MindPapers: 4.6b. Realization

Craver, Carl F. & Wilson, Robert A. (2006). Realization. In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological

de Muynck, Willem M. (2003). Wide physical realization. Inquiry 46 (1):97-111. (Google | Edit)

Endicott, Ronald P. (forthcoming). Realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan Press. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts: “multiplicity” and “realizability.” “Multiplicity” designates a kind of variability in the mechanism and materials from which a particular type of thing can be made. “Realizability” designates a specific relation that exists when there is the stated variability

Francescotti, Robert M. (2002). Understanding physical realization (and what it does not entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):279-292. (Google | Edit)

Gillett, Carl (2002). The dimensions of realization: A critique of the standard view. Analysis 62 (4):316-323. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gillett, Carl (2003). The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603. (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)

Hendel, Giovanna (2001). Realization. Critica 33 (98):41-70. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hofmann, Frank (2007). Causal powers, realization, and mental causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises, since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal powers and causation

McLaughlin, Brian P. (2007). Mental causation and Shoemaker-realization. Erkenntnis 67 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental properties

Opie, Jonathan (1998). Connectionist modelling strategies. Psycoloquy 9 (30). (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena

Opie, Jonathan & O'Brien, Gerard (2006). How do connectionist networks compute? Cognitive Processing 7 (1):30-41. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the “conventional” account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks aren’t genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks

Polger, Thomas W. (2004). Neural machinery and realization. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):997-1006. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains

Polger, Thomas W. (2007). Realization and the metaphysics of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: According to the received view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are _realized_ by brain states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called _realization_ _physicalism_. Carl Gillett has recently defended a detailed formulation of the realization relation. However, Gillett’s formulation cannot be the relation that realization physicalists have in mind. I argue that Gillett’s “dimensioned” view of realization fails to apply to a textbook case of realization. I also argue Gillett counts as realization some cases that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I conclude that the relation described by Gillett cannot be realization

Shoemaker, Sydney (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (2003). Realization, micro-realization, and coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)

Vicente, Agustín (2001). Realization, determination and mental causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Wilson, Robert A. & Craver, Carl F. (2004). Realization. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological..

Wilson, Robert A. (2004). Realization: Metaphysics, mind, and science. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science

Wilson, Robert A. (2001). Two views of realization. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):1-31. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper examines the standard view of realization operative incontemporary philosophy of mind, and proposes an alternative, generalperspective on realization. The standard view can be expressed, insummary form, as the conjunction of two theses, the sufficiency thesis andthe constitutivity thesis. Physicalists of both reductionist and anti-reductionist persuasions share a conception of realization wherebyrealizations are determinative of the properties they realize and physically constitutive of the individuals with those properties. Centralto the alternative view that I explore here is the idea that the requisite,metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive. I shall argue that the sufficiency and constitutivity theses aretypically not jointly satisfied by any one candidate realizer, and that goingcontext-sensitive in one's metaphysics is preferable to the standard view.The context-sensitive views developed here are implicit in a range ofcommon views in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology,even if they have not been explicitly articulated, and even though theyundermine other views that are commonly endorsed

4.6a	Emergence [146]

4.6b	Realization [19]

4.6c	Token Identity [18]

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