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4.8. Personal Identity (Personal Identity on PhilPapers)

Agich, George J. & Jones, Royce P. (1986). Personal identity and brain death: A critical response. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (3):267-274.   (Google | More links)
Anomaly, Jonny (2009). Personal Identity and Practical Reason. Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.   (Google | More links)
Arnold, Keith (1989). Personal identity: The Galton details. Philosophia 19 (1).   (Google)
Atkins, Kim (2000). Personal identity and the importance of one's own body: A response to Derek Parfit. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs
Audi, Robert (1976). Eschatological verification and personal identity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):391-408.   (Google)
Belzer, Marvin (2005). Self-conception and personal identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an eye on the grip of the unity reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.   (Google)
Abstract: Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction. Footnotesa * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the philosophy departments at Rutgers University and Bowling Green State University. I am indebted to many members of these audiences, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their comments—especially Frank Arntzenius, Michael Bradie, David Copp, John Finnis, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Fred Miller, Mark Moyer, David Oderberg, Marya Schechtman, David Schmidtz, David Sobel, and Sara Worley. Special thanks to David Sanford. I am also grateful to graduate students in my seminar at Bowling Green during the spring of 2003, for urging me to take seriously the grip of the unity reaction; I am especially grateful for the comments of Nico Maloberti, Jonathan Miller, John Milliken, Robyn Peabody, Jennifer Sproul, Jessica Teaman, and Sherisse Webb
Berman, David (2001). Book review. Naturalization of the soul: Self and personal identity in the eighteenth century Raymond Martin John Barresi. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Blatti, Stephan (2008). The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Review). Mind 117 (465):191-95.   (Google)
Borowski, E. J. (1976). Identity and personal identity. Mind 85 (340):481-502.   (Google | More links)
Braude, Stephen E. (2005). Personal identity and postmortem survival. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):226-249.   (Google)
Abstract: The so-called “problem of personal identity” can be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an individual is the same person as someone else. These two problems converge around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation cases, suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases make us wonder how it might be possible for a person to survive death and either temporarily or permanently animate another body. And they make us wonder how we could decide if such postmortem survival has actually occurred. In this essay I argue, first, that metaphysical worries about postmortem survival are less important than many have supposed. Next, I'll consider briefly why cases suggesting postmortem survival can be so intriguing and compelling, and I'll survey our principal explanatory options and challenges. Then, I'll consider why we need to be circumspect in our appraisal of evidence for mind-body correlations. And finally, I'll try to draw a few tentative and provocative conclusions
Brey, Philip (2009). Human enhancement and personal identity. In Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger & Søren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Brody, Baruch (1974). An impersonal theory of personal identity. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6).   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony (2009). Endurantism and the psychological approach to personal identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated
Buchanan, Allen (1988). Advance directives and the personal identity problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (4):277-302.   (Google | More links)
Buford, Christopher (2009). Baker on the psychological account of personal identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.   (Google)
Abstract: Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity over time . Baker claims that her account avoids the commitment to indeterminacy of personal identity entailed by the psychological account. Further, the psychological account, but not her account, is plagued by what Baker labels the ‘duplication problem’. In the end, I argue that neither of these considerations forces us to renounce the psychological account and adopt Baker’s favored account
Care, Norman S. & Grimm, Robert H. (eds.) (1969). Perception and Personal Identity. Cleveland, Press of Case Western Reserve University.   (Google)
Chaturvedi, Vibha (1988). The Problem of Personal Identity. Ajanta Publications.   (Google)
Coe, John (2009). The person as spirit : Personal identity, natures, freedom and relationality. In John H. Coe (ed.), Psychology in the Spirit: Contours of a Transformational Psychology. Ivp Academic.   (Google)
Cole, David J. (1991). Artificial intelligence and personal identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that artificial minds are impossible: minds and persons are not the same as the machines, biological or electronic, that realize them
Copenhaver, Rebecca (online). Reid on memory and personal identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Costa, P. (2010). Personal identity and the nature of the self. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Doore, G. L. (1982). Mackie on personal identity. Mind 91 (364):593-598.   (Google | More links)
Douven, Igor (1999). Marc Slors on personal identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form 'x-at-ti is the same person as y-at-tj. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper argues that Slors' theory either is no theory of personal identity at all or is too weak.Towards the end of the paper, it is indicated how the problem uncovered for Slors' theory may be avoided
Ducharme, Howard M. (1986). Personal identity in Samuel Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3).   (Google)
Ehring, Douglas (1987). Personal identity and time travel. Philosophical Studies 52 (3).   (Google)
Feldman, Fred, Hume's a treatise of human nature (I, IV, 6): Personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: We are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; we feel its existence and its continuing to exist, and are certain - more even than any demonstration could make us - both of its perfect identity and of its simplicity. The strongest sensations and most violent emotions, instead of distracting us from this view ·of our self·, only focus it all the more intensely, making us think about how these sensations and emotions affect our self by bringing it pain or pleasure. To offer further evidence of the existence of one’s self would make it less evident, not more, because no fact we could use as evidence is as intimately present to our consciousness as is the existence of our self. If we doubt the latter, we can’t be certain of anything
Feser, Edward (2005). Personal identity and self-ownership. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):100-125.   (Google)
Abstract: Defenders of the thesis of self-ownership generally focus on the “ownership” part of the thesis and say little about the metaphysics of the self that is said to be self-owned. But not all accounts of the self are consistent with robust self-ownership. Philosophical accounts of the self are typically enshrined in theories of personal identity, and the paper examines various such theories with a view to determining their suitability for grounding a metaphysics of the self consistent with self-ownership. As it happens, only one such theory is suitable: the hylemorphic theory of Aristotle and Aquinas. To adopt such a theory, however, is to see that self-ownership may in some respects have implications different from those many of its defenders take it to have. Footnotesa For comments on earlier versions of this essay, I thank Christopher Kaczor, Ellen Frankel Paul, the participants at an Institute for Humane Studies current research workshop in January 2004, and the other contributors to this volume
Finnis, John (2005). “The thing I am”: Personal identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):250-282.   (Google)
Abstract: The four kinds of explanation identified by Aquinas at the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics are deployed to show that the identity of the human person is sui generis and mysterious, even though each of its elements is more or less readily accessible to our understanding. The essay attends particularly to the explorations by Aquinas and, with different techniques, by Shakespeare of the experience and understanding of (a) one's lasting presence to oneself as one and the same bodily and mental self, and (b) one's self-shaping by one's free choices, especially of commitments. Shakespeare further explores these, quite deliberately, through displays of mistaken identity and humiliating deflations of the personas one constructs for life in society
Fischer, John Martin & Speak, Daniel (2000). Death and the psychological conception of personal identity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):84–93.   (Google | More links)
Flint, Kate (1997). As a rule, I does not mean I" : Personal identity and the Victorian woman poet. In Roy Porter (ed.), Rewriting the Self: Histories From the Renaissance to the Present. Routledge.   (Google)
Forstrom, Joanna K. (2010). John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- John Locke and the problem of personal identity : the principium individuationis, personal immortality, and bodily resurrection -- On separation and immortality : Descartes and the nature of the soul -- On materialism and immortality or Hobbes' rejection of the natural argument for the immortality of the soul -- Henry More and John Locke on the dangers of materialism : immateriality, immortality, immorality, and identity -- Robert Boyle : on seeds, cannibalism, and the resurrection of the body -- Locke's theory of personal identity in its context : a reassessment of classic objections.
Foster, Gary (2009). Bestowal without appraisal: Problems in Frankfurt's characterization of love and personal identity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal at the expense of the part played by appraisal and (c) it is insufficiently social. Certain forms of love, romantic love and friendship for instance, are defined largely in terms of reciprocation. For Frankfurt, reciprocation is somewhat of an accidental feature of love. This deficiency in Frankfurt’s conception of love can be traced to a problem in his conception of selfhood which I argue is insufficiently social in nature
Gamble, Ruth (2008). Review of mark Siderits, personal identity and buddhist philosophy: Empty persons. Sophia 47 (1).   (Google)
Ganeri, Jonardon (1999). Self-intimation, memory and personal identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5).   (Google)
Garrett, Don (1981). Hume's self-doubts about personal identity. Philosophical Review 90 (3):337-358.   (Google | More links)
Garrett, Brian (1998). Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The first book synthesizing the many different topics that surround the issue of personal identity, this text makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology
Garfield, Jay (ms). Reductionism and fictionalism comments on Siderits' personal identity and buddhist philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: As a critic, I am in the unenviable position of agreeing with nearly all of what Mark does in this lucid, erudite and creative book. My comments will hence not be aimed at showing what he got wrong, as much as an attempt from a Madhyamaka point of view to suggest another way of seeing things, in particular another way of seeing how one might think of how Madhyamaka philosophers, such as Någårjuna and Candrak¥rti, see conventional truth, our engagement with conventional truth, and the status of persons. I suspect that this alternative is also in the minds of earlier Buddhist philosophers, and that Madhyamaka may be more an explicit working out of ideas implicit in the tradition than a radical break. If this suspicion—for which I will not argue here—is correct, this alternative is also available to those to whom Mark refers as “reductionists.” I think that this way of seeing things may put certain ideas in Buddhist philosophy into better focus, and may indeed make them more attractive as well
Giles, James (1993). The no-self theory: Hume, buddhism, and personal identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.   (Google | More links)
Godoń, Rafał (2004). Understanding, personal identity and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 38 (4):589–600.   (Google | More links)
GreenwooD, John d (1994). A sense of identity: Prolegomena to a social theory of personal identity. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):25–46.   (Google | More links)
Green, Michael B. & Wikler, Daniel (1980). Brain death and personal identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (2):105-133.   (Google | More links)
Green, Michael J. (1999). The idea of a momentary self and Hume's theory of personal identity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):103 – 122.   (Google)
Harrison, Victoria S. (1999). Personal identity and integration: Von balthasar's phenomenology of human holiness. Heythrop Journal 40 (4):424–437.   (Google | More links)
Hershenov, David (ms). A hylomorphic account of personal identity thought experiments.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity that maintain psychology is irrelevant to our persistence and neo-Lockean accounts that deny we are animals. A Thomistic-inspired account is provided that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones without having to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity that matters in survival nor countenance the puzzles of spatially coincident entities that plague the neo-Lockean. The key is to understand the human being as only contingently an animal. This approach to our animality is one that Catholics have additional reason to hold given certain views about Purgatory, our uniqueness as free and rational creatures, and our having once existed as zygotes
Hershenov, David (2004). Countering the appeal of the psychological approach to personal identity. Philosophy 79 (3):447-474.   (Google)
Abstract: Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by relying upon what I take will be the reader's disagreement with Locke's conjecture that a dreaming Socrates and an awake Socrates are two distinct people
Hershenov, David (2006). Personal identity and purgatory. Religious Studies 42 (4):439-451.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If Purgatory involves just an immaterial soul undergoing a transformation between our death and resurrection, then, as Aquinas recognized, it won't be us in Purgatory. Drawing upon Parfit's ideas about identity not being what matters to us, we explore whether the soul's experience of Purgatory could still be beneficial to it as well as the deceased human who didn't experience the purging yet would possess the purged soul upon resurrection. We also investigate an alternative non-Thomistic hylomorphic account of Purgatory in which humans would survive during the period between death and resurrection in a bodiless form with a soul as their only proper part
Hossack, Keith (2006). Vagueness and personal identity. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Intisar-Ul-Haque, (1970). The person and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1):60-72.   (Google | More links)
Kakkattuthadathil, Tomy Paul (2001). Otherness and Being Oneself: Thinking with Martin Buber on Intersubjectivity and Personal Identity. Intercultural Publications.   (Google)
Kamm, F. M. (2005). Moral status and personal identity: Clones, embryos, and future generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the second part, I argue that cloning poses no threat to the nonsubstitutability of these entities (and in this sense, to the dignity of persons). I also consider the relation between cloning and (what I called) holistic identity, and between the latter and genetic identity. In the concluding part of the article, I try to distinguish cases where identity over time and so-called person-affecting acts have and do not have greater moral significance than nonidentity over time and nonperson-affecting acts. I try to apply my results to cases involving embryos, future generations, and to the so-called Non-Identity Problem
Koch, Rose (2006). Conjoined twins and the biological account of personal identity. The Monist 89 (3):351-370.   (Google)
Kolak, Daniel (2008). Room for a view: On the metaphysical subject of personal identity. Synthese 162 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself
Kopf, Gereon (2002). Temporality and personal identity in the thought of Nishida Kitaro. Philosophy East and West 52 (2):224-245.   (Google | More links)
Korfmacher, Carsten (online). Personal identity. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Kuczewski, Mark G. (1994). Whose will is it, anyway? A discussion of advance directives, personal identity, and consensus in medical ethics. Bioethics 8 (1):27–48.   (Google | More links)
Kuhse, Helga (1999). Some reflections on the problem of advance directives, personhood, and personal identity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : In this paper, I consider objections to advance directives based on the claim that there is a discontinuity of interests, and of personal identity, between the time a person executes an advance directive and the time when the patient has become severely demented. Focusing narrowly on refusals of life-sustaining treatment for severely demented patients, I argue that acceptance of the psychological view of personal identity does not entail that treatment refusals should be overridden. Although severely demented patients are morally considerable beings, and must be kept comfortable whilst alive, they no longer have an interest in receiving life-sustaining treatment
Lance, Mark & White, H. Heath (2007). Stereoscopic vision: Persons, freedom, and two spaces of material inference. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (4):1-21.   (Google)
Abstract: We discuss first a "stance" methodology toward the problem of personhood. This is to ask first, what it is to take something to be a person, and then to move via a notion of appropriateness to an answer to what it is to be a person. We argue that the distinctions between persons and non-persons, between agents and patients, and between subjects and mere objects are deeply connected. All three distinctions are themselves traced to a fundamental distinction within the space of reasons -- between, that is, two sorts of material inferential propriety. These two structures of inference are made explicit by indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Tracing personhood to the fundamentally stereoscopic structure of material inference sheds light not only on notions of freedom, agency, and personhood, but on the nature of modal judgments, on the conceptual space of causation, and on the semantics of the explicitating conditionals. We conclude with a pragmatic argument for belief in persons
Leiber, Justin (1985). Can Animals and Machines Be Persons?: A Dialogue. Hackett Pub. Co..   (Google)
Lesser, A. Harry (2006). Dementia and personal identity. In Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw & Steven R. Sabat (eds.), Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Levin, Michael E. (1980). Reverse discrimination, shackled runners, and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 37 (2).   (Google)
Lin, Martin (online). Memory and personal identity in Spinoza.   (Google)
Lipsman, Nir; Zener, Rebecca & Bernstein, Mark (2009). Personal identity, enhancement and neurosurgery: A qualitative study in applied neuroethics. Bioethics 23 (6):375-383.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent developments in the field of neurosurgery, specifically those dealing with the modification of mood and affect as part of psychiatric disease, have led some researchers to discuss the ethical implications of surgery to alter personality and personal identity. As knowledge and technology advance, discussions of surgery to alter undesirable traits, or possibly the enhancement of normal traits, will play an increasingly larger role in the ethical literature. So far, identity and enhancement have yet to be explored in a neurosurgical context, despite the fact that 1) neurological disease and treatment both potentially alter identity, and 2) that neurosurgeons will likely be the purveyors of future enhancement implantable technology. Here, we use interviews with neurosurgical patients to shed light on the ethical issues and challenges that surround identity and enhancement in neurosurgery. The results provide insight into how patients approach their identity prior to potentially identity-altering procedures and what future ethical challenges lay ahead for clinicians and researchers in the field of neurotherapeutics
Loptson, Peter (2004). Locke, Reid, and personal identity. Philosophical Forum 35 (1):51–63.   (Google | More links)
Lowe, E. Jonathan (2006). Can the self disintegrate? Personal identity, psychopathology, and disunities of consciousness. In Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw & Steven R. Sabat (eds.), Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Lund, D. H. (1994). Perception, Mind, and Personal Identity: A Critique of Materialism. University Press of America.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mackenzie, Catriona (2009). Personal identity, narrative integration, and embodiment. In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Manninen, Bertha Alvarez (2009). The metaphysical foundations of reproductive ethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):190-204.   (Google)
Abstract: Many bioethicists working in reproductive ethics tacitly assume some theory of diachronic personal identity. For example, Peter Singer argues that there is no identity relation between a foetus and a future individual because the former shares no robust mental connections with the latter. Consequently, abortion prevents the existence of an individual; it does not destroy an already existing individual. Singer's argument implicitly appeals to the psychological account of personal identity, which, although endorsed by many philosophers such as Derek Parfit, is contentious. Singer does not attempt to defend the psychological account before applying it to the moral permissibility of abortion. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, very few bioethicists attempt antecedently to defend their chosen theory of personal identity before applying it to their ethical arguments. In this paper, I look at the issues of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and human reproductive cloning in order to illustrate how many of the arguments made by bioethicists on these topics are, at least partly, based upon veiled metaphysical assumptions. My objective is to illustrate that progress can be made on these topics by attending to their fundamental metaphysical claims
Martin, Raymond (ms). Eighteenth century british theories of self & personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. In the Essay, Locke’s most controversial claim, which he slipped into Book IV almost as an aside, was that matter might think (Locke1975:IV.iii.6;540-1).i Either because he was genuinely pious, which he was, or because he was clever, which he also was, he tied the denial that matter might think to the claim that God’s powers are limited, thus, attempting to disarm his critics. It did not work. Stillingfleet and others were outraged. If matter can think, then for explanatory purposes the immaterial soul might be dispensable. But throughout the eighteenth century explanatory purposes were at the top of the agenda. And what had always made the soul so handy for proving immortality - that it is non-composite, static, and inaccessible to empirical examination - is also what made it so useless for investigating human nature. By contrast, consciousness is multifaceted, dynamic, and open to empirical investigation. Early in the century a Clarke might take the high road and resist descent into the merely probable and contingent. But when it came to investigating persons, the emerging science of human nature was the only game in town. One either played it or took oneself out of the action
Markosian, Ned (2010). Identifying the problem of personal identity. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie my proposal. Then I introduce the new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity that I am recommending, and I show that it avoids the difficulties facing the old ways. I also mention several vexing problems that arise in connection with certain popular views about personal identity, and I argue that if we formulate the problem of personal identity in the way that I am proposing, then each of these problems can be handled fairly easily. Finally, I show that there is an additional benefit to adopting my proposal, namely, that several other important problems facing anyone who endorses a 3D view of persistence (as opposed to the 4D, “temporal parts” view of persistence) can all be resolved in a relatively straightforward..
Martin, Raymond (2000). Locke's psychology of personal identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1).   (Google)
Martin, Raymond (2000). Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Naturalization of the Soul charts the development of the concept of soul in western thought, from Plato to the present. The authors place particular emphasis on the eighteenth century which witnessed an enormous intellectual transformation in the way theorists perceived self and personal identity and paved the way for contemporary philosophical and psychological debates
Martin, Raymond & Barresi, John (eds.) (2003). Personal Identity. Blackwell.   (Google)
Markosian, Ned (ms). Three problems for Olson's account of personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: I take Eric Olson’s account of personal identity to have two components. First there is his characterization of the problem of personal identity. Here’s a paraphrase of some things Olson says on p. 23 of The Human Animal.1..
Mathews, Debra J. H.; Bok, Hilary & Rabins, Peter V. (eds.) (2009). Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book brings together some of the best minds in neurology and philosophy to discuss the concept of personal identity and the moral dimensions of treating ...
Mcintyre, Jane L. (2009). Hume and the problem of personal identity. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
McIntyre, Jane L. (1989). Personal identity and the passions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4).   (Google)
McIntyre, Jane L. (2003). “So great a question”: A critical study of Raymond Martin and John Barresi: Naturalization of the soul: Self and personal identity in the eighteenth century. Hume Studies 29 (2):363-373.   (Google)
Mendus, Susan (1980). Personal identity: The two analogies in Hume. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):61-68.   (Google | More links)
Merricks, Trenton (1999). Endurance, psychological continuity, and the importance of personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.   (Google | More links)
Miri, Mrinal (1980). What is a Person. Distributors, Jain Book Depot.   (Google)
Mohapatra, P. K. (1983). Personal Identity. Santosh Publications.   (Google)
Montefiore, Alan (2003). Personal identity and family commitment. In Kim Chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan & C. L. Ten (eds.), The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches. Open Court.   (Google)
Nelson, James Lindemann (2000). Prenatal diagnosis, personal identity, and disability. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : A fascinating criticism of abortion occasioned by prenatal diagnosis of potentially disabling traits is that the complex of test-and-abortion sends a morally disparaging message to people living with disabilities. I have argued that available versions of this "expressivist" argument are inadequate on two grounds. The most fundamental is that, considered as a practice, abortions prompted by prenatal testing are not semantically well-behaved enough to send any particular message; they do not function as signs in a rule-governed symbol system. Further, even granting, for the sake of argument, the expressive power of testing and aborting, it would not be possible, contra the argument's proponents, to distinguish between abortions undertaken because of beliefs about the disabling conditions the fetus might face as a child and abortions undertaken for many other possible reasons--e.g., because of the poverty the fetus would face or the increase in family size that the birth of a new child would occasion. Here, I respond to criticisms of those arguments, and propose and defend another: the expressivist argument cannot, in general, distinguish successfully between abortion and therapy as modalities for responding to disabilities
Nichols, Shaun, Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study.   (Google)
Abstract: Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires persistence of one’s psychological characteristics; other frames lead us to think that the self persists even after the loss of one’s distinctive psychological characteristics. The current paper takes an empirical approach to these issues. We find that framing does affect whether or not people judge that persistence of psychological characteristics is required for persistence of self. This difference is not explained by whether the case is framed in first or third person. By contrast, open-ended, abstract questions about what is required for survival tend to elicit responses that appeal to the importance of psychological characteristics. This emphasis on psychological characteristics is largely preserved even when participants are exposed to a concrete case that yields conflicting intuitions over whether memory must be..
Nichols, Peter (forthcoming). Substance concepts and personal identity. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the other hand, can provide such criteria. This argument has been defended by Eric Olson, among others. I argue that this line of reasoning fails to show Animalism to be superior to the Psychological Approach, for the following two reasons: (1) human animal , animal , and organism are all functional concepts, and (2) the distinction between what something is and what it does is illegitimate on the reading that the argument needs
Nnoruka, Sylvanus Ifeanyi (1995). Personal Identity: A Philosophical Survey. Modern Business Press.   (Google)
Olson, Eric T. (2006). Identity, personal identity, and the self, by John Perry. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):434–437.   (Google | More links)
Olson, Eric (2006). Is there a bodily criterion of personal identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an important view which anyone thinking about personal identity must consider
Paul, Ellen Frankel; Miller, Fred Dycus & Paul, Jeffrey (eds.) (2005). Personal Identity. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory? These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy
Penelhum, Terence (1955). Hume on personal identity. Philosophical Review 64 (4):571-589.   (Google | More links)
Perrett, Roy W. (2002). Personal identity, minimalism, and madhyamaka. Philosophy East and West 52 (3):373-385.   (Google | More links)
Persson, Ingmar (1992). The indeterminacy and insignificance of personal identity. Inquiry 35 (2):271 – 283.   (Google)
Petrović, Neven (2009). Equality of opportunity and personal identity. Acta Analytica 24 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: One of the central theses of egalitarian liberals in the domain of distributive justice is that talented individuals should not be allowed to keep their entire market-income even if it flows solely from their greater abilities. This claim is usually supported by one of several arguments or some mixture of them, but in the present paper, I want to concentrate on the version that invokes equality of opportunity as its starting point. Namely, it is claimed that every human being should enjoy an equal starting point in the life-race but that this is not secured insofar as some have greater natural talents than others. Therefore, egalitarians hold that results that arise from such an unfair situation are unjust and should be corrected by a redistributive taxation. I want to criticize this argument by hoping to show that it presupposes an untenable view about identity of persons
phd, Hugh Upton ba mphil (2005). Personal identity. Nursing Philosophy 6 (1):77–79.   (Google | More links)
Plantikow, Thane (2008). Surviving personal identity theory: Recovering interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction
Pucci, Edi (1992). Review of Paul Ricoeur's oneself as another: Personal identity, narrative identity and "selfhood" in the thought of Paul Ricoeur. Philosophy and Social Criticism 18 (2).   (Google)
Quante, Michael (1999). Precedent autonomy and personal identity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Debates on precedent autonomy and some forms of paternalistic interventions, which are related to questions of personal identity, are analyzed. The discussion is based on the distinction between personal identity as persistence and as biographical identity. It first is shown that categorical objections to advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are based on false assumptions about personal identity that conflate persistence and biographical identity. Therefore, advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are ethically acceptable tools for prolonging one's autonomy. The notions of personality and biographical identity are used to analyze the ethically relevant features. Thereby, it is shown that these concepts are operative in and useful for thinking in biomedical ethics. The overall conclusion is that categorical arguments against precedent autonomy or "Ulysses contracts" are based on misleading theories of personal identity and that advance directives are an ethically respectable tool for prolonging individuals' autonomy in cases of dementia and mental illness
Quinn, Philip L. (1978). Personal identity, bodily continuity and resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2).   (Google)
Rabins, Peter V. & Blass, David M. (2009). Toward a neurobiology of personal identity. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Rapaport, William J. (online). Computer processes and virtual persons: Comments on Cole's "artificial intelligence and personal identity".   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentation
Robison, Wade L. (1974). Hume on personal identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (2).   (Google)
Robison, Wade L. (1997). Privacy and personal identity. Ethics and Behavior 7 (3):195 – 205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What marks the traditional privacy torts of disclosure, intrusion, false light, and appropriation is that they require an invasion, an intrinsic harm caused by someone doing something to us without our consent. But we are now voluntarily giving up information about ourselves--to our physicians, for instance--that is being gathered into databases that are brought and sold and that can be appropriated by those who wish to assume our identities. The way in which our privacy is put at risk is different, and this leads to a new understanding of the concept of privacy. Others appropriate our identities, treating us as objects; by doing so, our standing as autonomous moral agents, controlling how we present ourselves to the world, is thus denied
Robinson and Tom Beauchamp, Daniel N. (1978). Personal identity: Reid's answer to Hume. The Monist 61:326-339.   (Google)
Ross, Jacob, Personal identity and the irrelevance of self-interest.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-interest is widely regarded as an important, if not as the only, source of reasons for action, and hence it is widely held that one can rationally give special weight to one’s self-interest in deciding how to act. In what follows, I will argue against this view. I will do so by following the lead of Derek Parfit, and considering cases in which personal identity appears to break down. My argument will differ from Parfit’s, however, in that it will have a stronger conclusion, it will involve fewer assumptions, and it will be compatible with a wider range of theories of personal identity
Roth, Abraham Sesshu (2000). What was Hume's problem with personal identity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):91-114.   (Google | More links)
Rovane, Carol (2009). Personal identity and choice. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Santos, Ferdinand (2007). Personal Identity, the Self, and Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Going beyond the present controversy surrounding personhood in various non-philosophical contexts, this book seeks to defend the renewed philosophical interest in issues connected with this topic and the need for a more credible philosophical conception of the person. Taking the theory of John Locke as a starting point and in dialogue with contemporary philosophers such as Derek Parfit and P.F. Strawson, the authors develop an original philosophical anthropology based on the writings of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead. The authors then show the implications for ethics of this conception of the person and the self
Saw, Ruth L. (1969). Personal identity in Spinoza. Inquiry 12 (1-4):1 – 14.   (Google)
Schechtman, Marya (2001). Empathic access: The missing ingredient in personal identity. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity
Schechtman, Marya (2009). Getting our stories straight : Self-narrative and personal identity. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1984). Personal Identity. B. Blackwell.   (Google)
Shoemaker, David W. (2007). Personal identity and practical concerns. Mind 116 (462).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves the project intact, albeit significantly changed. Perhaps the most important change stems from the recognition that the practical concerns motivating investigation into personal identity turn out to be not univocal, as is typically thought, such that each of the different practical concerns may actually be related to personal identity in very different ways
Shoemaker, David (2008). Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction. Broadview Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, David (forthcoming). The insignificance of personal identity for bioethics. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each case that the significant work is being done by a relation other than identity
Shoemaker, David W. (1999). Utilitarianism and personal identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2).   (Google)
Siderits, Mark (2003). Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. Ashgate.   (Google)
Smith, Quentin (1993). Personal identity and time. Philosophia 22 (1-2).   (Google)
Smythe, Thomas W. (1975). Chisholm on personal identity. Philosophical Studies 27 (5).   (Google)
Smythe, Thomas W. (1989). Disembodied minds and personal identity. Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.   (Google)
Snowdon, Paul (2009). The self and personal identity. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1979). Consciousness, free will and personal identity. In David A. Oakley & H.C. Plotkin (eds.), Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.   (Google)
Stokes, Patrick (2008). Locke, Kierkegaard and the phenomenology of personal identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke's original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given the distinctly normative (and indeed eschatological) focus of his discussion. To succeed, the Lockean project needs to identify some phenomenal property of experience that can constitute a sense of identity with the self figured in all moments to which consciousness can be extended. I draw upon key themes in Kierkegaard's phenomenology of moral imagination to show that Kierkegaard describes a phenomenal quality of experience that unites the experiencing subject with its past and future, regardless of facts about psychological change across time. Yet Kierkegaard's account is fully normative, recasting affective identification with past/future selves as a moral task rather than something merely psychologically desirable (Schechtman) or utterly contingent (Parfit, Strawson)
Strawson, Peter F. (1976). Entity and identity. In H. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, Fourth Series. George Allen and Unwin.   (Google)
Swindell, J. S. (2007). Facial Allograft Transplantation, Personal Identity, and Subjectivity. Journal of Medical Ethics 33:449-453.   (Google)
Abstract: An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general, under both theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but much stronger because the face is so closely linked with personal identity. Recipients of facial allograft transplantation have the potential to feel that their identity is a mix between their own and the donor’s, and the donor’s family is potentially likely to feel that their loved one ‘‘lives on’’. It is also argued that facial allograft transplantation allows the recipients to regain an identity, because they can now be seen in the social world. Moreover, they may regain expressivity, allowing for them to be seen even more by others, and to regain an identity to an even greater extent. Informing both recipients and donors about the role that identity plays in facial allograft transplantation could enhance the consent process for facial allograft transplantation and donation.
Tappolet, Christine, Procrastination and personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: As Ilia Ilitch Oblomov was perfectly aware when he woke up, there were a great many things that he had to do.2 For one thing, he had to reply to an alarming letter from his estate manager. So, as soon as he woke up, he formed the intention to get out of bed, have his tea, and do some serious thinking in order to decide which measures had to be taken to save his estate. But after half an hour spent worrying about the intention he had formed, Oblomov judged he could just as well have his tea while in bed as he usually did; nothing, he thought, would prevent him from thinking while being stretched out. And as the morning proceeded, he just kept postponing doing any thinking, taking any action, and even getting out of bed. Indeed, Oblomov spent his entire life putting off the things he had to do, so that in the end, he died in poverty and loneliness. Oblomov’s procrastination clearly had a very high cost, something of which he must have been aware. What, one wonders, does this apparent lack of concern for one’s future entail with respect to our conception of personal identity? It would seem that Oblomov fails to consider his future as truly his own. If so, procrastination would point in the opposite direction of phenomena such as promising, which have been used to argue against reductionist accounts of personal identity that place psychological continuity at the heart of personal identity.3 My aim in this chapter is to examine what procrastination entails with respect to personal identity theories. My plan is the following. In the first section, I explain why the kind of concern we seem to have for what have been called our “future selves” has been thought to be problematic for psychological continuity theories of personal identity. An important assumption in these debates is that we normally have what is often referred to as a..
Taylor, Richard (1969). The anattā doctrine and personal identity. Philosophy East and West 19 (4):359-366.   (Google | More links)
Toner, Patrick (forthcoming). On hylemorphism and personal identity. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: There is no such thing as 'the' hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In this paper, I argue that hylemorphists should prefer the corruptionist view. This project ought to be of interest to anyone working on issues of personal identity, not only because hylemorphic views are historically important, but also because they are currently receiving significant attention in the personal identity literature
Trott, Elizabeth (2001). Personal identity and the sense of duty. In William Sweet (ed.), The Bases of Ethics. Marquette University Press.   (Google)
Tumulty, Maura (2009). How philosophers think about persons, personal identity, and the self. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Uzgalis, William (2009). Anthony Collins on the emergence of consciousness and personal identity. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):363-379.   (Google)
Abstract: The correspondence between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins of 1706–8, while not well known, is a spectacularly good debate between a dualist and a materialist over the possibility of giving a materialist account of consciousness and personal identity. This article puts the Clarke Collins Correspondence in a broader context in which it can be better appreciated, noting that it is really a debate between John Locke and Anthony Collins on one hand, and Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler on the other. Anthony Collins argues on behalf of John Locke's claim that it would be as easy for God to superadd the power of thinking to matter as for him to connect a soul to a body. Locke did not believe that matter could naturally produce thought or consciousness, but it was in God's power to make matter think. To defend Locke's claim Collins must defend the claim that there are emergent properties in the world – properties of a whole that are not possessed by the parts. Collins also defends a materialist version of Locke's account of personal identity against a variety of charges. Because the topics of debate in the correspondence are of such great interest to us, it deserves to be rescued from the neglect into which it fell and from which intellectual historians and philosophers have only recently and partially removed it
Vasalou, Sophia (2008). Personal identity as a task. Inquiry 51 (3):288 – 311.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I explore a mode of concern with the question of personal identity in which the latter is raised as a problem of a practical order. What provokes this is a concern with the experience of discontinuity within the self and with the perception of continuity as a fragile and uncontrollable good. I discuss the relation which this practically oriented perspective bears to the philosophical form of engagement with personal identity, and the reasons which make the perspective of the latter particularly enticing to the former, yet at the same time entirely inadequate to its needs. Finally, I consider how the need in question can instead appropriately be met, within a broader (and broadly Wittgensteinian) interest in the tendency of philosophical questions to mask—and thus sometimes betray—the need that inspires them
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Wang, Stephen (2009). Aquinas and Sartre: On Freedom, Personal Identity, and the Possibility of Happiness. Catholic University of America Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Historical introduction -- Human being -- Identity and human incompletion in Sartre -- Identity and human incompletion in Aquinas -- Human understanding -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Sartre -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Aquinas -- Human freedom -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Sartre -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Aquinas -- Human fulfillment -- The possibility of human happiness in Sartre -- The possibility of human happiness in Aquinas.
West, Caroline (ms). Personal identity, individual autonomy and group rights.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace in liberal circles that individual persons have a right to individual autonomy or self-determination. Each mentally competent adult has a right to be at liberty to live and shape their own life in accordance with their own view about what makes for a good life, free from undue coercion or interference by others, so long as they do not harm others. In the words of John Stuart Mill, mentally-competent persons should have the liberty of “framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they may think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong”
Winkler, Kenneth (1991). Locke on personal identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (2).   (Google)
Wolfram, Sybil (1974). Hume on personal identity. Mind 83 (332):586-593.   (Google | More links)
Wolgast, Elizabeth (1999). Personal identity. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):297–311.   (Google | More links)
Wood, David (1979). Hume on identity and personal identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):69 – 73.   (Google | More links)
Woods, R. G. N.; BA, & PhD, (2000). Persons and personal identity. Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):169–172.   (Google | More links)
Wrigley, Anthony (2007). Personal identity, autonomy and advance statements. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):381–396.   (Google | More links)
Wright, John (2006). Personal identity, fission and time travel. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem

4.8a Personal Identity, Misc

Alter, Torin & Rachels, Stuart (2004). Epistemicism and the combined spectrum. Ratio 17 (3):241-255.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that 'the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to its effect.'
Baillie, James (1997). Personal identity and mental content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not change immediately, but only after the person becomes integrated within the new linguistic community. I also suggest that recent work on personal identity, notably by Derek Parfit, has tacitly assumed internalism regarding mental content. I do not intend to argue for either externalism or a psychological criterion. My aim is merely to explicate the issues involved in making them compatible
Baillie, James (1993). Problems in Personal Identity. New York: Paragon House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Baillie, James (1993). Recent work on personal identity. Philosophical Books 34 (4):193-206.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bajakian, Mark (forthcoming). How to count people. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
Baron, Richard J. (online). The self is unreal.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2001). The inclusion model of the incarnation: Problems and prospects. Religious Studies 37 (2):125-141.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant of inclusionism which I call ‘restricted inclusionism’ (RI); RI can evade many, but not all, of the objections to standard inclusionism
Beck, Simon, Fiction and fictions: On Ricoeur on the route to the self.   (Google)
Abstract: In reaching his narrative view of the self in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur argues that, while literature offers revealing insights into the nature of the self, the sort of fictions involving brain transplants, fission, and so on, that philosophers often take seriously do not (and cannot). My paper is a response to Ricoeur's charge, contending that the arguments Ricoeur rejects are not flawed in the way he suggests, and that his own arguments are sometimes guilty of the very charges he lays at the door of his opponents
Beck, Simon, Going narrative: Schechtman and the Russians.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman's The Constitution of Selves presented an impressive attempt to persuade those working on personal identity to give up mainstream positions and take on a narrative view instead. More recently, she has presented new arguments with a closely related aim. She attempts to convince us to give up the view of identity as a matter of psychological continuity, using Derek Parfit's story of the “Nineteenth Century Russian” as a central example in making the case against Parfit's own view, and offers a form of narrative theory as a way out of the problem. In this paper I consider this new case, and argue that we should not be persuaded towards the narrative
Beck, Simon (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.   (Google)
Abstract: Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her thought-experiment. I also argue that each of her sources of authority presents further difficulties for her project. Finally, I argue that it is not clear that her thought-experiment is one that actually involves identity in any crucial way. As a result, the case she offers does not offer any satisfactory support for her view on the relation between identity, morality and thought-experiments, but we do gain some insights into what that relation really is along the way.
Beck, Simon (2006). These bizarre fictions: Thought-experiments, our psychology and our selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.   (Google | More links)
Behrendt, Kathy (2005). Impersonal identity and corrupting concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.   (Google)
Behrendt, Kathy (2003). The new neo-Kantian and reductionist debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.   (Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1995). Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self. Inquiry 38 (4):1-15.   (Google)
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Abstract: Addressing many topics in epistemology and metaphysics, this treatise sets out a new theory of the unity of objects, and discusses personal identity, the metaphysics of possible worlds, the continuity in space time, and the nature of philosophical theorizing
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Abstract: In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified
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Cartwright, Helen Morris (1993). On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity. Synthese 95 (2):241-273.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate
Cartwright, Helen Morris (1987). Ruminations on an account of personal identity. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays on Honor of Richard Cartwright. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence
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Abstract: What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines creates more intelligent machines in turn. This intelligence explosion is now often known as the “singularity”. The basic argument here was set out by the statistician I.J. Good in his 1965 article “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine”: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion”, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make. The key idea is that a machine that is more intelligent than humans will be better than humans at designing machines. So it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than the most intelligent machine that humans can design. So if it is itself designed by humans, it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. By similar reasoning, this next machine will also be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. If every machine in turn does what it is capable of, we should expect a sequence of ever more intelligent machines. This intelligence explosion is sometimes combined with another idea, which we might call the “speed explosion”. The argument for a speed explosion starts from the familiar observation that computer processing speed doubles at regular intervals. Suppose that speed doubles every two years and will do so indefinitely. Now suppose that we have human-level artificial intelligence 1 designing new processors. Then faster processing will lead to faster designers and an ever-faster design cycle, leading to a limit point soon afterwards. The argument for a speed explosion was set out by the artificial intelligence researcher Ray Solomonoff in his 1985 article “The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence”.1 Eliezer Yudkowsky gives a succinct version of the argument in his 1996 article “Staring at the Singularity”: “Computing speed doubles every two subjective years of work..
Clark, Thomas W. (1995). Death, nothingness, and subjectivity. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: The words quoted above distill the common secular conception of death. If we decline the traditional religious reassurances of an afterlife, or their fuzzy new age equivalents, and instead take the hard-boiled and thoroughly modern materialist view of death, then we likely end up with Gonzalez-Cruzzi. Rejecting visions of reunions with loved ones or of crossing over into the light, we anticipate the opposite: darkness, silence, an engulfing emptiness. But we would be wrong
Clark, Andy (1995). I am John's brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):144-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am John's[3] brain. In the flesh, I am just a rather undistinguished looking grey/white mass of cells. My surface is heavily convoluted and I am possessed of a fairly differentiated internal structure. John and I are on rather close and intimate terms; indeed, sometimes it is hard to tell us apart. But at times, John takes this intimacy a little too far. When that happens, he gets very confused about my role and functioning. He imagines that I organize and process information in ways which echo his own perspective on the world. In short, he thinks that his thoughts are, in a rather direct sense, my thoughts. There is some truth to this of course. But things are really rather more complicated than John suspects, as I shall try to show
Coleman, Stephen R. (2000). Thought experiments and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.   (Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. & Bayne, Timothy J. (2005). Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding [II.xxvii.17]
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Garrett, Brian J. (1991). Personal identity and reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):361-373.   (Google | More links)
Garrett, Brian J. (1990). Personal identity and extrinsicness. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):177-194.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Critical study of Carol Rovane's the Bounds of agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):229–240.   (Google | More links)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (1998). Exceptional persons: On the limits of imaginary cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):592-610.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Personal identity and thought-experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions
Gendler, Tamar (2000). Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases. Garland Pub..   (Google)
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Abstract: Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often raised against views such as his, that thoughts must be distinct from their thinker. In this paper, I argue that Campbell's responses to the "two thinkers" and the "thoughts/thinker" objections are unsuccessful. Furthermore, his reply to the latter leads to four-dimensionalism of the kind he wanted to avoid – and this view too allows a person to change bodies. Moreover, I argue that it speaks against the series view that generalised versions of it fare much more poorly than do generalised versions of constitutionalism and four-dimensionalism
Johnston, Mark (1992). Reasons and reductionism. Philosophical Review 3 (3):589-618.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Kolak, Daniel & Martin, R. (1987). Personal identity and causality: Becoming unglued. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October):339-347.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
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Abstract: It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when...
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Abstract: What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject of current debate, including the work of Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit, and makes new and challenging interpretations of them. This new edition contains additional material assessing the biological approach which has become increasingly popular in recent years, and extends the treatment of indeterminate identity to take account of the epistemic view of vagueness. This book covers the problem of personal identity from its origin in Locke's work to the most recent debates in the philosophical literature, and will be invaluablereading for any student of the topic
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Olson, Eric T. (2002). Personal identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent to discuss. Collins 1982 is a good source.)
Olson, Eric T. (2007). What are we? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer
Penelhum, Terence W. (1971). The importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):667-78.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1978). A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Hackett.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Perry, John (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Abstract: Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...
Perrett, Roy W. & Barton, Charles (1999). Personal identity, reductionism, and the necessity of origins. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):277-94.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge
Perry, John (1976). The importance of being identical. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
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Quante, Michael (2007). The social nature of personal identity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):56-76.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper the thesis that personal identity is essentially constituted by social relations is defended. To make this plausible the problem of personal identity is broken down into four interrelated sets of problems. Of these, the unity -- and the persistence -- problems cannot be resolved using the notion of a person and therefore personal identity in this sense is not socially constituted. But this paper argues that the conditions of personhood, and the structure of a human being's personality -- which are the other two sets into which the problem of personal identity is dissolved -- are best understood as being constituted by social relations, especially relations of mutual
Radden, Jennifer (2004). Identity: Personal identity, characterization identity, and mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the suggestion was never properly developed by Strawson, and secondly, it seemed vulnerable to an objection that he himself raised against it. Consequently, the paper’s aim is to further develop Strawson’s suggestion, and to show that the result is not vulnerable to the objection that seemed fatal to its underdeveloped predecessor. In addition, the paper aims to defend Locke’s Principle against alleged counterexamples such as those produced by Leibniz, Fine and Hughes.
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Rudd, Anthony J. (2005). Narrative, expression and mental substance. Inquiry 48 (5):413-435.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to its states. I suggest that we may be able to do this by relying on the notion of expression. In developing this idea I draw heavily on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, while also developing and criticizing Strawson's account of persons and recent work by Lynne Baker. I conclude by arguing that mental substance, understood in this way, can only be grasped in narrative terms; substantialist and narrative accounts of personal identity, far from being opposed, are mutually supporting and require one another to be coherent
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 111 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be fully material beings without being identical to our bodies. The Constitution View yields answers to the questions 'What am I most fundamentally?', 'What is a person?', and 'What is the relation between human persons and their bodies'? Baker argues that the complex mental property of first-person perspective enables one to conceive of one's body and mental states as one's own
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Schechtman, Marya (2005). Experience, agency, and personal identity. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather than unity of consciousness. While this shift contributes significantly to the discussion, it does not offer a fully satisfying alternative. Unity of consciousness still seems required if identity is to be as important as we think it is. Views of identity based on agential unity do, however, point to a new understanding of unity of consciousness which meets Parfit's challenge, yielding an integrated view of identity which sees persons as both subjects and agents. Footnotesa I am indebted to many friends and colleagues for their input in the course of writing this essay. I would like especially to thank David DeGrazia, Anthony Laden, Ray Martin, Marc Slors, and the editors of Social Philosophy and Policy
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Abstract: Personal identity and social identity are two very different concepts and the idea of getting them together, as Bhikhu Parekh proposes, within an integrated bundle of some `overall identity' raises serious questions of coherence. Personal identity demands the `sameness' of a person (Who is this guy? Am I still the same person that I was ten years ago?). Social identity is focused instead on our social affiliations, such as identifying with others with, say, the same nationality, or the same religion, or same political partnership. We can make reasoned choices about our priorities in social affiliation. Those who want to make our social affiliation a matter of `discovery' rather than of choice may frighten us by saying that we would lose our overall identity if we were to choose to affiliate differently (for example as an Indian and not just as a Hindu, or as British and not just as a Muslim). To understand that there is no threat to personal identity involved in such choices is important both for clarity of analysis and for standing up against the herd behaviour of identity politics. Key Words: identity • multiculturalism • violence • reason • choice Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 285-288 (2009) DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09105388
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Strawson, Galen (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio 17 (4):428-452.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life
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Abstract: In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is with the bodies of these beings. And, even as each of these _ordinary entities_ extends through some space, so, also, each endures through some time. In line with that, each ordinary entity is at least very largely, and is perhaps entirely, an _enduring physical_ entity (which allows that many might have certain properties that aren't purely physical properties.) Further, each ordinary enduring entity is a _physically complex_ entity: Not only is each composed of parts, but many of these parts, whether or not absolutely all of them, are themselves enduring physical entities, and many of _them_ also are such physically complex continuing entities
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Abstract: Derek Parfit finally meets the Buddha -- on Tralfamadore! This paper is also archived at SSRN
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Williams, Bernard A. O. (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 144 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A volume of philosophical studies, centred on problems of personal identity and extending to related topics in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1988). Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 97 | Google | More links)
Wright, John (2006). Personal identity and consciousness. Iyyun 55 (July):235-263.   (Google)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1987). Looking out for number one. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):209-233.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1969). Personal identity without criteria. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):344-353.   (Google | More links)
Zuboff, Arnold (1978). Moment universals and personal identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:141-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zuboff, Arnold (1990). One self: The logic of experience. Inquiry 33 (1):39-68.   (Cited by 6 | Google)

4.8b Survival and What Matters

Andra, L. (2007). Multiple occupancy, identity, and what matters. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):211 – 225.   (Google)
Abstract: As regards the question of what matters in survival two views have been identified: on the one hand, we have the view that what matters is identity (the so-called 'commonsense view') and, on the other hand, we have the view that what matters is the holding of certain psychological connections between various mental states over time (the relation R). Several attempts have tried to reconcile these two views involving the so-called 'multiple occupancy view' or 'cohabitation thesis'. Even if the latter comes in several formulations, common elements are, positing the appropriateness of a description of the fission case according to which the post-fission persons existed prior to fission and also, that what determines that two persons who exist at a certain time are distinct can be facts about what is the case at other times. The paper discusses three of the most influential formulations of the multiple occupancy view, which intend to reconcile identity with what matters, and argues that for various reasons these at least do not work in this regard
Baillie, James (1996). Identity, relation r, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):263-267.   (Google)
Baillie, James (1993). What matters in survival. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):255-61.   (Google)
Beck, Simon (1989). Parfit and the Russians (personal identity and moral concepts). Analysis 49:205-209.   (Google)
Bodansky, E. (1987). Parfit on selves and their interests. Analysis 47 (January):47-50.   (Google)
Bordes, Montse (1997). Four-dimensional remarks: a defence of temporal parts. Theoria (29):343-377.   (Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1982). Personal identity and personal survival. Analysis 42 (January):44-50.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1984). Survival. Synthese 59 (June):339-62.   (Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1987). Survival and importance. Analysis 47 (October):225-30.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Parfit on what matters in survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Buckareff, Andrei A. & Van Wagenen, Joel S. (forthcoming). Surviving resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified
Bushnell, Dana E. (1993). Identity, psychological continuity, and rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2001). Is connectedess necessary to what matters in survival? Ration 14 (3):193-202.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Scott (2005). Is causation necessary for what matters in survival? Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact
Campbell, Scott (2000). Strawson, Parfit and impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225.   (Google)
Cassam, Quassim (1993). Parfit on persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Chappell, Timothy (1995). Personal identity, r-relatedness, and the empty question argument. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):88-92.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Parfit on Division.   (Google)
Chappell, Timothy (1998). Reductionism about persons; and what matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Curzer, Howard J. (1991). An ambiguity in Parfit's theory of personal identity. Ratio 4 (1):16-24.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (1996). Survival and experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:17-36.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996: 17-36) I If I am to survive until some later date, what must happen, and what must not happen, over the intervening period? I am talking here about survival in the strict sense. Take an earlier and a later person, if they are one and the same, what is it about them that makes this so? In addressing this question the preferred tool has long been the exploitation of imaginary or science fiction cases. We are asked to reflect on scenarios in which an ordinary person is subjected to some unusual treatment which effectively removes one or more of the elements that usually accompanies personal persistence. If we think the subject survives the treatment, the conclusion is drawn that the elements removed are not necessary to personal identity as we conceive it. The hope is that the repeated use of this method, with a variety of scenarios, will finally produce a convergence of intuitive responses as to what is necessary and sufficient for survival. Unfortunately, this method has failed to produce the goods. The literature is brimming with cunningly constructed scenarios yet consensus as to what personal persistence involves seems as elusive as ever. So it is hardly surprising that the method has come in for some criticism recently. There is a feeling that much time has been wasted on devising fantastic stories about which many people have no firm or reliable intuitions. Hence the demand for a different approach. As for the direction the new approach should take, a general trend can be detected: a focusing on human beings, biological entities of a particular kind, with species-specific identity conditions - a move away from science fiction, towards science. I shall be arguing here that this response is premature. Although it would be a mistake to expect too much from the standard method, it delivers at least one significant result: that of the several strands that make up a human life, we believe that one particular strand is of overriding importance in regard to our continued existence..
Dancy, J.. (ed.) (1997). Reading Parfit. Blackwell.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Doepke, F. (1990). The practical importance of personal identity. Logos 83:83-91.   (Google)
Ehring, Douglas E. (1987). Survival and trivial facts. Analysis 47 (January):50-54.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Eklund, Matti (2004). Personal identity, concerns, and indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are so intimately connected that the entities we should focus our concerns and ascriptions around are, pretty trivially, the persons. In part, my aim here is to evaluate this naive view. However, I will not actually attempt to give a definite verdict on it. Rather, I will identify the assumptions under which the naive view is true, and discuss how to go about evaluating those assumptions
Fields, Lloyd (1987). Parfit on personal identity and desert. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):432-41.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1987). Reasoning about persons. In Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goodenough, J. M. (1996). Parfit and the sorites paradox. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):113-20.   (Google | More links)
Grau, Christopher (forthcoming). Love and History. The Southern Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay I explore the different ways in which love involves an historical dimension, and I argue that the proper way to capture the relevant historicity of love includes an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this in part through offering an elaboration and defense of some ideas that were originally put forward by Robert Kraut in his paper “Love De Re.” I also consider the treatment that paper received when it was discussed in a paper by Amelie Rorty entitled “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds.” While Rorty’s paper offers valuable insights, I argue that she misses Kraut’s point, and thus misses out on his own helpful contribution to the topic. I go on to criticize her claim that concern over the proper object of love should be best understood as a concern over constancy, and I then consider a related treatment of these issues by Hugh LaFollette. This leads to a clearer understanding of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical, and a better appreciation of the Kripkean analogy Kraut has offered. I end with further defense of the irreplaceability and historicity of the beloved, one that situates these issues in relation to debates concerning personal identity.
Haugen, David (1995). Personal identity and concern for the future. Philosophia 24 (3-4):481-492.   (Google | More links)
Kind, Amy (2004). The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the above-mentioned objection to reductionism cannot get off the ground. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves.” According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern. By arguing against Wolf’s treatment of self-interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1989). Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Lee, Win-Chiat (1990). Personal identity, the temporality of agency, and moral responsibility. Auslegung 16 (1):17-29.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lewis, David (1976). Survival and identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 108 | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1985). Derek Parfit and Greta garbo. Analysis 45 (March):105-9.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Maddy, Penelope (1979). Is the importance of identity derivative? Philosophical Studies 35 (February):151-70.   (Google | More links)
Martin, R. (1987). Memory, connecting, and what matters in survival. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (March):82-97.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Martin, R. (1992). Self-interest and survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):319-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Matthews, Gareth B. (1977). Surviving as. Analysis 37 (January):53-58.   (Google)
Matthews, Steve (2000). Survival and separation. Philosophical Studies 98 (3):279-303.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
McKinnon, Neil & Bigelow, John C. (2001). Parfit, causation, and survival. Philosophia 28 (1-4):467-476.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Measor, Nicholas (1980). On what matters in survival. Mind 89 (3):406-11.   (Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1987). Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1988). Shoemaker on the duplication argument, survival, and what matters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):234-239.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek A. (1999). Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes. Philosophical Topics 26:217-70.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Parfit, Derek (1976). Lewis, Perry, and what matters. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Parfit, Derek A. (1973). Later selves and moral principles. In A. Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Parfit, Derek (1971). On the importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):683-90.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek (1971). Personal identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek (1982). Personal identity and rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible
Parfit, Derek A. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1621 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions that most of us will find very disturbing.
Parfit, Derek A. (1995). The unimportance of identity. In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Penelhum, Terence W. (1959). Personal identity, memory, and survival. Journal of Philosophy 56 (June):319-328.   (Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1976). Survival. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Google)
Roache, Rebecca (2010). Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google | More links)
Rovane, Carol A. (1990). Branching self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 99 (3):355-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Schechtman, Marya (2004). Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):87-106.   (Google)
Siderits, Mark (1988). Ehring on Parfit's relation R. Analysis 48 (January):29-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Slors, Marc (2004). Care for one's own future experiences. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism
Stone, Jim Stone (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Williams, Robert (ms). Indeterminate survival.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most views of personal identity allow that sometimes, facts of personal identity can be borderline or indeterminate. Bernard Williams argued that regarding questions of one’s own survival as borderline “had no comprehensible representation” in one’s emotions and expectations. Whether this is the case, I will argue, depends crucially on what account of indeterminacy is presupposed
Wolf, Susan (1986). Self-interest and interest in selves. Ethics 96 (July):704-20.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

4.8c Persons

Abelson, Raziel (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bajakian, Mark (forthcoming). How to count people. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Materialism with a human face. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2009). Persons and the extended-mind thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2003). Review: A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Mind 112 (445).   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2005). When does a person begin? Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, I give a broadly materialistic account of the coming-into-existence of a human person. I argue for the metaphysical superiority of the Constitution View to Biological Animalism, Thomistic Animalism, and other forms of Substance Dualism. I conclude by discussing the single implication of the Constitution View for thinking about abortion. Footnotesa Thanks to Gareth Matthews and Catherine E. Rudder for comments. I am also grateful to other contributors to this volume, especially Robert A. Wilson, Marya Schechtman, David Oderberg, Stephen Braude, and John Finnis
Balowitz, Victor H. (1972). Persons as subjects of perception. Personalist 53:102-103.   (Google)
Barresi, John (1999). On becoming a person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person
Berofsky, Bernard (1964). Determinism and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.   (Google | More links)
Bertocci, Peter A. (1978). The essence of a person. The Monist 61 (January):28-41.   (Google)
Biro, John I. (1981). Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons. Nature and System 3 (September):173-80.   (Google)
Bloor, David (1970). Explanation and analysis in Strawson's persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):2-9.   (Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Harris, John (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.
Campbell, Scott (2001). Persons and substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria
Campbell, Scott (2006). The conception of a person as a series of mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carter, William R. (1988). Our bodies, our selves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):308-319.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Centore, F. F. (1979). Persons: A Comparative Account Of The Six Possible Theories. Westport: Greenwood Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Minds.   (Google)
Cherry, Christopher (1984). Self, near-death and death. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1):3-11.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.   (Cited by 177 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
Christman, John P. (2004). Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Clarke, David S. (1972). A defence of the no-ownership theory. Mind 81 (January):97-101.   (Google)
Clarke, J. J. (1973). Persons, thoughts and brains. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):89-104.   (Google)
Coburn, Robert C. (1967). Persons and psychological concepts. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):208-221.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (ed.) (1991). Human Beings. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contributors to this collection have radically different approaches, some accepting and others denying its validity for a proper understanding of what a...
Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001). Physical persons and postmortem survival without temporal gaps. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Davies, Martin (2000). Persons and their underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, this is the product of an unacceptably • mechanistic view of persons. According to this objection, if we were to focus on persons as conscious rational thinkers and agents then the support for putative downward inferences would be undermined. I consider and reject developments of this objection in response to two arguments for downward inferences
de bij Weg, Henk (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind
Degrazia, D. (2002). Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Conditions of personhood. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google)
de Weg, Henk bij (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google)
Abstract: Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person.
Dyck, Corey W. (2010). The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant's Third Paralogism. Kant Yearbook 2:95-122.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I challenge the assumption that Kant’s Third Paralogism has to do, first and foremost, with the question of personal identity.
Fairbairn, Gavin J. (2002). Brain transplants and the orthodox view of personhood. In R.N. Fisher (ed.), Suffering, Death, and Identity. New York: Rodopi.   (Google)
Farah, Martha J. & Heberlein, Andrea S. (2007). Personhood and neuroscience: Naturalizing or nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior
Flew, Antony (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. New York, Macmillan.   (Google)
Garrett, Brian J. (1992). Persons and values. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):337-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gill, Christopher (1991). Is there a concept of person in greek philosophy? In S. Everson (ed.), Psychology (Companions to Ancient Thought: 2). New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Goodenough, Jerry (1997). The achievement of personhood. Ratio 10 (2):141-156.   (Google | More links)
Goodman, Michael F. (ed.) (1988). What is a Person. Clifton: Humana Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Haque, Intisar-Ul (1970). The person and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (September):60-72.   (Google)
Hasker, William (2001). Persons as emergent substances. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hasker, William (2004). The constitution view of persons: A critique. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.   (Google)
Hasker, William (1999). The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Heinimaa, Markus (2000). Ambiguities in the psychiatric use of the concepts of the person: An analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (2):125-136.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hellsten, Sirkku Kristiina (2000). Towards an alternative approach to personhood in the end of life questions. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (6):515-536.   (Google)
Abstract: Within the Western bioethical framework, we make adistinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: thenaturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim topromote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normativeviews on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every daylife. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general thearguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of moral personhoodwhile the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealistand/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses onexamining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposingarguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions:Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of thedebate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to takethe social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite ourneed to set individual's decision making into social context, the currentcommunitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative.Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with acollective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss thenormative relation between the concept of `moral personhood' and the demand for respect ofindividual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective
Hershenov, David B. (2005). Persons as proper parts of organisms. Theoria 71 (1):29-37.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the loss of cognition and the destruction of the person, the organism and the person were spatially coincident entities – two beings composed of the same matter at the same time and place. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of positing spatially coincident material entities is that it would seem to result in there being one too many thinkers. Since the person can obviously think, the organism should also have such a capacity as a result of possessing the same brain as well as every other atom of the person. This means that there now exist two thinking beings under the reader’s clothes!
Hershenov, David B. (2006). The death of a person. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):107 – 120.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, as he does, that persons are identical to organisms or that persons can only die metaphorical deaths
Hudson, H. (1955). People and part-whole talk. Analysis 15 (March):90-93.   (Google)
Ikaheimo, Heikki (2007). Recognizing persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):224-247.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as interrelated, yet irreducible, layers and dimensions of what it is to be a person in the full-fledged sense of the word. Three layers of personhood -- consisting of person-making psychological capacities, person-making interpersonal significances, and person-making institutional or deontic powers -- are distinguished. Running through the layers there are then two dimensions -- the deontic and the axiological -- corresponding to the recognitive attitudes of respect and love. These recognitive attitudes of 'taking something/-one as a person' are responses to the psychological layer and directly constitutive of the interpersonal layer of the respective dimensions of personhood. The multiplicity of ways to understand what 'personhood' means is only apparently chaotic and reveals, on a closer look, a well-ordered and dynamic internal structure
Johnston, Mark (1987). Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Kamler, Howard F. (1982). Could persons be nonconscious like machines? Nature and System 4 (September):143-150.   (Google)
Lanier, Jaron (1995). Agents of alienation. Interactions 2 (3):76-81.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Lewis, Hywel David (1978). Persons and Life After Death: Essays. Barnes & Noble.   (Google)
Abstract: Realism and metaphysics.--Ultimates and a way of looking.--Religion and the paranormal.--Quinton, A., Lewis, H. D., Williams, B. Life after death.--Lewis, H. D., Flew, A. Survival.--Shoemaker, S., Lewis, H. D. Immortality and dualism.--The belief in life after death.--The person of Christ.
Li, Hon-Lam & Yeung, Anthony (eds.) (2007). New Essays on Applied Ethics: Animal Rights, Personhood, and the Ethics of Killing. Palgrave.   (Google)
Abstract: This collection of new essays aims to address some of the most perplexing issues arising from death and dying, as well as the moral status of persons and animals. Leading scholars, including Peter Singer and Gerald Dworkin, investigate diverse topics such as animal rights, vegetarianism, lethal injection, abortion and euthanasia
Lindsay, Chris (ms). Subjects as objects: Living in a material world.   (Google)
Locke, John (1690). Of identity and diversity (book II, chapter XXVII). In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1991). Real selves: Persons as a substantial kind. Philosophy 29:87-107.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1999). Self, agency, and mental causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8):225-239.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (2009). What are we? A study in personal ontology • by Eric T. Olson. Analysis 69 (2).   (Google)
Mackay, Donald M. (1980). Brains, Machines And Persons. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1991). Personal identity and the idea of a human being. Philosophy 29:127-142.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Margolis, Joseph & Margolis, Clorinda G. (1979). The theory of hypnosis and the concept of persons. Behaviorism 7:97-111.   (Google)
Mayberry, Thomas C. (1979). The concept of a human being. Personalist 60 (April):162-172.   (Google)
McCall, C. (1990). Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being. Avebury.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
McInerney, Peter K. (2000). Conceptions of persons and persons through time. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):121-134.   (Google)
McInerney, Peter K. (1998). Persons and psychological systems. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):179-193.   (Google)
Merricks, Trenton (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: With ontology motivated largely by causal considerations, this lucid and provocative work focuses on the idea that physical objects are causally non-redundant. Merricks "eliminates" inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would--if they existed--be at best completely causally redundant. He defends human existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we cause things that are not determined by our proper parts. He also provides insight into a variety of philosophical puzzles, while addressing many significant issues like free will, the "reduction" of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can "for practical purposes" be a matter of convention. Anyone working in metaphysics will enjoy this book immensely
Morton, Adam (1989). Why there is no concept of a person in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Moulder, James (1972). In defense of immaterial persons. Philosophical Papers 1 (May):38-55.   (Google)
Oderberg, David S. (1989). Johnston on human beings. Journal of Philosophy 86 (March):137-41.   (Google | More links)
Olson, Eric (2001). Book review. Persons and bodies: A constitution view Lynne Rudder Baker. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Park, Desiree (1973). Person: Theories And Perceptions. The Hague: Nijhoff.   (Google)
Peacocke, Arthur R. & Gillett, Grant R. (eds.) (1987). Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Perry, John (1983). Personal identity and the concept of a person. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.   (Google)
Petrus, Klaus (ed.) (2003). On Human Persons (Metaphysical Research, Volume 1). Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Peterson, Jordan B. (1985). Persons and the problem of interaction. Modern Schoolman 62 (January):131-38.   (Google)
Phillips, Dayton Z. (2001). Minds, persons and the unthinkable. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Pillsbury, Walter B. (1907). The ego and empirical psychology. Philosophical Review 16 (4):387-407.   (Google | More links)
Plantinga, Alvin (1961). Things and persons. Review of Metaphysics 14 (March):493-519.   (Google)
Pollock, John L. (1988). My brother, the machine. Noûs 22 (June):173-211.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rankin, Kenneth W. (1976). The trinitarian vision of P.f. Strawson. Philosophy Research Archives 1164.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1976). A literary postscript: Characters, persons, selves, individuals. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Rosenkrantz, Gary S. (2005). An epistemic argument for enduring human persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):209-224.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Persons, minds, and consciousness. In R.E. Auxier & L.E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2004). On being one's own person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). The ontological status of persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2009). Mindscan: Transcending and enhancing the human brain. In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose it is 2025 and being a technophile, you purchase brain enhancements as they become readily available. First, you add a mobile internet connection to your retina, then, you enhance your working memory by adding neural circuitry. You are now officially a cyborg. Now skip ahead to 2040. Through nanotechnological therapies and enhancements you are able to extend your lifespan, and as the years progress, you continue to accumulate more far-reaching enhancements. By 2060, after several small but cumulatively profound alterations, you are a “posthuman.” To quote philosopher Nick Bostrom, posthumans are possible future beings, “whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards” (Bostrom 2003c). At this point, your intelligence is enhanced not just in terms of speed of mental processing; you are now able to make rich connections that you were not able to make before. Unenhanced humans, or “naturals,” seem to you to be intellectually disabled—you have little in common with them—but as a transhumanist, you are supportive of their right to not enhance (Bostrom 2003c; Garreau 2005; Kurzweil 2005)
Schechtman, Marya (1990). Personhood and personal identity. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1966). Persons and their bodies. Philosophical Review 75 (January):59-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2008). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.   (Google)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1989). Persons, animals, and ourselves in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1999). The essentials of persons. Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41.   (Google | More links)
Spaemann, Robert (2006). Persons: The Difference Between 'Someone' and 'Something'. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: An examination and defence of the concept of personality, long central to Western moral culture but now increasingly under attack. Robert Spaemann tackles urgent practical questions, such as our treatment of the severely disabled human and the moral status of intelligent non-human animals
Srinivasan, Gummaraju (1974). The Self and its Ideals in East-West Philosophy. College Book House.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (1981). Hume on identity: A defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2).   (Google | More links)
Stone, Jim (2007). Persons are not made of temporal parts. Analysis 67 (1):7–11.   (Google | More links)
Stone, Jim (1988). Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (March):519-32.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Storl, Heidi (1992). The problematic nature of Parfitian persons. Personalist Forum 8:123-31.   (Google)
Stone, Jim Stone (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Strawson, Peter F. (1958). Persons. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:330-53.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Sturma, Dieter (2007). Person as subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):77-100.   (Google)
Abstract: Persons are present in the social realm of reasons and make active use of their ability to express themselves. They have a sense of self-reference and lead their lives in the perspective of possible self-consciousness and possible autonomy. For understanding what it means for a person to be a subject one must avoid egological reifications. Expressions like 'self' or 'self-reference' do not refer to entities. They can only be introduced in a way that meets standards of semantic control. Self- reference proves to be an inner-worldly phenomenon that expresses itself indirectly in reflexive attitudes and activities over time
Tallent, Norman (1967). Psychological Perspectives On The Person. London: Van Nostrand,.   (Google)
Tietz, John (1980). Davidson and Sellars on persons and science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18:237-249.   (Google)
Unger, Peter K. (1988). Conscious beings in a gradual world. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12:287-333.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Unger, Peter K. (1979). I do not exist. In Graham F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Unger, Peter K. (1979). Why there are no people. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:177-222.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Vincent, Andrew W. (1989). Can groups be persons? Review of Metaphysics 42:687-715.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wallace, Kathleen (2000). Agency, personhood, and identity: Carol Rovane's The Bounds of Agency. Metaphilosophy 31 (3):311-322.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wiggins, David (1987). The person as object of science, as subject of experience, and as locus of value. In Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality. Blackwell.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Wilkerson, Terence E. (1974). Minds, Brains And People. Oxford,: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (2005). Persons, social agency, and constitution. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):49-69.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In her recent book Persons and Bodies1, Lynne Rudder Baker has defended what she calls the constitution view of persons. On this view, persons are constituted by their bodies, where “constitution” is a ubiquitous, general metaphysical relation distinct from more familiar relations, such as identity and part-whole composition
Young, Fredric C. (1979). On Dennett's conditions of personhood. Auslegung 6 (June):161-177.   (Google)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1975). Strawson's transcendental deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (April):114-125.   (Google | More links)

4.8d The Self

Albahari, Miri (2006). Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Anderson, Joel (1995). The persistence of authenticity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (1).   (Google)
Anderson, W. (1928). Self. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):81 – 92.   (Google | More links)
Annand, J. B. (ed.) (1977). Education for Self-Discovery. Hodder and Stoughton.   (Google)
Aune, Bruce (1994). Speaking of selves. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):279-93.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Barresi, John (online). The rise and fall of the conscious self: A history of western concepts of self and personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: I will trace the history of western conceptions of soul and self from the ancient Greeks to the present. The story line that I will present is based mainly on material covered in two books by Ray Martin and myself: _The Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the_
Bermúdez, José Luis (1997). Reduction and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):458-466.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Butterworth, George (1998). A developmental-ecological perspective on Strawson's 'the self'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):132-140.   (Google)
Capek, Milic (1953). The reappearance of the self in the last philosophy of William James. Philosophical Review 62 (October):526-544.   (Google | More links)
Carrithers, Michael; Collins, Steven & Lukes, Steven (eds.) (1985). The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept that peope have of themselves as a 'person' is one of the most intimate notions that they hold. Yet the way in which the category of the person is conceived varies over time and space. In this volume, anthropologists, philosophers, and historians examine the notion of the person in different cultures, past and present. Taking as their starting point a lecture on the person as a category of the human mind, given by Marcel Mauss in 1938, the contributors critically assess Mauss's speculation that ntions of the person, rather than being primarily philosophical or psychological, have a complex social and ideological origin. Discussing societies ranging from ancient Greece, India, and China to modern Africa and Papua New Guinea, they provide fascinating descriptions of how these different cultures define the person. But they also raise deeper theoretical issues: What is universally constant and what is culturally variable in people's thinking about the person? How can these variations be explained? Has there been a general progressive development toward the modern Western view of the person? What is distinctive about this? How do one's notions of the person inform one's ability to comprehend alternative formulations? These questions are of compelling interest for a wide range of anthropologists, philosophers, historians, psychologists, sociologists, orientalists, and classicists. The book will appeal to any reader concerned with understanding one of the most fundamental aspects of human existence
Castell, Alburey (1965). The Self In Philosophy. Macmillan.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cavell, Marcia (1994). Dividing the self. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chattopadhyaya, D. P.; Gupta, Sen & A., K. (eds.) (2005). Self, Society, and Science: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. Distributed by Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Clack, Robert J. (1973). Chisholm and Hume on observing the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (March):338-348.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1995). I am John's brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):144-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am John's[3] brain. In the flesh, I am just a rather undistinguished looking grey/white mass of cells. My surface is heavily convoluted and I am possessed of a fairly differentiated internal structure. John and I are on rather close and intimate terms; indeed, sometimes it is hard to tell us apart. But at times, John takes this intimacy a little too far. When that happens, he gets very confused about my role and functioning. He imagines that I organize and process information in ways which echo his own perspective on the world. In short, he thinks that his thoughts are, in a rather direct sense, my thoughts. There is some truth to this of course. But things are really rather more complicated than John suspects, as I shall try to show
Clark, Andy (2002). That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Crisp, Quentin (1981). Doing It with Style. Watts.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). The self and the phenomenal. Ratio 17 (4):365-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience-producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper..
Dean, Carolyn J. (1992). The Self and its Pleasures: Bataille, Lacan, and the History of the Decentered Subject. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (online). In Darwin's wake, where am I?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: He was not just my teacher and my friend. He was my hero, a man who was quietly but passionately committed to truth, to clarity, to understanding everything under the sun–and to making himself understood. More than anybody else he has made me proud to be a philosopher, so I would like to dedicate my Presidential Address to his memory
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Where am I? In Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Google)
Teroni, Fabrice & Deonna, Julien A. (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.
Deutsch, Eliot (1966). The self in advaita vedanta. International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (March):5-21.   (Google)
de Villiers, Tanya & Cilliers, Paul (2004). Narrating the self: Freud, Dennett and complexity theory. South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):34-53.   (Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1890). On some current conceptions of the term 'self'. Mind 15 (57):58-74.   (Google | More links)
Diekman, Arthur J. (1996). I = awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-356.   (Google)
Duhrssen, Alfred (1956). The self and the body. Review of Metaphysics 10 (September):28-34.   (Google)
Edey, Mait (2002). Subject and object. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ehman, Robert R. (1965). Two basic concepts of the self. International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (December):594-611.   (Google)
Fisher, Seymour (1974). Body Consciousness. J. Aronson.   (Google)
Fisher, Seymour (1973). Body Consciousness; You Are What You Feel. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1996). Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Human beings have the unique ability to consciously reflect on the nature of the self. But reflection has its costs. We can ask what the self is, but as David Hume pointed out, the self, once reflected upon, may be nowhere to be found. The favored view is that we are material beings living in the material world. But if so, a host of destabilizing questions surface. If persons are just a sophisticated sort of animal, then what sense is there to the idea that we are free agents who control our own destinies? What makes the life of any animal, even one as sophisticated as Homo sapiens, worth anything? What place is there in a material world for God? And if there is no place for a God, then what hold can morality possibly have on us--why isn't everything allowed? Flanagan's collection of essays takes on these questions and more. He continues the old philosophical project of reconciling a scientific view of ourselves with a view of ourselves as agents of free will and meaning-makers. But to this project he brings the latest insights of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry, exploring topics such as whether the conscious mind can be explained scientifically, whether dreams are self-expressive or just noise, the moral socialization of children, and the nature of psychological phenomena such as multiple personality disorder and false memory syndrome. What emerges from these explorations is a liberating vision which can make sense of the self, agency, character transformation, and the value and worth of human life. Flanagan concludes that nothing about a scientific view of persons must lead to nihilism
Flew, Antony G. N. (1949). Selves. Mind 58 (July):355-358.   (Google | More links)
Frondizi, Risieri (1950). On the nature of the self. Review of Metaphysics 3 (June):437-452.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Frondizi, Risieri (1976). The self as a dynamic gestalt. Personalist 57:55-63.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (ed.) (2002). Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Abstract: A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the viewpoints of philosophy, developmental psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience,...
Gallagher, Shaun (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.   (Cited by 137 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is good evidence to suggest that although certain aspects of the minimal self are primitive and embodied, other aspects may be accessed only in reflective consciousness. Employing a modified concept of the minimal self, it may be possible to construct a robotic form of non-conscious self-reference that depends on an interaction between the robotic body and its environment. In contrast to the minimal self, the narrative self involves continuity over time and is directly relevant to discussions of memory and personal identity. There is growing consensus among philosophers and cognitive scientists about the importance of narrative and its relation to episodic memory and left-hemisphere functions. There are, however, at least two different views of how the narrative self is structured. On one model it is nothing more than an abstract point. On a more extended view, proposed here, the self is a rich amalgam of narratives that allows for the equivocations, contradictions, and self-deceptions of personal life. Even in this case, however, neurocognitive models contribute to our understanding of how narrative identity is structured
Gallagher, Shaun & Marcel, Anthony J. (2002). The self in contextualized action. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Ganeri, Jonardon (2004). An irrealist theory of self. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:61-80.   (Google)
Ganeri, Jonardon (2000). Cross-modality and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):639-658.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It would surely be strange if we had several senses sitting in us, as if in a wooden horse, and it wasn’t the case that all those things converged on some one kind of thing, a mind or whatever one ought to call it: something with which we perceive all the perceived things by means of the senses, as if by means of instruments (Plato, _Theaetetus_ 184d1–5)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2008). Priest and Nagel on Being Someone: A Refutation of Physicalism. The Heythrop Journal 49 (4):648-651.   (Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip (2003). The motor of cognition. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):510-512.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ghin, Marcello (2005). What a self could be (commentary on metzinger). Psyche 11.   (Google)
Abstract: Metzinger’s claim that there are no such things as selves has given rise to a lot of discussions. By examining the notion of self used by Metzinger, I want to clarify what he means when saying that nobody ever was or had a self. Furthermore, I want to examine if there could be a notion of ‘self’ which is compatible with the Self- Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT). I will argue that there is a notion of self which is not only compatible with the SMT, but that the SMT also provides the theoretical framework for developing such a notion
Glover, J. (1988). I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity. Penguin.   (Google)
Gregg, John (ms). The self.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most certain truths in the world is Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". Descartes was so certain of the existence of some kind of essential _self_ that others have coined the term "Cartesian theater" to describe the sense that we all have of being the audience enjoying the rich play of our experiences. We tend to believe in an enduring self, independent of our individual percepts. Sometimes this virtual "self" in our mind, sitting in the audience of the Cartesian theater who watches our thoughts is referred to as a homunculus. This is not necessarily to imply that most of us believe that the self or homunculus is an identifiable region of the brain like the pineal gland, just that at some level of organization, we assume that there is a self that is separate from the stuff that self experiences, remembers, thinks about, etc
Haight, M. R. (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Harding, M. Esther (1965). The "I" and the "Not-I": A Study in the Development of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book provides a very accessible general introduction to the Jungian concept of ego development and Jung's theory of personality structure--the collective unconscious, anima, animus, shadow, archetypes
Hartnack, Justus (1972). The metaphysical subject. Teorema 131:131-138.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (1982). Heidegger on being a person. Noûs 16 (1):15-26.   (Google | More links)
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1982). Who shoves whom around inside the careenium? Synthese 53 (November):189-218.   (Google)
Howie, Duncan (1945). Internalising the external: Some aspects of the psychological problem of the self. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 23 (December):35-56.   (Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2007). The society of selves. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):745-754.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Human beings are not only the most sociable animals on Earth, but also the only animals that have to ponder the separateness that comes with having a conscious self. The philosophical problem of ‘other minds’ nags away at people’s sense of who—and why—they are. But the privacy of consciousness has an evolutionary history—and maybe even an evolutionary function. While recognizing the importance to humans of mind-reading and psychic transparency, we should consider the consequences and possible benefits of being—ultimately—psychically opaque
Hutto, Daniel D. (forthcoming). Composing our "selves": Aristotelian and fictional personhood. In Charles C. Conti (ed.), Aspects of Persons and Personalism. Amsterdam/Alanta, GA: Ropodi.   (Google)
Abstract: The postmodern 'dismantling' of the self is often regarded, in sensationalist terms, as threatening to undermine most if not all of our familiar ideas concerning philosophy and morality. This is so because in challenging our 'commonplace' concept of what it is to be a person - a concept with a heavy Cartesian legacy (or at least a legacy that commonly traced back to Descartes) - it also challenges the standard visions of how we stand, or fail to stand, as knowers in relation to reality and causes upset to the grounds for many of our ethico-political practices
Hutto, Daniel D. (1997). The story of the self. In Karl Simms (ed.), Critical Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Imam, Akhtar (1966). Is the substantial self known by introspection. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 13 (May):92-99.   (Google)
Ismael, Jenann (2006). Saving the baby: Dennett on autobiography, agency, and the self. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):345-360.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing support in parts of cognitive science undermines talk of an inner self. On his view, the causal underpinnings of behavior are distributed across a collection of autonomous subsystems operating without any centralized supervision. Selves are fictions contrived to simplify description and facilitate prediction of behavior with no real correlate inside the mind. Dennett often uses an analogy with termite colonies whose behavior looks organized and purposeful to the external eye, but which is actually the emergent product of uncoordinated activity of separate components marching to the beat of their individual drums. I examine the cognitive organization of a system steering by an internal model of self and environment, and argue that it provides a model that lies between the image of mind as termite colony and a naïve Cartesianism that views the self as inner substance
Ismael, Jenann (2007). The Situated Self. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world? Ismael is an original and creative thinker who tries to understand our problematic concepts about the self and how they are related to our use of language in particular
Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1970). The Problem Of The Self. University Park PA: Penn St University Press.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1950). A reply to mr flew's "selves". Mind 59 (April):233-236.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1967). How do I know who I am? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1:1-18.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1949). The self in sensory cognition. Mind 58 (January):40-61.   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, Ralph C. & Graham, George (2006). Extreme self-denial. In M. Marraffa, D. De Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Kolak, Daniel & Martin, R. (eds.) (1991). Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Macmillan.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Helm, Bennett W. (2010). Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Social Nature of Persons. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (2001). Identity, composition, and the simplicity of the self. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge
Mackenzie, Catriona (2007). Bare personhood? Velleman on selfhood. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):263 – 282.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that 'the word "self" does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind' (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of 'bare personhood' in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons
Margolis, Joseph (1988). Minds, selves, and persons. Topoi 7 (March):31-45.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   There is a considerable effort in current theorizing about psychological phenomena to eliminate minds and selves as a vestige of folk theories. The pertinent strategies are quite varied and may focus on experience, cognition, interests, responsibility, behavior and the scientific explanation of these phenomena or what they purport to identify. The minimal function of the notion of self is to assign experience to a suitable entity and to fix such ascription in a possessive as well as a predicative way. It is usually argued that Hume formulated an empiricist account of experience that obviated the need for reference to selves; and recent arguments mustered by Derek Parfit claim to show how to preserve experience, interest, responsibility usually assigned selves and persons without invoking any such entities. The argument here advanced demonstrates that Hume actually concedes the minimal use of the notion of self, that there appear to be no convincing grounds for eliminating it, that there are critical uses for the notion that render it ineliminable, that admission is neutral regarding the nature of selves, and that Parfit''s arguments in particular fail. There appear, therefore, to be no empiricist or materialist grounds for the eliminative move. A large recent literature that favors various eliminative strategies is canvassed and shown to be inadequate to its task and unlikely (for principled reasons) to be able to achieve its eliminative objective
Mccreary, John K. (1948). The self in current philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 45 (December):701-711.   (Google | More links)
McIntosh, Donald (1995). Self, Person, World: The Interplay of Conscious and Unconscious in Human Life. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Meares, Russell (2000). Intimacy and Alienation: Memory, Trauma and Personal Being. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Intimacy and Alienation puts forward the author's unique paradigm for psychotherapy and counselling based on the assumption that each patient has suffered a disruption of the `self', and that the goal of the therapist is to identify and work with that disruption. Using many clinical illustrations, and drawing on self psychology, attachment therapy and theories of trauma, Russell Meares looks at the nature of self and how it develops, before going on to explore the form and feeling of experience when self is disrupted in a traumatic way, and focusing on ways towards the restoration of the self. Written in an accessible style from the author's singular perspective, Intimacy and Alienation will appeal to professionals in the fields of psychotherapy, counseling, social work and psychiatry, as well as to students and the lay reader
Menary, Richard (2008). Embodied narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.   (Google)
Abstract: Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from this work, there appear to be a variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life.
Miller, William Ian (2003). Faking It. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this book polymath William Ian Miller probes one of the dirty little secrets of humanity: that we are all faking it much more than anyone would care to admit. He writes with wit and wisdom about the vain anxiety of being exposed as frauds in our professions, cads in our loves, and hypocrites to our creeds. He finds, however, that we are more than mere fools for wanting so badly to look good to ourselves and others. Sometimes, when we are faking it, our vanity leads to virtue, and we actually achieve something worthy of esteem and praise William Ian Miller is the Thomas G. Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. He has also taught at Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and the Universities of Bergen and Tel Aviv. His previous books include The Mystery of Courage (Harvard University Press, 2000) and The Anantomy of Disgust (Harvard University Press, 1997)
Mischel, Theodore (ed.) (1977). The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Google)
Moore, Jared S. (1933). The problem of the self. Philosophical Review 42 (5):487-499.   (Google | More links)
More, Max (1995). The Diachronic Self. Dissertation, University of Southern California   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1969). Self: An Introduction To Philosophical Psychology. Ny: Pegasus.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun (2008). Imagination and the I. Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract:  Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self
Nichols, Shaun (2000). The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self. Philosophical Topics 28:171-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.2 But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.3 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.4 In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
Noonan, Harold W. (1979). Identity and the first person. In Intention And Intentionality. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Norman, Robert (1970). Ryle on 'the problem of the self'. Philosophical Studies 19:220-235.   (Google)
Olson, Eric T. (1998). There is no problem of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves
Persson, Ingmar (2004). Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind. Ratio 17 (4):390-408.   (Google | More links)
Perry, John (1996). The self. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The English expression “self” is a modest one; in its normal use, it is not even quite a word, but something that makes an ordinary object pronoun into a reflexive one: “her” into “herself,” “him” into “himself” and “it” into “itself”. The reflexive pronoun is used when the object of an action or attitude is the same as the subject of that action or attitude. If I say Mark Twain shot _himself _in the foot, I describe Mark Twain not only as the shooter but as the person shot; if I say Mark Twain admired _himself, _I describe him not only as the admirer but as the admired. In this sense, “the self” is just the person doing the action or holding the attitude that is somehow in question. “Self” is also used as a prefix for names of activities and attitudes, identifying the special case where the object is the same as the agent: self-love, self-hatred, self-abuse, self-promotion, self-knowledge
Pollock, John L. & Ismael, Jenann (2006). So you think you exist? — In defense of nolipsism. In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: Human beings think of themselves in terms of a privileged non-descriptive designator — a mental “I”. Such thoughts are called “_de se_” thoughts. The mind/body problem is the problem of deciding what kind of thing I am, and it can be regarded as arising from the fact that we think of ourselves non-descriptively. Why do we think of ourselves in this way? We investigate the functional role of “I” (and also “here” and “now”) in cognition, arguing that the use of such non-descriptive “reflexive” designators is essential for making sophisticated cognition work in a general-purpose cognitive agent. If we were to build a robot capable of similar cognitive tasks as humans, it would have to be equipped with such designators
Pollock, John L. (online). What am I?   (Google)
Abstract: It’s morning. You sit down at your desk, cup of coffee in hand, and prepare to begin your day. First, you turn on your computer. Once it is running, you check your e-mail. Having decided it is all spam, you trash it. You close the window on your e-mail program, but leave the program running so that it will periodically check the mail server to see whether you have new mail. If it finds new mail it will alert you by playing a musical tone. Next you start your word processor. You have in mind to write a paper in moral philosophy about whether people who send spam
Pribram, Karl H. (1999). The self as me and I. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):385-386.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ramsey, I. T. (1955). The systematic elusiveness of 'I'. Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):193-204.   (Google | More links)
Russman, Thomas A. (1979). Roderick Chisholm: Self and others. Review of Metaphysics 33 (September):135-166.   (Google)
Schechtman, Marya (2005). Community, consciousness, and dynamic self-understanding. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. Special Issue 12 (1):27-29.   (Google | More links)
Schiller, F. C. S. (1922). The meaning of 'self'. Mind 31 (122):185-188.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2001). The constructed and the secret self. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shalom, Albert (1985). The Body-Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Shear, Jonathan (2002). Experiential clarification of the problem of self. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine (2002). Phenomenology and agency: Methodological and theoretical issues in Strawson's 'the self'. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Shea, John J. (1973). The self in William James. Philosophy Today 17:319-327.   (Google)
Shoemaker, David W. (1999). Selves and moral units. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: offers each of these as a possible moral unit at various points.1 It is the aim of this paper, however, to suggest that, if Parfit’s two key arguments about the indeterminacy of identity and what matters in our identity are correct, we should take selves to be the significant moral units in any metaphysically-grounded ethical theory. Furthermore, because Parfit’s own explanation of what the concept of the self involves is problematic in important respects, I hope to point out a few ways in which this concept might be made clearer and more coherent. Finally, I will defend this intermediate view from objections stemming from each of the other two alternatives. I begin with a brief exposition of the Parfitian model
Smart, Brian J. (1976). Synchronous and diachronous selves. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (March):13-33.   (Google)
Smythe, Thomas W. (2001). Self-knowledge and the self. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):287-294.   (Google)
Sorenson, Roy (forthcoming). The vanishing point: A model of the self as an absence. Monist.   (Google)
Abstract: The vanishing point is a representational gap that organizes the visual field. Study of this singularity revolutionized art in the fifteenth century. Further reflection on the vanishing point invites the conjecture that the self is an absence. This paper opens with perceptual peculiarities of the vanishing point and closes with the metaphysics of personal identity
Staes, Paul E. (1972). Positive Self-Regard and Authentic Morality. [Manila]Loyola School of Theology.   (Google)
Steele, Guy L. (1982). Comments on Hofstadter's Who Shoves Whom Around Inside the Careenium?. Synthese 53 (November):219-226.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (1993). Cogito ergo sum. Journal of Philosophy 60 (9):462-468.   (Google | More links)
Stone, Jim (1981). Hume on identity: A defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2).   (Google | More links)
Stoops, John D. (1901). The concept of the self. Philosophical Review 10 (6):619-629.   (Google | More links)
Stone, Jim Stone (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Strawson, Galen (2002). The self and the SESMET. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Suber, Peter (online). Self-determination and selfhood in recent legal cases.   (Google)
Thilly, Frank (1910). The self. Philosophical Review 19 (1):22-33.   (Google | More links)
Throop, C. Jason (2000). Shifting from a constructivist to an experiential approach to the anthropology of self and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):27-52.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tower, Carl V. (1903). An interpretation of some aspects of the self. Philosophical Review 12 (1):16-36.   (Google | More links)
Sorensen, Roy (online). The vanishing point: The self as an absence.   (Google)
Abstract: The vanishing point is a representational gap that organizes the visual field. Study of this singularity revolutionized art in the fifteenth century. Further reflection on the vanishing point invites the conjecture that the self is an absence. This paper opens with perceptual peculiarities of the vanishing point and closes with the metaphysics of personal identity
van Fraassen, Bas (2004). Transcendence of the ego (the nonexistent knight). Ratio 17 (4):453-77.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (2004). The self: The incredulous stare articulated. Ratio 17 (4):478-91.   (Google | More links)
Velleman, David (1996). Self to self. Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Velleman, James David (2006). Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual as being among the ten best papers in their year of publication. Aimed primarily at professional philosophers and advanced students, Self to Self will also be of interest to psychologists and others who theorize about the self
Velleman, J. David (2005). The self as narrator. In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Vierkant, Till (2003). Is the Self Real?: An Investigation Into the Philosophical Concept of 'Self' Between Cognitive Science and Social Construction. Lit.   (Google)
Watson, Rodney (1998). Ethnomethodology, consciousness and self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):202-223.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
White, Stephen L. (1989). Metapsychological relativism and the self. Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):298-323.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
White, Stephen L. (2004). Skepticism, deflation and the rediscovery of the self. The Monist 87 (2):275-298.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
White, Stephen L. (1991). The Unity of the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Willard, Dallas (online). Intentionality and the substance of the self.   (Google)
Abstract: For the Society of Christian Philosophers, APA San Francisco, April 4, 2007
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (2002). Know thyself. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (ed.) (2000). Exploring the Self. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1970). The unity and indivisibility of the self. International Philosophical Quarterly 10 (December):542-555.   (Google)

4.8e Psychological Theories of Personal Identity

Agar, Nicholas (2003). Functionalism and personal identity. Noûs 37 (1):52-70.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Beck, Simon (2001). Let's exist again (like we did last summer). South African Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):159-170.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2001). Animals, babies, and subjects. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):157-167.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2001). Neo-lockeanism and circularity. Philosophia 28 (1-4):477-489.   (Google | More links)
Collins, Arthur W. (1997). Personal identity and the coherence of q-memory. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):73-80.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Davis, Lawrence H. (1998). Functionalism and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Davis, Lawrence H. (2001). Functionalism, the brain, and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-79.   (Google | More links)
de Weg, Henk bij (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google)
Abstract: Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person.
Francescotti, Robert M. (2005). Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory
Giberman, Daniel (2009). Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory. Philosophical Studies 144 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one
Greenwood, Terence (1967). Personal identity and memory. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (October):334-344.   (Google | More links)
Imam, Akhtar (1967). Concept of memory as a criterion of self-identity. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 14 (April):158-176.   (Google)
Johansson, Jens (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often raised against views such as his, that thoughts must be distinct from their thinker. In this paper, I argue that Campbell's responses to the "two thinkers" and the "thoughts/thinker" objections are unsuccessful. Furthermore, his reply to the latter leads to four-dimensionalism of the kind he wanted to avoid – and this view too allows a person to change bodies. Moreover, I argue that it speaks against the series view that generalised versions of it fare much more poorly than do generalised versions of constitutionalism and four-dimensionalism
Mackie, David (1999). Personal identity and dead people. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-42.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Mcgoldrick, P. M. (1981). Memory and personal identity. Southwest Philosophical Studies 6 (April):62-68.   (Google)
Merrill, Kenneth R. (1970). Comments on professor H.d. Lewis, self-identity and memory. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:230-236.   (Google)
Merricks, Trenton (2000). Perdurance and psychological continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-199.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Miri, Mrinal (1973). Memory and personal identity. Mind 82 (January):1-21.   (Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (2006). Non-branching and circularity -- reply to Brueckner. Analysis 66 (290):163-167.   (Google | More links)
Northoff, Georg (2000). Are "q-memories" empirically realistic? A neurophilosophical approach. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):191-211.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "Quasi-memories," necessarily presupposing a distinction between an "experiencing" and a "remembering" person, are considered by Parfit and Shoemaker as necessary and/or sufficient criteria for personal identity. However, the concept of "q-memories" is rejected by Schechtman since, according to her, neither "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other in "q-memories" ("principal inseparability") nor can they be distinguished from delusions/confabulations ("principal indistinguishability"). The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that, relying on a neurophilosophical approach, both arguments can be rejected. Neuropsychological research shows that "contents" of memories are classified according to the accompanying psychological state such that the same "content" can be classified either as auto- or heterobiographical by the respective "experience." Since "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other, the argument of "principal inseparability" must be rejected on empirical grounds. In addition, as demonstrated in an example of a schizophrenic patient, "q-memories" can be distinguished from delusions/confabulations considering the ability to distinguish between different sources of autobiographical memories as a differential criterion. In conclusion, both arguments by Schechtman against the concept of "q-memories" have to be rejected on the basis of neurophilosophical considerations. Consequently, the concept of "q-memories" can be considered as compatible with current empirical knowledge
Olson, Eric T. (1994). Is psychology relevant to personal identity? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):173-186.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (1999). Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):161-166.   (Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (2002). What does functionalism tell us about personal identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us little if anything about personal identity
Palma, A. B. (1964). Memory and personal identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (May):53-68.   (Google | More links)
Perry, John (1975). Personal identity, memory, and the problem of circularity. In John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity. University of California Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Persson, Ingmar (1992). The indeterminacy and insignificance of personal identity (peter Unger, identity, consciousness and value). Inquiry 35 (2):249-269.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1973). Remembering the past of another. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (June):523-532.   (Google)
Rea, Michael C. & Silver, David (2000). Personal identity and psychological continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):185-194.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Jenefer M. (1988). Personal identity and survival. Journal of Philosophy 85 (June):319-28.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1999). What am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.   (Google | More links)
Schechtman, Marya (2005). Personal identity and the past. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Schechtman, Marya (1994). The same and the same: Two views of psychological continuity. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):199-212.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1977). Personal identity: The implications of brain bisection and brain transplants. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):147-61.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2004). Functionalism and personal identity: A reply. Noûs 38 (3):525-533.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1959). Personal identity and memory. Journal of Philosophy 56 (October):868-902.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1992). Unger's psychological continuity theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):139-143.   (Google | More links)
Slors, Marc (1999). A reply to Igor Douven. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):150-152.   (Google | More links)
Slors, Marc (2001). Personal identity, memory, and circularity: An alternative for q-memory. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):186-214.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Stone, Jim Stone (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Tappenden, Paul (2006). No worries for captain Kirk, pace Brueckner (or at least different worries). Analysis 66 (290):171-172.   (Google | More links)
Uzgalis, William (2008). Review of Barry Dainton, The Phenomenal Self. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (12).   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1997). Materialism and the psychological-continuity account of personal identity. Philosophical Perspectives 11:305-319.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Wallace, Kyle (1973). Shoemaker and personal identity. Personalist 54:71-74.   (Google)
Whiting, Jennifer E. (1986). Friends and future selves. Philosophical Review 95 (4):547-80.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Zong, Desheng (forthcoming). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. The Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation. I argue that the belief is unfounded. Briefly: a notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation only if it includes as a constituent psychological properties whose relation with their bearer is one-many or many-one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state (a psychological state with indexical content) and its bearer in which it is first tokened is not a one-many or many-one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one-many or many-one form. Since the Lockean account of personal identity relies on the availability of a notion of psychological continuity featuring indexical psychological states, the conclusion of this paper cast strong doubt on the plausibility of the Lockean theory.

4.8f Physical and Animalist Theories

Adams, Ernest W. (1978). Two aspects of physical identity. Philosophical Studies 34 (August):111-134.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ameriks, Karl (1976). Personal identity and memory transfer. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:385-391.   (Google)
Blatti, Stephan (2006). Animalism. In A. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins
Blatti, Stephan (2007). Animalism and personal identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Abstract: After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity
Blatti, Stephan (2007). Animalism, dicephalus, and borderline cases. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I argue that in cases of dicephalus it is obvious neither that there is one animal nor that there are two of us. Consequently, the animalist criterion does not straightforwardly apply to cases of dicephalus. I defend an account of dicephalus that is both sensitive to the complexity of twinning phenomena and not inconsistent with animalism. In my view, dicephalic twins are a borderline case of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL. I conclude with some speculative remarks concerning the normative import (if any) of my claim that dicephalic twins are a borderline case
Blatti, Stephan (ms). Animalism unburdened.   (Google)
Abstract: Two theories—animalism and Lockeanism—compete for favor in the contemporary debate over personal identity. The aim of this paper is to criticize the Lockean bias that their capacity for self-consciousness renders persons metaphysically unique vis-à-vis other animals—’unique’ in the sense that the conditions whose satisfaction is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of persons differ in kind from the persistence conditions of all other animals. I argue that this uniqueness claim is both philosophically untenable and empirically implausible, and that its failure necessitates a reassessment of the debate between animalism and Lockeanism. The burden, I conclude, should rest with the latter to disprove the former—which is to say, animalism ought to be considered the default position in the debate over personal identity
Brennan, Andrew A. (1969). Persons and their brains. Analysis 30 (October):27-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Campbell, P. A. (1942). Body And Self, One And Inseparable. San Francisco: Kennedy.   (Google)
Carter, William R. (2002). Many minds, no persons. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):55-70.   (Google)
Carter, William R. (1999). Will I be a dead person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Coder, David (1973). How brains think. Dialogue 12 (March):78-86.   (Google)
Cowley, Fraser (1971). The identity of a person and his body. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):678-683.   (Google | More links)
Davis, Stephen T. (2001). Physicalism and resurrection. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Gale, Richard M. (1969). A note on personal identity and bodily continuity. Analysis 30 (June):193-195.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gert, Bernard (1971). Personal identity and the body. Dialogue 10:458-478.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gilmore, Cody (2007). Defining 'dead' in terms of 'lives' and 'dies'. Philosophia 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does
Hershenov, David B. (2005). Do dead bodies pose a problem for biological approaches to personal identity? Mind 114 (453):31-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is argued that such an identification would be a mistake. A living organism has a different part/whole relationship and persistence conditions than the alleged body. A case will be made that the concept ?human body? is a conceptual mess, vague in an unprincipled manner, and that an eliminativist stance towards dead bodies is the appropriate response
Hershenov, David B. (2002). Olson's embryo problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):502-511.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Johansson, Jens (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often raised against views such as his, that thoughts must be distinct from their thinker. In this paper, I argue that Campbell's responses to the "two thinkers" and the "thoughts/thinker" objections are unsuccessful. Furthermore, his reply to the latter leads to four-dimensionalism of the kind he wanted to avoid – and this view too allows a person to change bodies. Moreover, I argue that it speaks against the series view that generalised versions of it fare much more poorly than do generalised versions of constitutionalism and four-dimensionalism
Larkin, William S. (2004). Persons, animals, and bodies. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):95-116.   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophical problem of personal identity starts with something like Descartes’ famous question—“But what then am I?”—construed as an inquiry into the most fundamental nature of creatures like us. Let us stipulate that creatures like us are most fundamentally persons. That is, ‘person’ is the name of our..
Lowe, E. J. (2002). Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: A response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Mackie, David (1999). Animalism vs. Lockeanism 49:369-76.   (Google)
Mackie, David (1999). Animalism versus lockeanism: No contest. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):369-376.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Mackie, David (1998). Going topless. Ratio 11 (2):125-140.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Morreall, John (1980). Smooth replicas. Philosophical Studies 38 (July):101-103.   (Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (2001). Animalism versus lockeanism: Reply to Mackie. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (1998). Animalism versus lockeanism: A current controversy. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Odegard, Douglas (1970). On an argument against mind-body monism. Philosophical Studies 21 (January-February):1-3.   (Google | More links)
Odegard, Douglas (1969). Personal and bodily identity. Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):69-71.   (Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (2004). Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism
Olson, Eric (forthcoming). Brains. In E Olson (ed.), What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: If we are neither animals nor material things constituted by animals, we might be parts of animals. This chapter is devoted to the view that we are spatial parts of animals; the next asks whether we are temporal parts. The only spatial parts of animals that I can think of any reason to suppose we might be are brains, or something like brains--parts of brains or perhaps entire central nervous sytems. Call the view that we are something like brains the brain view
Olson, Eric T. (1998). Human atoms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):396-406.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (1995). Human people or human animals? Philosophical Studies 80 (2):159-181.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (2001). Personal identity and the radiation argument. Analysis 61 (269):38-44.   (Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments dealing with personal identity. He argues, instead, that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive--as long as its vital functions, such as breathing, circulation, and metabolism, continue
Pruss, Alexander (online). Animalism and brains.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that it is possible for a human animal to survive the loss of all bodily parts other than the brain
Puccetti, Roland (1969). Brain transplantation and personal identity. Analysis 30 (January):65-77.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Brains that think. Dialogue 13 (March):99-104.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1970). Mr Brennan on persons' brains. Analysis 31 (October):30-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1980). The duplication argument defeated. Mind 89 (October):582-587.   (Google | More links)
Raju, P. T. (1978). Self and body: How known and differentiated. The Monist 61 (January):135-155.   (Google)
Shorter, J. M. (1962). More about bodily continuity and personal identity. Analysis 22 (March):79-85.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2008). Persons, animals, and identity. Synthese 162 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles
Shoemaker, Sydney (1999). Self and body: Self, body, and coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):287-306.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2003). Self, body, and coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:287-306.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1999). Self, body, and coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:287-306.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Smart, Brian J. (1973). Personal identity in an organized parcel. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):420-423.   (Google | More links)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1991). Personal identity and brain transplants. In Human Beings. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Steinhart, Eric (2001). Persons versus brains: Biological intelligence in human organisms. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):3-27.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I go deep into the biology of the human organism to argue that the psychological features and functions of persons are realized by cellular and molecular parallel distributed processing networks dispersed throughout the whole body. Persons supervene on the computational processes of nervous, endocrine, immune, and genetic networks. Persons do not go with brains
Stone, Jim (2000). Review of Eric Olson: 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology '. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (No. 2):495-497.   (Google)
Hershenov, David B. (2001). Do dead bodies pose a problem for biological approaches to personal identity? Mind 114 (453):31-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One reason why the Biological Approach to personal identity is attractive is that it doesn’t make its advocates deny that they were each once a mindless fetus.[i] According to the Biological Approach, we are essentially organisms and exist as long as certain life processes continue. Since the Psychological Account of personal identity posits some mental traits as essential to our persistence, not only does it follow that we could not survive in a permanently vegetative state or irreversible coma, but it would appear that none of us was ever a mindless fetus. But what happens to the organism that was a mindless fetus when the _person_ arrives on the scene?[ii] Can the acquisition of thought destroy an organism? That would certainly be news to biologists. Does one organism cease to exist with the emergence of thought and another organism, one identical to the person, take its place? (Burke,1994) That doesn’t seem much more plausible than the previous move. Should identity and Leibniz
Zimmerman, Dean W. (2003). Material people. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Zimmerman, Dean (ms). Problems for animalism.   (Google)
Abstract: My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that would seem to infect the boundaries of human animals

4.8g Fission and Split Brains

Anderson, Susan L. (1976). Coconsciousness and numerical identity of the person. Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Baillie, James (1991). Split brains and single minds. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:11-18.   (Google)
Bajakian, Mark (forthcoming). How to count people. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2005). Branching in the psychological approach to personal identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Parfit on Division.   (Google)
Cheng, Charles L. Y. (1978). On Puccetti's two-persons view of man. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16:605-616.   (Google)
Davis, Lawrence H. (1997). Cerebral hemispheres. Philosophical Studies 87 (2):207-22.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
de Weg, Henk bij (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google)
Abstract: Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person.
Ehring, Douglas E. (1999). Fission, fusion, and the Parfit revolution. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):329-32.   (Google | More links)
Ehring, Douglas E. (1995). Personal identity and the r-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):337-346.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Eklund, Matti (2002). Personal identity and conceptual incoherence. Noûs 36 (3):465-485.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Garrett, Brian J. (2004). Johnston on fission. Sorites 15 (December):87-93.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Personal identity and thought-experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions
Gillett, Grant R. (1986). Brain bisection and personal identity. Mind 95 (April):224-9.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Gill, Jerry H. (1980). Of split brains and tacit knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1993). Split brains and singular personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hawley, Katherine (2005). Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence
Hirsch, E. (1991). Divided minds. Philosophical Review 1 (January):3-30.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Johnston, Mark (1989). Fission and the facts. Philosophical Perspectives 3:369-97.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Marks, Charles E. (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Martin, R. (1995). Fission rejuvenation. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):17-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1975). Puccetti on brains, minds, and persons. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):275-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Matheson, Carl A. (1990). Consciousness and synchronic identity. Dialogue 523:523-530.   (Google)
Merricks, Trenton (1997). Fission and personal identity over time. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mills, Eugene O. (1993). Dividing without reducing: Bodily fission and personal identity. Mind 102 (405):37-51.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Montgomery, Brint A. (2003). Consciousness and Personhood in Split-Brain Patients. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma   (Google)
Moor, James H. (1982). Split brains and atomic persons. Philosophy of Science 49 (March):91-106.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1971). Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22 (May):396-413.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek A. (1987). Divided minds and the nature of persons. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Perry, John (1972). Can the self divide? Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):463-88.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Peterson, Gregory R. (2004). Do split brains listen to prozac? Zygon 39 (3):555-576.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1975). A reply to professor Margolis' Puccetti on Brains, Minds, and Persons. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):275-285.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1973). Brain bisection and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1993). Dennett on the split-brain. Psycoloquy 4 (52).   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In "Consciousness Explained," Dennett (1991) denies that split-brain humans have double consciousness: he describes the experiments as "anecdotal." In attempting to replace the Cartesian Theatre of the Mind" with his own "Multiple Drafts" view of consciousness, Dennett rejects the notion of the mind as a countable thing in favour of its being a mere "abstraction." His criticisms of the standard interpretation of the split-brain data are analyzed here and each is found to be open to objections. There exist people who have survived left ["dominant"] cerebral hemispherectomy; by Dennett's criteria, they would not have minds
Puccetti, Roland (1973). Multiple identity. Personalist 54:203-13.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1993). Mind with a double brain. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):675-92.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1989). Two brains, two minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40:137-44.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1981). The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1975). The mute self: A reaction to DeWitt's alternative account of the split-brain data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):65-73.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rigterink, Roger J. (1980). Puccetti and brain bisection: An attempt at mental division. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (September):429-452.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Roache, Rebecca (2010). Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google | More links)
Robinson, Daniel N. (1976). What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at "split-brain" man. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (March):73-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Seibt, J. (2002). Fission, sameness, and survival: Parfit's branch line argument revisited. Metaphysica 1 (2):95-134.   (Google)
Shaffer, Jerome A. (1977). Personal identity: The implications of brain bisection and brain transplants. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):147-61.   (Google | More links)
Sperry, Roger W. (1984). Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain. Neuropsychologia 22:611-73.   (Cited by 52 | Google)
Williams, Robert (ms). Indeterminate survival.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most views of personal identity allow that sometimes, facts of personal identity can be borderline or indeterminate. Bernard Williams argued that regarding questions of one’s own survival as borderline “had no comprehensible representation” in one’s emotions and expectations. Whether this is the case, I will argue, depends crucially on what account of indeterminacy is presupposed

4.8h Multiple Personality

Apter, Andrew (1991). The problem of who: Multiple personality, personal identity, and the double brain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):219-48.   (Google)
Abstract: The received view of multiple personality disorder (MPD) presupposes a form of realism, according to which the 'secondary personality' is an independent conscious entity joined to the psyche of the host. The received view of MPD is endorsed by the majority of psychologists, as are the major diagnostic criteria for MPD. Realism of this type, gives rise to a certain problem concerning the personal identity of the secondary personality, namely, who this individual is. It is argued that three broad answers to the Question of Who in the context of MPD have been proposed in the history of psychology and psychiatry: psychological realism (Janet and the Dissociationist School); psychological anti-realism (Freud and the Psychoanalytic School), and neural realism (Wigan, Sperry and Gazzaniga). These views are examined. In addition, the relationship of the Question of Who to the traditional problem of personal identity is examined. It is argued that philosophers such as Locke, Reid and Parfit have either overlooked or presupposed the Question of Who
Bayne, Timothy J. (2002). Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder. Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach claim suffice for full moral status. If this account of DID is true, then the psychological approach to full moral status seems to entail that the two standard therapies for treating DID might, on occasion, be seriously immoral, for they may well involve the (involuntary) elimination of an entity with full moral status. This result should give proponents of the psychological approach pause, for most people find the claim that current treatments of DID are ethically suspect highly counter-intuitive
Beahrs, J. O. (1983). Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Benner, D. G. & Evans, C. Stephen (1984). Unity and multiplicity in hypnosis, commissurotomy, and multiple personality disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (1994). Multiple personality and computational models. Philosophy 37:103-114.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Braude, Stephen E. (2003). Counting persons and living with alters: Comments on Matthews. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):153-156.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: KEYWORDS: dissociation; multiple personality, person, responsibility
Braude, Stephen E. (1995). First-Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Braude, Stephen E. (1996). Multiple personality and moral responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Braude, Stephen E. (1996). Multiple personality disorder and moral responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.   (Google)
Brown, Mark T. (2001). Multiple personality and personal identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated clusters of general event memory and episodic memory. Multiples exhibit erratic behavior because they cannot access reliably the intersecting autobiographical memory schemata that permit graceful transitions between social roles, behavioral repertoire and emotional dispositions. Selves, in both normal and certain pathological cases, are best understood as semi-fictional narratives created by human animals to serve their social, emotional and physical needs
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1991). How many selves make me? Philosophy 29:213-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1996). Minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):21-28.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1994). Multiple identity, character transformation, and self-reclamation. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1997). A discursive account of multiple personality disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):213-22.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1986). Multiple personality and the concept of a person. New Ideas in Psychology 4:173-84.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Graham, George (1999). Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorder. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple personalities
Gunnarsson, Logi (2010). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Am I alone in my body? -- Multiple personality -- Personal identity -- Diachronic identity -- What am I fundamentally? -- Empirical discernability and fission -- My body -- The various senses of personal identity -- Multiple personality and individuation -- Morton Prince's seminal case study the dissociation of a personality -- Philosophical theories of multiple personality -- The coexistence thesis -- Sharing my body -- A criterion of individuation -- Multiple personality in therapeutic and biographic discourses -- Multiple personality in literary discourses.
Hacking, Ian (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 472 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Here the distinguished philosopher Ian Hacking uses the MPD epidemic and its links with the contemporary concept of child abuse to scrutinize today's moral...
Hacking, Ian (1991). Two souls in one body. Critical Inquiry 17:838-67.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Flanagan, Owen J. (1999). Multiplex vs. multiple selves: Distinguishing dissociative disorders. The Monist 82 (4):645-657.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hinshelwood, R. D. (1995). The social relocation of personal identity as shown by psychoanalytic observations of splitting, projection and introjection. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):185-204.   (Google)
Humphrey, N. & Dennett, Daniel C. (1989). Speaking for ourselves. Raritan 9:68-98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Raritan: A Quarterly Review_ , IX, 68-98, Summer 1989. Reprinted (with footnotes), _Occasional Paper #8_ , Center on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, 1991; Daniel Kolak and R. Martin, eds., _Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues_ , Macmillan, 1991
Humphrey, Nicholas & Dennett, Daniel C. (1989). Speaking for our selves: An assessment of multiple personality disorder. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2003). Delusion, dissociation and identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and that there is little theoretical motivation to yield to that view in light of the fact that the core symptoms of DID bear remarkable similarity to the symptoms of these other disorders where no such extravagance is ever seriously entertained.
Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2002). Identity, control and responsibility: The case of dissociative identity disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); otherwise the presumption should be that persons with DID are indeed responsible for their actions. We find their interpretation of DID and of the way in which the requirements for criminal insanity relate to this condition worrying and likely to result in injustice to DID sufferers. Our thesis is that persons with DID cannot be responsible for their actions if the usual features of the condition are present. A person with DID is a single person in the grip of a very serious mental disorder. By focusing on the features of DID which have, as we argue, the effect of deluding the patient, we try to show that such a person is unable to fulfill the ordinary conditions of responsible agency (namely, autonomy and self-control)
Kolak, Daniel (1993). Finding our selves: Identification, identity, and multiple personality. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):363-86.   (Google)
Abstract: Many of the differences between empirical/psychological and conceptual/philosophical approaches to the mind can be resolved using a more precise language that is sensitive to both. Distinguishing identification from identity and identification as from identification with, and then defining the experiential concept of the per sonat, provides a walking bridge. Applying the new terminology to increasing degrees of dissociation, from non-pathological cases to multiple personality, shows how our psychologies can profit from philosophical analysis while our philosophies can revise themselves according to empirical data. Redefining the psychological structures of persona, personality, and self in terms of an experientially more precise conceptual vocabulary, including the per sonat, avoids the pitfalls of the old approaches and provides insights into the nature of human consciousness that lead both to therapeutic results in psychotherapy and a long-overdue conceptual revision in the philosophy of personal identity. Among the practical conclusions is that for legal purposes MPD should not be considered as a multiple person phenomenon but, rather, as a phenomenon of one person who, simultaneously, is identified as many selves. Among the theoretical conclusions is that a person qua person consists not just in a biology and a psychology but also a philosophy
Lizza, John P. (1993). Multiple personality and personal identity revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):263-274.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Matthews, Steve (2003). Blaming agents and excusing persons: The case of DID. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 10 (2):169-74.   (Google | More links)
Matthews, Steve (2003). Establishing personal identity in cases of DID. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 10 (2):143-51.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Matthews, Steve (1998). Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped using quasi-psychological states even with the addition of the coherence condition. Second, I argue that there is something right about the coherence condition, and a major task of this paper is to identify its proper theoretical role. I do so by reflection on integration therapies for people with multiple personality disorder (MPD). The familiar distinction between the moral and the metaphysical concept of the person is developed alongside such reflection. Connecting these two issues I argue that coherence acts as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity, but that the normative dimension of personhood is not essential to our notion of a person tout court
Mensch, James R. (ms). Multiple personality disorder: A phenomenological/postmodern account.   (Google)
Abstract: A striking feature of post-modernism is its distrust of the subject. If the modern period, beginning with Descartes, sought in the subject a source of certainty, an Archimedian point from which all else could be derived, post- modernism has taken the opposite tack. Rather than taking the self as a foundation, it has seen it as founded, as dependent on the accidents which situate consciousness in the world. The same holds for the unity of the subject. Modernity, in its search for a single foundation, held the subject to be an indissoluble unity. Post-modernism’s position, by contrast, is announced by Nietzsche: “The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? ...My hypotheses: The subject as multiplicity.” Given this, there is a natural correspondence between the success of post- modernism and the current interest in multiple personality disorder. In the latter, we actually have the experience of a “multiplicity of subjects” in their interaction and struggle. The subject stands there before us “as multiplicity.” It gives us a concrete case, one which raises some of the pressing questions associated with the post-modern denial of the subject. Confronting it, we ask: how real are the personalities composing the multiplicity of this disordered self? What, in fact, does this multiplicity tell us about the self? about its genesis and status? What does it reveal about “our thought and consciousness in general”? I plan, in the short compass of this paper, to sketch some answers to these questions. §1. A brief description of MPD. The American Psychiatric Association gives two criteria for (MPD) multiple personality disorder. First, and most obviously, there is “the existence within the person of two or more distinct personalities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern
Olson, Eric T. (2003). Was jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perhaps we should begin with this question: What is the “problem of free will”? Like those other great “problem” phrases that philosophers bandy about, “the mind-body problem,” “the problem of universals,” and “the problem of evil,” this phrase has no clear referent. There are obviously a lot of philosophical problems about free will, but which of them, or which combination of them, is the problem of free will? I will propose an answer to this question, but this proposal can be no more than just that, a proposal. I propose that we understand the problem of free will to be the following problem
Radden, Jennifer (1996). Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Abstract: This book addresses these and a cluster of other questions about changes in the self through time and about the moral attitudes we adopt in the face of these...
Shalizi, Cosma (ms). Possession, multiple-personality disorder.   (Google)
Abstract: Multiple-personality disorder is just what it sounds like: a clinical psychiatric condition whose sufferers exhibit more than one apparent personality in a single body. Some therapists claim over a hundred personalities in one body, which may present themselves as differing from the body in age, appearance, sex, language and even species. (Some therapists claim to have uncovered vegetable and even inanimate personalities.) I have tried to use language as neutral about this as possible, since there is a great deal of controversy about what, exactly, is going on in these lunatics, and even what they should be called. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, that judicious compromise between clinical knowledge, professional politics and random social prejudice, in the new fourth edition has eliminated "multiple personality disorder" and put "dissociative identity disorder" in its place. The popular name is still "schizophrenia," but that properly belongs to another mental disorder altogether, and one with, ironically, a much firmer grip in reality. William Calvin has suggested that these states be called "chimeric," which would make the patients chimerae (sing. chimera). I like this, and will try using it here
Shaffer, Michael J. & Oakley, Jeffery (2005). Some epistemological concerns about dissociative identity disorder and diagnostic practices in psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. When every ounce of your concentration is fixed upon blasting a winged pig out of the sky, you do not question its species' ontological status. James Morrow, City of Truth (1990)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1996). Commentary on minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):31-36.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Thomasma, David C. (2000). Moral and metaphysical reflections on multiple personality disorder. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (3).   (Google)
Wells, Lloyd A. (2003). Discontinuity in personal narrative: Some perspectives of patients. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):297-303.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991). How many selves make me? Philosophy 66:235-43.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1981). Multiple personalty and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):331-48.   (Google | More links)