can be found in the debate over the interpretation of recent advances in ape language research (ALR). To some extent, many of the early ALR studies reinforced the stereotype that animal communication is functional and stimulus bound, precisely because they were based on an information-processing paradigm that promoted a static model of communicative development. But Savage-Rumbaugh's recent results with bonobos has introduced an entirely new dimension into this debate. Shifting the terms of the discussion from an information-processing to a dynamic systems paradigm not only highlights the striking differences between Savage-Rumbaugh's research and earlier ALR studies, but further, it sheds illuminating light on the factors that underpin the development of communication skills in great apes and humans, and the relationship between communicative development and the development of language. Key Words: apes; ape language research (ALR); brain development; co-regulation; communication; dynamic systems; language development; symbols
Snyder, Douglas M. (1990). On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the physical world. Journal of Mind and Behavior 297:297-302.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). Body and soul. Think 5.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Swinburne, Richard (2003). The soul. In Timothy O'Connor & David Robb (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thilly, Frank (1901). The theory of interaction. Philosophical Review 10 (2):124-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Vandervert, Larry R. (1991). A measurable and testable brain-based emergent interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 201:201-219.   (Google)
Van Rooijen, Jeroen (1987). Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):87-92.   (Google | More links)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2009). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its colloraries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of "local interactionism" (compatible with causal closure) is proposed.
Wilson, D. L. (1999). Mind-brain interactionism and the violation of physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Cited by 11 | Google)