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4.8d. The Self (The Self on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albahari, Miri (2006). Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Anderson, Joel (1995). The persistence of authenticity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (1).   (Google)
Anderson, W. (1928). Self. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):81 – 92.   (Google | More links)
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Aune, Bruce (1994). Speaking of selves. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):279-93.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Barresi, John (online). The rise and fall of the conscious self: A history of western concepts of self and personal identity.   (Google)
Abstract: I will trace the history of western conceptions of soul and self from the ancient Greeks to the present. The story line that I will present is based mainly on material covered in two books by Ray Martin and myself: _The Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the_
Bermúdez, José Luis (1997). Reduction and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):458-466.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Butterworth, George (1998). A developmental-ecological perspective on Strawson's 'the self'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):132-140.   (Google)
Capek, Milic (1953). The reappearance of the self in the last philosophy of William James. Philosophical Review 62 (October):526-544.   (Google | More links)
Carrithers, Michael; Collins, Steven & Lukes, Steven (eds.) (1985). The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept that peope have of themselves as a 'person' is one of the most intimate notions that they hold. Yet the way in which the category of the person is conceived varies over time and space. In this volume, anthropologists, philosophers, and historians examine the notion of the person in different cultures, past and present. Taking as their starting point a lecture on the person as a category of the human mind, given by Marcel Mauss in 1938, the contributors critically assess Mauss's speculation that ntions of the person, rather than being primarily philosophical or psychological, have a complex social and ideological origin. Discussing societies ranging from ancient Greece, India, and China to modern Africa and Papua New Guinea, they provide fascinating descriptions of how these different cultures define the person. But they also raise deeper theoretical issues: What is universally constant and what is culturally variable in people's thinking about the person? How can these variations be explained? Has there been a general progressive development toward the modern Western view of the person? What is distinctive about this? How do one's notions of the person inform one's ability to comprehend alternative formulations? These questions are of compelling interest for a wide range of anthropologists, philosophers, historians, psychologists, sociologists, orientalists, and classicists. The book will appeal to any reader concerned with understanding one of the most fundamental aspects of human existence
Castell, Alburey (1965). The Self In Philosophy. Macmillan.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cavell, Marcia (1994). Dividing the self. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chattopadhyaya, D. P.; Gupta, Sen & A., K. (eds.) (2005). Self, Society, and Science: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. Distributed by Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Clack, Robert J. (1973). Chisholm and Hume on observing the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (March):338-348.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1995). I am John's brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):144-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am John's[3] brain. In the flesh, I am just a rather undistinguished looking grey/white mass of cells. My surface is heavily convoluted and I am possessed of a fairly differentiated internal structure. John and I are on rather close and intimate terms; indeed, sometimes it is hard to tell us apart. But at times, John takes this intimacy a little too far. When that happens, he gets very confused about my role and functioning. He imagines that I organize and process information in ways which echo his own perspective on the world. In short, he thinks that his thoughts are, in a rather direct sense, my thoughts. There is some truth to this of course. But things are really rather more complicated than John suspects, as I shall try to show
Clark, Andy (2002). That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Crisp, Quentin (1981). Doing It with Style. Watts.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). The self and the phenomenal. Ratio 17 (4):365-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience-producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper..
Dean, Carolyn J. (1992). The Self and its Pleasures: Bataille, Lacan, and the History of the Decentered Subject. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (online). In Darwin's wake, where am I?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: He was not just my teacher and my friend. He was my hero, a man who was quietly but passionately committed to truth, to clarity, to understanding everything under the sun–and to making himself understood. More than anybody else he has made me proud to be a philosopher, so I would like to dedicate my Presidential Address to his memory
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Where am I? In Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Google)
Teroni, Fabrice & Deonna, Julien A. (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.
Deutsch, Eliot (1966). The self in advaita vedanta. International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (March):5-21.   (Google)
de Villiers, Tanya & Cilliers, Paul (2004). Narrating the self: Freud, Dennett and complexity theory. South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):34-53.   (Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1890). On some current conceptions of the term 'self'. Mind 15 (57):58-74.   (Google | More links)
Diekman, Arthur J. (1996). I = awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-356.   (Google)
Duhrssen, Alfred (1956). The self and the body. Review of Metaphysics 10 (September):28-34.   (Google)
Edey, Mait (2002). Subject and object. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ehman, Robert R. (1965). Two basic concepts of the self. International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (December):594-611.   (Google)
Fisher, Seymour (1974). Body Consciousness. J. Aronson.   (Google)
Fisher, Seymour (1973). Body Consciousness; You Are What You Feel. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1996). Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Human beings have the unique ability to consciously reflect on the nature of the self. But reflection has its costs. We can ask what the self is, but as David Hume pointed out, the self, once reflected upon, may be nowhere to be found. The favored view is that we are material beings living in the material world. But if so, a host of destabilizing questions surface. If persons are just a sophisticated sort of animal, then what sense is there to the idea that we are free agents who control our own destinies? What makes the life of any animal, even one as sophisticated as Homo sapiens, worth anything? What place is there in a material world for God? And if there is no place for a God, then what hold can morality possibly have on us--why isn't everything allowed? Flanagan's collection of essays takes on these questions and more. He continues the old philosophical project of reconciling a scientific view of ourselves with a view of ourselves as agents of free will and meaning-makers. But to this project he brings the latest insights of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry, exploring topics such as whether the conscious mind can be explained scientifically, whether dreams are self-expressive or just noise, the moral socialization of children, and the nature of psychological phenomena such as multiple personality disorder and false memory syndrome. What emerges from these explorations is a liberating vision which can make sense of the self, agency, character transformation, and the value and worth of human life. Flanagan concludes that nothing about a scientific view of persons must lead to nihilism
Flew, Antony G. N. (1949). Selves. Mind 58 (July):355-358.   (Google | More links)
Frondizi, Risieri (1950). On the nature of the self. Review of Metaphysics 3 (June):437-452.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Frondizi, Risieri (1976). The self as a dynamic gestalt. Personalist 57:55-63.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (ed.) (2002). Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Abstract: A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the viewpoints of philosophy, developmental psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience,...
Gallagher, Shaun (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.   (Cited by 137 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is good evidence to suggest that although certain aspects of the minimal self are primitive and embodied, other aspects may be accessed only in reflective consciousness. Employing a modified concept of the minimal self, it may be possible to construct a robotic form of non-conscious self-reference that depends on an interaction between the robotic body and its environment. In contrast to the minimal self, the narrative self involves continuity over time and is directly relevant to discussions of memory and personal identity. There is growing consensus among philosophers and cognitive scientists about the importance of narrative and its relation to episodic memory and left-hemisphere functions. There are, however, at least two different views of how the narrative self is structured. On one model it is nothing more than an abstract point. On a more extended view, proposed here, the self is a rich amalgam of narratives that allows for the equivocations, contradictions, and self-deceptions of personal life. Even in this case, however, neurocognitive models contribute to our understanding of how narrative identity is structured
Gallagher, Shaun & Marcel, Anthony J. (2002). The self in contextualized action. In Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Ganeri, Jonardon (2004). An irrealist theory of self. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:61-80.   (Google)
Ganeri, Jonardon (2000). Cross-modality and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):639-658.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It would surely be strange if we had several senses sitting in us, as if in a wooden horse, and it wasn’t the case that all those things converged on some one kind of thing, a mind or whatever one ought to call it: something with which we perceive all the perceived things by means of the senses, as if by means of instruments (Plato, _Theaetetus_ 184d1–5)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2008). Priest and Nagel on Being Someone: A Refutation of Physicalism. The Heythrop Journal 49 (4):648-651.   (Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip (2003). The motor of cognition. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):510-512.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ghin, Marcello (2005). What a self could be (commentary on metzinger). Psyche 11.   (Google)
Abstract: Metzinger’s claim that there are no such things as selves has given rise to a lot of discussions. By examining the notion of self used by Metzinger, I want to clarify what he means when saying that nobody ever was or had a self. Furthermore, I want to examine if there could be a notion of ‘self’ which is compatible with the Self- Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT). I will argue that there is a notion of self which is not only compatible with the SMT, but that the SMT also provides the theoretical framework for developing such a notion
Glover, J. (1988). I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity. Penguin.   (Google)
Gregg, John (ms). The self.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most certain truths in the world is Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". Descartes was so certain of the existence of some kind of essential _self_ that others have coined the term "Cartesian theater" to describe the sense that we all have of being the audience enjoying the rich play of our experiences. We tend to believe in an enduring self, independent of our individual percepts. Sometimes this virtual "self" in our mind, sitting in the audience of the Cartesian theater who watches our thoughts is referred to as a homunculus. This is not necessarily to imply that most of us believe that the self or homunculus is an identifiable region of the brain like the pineal gland, just that at some level of organization, we assume that there is a self that is separate from the stuff that self experiences, remembers, thinks about, etc
Haight, M. R. (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Harding, M. Esther (1965). The "I" and the "Not-I": A Study in the Development of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book provides a very accessible general introduction to the Jungian concept of ego development and Jung's theory of personality structure--the collective unconscious, anima, animus, shadow, archetypes
Hartnack, Justus (1972). The metaphysical subject. Teorema 131:131-138.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (1982). Heidegger on being a person. Noûs 16 (1):15-26.   (Google | More links)
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1982). Who shoves whom around inside the careenium? Synthese 53 (November):189-218.   (Google)
Howie, Duncan (1945). Internalising the external: Some aspects of the psychological problem of the self. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 23 (December):35-56.   (Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2007). The society of selves. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):745-754.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Human beings are not only the most sociable animals on Earth, but also the only animals that have to ponder the separateness that comes with having a conscious self. The philosophical problem of ‘other minds’ nags away at people’s sense of who—and why—they are. But the privacy of consciousness has an evolutionary history—and maybe even an evolutionary function. While recognizing the importance to humans of mind-reading and psychic transparency, we should consider the consequences and possible benefits of being—ultimately—psychically opaque
Hutto, Daniel D. (forthcoming). Composing our "selves": Aristotelian and fictional personhood. In Charles C. Conti (ed.), Aspects of Persons and Personalism. Amsterdam/Alanta, GA: Ropodi.   (Google)
Abstract: The postmodern 'dismantling' of the self is often regarded, in sensationalist terms, as threatening to undermine most if not all of our familiar ideas concerning philosophy and morality. This is so because in challenging our 'commonplace' concept of what it is to be a person - a concept with a heavy Cartesian legacy (or at least a legacy that commonly traced back to Descartes) - it also challenges the standard visions of how we stand, or fail to stand, as knowers in relation to reality and causes upset to the grounds for many of our ethico-political practices
Hutto, Daniel D. (1997). The story of the self. In Karl Simms (ed.), Critical Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Imam, Akhtar (1966). Is the substantial self known by introspection. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 13 (May):92-99.   (Google)
Ismael, Jenann (2006). Saving the baby: Dennett on autobiography, agency, and the self. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):345-360.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing support in parts of cognitive science undermines talk of an inner self. On his view, the causal underpinnings of behavior are distributed across a collection of autonomous subsystems operating without any centralized supervision. Selves are fictions contrived to simplify description and facilitate prediction of behavior with no real correlate inside the mind. Dennett often uses an analogy with termite colonies whose behavior looks organized and purposeful to the external eye, but which is actually the emergent product of uncoordinated activity of separate components marching to the beat of their individual drums. I examine the cognitive organization of a system steering by an internal model of self and environment, and argue that it provides a model that lies between the image of mind as termite colony and a naïve Cartesianism that views the self as inner substance
Ismael, Jenann (2007). The Situated Self. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world? Ismael is an original and creative thinker who tries to understand our problematic concepts about the self and how they are related to our use of language in particular
Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1970). The Problem Of The Self. University Park PA: Penn St University Press.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1950). A reply to mr flew's "selves". Mind 59 (April):233-236.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1967). How do I know who I am? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1:1-18.   (Google)
Jones, J. R. (1949). The self in sensory cognition. Mind 58 (January):40-61.   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, Ralph C. & Graham, George (2006). Extreme self-denial. In M. Marraffa, D. De Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Kolak, Daniel & Martin, R. (eds.) (1991). Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Macmillan.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Helm, Bennett W. (2010). Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Social Nature of Persons. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (2001). Identity, composition, and the simplicity of the self. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge
Mackenzie, Catriona (2007). Bare personhood? Velleman on selfhood. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):263 – 282.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that 'the word "self" does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind' (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of 'bare personhood' in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons
Margolis, Joseph (1988). Minds, selves, and persons. Topoi 7 (March):31-45.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   There is a considerable effort in current theorizing about psychological phenomena to eliminate minds and selves as a vestige of folk theories. The pertinent strategies are quite varied and may focus on experience, cognition, interests, responsibility, behavior and the scientific explanation of these phenomena or what they purport to identify. The minimal function of the notion of self is to assign experience to a suitable entity and to fix such ascription in a possessive as well as a predicative way. It is usually argued that Hume formulated an empiricist account of experience that obviated the need for reference to selves; and recent arguments mustered by Derek Parfit claim to show how to preserve experience, interest, responsibility usually assigned selves and persons without invoking any such entities. The argument here advanced demonstrates that Hume actually concedes the minimal use of the notion of self, that there appear to be no convincing grounds for eliminating it, that there are critical uses for the notion that render it ineliminable, that admission is neutral regarding the nature of selves, and that Parfit''s arguments in particular fail. There appear, therefore, to be no empiricist or materialist grounds for the eliminative move. A large recent literature that favors various eliminative strategies is canvassed and shown to be inadequate to its task and unlikely (for principled reasons) to be able to achieve its eliminative objective
Mccreary, John K. (1948). The self in current philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 45 (December):701-711.   (Google | More links)
McIntosh, Donald (1995). Self, Person, World: The Interplay of Conscious and Unconscious in Human Life. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Meares, Russell (2000). Intimacy and Alienation: Memory, Trauma and Personal Being. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Intimacy and Alienation puts forward the author's unique paradigm for psychotherapy and counselling based on the assumption that each patient has suffered a disruption of the `self', and that the goal of the therapist is to identify and work with that disruption. Using many clinical illustrations, and drawing on self psychology, attachment therapy and theories of trauma, Russell Meares looks at the nature of self and how it develops, before going on to explore the form and feeling of experience when self is disrupted in a traumatic way, and focusing on ways towards the restoration of the self. Written in an accessible style from the author's singular perspective, Intimacy and Alienation will appeal to professionals in the fields of psychotherapy, counseling, social work and psychiatry, as well as to students and the lay reader
Menary, Richard (2008). Embodied narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.   (Google)
Abstract: Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from this work, there appear to be a variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life.
Miller, William Ian (2003). Faking It. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this book polymath William Ian Miller probes one of the dirty little secrets of humanity: that we are all faking it much more than anyone would care to admit. He writes with wit and wisdom about the vain anxiety of being exposed as frauds in our professions, cads in our loves, and hypocrites to our creeds. He finds, however, that we are more than mere fools for wanting so badly to look good to ourselves and others. Sometimes, when we are faking it, our vanity leads to virtue, and we actually achieve something worthy of esteem and praise William Ian Miller is the Thomas G. Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. He has also taught at Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and the Universities of Bergen and Tel Aviv. His previous books include The Mystery of Courage (Harvard University Press, 2000) and The Anantomy of Disgust (Harvard University Press, 1997)
Mischel, Theodore (ed.) (1977). The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Google)
Moore, Jared S. (1933). The problem of the self. Philosophical Review 42 (5):487-499.   (Google | More links)
More, Max (1995). The Diachronic Self. Dissertation, University of Southern California   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1969). Self: An Introduction To Philosophical Psychology. Ny: Pegasus.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun (2008). Imagination and the I. Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract:  Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self
Nichols, Shaun (2000). The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self. Philosophical Topics 28:171-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.2 But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.3 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.4 In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
Noonan, Harold W. (1979). Identity and the first person. In Intention And Intentionality. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Norman, Robert (1970). Ryle on 'the problem of the self'. Philosophical Studies 19:220-235.   (Google)
Olson, Eric T. (1998). There is no problem of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves
Persson, Ingmar (2004). Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind. Ratio 17 (4):390-408.   (Google | More links)
Perry, John (1996). The self. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The English expression “self” is a modest one; in its normal use, it is not even quite a word, but something that makes an ordinary object pronoun into a reflexive one: “her” into “herself,” “him” into “himself” and “it” into “itself”. The reflexive pronoun is used when the object of an action or attitude is the same as the subject of that action or attitude. If I say Mark Twain shot _himself _in the foot, I describe Mark Twain not only as the shooter but as the person shot; if I say Mark Twain admired _himself, _I describe him not only as the admirer but as the admired. In this sense, “the self” is just the person doing the action or holding the attitude that is somehow in question. “Self” is also used as a prefix for names of activities and attitudes, identifying the special case where the object is the same as the agent: self-love, self-hatred, self-abuse, self-promotion, self-knowledge
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Abstract: Human beings think of themselves in terms of a privileged non-descriptive designator — a mental “I”. Such thoughts are called “_de se_” thoughts. The mind/body problem is the problem of deciding what kind of thing I am, and it can be regarded as arising from the fact that we think of ourselves non-descriptively. Why do we think of ourselves in this way? We investigate the functional role of “I” (and also “here” and “now”) in cognition, arguing that the use of such non-descriptive “reflexive” designators is essential for making sophisticated cognition work in a general-purpose cognitive agent. If we were to build a robot capable of similar cognitive tasks as humans, it would have to be equipped with such designators
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Abstract: It’s morning. You sit down at your desk, cup of coffee in hand, and prepare to begin your day. First, you turn on your computer. Once it is running, you check your e-mail. Having decided it is all spam, you trash it. You close the window on your e-mail program, but leave the program running so that it will periodically check the mail server to see whether you have new mail. If it finds new mail it will alert you by playing a musical tone. Next you start your word processor. You have in mind to write a paper in moral philosophy about whether people who send spam
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Abstract: The vanishing point is a representational gap that organizes the visual field. Study of this singularity revolutionized art in the fifteenth century. Further reflection on the vanishing point invites the conjecture that the self is an absence. This paper opens with perceptual peculiarities of the vanishing point and closes with the metaphysics of personal identity
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Abstract: The vanishing point is a representational gap that organizes the visual field. Study of this singularity revolutionized art in the fifteenth century. Further reflection on the vanishing point invites the conjecture that the self is an absence. This paper opens with perceptual peculiarities of the vanishing point and closes with the metaphysics of personal identity
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Abstract: Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual as being among the ten best papers in their year of publication. Aimed primarily at professional philosophers and advanced students, Self to Self will also be of interest to psychologists and others who theorize about the self
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