MindPapers: 4.8c. Persons

Abelson, Raziel (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan. (Cited by 14 | Google | Edit)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Materialism with a human face. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2004). On being one's own person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). The ontological status of persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Balowitz, Victor H. (1972). Persons as subjects of perception. Personalist 53:102-103. (Google | Edit)

Barresi, John (1999). On becoming a person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person

Berofsky, Bernard (1964). Determinism and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bertocci, Peter A. (1978). The essence of a person. The Monist 61 (January):28-41. (Google | Edit)

Biro, John I. (1981). Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons. Nature and System 3 (September):173-80. (Google | Edit)

Bloor, David (1970). Explanation and analysis in Strawson's persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):2-9. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Campbell, Scott (2001). Persons and substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria

Campbell, Scott (2006). The conception of a person as a series of mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carter, William R. (1988). Our bodies, our selves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):308-319. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Centore, F. F. (1979). Persons: A Comparative Account Of The Six Possible Theories. Westport: Greenwood Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court. (Cited by 177 | Google | More links | Edit)

Christman, John P. (2004). Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Clarke, David S. (1972). A defence of the no-ownership theory. Mind 81 (January):97-101. (Google | Edit)

Clarke, J. J. (1973). Persons, thoughts and brains. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):89-104. (Google | Edit)

Coburn, Robert C. (1967). Persons and psychological concepts. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):208-221. (Google | Edit)

Cockburn, David (ed.) (1991). Human Beings. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)

Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001). Physical persons and postmortem survival without temporal gaps. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Google | Edit)

Davies, Martin (2000). Persons and their underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, this is the product of an unacceptably • mechanistic view of persons. According to this objection, if we were to focus on persons as conscious rational thinkers and agents then the support for putative downward inferences would be undermined. I consider and reject developments of this objection in response to two arguments for downward inferences

de bij Weg, Henk (ms). Can a person break a world record? (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind

Degrazia, D. (2002). Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Conditions of personhood. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 65 | Google | Edit)

Fairbairn, Gavin J. (2002). Brain transplants and the orthodox view of personhood. In R.N. Fisher (ed.), Suffering, Death, and Identity. New York: Rodopi. (Google | Edit)

Farah, Martha J. & Heberlein, Andrea S. (2007). Personhood and neuroscience: Naturalizing or nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior

Garrett, Brian J. (1992). Persons and values. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):337-44. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gendler, Tamar S.ó (1998). Exceptional persons: On the limits of imaginary cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):592-610. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Gill, Christopher (1991). Is there a concept of person in greek philosophy? In S. Everson (ed.), Psychology (Companions to Ancient Thought: 2). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Google | Edit)

Goodenough, Jerry (1997). The achievement of personhood. Ratio 10 (2):141-156. (Google | More links | Edit)

Goodman, Michael F. (ed.) (1988). What is a Person. Clifton: Humana Press. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Haque, Intisar-Ul (1970). The person and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (September):60-72. (Google | Edit)

Hasker, William (2001). Persons as emergent substances. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Hasker, William (2004). The constitution view of persons: A critique. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34. (Google | Edit)

Hasker, William (1999). The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 40 | Google | More links | Edit)

Heinimaa, Markus (2000). Ambiguities in the psychiatric use of the concepts of the person: An analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (2):125-136. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Hershenov, David B. (2005). Persons as proper parts of organisms. Theoria 71 (1):29-37. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the loss of cognition and the destruction of the person, the organism and the person were spatially coincident entities – two beings composed of the same matter at the same time and place. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of positing spatially coincident material entities is that it would seem to result in there being one too many thinkers. Since the person can obviously think, the organism should also have such a capacity as a result of possessing the same brain as well as every other atom of the person. This means that there now exist two thinking beings under the reader’s clothes!

Hudson, H. (1955). People and part-whole talk. Analysis 15 (March):90-93. (Google | Edit)

Ikaheimo, Heikki (2007). Recognizing persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):224-247. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as interrelated, yet irreducible, layers and dimensions of what it is to be a person in the full-fledged sense of the word. Three layers of personhood -- consisting of person-making psychological capacities, person-making interpersonal significances, and person-making institutional or deontic powers -- are distinguished. Running through the layers there are then two dimensions -- the deontic and the axiological -- corresponding to the recognitive attitudes of respect and love. These recognitive attitudes of 'taking something/-one as a person' are responses to the psychological layer and directly constitutive of the interpersonal layer of the respective dimensions of personhood. The multiplicity of ways to understand what 'personhood' means is only apparently chaotic and reveals, on a closer look, a well-ordered and dynamic internal structure

Johnston, Mark (1987). Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kamler, Howard F. (1982). Could persons be nonconscious like machines? Nature and System 4 (September):143-150. (Google | Edit)

Lanier, Jaron (1995). Agents of alienation. Interactions 2 (3):76-81. (Cited by 60 | Google | Edit)

Lindsay, Chris (ms). Subjects as objects: Living in a material world. (Google | Edit)

Locke, John (1690). Of identity and diversity (book II, chapter XXVII). In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1991). Real selves: Persons as a substantial kind. Philosophy 29:87-107. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1999). Self, agency, and mental causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):225-39. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Mackay, Donald M. (1980). Brains, Machines And Persons. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Madell, Geoffrey C. (1991). Personal identity and the idea of a human being. Philosophy 29:127-142. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Margolis, Joseph & Margolis, Clorinda G. (1979). The theory of hypnosis and the concept of persons. Behaviorism 7:97-111. (Google | Edit)

Mayberry, Thomas C. (1979). The concept of a human being. Personalist 60 (April):162-172. (Google | Edit)

McCall, C. (1990). Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being. Avebury. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

McInerney, Peter K. (2000). Conceptions of persons and persons through time. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):121-134. (Google | Edit)

McInerney, Peter K. (1998). Persons and psychological systems. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):179-193. (Google | Edit)

Merricks, Trenton (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 78 | Google | More links | Edit)

Morton, Adam (1989). Why there is no concept of a person in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press. (Google | Edit)

Moulder, James (1972). In defense of immaterial persons. Philosophical Papers 1 (May):38-55. (Google | Edit)

Oderberg, David S. (1989). Johnston on human beings. Journal of Philosophy 86 (March):137-41. (Google | More links | Edit)

Park, Desiree (1973). Person: Theories And Perceptions. The Hague: Nijhoff. (Google | Edit)

Peacocke, Arthur R. & Gillett, Grant R. (eds.) (1987). Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Perry, John (1983). Personal identity and the concept of a person. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff. (Google | Edit)

Peterson, Jordan B. (1985). Persons and the problem of interaction. Modern Schoolman 62 (January):131-38. (Google | Edit)

Petrus, Klaus (ed.) (2003). On Human Persons (Metaphysical Research, Volume 1). Ontos Verlag. (Google | Edit)

Phillips, Dayton Z. (2001). Minds, persons and the unthinkable. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Edit)

Pillsbury, Walter B. (1907). The ego and empirical psychology. Philosophical Review 16 (4):387-407. (Google | More links | Edit)

Plantinga, Alvin (1961). Things and persons. Review of Metaphysics 14 (March):493-519. (Google | Edit)

Pollock, John L. (1988). My brother, the machine. Noûs 22 (June):173-211. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Rankin, Kenneth W. (1976). The trinitarian vision of P.f. Strawson. Philosophy Research Archives 1164. (Google | Edit)

Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1976). A literary postscript: Characters, persons, selves, individuals. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)

Rosenkrantz, Gary S. (2005). An epistemic argument for enduring human persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):209-224. (Google | More links | Edit)

Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Persons, minds, and consciousness. In R.E. Auxier & L.E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Schechtman, Marya (1990). Personhood and personal identity. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Shaffer, Jerome A. (1966). Persons and their bodies. Philosophical Review 75 (January):59-77. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Snowdon, Paul F. (1989). Persons, animals, and ourselves in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press. (Google | Edit)

Sosa, Ernest (1999). The essentials of persons. Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41. (Google | Edit)

Stone, James H. (1988). Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (March):519-32. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Stone, James H. (2005). Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70. (Google | Edit)

Stone, James H. (2005). Why there still are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Storl, Heidi (1992). The problematic nature of Parfitian persons. Personalist Forum 8:123-31. (Google | Edit)

Strawson, Peter F. (1958). Persons. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:330-53. (Cited by 15 | Google | Edit)

Sturma, Dieter (2007). Person as subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):77-100. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Persons are present in the social realm of reasons and make active use of their ability to express themselves. They have a sense of self-reference and lead their lives in the perspective of possible self-consciousness and possible autonomy. For understanding what it means for a person to be a subject one must avoid egological reifications. Expressions like 'self' or 'self-reference' do not refer to entities. They can only be introduced in a way that meets standards of semantic control. Self- reference proves to be an inner-worldly phenomenon that expresses itself indirectly in reflexive attitudes and activities over time

Tallent, Norman (1967). Psychological Perspectives On The Person. London: Van Nostrand,. (Google | Edit)

Tietz, John (1980). Davidson and Sellars on persons and science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18:237-249. (Google | Edit)

Unger, Peter K. (1988). Conscious beings in a gradual world. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12:287-333. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Unger, Peter K. (1979). I do not exist. In Graham F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google | Edit)

Unger, Peter K. (1979). Why there are no people. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:177-222. (Cited by 19 | Google

4.8c	Persons [94]

4.8d	The Self [96]

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