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4.4. Supervenience (Supervenience on PhilPapers)

Almeida, Michael J. (2004). Supervenience and property-identical divine-command theory. Religious Studies 40 (3):323-333.   (Google)
Abstract: Property-identical divine-command theory (PDCT) is the view that being obligatory is identical to being commanded by God in just the way that being water is identical to being H2O. If these identity statements are true, then they express necessary a posteriori truths. PDCT has been defended in Robert M. Adams (1987) and William Alston (1990). More recently Mark C. Murphy (2002) has argued that property-identical divine-command theory is inconsistent with two well-known and well-received theses: the free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis. I show that Murphy's argument is vitiated by mistaken assumptions about the substitutivity of metaphysical identicals in contexts of supervenience. The free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis therefore pose no serious threat to PDCT. (Published Online August 11 2004)
Ball, Stephen W. (1989). Facts, values, and normative supervenience. Philosophical Studies 55 (2).   (Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1992). Supervenience, emergence, and reduction. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Bender, John W. (1996). Realism, supervenience, and irresolvable aesthetic disputes. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (4):371-381.   (Google | More links)
Bender, John (1987). Supervenience and the justification of aesthetic judgments. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (1):31-40.   (Google | More links)
Bolender, John (1998). Factual phenomenalism: A supervenience theory. Sorites 9 (9):16-31.   (Google)
Bonevac, Daniel (1991). Semantics and supervenience. Synthese 87 (3).   (Google)
Bovens, Luc & Drai, Dalia (1999). Supervenience and moral realism. Philosophia 27 (1-2).   (Google)
Brakel, J. (1996). Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. Synthese 106 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience is a relation between different discourses which has all the advantages of reduction, but without its disadvantages. I apply the more abstract considerations to two concrete cases: schizophrenia and colour. Usually an interlevel or interdiscourse relation is seen as asymmetrical: the overlaying discourse depends on the underlying discourse (and not vice versa), where the out- or un-spoken assumption is that the ultimate underlying discourse is physical. Instead I argue that scientific categories referred to in interdiscourse relations are, ultimately, dependent on common sense categories and common sense normative criteria. It is the manifest categories and common sense ideas about what is reasonable and what is right that determine the relevant categorisations at the deeper, underlying levels. I suggest that the implications of this are not merely methodological or epistemological
Bricker, Phillip (online). The relation between general and particular: Entailment vs. supervenience.   (Google)
Brown, Robin & Ladyman, James (2009). Physicalism, supervenience and the fundamental level. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.   (Google | More links)
Callender, C. (2001). Humean supervenience and rotating homogeneous matter. Mind 110 (437).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: is the thesis that everything supervenes upon the spatiotemporal distribution of local intrinsic qualities. A recent threat to HS, originating in thought experiments by Armstrong and Kripke, claims that the mere possibility of rotating homogeneous discs proves HS false. I argue that the rotating disc argument (RDA) fails. If I am right, Humeans needn't abandon or alter HS to make sense of rotating homogeneous discs. Homogeneous discs, as necessarily understood by RDA, are not the sorts of things in which we should believe. These discs do not belong in our ontology - not because there is a problem with their homogeneity, but (surprisingly) because there is a problem with their rotation. RDA is shown to be a kind of parody of classic arguments for spatial substantivalism
Campbell, Review author[s]: Keith (1991). Causation, supervenience, and method. Reflections on Jonathan Bennett's events and their names. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):637-640.   (Google | More links)
Cleve, James (1990). Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3).   (Google)
Collier, John (2004). Reduction, supervenience, and physical emergence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):629-630.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: After distinguishing reductive explanability in principle from ontological deflation, I give a case of an obviously physical property that is reductively inexplicable in principle. I argue that biological systems often have this character, and that, if we make certain assumptions about the cohesion and dynamics of the mind and its physical substrate, then it is emergent according to Broad's criteria
Conee, Earl (1995). Supervenience and intentionality. In Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cross, Troy (forthcoming). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.   (Google)
Abstract: Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
Currie, Gregory (1990). Supervenience, essentialism and aesthetic properties. Philosophical Studies 58 (3).   (Google)
Dancy, Jonathan (1995). Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies 78 (3).   (Google)
Darby, George (2009). Lewis's worldmate relation and the apparent failure of Humean supervenience. Dialectica 63 (2):195-204.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers two aspects of Lewis's metaphysics to which spatiotemporal relations appear central, with the aim of showing them to be less so. First, Lewis reluctantly characterises what it is for two things to be part of the same possible world in terms of an analogically spatiotemporal category of relations, rather than a wider natural external category. But Lewis's reason for restricting himself to the narrower category is unpersuasive. Second, Humean supervenience is formulated with spatiotemporal relations at its core. But that seems negotiable. A reason for caring about this is that quantum mechanics is supposed to threaten Lewis's metaphysics by introducing natural external relations that are not (even analogically) spatiotemporal, hence the interest in how central spatiotemporal relations really are
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Davies, Martin (1992). Perceptual content and local supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
Depaul, Michael R. (1987). Supervenience and moral dependence. Philosophical Studies 51 (3).   (Google)
Dieterle, J. M. (2000). Supervenience and necessity: A response to Balaguer. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Mark Balaguer attempts to show that there is (1) one and only one defensible version of platonism, (2) one and only one defensible version of anti-platonism, and (3) no fact of the matter as to which is true. His arguments depend essentially on the notion of supervenience, yet he rejects metaphysical necessity. I argue that he cannot use logical, conceptual, or nomological necessity to explicate supervenience. Balaguer must either give up the arguments that make use of supervenience or accept metaphysical necessity. I also consider and reject a possible response to my arguments
Douven, Igor (1999). Style and supervenience. British Journal of Aesthetics 39 (3).   (Google)
Dreier, James (ms). The supervenience argument against moral realism.   (Google)
Abstract: In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to particular varieties of moral realism. As I see it, we must look to these various brands if we want to understand just where the concept of supervenience can be usefully employed
Earman, John & Roberts, John T. (2005). Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part I: Humean supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1–22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments
Earman, John & Roberts, John T. (2005). Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part II: The epistemological argument for Humean supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):253–286.   (Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (2001). Vagueness, sharp boundaries, and supervenience conditions. Synthese 127 (3).   (Google)
Elshof, Ten G. (1997). Supervenient difficulties with nonreductive physicalism: A critical analysis of supervenience physicalism. Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.   (Google)
Farrelly, Colin (2005). Historical materialism and supervenience. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article I put forth a new interpretation of historical materialism titled the supervenient interpretation . Drawing on the insights of analytical Marxism and utilizing the concept of supervenience, I advance two central claims. First, that Marx's synchronic materialism maintains that the superstructure supervenes naturally on the economic structure. Second, that diachronic materialism maintains that the relations of production supervene naturally on the forces of production. Taken together, these two theses help bring to the fore the central tenets of historical materialism. Furthermore, they help resolve what I call the problem of reductionism and the problem of verification . Key Words: Marx • historical materialism • supervenience • synchronic materialism • diachronic materialism
Feit, Neil (2006). The doctrine of propositions, internalism, and global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.   (Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Individualism and supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:235-262.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1998). The nonreductionist's troubles with supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.   (Google)
French, Steven (1989). Individuality, supervenience and bell's theorem. Philosophical Studies 55 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Some recent work in the philosophy of quantum mechanics has suggested that quantum systems can be thought of as non-separable and therefore non-individual, in some sense, in Bell and E.P.R. type situations. This suggestion is set in the context of previous work regarding the individuality of quantal particles and it is argued that such entities can be considered as individuals if their non-classical statistical correlations are understood in terms of non-supervenient relations holding between them. We conclude that such relations are strongly non-supervenient in Cleland's sense and note a possible connection between this idea and the realist quantum logic programme
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). The supervenience of mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Gibbons, John (1993). Identity without supervenience. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Goetz, Stewart C. (1994). Dualism, causation, and supervenience. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):92-108.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hanson, Philip P. (2001). Mind, matter, and supervenience: A reply to Mulhauser. Minds and Machines 11 (2).   (Google)
Hare, John E. (2009). Pt. 2. praecipue de hominibus. The supervenience of goodness on being. In Kevin Timpe (ed.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump. Routledge.   (Google)
Haslanger, Sally (1994). Humean supervenience and enduring things. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):339 – 359.   (Google | More links)
Haugeland, John (1982). Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):93-103.   (Cited by 45 | Annotation | Google)
Hiddleston, Eric (ms). Humean supervenience, chance, and magic.   (Google)
Hoffmann, Vera & Newen, Albert (2007). Supervenience of extrinsic properties. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to define a notion of supervenience which can adequately describe the systematic dependence of extrinsic as well as of intrinsic higher-level properties on base-level features. We argue that none of the standard notions of supervenience—the concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience—fulfil this function. The concept of regional supervenience, which is purported to improve on the standard conceptions, turns out to be problematic as well. As a new approach, we develop the notion of property-dependent supervenience. This notion is founded on a criterion of relevance adapting the supervenience base to the considered higher-level properties in a specific way, such that only features which are relevant to the instantiation of the higher-level properties under consideration are taken into account
Holmes, Robert L. (1966). Descriptivism, supervenience, and universalizability. Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):113-119.   (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terry (1997). Deep ignorance, brute supervenience, and the problem of the many. Philosophical Issues 8:229-236.   (Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. (2009). Emergentism and supervenience physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A purely metaphysical formulation of physicalism is surprisingly elusive. One popular slogan is, 'There is nothing over and above the physical'. Problems with this arise on two fronts. First, it is difficult to explain what makes a property 'physical' without appealing to the methodology of physics or to particular ways in which properties are known. This obviously introduces epistemic features into the core of a metaphysical issue. Second, it is difficult to cash out 'over-and-aboveness' in a way that is rigorous, metaphysically pure and extensionally apt for the purposes of the debate. In this paper I will touch on the first problem, but I wish to focus on the second. In particular, I will focus on the claim that supervenience theses cannot define physicalism because they allow classical emergentist dualism through the physicalist door [Horgan 1993; Kim 1998; Wilson 2005]. I will argue that when the relevant supervenience thesis is metaphysical, emergentism is excluded. Against recent arguments to the contrary, I maintain that this is the case even given necessitarianism about natural laws [Wilson 2005]. I will argue that a necessitarian with emergentist sympathies will be forced either into a type of quasi-panpsychism, where our basic physical properties contain the illicit seeds of mentality at their core, or she will be forced to admit that emergence laws are not necessary after all. Either way, the combination of necessitarianism and emergentism does not provide a counterexample to supervenience physicalism
Humphreys, Paul W. (1997). Emergence, not supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Humberstone, I. L. (1993). Functional dependencies, supervenience, and consequence relations. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: An analogy between functional dependencies and implicational formulas of sentential logic has been discussed in the literature. We feel that a somewhat different connexion between dependency theory and sentential logic is suggested by the similarity between Armstrong's axioms for functional dependencies and Tarski's defining conditions for consequence relations, and we pursue aspects of this other analogy here for their theoretical interest. The analogy suggests, for example, a different semantic interpretation of consequence relations: instead of thinking ofB as a consequence of a set of formulas {A1,...,A n} whenB is true on every assignment of truth-values on which eachA i is true, we can think of this relation as obtaining when every pair of truth-value assignments which give the same truth-values toA 1, the same truth-values toA 2,..., and the same truth-values toA n, also make the same assignment in respect ofB. We describe the former as the consequence relation inference-determined by the class of truth-value assignments (valuations) under consideration, and the latter as the consequence relation supervenience-determined by that class of assignments. Some comparisons will be made between these two notions
Hurley, S. L. (1985). Supervenience and the possibility of coherence. Mind 94 (376):501-525.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1996). Moral functionalism, supervenience and reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):82-86.   (Google | More links)
Jaeger, Lydia (2002). Humean supervenience and best-system laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):141 – 155.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: David Lewis has proposed an analysis of lawhood in terms of membership of a system of regularities optimizing simplicity and strength in information content. This article studies his proposal against the broader background of the project of Humean supervenience. In particular, I claim that, in Lewis's account of lawhood, his intuition about small deviations from a given law in nearby worlds (in order to avoid backtracking and epiphenomena) leads to the conclusion that laws do not support (certain) counterfactuals and do not bestow nomic necessity on (certain) facts induced by these laws. Support of counterfactuals and nomic necessity, however, are widely held to be important aspects of the concept of lawhood. In my view, therefore, it is not possible to abandon these criteria in any satisfactory analysis of the notion of laws of nature. In a final section, I suggest that the whole project of Humean supervenience is misleading. It does not sufficiently take notice of the important role that reasoning about contrary-to-fact situations plays in modern scientific practice
Johansson, Ingvar (2001). Hartmann's nonreductive materialism, superimposition, and supervenience. Axiomathes 12 (3-4).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Judisch, Neal (2009). Descartes' revenge part II : The supervenience argument strikes back. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Karakostas, Vassilios, Humean supervenience in the light of contemporary science.   (Google)
Abstract: It is shown that Lewis’ ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, the claim that contemporary physical science may posit non-supervenient relations beyond the spatiotemporal ones is reinforced on a foundational basis concerning constraints on the state-representation of physical systems. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems — unit state vectors versus statistical density operators — we distinguish between strongly and weakly non-Humean, non-supervenient relations. It is demonstrated that in either case the relations of quantum entanglement constitute prototypical examples of irreducible physical relations that do not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, weakening, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. It is examined, in this respect, the status of Lewis’ recombination principle, whereas his conception of lawhood is critically investigated. It is concluded that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis’ Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that, due to the undeniable existence of non-supervenient relations, a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level
Keaton, Douglas (forthcoming). Kim's supervenience argument and the nature of total realizers. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: I offer a novel objection to Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument. I argue that the Supervenience Argument relies upon an untenable conception of the base physical properties upon which mental properties are supposed to supervene: the base properties are required to be both ordinary physical/causal properties and also unconditionally sufficient for the properties that they subvene. But these requirements are mutually exclusive; as a result, at least two premises in the Supervenience Argument are false. I argue that this has disruptive consequences both for the reductive position that Kim defends and the non-reductive position that he attacks. Neither side in the debate over the status of functionally conceived mental properties comes out unscathed
Kierland, Brian & Monton, Bradley (2007). Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485 – 497.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, we show that presentism - the view that the way things are is the way things presently are - is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Kim, Sungsu (2000). Supervenience and causations: A probabilistic approach. Synthese 122 (3):245-259.   (Google)
Abstract:   It is often argued that if a mentalproperty supervenes on a physical property, then (1)the mental property M ``inherits'''' its causal efficacyfrom the physical property P and (2) the causalefficacy of M reduces to that of P. However, once weunderstand the supervenience thesis and the concept ofcausation probabilistically, it turns out that we caninfer the causal efficacy of M from that of P andvice versa if and only if a certain condition, whichI call the ``line-up'''' thesis, holds. I argue that thesupervenience thesis entails neither this conditionnor its denial. I also argue that even when theline-up thesis holds true, reductionism about thecausal efficacy of the mental property doesn''tfollow
Kim, Jaegwon (1985). Supervenience, determination, and reduction. Journal of Philosophy 82 (11):616-618.   (Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Supervenience, emergence, realization, reduction. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1990). Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85 (November):339-52.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Klagge, James C. (1987). Supervenience: Perspectives V. possible worlds. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):312-315.   (Google | More links)
Kutschera, Franz (1992). Supervenience and reductionism. Erkenntnis 36 (3).   (Google)
Ladyman, James (2004). Supervenience: Not local and not two-way. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):630-630.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics
Lange, Marc (2000). Salience, supervenience, and layer cakes in Sellars's scientific realism, McDowell's moral realism, and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3).   (Google)
Le Poidevin, Robin (2004). Space, supervenience and substantivalism. Analysis 64 (3):191–198.   (Google | More links)
Leuenberger, Stephan (2008). Supervenience in metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):749-762.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Supervenience is a topic-neutral, broadly logical relation between classes of properties or facts. In a slogan, A supervenes on B if and only if there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. The first part of this paper considers different ways in which that slogan has been cashed out. The second part discusses applications of concepts of supervenience, focussing on the question whether they may provide an explication of determination theses such as physicalism
Leuenberger, Stephan (2009). What is global supervenience? Synthese 170 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience
Lewis, David (1994). Symposium: Chance and credence: Humean supervenience debugged. Mind 103 (412).   (Google)
List, Christian & Pettit, Philip (2006). Group agency and supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44:85-105.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So, knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be 'set-wise', not 'proposition-wise'. Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious, but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members' corresponding individual judgments
Liz, Manuel (2003). Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Mabrito, Robert (2005). Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience? Philosophical Studies 126 (2).   (Google)
MacKinnon, JE (2001). Aesthetic supervenience: For and against. British Journal of Aesthetics 41 (1).   (Google)
Macdonald, Graham (2004). Causation, supervenience, and special sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):631-631.   (Google)
Abstract: Ross & Spurrett (R&S) argue that Kim's reductionism rests on a restricted account of supervenience and a misunderstanding about causality. I contend that broadening supervenience does nothing to avoid Kim's argument and that it is difficult to see how employing different notions of causality helps to avoid the problem. I end by sketching a different solution
MacKinnon, John E. (2000). Scruton, Sibley, and supervenience. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (4):383-392.   (Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (ms). Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism.   (Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (forthcoming). Supervenience and neuroscience. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The philosophical technical term “supervenience” is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience, “fine-grained supervenience,” which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists
Marras, Ausonio (2004). Functionalism without multiple supervenience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):632-632.   (Google)
Abstract: Multiple supervenience is a problematic notion whose role can well be served by a contextualized or properly restricted standard notion of supervenience. It is furthermore not needed to defend functionalism against Kim's charge that cross-classifying taxonomies imply a serious form of dualism; nor does Ross & Spurrett's (R&S's) Kitcherian account of the metaphysics of causation crucially depend on multiple supervenience
Marras, Ausonio (2007). Kim's supervenience argument and nonreductive physicalism. Erkenntnis 66 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs. nonreductive physicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated
Marras, Ausonio (2001). On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: Mind-body identity and supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity and supervenience
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism. Synthese 95 (2):275-304.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties
McFetridge, I. G. (1985). Supervenience, realism, necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):245-258.   (Google | More links)
Mclaughlin, Brian P. (1984). Perception, causation, and supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:569-592.   (Google)
Bennett, Karen & McLaughlin, Brian (online). Supervenience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1999). Elias E. Savellos and ümit D. yalçin (eds.) Supervenience: New essay (cambridge university press, cambridge: 1995)supercalifragilisticexpialidocious. Noûs 33 (1):144–154.   (Google | More links)
Menzies, Peter (1993). Laws, modality, and Humean supervenience. In J. Bacon, K. Campbell & L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Mendonça, Wilson (2002). Supervenience and the problem of downward causation. Manuscrito 25:251-270.   (Google)
Mogi, Ken (1999). Supervenience and qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):844-845.   (Google)
Abstract: The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuroscience might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neuroscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the supervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural activity
Morton, P. (1993). Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
M., J. (2002). Supervenience and (non-modal) reductionism in Leibniz's philosophy of time. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):793-810.   (Google)
Abstract: It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz's causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz's philosophy of time. On the view of Leibniz defended here, he adopts a non-modal reduction of time to events, a form of reductionism that entails a strong covariation between a world's temporal facts and its causal facts. Consequently, worlds discernible with respect to their temporal facts must be discernible with respect to their causal facts, and worlds discernible with respect to their causal facts must be discernible with respect to their temporal facts. This position strongly favors the standard identificatory reduction of time to causation often imputed to Leibniz
Muelder, Eaton Marcia (1998). Intention, supervenience, and aesthetic realism. British Journal of Aesthetics 38 (3).   (Google)
Mumford, Stephen (1994). Dispositions, supervenience and reduction. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):419-438.   (Google | More links)
Murphy, Nancey C. (1999). Supervenience and the downward efficacy of the mental: A nonreductive physicalist account of human action. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Newman, Micah (2008). Chemical supervenience. Foundations of Chemistry 10 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   This paper surveys some ways in which the chemical realm can be described and outlined in terms of the concept of supervenience. The particular contours of general chemical theory provide a ready basis for interpretation of determination, covariance, and nonreduction—the characteristic metaphysical facets of the supervenience relation—in mutual terms. Building on this, the extent to which chemically characterized properties and entities can be described in terms of a supervenience-scaffolded structure represents a particularly vivid application that philosophers in general interested in supervenience would do well to attend to. In addition, the model of chemical supervenience given here can be used as a rubric on which to decide on issues already raised by philosophers of chemistry
Noordhof, Paul (1999). Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Oddie, Graham (1991). Supervenience, goodness, and higher-order universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47.   (Google | More links)
O'Dea, John (2006). Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.   (Google)
Abstract: The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that is to say, purported failures of supervenience. The refutation of putative counter-examples has been, it seems to me, by and large successful. But there is a certain class of these for which the representationalist response has been something less than completely convincing. These are the cross-modality cases. I will explain what I mean, and then argue that the response in question is not only unconvincing but actually undermines the representationalist position.
Oppy, G. (2000). Humean supervenience? Philosophical Studies 101 (1).   (Google)
Owens, Joseph (1993). Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1992). Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation. Synthese 90 (1):89-117.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Pagès, Joan (2005). Truthmaking and supervenience. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2):191-197.   (Google)
Abstract: In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker essentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated
Parsons, Review author[s]: Terence (1991). Tropes and supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):629-632.   (Google | More links)
Platchias, Dimitris (2008). Representationalism, symmetrical supervenience and identity. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not a property of one’s experience but an externally constituted property of the perceived physical object. In this sense, qualia are out there, in the external world. Here, I argue that the main representationalist arguments to this effect, if successful, establish no more than a symmetrical supervenience relation between representational content and qualia, and that a supervenience relation alone (albeit symmetrical) doesn’t suffice for identity. This supervenience thesis between qualia and representational content leaves open the question as to the essential nature of qualia
Polger, Tom, Moorean supervenience.   (Google)
Abstract: G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources available to physicalists
Post, John F., Breakwater: The new wave, supervenience and individualism.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism, Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that ALL a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology
Post, John F. (2000). Is supervenience asymmetric? In [Book Chapter] (in Press).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: After some preliminary clarifications, arguments for the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination, such as they are, are shown to be unsound. An argument against the supposed asymmetry is then constructed and defended against objections. This is followed by explanations of why the intuition of asymmetry is nonetheless so entrenched, and of how the asymmetric ontological priority of the physical over the non-physical can be understood without the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination
Post, John F. (1995). Review of Jaegwon Kim, supervenience and mind. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: "Adaptation properties," as individuated according to evolutionary biology, cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. This causes serious if not fatal trouble for several of Kim's crucial theses: the Causal Individuation of Kinds, Weak Supervenience, Alexander's Dictum, the synchronicity thesis (that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism), the Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that all a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology
Preti, Consuelo (1998). The irrelevance of supervenience. Protosociology 11:160-172.   (Google)
Prosser, Simon (2009). Zeno objects and supervenience. Analysis 69 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers accept a ‘layered’ world‐view according to which the facts about the higher ontological levels supervene on the facts about the lower levels. Advocates of such views often have in mind a version of atomism, according to which there is a fundamental level of indivisible objects known as simples or atoms upon whose spatiotemporal locations and intrinsic properties everything at the higher levels supervenes.1 Some, however, accept the possibility of ‘gunk’ worlds in which there are parts ‘all the way down’ such that there are no simples and insofar as composite objects exist these are composed of smaller objects which in turn are composed of smaller objects, and so on. It may nonetheless still be claimed that the facts about each ontological level supervene on the facts about the lower levels
Rea, Michael, Supervenience and co-location.   (Google)
Abstract: Co-location is compatible with the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Microphysical supervenience involves intrinsic qualitative properties that supervene on microphysical structures. Two different objects, such as Socrates and the lump of tissue of which he is constituted, can be co-located objects that supervene on different sets of properties. Some of the properties are shared, but others, such as the human-determining properties or the lump-determining properties, supervene only on one object or the other. Therefore, properties at the same location can be arranged so as to constitute more than one object at the same time
Rickles, Dean (online). Supervenience and determination. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Ridge, Michael (2007). Anti-reductionism and supervenience. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how Shafer-Landau's proffered strategy to explain supervenience not only fails to explain supervenience, but that it also has a number of implausible consequences. The more general lesson is that strategies which may work well for explaining supervenience in the philosophy of mind and other areas cannot be assumed to carry over successfully to the metaethical context. We should therefore treat so-called `companions in guilt' arguments in this area of philosophy with considerable skepticism. Key Words: expressivism • moral realism • non-naturalism • reductionism • supervenience • trope
Roberts, John (ms). Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easily to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments
Robinson, Howard (2009). Supervenience, reductionism, and emergence. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.   (Google)
Roberts, John T. (2001). Undermining undermined: Why Humean supervenience never needed to be debugged (even if it's a necessary truth). Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3).   (Google)
Rodríguedez, Xabier Donato & Polanski, Marek (2006). Superveniencia, propiedades maximales Y teoría de modelos (supervenience, maximal properties, and model theory). Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (3):257-276.   (Google)
Abstract: En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general
Ross, Don & Spurrett, David (2004). The cognitive and behavioral sciences: Real patterns, real unity, real causes, but no-supervenience - response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):637-647.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science
Rosenberg, Alexander (1978). The supervenience of biological concepts. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):368-386.   (Google | More links)
Rowlands, Mark (1990). Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 20 (3):295-310.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Rueger, Alexander (2000). Robust supervenience and emergence. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):466-491.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Ruloff, Colin (2009). Epistemic supervenience and internalism: A trilemma. Theoria 75 (2):129-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a strong version – I offer some general considerations for thinking that neither the weak version nor the strong version provides the proponent of EI with a plausible analysis of epistemic justification and conclude, therefore, that EI itself cannot be considered a plausible analysis of epistemic justification
Savellos, Elias E. & Yalçin, Ümit D. (eds.) (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Supervenience is one of the 'hot discoveries' of recent analytic philosophy, and this collection of new essays on the topic represents a 'state of the art' examination of it and its application to major areas of philosophy. The interest in supervenience has much to do with the flexibility of the concept. To say that x supervenes on y indicates a degree of dependence without committing one to the view that x can be reduced to y. Thus supervenience is a relationship that has the potential of replacing the traditional notion of dependence, while performing at least part of the function reductive relationships were supposed to fulfil. Moreover, since it is a topic-neutral concept, supervenience has a wide range of applicability
Sawyer, R. Keith (2002). Nonreductive individualism: Part I—supervenience and wild disjunction. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The author draws on arguments from contemporary philosophy of mind to provide an argument for sociological collectivism. This argument for nonreductive individualism accepts that only individuals exist but rejects methodological individualism. In Part I, the author presents the argument for nonreductive individualism by working through the implications of supervenience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in some detail. In Part II, he extends the argument to provide a defense for social causal laws, and this account of social causation does not require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of individuals
Schröder, Jürgen (2007). Mental causation and the supervenience argument. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of several problems concerning the possibility of mental causation is that the causal potential of a supervenient property seems to be absorbed by its supervenience base if that base and the supervenient property are not identical. If the causal powers of the supervenient property are a proper subset of the causal powers of the supervenience base then, according to the causal individuation of properties, the supervenience base seems to do all the causal work and the supervenient property appears to be futile. Against this consequence it is possible to argue, first, that the relevant properties of causes must be in some sense proportional to the relevant properties of their effects and, second, that the principle of causal closure serving as a premise in the supervenience argument is probably false. The constraint that the relevant properties of causes should be proportional to the relevant properties of their effects together with the falsity of the closure principle leads to a restoration of the causal efficacy of supervenient properties
Schroder, Jurgen (1999). Mental causation: The supervenience argument and the proportionality constraint. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Schmitt, Johannes & Schroeder, Mark (forthcoming). Supervenience arguments under relaxed assumptions. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn’s arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been influential. But most discussions of these arguments have proceeded under the strong and restrictive assumptions of the S5 modal logic. In this paper we aim to remedy that defect, by illustrating in an accessible way what happens to these arguments under relaxed assumptions and why. The occasion is recent work by Ralph Wedgwood, who seeks to defend non-reductive accounts of moral and mental properties together with strong supervenience, but to evade both the arguments of Kim and Jackson and the explanatory challenge by accepting only the weaker, B, modal logic. In addition to drawing general lessons about what happens to supervenience arguments under relaxed assumptions, our goal is therefore to shed some light on both the virtues and costs of Wedgwood’s proposal
Schroder, Jurgen (2002). The supervenience argument and the generalization problem. Erkenntnis 56 (3):319-28.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper tries to show that Kims strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all
Seager, William E. (1991). Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51 (March):93-98.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Seager, William E. (ms). Emergence and supervenience.   (Google)
Abstract: The metaphysical relation of supervenience has seen most of its service in the fields of the philosophy of mind and ethics. Although not repaying all of the hopes some initially invested in it – the mind-body problem remains stubbornly unsolved, ethics not satisfactorily naturalized – the use of the notion of supervenience has certainly clarified the nature and the commitments of so- called non-reductive materialism, especially with regard to the questions of whether explanations of supervenience relations are required and whether such explanations must amount to a kind of reduction
Senchuk, Dennis M. (1991). Consciousness naturalized: Supervenience without physical determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):37-47.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shagrir, Oron (2009). Anomalism and supervenience: A critical survey. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 237-272.   (Google)
Shalkowski, Scott A. (1992). Supervenience and causal necessity. Synthese 90 (1):55-87.   (Google)
Abstract:   Causal necessity typically receives only oblique attention. Causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, or dispositions are usually the immediate subject(s) of interest. All of these, however, have a common feature. In some way, they involve the causal modality, some form of natural or physical necessity. In this paper, causal necessity is discussed with the purpose of determining whether a completely general empiricist theory can account for the causal in terms of the noncausal. Based on an examination of causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, and dispositions, it is argued that no reductive program devoid of essentialist commitments can account for all the phenomena that involve causal necessity. Hence, neo-Humean empiricism fails to provide a framework adequate for understanding causal necessity
Shagrir, Oron (2009). Strong global supervenience is valuable. Erkenntnis 71 (3):417-423.   (Google)
Abstract: It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations , strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one
Shrader, Warren (2008). On the relevance of supervenience theses to physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is an investigation into the nature of physicalism as well as to the possibility of formulating physicalism as a supervenience thesis. First, I review the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism. Second, I briefly survey the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or, in some cases, as necessary and sufficient) for physicalism. Third, I analyze the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson claims the supervenience thesis is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism; Witmer has proposed a different interpretation of one of the Jackson’s key notions and has suggested an amended supervenience thesis that is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for physicalism. However, I will argue that neither Jackson’s nor Witmer’s supervenience theses as stated are necessary for physicalism
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Sloman, Aaron (ms). Supervenience and implementation.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can a virtual machine X be implemented in a physical machine Y? We know the answer as far as compilers, editors, theorem-provers, operating systems are concerned, at least insofar as we know how to produce these implemented virtual machines, and no mysteries are involved. This paper is about extrapolating from that knowledge to the implementation of minds in brains. By linking the philosopher's concept of supervenience to the engineer's concept of implementation, we can illuminate both. In particular, by showing how virtual machines can be implemented in causally complete physical machines, and still have causal powers, we remove some philosophical problems about how mental processes can be real and can have real effects in the world even if the underlying physical implementation has no causal gaps. This requires a theory of ontological levels
Stanton, W. L. (1983). Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):72-9.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Steen, Wim J. (1986). Methodological problems in evolutionary biology V. the import of supervenience. Acta Biotheoretica 35 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Rosenberg has rightly argued that fitness is supervenient. But he has wrongly assumed that this makes The fittest survive nontautologous. Supervenience makes strict reduction impossible. It sheds light on disputes concerning the testability of evolutionary theory
Szabó, Zoltán Gendler (2000). Compositionality as supervenience. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5).   (Google)
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Toni, R. (2008). Love, value and supervenience. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495 – 508.   (Google)
Abstract: People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non-fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, the paper shows why it is difficult to combine with certain views on value. The main challenge comes from the idea that value judgments are universalizable. This view squares badly with the thought that the people whom we love are irreplaceable. Introducing the idea that properties may have different functions in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper determines what precisely it is about love that makes it hard to combine with universalizability. Moreover, it suggests two ways of meeting this challenge
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Uehling, Theodore E., In defense of global supervenience.   (Google)
Abstract: Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and in general that global supervenience is too weak to be an interesting dependence relation. We argue that these arguments are unsound. Along the way, we clarify the relationship between global and strong supervenience, and show clearly what sort of dependence global supervenience provides
van Roojen, Mark (2005). Expressivism, supervenience and logic. Ratio 18 (2):190–205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Expressivist analyses of evaluative discourse characterize unembedded moral claims as functioning primarily to express noncognitive attitudes. The most thorny problem for this project has been explaining the logical relations between such evaluative judgements and other judgements expressed using evaluative terms in unasserted contexts, such as when moral judgements are embedded in conditionals. One strategy for solving the problem derives logical relations among moral judgements from relations of "consistency" and "inconsistency" which hold between the attitudes they express. This approach has been accused of conflating inconsistency with mere pragmatic incoherence. In reaction such criticisms several recent theorists have attempted to use alternative resources. The most sophisticated noncognitivists have often propounded theories with secondary descriptive components in addition to their primary expressive meanings. Recent independent suggestions by Frank Jackson and Stephen Barker attempt to solve the embedding problem by utilizing such descriptive components of moral utterances. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to handle a certain sort of example using just the descriptive resources available to noncognitivists. For it must rule valid arguments invalid in virtue of equivocation in the secondary descriptive meanings. The present paper explains the problem and suggests a moral for expressivist theories.
Van Cleve, James (1992). Semantic supervenience and referential indeterminacy. Journal of Philosophy 89 (7):344-361.   (Google | More links)
Vicente, Agustín & Ezquerro, Jesús (1996). Supervenience and mind. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (1):235-237.   (Google)
Voltolini, Alberto, Compositional supervenience without compositional meaning?   (Google)
Abstract: An attempt is first made to clarify why Stephen Schiffer may legitimately claim that his noncompositional account of meaning differs from other non-compositional semantic doctrines such as the hidden-indexical theory of propositional attitudes. Subsequently, however, doubt is cast upon Schiffer's main contention that, as far as language of thought is concerned, a compositional supervenience theory can adequately satisfy all the desiderata a compositional meaning theory is traditionally called upon for. This doubt basically depends on the fact that, once a physical property is assigned by the compositional supervenience theory to the relevant nominal constituent of a Mentalese attitude report as the basic element on which the physical property assigned to the whole report depends, such a property precisely plays the role of a mode of presentation of the referent of that constituent. Finally, the following dilemma is arisen: in order to account for the meaning of attitude reports either the dismissal of modes of presentation or the rejection of compositionality is to be given up
von Kutschera, Franz (1994). Global supervenience and belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. This is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical ones, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred materialist thesis
Vranas, Peter B. M., Who'S AFRAID OF UNDERMINING? Why the principal principle might not contradict Humean supervenience.   (Google)
Abstract: The Principal Principle (PP) says that, for any proposition A, given any admissible evidence and the proposition that the chance of A is x%, one’s conditional credence in A should be x%. Humean Supervenience (HS) claims that, among possible worlds like ours, no two differ without differing in the spacetime-point-by-spacetime-point arrangement of local properties. David Lewis (1986b, 1994a) has argued that PP contradicts HS, and the validity of his argument has been endorsed by Bigelow, Collins, and Pargetter (1993), Thau (1994), Hall (1994), Strevens (1995), Ismael (1996), Hoefer (1997), and Black (1998). Against this consensus, I argue that PP might not contradict HS: Lewis’s argument is invalid, and every attempt—within a broad class of attempts—to amend the argument fails
Wagner, Steven J. (1994). Supervenience, recognition, and consciousness. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.   (Google)
Walter, Sven (2008). The supervenience argument, overdetermination, and causal drainage: Assessing Kim's master argument. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an untenable all-encompassing epiphenomenalism. It is argued that as of yet, Kim has failed to develop a coherent overall position, since various moves he makes in response to these criticisms are strangely at odds with other parts of his philosophical position
Ward, Barry (2002). Humeanism without Humean supervenience: A projectivist account of laws and possibilities. Philosophical Studies 107 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible set of laws. The extension ofthe semantics to counterfactual and subjunctiveconditionals is sketched. Potential objectionsinvolving subjectivity, mind-dependence, andnon-factuality are discussed
Weber, Marcel (1996). Fitness made physical: The supervenience of biological concepts revisited. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):411-431.   (Google | More links)
Welshon, Rex (2002). Emergence, realization, and supervenience. Philosophical Studies 108:39-51.   (Google)
Welshon, Rex (2002). Emergence, supervenience, and realization. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent down ward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relationsbetween emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false
White, Michael J. (1993). Aristotle on the non-supervenience of local motion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):143-155.   (Google | More links)
Wicks, Robert (1988). Supervenience and aesthetic judgment. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (4):509-511.   (Google | More links)
Wicks, Robert (1992). Supervenience and the "science of the beautiful". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 (4):322-324.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Robert (online). Metaphysical indeterminacy, supervenience, and emergence.   (Google)
Williamson, Timothy (2001). Ethics, supervenience and Ramsey sentences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):625–630.   (Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (1996). Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap. Synthese 106 (1):67-101.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (1992). Long live supervenience. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 (4):319-322.   (Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (ms). Moore, morality, supervenience, essence, epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: riety of necessity that binds moral and natural his conception of mental properties has no metaphysical consequences. Descartes is properties because the necessity is neither..
Zangwill, Nick (1993). Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Zangwill, Nick (1995). Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunction. Philosophia 24 (3-4):321-30.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can a certain sort of property supervene on another sort of property without reducing to it? Many philosophers find the superveniencel irreducibility combination attractive in the philosophy of mind and in moral philosophy (Davidson 1980 and Moore 1903). They think that mental properties supervene upon physical properties but do not reduce to them, or that moral properties supervene upon natural properties without reducing to them. Other philosophers have tried to show that the combination is ultimately untenable, however attractive it might initially appear. Thus Ted Honderich and Jaegwon Kim argue that the combination cannot explain the causal efhcacy of the supervening properties (Honderich 1982, Kim 1984b). And Simon..
Zangwill, Nick (1998). Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunction. Philosophia 26 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can a certain sort of property supervene on another sort of property without reducing to it? Many philosophers find the superveniencel irreducibility combination attractive in the philosophy of mind and in moral philosophy (Davidson 1980 and Moore 1903). They think that mental properties supervene upon physical properties but do not reduce to them, or that moral properties supervene upon natural properties without reducing to them. Other philosophers have tried to show that the combination is ultimately untenable, however attractive it might initially appear. Thus Ted Honderich and Jaegwon Kim argue that the combination cannot explain the causal efhcacy of the supervening properties (Honderich 1982, Kim 1984b). And Simon..
Zangwill, Nick (1994). Supervenience unthwarted: Rejoinder to Wicks. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (4):466-469.   (Google | More links)
Zynda, L. (1996). Should we reject supervenience analyses of laws, chance, and causation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (4):587-592.   (Google)

4.4b Supervenience and Physicalism

Armstrong, David M. (1982). Metaphysics and supervenience. Critica 42:3-17.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Bailey, Andrew R. (1998). Supervenience and physicalism. Synthese 117 (1):53-73.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities uncovered during work over the past two decades. I test my analysis by applying it to the problem of defining physicalism, concluding that the thesis of physicalism is best captured by the conjunction of two supervenience relations
Botterell, Andrew (2002). Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: A reply to Campbell. Dialogue 41 (1):155-161.   (Google)
Campbell, Neil (2002). Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: A reply to Botterell. Dialogue 41 (1):163-167.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). Supervenience and materialism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Charles, David (1992). Supervenience, composition, and physicalism. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Diaz-Leon, Esa (2008). We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl). Teorema 27 (3):85-101.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived
Gardner, Thomas (2005). Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation. Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208.   (Google | More links)
Haugeland, John (1984). Ontological supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:1-12.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Hellman, G. (1985). Determination and logical truth. Journal of Philosophy 82 (November):607-16.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hendel, Giovanna (2001). Physicalism, nothing buttery, and supervenience. Ratio 14 (3):252-262.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:19-38.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1982). Supervenience and microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1981). Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics. Synthese 49 (December):395-413.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jack, Anthony I. (1994). Materialism and supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):426-43.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kirk, Robert E. (1996). Strict implication, supervenience, and physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (1991). Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (September):573-87.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Menuge, Angus (1993). Supervenience, by chance? Reply to Crane and Mellor. Analysis 53 (4):228-235.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Moreland, James P. (1999). Should a naturalist be a supervenient physicalist? Metaphilosophy 29 (1-2):35-57.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Moser, Paul K. & Trout, J. D. (1995). Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence. In Elias E. Savellos (ed.), Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.   (Google)
Polger, Thomas W. (online). Physicalism and cosmic hermeneutics: Comments on Horgan.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that there are two obstacles to precisely formulating the doctrine of physicalism: Hempel’s Problem, and Hume’s Problem.2 Hempel’s Problem is that if physicalism is to be formulated in terms of physics—or in terms of any science, for the problem is fully general if it is a problem at all—whether to use the current or future science. If physicalism is formulated in terms of current physics, then it is most likely false because current physics is at least very likely to be false and is perhaps known to be incomplete or inconsistent. If physicalism is formulated in terms of future physics, then (the worry goes) physicalism will prove to be trivial, vacuous, or simply of indeterminate content. Horgan offers no direct guidance on Hempel’s Problem, though he seems to adopt a future-physics view.3
Post, John F. (2002). Sense and supervenience. Philo 4 (2):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract. Alleged counter-examples based on conceptual thought-experiments, including those involving sense or content, have no force against physicalist supervenience theses properly construed. This is largely because of their epistemological status and their modal status. Still, there are empirical examples that do contradict Kim-style theses, due to the latter's individualism. By contrast, non-individualist supervenience, such as "global" supervenience, remains unscathed, a possibility overlooked by Lynne Baker, as is clear from a physicalist account of sense in the case of non-human biological adaptations that are for producing things about affairs in the world
Rowlands, Mark (1995). Supervenience and Materialism. Avebury.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Seager, William E. (1988). Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shrader, Warren (ms). Does physicalism require a supervenience thesis?   (Google)
Abstract: Many authors have taken up the challenge of formulating physicalism as a supervenience thesis. These endeavors have met with varying response, but it seems that the general consensus still remains that a supervenience thesis that is both sufficient and necessary for physicalism has yet to be developed. Terence Horgan1 and Jaegwon Kim2 have most famously argued that supervenience theses are not sufficiently strong for physicalism. Nonetheless, several recent articles suggest that there are philosophers who still hold out hope for some type of supervenience of the mental upon the physical being, if not both sufficient and necessary, at least necessary for physicalism.3 In this paper, I will 1) investigate some of the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism, 2) briefly review the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or necessary and sufficient) for physicalism, and 3) investigate in some detail the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson, in his recent book, claims to have a supervenience thesis that is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism
Ten Elshof, Gregg (1997). Supervenient difficulties with nonreductive materialism: A critical appraisal of supervenience-physicalism. Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.   (Google)
Trout Moser, P. (1996). Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
von Kutschera, Franz (1992). Supervenience and reductionism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):333-343.   (Google)
Wilson, Jessica M. (2002). Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):53-77.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" - supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability - is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory,for on the usual understandings of causal power bestowal, it is trivially satisfied or falsified. I offer a revision of CCP which incorporates the evident fact that causal powers are grounded in fundamental forces.
Wilson, Jessica M. (1999). How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):33-52.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The standard formulations of the supervenience relation present the supervenience of one set of properties on another in terms of property correlations, without placing any constraints on the dependency relation concerned. As Horgan notes, this does not ensure that properties supervening upon physicalistically acceptable base properties are not themselves emergent in a way at odds with materialism; hence he concludes that what physicalism needs is "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that, where supervenient and base properties are instanced in the same individuals, Horgan's requirement of robust explanation is neither sufficient nor necessary for superdupervenience. In particular, his paradigm case is compatible with the supervenient property's being emergent. This and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by means of a metaphysical constraint on the supervenience relation: each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property must be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. Satisfying this condition is all that is needed to render supervenience superduper. I go on to show that a wide variety of physicalist accounts, both reductive and non-reductive, are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem
Wilson, Jessica M. (2005). Supervenience-based formulations of physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The many and varied formulations of physicalism instantiate the following schema: Physicalism: All entities are nothing over and above physical entities. Supervenience-based accounts of “nothing over and aboveness” also instantiate a schema: Supervenience-based Nothing Over and Aboveness: The A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The four main approaches to filling in the latter schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that a physicalism based on the associated account of nothing over and aboveness is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable.
Witmer, D. Gene (1999). Supervenience physicalism and the problem of extras. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):315-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Supervenience, determination, and dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):114–133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras

4.4c Supervenience, General

Demeter, Tamás (2003). A Metaphysics for Explanatory Ecumenism. Philosophica 71:99-115.   (Google)
Bacon, John (1986). Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):163-76.   (Annotation | Google)
Bacon, John (1990). Van Cleve versus closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):239-242.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bacon, John (1995). Weak supervenience supervenes. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bennett, Karen (2004). Global supervenience and dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value
Blackburn, Simon W. (1984). Supervenience revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google)
Bonevac, Daniel A. (1988). Supervenience and ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (January):37-47.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Bontly, Thomas D. (2002). The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):75-96.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious
Bovens, Luc (1994). Principles of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):294-301.   (Google | More links)
Buekens, Filip (online). Supervenience without duplication.   (Google)
Abstract: Most attempts at defining or elucidating ’weak’ or ’strong’ supervenience introduce various forms of _physical indiscernibility_. After glancing at some definitions, I argue that they must fail if mental events are supposed to be genuinely causally efficacious and non-epiphenomenal. Then I elucidate Davidson’s account of supervenience (’D-supervenience’), first as an abstract relation between a predicate and a set of predicates (to be illustrated by uncontroversial examples), and then as applied to the mental/physical relation. I argue that Davidson must defend that if two events are physically indiscernible in the light of a complete physical theory of the world then they must be identical in the Leibnizian sense (‘L-identity’): physical indiscernibility collapses into L-identity. It follows that mental differences between two numerically different events logically entail physical differences between them. I conclude by demonstrating how the Davidsonian account of the concept can explain some counterexamples to Moore’s approach to supervenience of moral on natural properties. The central tenet in this paper is that supervenience principles based on duplication create, rather than solve, problems in this problem area
Currie, Gregory (1984). Individualism and global supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):345-58.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dale, A. J. (1985). Hare on supervenience: Remarks on R.m. Hare's Supervenience. Mind 94 (October):599-600.   (Google | More links)
Divers, John (1998). Recent work on supervenience. Philosophical Books 39 (2):81-91.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Divers, John (1996). Supervenience for operators. Synthese 106 (1):103-12.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifled notion. Therefore, Lewis is unjustified in claiming that a genuine modal realist approach to the analysis of the concept of supervenience is superior to a modal primitivist approach
Enc, Berent (1996). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Forrest, Peter (1988). Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):1-12.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Forrest, Peter (1992). Universals and universalisability: An interpretation of Oddie's discussion of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):93-98.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Glanzberg, Michael (2001). Supervenience and in?nitary logic. Noûs 35 (3):419-439.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion of supervenience is replete with the use of in?nitary logical operations. For instance, one may often ?nd a supervenient property that corresponds to an in?nite collection of supervenience-base properties, and then ask about the in?nite disjunction of all those base properties. This is crucial to a well-known argument of Kim (1984) that supervenience comes nearer to reduction than many non-reductive physicalists suppose. It also appears in recent discussions such as Jackson (1998)
Grimes, Thomas (1991). Supervenience, determination, and dependency. Philosophical Studies 62 (April):81-92.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Grimes, Thomas (1988). The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):152-60.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Grimes, Thomas (1995). The tweedledum and tweedledee of supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Grim, Patrick (1997). Worlds by supervenience: Some further problems. Analysis 57 (2):146-51.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hare, R. M. (1984). Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-16.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Hauser, Larry (2000). Ordinary devices: Reply to Bringsjord's Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser. Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema"
Heil, John (1998). Supervenience deconstructed. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):146-155.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Heil, John (1995). Supervenience redux. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hellman, G. (1992). Supervenience/determination a two-way street? Yes, but one of the ways is the wrong way! Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):42-47.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hendel, Giovanna (2001). Supervenience, metaphysical reduction, and metaphysics of properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 39 (1):99-118.   (Google)
Hofweber, Thomas (2005). Supervenience and object-dependent properties. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that the semantic thesis of direct reference and the meta- physical thesis of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical cannot both be true. The argument first develops a necessary condition for supervenience, a so-called conditional locality requirement, which is then shown to be incompatible with some physical object having object dependent properties, which in turn is required for the thesis of direct reference to be true. We apply this argument to formulate a new argument against the claim that a thisness is analyzable in purely general terms, one that does not rely on complete symmetry nor the falsity of the identity of indiscernibles. I outline a strategy at the end how the conclusion could be avoided, at a price
Horgan, Terence E. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102 (408):555-86.   (Cited by 102 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Humberstone, I. L. (1992). Some structural and logical aspects of the notion of supervenience. Logical Analysis 35 (March-June):101-37.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Johansson, Ingvar (2002). Critical notice of Armstrong's and Lewis' concepts of supervenience. Sats 3 (1):118-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Keller, Philipp (online). Supervenience and dependence.   (Google)
Abstract: “Supervenience”, though a philosophers’ notion, has a venerable history. It was used by Leibniz to say that relations are nothing over and above the intrinsic properties of their relata, by Sidgwick to say that moral characteristics covary with non-moral ones, by Moore to say that the former are grounded in the latter, by Hare to say that they stand in some relation of strict implication and by Davidson (1970: 214) to say that “mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics” (cf. Kim 1990: 136–138). Here is what Robert Stal- naker (1996) says about the “intuitive ideas that motivate the attempts to articulate concepts of supervenience”:
To say that the A-properties or facts are supervenient on the B-properties or facts is
to say that the A-facts are, in a sense, redundant, since they are already implicitly
specified when one has specified all the B-facts. A-facts are not fact ‘over and above’
the B-facts, not something ‘separate’. To state an A-fact, or ascribe an A-property, is
to describe the same reality in a different way, at a different level of abstraction, by
carving the same world at different joints. (Stalnaker 1996: 87)
Kim (1990: 140) identifies three key features of our concept of supervenience: covariance, depend- ency and nonreducibility (where “non-reducibility” means that the supervenience of A-features on B-features is consistent with the former not being reducible to the latter).1 Explanation, sometimes required for reducibility, is absent : supervenience claims state that some patterns of property covariation hold, without explaining why they hold.2
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.   (Cited by 167 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1991). Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.   (Cited by 82 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1987). 'Strong' and 'global' supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.   (Cited by 56 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 531 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticizes the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection
Kim, Jaegwon (1978). Supervenience and nomological incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April):149-56.   (Cited by 47 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1988). Supervenience for multiple domains. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):129-50.   (Annotation | Google)
Kincaid, Harold (1988). Supervenience and explanation. Synthese 77 (November):251-81.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the explanatory adequacy of lower-level theories when their higher-level counterparts are irreducible. If some state or entity described by a high-level theory supervenes upon and is realized in events, entities, etc. described by the relevant lower-level theory, does the latter fully explain the higher-level event even if the higher-level theory is irreducible? While the autonomy of the special sciences and the success of various eliminativist programs depends in large part on how we answer this question, neither the affirmative or negative answer has been defended in detail. I argue, contra Putnam and others, that certain facts about causation and explanation show that such lower-level theories do explain. I also argue, however, that there may be important questions about counterfactuals and laws that such explanations cannot answer, thereby showing their partial inadequacy. I defend the latter claim against criticisms based on eliminativism about higher-level explanations and sketch a number of empirical conditions that lower-level explanations would have to meet to fully explain higher-level events
Kincaid, Harold (1987). Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:343-56.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1995). Supervenience: Model theory or metaphysics? In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1988). Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):461-70.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Loewer, Barry M. (1995). An argument for strong supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Lynch, Michael P. & Glasgow, J. I. (2003). The impossibility of superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):201-221.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):215-222.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1983). Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1997). Supervenience, vagueness, and determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11:209-30.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1995). Varieties of supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1994). Varieties of supervenience. In Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience.   (Cited by 37 | Annotation | Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1997). On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):277-308.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Miller, R. B. (1990). Supervenience is a two-way street. Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):695-701.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Moravec, Hans (1998). When will computer hardware match the human brain? Journal of Evolution and Technology.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Computers have far to go to match human strengths, and our estimates will depend on analogy and extrapolation. Fortunately, these are grounded in the first bit of the journey, now behind us. Thirty years of computer vision reveals that 1 MIPS can extract simple features from real-time imagery--tracking a white line or a white spot on a mottled background. 10 MIPS can follow complex gray-scale patches--as smart bombs, cruise missiles and early self-driving vans attest. 100 MIPS can follow moderately unpredictable features like roads--as recent long NAVLAB trips demonstrate. 1,000 MIPS will be adequate for coarse-grained three-dimensional spatial awareness--illustrated by several mid-resolution stereoscopic vision programs, including my own. 10,000 MIPS can find three-dimensional objects in clutter--suggested by several "bin-picking" and high-resolution stereo-vision demonstrations, which accomplish the task in an hour or so at 10 MIPS. The data fades there--research careers are too short, and computer memories too small, for significantly more elaborate experiments
Moser, Paul K. (1992). Physicalism and global supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Moyer, Mark (1999). Strengths and weaknesses of weak and strong supervenience. .   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the relation between weak and strong supervenience? Kim claims that weak supervenience is weaker, that it fails to entail strong supervenience. But he mistakenly infers this in virtue of logical form. In fact, one line of reasoning suggests weak supervenience _does_ entail strong. Following this line, we see that weak and strong supervenience
Moyer, Mark (online). Weak and global supervenience: Functional bark and metaphysical bite?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience for intrinsic properties. Moreover, weak and global supervenience relations are always mere parts of a more general underlying strong supervenience relation. Most appeals to global supervenience, though, involve spatio-temporally relational properties; but here too, global and strong supervenience are equivalent. _Functionally_ we can characterize merely weak and global supervenience as follows: for A to supervene on B requires that at all worlds an individual’s A properties be a function of its B properties, where this function varies from world to world. But what are the
Moyer, Mark (2008). Weak and global supervenience are strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers
Noonan, Harold W. (1987). Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (January):78-85.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Oddie, Graham & Tichy, P. (1990). Resplicing properties in the supervenience base. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):259-69.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Oddie, Graham (1991). Supervenience and higher-order universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (March):20-47.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Paull, R. Cranston & Sider, Theodore R. (1992). In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):833-53.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Petrie, Bradford (1987). Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):119-30.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Post, John F. (1995). "Global" determination: Too permissive? In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Post, John F. (1999). Is supervenience asymmetric? Manuscrito 22 (2):305-344.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: After some preliminary clarifications, arguments for the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination, such as they are, are shown to be unsound. An argument against the supposed asymmetry is then constructed and defended against objections. This is followed by explanations of why the intuition of asymmetry is nonetheless so entrenched, and of how the asymmetric ontological priority of the physical over the non-physical can be understood without the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination
Post, John F. (1984). On the determinacy of valuation. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):315-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Post, John F. (2002). Sense and supervenience. Philo 4 (2):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract. Alleged counter-examples based on conceptual thought-experiments, including those involving sense or content, have no force against physicalist supervenience theses properly construed. This is largely because of their epistemological status and their modal status. Still, there are empirical examples that do contradict Kim-style theses, due to the latter's individualism. By contrast, non-individualist supervenience, such as "global" supervenience, remains unscathed, a possibility overlooked by Lynne Baker, as is clear from a physicalist account of sense in the case of non-human biological adaptations that are for producing things about affairs in the world
Pérez Otero, Manuel (1998). On the utility of global supervenience. Critica 30 (90):3-21.   (Google)
Shagrir, Oron (2002). Global supervenience, coincident entities, and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities
Shagrir, Oron (1999). More on global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):691-701.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Sider, Theodore R. (1999). Global supervenience and identity across times and worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):913-937.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Spector, Horacio (1987). Dale on supervenience: Remarks on Hare on supervenience. Mind 96 (January):93-94.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1996). Varieties of supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Suster, Danilo (1996). Modality and supervenience. Acta Analytica 15 (15):141-155.   (Google)
Teller, Paul R. (1985). Is supervenience just disguised reduction? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:93-100.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Teller, Paul R. (1984). The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
Turri, John (forthcoming). Epistemic Supervenience. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 ed. Blackwell.   (Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (1996). Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. Synthese 106 (2):253-97.   (Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (2005). Supervenience and anomalous monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
van Cleve, James (1990). Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):225-38.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Supervenience, determination, and dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):114–133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras
Zangwill, Nick (1997). Explaining supervenience: Moral and mental. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):509-518.   (Google)

4.4d Supervenient Causation

Coppock, Paul (1999). Supervenient causation and program explanation: A note on the difference. Analysis 59 (4):346-354.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Crane, Tim (2008). Causation and determinable properties : On the efficacy of colour, shape, and size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the..
Demeter, Tamás (2002). Supervenient causation and programme explanation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):83-93.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Jaegwon Kim put forward two models of higher-level causal explanation. Advocates of both versions are inclined to draw the conclusion that the models don't differ substantially. I argue, on the contrary, that there are relevant metaphysical differences between Jackson and Pettit's notion of programme explanation on the one hand, and Kim's idea of supervenient causation on the other. These can be traced back to underlying differences between the contents of their physicalisms
Enc, Berent (1996). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Enç, Berent (1995). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:257-70.   (Cited by 87 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia & Macdonald, Graham F. (1995). Supervenient causation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1983). Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1984). Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:271-81.   (Annotation | Google)
Zimmerman, Dean W. (1998). Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265 – 288.   (Google)