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4.8c. Persons (Persons on PhilPapers)

See also:
Abelson, Raziel (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bailey, Andrew M.; Rasmussen, Joshua & Van Horn, Luke (forthcoming). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails.
Bajakian, Mark (forthcoming). How to count people. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Materialism with a human face. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2009). Persons and the extended-mind thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2003). Review: A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Mind 112 (445).   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2005). When does a person begin? Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, I give a broadly materialistic account of the coming-into-existence of a human person. I argue for the metaphysical superiority of the Constitution View to Biological Animalism, Thomistic Animalism, and other forms of Substance Dualism. I conclude by discussing the single implication of the Constitution View for thinking about abortion. Footnotesa Thanks to Gareth Matthews and Catherine E. Rudder for comments. I am also grateful to other contributors to this volume, especially Robert A. Wilson, Marya Schechtman, David Oderberg, Stephen Braude, and John Finnis
Balowitz, Victor H. (1972). Persons as subjects of perception. Personalist 53:102-103.   (Google)
Barresi, John (1999). On becoming a person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person
Berofsky, Bernard (1964). Determinism and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.   (Google | More links)
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Bortolotti, Lisa & Harris, John (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.
Campbell, Scott (2001). Persons and substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria
Campbell, Scott (2006). The conception of a person as a series of mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carter, William R. (1988). Our bodies, our selves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):308-319.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.   (Cited by 177 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
Christman, John P. (2004). Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Clarke, David S. (1972). A defence of the no-ownership theory. Mind 81 (January):97-101.   (Google)
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Cockburn, David (ed.) (1991). Human Beings. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contributors to this collection have radically different approaches, some accepting and others denying its validity for a proper understanding of what a...
Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001). Physical persons and postmortem survival without temporal gaps. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Davies, Martin (2000). Persons and their underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, this is the product of an unacceptably • mechanistic view of persons. According to this objection, if we were to focus on persons as conscious rational thinkers and agents then the support for putative downward inferences would be undermined. I consider and reject developments of this objection in response to two arguments for downward inferences
de bij Weg, Henk (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind
Degrazia, D. (2002). Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Conditions of personhood. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google)
de Weg, Henk bij (ms). Can a person break a world record?   (Google)
Abstract: Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person.
Dyck, Corey W. (2010). The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant's Third Paralogism. Kant Yearbook 2:95-122.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I challenge the assumption that Kant’s Third Paralogism has to do, first and foremost, with the question of personal identity.
Fairbairn, Gavin J. (2002). Brain transplants and the orthodox view of personhood. In R.N. Fisher (ed.), Suffering, Death, and Identity. New York: Rodopi.   (Google)
Farah, Martha J. & Heberlein, Andrea S. (2007). Personhood and neuroscience: Naturalizing or nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior
Flew, Antony (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. New York, Macmillan.   (Google)
Garrett, Brian J. (1992). Persons and values. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):337-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gill, Christopher (1991). Is there a concept of person in greek philosophy? In S. Everson (ed.), Psychology (Companions to Ancient Thought: 2). New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Goodenough, Jerry (1997). The achievement of personhood. Ratio 10 (2):141-156.   (Google | More links)
Goodman, Michael F. (ed.) (1988). What is a Person. Clifton: Humana Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Haque, Intisar-Ul (1970). The person and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (September):60-72.   (Google)
Hasker, William (2001). Persons as emergent substances. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Heinimaa, Markus (2000). Ambiguities in the psychiatric use of the concepts of the person: An analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (2):125-136.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hellsten, Sirkku Kristiina (2000). Towards an alternative approach to personhood in the end of life questions. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (6):515-536.   (Google)
Abstract: Within the Western bioethical framework, we make adistinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: thenaturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim topromote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normativeviews on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every daylife. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general thearguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of moral personhoodwhile the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealistand/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses onexamining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposingarguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions:Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of thedebate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to takethe social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite ourneed to set individual's decision making into social context, the currentcommunitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative.Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with acollective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss thenormative relation between the concept of `moral personhood' and the demand for respect ofindividual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective
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Abstract: Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the loss of cognition and the destruction of the person, the organism and the person were spatially coincident entities – two beings composed of the same matter at the same time and place. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of positing spatially coincident material entities is that it would seem to result in there being one too many thinkers. Since the person can obviously think, the organism should also have such a capacity as a result of possessing the same brain as well as every other atom of the person. This means that there now exist two thinking beings under the reader’s clothes!
Hershenov, David B. (2006). The death of a person. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):107 – 120.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, as he does, that persons are identical to organisms or that persons can only die metaphorical deaths
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Abstract: In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as interrelated, yet irreducible, layers and dimensions of what it is to be a person in the full-fledged sense of the word. Three layers of personhood -- consisting of person-making psychological capacities, person-making interpersonal significances, and person-making institutional or deontic powers -- are distinguished. Running through the layers there are then two dimensions -- the deontic and the axiological -- corresponding to the recognitive attitudes of respect and love. These recognitive attitudes of 'taking something/-one as a person' are responses to the psychological layer and directly constitutive of the interpersonal layer of the respective dimensions of personhood. The multiplicity of ways to understand what 'personhood' means is only apparently chaotic and reveals, on a closer look, a well-ordered and dynamic internal structure
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Abstract: This collection of new essays aims to address some of the most perplexing issues arising from death and dying, as well as the moral status of persons and animals. Leading scholars, including Peter Singer and Gerald Dworkin, investigate diverse topics such as animal rights, vegetarianism, lethal injection, abortion and euthanasia
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