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4.3b. Causal Role Functionalism (Causal Role Functionalism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alward, Peter (2004). Mad, Martian, but not mad Martian pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.   (Google)
Abstract: Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad pain—pain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian pain—pain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role in normal humans). After all, what it is to be in pain according to the identity theory is to be in whatever state that occupies the pain role for us
Armstrong, David M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.   (Cited by 723 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This causal analysis of mental concepts, along with the similar theory by David Lewis, has come to dominate all subsequent debates in the philosophy of mind. In the preface to this updated edition, Armstrong reflects on the impact of the book, and places it in the context of subsequent developments. A full bibliography of all the key writings that have appeared in the materialist debate is also provided
Armstrong, David M. (1970). The nature of mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.   (Cited by 111 | Annotation | Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, David & Jackson, K. (1999). The divide-and-conquer path to analytic functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26:71-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Clark, Austen (1983). Functionalism and the definition of theoretical terms. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:339-352.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (1986). Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53 (December):535-59.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1968). Mental terms, theoretical terms, and materialism. Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Endicott, Ronald P. (2007). Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles. Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still higher-level states generated by them. I defend this position on grounds that mental properties should be understood by our best scientific theories, which at present include informatioin about mental engineering. I further defend this claim by a "parity of reasons" argument. Causal-role functionalists are justified to include sensory stimuli in their theory of mind as opposed to, say, the remote causes of sensory stimuli because the former but not the latter are items of direct mental production. But ditto for the system's physical realizations. They too directly produce mental states, only not by "causing" them but by "realizing" them. Engineering realizations and their input triggering conditions work in tandem. In addition, I tell a related but more general metaphysical story about property identity, namely, that the traditional causal theory should be replaced by a more comprehensive nomic theory that individuates properties by their intra-level causal powers as well as their inter-level realization capacities.
Goldstein, Irwin (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Hiley, David R. (1973). Armstrong's concept of a mental state. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11:113-118.   (Google)
Hodges, Michael P. (1979). Armstrong's causal analysis and direct knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:335-343.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59 (June):321-38.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1984). On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and prior on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46 (July):75-96.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank; Pargetter, Robert & Prior, E. W. (1982). Functionalism and type-type identity theories. Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2005). Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui Generis. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D.H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Kernohan, Andrew (1990). Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):235-46.   (Annotation | Google)
Lewis, David (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.   (Cited by 127 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1978). Mad pain and Martian pain. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.   (Cited by 111 | Annotation | Google)
Lewis, David (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1980). Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):35-46.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Moffett, Marc (2010). Against a posteriori functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 83-106.   (Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1970). Armstrong on the mind. Philosophical Review 79 (July):394-403.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1982). The failure of Lewis's functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rogler, Erwin (2000). On David Lewis' philosophy of mind. Protosociology 14:285-311.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2006). Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sayward, Charles (1995). Taking actions seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24):51-60.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1981). Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.   (Cited by 45 | Annotation | Google)
Tye, Michael (1983). Functionalism and type physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)