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Metaphysics of Mind :: Reduction :: Reduction and Multiple Realizability

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Aizawa, Kenneth & Gillett, Carl (online). Multiple realization and methodology in the neurological and psychological sciences.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame thus
Antony, Louise M. (1999). Multiple realizability, projectibility, and the reality of mental properties. Philosophical Topics 26:1-24.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)
Antony, Louise M. (2003). Who's afraid of disjunctive properties? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):1-21.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bechtel, William P. & Mundale, Jennifer (1999). Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
Bickle, John (1995). Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Bickle, John (1992). Multiple realizability and psychophysical reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.   (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)
Block, Ned (1997). Anti-reductionism slaps back. Philosophical Perspectives 11:107-32.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.2 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the antireductionist consensus survives Kim’s critique. This paper was originally titled “Anti- Reductionism Strikes Back”, but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well
Bolender, John (1995). Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not wholly a matter of metaphysics but is, at least to some degree, a matter of convention as well. The central point is that physical sciences and mental sciences have somewhat different criteria for individuating kinds
Boyd, Robert (1999). Kinds, complexity, and multiple realization. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):67-98.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links | Edit)
Clapp, Leonard J. (2001). Disjunctive properties: Multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):111-136.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links | Edit)
Couch, Mark B. (2004). Discussion: A defense of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur
Endicott, Ronald P. (1998). Collapse of the new wave. Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):53-72.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)
Endicott, Ronald P. (1994). Constructival plasticity. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Endicott, Ronald P. (1998). Many-many mappings and world structure. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):267-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Endicott, Ronald P. (1991). MacDonald on type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29:209-14.   (Google | Edit)
Endicott, Ronald P. (1989). On physical multiple realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):212-24.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Endicott, Ronald P. (1993). Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies. Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1997). Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.   (Cited by 203 | Google | More links | Edit)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1997). What multiple realizability does not show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | Edit)
Funkhouser, Eric (2007). A liberal conception of multiple realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The last section presents a survey of the ontological, explanatory, and methodological consequences of this analysis of multiple realizability
Funkhouser, Eric (2007). Multiple realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful
Harnad, Stevan (1995). Grounding symbols in sensorimotor categories with neural networks. Institute of Electrical Engineers Colloquium on "Grounding Representations.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: It is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too: Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by external interpreters as meaning something. However, unlike symbols in symbol systems, thoughts mean what they mean autonomously: Their meaning does not consist of or depend on anyone making or being able to make any external interpretations of them at all. When I think "the cat is on the mat," the meaning of that thought is autonomous; it does not depend on YOUR being able to interpret it as meaning that (even though you could interpret it that way, and you would be right)
Heil, John (1999). Multiple realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):189-208.   (Cited by 26 | Google | Edit)
Heil, John (2003). Multiply realized properties. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Horgan, Terence E. (2001). Multiple reference, multiple realization, and the reduction of mind. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Jaworksi, W. (2002). Multiple-realizability, explanation, and the disjunctive move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):298-308.   (Google | Edit)
Jones, Todd (2004). Reduction and anti-reduction: Rights and wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25 (5):614-647.   (Google | Edit)
Jones, Todd (2004). Special sciences: Still a flawed argument after all these years. Cognitive Science 28 (3):409-432.   (Google | Edit)
Jones, Todd (2003). The virtues of non-reduction, even when reduction is a virtue. Philosophical Forum 34 (4):121-140.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Keeley, Brian L. (2000). Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization. Philosophy Of Science 67 (3):444-465.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Kim, Jaegwon (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 128 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Kim, Sungsu (2002). Testing multiple realizability: A discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for or against multiple realizability
Kistler, Max (1999). Multiple realization, reduction and mental properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Klein, Colin (forthcoming). An ideal solution to disputes about multiply realized kinds. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia, such explanations do not run afoul of the metaphysical problems that plague MR kinds
Macdonald, C. (1992). Psychological type-type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):65-69.   (Google | Edit)
McClamrock, Ron (1993). Emergence unscathed: Kim on non-reducible types. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that the widespread assumption of the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds -- and in particular, psychological kinds -- conflicts with some fundamental constraints on both materialistic metaphysics and scientific taxonomy. Kim concludes that the multiple realizability of psychological kinds would leave them "disqualified as proper scientific kinds" (Kim 1992: 18), and that search for a scientific psychology should focus instead on more reductive or type- materialist possibilities. If correct, this would strikingly undermine a widespread assumption in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But it's not
McClamrock, Ron (1994). Kim on multiple realizability and causal types. Analysis 54 (4):248-252.   (Google | Edit)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Noûs 8 (November):327-42.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Nasrin, Mehdi (2000). Multiple realizability: Also a difficulty for functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Nelson, Alvin F. (1985). Physical properties. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (July-October):268-82.   (Annotation | Google | Edit)
Pauen, Michael (2002). Is type identity incompatible with multiple realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics and it should be acceptable for physicalism in general
Polger, Thomas W. (2002). Putnam's intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat of Putnam's intuition alone. I distinguishfour interpretations of the multiplerealizability intuition. Some commonformulations of multiple realizability arealmost certainly true, while others are not atall plausible. I argue that the plausible formsof multiple realizability do not impugn theprospects for a mind-brain Identity Theory
Polger, Thomas W. (online). Realization and multiple realization, chicken and egg.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Which comes first, realization or multiple realization? Hilary Putnam (1960) invoked the term ‘realization’ to refer to the relation that holds between physical devices and abstract computing machines, such as Turing machines or probabilistic automata. Putnam (1967) hypothesized that the relation between brain and mind is also realization. He contrasted his hypothesis—which he dubbed “functionalism”—with the competing hypotheses that mental states are to be identified with syndromes of behavior and behavioral dispositions, or that mental states are to be identified with brain processes. Instead, functionalism proposes that mental states are to be identified with functional states of whole organisms. Importantly, Putnam regards functionalism as an empirical hypothesis, and one whose explication appeals to some technical notions, particularly to the idea of a probabilistic automaton
Polger, Thomas W. (online). Review of Shapiro's The Mind Incarnate.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: To what degree must the brains and bodies of creatures with minds have to be similar to the brains and bodies of human beings? Since the late 1960’s, most philosophers and cognitive scientists have supposed that there a relatively few constraints on what sorts of brains and bodies can realize minds. It is widely believed that minds are multiply realizable. Of course there were always dissenters, and in recent years their grumbling has grown harder to dismiss. In _The Mind_ _Incarnate_, Lawrence Shapiro provides the first book-length study of the multiple realizability thesis. Such an examination is long overdue, and Shapiro’s treatment is sure to set the standard for the budding debate
Polger, Thomas W. (online). Two confusions concerning multiple realization.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the question of multiple realization from the explanatory context in which it is invoked. Anchoring multiple realizability in its theoretical context provides grounds for arbitrating disagreements. Doing so, I argue, favors the view advanced by Shapiro
Ramsey, William (2006). Multiple realizability intuitions and the functionalist conception of the mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Rosenberg, Alex (2001). On multiple realization and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):365-373.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Ross, Patricia A. (1999). The limits of physicalism. Philosophy of Science 66 (1):94-116.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Schwartz, J. (1992). Who's afraid of multiple realizability?: Functionalism, reductionism, and connectionism. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Shagrir, Oron (1998). Multiple realization, computation and the taxonomy of psychological states. Synthese 114 (3):445-461.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (2000). Multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links | Edit)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (online). Neural plasticity and multiple realizability.   (Google | Edit)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (2004). The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (online). The metaphysics of multiple realizability: It's like apples and oranges.   (Google | Edit)
Sober, Elliott (1999). The multiple realizability argument against reductionism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links | Edit)
Walter, Sven (2006). Multiple realizability and reduction: A defense of the disjunctive move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.   (Google | Edit)
Walter, Sven (2002). Need multiple realizability Deter the identity-theorist? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):51-75.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: I will