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4.2b. Epiphenomenalism (Epiphenomenalism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bailey, Andrew R., Zombies and epiphenomenalism.   (Google)
Abstract: RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est rarement formulés et l’autre nouveaux—sont plus persuasif. Le résultat, cependant, est que le zombist pourraient en effet être confronté à un engagement indésirables à l’epiphenomenalism de conscience
Bailey, Andrew R. (2006). Zombies, epiphenomenalism, and physicalist theories of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4).   (Google)
Beyer, Jason A. (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the eliminative strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.   (Google)
Bieri, Peter (1992). Trying out epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Birnbacher, Dieter (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2000). Against Chalmers' epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.   (Google)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1910). Huxley's epiphenomenalism: A criticism and an appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.   (Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Campbell, Neil (1998). Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Keith (1974). Comments on: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2005). Explanatory epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2001). What was Huxley's epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism is in factdifferent from the forms usually attributed to him
Capek, Milic (1954). James's early criticism of the automaton theory. Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Caston, Victor (1997). Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modern. Philosophical Review 106 (3):309-363.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2009). Still epiphenomenal qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.   (Google)
Abstract: Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (1997). Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Creel, Richard E. (1980). Radical epiphenomenalism: B.f. Skinner's account of private events. Behaviorism 8:31-53.   (Google)
Dauer, Francis W. (2001). McGinn's materialism and epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.   (Google | More links)
Dempsey, Liam & Shani, Itay (2009). Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1979). Taylor's refutation of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8:23-28.   (Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. & Polger, Thomas W. (1998). Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Fries, Horace S. (1929). Some attitudes and considerations and a biological argument for epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (23):626-634.   (Google | More links)
Gadenne, Volker (2006). In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Gjelsvik, Olav (1999). On mind and matter. In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Gulick, Robert (1992). Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3).   (Google)
Hodges, Michael P. (1979). Meaning and the impotence hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):515-29.   (Google)
Horowitz, Amir (1999). Is there a problem in physicalist epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.   (Google | More links)
Huxley, T. (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. Fortnightly Review 95:555-80.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Hyslop, Alec (2000). Methodological epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Baumgartner, Michael (2010). Interventionism and epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):pp. 359-383.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.   (Cited by 566 | Annotation | Google | More links)
James, William (1879). Are we automata? Mind 4 (13):1-22.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (1987). Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1980). Imitation-man and the 'new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (September):479-487.   (Annotation | Google)
Lachs, John (1967). Angel, animal, machine: Models for man. Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):221-27.   (Google)
Lachs, John (1963). Epiphenomenalism and the notion of cause. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):141-45.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lachs, John (1963). The impotent mind. Review of Metaphysics 17 (December):187-99.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Law, Stephen (2006). Honderich and the curse of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):61-70.   (Google)
Long, Wilbur (1953). Comments on the alleged proof of epiphenomenalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (February):355-58.   (Google | More links)
Lonky, M. L. (2003). Human consciousness: A systems approach to the mind/brain interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):91-118.   (Google)
Lyons, Jack C. (2006). In defense of epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible
McGilvary, Evander Bradley (1910). Huxley's epiphenomenalism: A criticism and an appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.   (Google | More links)
Mclaughlin, Brian P. (2006). Is role-functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1989). Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Megill, Jason (2007). Naturalism, physicalism and epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):681 – 686.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism
Menzel, Paul T. (1970). Epiphenomenalism and metaethical non-naturalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1).   (Google)
Muller, Hans (2009). More troubles for epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized
Nagasawa, Yujin (2010). The knowledge argument and epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson’s position is what I call the ‘inconsistency objection’. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson’s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is ‘the most powerful reply to the knowledge argument’ he knows of, it has never been discussed critically. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the objection and to identify and consider its implications. The objection is alleged to be based on a causal theory of knowledge. I argue that the objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that it is either false or does not support the inconsistency objection. In order to defend my argument, I offer a hypothesis concerning phenomenal knowledge
Newen, Albert & Cuplinskas, Rimas (2002). Mental causation: A real phenomenon in a physicalistic world without epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):139-167.   (Google)
Abstract: The so-called problem of mental causation as discussed in the recent literature raises three central challenges for an adequate solution from a physicalist perspective: the threat of epiphenomenalism, the problem of externalism (or the difficulty in accounting for the causal efficacy of extrinsic mental properties) and the problem of causal exclusion (or the threat of over determination). We wish to account for mental causationas a real phenomenon within a physicalistic framework without accepting epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The key ideas of our proposal are an internal realism of causation combined with a relative notion of individuating events. We are arguing?contra Davidson?tha there is no absolute notion of events (neither as types nor as tokens) but rather one which is relative to explanatory interests and our intuitions concerning a relevant spatial and temporal overlap. Furthermore, we are presupposing a metaphysics of internal realism: We can only characterize entities by means of concepts produced within our epistemological framework. Physical concepts and mental concepts crossclassify the world as it is. Relying on this framework we try to explain how mental causation can be adequately described: Although mental concepts are not reducible to physical concepts and mental event-tokens may be different from "underlying" physical event-tokens, mental events are real phenomena that are realized by physical phenomena in special context conditions
Noordhof, Paul (2003). Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pauen, Michael; Staudacher, Alexander & Walter, Sven (2006). Epiphenomenalism: Dead end or way out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.   (Google)
Pauen, Michael; Staudacher, & Walter, S. (2006). Editors' introduction -- epiphenomenalism: Dead end or way out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):7-19.   (Google)
Pecnjak, D. (1989). Epiphenomenalism and machines: A discussion of Van rooijen's critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (September):404-8.   (Google | More links)
Plantinga, Alvin (2004). Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pockett, Susan (2004). Does consciousness cause behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (2002). Consciousness, adaptation and epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Popper, Karl R. (1977). Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Power, Nicholas P. (1996). Fodor's vindication of folk psychology and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Physicalism and the evolution of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:171-83.   (Google)
Randrup, Axel (ms). Conscious experience, existence and behaviour.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If consciousness has no influence on my behaviour,what shall I do with it ? In this paper it is contended, that even if neuroscience is right, if some conscious experiences such as emotional experiences have no influence on our behavior, they still constitute a significant part of our world, our existence. For understanding the significance of conscious experiences we should go beyond behaviour, biology and biological evolution. This paper and its understanding of consciousness and natural science is based on an idealist philosophy maintaining, that only conscious experience is real. Conscious experience is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it cannot be explained. Key words: Consciousness as existence; behaviour; communication; language; free will; idealist philosophy; collective conscious experience; cognition
Raymont, Paul (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto   (Google)
Rivas, Titus & van Dongen, Hein (2001). Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (online). Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Robinson, William (2007). Evolution and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on 'explanation'. Finally, an argument by Plantinga (2004), which applies to beliefs rather than phenomenal qualities, is stated and rebutted
Robinson, Daniel N. (1993). Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, William S. (2006). Knowing epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things
Robinson, William S. (2004). Perception, affect and epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism
Rudd, Anthony J. (2000). Phenomenal judgment and mental causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):53-69.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sabatés, Marcelo H. (2003). Being without doing. Topoi 22 (2):111-125.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2006). Emergence, epiphenomenalism and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):21-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Causation can be regarded from either an explanatory/epistemic or an ontological viewpoint. From the former, emergent features enter into a host of causal relationships which form a hierarchical structure subject to scientific investigation. From the latter, the paramount issue is whether emergent features provide any novel causal powers, or whether the 'go' of the world is exhausted by the fundamental physical features which underlie emergent phenomena. I argue here that the 'Scientific Picture of the World' (SPW) strongly supports the claim that ontological causation is exhausted in the elementary physical features of the world. A method is developed for distinguishing 'emergent ontological causation' from the epistemological emergent explanatory patterns sanctioned by the SPW, and it is argued that the SPW implies that all emergence is mere epistemological emergence. However, this leads to a paradox when applied to consciousness itself, which turns out to be both epiphenomenal and viewpoint dependent
Seager, William E. (ms). Generalized epiphenomenalism.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem that, once granted, generalized epiphenomenalism is fairly innocuous, since its threat is too diffuse to provoke traditional worries about the epiphenomenal nature of mental states. If mental states are epiphenomenal only in the same sense that the putative powers of hurricanes, psyche- delic drugs or hydrogen bombs are epiphenomenal, then probably there is not much to worry about in the epiphenomenalism of the mental. I agree that the epiphenomenalism of hurricanes and the like is manageable, but it will turn out that ensuring manageability requires that mental states have an ontological status fundamentally different from that of hurricanes, drugs and bombs, a status that is in fact inconsistent with the SPW. So I’ll argue that generalized epiphenomenalism does have some seriously worrying consequences after all
Segal, Gabriel M. A. (2009). The causal inefficacy of content. Mind and Language 24 (1):80-102.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper proceeds to argue against Kim's ( Kim, 2000, 2005 ) attempt to articulate a plausible version of reductionism. It is then argued that psychological properties, along with paradigmatically causally efficacious macro-properties, such as toughness, are causally inefficacious in respect of their possessor's typical effects, because they are insufficiently distinct from those effects. It is finally suggested that the distinction between epiphenomenalism and overdeterminationism may be more terminological than real
Seth, James (1894). Are we 'conscious automata'? Philosophical Review 3 (3):278-288.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. & Sober, Elliott (forthcoming). Epiphenomenalism - the do's and the don'ts. In G. Wolters & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Agent causation, functional explanation, and epiphenomenal engines: Can conscious mental events be causally efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.   (Google)
Sleutels, Jan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.   (Google)
Slors, Marc (2003). Epiphenomenalism and cross-realization induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation does what none of the currently available ones can: combine the generally accepted ideas that (i) folk-psychology is a successful means of predicting, explaining, and understanding human behaviour and (ii) that mental states are multiply realized. Given these two steps, it is relatively safe to say that there is no epiphe-nomenalism-threat to nonreductive physicalism
Smith, Peter K. (1984). Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism: A reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, Nick (ms). EPIPHENOMENALISM Keith Campbell and Nicholas J.j. Smith december 1993.   (Google)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both the feeling and the yawning are effects of an underlying neural state
Sober, Elliott (ms). Epiphenomenalism – the do's and the don'ts.   (Google)
Abstract: When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann’s experimental arguments against the inheritance of acquired characters. This conception of how epiphenomenalism ought to be developed helps clarify some mistakes in two recent epiphenomenalist positions – Jaegwon Kim’s (1993) arguments against mental causation, and the arguments developed by Walsh (2000), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002), and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that natural selection and drift are not causes of evolution. A manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003) leads naturally to an account of how macro- and micro-causation are related and to an understanding of how epiphenomenalism at different levels of organization should be understood
Spät, Patrick (2006). A pill against epiphenomenalism. Abstracta 2 (2):172-9.   (Google | More links)
Laurie, S. S. (1894). Reflexions suggested by psychophysical materialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (9):56-76.   (Google | More links)
Staudacher, Alexander (2006). Epistemological challenges to qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge which does not invoke causation at all. Michael Pauen has argued extensively (this volume of Journal of Consciousness Studies), however, that this line of defence doesn't work because it presupposes the existence of psychophysical laws connecting qualia with physical phenomena which cannot be established under epiphenomenalist presuppositions. It is argued that Pauen's arguments lead to sceptical consequences which threaten not only interactionist alternatives to epiphenomenalism but finally his own account
Suster, Danilo (2001). Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.   (Google)
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van Gulick, Robert (1992). Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.   (Google)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2009). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its colloraries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of "local interactionism" (compatible with causal closure) is proposed.
Vendler, Zeno (1991). Epiphenomena. In Certainty and Surface in Epistemology and Philosophical Method. Lewiston: Mellen Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wallhagen, Morgan (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark ([2001]) does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. 1 Introduction 2 Clarifying EBC 2.1 Control and guidance 2.2 Fine-tuned activity 3 The empirical case against EBC 4 Conclusion
Walter, Sven (2009). Epiphenomenalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism
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