Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
updated 2008-11-22 16:20:35
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

4.3b. Causal Role Functionalism

See also:
Alward, Peter (2004). Mad, Martian, but not mad Martian pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad pain—pain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian pain—pain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role in normal humans). After all, what it is to be in pain according to the identity theory is to be in whatever state that occupies the pain role for us
Armstrong, David M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.   (Cited by 723 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Armstrong, David M. (1970). The nature of mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.   (Cited by 111 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Braddon-Mitchell, David & Jackson, K. (1999). The divide-and-conquer path to analytic functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26:71-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Clark, Austen (1983). Functionalism and the definition of theoretical terms. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:339-352.   (Google | Edit)
Clark, Austen (1986). Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53 (December):535-59.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Cornman, James W. (1968). Mental terms, theoretical terms, and materialism. Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Goldstein, Irwin (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Hiley, David R. (1973). Armstrong's concept of a mental state. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11:113-118.   (Google | Edit)
Hodges, Michael P. (1979). Armstrong's causal analysis and direct knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:335-343.   (Google | Edit)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59 (June):321-38.   (Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1984). On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and prior on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46 (July):75-96.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Jackson, Frank; Pargetter, Robert & Prior, E. W. (1982). Functionalism and type-type identity theories. Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Jackson, Frank (2005). Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui Generis. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D.H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google | Edit)
Kernohan, Andrew (1990). Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3:235-46.   (Annotation | Google | Edit)
Lewis, David (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.   (Cited by 127 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Lewis, David (1978). Mad pain and Martian pain. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.   (Cited by 111 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Lewis, David (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
McGinn, Colin (1980). Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):35-46.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Nagel, Thomas (1970). Armstrong on the mind. Philosophical Review 79 (July):394-403.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Owens, Joseph (1982). The failure of Lewis's functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Rogler, Erwin (2000). On David Lewis' philosophy of mind. Protosociology 14:285-311.   (Google | Edit)
Rupert, Robert D. (2006). Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Sayward, Charles (1995). Taking actions seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24):51-60.   (Google | Edit)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1981). Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.   (Cited by 45 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Tye, Michael (1983). Functionalism and type physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)