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4.5d. Psychophysical Reduction, Misc (Psychophysical Reduction, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Beckermann, Ansgar (2001). Physicalism and new wave reductionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1997). Property physicalism, reduction, and realization. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.2 In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. In the course of this paper I will therefore do two things: At the start, I will try to sketch the logical topography of the „solution space“ of the problem Kim is concerned with. As a second step, I shall then comment on the concepts of identity, realization and reduction and attempt to show that Kim’s concept of realization is too narrow, because he is still very much in the grip of the traditional view with regard to what it means to show that a property _F _is identical with, or realized by, another property _G_
Bechtel, William P. & Hamilton, Andrew (2007). Reduction, integration, and the unity of science: Natural, behavioral, and social sciences and the humanities. In T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: 1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines
Bechtel, William P. (2001). The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research. Minds And Machines 11 (4):483-502.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an analysis of recent cognitive neuroscience research on memory is used to illustrate what is involved. Memory researchers split between advocating memory systems and advocating memory processes, and I argue that it is the latter approach that provides the critical sort of decomposition and localization for explaining memory. The challenges of linking distinguishable functions with brain processes is illustrated by two examples: competing hypotheses about the contribution of the hippocampus and competing attempts to link areas in frontal cortex with memory processing
Bickle, John (online). Concepts of intertheoretic reduction in contemporary philosophy of mind.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bickle, John (1996). New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bickle, John (1997). Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press.   (Cited by 153 | Google | More links)
Bringsjord, Selmer (1994). Searle on the Brink. Psyche 1 (5).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second
Brooks, D. H. M. (1994). How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):803-14.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bunzl, Martin (1987). Reductionism and the mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):181-9.   (Annotation | Google)
Causey, Robert L. (1972). Attribute identities in microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 64 (August):407-22.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Combes, Richard (1988). Ockhamite reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):325-36.   (Google)
Enc, Berent (1976). Identity statements and microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 73 (June):285-306.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1995). Materialism, reduction, replacement, and the place of consciousness in science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):401-29.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Carl (2007). The metaphysics of mechanisms and the challenge of the new reductionism. In Maurice K. D. Schouten & H. L. De Joong (eds.), The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Over the last century, as Figure 1 graphically illustrates, scientific investigations have given us a detailed account of many natural phenomena, from molecules to manic depression, through so-called
Gillett, Carl (2007). Understanding the new reductionism: The metaphysics of science and compositional reduction. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Goldstein, Irwin (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. I argue against the existence of a posteriori identities.
Grene, Marjorie G. (ed.) (1971). Interpretations Of Life And Mind: Essays Around The Problem Of Reduction. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hellman, Geoffrey (1999). Reduction(?) To what? Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2).   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1984). In defense of type materialism. Synthese 59 (June):295-320.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2002). From reduction to type-type identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):644-647.   (Google | More links)
Kistler, Max (2005). Is functional reduction logical reduction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.   (Google)
Kitcher, Patricia S. (1980). Discussion: How to reduce a functional psychology? Philosophy of Science 47 (March):134-140.   (Google)
Kitcher, P. S. (1980). How to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):134-40.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lugg, Andrew (1975). Putnam on reductionism. Cognition 3:289-293.   (Google)
Lyre, Holger (2009). The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction.
Maloney, Christopher (2001). Reservations about new wave reduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:263-277.   (Google)
Marras, Ausonio (2002). Kim on reduction. Erkenntnis 57 (2):231-57.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction
McGivern, Patrick (2008). Reductive levels and multi-scale structure. Synthese 165 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised
Millikan, Ruth G. (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). Scientific reduction and the mind-body problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 185:185-204.   (Google)
Nickles, Thomas (1973). Two concepts of intertheoretic reduction. Journal of Philosophy 70 (April):181-201.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Papineau, David (1985). Social Facts and Psychological Facts. In Gregory Currie & A. Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the Human Sciences. Martinus Nijhoff.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Peacocke, Arthur R. (1976). Reductionism: A review of the epistemological issues and their relevance to biology and the problem of consciousness. Zygon 11 (December):307-334.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Peschard, Isabelle & Bitbol, Michel (2008). Heat, Temperature and Phenomenal Concepts. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The reduction of the concept of heat to that of molecular kinetic energy is recurrently presented as lending analogical support to the project of reduction of phenomenal concepts to physical concepts. The claimed analogy draws on the way the use of the concept of heat is attached to the experience in first person of a certain sensation. The reduction of this concept seems to prove the possibility to reduce discourse involving phenomenal concepts to a scientific description of neural activity. But is this analogy really justified? We will show that if there is an analogy, far from speaking for a reduction of phenomenal concepts, it rather stresses the necessity to integrate phenomenal reports in the scientific study of experience.
Post, John F., Breakwater: The new wave, supervenience and individualism.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism, Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that ALL a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology
Raatikainen, Panu, The return of reductive physicalism.   (Google)
Abstract: The importance of the exclusion argument for contemporary physicalism is emphasized. The recent attempts to vindicate reductive physicalism by invoking certain needed revisions to the Nagelian model of reduction are then discussed. It is argued that such revised views of reduction offer in fact much less help to reductive physicalism than is sometimes supposed, and that many of these views lead to trouble when combined with the exclusion argument
Richardson, Robert C. (1979). Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):533-58.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Richardson, Robert C. (1982). How not to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):125-37.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rueger, Alexander (2004). Reduction, autonomy, and causal exclusion among physical properties. Synthese 139 (1):1-21.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Is there a problem of causal exclusion between micro- and macro-level physical properties? I argue (following Kim) that the sorts of properties thatin fact are in competition are macro properties, viz., the property of a (macro-) system of `having such-and-such macro properties'' (call this a `macro-structural property'') and the property of the same system of `being constituted by such-and-such a micro-structure'' (call this a `micro-structural property''). I show that there are cases where, for lack of reducibility, there is a prima facie intra-level causal competition between the two kinds of properties. The problem can be resolved without giving up on the causal efficacy of the macro-structural properties if we understandinstances of macro-structural properties to be parts ofmicro-structural property instances. The parthood relation between both kinds of property instances can bemapped onto the way physical theory deals with the relation of their descriptionsin the framework of perturbation theory. The application of this framework to theproblem of emergent properties is discussed
Ruttkamp, Emma (2006). Reduction revisited. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):102-112.   (Google)
Sachse, Christian & Esfeld, Michael (2007). Theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21:1-17.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim’s argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, a conservative theory reduction is in principle possible despite multiple realization. We link this account with Nagelian reduction as well as Kim’s functional reduction
Sarkar, Sahotra (1992). Models of reduction and categories of reductionism. Synthese 91 (3):167-94.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A classification of models of reduction into three categories — theory reductionism, explanatory reductionism, and constitutive reductionism — is presented. It is shown that this classification helps clarify the relations between various explications of reduction that have been offered in the past, especially if a distinction is maintained between the various epistemological and ontological issues that arise. A relatively new model of explanatory reduction, one that emphasizes that reduction is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts is also presented in detail. Finally, the classification is used to clarify the debate over reductionism in molecular biology. It is argued there that while no model from the category of theory reduction might be applicable in that case, models of explanatory reduction might yet capture the structure of the relevant explanations
Sarkar, Tushar K. (1982). Types of reductionism: Their alleged incompatibility with anti-physicalism. In Logic, Ontology And Action. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.   (Google)
Schweizer, Paul (2001). Realization, reduction and psychological autonomy. Synthese 126 (3):383-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist views based on multiple realizability, I argue that the primary goal of a computational approach to the mind should be to facilitate a translation of the psychological to the neurophysiological
Spurrett, David (2006). Reductionisms and physicalisms. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):159-170.   (Google)
Sturgeon, Scott (2001). The roots of reductionism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Swanson, J. W. (1962). On the Kemeny-Oppenheim treatment of reduction. Philosophical Studies 13 (6):94-96.   (Google | More links)
Wimsatt, William C. (1976). Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem. In Gordon G. Globus (ed.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 86 | Annotation | Google)