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4.9. Metaphysics of Mind, Misc (Metaphysics of Mind, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. University of Minnesota Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a description" -- Analysis competition--tenth problem -- A reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's argument that "naturalism" is self-refuting.
Aquila, Richard E. (1979). Mental particulars, mental events, and the bundle theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.   (Google)
Barton Perry, Ralph (1909). The mind within and the mind without. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):169-175.   (Google | More links)
Bateman, J. V. (1940). Professor Alexander's proofs of the spatio-temporal nature of mind. Philosophical Review 49 (May):309-324.   (Google | More links)
Beloff, John (1962). The Existence Of Mind. McGibbon & Kee.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Bentley, Arthur F. (1941). Some logical considerations concerning professor Lewis's mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (November):634-635.   (Google | More links)
Bergmann, Gustav (1942). An empiricist schema of the psychophysical problem. Philosophy of Science 9 (January):72-91.   (Google | More links)
Bird, Graham H. (1971). Minds and states of mind. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):244-246.   (Google | More links)
Blanshard, Brand (1941). The nature of mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):207-215.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Jason W. (2002). The Self-Embodying Mind: Process, Brain Dynamics and the Conscious Present. Midpoint Trade Books Inc.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Campbell, K. (1983). Abstract particulars and the philosophy of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (June):129-41.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Caruso, Gregg (2002). Review of David Cockburn’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Metapsychology.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Borderline 'Minds'.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Counting Minds.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). How Many Minds?   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). How Many Minds?   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Indeterminate 'minds'.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Minds.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). 13 'Minds'.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Many Minds.   (Google)
Chakraborti, Chhanda (2005). Mental properties and levels of properties. Metaphysica 6 (2):7-24.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). No Mind?   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). One Mind?   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Singular Minds.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh S. (ms). Tredecims.   (Google)
Chandler, Hugh (ms). Tredicims' minds.   (Google)
Chant, Sara Rachel (2006). The special composition question in action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct answer to this question depends on a particular kind of consequence produced by the individual constituent actions
Collins, Arthur W. (1994). Precis of the nature of mental things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):901-903.   (Google | More links)
Collins, Arthur W. (1994). Reply to commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):929-945.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cox, John G. (1982). Mental events must have spatial location. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (July):270-274.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (1998). How to define your (mental) terms. Inquiry 41 (3):341-354.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Demeter, Tamás (2010). In defence of empty realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 41 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This piece defends the distinction I have drawn in my "Two Kinds of Mental Realism" against criticism put forward in János Tőzsér's "Mental Realism Reloaded".
Demeter, Tamás (2009). Two kinds of mental realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component of realism about folk psychology, and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this conflict
Dipert, Randall R. (ms). Two unjustly neglected aspects of C.s. Peirce's philosophy of mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Few philosophers today know much about Charles Peirce’s metaphysics, although a great many know something about his epistemology, philosophy of science, and logic. Indeed, few Peirce experts have written much on his metaphysics or made it the focus of their research. To an extent, this is understandable. Peirce’s writings were left in a disastrously disorganized state (mostly unpublished), and the crucial papers on metaphysics from his later years have not yet been republished in the first-rate chronological edition, the incomplete Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition , edited at Indianapolis by my friends. And then there is Peirce’s writing: an awkward, abrasive, arrogant, eclectic style that demands technical knowledge in diverse fields, especially logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences. His worst personality traits manifested themselves in his highly technical metaphysics—with its idiosyncratic, anti-Cantorian conception of continua, a pecularly mathematical phenomenology, and elaborate views on Darwinian and non-Darwinian evolution, for example. Finally, there is what might appear to be the bizarreness of the theory itself, as we shall see. Peirce was a kind of philosophical swashbuckler, a bold, courageous speculator on philosophical questions beyond most of our temperaments even to ponder. Ours is not the philosophical age of Errol Flynn but the minimalist age of Harrison Ford, with no grand gestures or speeches, just a series of small, no-nonsense gestures: we typically like our philosophy short, neat, "science-like," and isolated from other philosophical issues
Drake, Durant (1926). What is a mind? Ontological pluralism versus ontological monism. Mind 35 (138):230-236.   (Google | More links)
Ewing, Alfred C. (1945). Are mental attributes attributes of the body? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:27-58.   (Google)
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1958). The dependence of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (September):16-26.   (Google | More links)
Garnett, A. Campbell (1952). Mind as minding. Mind 61 (July):349-358.   (Google | More links)
Geisz, Steven F. (2009). Turning representation inside out: An adverbial approach to the metaphysics of language and mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential objections are identified and considered. To respond to these objections, relationships between physical form and linguistic/representational form are examined. In the process, two ways of idealizing away from the heterogeneous details of actual language use are introduced: idealization toward homogeneity and idealization toward complete heterogeneity. I argue that an adverbial view of linguistic representation both allows for and requires that we idealize toward complete heterogeneity and that doing so has important implications for (1) our understanding of the relationship between physical form and representational form and (2) property attribution in general. These implications provide further indirect support for the alternative metaphysics of representation developed here
Gillett, Grant R. (1992). Consciousness, intentionality and internalism: A philosophical perspective on Velmans and his critics. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):173-179.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gozzano, Simone (2008). Tropes' simplicity and mental causation. Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem of mental causation is evaluated. It is argued that no solution based on the determinable/determinate relation is viable without begging the question as regards the individuating conditions of the related properties. Next, it is shown that Robb’s solution, much in the spirit of Davidson’s anomalous monism, entails abandoning the assumption that tropes are essentially simple, a consequence that I find not acceptable. My conclusion is that these entities are of no help in solving the problem of mental causation, and that a universalist approach should be preferred.
Gozzano, Simone & Orilia, Francesco (eds.) (2008). Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind. Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Greidanus, J. H. (1966). A Theory Of Mind And Matter. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandshe.   (Google)
Grossman, Reinhardt S. (1965). The Structure Of Mind. Madison: University Of Wisconsin Press.   (Google)
Hall, Everett W. (1961). On exorcising mental ghosts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):572-574.   (Google | More links)
Hammond, Albert L. (1951). On being put in mind of the mental. Journal of Philosophy 48 (March):211-214.   (Google | More links)
Harre, Rom (1973). Where are we now in the theory of the mind? Philosophical Papers 2 (October):41-51.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (1998). Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 83 | Google | More links)
Heath Bawden, H. (1904). The meaning of the psychical from the point of view of the functional psychology. Philosophical Review 13 (3):298-319.   (Google | More links)
Heil, John (online). Metaphysics of mind. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Heil, John & Robb, David (2003). Mental properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, not particulars. (D) Every property is either categorical or dispositional, but not both. We show how these doctrines influence current philosophical thinking about the mind, suggest and defend an alternative conception of properties, and indicate how this conception provides answers to two puzzles besetting contemporary philosophy of mind: the problem of mental causation and the problem of qualia.
Heil, John (1992). The Nature of True Minds. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book aims at reconciling the emerging conceptions of mind and their contents that have, in recent years, come to seem irreconcilable. Post-Cartesian philosophers face the challenge of comprehending minds as natural objects possessing apparently non-natural powers of thought. The difficulty is to understand how our mental capacities, no less than our biological or chemical characteristics, might ultimately be products of our fundamental physical constituents, and to do so in a way that preserves the phenomena. Externalists argue that the significance of thought turns on the circumstances of thinkers; reductionists hold that mental characteristics are physical; eliminationists contend that the concept of thought belongs to an outmoded folk theory of behavior. John Heil explores these topics and points the way to a naturalistic synthesis, one that accords the mental a place in the physical world alongside the non-mental
Hendel, Charles W. (1934). The status of mind in reality. Journal of Philosophy 31 (9):225-235.   (Google | More links)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1994). Mental states as mental. Philosophia 23 (1-4):223-245.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kenyon, F. (1941). The Myth of the Mind. London,: Watts,.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (2002). Responses to comments on Mind in a Physical World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):671-680.   (Google)
Krikorian, Y. H. (1949). Empiricism and the mind. Journal of Philosophy 46 (October):685-692.   (Google | More links)
Krikorian, Y. H. (1950). Empiricism: Mind and matter. Journal of Philosophy 47 (April):255-259.   (Google | More links)
Lahren, Brian (1976). Commentary on Margolis' paper mental states. Behaviorism 4:77-95.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1991). Metamind, autonomy and materialism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:1-11.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lewis, C. I. (1941). Some logical considerations concerning the mental. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):225-232.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Locke, Don (1972). Can a materialist see what isn't there? Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):55-56.   (Google | More links)
Marcus, Eric (ms). Defending naïve realism about mental properties.   (Google)
Abstract: _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about mental _properties_. 1 I will defend naïve realism first in relation to the view that mental properties are (ultimately) realized by fundamental physical properties (property-physicalism), and, second, in relation to the broader view that mental properties are realized by the non- rational properties of some natural science or other (property-naturalism).2 Plainly, the construction of an impenetrable defense of naïve realism would be a foolhardy ambition for a single essay. Ultimately, my aim here is thus significantly more modest: I hope just to show that naïve realism is a legitimate contender in the philosophy of mind, one which is for the most part completely overlooked, but which deserves serious consideration
Margolis, Joseph (1975). Mental states. Behaviorism 3:23-31.   (Google)
Marsh, Leslie (ms). Man Without Qualities.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The question of how a physical system gives rise to the phenomenal or experiential (olfactory, visual, somatosensitive, gestatory and auditory), is considered the most intractable of scientific and philosophical puzzles. Though this question has dominated the philosophy of mind over the last quarter century, it articulates a version of the age-old mind-body problem. The most famous response, Cartesian dualism, is on Daniel Dennett’s view still a corrosively residual and redundant feature of popular (and academic) thinking on these matters. Fifteen years on from his anti-Cartesian theory of consciousness (Consciousness Explained, 1991), Dennett’s frustration with this tradition is still palpable. This frustration is primarily aimed at philosophers
Martin, Michael W. (1971). On the conceivability of mechanism. Philosophy of Science 38 (March):79-86.   (Google | More links)
Mccloskey, Mary A. (1962). Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (December):303-312.   (Google | More links)
Mills, Jon K. (2003). Whitehead's unconscious ontology. Theory and Psychology 13 (2):209-238.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Miri, Mrinal (1982). Mental states. In Logic, Ontology and Action. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mohrhoff, Ulrich (2007). The quantum world, the mind, and the cookie Cutter paradigm. AntiMatters 1 (1):55-90.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Northoff, Georg (1997). Mental states in phenomenological and analytical philosophy. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Pappas, George S. (1982). Postulation and materialism. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):71-82.   (Google | More links)
Peijnenburg, Jeanne (1999). Are there mental entities? Some lessons from Hans Reichenbach. Sorites 11 (11):66-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Prado, C. G. (1972). Subjects and states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (August):168-172.   (Google | More links)
Putnam, Hilary (2001). Reply to Charles Travis. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):525-533.   (Google)
Raatikainen, Panu (ms). Truth and provability again.   (Google)
Abstract: Lucas and Redhead ([2007]) announce that they will defend the views of Redhead ([2004]) against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). They certainly re-state the main claims of Redhead ([2004]), but they do not give any real arguments in their favour, and do not provide anything that would save Redhead’s argument from the serious problems pointed out in (Raatikainen [2005]). Instead, Lucas and Redhead make a number of seemingly irrelevant points, perhaps indicating a failure to understand the logico-mathematical points at issue
Resnick, Lawrence (1969). Thinking and correspondence. Philosophical Review 78 (October):507-509.   (Google | More links)
Reyburn, Hugh A. (1919). Mental process. Mind 28 (109):19-40.   (Google | More links)
Roberts, John L. (1947). Human minds and physical objects. Journal of Philosophy 44 (July):434-441.   (Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (2003). The ontology of the mental. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2006). Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Russell, Bertrand (1958). What is mind? Journal of Philosophy 55 (January):5-11.   (Google | More links)
Sapontzis, Steve F. (1979). Consciousness and numerical identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17:107-117.   (Google)
Schlosser, Markus E. (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.
Searle, John R. (1981). Analytic philosophy and mental phenomena. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6:405-423.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sheldon, W. H. (1941). On the nature of mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):197-206.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (1976). Psychological predicates. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (June):472-493.   (Google | More links)
Squires, Roger (1970). On one's mind. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):347-356.   (Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (1997). The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Abstract: Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood
Stroll, Avrum (1993). That puzzle we call the mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:189-210.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stuart, Susan A. J. (2003). A metaphysical approach to the mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):223-37.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is argued that, based on Kant's descriptive metaphysics, one can prescribe the necessary metaphysical underpinnings for the possibility of conscious experience in an artificial system. This project is developed by giving an account of the a priori concepts of the understanding in such a system. A specification and implementation of the nomological conditions for a conscious system allows one to know a priori that any system possessing this structure will be conscious; thus enabling us to avoid possible false-indicators of consciousness like that offered in a behaviouristic analysis. This is an alternative approach to the bottom-up or top-down approaches adopted by, for example CYC (Lenat and Feigenbaum 1992) and COG (Brooks 1994; Brooks and Stein 1993), neither of which, alone, or in some hybrid form, have proved productive
Taylor, Brandon (1973). Mental events: Are there any? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):189-200.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Vacariu, Gabriel (2005). Mind, brain, and epistemologically different worlds. Synthese 147 (3):515-548.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds
van Gelder, Tim (online). Beyond the mind-body problem.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Wilfred Sellars once famously described philosophy as "the attempt to say how things, in the most general sense of the term, hang together, in the most general sense of the term." (Sellars, 1962). In the spirit of that suggestion, we can think of philosophy of mind as the attempt to say how minds hang together-how things fit to form minds, and how minds fit with other things. It can hardly be disputed that there are these kinds of fit; in that respect at least, the world is a coherent place. The philosophical challenge is to understand and elucidate that nature of the fit, such as it is
Vogel, Jonathan (1999). Causation and subjectivity. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Weissman, David J. (1969). Mental structure. Ratio 11 (June):14-37.   (Google)
Wisdom, John O. (1963). Problems Of Mind And Matter. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: Reprint of the first paperback ed. of 1963.
Yolton, John W. (1961). Thinking And Perceiving: A Study In The Philosophy Of Mind. Open Court.   (Google)