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4.8a. Personal Identity, Misc (Personal Identity, Misc on PhilPapers)

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Alter, Torin & Rachels, Stuart (2004). Epistemicism and the combined spectrum. Ratio 17 (3):241-255.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that 'the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to its effect.'
Baillie, James (1997). Personal identity and mental content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not change immediately, but only after the person becomes integrated within the new linguistic community. I also suggest that recent work on personal identity, notably by Derek Parfit, has tacitly assumed internalism regarding mental content. I do not intend to argue for either externalism or a psychological criterion. My aim is merely to explicate the issues involved in making them compatible
Baillie, James (1993). Problems in Personal Identity. New York: Paragon House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Baillie, James (1993). Recent work on personal identity. Philosophical Books 34 (4):193-206.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bajakian, Mark (forthcoming). How to count people. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
Baron, Richard J. (online). The self is unreal.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2001). The inclusion model of the incarnation: Problems and prospects. Religious Studies 37 (2):125-141.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant of inclusionism which I call ‘restricted inclusionism’ (RI); RI can evade many, but not all, of the objections to standard inclusionism
Beck, Simon, Fiction and fictions: On Ricoeur on the route to the self.   (Google)
Abstract: In reaching his narrative view of the self in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur argues that, while literature offers revealing insights into the nature of the self, the sort of fictions involving brain transplants, fission, and so on, that philosophers often take seriously do not (and cannot). My paper is a response to Ricoeur's charge, contending that the arguments Ricoeur rejects are not flawed in the way he suggests, and that his own arguments are sometimes guilty of the very charges he lays at the door of his opponents
Beck, Simon, Going narrative: Schechtman and the Russians.   (Google)
Abstract: Marya Schechtman's The Constitution of Selves presented an impressive attempt to persuade those working on personal identity to give up mainstream positions and take on a narrative view instead. More recently, she has presented new arguments with a closely related aim. She attempts to convince us to give up the view of identity as a matter of psychological continuity, using Derek Parfit's story of the “Nineteenth Century Russian” as a central example in making the case against Parfit's own view, and offers a form of narrative theory as a way out of the problem. In this paper I consider this new case, and argue that we should not be persuaded towards the narrative
Beck, Simon (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.   (Google)
Abstract: Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her thought-experiment. I also argue that each of her sources of authority presents further difficulties for her project. Finally, I argue that it is not clear that her thought-experiment is one that actually involves identity in any crucial way. As a result, the case she offers does not offer any satisfactory support for her view on the relation between identity, morality and thought-experiments, but we do gain some insights into what that relation really is along the way.
Beck, Simon (2006). These bizarre fictions: Thought-experiments, our psychology and our selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.   (Google | More links)
Behrendt, Kathy (2005). Impersonal identity and corrupting concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.   (Google)
Behrendt, Kathy (2003). The new neo-Kantian and reductionist debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.   (Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1995). Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self. Inquiry 38 (4):1-15.   (Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1988). Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Addressing many topics in epistemology and metaphysics, this treatise sets out a new theory of the unity of objects, and discusses personal identity, the metaphysics of possible worlds, the continuity in space time, and the nature of philosophical theorizing
Brennan, Andrew A. (1987). Discontinuity and identity. Noûs 21 (June):241-60.   (Google | More links)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1986). Group minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):456-70.   (Google | More links)
Buckareff, Andrei A. & Van Wagenen, Joel S. (forthcoming). Surviving resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified
Campbell, Scott (2004). Can you survive a brain-zap? Theoria 70 (1):22-27.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2004). Rapid psychological change. Analysis 64 (3):256-264.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, John (2004). What is it to know what 'I' refers to? The Monist 87 (2):206-218.   (Google | More links)
Cartwright, Helen Morris (1993). On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity. Synthese 95 (2):241-273.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate
Cartwright, Helen Morris (1987). Ruminations on an account of personal identity. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays on Honor of Richard Cartwright. MIT Press.   (Google)
Catterson, Troy (2008). Changing the subject: On the subject of subjectivity. Synthese 162 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence
Chalmers, David J., The singularity: A philosophical analysis.   (Google)
Abstract: What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines creates more intelligent machines in turn. This intelligence explosion is now often known as the “singularity”. The basic argument here was set out by the statistician I.J. Good in his 1965 article “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine”: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion”, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make. The key idea is that a machine that is more intelligent than humans will be better than humans at designing machines. So it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than the most intelligent machine that humans can design. So if it is itself designed by humans, it will be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. By similar reasoning, this next machine will also be capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. If every machine in turn does what it is capable of, we should expect a sequence of ever more intelligent machines. This intelligence explosion is sometimes combined with another idea, which we might call the “speed explosion”. The argument for a speed explosion starts from the familiar observation that computer processing speed doubles at regular intervals. Suppose that speed doubles every two years and will do so indefinitely. Now suppose that we have human-level artificial intelligence 1 designing new processors. Then faster processing will lead to faster designers and an ever-faster design cycle, leading to a limit point soon afterwards. The argument for a speed explosion was set out by the artificial intelligence researcher Ray Solomonoff in his 1985 article “The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence”.1 Eliezer Yudkowsky gives a succinct version of the argument in his 1996 article “Staring at the Singularity”: “Computing speed doubles every two subjective years of work..
Clark, Thomas W. (1995). Death, nothingness, and subjectivity. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: The words quoted above distill the common secular conception of death. If we decline the traditional religious reassurances of an afterlife, or their fuzzy new age equivalents, and instead take the hard-boiled and thoroughly modern materialist view of death, then we likely end up with Gonzalez-Cruzzi. Rejecting visions of reunions with loved ones or of crossing over into the light, we anticipate the opposite: darkness, silence, an engulfing emptiness. But we would be wrong
Clark, Andy (1995). I am John's brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):144-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am John's[3] brain. In the flesh, I am just a rather undistinguished looking grey/white mass of cells. My surface is heavily convoluted and I am possessed of a fairly differentiated internal structure. John and I are on rather close and intimate terms; indeed, sometimes it is hard to tell us apart. But at times, John takes this intimacy a little too far. When that happens, he gets very confused about my role and functioning. He imagines that I organize and process information in ways which echo his own perspective on the world. In short, he thinks that his thoughts are, in a rather direct sense, my thoughts. There is some truth to this of course. But things are really rather more complicated than John suspects, as I shall try to show
Coleman, Stephen R. (2000). Thought experiments and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.   (Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. & Bayne, Timothy J. (2005). Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding [II.xxvii.17]
De Clercq, Rafael (2005). A criterion of diachronic identity based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.   (Google)
Ehring, Douglas E. (1984). Mental identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22:189-194.   (Google)
Elliot, Robert (1991). Personal identity and the causal continuity requirement. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):55-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foster, John A. (2001). A brief defense of the cartesian view. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Garver, Newton (1964). Criterion of personal identity. Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):779-783.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Garrett, Brian J. (1991). Personal identity and reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):361-373.   (Google | More links)
Garrett, Brian J. (1990). Personal identity and extrinsicness. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):177-194.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Critical study of Carol Rovane's the Bounds of agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):229–240.   (Google | More links)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (1998). Exceptional persons: On the limits of imaginary cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):592-610.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Personal identity and thought-experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions
Gendler, Tamar (2000). Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Glover, J. (1988). I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity. Penguin.   (Google)
Grice, H. P. (1941). Personal identity. Mind 50 (October):330-350.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Hamilton, A. (1995). A new look at personal identity. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):332-349.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Harris, H. (1995). An experimentalist looks at identity. In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Harris, H. (ed.) (1995). Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hertzberg, Lars (1991). Imagination and the sense of identity. In Human Beings. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hope, Tony (1994). Personal identity and psychiatric illness. Philosophy 37:131-143.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Johansson, Jens (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often raised against views such as his, that thoughts must be distinct from their thinker. In this paper, I argue that Campbell's responses to the "two thinkers" and the "thoughts/thinker" objections are unsuccessful. Furthermore, his reply to the latter leads to four-dimensionalism of the kind he wanted to avoid – and this view too allows a person to change bodies. Moreover, I argue that it speaks against the series view that generalised versions of it fare much more poorly than do generalised versions of constitutionalism and four-dimensionalism
Johnston, Mark (1992). Reasons and reductionism. Philosophical Review 3 (3):589-618.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Kolak, Daniel & Martin, R. (1987). Personal identity and causality: Becoming unglued. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October):339-347.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kolak, Daniel (1993). The metaphysics and metapsychology of personal identity: Why thought experiments matter in deciding who we are. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1):39-50.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Langsam, Harold (2001). Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact. Erkenntnis 54 (2):247-271.   (Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1971). Counterparts of persons and their bodies. Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.   (Google | More links)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1981). The Identity of the Self. Edinburgh University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Martin, R. & Barresi, John (2004). Naturalizing the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when...
Matthews, Steve (1999). Metapsychological relativism: A response to white. Philosophical Papers 28 (1):55-76.   (Google)
Matthews, Steve (2004). Parfit's 'realism' and his reductionism. Philosophia 31 (4):531-41.   (Google)
Merricks, Trenton (2001). How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Merricks, Trenton (2001). Physicalism and immortality. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1997). Self-awareness and personal identity. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.   (Google)
Nerlich, G. C. (1958). Sameness, difference, and continuity. Analysis 18 (June):144-149.   (Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1997). Chisholm on personal identity and the attribution of experiences. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.   (Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1993). Chisholm, persons, and identity. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):35-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject of current debate, including the work of Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit, and makes new and challenging interpretations of them. This new edition contains additional material assessing the biological approach which has become increasingly popular in recent years, and extends the treatment of indeterminate identity to take account of the epistemic view of vagueness. This book covers the problem of personal identity from its origin in Locke's work to the most recent debates in the philosophical literature, and will be invaluablereading for any student of the topic
Northoff, Georg (2004). Am I my brain? Personal identity and brain identity - a combined philosophical and psychological investigation in brain implants. Philosophia Naturalis 41 (2):257-282.   (Google)
Nozick, Robert (1981). The identity of the self. In Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1984). Perry, personal identity and the characteristic way. Metaphilosophy 15 (January):35-44.   (Google | More links)
Oderberg, David S. (1989). Reply to Sprigge on personal and impersonal identity. Mind 98 (January):129-133.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Olson, Eric T. (2002). Personal identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent to discuss. Collins 1982 is a good source.)
Olson, Eric T. (2007). What are we? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer
Penelhum, Terence W. (1971). The importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):667-78.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1978). A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Hackett.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Perry, John (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Abstract: Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...
Perrett, Roy W. & Barton, Charles (1999). Personal identity, reductionism, and the necessity of origins. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):277-94.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge
Perry, John (1976). The importance of being identical. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
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Quante, Michael (2007). The social nature of personal identity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):56-76.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper the thesis that personal identity is essentially constituted by social relations is defended. To make this plausible the problem of personal identity is broken down into four interrelated sets of problems. Of these, the unity -- and the persistence -- problems cannot be resolved using the notion of a person and therefore personal identity in this sense is not socially constituted. But this paper argues that the conditions of personhood, and the structure of a human being's personality -- which are the other two sets into which the problem of personal identity is dissolved -- are best understood as being constituted by social relations, especially relations of mutual
Radden, Jennifer (2004). Identity: Personal identity, characterization identity, and mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rafaedel, Clercq (2005). A criterion of diachronic identity based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the suggestion was never properly developed by Strawson, and secondly, it seemed vulnerable to an objection that he himself raised against it. Consequently, the paper’s aim is to further develop Strawson’s suggestion, and to show that the result is not vulnerable to the objection that seemed fatal to its underdeveloped predecessor. In addition, the paper aims to defend Locke’s Principle against alleged counterexamples such as those produced by Leibniz, Fine and Hughes.
Rieber, Steven (1998). The concept of personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.   (Google | More links)
Roache, Rebecca (2006). A defence of quasi-memory. Philosophy 81 (2):323-355.   (Google)
Robert, Melinda (1983). Lewis's theory of personal identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (March):58-67.   (Google | More links)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed.) (1976). The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Rudd, Anthony J. (2005). Narrative, expression and mental substance. Inquiry 48 (5):413-435.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to its states. I suggest that we may be able to do this by relying on the notion of expression. In developing this idea I draw heavily on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, while also developing and criticizing Strawson's account of persons and recent work by Lynne Baker. I conclude by arguing that mental substance, understood in this way, can only be grasped in narrative terms; substantialist and narrative accounts of personal identity, far from being opposed, are mutually supporting and require one another to be coherent
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 111 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be fully material beings without being identical to our bodies. The Constitution View yields answers to the questions 'What am I most fundamentally?', 'What is a person?', and 'What is the relation between human persons and their bodies'? Baker argues that the complex mental property of first-person perspective enables one to conceive of one's body and mental states as one's own
Baker, Lynne Rudder (online). Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Google | More links)
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