MindPapers: 4.6c. Token Identity

Brewer, Bill (1998). Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: A difficulty for the token identity theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one caused her reaching out and grasping for it. This tells us how the action came about and makes sense of why it happened. At least, something broadly along these lines strikes me as a fairly crude and partial regimentation of our pretheoretic understanding of everyday action explanation

Campbell, Neil (1999). Putnam on the token-identity theory. Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carrier, Leonard S. (1981). Event identity and a significant physicalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:171-180. (Google | Edit)

Cartwright, Nancy D. (1979). Do token-token identity theories show why we don't need reductionism? Philosophical Studies 36 (July):85-90. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Foster, John A. (1994). The token-identity thesis. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Haugeland, John (1982). Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):93-103. (Cited by 45 | Google | Annotation | Edit)

Horgan, Terence E. & Tye, Michael (1985). Against the token identity theory. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 14 | Google | Annotation | Edit)

Hornsby, Jennifer (1981). Which physical events are mental events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92. (Cited by 12 | Google | Edit)

Hutto, Daniel D. (1999). Cognition without representation? In A. Reigler & Markus F. Peschl (eds.), Understanding Representation. Plenum Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: ionality which is processed by non-systematic connectionist networks and has its correctness conditions provided by a modest biose- mantics; but this type of content is not properly rep- resentational. Finally, I consider the consequences that such a verdict has on eliminativist views that look to connectionism as a means of radically re- conceiving our understanding of cognition

Latham, Noa (2003). What is token physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than substance physicalism, and as a good statement on its own or in conjunction with other theses of minimal physicalism.[i] It is also generally simply assumed to be true, though Davidson has offered a famous argument for its truth, and some have argued against it. Many of those arguing against it are substance physicalists, indicating that they believe token physicalism to be a strictly stronger view.[ii]

Leder, Drew (1985). Troubles with token identity. Philosophical Studies 47 (January):79-94. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1981). Against an argument for token identity. Mind 90 (January):120-121. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lurie, Yuval (1978). Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56:135-44. (Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)

Macdonald, Cynthia (1985). Mind-body identity and the subjects of events. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):73-82. (Google | More links | Edit)

Marcus, Eric (ms). Why there are no token states. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Physicalism constrains philosophical thought in general, perhaps most powerfully when such thought is turned to the nature of the mind. The thought that everything mental must also be physical has been a demanding muse for most philosophers of mind, requiring the construction of ever more elaborate theories to surmount the formidable obstacles lying in the way of its substantiation. The core of any such theory is that something is both mental and physical. But which something? Objects, properties, events, states, processes, and facts among some others, have historically served as the metaphysical hooks on which physicalists have attempted to hang their various identity- theses. Over the last half-century, most of the debate has surrounded property- or type- identity theories, and particular or token-identity theories. But the thesis that mental properties or types are identical to physical properties or types has been largely abandoned on account of the ‘multiple-realizability’ of mental types.1 To the extent that type-identity theory survives at all, it is often limited to a restricted class of mental types—to sensations, as opposed to propositional attitudes.2 But identity-theses stated in terms of particulars—token events, token states, and token processes—are largely taken for granted

Odegard, Douglas (1971). The sense of mental events-corporeal events. Synthese 22 (May):360-368. (Google | More links | Edit)

Peacocke, Christopher (1979). Argument for token identity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Smith, Peter K. (1983). On identifying the mental with the physical. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (June):227-238. (Google | Edit)

4.6a	Emergence [147]

4.6b	Realization [19]

4.6c	Token Identity [18]

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