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4.4c. Supervenience, General (Supervenience, General on PhilPapers)

See also:
Demeter, Tamás (2003). A Metaphysics for Explanatory Ecumenism. Philosophica 71:99-115.   (Google)
Bacon, John (1986). Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):163-76.   (Annotation | Google)
Bacon, John (1990). Van Cleve versus closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):239-242.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bacon, John (1995). Weak supervenience supervenes. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bennett, Karen (2004). Global supervenience and dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value
Blackburn, Simon W. (1984). Supervenience revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google)
Bonevac, Daniel A. (1988). Supervenience and ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (January):37-47.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Bontly, Thomas D. (2002). The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):75-96.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious
Bovens, Luc (1994). Principles of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):294-301.   (Google | More links)
Buekens, Filip (online). Supervenience without duplication.   (Google)
Abstract: Most attempts at defining or elucidating ’weak’ or ’strong’ supervenience introduce various forms of _physical indiscernibility_. After glancing at some definitions, I argue that they must fail if mental events are supposed to be genuinely causally efficacious and non-epiphenomenal. Then I elucidate Davidson’s account of supervenience (’D-supervenience’), first as an abstract relation between a predicate and a set of predicates (to be illustrated by uncontroversial examples), and then as applied to the mental/physical relation. I argue that Davidson must defend that if two events are physically indiscernible in the light of a complete physical theory of the world then they must be identical in the Leibnizian sense (‘L-identity’): physical indiscernibility collapses into L-identity. It follows that mental differences between two numerically different events logically entail physical differences between them. I conclude by demonstrating how the Davidsonian account of the concept can explain some counterexamples to Moore’s approach to supervenience of moral on natural properties. The central tenet in this paper is that supervenience principles based on duplication create, rather than solve, problems in this problem area
Currie, Gregory (1984). Individualism and global supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):345-58.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dale, A. J. (1985). Hare on supervenience: Remarks on R.m. Hare's Supervenience. Mind 94 (October):599-600.   (Google | More links)
Divers, John (1998). Recent work on supervenience. Philosophical Books 39 (2):81-91.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Divers, John (1996). Supervenience for operators. Synthese 106 (1):103-12.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifled notion. Therefore, Lewis is unjustified in claiming that a genuine modal realist approach to the analysis of the concept of supervenience is superior to a modal primitivist approach
Enc, Berent (1996). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Forrest, Peter (1988). Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):1-12.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Forrest, Peter (1992). Universals and universalisability: An interpretation of Oddie's discussion of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):93-98.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Glanzberg, Michael (2001). Supervenience and in?nitary logic. Noûs 35 (3):419-439.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion of supervenience is replete with the use of in?nitary logical operations. For instance, one may often ?nd a supervenient property that corresponds to an in?nite collection of supervenience-base properties, and then ask about the in?nite disjunction of all those base properties. This is crucial to a well-known argument of Kim (1984) that supervenience comes nearer to reduction than many non-reductive physicalists suppose. It also appears in recent discussions such as Jackson (1998)
Grimes, Thomas (1991). Supervenience, determination, and dependency. Philosophical Studies 62 (April):81-92.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Grimes, Thomas (1988). The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):152-60.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Grimes, Thomas (1995). The tweedledum and tweedledee of supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Grim, Patrick (1997). Worlds by supervenience: Some further problems. Analysis 57 (2):146-51.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hare, R. M. (1984). Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-16.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Hauser, Larry (2000). Ordinary devices: Reply to Bringsjord's Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser. Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema"
Heil, John (1998). Supervenience deconstructed. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):146-155.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Heil, John (1995). Supervenience redux. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hellman, G. (1992). Supervenience/determination a two-way street? Yes, but one of the ways is the wrong way! Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):42-47.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hendel, Giovanna (2001). Supervenience, metaphysical reduction, and metaphysics of properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 39 (1):99-118.   (Google)
Hofweber, Thomas (2005). Supervenience and object-dependent properties. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that the semantic thesis of direct reference and the meta- physical thesis of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical cannot both be true. The argument first develops a necessary condition for supervenience, a so-called conditional locality requirement, which is then shown to be incompatible with some physical object having object dependent properties, which in turn is required for the thesis of direct reference to be true. We apply this argument to formulate a new argument against the claim that a thisness is analyzable in purely general terms, one that does not rely on complete symmetry nor the falsity of the identity of indiscernibles. I outline a strategy at the end how the conclusion could be avoided, at a price
Horgan, Terence E. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102 (408):555-86.   (Cited by 102 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Humberstone, I. L. (1992). Some structural and logical aspects of the notion of supervenience. Logical Analysis 35 (March-June):101-37.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Johansson, Ingvar (2002). Critical notice of Armstrong's and Lewis' concepts of supervenience. Sats 3 (1):118-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Keller, Philipp (online). Supervenience and dependence.   (Google)
Abstract: “Supervenience”, though a philosophers’ notion, has a venerable history. It was used by Leibniz to say that relations are nothing over and above the intrinsic properties of their relata, by Sidgwick to say that moral characteristics covary with non-moral ones, by Moore to say that the former are grounded in the latter, by Hare to say that they stand in some relation of strict implication and by Davidson (1970: 214) to say that “mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics” (cf. Kim 1990: 136–138). Here is what Robert Stal- naker (1996) says about the “intuitive ideas that motivate the attempts to articulate concepts of supervenience”:
To say that the A-properties or facts are supervenient on the B-properties or facts is
to say that the A-facts are, in a sense, redundant, since they are already implicitly
specified when one has specified all the B-facts. A-facts are not fact ‘over and above’
the B-facts, not something ‘separate’. To state an A-fact, or ascribe an A-property, is
to describe the same reality in a different way, at a different level of abstraction, by
carving the same world at different joints. (Stalnaker 1996: 87)
Kim (1990: 140) identifies three key features of our concept of supervenience: covariance, depend- ency and nonreducibility (where “non-reducibility” means that the supervenience of A-features on B-features is consistent with the former not being reducible to the latter).1 Explanation, sometimes required for reducibility, is absent : supervenience claims state that some patterns of property covariation hold, without explaining why they hold.2
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.   (Cited by 167 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1991). Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.   (Cited by 82 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1987). 'Strong' and 'global' supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.   (Cited by 56 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 531 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticizes the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection
Kim, Jaegwon (1978). Supervenience and nomological incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April):149-56.   (Cited by 47 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1988). Supervenience for multiple domains. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):129-50.   (Annotation | Google)
Kincaid, Harold (1988). Supervenience and explanation. Synthese 77 (November):251-81.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the explanatory adequacy of lower-level theories when their higher-level counterparts are irreducible. If some state or entity described by a high-level theory supervenes upon and is realized in events, entities, etc. described by the relevant lower-level theory, does the latter fully explain the higher-level event even if the higher-level theory is irreducible? While the autonomy of the special sciences and the success of various eliminativist programs depends in large part on how we answer this question, neither the affirmative or negative answer has been defended in detail. I argue, contra Putnam and others, that certain facts about causation and explanation show that such lower-level theories do explain. I also argue, however, that there may be important questions about counterfactuals and laws that such explanations cannot answer, thereby showing their partial inadequacy. I defend the latter claim against criticisms based on eliminativism about higher-level explanations and sketch a number of empirical conditions that lower-level explanations would have to meet to fully explain higher-level events
Kincaid, Harold (1987). Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:343-56.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1995). Supervenience: Model theory or metaphysics? In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klagge, James C. (1988). Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):461-70.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Loewer, Barry M. (1995). An argument for strong supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Lynch, Michael P. & Glasgow, J. I. (2003). The impossibility of superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):201-221.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):215-222.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1983). Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1997). Supervenience, vagueness, and determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11:209-30.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1995). Varieties of supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Annotation | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1994). Varieties of supervenience. In Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience.   (Cited by 37 | Annotation | Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1997). On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):277-308.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Miller, R. B. (1990). Supervenience is a two-way street. Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):695-701.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Moravec, Hans (1998). When will computer hardware match the human brain? Journal of Evolution and Technology.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Computers have far to go to match human strengths, and our estimates will depend on analogy and extrapolation. Fortunately, these are grounded in the first bit of the journey, now behind us. Thirty years of computer vision reveals that 1 MIPS can extract simple features from real-time imagery--tracking a white line or a white spot on a mottled background. 10 MIPS can follow complex gray-scale patches--as smart bombs, cruise missiles and early self-driving vans attest. 100 MIPS can follow moderately unpredictable features like roads--as recent long NAVLAB trips demonstrate. 1,000 MIPS will be adequate for coarse-grained three-dimensional spatial awareness--illustrated by several mid-resolution stereoscopic vision programs, including my own. 10,000 MIPS can find three-dimensional objects in clutter--suggested by several "bin-picking" and high-resolution stereo-vision demonstrations, which accomplish the task in an hour or so at 10 MIPS. The data fades there--research careers are too short, and computer memories too small, for significantly more elaborate experiments
Moser, Paul K. (1992). Physicalism and global supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Moyer, Mark (1999). Strengths and weaknesses of weak and strong supervenience. .   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the relation between weak and strong supervenience? Kim claims that weak supervenience is weaker, that it fails to entail strong supervenience. But he mistakenly infers this in virtue of logical form. In fact, one line of reasoning suggests weak supervenience _does_ entail strong. Following this line, we see that weak and strong supervenience
Moyer, Mark (online). Weak and global supervenience: Functional bark and metaphysical bite?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience for intrinsic properties. Moreover, weak and global supervenience relations are always mere parts of a more general underlying strong supervenience relation. Most appeals to global supervenience, though, involve spatio-temporally relational properties; but here too, global and strong supervenience are equivalent. _Functionally_ we can characterize merely weak and global supervenience as follows: for A to supervene on B requires that at all worlds an individual’s A properties be a function of its B properties, where this function varies from world to world. But what are the
Moyer, Mark (2008). Weak and global supervenience are strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers
Noonan, Harold W. (1987). Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (January):78-85.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Oddie, Graham & Tichy, P. (1990). Resplicing properties in the supervenience base. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):259-69.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Oddie, Graham (1991). Supervenience and higher-order universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (March):20-47.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Paull, R. Cranston & Sider, Theodore R. (1992). In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):833-53.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Petrie, Bradford (1987). Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):119-30.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Post, John F. (1995). "Global" determination: Too permissive? In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Post, John F. (1999). Is supervenience asymmetric? Manuscrito 22 (2):305-344.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: After some preliminary clarifications, arguments for the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination, such as they are, are shown to be unsound. An argument against the supposed asymmetry is then constructed and defended against objections. This is followed by explanations of why the intuition of asymmetry is nonetheless so entrenched, and of how the asymmetric ontological priority of the physical over the non-physical can be understood without the supposed asymmetry of supervenience and determination
Post, John F. (1984). On the determinacy of valuation. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):315-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Post, John F. (2002). Sense and supervenience. Philo 4 (2):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract. Alleged counter-examples based on conceptual thought-experiments, including those involving sense or content, have no force against physicalist supervenience theses properly construed. This is largely because of their epistemological status and their modal status. Still, there are empirical examples that do contradict Kim-style theses, due to the latter's individualism. By contrast, non-individualist supervenience, such as "global" supervenience, remains unscathed, a possibility overlooked by Lynne Baker, as is clear from a physicalist account of sense in the case of non-human biological adaptations that are for producing things about affairs in the world
Pérez Otero, Manuel (1998). On the utility of global supervenience. Critica 30 (90):3-21.   (Google)
Shagrir, Oron (2002). Global supervenience, coincident entities, and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities
Shagrir, Oron (1999). More on global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):691-701.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Sider, Theodore R. (1999). Global supervenience and identity across times and worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):913-937.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Spector, Horacio (1987). Dale on supervenience: Remarks on Hare on supervenience. Mind 96 (January):93-94.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1996). Varieties of supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Suster, Danilo (1996). Modality and supervenience. Acta Analytica 15 (15):141-155.   (Google)
Teller, Paul R. (1985). Is supervenience just disguised reduction? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:93-100.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Teller, Paul R. (1984). The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
Turri, John (forthcoming). Epistemic Supervenience. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 ed. Blackwell.   (Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (1996). Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. Synthese 106 (2):253-97.   (Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (2005). Supervenience and anomalous monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
van Cleve, James (1990). Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):225-38.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Supervenience, determination, and dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):114–133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras
Zangwill, Nick (1997). Explaining supervenience: Moral and mental. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):509-518.   (Google)