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4.4d. Supervenient Causation (Supervenient Causation on PhilPapers)

Coppock, Paul (1999). Supervenient causation and program explanation: A note on the difference. Analysis 59 (4):346-354.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Crane, Tim (2008). Causation and determinable properties : On the efficacy of colour, shape, and size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the..
Demeter, Tamás (2002). Supervenient causation and programme explanation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):83-93.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Jaegwon Kim put forward two models of higher-level causal explanation. Advocates of both versions are inclined to draw the conclusion that the models don't differ substantially. I argue, on the contrary, that there are relevant metaphysical differences between Jackson and Pettit's notion of programme explanation on the one hand, and Kim's idea of supervenient causation on the other. These can be traced back to underlying differences between the contents of their physicalisms
Enc, Berent (1996). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Enç, Berent (1995). Nonreducible supervenient causation. In Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:257-70.   (Cited by 87 | Annotation | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia & Macdonald, Graham F. (1995). Supervenient causation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1983). Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1984). Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:271-81.   (Annotation | Google)
Zimmerman, Dean W. (1998). Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265 – 288.   (Google)