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4.8b. Survival and What Matters (Survival and What Matters on PhilPapers)

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Andra, L. (2007). Multiple occupancy, identity, and what matters. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):211 – 225.   (Google)
Abstract: As regards the question of what matters in survival two views have been identified: on the one hand, we have the view that what matters is identity (the so-called 'commonsense view') and, on the other hand, we have the view that what matters is the holding of certain psychological connections between various mental states over time (the relation R). Several attempts have tried to reconcile these two views involving the so-called 'multiple occupancy view' or 'cohabitation thesis'. Even if the latter comes in several formulations, common elements are, positing the appropriateness of a description of the fission case according to which the post-fission persons existed prior to fission and also, that what determines that two persons who exist at a certain time are distinct can be facts about what is the case at other times. The paper discusses three of the most influential formulations of the multiple occupancy view, which intend to reconcile identity with what matters, and argues that for various reasons these at least do not work in this regard
Baillie, James (1996). Identity, relation r, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):263-267.   (Google)
Baillie, James (1993). What matters in survival. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):255-61.   (Google)
Beck, Simon (1989). Parfit and the Russians (personal identity and moral concepts). Analysis 49:205-209.   (Google)
Bodansky, E. (1987). Parfit on selves and their interests. Analysis 47 (January):47-50.   (Google)
Bordes, Montse (1997). Four-dimensional remarks: a defence of temporal parts. Theoria (29):343-377.   (Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1982). Personal identity and personal survival. Analysis 42 (January):44-50.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1984). Survival. Synthese 59 (June):339-62.   (Google)
Brennan, Andrew A. (1987). Survival and importance. Analysis 47 (October):225-30.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Parfit on what matters in survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Buckareff, Andrei A. & Van Wagenen, Joel S. (forthcoming). Surviving resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified
Bushnell, Dana E. (1993). Identity, psychological continuity, and rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2001). Is connectedess necessary to what matters in survival? Ration 14 (3):193-202.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Scott (2005). Is causation necessary for what matters in survival? Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact
Campbell, Scott (2000). Strawson, Parfit and impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225.   (Google)
Cassam, Quassim (1993). Parfit on persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Chappell, Timothy (1995). Personal identity, r-relatedness, and the empty question argument. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):88-92.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Parfit on Division.   (Google)
Chappell, Timothy (1998). Reductionism about persons; and what matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Curzer, Howard J. (1991). An ambiguity in Parfit's theory of personal identity. Ratio 4 (1):16-24.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (1996). Survival and experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:17-36.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996: 17-36) I If I am to survive until some later date, what must happen, and what must not happen, over the intervening period? I am talking here about survival in the strict sense. Take an earlier and a later person, if they are one and the same, what is it about them that makes this so? In addressing this question the preferred tool has long been the exploitation of imaginary or science fiction cases. We are asked to reflect on scenarios in which an ordinary person is subjected to some unusual treatment which effectively removes one or more of the elements that usually accompanies personal persistence. If we think the subject survives the treatment, the conclusion is drawn that the elements removed are not necessary to personal identity as we conceive it. The hope is that the repeated use of this method, with a variety of scenarios, will finally produce a convergence of intuitive responses as to what is necessary and sufficient for survival. Unfortunately, this method has failed to produce the goods. The literature is brimming with cunningly constructed scenarios yet consensus as to what personal persistence involves seems as elusive as ever. So it is hardly surprising that the method has come in for some criticism recently. There is a feeling that much time has been wasted on devising fantastic stories about which many people have no firm or reliable intuitions. Hence the demand for a different approach. As for the direction the new approach should take, a general trend can be detected: a focusing on human beings, biological entities of a particular kind, with species-specific identity conditions - a move away from science fiction, towards science. I shall be arguing here that this response is premature. Although it would be a mistake to expect too much from the standard method, it delivers at least one significant result: that of the several strands that make up a human life, we believe that one particular strand is of overriding importance in regard to our continued existence..
Dancy, J.. (ed.) (1997). Reading Parfit. Blackwell.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Doepke, F. (1990). The practical importance of personal identity. Logos 83:83-91.   (Google)
Ehring, Douglas E. (1987). Survival and trivial facts. Analysis 47 (January):50-54.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Eklund, Matti (2004). Personal identity, concerns, and indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are so intimately connected that the entities we should focus our concerns and ascriptions around are, pretty trivially, the persons. In part, my aim here is to evaluate this naive view. However, I will not actually attempt to give a definite verdict on it. Rather, I will identify the assumptions under which the naive view is true, and discuss how to go about evaluating those assumptions
Fields, Lloyd (1987). Parfit on personal identity and desert. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):432-41.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1987). Reasoning about persons. In Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goodenough, J. M. (1996). Parfit and the sorites paradox. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):113-20.   (Google | More links)
Grau, Christopher (forthcoming). Love and History. The Southern Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay I explore the different ways in which love involves an historical dimension, and I argue that the proper way to capture the relevant historicity of love includes an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this in part through offering an elaboration and defense of some ideas that were originally put forward by Robert Kraut in his paper “Love De Re.” I also consider the treatment that paper received when it was discussed in a paper by Amelie Rorty entitled “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds.” While Rorty’s paper offers valuable insights, I argue that she misses Kraut’s point, and thus misses out on his own helpful contribution to the topic. I go on to criticize her claim that concern over the proper object of love should be best understood as a concern over constancy, and I then consider a related treatment of these issues by Hugh LaFollette. This leads to a clearer understanding of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical, and a better appreciation of the Kripkean analogy Kraut has offered. I end with further defense of the irreplaceability and historicity of the beloved, one that situates these issues in relation to debates concerning personal identity.
Haugen, David (1995). Personal identity and concern for the future. Philosophia 24 (3-4):481-492.   (Google | More links)
Kind, Amy (2004). The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the above-mentioned objection to reductionism cannot get off the ground. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves.” According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern. By arguing against Wolf’s treatment of self-interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1989). Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Lee, Win-Chiat (1990). Personal identity, the temporality of agency, and moral responsibility. Auslegung 16 (1):17-29.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lewis, David (1976). Survival and identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 108 | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1985). Derek Parfit and Greta garbo. Analysis 45 (March):105-9.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Maddy, Penelope (1979). Is the importance of identity derivative? Philosophical Studies 35 (February):151-70.   (Google | More links)
Martin, R. (1987). Memory, connecting, and what matters in survival. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (March):82-97.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Martin, R. (1992). Self-interest and survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):319-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Matthews, Gareth B. (1977). Surviving as. Analysis 37 (January):53-58.   (Google)
Matthews, Steve (2000). Survival and separation. Philosophical Studies 98 (3):279-303.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
McKinnon, Neil & Bigelow, John C. (2001). Parfit, causation, and survival. Philosophia 28 (1-4):467-476.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Measor, Nicholas (1980). On what matters in survival. Mind 89 (3):406-11.   (Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1987). Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1988). Shoemaker on the duplication argument, survival, and what matters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):234-239.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek A. (1999). Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes. Philosophical Topics 26:217-70.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Parfit, Derek (1976). Lewis, Perry, and what matters. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Parfit, Derek A. (1973). Later selves and moral principles. In A. Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Parfit, Derek (1971). On the importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):683-90.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek (1971). Personal identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Parfit, Derek (1982). Personal identity and rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible
Parfit, Derek A. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1621 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions that most of us will find very disturbing.
Parfit, Derek A. (1995). The unimportance of identity. In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Penelhum, Terence W. (1959). Personal identity, memory, and survival. Journal of Philosophy 56 (June):319-328.   (Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1976). Survival. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Google)
Roache, Rebecca (2010). Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google | More links)
Rovane, Carol A. (1990). Branching self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 99 (3):355-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Schechtman, Marya (2004). Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):87-106.   (Google)
Siderits, Mark (1988). Ehring on Parfit's relation R. Analysis 48 (January):29-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Slors, Marc (2004). Care for one's own future experiences. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism
Stone, Jim Stone (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Williams, Robert (ms). Indeterminate survival.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most views of personal identity allow that sometimes, facts of personal identity can be borderline or indeterminate. Bernard Williams argued that regarding questions of one’s own survival as borderline “had no comprehensible representation” in one’s emotions and expectations. Whether this is the case, I will argue, depends crucially on what account of indeterminacy is presupposed
Wolf, Susan (1986). Self-interest and interest in selves. Ethics 96 (July):704-20.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)