Javascript Menu by
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
click here for help on how to search

5.1. Mental States (Mental States on PhilPapers)

Barnett, David (2008). The simplicity intuition and its hidden influence on philosophy of mind. Noûs 42 (2):308–335.   (Google | More links)
Bremer, Manuel (2005). Lessons from Sartre for the Analytic Philosophy of Mind. Analecta Husserliana 88:63-85.   (Google)
Abstract: There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness. This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly take¬over” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind.
Frankfurt, Harry (1982). The importance of what we care about. Synthese 53 (2):257-272.   (Google | More links)
Moore, G. E. (1899). The nature of judgment. Mind 8 (30):176-193.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher, Conceiving of conscious states.   (Google)
Abstract: For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we explain our understanding of what it is for someone else to be in a particular conscious state in terms of our knowledge of the relation of identity which that state bears to some of our own states?[1] This is a large issue, with many ramifications both within and beyond the philosophy of mind; so let me give a map for the route I aim to take. We first need to consider the features of explanations of concepts in terms of identity in domains outside the mental. There are substantial constraints on legitimate explanation of concepts in terms of identity. There are also reasons that it is harder to meet these constraints in the case of concepts of conscious states than it is in other cases. I will go on to suggest a way in which we can overcome the special difficulties of the conscious case, and to try to elaborate the nature both of our understanding of first person applications of concepts of conscious states, and of our grasp of an identity relation applied to these states. A positive account of understanding in this area, as in any other, has to dovetail with a credible epistemology of conscious states in oneself and in others. I will offer something under that head, and say how the resulting position steers a middle way distinct from each of the two classic rival positions on conscious states of the later Wittgenstein on the one hand, and of Frege on the other
Schiller, Aaron Allen (2007). Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars's Myth of Jones. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):435-454.   (Google)
Abstract: Part of Sellars’s general attack on the Myth of the Given is his endorsement of psychological nominalism, a view that implies that awareness of our own mental states is not given but must be earned. Sellars provides an account of how such awareness might have been earned with the Myth of Jones. Such an account is important for Sellars, for without it the Given can look necessary after all. But a problem with such accounts is that they can look extremely implausible. Sellars himself seems unconcerned to make his account plausible, and so others have stepped in here. But, I argue, they have done so in ways that fail to respect his psychological nominalism. This evinces, as well as reinforces, a lack of sensitivity to the scope of Sellars’s attack on the Given, the aim of which is the dismantling of “the entire framework of givenness.” In this essay, I show how one can make Sellars’s Myth of Jones plausible, while still respecting his psychological nominalism, by seeing how Jones’s thought is governed by the norms of rationality as interpretability.

5.1a Attention

5.1a.1 Attention and Consciousness

Arvidson, P. Sven (2008). Attentional capture and attentional character. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere of attention, primarily as an irrelevant centering in attending
Arvidson, P. Sven (2003). A lexicon of attention: From cognitive science to phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):99-132.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Arvidson, P. Sven (1998). Bringing context into focus: Parallels in the psychology of attention and the philosophy of science. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 29:50-91.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (2004). Experimental evidence for three dimensions of attention. In Lester Embree (ed.), GurwitschS Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer.   (Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (1997). Looking intuit: A phenomenological analysis of intuition and attention. In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (1996). Toward a phenomenology of attention. Human Studies 19 (1):71-84.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and the cognitive bestowal of organization on otherwise unorganized data. It is concluded that cognitive psychologists and others working on attention can benefit from Gurwitsch's work, and that a credible account of attention is crucial to the success of any comprehensive statement on the nature of consciousness
Arvidson, P. Sven (1992). The field of consciousness: James and Gurwitsch. Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 28 (4):833-856.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (2006). The Sphere of Attention: Context and Margin. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...
Binet, Alfred (1886). Attention in perception. Mind 11 (44):599-600.   (Google | More links)
Block, Richard A. & Zakay, Dan (2001). Retrospective and prospective timing: Memory, attention and consciousness. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Bradley, Francis H. (1886). Is there any special activity of attention? Mind 11 (43):305-323.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Christ, Gregory J. (1993). Reply to the ability of the sweeping model to explain human attention. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):215-222.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (online). Preattentive precursors to phenomenal properties.   (Google)
Abstract: What are the relations between preattentive feature-placing and states of perceptual awareness? For the purposes of this paper, states of "perceptual awareness" are confined to the simplest possible exemplars: states in which one is aware of some aspect of the appearance of something one perceives. Subjective contours are used as an example. Early visual processing seems to employ independent, high-bandwidth, preattentive feature "channels", followed by a selective process that directs selective attention. The mechanisms that yield subjective contours are found very early in this processing. An experiment by Greg Davis and Jon Driver is described; it seems to show that multiple subjective figures can be coded in these preattentive, parallel stages of visual processing. I propose that some of these preattentive states might register the very same differences that, were one aware of them, would be phenomenal differences. Some arguments pro and con on this possibility are assessed
Coates, Paul (2004). Wilfrid Sellars, perceptual consciousness, and theory of attention. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (1999). Trains, planes, and brains: Attention and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):152-153.   (Google)
Abstract: O'Brien & Opie believe that some mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which a person is attending, and other mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which attention was not paid. I argue that this is the classical view of consciousness; yet this is the view which they wish to challenge
Eilan, Naomi M. (2006). On the role of perceptual consciousness in explaining the goals and mechanisms of vision: A convergence on attention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67�88.   (Google | More links)
Eilan, Naomi M. (1998). Perceptual intentionality, attention and consciousness. In Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2001). A theoretical model of the role of the cerebellum in cognition, attention and consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):300-309.   (Google)
Ford, Jason & Smith, David Woodruff (2006). Consciousness, self, and attention. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Ford, Jason M. (online). The attention model of consciousness.   (Google)
Grassia, Massimo (2004). Consciousness and perceptual attention: A methodological argument. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Grossberg, S. (1999). The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):1-44.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2003). Attention versus consciousness: A distinction with a difference. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1998). The puzzle of attention, the importance of metaphors. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):331-351.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to show by example that inferences about theoretical entities are relatively contingent affairs. Previously accepted conceptual metaphors in science set both the general form of new theories and our acceptance of the theories as plausible. In addition, they determine how we define the relevant parameters in investigating phenomena in the first place. These items then determine how we conceptualize things in the world. Second, and maybe more importantly, I want to solve a puzzle that falls out of our current explication of attention, namely why we have it. Given the now widely accepted view that our brains are massively parallel, it is difficult to see why we should have evolved attentional mechanisms at all. Why gate when we can already process what we transduce in parallel? Here I answer that puzzle and suggest a perspective on attention that makes it a bit easier to understand, although this perspective also entails that we have to revise how we individuate experimental protocols and relevant data
Hellie, Benj (2006). Beyond phenomenal naivete. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
Hellie, Benj (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Google)
Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
Jimenez, Luis (2003). Intention, attention, and consciousness in probabilistic sequence learning. In Luis Jimenez (ed.), Attention and Implicit Learning. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lavie, Nilli (2007). Attention and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Malach, Rafael & Josipovic, Zoran (2006). Perception without a perceiver - in conversation with Zoran josipovic. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):57-66.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Rafael Malach is currently a professor in the department of Neurobiology at the Weizmann Institute in Israel. His current research is aimed at understanding how the neuronal circuitry in the human brain translates a stream of sensory stimuli into meaningful perception. Rafael Malach received his PhD in physiological optics from UC Berkeley and did his post-doctorate research at MIT. Originally doing research on the organization of neuronal connections in the primate brain, his focus has recently shifted to the study of the human cerebral cortex using fMRI. Professor Malach has begun this research at Massachusetts General Hospital, exploring a new object-related region called the lateral occipital complex. Since then he expanded this research, studying the human visual cortex using a variety of methods, including adaptation paradigms, backward masking, and more recently naturalistic stimuli--all aimed at deciphering the intriguing link between perceptual experience and brain activity
Marshall, G. D. (1970). Attention and will. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (January):14-25.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). Sense, reference and selective attention II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):75–98.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.   (Google)
Abstract: According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important implications regarding the prospects of using attention research to inform us about consciousness. The present essay shows that these lines of research are not successful, and that the commonsense picture of the relationship between attention and consciousness can be
Mole, Christopher (2005). Attention is Cognitive Unison. Dissertation, Princeton University   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention in the absence of consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (2):44.   (Google)
Abstract: A response to Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya's 'Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes'
Morrison, J. F. & David, AS (2005). Now you see it, now you don't: More data at the cognitive level needed before the PAD model can be accepted. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):770-+.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Before a general cognitive model for recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) is accepted, there must be more research into the neuropsychological and cognitive characteristics of the various disorders in which they occur. Currently available data are insufficient to distinguish whether the similar phenomenology of RCVH across different disorders is in fact produced by a single or by multiple cognitive mechanisms
Natsoulas, Thomas (2002). On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: O'Shaughnessy and the mythology of the attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):35-64.   (Google)
Abstract: What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is simultaneously occupied by several experiences. Whereas, according to the first conception, emotion is a feature of a temporal segment of the stream of consciousness and colors through and through each consciousness state that instantiates it, the second conception considers an emotion to be a distinct one of a system of simultaneous experiences that interact with each other, for example, limiting each other?s number and intensity. Among other matters discussed is the two theorists? mutually contrasting conception of how the non-inferential awareness which we have of our states of consciousness is accomplished
Newman, J. B. (1995). Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4:172-93.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (1998). Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Roessler, Johannes (2000). Attention and the self: An appreciation of C.o. Evans' The Subject of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):76-81.   (Google)
Abstract: _The Sub ject of Con scious ness_ is a rich, strik ingly orig i nal and ambi tious work. It makes an impor tant and timely con tri bu tion to cur rent debates on a num ber of issues which over the last few years have been tak ing cen tre stage in the phi los o phy of mind: for exam ple, self-consciousness, selec tive atten tion and the nature of bodily aware ness. What makes this achieve ment some what unusual, and all the more remark able, is that _The Sub ject of Con scious ness_ was pub lished thirty years ago (Evans, 1970). The reviews it received at the time ranged from the hos tile to the deri sory
Roessler, Johannes (1999). Perception, introspection and attention. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1908). Subattentive consciousness and suggestion. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (18):477-483.   (Google | More links)
Ruz, M. (2006). Let the brain explain the mind: The case of attention. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):495-505.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Oversimplified conceptions of cognitive neuroscience regard the goal of this discipline as the localization of previously discovered and validated cognitive processes. Research however is showing how brain data goes far beyond this translation role, as it can be used to help in explaining human cognition. Knowing about the brain is useful in building and redefining taxonomies of the mind and also in describing the mechanisms by which cognitive phenomena proceed. The present paper takes the cognitive system of attention as a model research field to exemplify how biological knowledge can be used to advance the psychological theories explaining mental phenomena
Smith, W. G. (1895). The relation of attention to memory. Mind 4 (13):47-73.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Titchener, Edward Bradford (1910). Attention as sensory clearness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (7):180-182.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Ward, Lawrence M.; Doesburg, Sam M.; Kitajo, Keiichi; MacLean, Shannon E. & Roggeveen, Alexa B. (2006). Neural synchrony in stochastic resonance, attention, and consciousness. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 60 (4):319-326.   (Google)
White, Alan R. (1964). Attention. Oxford: Blackwell.   (Google)
Wu, Wayne (forthcoming). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes what it is like to consciously attend to an object. In fact conscious attention is more complicated. In what follows, I argue that the phenomenology of conscious attention to what is perceived involves not just a way of perceptually locking on to a specific object. It necessarily involves a way of cognitively locking on to it as well.

5.1a.2 Attention, Misc

Mole, Christopher (2005). Review of Naomi Eilan, christop hoerlh, Teresa McCormack, Johannes Roessler (eds), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds -- Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).   (Google)

5.1a.3 The Nature of Attention

Chrisley, Ron & Parthemore, J. (2007). Synthetic phenomenology:Exploiting embodiment to specify the non-conceptual content of visual experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: 'synthetic phenomenology'. Explanations involving specific experiential events require a means of specifying the contents of experience; not all of them can be specified linguistically. One alternative, at least for the case of visual experience, is to use depictions that either evoke or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation of depictions through the use of an embodied, perceiving and acting agent, either virtual or real. Synthetic phenomenology, then, is the attempt to use the states, interactions and capacities of an artificial agent for the purpose of specifying the contents of conscious experience. This paper takes the first steps toward seeing how one might use a robot to specify the non- conceptual content of the visual experience of an (hypothetical) organism that the robot models
Mole, Christopher (2005). Attention is Cognitive Unison. Dissertation, Princeton University   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wu, Wayne (forthcoming). Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive Control. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that when perception, indeed perceptual attention, plays a guiding role in intentional bodily action, it is a necessary part or constituent of that action. The argument begins with a challenge that necessarily arises for embodied agents, what I call the Many-Many Problem: in the context of action, agents face too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. Action requires that the Many-Many Problem be solved by reducing the many-many set of options to a specific mapping between target and response. Throughout the execution of action, the agent must continue to perceptually select, and hence attend to, relevant information so as to guide the execution of specific movements. Since perceptual attention is a necessary part of solving the Many-Many Problem, it is a necessary part of action. Indeed, the whole of the process of implementing a solution to the Many-Many Problem, as constrained by the agent’s motivational state, just is the agent’s acting in a bodily way.

5.1b Belief

Ackermann, Robert John (1972). Belief and Knowledge. Garden City, N.Y.,Anchor Books.   (Google)
Allison, Jay & Gediman, Dan (eds.) (2008). This I Believe Ii: More Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. Henry Holt.   (Google)
Abstract: A new collection of inspiring personal philosophies from another noteworthy group of people This second collection of This I Believe essays gathers seventyfive essayists—ranging from famous to previously unknown—completing the thought that begins the book’s title. With contributors who run the gamut from cellist Yo-Yo Ma to ordinary folks like a diner waitress, an Iraq War veteran, a farmer, a new husband, and many others, This I Believe II , like the first New York Times bestselling collection, showcases moving and irresistible essays. Included are Sister Helen Prejean writing about learning what she truly believes through watching her own actions, singer Jimmie Dale Gilmore writing about a hard-won wisdom based on being generous to others, and Robert Fulghum writing about dancing all the dances for as long as he can. Readers will also find wonderful and surprising essays about forgiveness, personal integrity, and honoring life and change. Here is a welcome, stirring, and provocative communion with the minds and hearts of a diverse, new group of people—whose beliefs and the remarkably varied ways in which they choose to express them reveal the American spirit at its best
Almaas, A. H. (1986). The Void: A Psychodynamic Investigation of the Relationship Between Mind and Space. Almaas Publications.   (Google)
Audi, Robert (1972). The concept of 'believing'. Personalist 53:43-52.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2003). Belief ascription and the illusion of depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.   (Google)
Beckerman, A. (2001). The real reason for the standard view. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Lynne Baker, there are three main arguments for the
Bogdan, R. (ed.) (1986). Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: Some of the topics presented in this volume of original essays on contemporary approaches to belief include the problem of misrepresentation and false belief, conscious versus unconscious belief, explicit versus tacit belief, and the durable versus ephemeral question of the nature of belief. The contributors, Fred Dretske, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Stephen Schiffer, Stephen P. Stich, and the editor, Radu Bogdan, focus on the mental realization of belief, its cognitive and behavioral aspects, and the semantic aspects of its content. This interdisciplinary study takes advantage of many new theories in what has become an important area of research
Bogdan, Radu J. (1986). The manufacture of belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Borhek, James T. (1983). A Sociology of Belief. R.E. Krieger Pub. Co..   (Google)
Botwinick, Aryeh (1997). Skepticism, Belief, and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bovens, Luc (1999). Do beliefs supervene on degrees of confidence? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Google)
Brown, Curtis (1992). Direct and indirect belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Caporale, Rocco & Grumelli, Antonio (eds.) (1971). The Culture of Unbelief. Berkeley,University of California Press.   (Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1996). Does belief exist? In A. Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Collins, Arthur W. (1979). Could our beliefs be representations in our brains? Journal of Philosophy 76 (May):225-243.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
D'Arcy, Martin Cyril (1976). The Nature of Belief. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Davies, Martin (2001). Explicit and implicit knowledge: Philosophical aspects. In N.J. Smelser & P.B Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd.   (Google)
Abstract: from the fact that the subject reacts faster to those words than to words that were not on the list. The subject
Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Beyond belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Ellis, B. D. (1979). Rational Belief Systems. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Engel, Pascal (1998). Believing, accepting, and holding true. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Evans, G. R. (2006). Belief: A Short History for Today. I.B. Tauris.   (Google)
Abstract: What is reasonable? -- Godness -- God's in his heaven; all's right with the world -- A high-risk strategy -- Repair -- A nice place to be -- Is there a future for 'me'? -- Heavenly community.
Frankish, Keith (1998). A matter of opinion. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett
Garfield, Jay L. (1988). Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gilbert, M. (2002). Belief and acceptance as features of groups. Protosociology 16:35-69.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Ginsberg, Mitchell (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Google)
Gupta, Sen & Chandra, Santosh (1971). Belief, Faith, and Knowledge. Santiniketan,Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati.   (Google)
Guttenplan, Samuel D. (1994). Belief, knowledge, and the origins of content. Dialectica 48 (3-4):287-305.   (Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (2004). On the ontology of belief. In Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. _The project_ Over the last two and a half centuries three main strands of opinion can be discerned in philosophers
Helm, Paul (1994). Belief Policies. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? It is widely accepted that what we believe is determined by evidence, and is therefore not directly under our control; but according to what criteria is the credibility of the evidence established? Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike single beliefs, belief-policies are directly subject to the will, and therefore to the possibility of weakness of will and self-deception. Helm sets out to interpret standard epistemological positions in terms of belief-policies, and to illustrate their operation in the history of philosophy. He establishes connections between belief-policies, responsibility for beliefs, and the desirability of toleration, before reassessing fideism in the light of his argument
Helm, Paul (1973). The Varieties of Belief. New York,Humanities Press.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. & Schechter, Joshua (2007). Hawthorne's lottery puzzle and the nature of belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that practical reasoning has more to do with rational degrees of belief than with states of knowledge.
Žižek, Slavoj (2001). On Belief. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: What happens to our supposedly atheistic, secular beliefs when they meet the internet, consumerism and New Age mysticism? Zizek, the renowned philosopher and cultural critic, shows in his controversial and witty new book that, despite postmodern warnings that belief is groundless, we are secretly believers. From "cyberspace reason" to the paradox of "Western Buddhism," On Belief traces the contours of the often unconscious beliefs that structure our daily experience
James, William (1889). The psychology of belief. Mind 14 (55):321-352.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Jones, Todd (2001). What CBS wants: How groups can have (difficult to uncover) beliefs. Philosophical Forum 32 (3):221-251.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Laird, John (1972). Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion. [Hamden, Conn.]Archon Books.   (Google)
Landesman, Charles (1964). A note on belief. Analysis 24 (April):180-182.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1983). Belief, acceptance, and cognition. In Herman Parret (ed.), On Believing. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1974). Knowledge. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Leon, Mark . (1992). Rationalising belief. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):299-314.   (Google)
Levi, Isaac & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1964). Belief and disposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (July):221-232.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Levi, Isaac (2004). Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals. He compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for "mild contractions." These are formally the same as the "severe withdrawals" considered by Pagnucco and Rott. The rationale, however, is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing and to accounts of conditionals. Mild Contraction will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism
Levi, Isaac (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists
Löffler, Winfried & Weingartner, Paul (eds.) (2004). Knowledge and Belief: Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 3rd to 9th August 2003, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria). Öbv & Hpt.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1986). Tacit belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1991). I believe that "p"'. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Maloney, J. Christopher (1990). It's hard to believe. Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Manfredi, Pat A. (1993). Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Marcus, Rutharcan B. (1990). Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:133-153.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1995). The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs. Dialectica 49 (2-4):113-30.   (Google)
McKinnon, Alastair (1970). Falsification and Belief. The Hague,Mouton.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1994). Individuating beliefs. Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (1998). The grammar of belief. In William J. Rapaport & F. Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Kluwer.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mclean, Murdith (1970). Episodic belief. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):389-396.   (Google | More links)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (1999). Believing and accepting as a group. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Meihers, A. W. M. (ed.) (1999). Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meyering, Theo C. (2001). The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2003). Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):277-95.   (Google)
Mosterin, J. (2002). Acceptance without belief. Manuscrito 25 (2):313-35.   (Google)
Nathan, N. M. L. (2001). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument. Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments against justified and rational belief
Needham, Rodney (1972). Belief, Language, and Experience. Oxford,Blackwell.   (Google)
Nelson, Raymond J. (1978). Objects of occasion beliefs. Synthese 39 (September):105-139.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Newen, Albert (2001). Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Novak, Michael (1965). Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge: With a New Preface. University Press of America.   (Google)
O'Connor, D. J. (1969). Beliefs, dispositions and actions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:1-16.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Paglieri, Fabio (2007). Changing minds: The role of beliefs in cognitive dynamics. Synthese 155 (2):163-166.   (Google | More links)
Parrett, H. (ed.) (1983). On Believing. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Parret, Herman (ed.) (1983). On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. W. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Pendlebury, Michael J. (1982). Indexical reference and the ontology of belief. South African Journal of Philosophy 1:65-74.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Penco, Carlo (2005). Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper gives attention to a special point in Brandom
Perry, John (1996). Rip Van winkle and other characters. European Review of Philosophy 2:13-39.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this essay I first review Kaplan’s theory of linguistic character, and then explain and motivate a concept of doxastic character. I then develop some concepts for dealing with the topic of belief retention and then, finally, discuss Rip Van Winkle. I come down on Kaplan’s side with respect to the Frege-inspired strategy, narrowly construed. But I advocate something like the Frege-inspired strategy, if it is construed more broadly. On my view it is remarkably easy to retain a belief, and I think Evans is quite wrong about Rip and Kaplan. The central concept I develop, however, that of an information game, is in the spirit of much of Evans’ work. I also borrow some of his terminology.
Pieper, Josef (1975). Belief and Faith: A Philosophical Tract. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Prior, A. N. (1971). Objects of Thought. Oxford,Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief
Quine, W. V. (1970). The Web of Belief. New York,Random House.   (Google)
Ramsey, William (1992). Belief and cognitive architecture. Dialogue 31 (1):115-120.   (Google)
Recanati, F. (1997). Can we believe what we do not understand? Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Rigterink, Roger J. (1991). What are beliefs (if they are anything at all)? Metaphilosophy 22 (January-April):101-14.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1990). States and beliefs. Mind 99 (393):33-51.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Are beliefs brain states? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, are brain states. I call this conception of belief
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Practical realism defended: Replies to critics. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Reply to Van Gulick. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):217-221.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1993). What beliefs are not. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Samraj, Tennyson (2001). What is Your Belief Quotient? Monograph Publishers.   (Google)
Sanyal, Manidipa (2006). The Web of Belief. Allied Publishers.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (ms). Acting contrary to our (professed) beliefs.   (Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (online). Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2001). In-between believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Schmitt, Frederick F. (1992). Knowledge and Belief. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the historically dominant epistemology by examining closely the epistemological principles that underlie the treatment of skepticism in Plato, the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics, Descartes and Hume. Schmitt develops a sustained, detailed argument against many forms of internalism in favor of a reliabilist/externalist epistemology. His version of reliabilism, though strictly externalist, accommodates and explains the most durable intuitions alleged to support internalism. Knowledge and Belief assumes no knowledge of epistemology or its history. Readers of philosophy will find this an excellent introduction to ancient and modern epistemology; this systematic study of the internalist and externalist debate is the first of its kind
Schiller, F. C. S. (1924). Problems of Belief. Ams Press.   (Google)
Sesonske, Alexander (1959). On believing. Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):486-492.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sinclair, Neil (2007). Propositional clothing and belief. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342�362.   (Google | More links)
Skokowski, Paul G. (2004). Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to a better grasp of how representational content can be carried by systems without an explicit representation
Sobel, David & Copp, David (2001). Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Speaks, Jeff (2010). Explaining the disquotational principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):pp. 211-238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Questions about the relationship between thought and language, while central to an understanding of the nature of intentionality, are often obscure. I suggest that such questions be framed by asking whether necessary truths which connect mental and linguistic properties are to be explained in terms of the essence of the mental, or of the linguistic, properties. I argue, first, that the disquotational principle, which connects the contents of the beliefs of agents with the meanings of sentences of their language, is such a necessary truth; second, that its necessity requires explanation; third, that it cannot be explained in terms of the `interdependence' of meaning and belief; and fourth, that it cannot be explained in terms of a theory of meaning which takes the meanings of sentences to be inherited from the beliefs with which they are correlated. I conclude by arguing that the view that social facts about public language meaning are part of the story about what it is to have a belief with a given content is more plausible than is usually thought.
Sperber, Dan (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.   (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts
Sperry, Roger W. (1985). The cognitive role of belief: Implications of the new mentalism. Contemporary Philosophy 10 (10).   (Google)
Spohn, Wolfgang (1996). On the objects of belief. In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When I talk about the objects of belief I do not mean, e.g., the sun to which my thought that the sun will rise tomorrow refers; I do not mean the objects we think about. I take objects rather in a general philosophical sense; they simply are the bearers of properties and the relata of relations. I am thus concerned with the objects that are related by the belief relation „_a_ believes that _p_“. In this scheme „ _a _“ represents a person or an epistemic subject; but I am not going to discuss what a person is. „ _p _“ or „that _p _“ represents an object, namely the object of belief; and I am going to discuss what this is. In other words, I am interested in belief contents – to use a less neutral, narrower and equally unclear term
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1970). Facts, Words and Beliefs. New York,Humanities P..   (Google)
Stainton, Robert J. (1999). Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction. Disputatio 6.   (Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1983). Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief. In Stephen P. Stich (ed.), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Google)
Stout, G. F. (1891). Belief. Mind 16 (64):449-469.   (Google | More links)
Suppes, Patrick (2006). Ramsey's psychological theory of belief. In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.   (Google)
Thomson, Allan (ed.) (1993). What I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Twenty-Two New Zealanders. Gp Publications.   (Google)
Todd, William L. (1977). Beliefs, feelings, and actions. Philosophy Research Archives 1173.   (Google)
Toribio, Josefa (2003). Free belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.   (Google | More links)
Toribio, Josefa (2002). Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds. Theoria 68 (3):224-49.   (Google)
Tuomela, Raimo (1990). Can collectives have beliefs? Acta Philosophica Fennica 49:454-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gulick, Robert (1994). Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.   (Google | More links)
Velleman, David (2000). On the aim of belief. In David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics
Voltolini, Alberto (1987). Belief and intentionality. Topoi 6 (September):121-131.   (Google | More links)
Weirich, Paul (2004). Belief and acceptance. In Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wolgast, Elizabeth Hankins (1977). Paradoxes of Knowledge. Cornell University Press.   (Google)

5.1b.1 Belief, Misc

Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits.
Bortolotti, Lisa & Cox, Rochelle (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Intentionality without rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description
Bortolotti, Lisa (2008). What does Fido believe? Think 7 (19):7-15.   (Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A., Acceptance does not entail belief.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: D.S. Clarke has defended the claim that accepting that p entails believing that p. He refers to this thesis as “the entailment thesis.” In this paper I argue that we ought to reject the entailment thesis. Many philosophers have defended the claim that acceptance and belief are different types of mental states, or, at the very least, that there are ways of accepting propositions that are distinct from doxastic acceptance.1 Many would claim that belief and non-doxastic acceptance differ in some or all of the following six ways. First, belief aims at truth, while acceptance aims at utility or success. Second, belief is shaped by evidence; acceptance need not be shaped by evidence. Third, belief is contextindependent insofar as it is not shaped by an agent’s purposes, but acceptance is often context-dependent and shaped by an agent’s purposes. Fourth, belief is subject to an ideal of agglomeration, and acceptance is not regulated by any such ideal. Fifth, belief comes in degrees while acceptance is all or nothing. Finally, belief is not subject to direct voluntary control, while acceptance can be under our direct voluntary control (some holding that acceptance is also a mental action type). Not all of those who claim that there is a real difference between (non-doxastic) acceptance and belief take it that all of six of these are real distinctions between the two types of attitudes. And some take ‘acceptance’ to be a rather broad type that includes attitudes such as assuming, having faith, hypothesizing, imagining, trusting, and believing as ways of accepting propositions
Funkhouser, Eric & Spaulding, Shannon (2009). Imagination and other scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief–desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script . We generalize the script concept to show how things besides imagination can occupy this same role in both pretense and non-pretense actions. The Humean Theory of Motivation should then be modified to cover this script role
Mele, Alfred R. (1986). Incontinent believing. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at odds with his performing the action at issue. More precisely, in intentionally and freely A-ing at t, S performs a full-blown akratic action if and only if, at t, S consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not doing an A at t. What I am after in this paper is an account of a comparable, full-blown variety of incontinent believing, and an explanation of its possibility.
Sandis, Constantine (2008). Jessica brown, anti-individualism and knowledge. Minds and Machines 18 (1).   (Google)
Shaffer, Michael J. (2006). The publicity of belief, epistemic wrongs and moral wrongs. Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide belief cannot be separated from action. It is then also suggested that we should accept a form of W. K. Clifford's evidentialism. When these theses are jointly accepted in conjunction with the basic principle of ethics that it is prima facie wrong to act in such a way that may subject others to serious but unnecessary and avoidable harm, it follows that many beliefs are morally wrong
Shieber, Joseph (2009). Understanding Assertion: Lessons from the False Belief Task. Language & Communication 29 (1):47-60.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper uses recent research in developmental psychology regarding the acquisition of the concept of belief in young children to explore the contrast between a disposition-based account of the principles underlying linguistic communication and the representative and highly influential intention-based accounts of assertional practice advanced by David Lewis and Donald Davidson. Indeed, evidence from recent work in developmental psychology would seem to suggest that disposition-based accounts are not only possible accounts of the acquisition of competence in assertional practice, but are in fact better than their rivals in explaining the way such competence is actually acquired.
Stalnaker, Robert C. (1981). Indexical belief. Synthese 49 (1).   (Google)

5.1b.2 Collective Belief

Gilbert, Margaret (1987). Modelling collective belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group beliefs according to the joint acceptance model are important phenomena whose aetiology and development require investigation. There is an analogous phenomenon of social or group preference, which social choice theory tends to ignore
Gilbert, Margaret P. (1994). Remarks on collective belief. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Abstract:      The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain proposition as a body. This joint commitment puts speakers under an obligation to refrain from speaking in certain ways, and gives hearers a correlative right to such refraining, and hence a basis for offended rebukes
Wray, K. Brad (2001). Collective belief and acceptance. Synthese 129 (3):319-33.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)

5.1b.3 De Re Belief

Bach, Kent (1982). "De re" belief and methodological solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1982). De re belief in action. Philosophical Review 91 (3):363-387.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder & Wald, Jan David (1979). Indexical reference and de re belief. Philosophical Studies 36 (3).   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2005). Indexical propositions and de re belief ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism
Cresswell, Maxwell J. & Stechow, Arnim (1982). De re belief generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4).   (Google)
Cusmariu, Arnold (1977). About Belief De Re. Logique et Analyse 77 (2):138-147.   (Google)
Abstract: I give the following analysis of de re belief: S believes with respect to X that it has the property F =df S believes a proposition which is for S extensionally to the effect that it has the property F. I spell this definition out and defend it against objections by M. Pastin, commenting also on his account of de re belief.
Daly, Chris John (2007). Acquaintance and de re thought. Synthese 156 (1).   (Google)
Eaker, Erin L. (2004). David Kaplan on de re belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):379–395.   (Google | More links)
Pastin, Mark J. (1974). About de re belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):569-575.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (2009). What is de re belief? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Zong, Desheng (forthcoming). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. The Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation. I argue that the belief is unfounded. Briefly: a notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation only if it includes as a constituent psychological properties whose relation with their bearer is one-many or many-one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state (a psychological state with indexical content) and its bearer in which it is first tokened is not a one-many or many-one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one-many or many-one form. Since the Lockean account of personal identity relies on the availability of a notion of psychological continuity featuring indexical psychological states, the conclusion of this paper cast strong doubt on the plausibility of the Lockean theory.

5.1b.4 The Nature of Belief

Adler, Jonathan E. (2002). Akratic believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
Adler, Jonathan E. (1999). The ethics of belief: Off the wrong track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.   (Google | More links)
Audi, Robert (1982). Believing and affirming. Mind 91 (361):115-120.   (Google | More links)
Audi, Robert N. (1994). Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Brown, Curtis (1986). What is a belief state? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within each noninternal psychological state that enters into the explanation of some action or behavior we can locate an ?internal core state? which can assume the causal-explanatory role of the noninternal state."2 In the same vein, Stephen Stich writes that "nonautonomous" states, like belief, are best viewed as "conceptually complex hybrids" made up of an autonomous component together with historical and contextual features.3 John Perry, whose term I have adopted, distinguishes between belief states, which are determined by an individual?s intrinsic properties, and objects of belief, which are not.4 And Daniel Dennett makes use of the same notion when he asks:5
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2004). Acceptance and deciding to believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):173-190.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2005). Can faith be a doxastic venture? Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture that involves pragmatically assuming that God exists
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Doxastic decisions and controlling belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1).   (Google | More links)
Buleandra, Andrei (2009). Doxastic transparency and prescriptivity. Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.   (Google)
Abstract: Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, given his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain
Chan, Timothy (2008). Belief, assertion and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are, in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions
Chan, Timothy (2010). Moore's paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox. Synthese 173 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox
Chien, A. J. (1985). Demonstratives and belief states. Philosophical Studies 47 (2).   (Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 104 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science
Crimmins, Mark (1992). Tacitness and virtual beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). Methodological reflections on belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Cusmariu, Arnold (1982). Translation and Belief. Analysis 42 (1):12-16.   (Google)
Abstract: I present a formally explicit statement of Church's celebrated argument against Carnap's analysis of belief and defend it against well-known objections by W.V.O. Quine, R.M. Martin, and Michael Dummett.
Cusmariu, Arnold (1983). Translation and Belief Again. Analysis 43 (1):23-25.   (Google)
Abstract: In "Translation and Belief" I presented a two-stage version of Church's translation argument against Carnap's analysis of belief. Here I show that the first stage is sufficient to establish a weaker, though no less significant conclusion, if supplemented with the principle that the same thought or idea can be expressed in different languages.
Falvey, Kevin (1999). A natural history of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Frankish, Keith (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists
Frankish, Keith (1998). Natural language and virtual belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). Alief and belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript]
Gendler, Tamar (2009). Alief in action (and reaction). Mind & Language 23 (5):552-585.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content
Gibbard, Allan (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.   (Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Gozzano, Simone (1994). Rationality, folk psychology, and the belief-opinion distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a useful treatment of the paradoxes can be obtained by revising the rationality assumption
Hawthorne, James (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may be just rational degree of confidence above some threshold level that the agent deems sufficient for belief. He finds hints of this view in Locke’s discussion of probability and degrees of assent, so he calls it the Lockean Thesis.1 The Lockean Thesis has important implications for the logic of belief. Most prominently, it implies that even a logically ideal agent whose degrees of confidence satisfy the axioms of probability theory may quite rationally believe each of a large body of propositions that are jointly inconsistent. For example, an agent may legitimately believe that on each given occasion her well-maintained car will start, but nevertheless believe that she will eventually encounter a..
Hendricks, Scott (2006). The frame problem and theories of belief. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief
Holton, Richard (2008). Partial belief, partial intention. Mind 117 (465):27-58.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
Hookway, Christopher (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:75-89.   (Google)
Horst, Steven (1995). Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Folk belief and commonplace belief. Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2007). Is belief an internal state? Philosophical Studies 132 (3):571-580.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1985). Beliefs, dispositions and demonstratives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (June):167-176.   (Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.   (Google | More links)
Moore, Joseph G. (1999). Misdisquotation and substitutivity: When not to infer belief from assent. Mind 108 (430):335-365.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is not always maintained when co-referential names are intersubstituted in belief reports. I argue here that our disquotational practice is sensitive to certain shifts in conversational context, and it is only if we overlook these shifts - if we 'misdisquote' - that we can draw the conclusions Kripke wants to draw from his examples. In the wake of this conclusion, I provide a 'contextualist' treatment of Kripke's puzzle cases. I show how this treatment is motivated by certain norms of rationality, and I defend these norms against an intriguing 'anti-Cartesian' theory of mind. Throughout the paper, I develop the larger implications that my treatment of Kripke's argument has for the semantic theory of names and belief reports, and, more generally, for our picture of the relation between linguistic behaviour and our states of mind
Owens, David J. (2003). Does belief have an aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs
Peacocke, Christopher (1998). Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." Postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," "From Worlds to Situations," and "The Prince and the Phone Booth" are a number of important essays that have been less accessible and that discuss important aspects of Perry's views, referred to as "Critical Referentialism," on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind
Pugmire, David (1972). A doubt about the normative theory of belief. Mind 81 (324):584-586.   (Google | More links)
Railton, Peter (1994). Truth, reason, and the regulation of belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.   (Google | More links)
Rowbottom, Darrell P. (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.   (Google)
Abstract: Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative.
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1991). Dretske on the explanatory role of belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Sandis, Constantine (2008). Jessica brown, anti-individualism and knowledge. Minds and Machines 18 (1).   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it
Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument
Shah, Nishi (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (2006). No Norm needed: On the aim of belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.   (Google)
Abstract: Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (forthcoming). The truth norm and guidance: a reply to Glüer and Wikforss. Mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (2009) argue that any truth norm for belief, linking the correctness of believing p with the truth of p, is bound to be uninformative since applying the norm to determine the correctness of a belief as to whether p, would itself require forming such a belief. I argue that this objection conflates the condition under which the norm deems beliefs correct, with the psychological state an agent must be in to apply the norm. I also show that since the truth norm conflicts with other possible norms that clearly are informative, the truth norm must itself be informative.
Tiffany, E. C. (2001). The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   If mental anomalism is to be interpreted as a thesisunique to psychology, the anomalousness must begrounded in some feature unique to the mental,presumably its rational nature. While the ground forsuch arguments from normativity has been notoriouslyslippery terrain, there are two recently influentialstrategies which make the argument precise. The firstis to deny the possibility of psychophysical bridgelaws because of the different constitutive essences ofmental and physical laws, and the second is to arguethat mental anomalism follows from the uncodifiabilityof rationality. In this paper I argue that bothstrategies fail – the latter because it conflates primafacie and all things considered rationality and theformer because it rests on a false premise, theprinciple of the rational character of belief. Idistinguish four different formulations of thisprinciple and argue that those formulations which areplausible cannot support the argument for mentalanomalism
Tomkow, Terrance (ms). Now, Me.   (Google | More links)
Vahid, Hamid (2006). Aiming at truth: Doxastic vs. epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin by critically examining a number of recent attempts to unpack the metaphor. I shall then proceed to highlight an error that seems to cripple most of these attempts. This involves the confusion between, what I call, doxastic and epistemic goals. Finally, having offered my own positive account of the aim-of-belief thesis, I shall underline its deflationary nature by distinguishing between aiming at truth and hitting that target (truth). I end by comparing the account with certain prominent inflationary theories of the nature of belief
Vahid, Hamid (forthcoming). Rationalizing beliefs: Evidential vs. pragmatic reasons. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truth-conducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by non-epistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant
Wedgwood, Ralph (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires that, if one considers a proposition at all, one should believe it if and only if it is true
Whiting, Daniel (2010). Should I believe the truth? Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-107.   (Google)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2007). The nature of belief. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to behaviour than most contemporary functionalists allow

5.1b.5 Tacit and Dispositional Belief

5.1c Bodily Experience

5.1c.1 Bodily Awareness

Bayne, Tim & Levy, Neil (2005). Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had been transformed for the better by the operation [1]. A second patient was also reported as having been satisfied with his amputation [2]
Berm, (2001). Bodily self-awareness and the will: Reply to power. Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.   (Google | More links)
Bermúdez, José Luis (2005). The phenomenology of bodily awareness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Berm, (2005). The phenomenology of bodily awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boyle, Marjorie O'Rourke (1998). Senses of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity From Michelangelo to Calvin. Brill.   (Google)
Brewer, Bill (1995). Bodily awareness and the self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and The Self. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Abstract: In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of common sense anti-Cartesianism. Progress in this direction depends upon a far more psychologically informed understanding of normal and abnormal bodily awareness than is generally found in philosophical discussions of these issues. In the context of my attempt at some such understanding, I go on to assess the potential of this more direct line of argument
Brugger, Peter (2006). From phantom limb to phantom body: Varieties of extracorporeal awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chen, Cheryl K. (forthcoming). Bodily awareness and immunity to error through misidentification. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: Some first person statements, such as 'I am in pain', are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine whether some physical self-ascriptions are in fact IEM, and—if they are—what role that fact is supposed to play in arguments for the anti-Cartesian claim that self-consciousness is consciousness of oneself as a material object. I will argue that if we accept the assumptions required to show that physical self-ascriptions are IEM, then IEM cannot play the role it needs to play in these anti-Cartesian arguments
Cole, Jonathan; Depraz, Natalie & Gallagher, Shaun (online). Unity and disunity in bodily awareness: Phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Google)
Conway, David A. (1973). Sensations and bodily position: A conclusive argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.   (Google | More links)
de Vignemont, Frederique (2007). Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Bodily self-awareness and object perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):in press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press
Holmes, Nicholas P. & Spence, Charles (2006). Beyond the body schema: Visual, prosthetic, and technological contributions to bodily perception and awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.   (Google)
Abstract: De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.
Legrand, D.; Grünbaum, T. & Krueger, J. (2009). Dimensions of bodily subjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):279-283.   (Google)
Legrand, Dorothée & Ravn, Susanne (2009). Perceiving subjectivity in bodily movement: The case of dancers. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form of reflective access to subjectivity at the bodily level. In particular, we argue that subjectivity is bodily expressed, thereby allowing the experience of the body′s subjectivity directly during perceptual experiences of the body. We use an interweaving of phenomenological explorations and ethnographical methods which allows validating this proposal by considering the experience of body experts (dancers)
Legrand, Doroth (2006). The bodily self: The sensori-motor roots of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is
Lenggenhager, Bigna; Tadi, Tej; Metzinger, Thomas & Blanke, Olaf (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.   (Google)
Lott, Tommy L. (1989). Anscombe on justifying claims to know one's bodily position. Philosophical Investigations 12 (October):293-307.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1995). Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Meeks, Roblin (online). Awareness of the body "from the inside": Identification, ownership, and error.   (Google)
Mizumoto, Masaharu & Ishikawa, Masato (2005). Immunity to error through misidentification and the bodily illusion experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):3-19.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we introduce a paradigm of experiment which, we believe, is of interest both in psychology and philosophy. There the subject wears an HMD (head-mount display), and a camera is set up at the upper corner of the room, in which the subject is. As a result, the subject observes his own body through the HMD. We will mainly focus on the philosophical relevance of this experiment, especially to the thesis of so-called 'immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun'. We will argue that one experiment conducted in this setting, which we call the bodily illusion experiment, provides a counterexample to that thesis
Montero, Barbara (2010). Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled movement? Inquiry 53 (2):105 – 122.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere with well-developed rote skills, like climbing stairs, I suggest that it is typically not detrimental to the skills of expert athletes, performing artists, and other individuals who endeavor to achieve excellence. Along the way, I present a critical analysis of some philosophical theories and behavioral studies on the relationship between attention and bodily movement, an explanation of why attention may be beneficial at the highest level of performance and an error theory that explains why many have thought the contrary. Though tentative, I present my view as a challenge to the widespread starting assumption in research on highly skilled movement that at the pinnacle of skill attention to one's movement is detrimental
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, I. Mind 10 (38):227-244.   (Google | More links)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, II. Mind 10 (39):377-398.   (Google | More links)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, III. Mind 10 (40):512-531.   (Google | More links)
Murray, Craig D. & Gordon, Michael S. (2001). Changes in bodily awareness induced by immersive virtual reality. CyberPsychology and Behavior 4 (3):365-371.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Newstead, Anne (2006). Evans's anti-cartesian argument: A critical evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract This paper evaluates the anti-Cartesian argument given by Evans in chapter seven of The Varieties of Reference. It focuses on Evans’ claim that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to errors of misidentification. However, Evans’s argument suffers from a crucial ambiguity. Once disambiguated, it turns out that Evans’s argument either begs the question against the Cartesian or fails to be plausible. Nonetheless, the argument is important for drawing our attention to the idea that bodily modes of awareness should be taken seriously as possible forms of self-awareness.
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1998). Proprioception and the body image. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links)
Reynaert, Peter (2006). What is it like to be embodied, naturalizing bodily self-awareness? In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume LXXXIX: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos, Book Two. Dordrecht: Springer.   (Google)
Ring, Merrill (1982). Sensations and kinaesthetic knowledge. Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2010). Consciousness, the self and bodily location. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (2008). Reply to Tsakiris and Fotopoulou "Is my body the sum of online and offline body representations. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1321):1323.   (Google)
Abstract: I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online/offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I advocate in the target article. Third they claim that my model makes a false prediction. I agree with the first two lines of criticism. As to the first I will clarify and tone down the claims made about the role of the sense of embodiment in self recognition tasks. However, I will argue that the sense of embodiment is measured in van den Bos and Jeannerod’s study. I strongly welcome the second line of criticism Tsakiris and Fotopoulou offer. I will add some reasons to agree that the ‘serial construction’ account of the relationship between online and offline representations cannot be true. I maintain, however, that this does not affect the central thesis of target article, namely that it is an offline representation of the body that underlies the sense of embodiment. Finally, I will defend the model by arguing that it does not make the false prediction Tsakiris and Fotopoulou attribute to it.
Montgomery, E. (1885). Space and Touch (i). Mind 10 (38):227-44.   (Google)
Smith, Joel (2006). Bodily awareness, imagination, and the self. European Journal Of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title
Carruthers, Glenn (2008). Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.

5.1c.2 Bodily Experience, Misc

Declerck, Gunnar & Gapenne, Olivier (2009). Actuality and possibility: On the complementarity of two registers in the bodily constitution of experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of possibility , and not merely that of actuality , for an inquiry into the bodily constitution of experience. The paper will study how the possibilities of action that may (or may not) be available to the subject help to shape the meaning attributed to perceived objects and to the situation occupied by the subject within her environment. This view will be supported by reference to empirical evidence provided by recent and current research on the perceptual estimation of distances and the effects brought about by the use of a tool on the organisation of our perceived immediate space
de Vignemont, Frederique (2005). Body Mereology. In G. Knoblich, I. M. Thornton, M. Grosjean & M. Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Nancy, Jean-Luc (2008). Corpus. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Protevi, John (ms). Continuum companion to continental philosophy philosophy of consciousness and the body.   (Google)
Abstract: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE FIELD. Because 'consciousness and the body' is central to so many philosophical endeavors, I cannot provide a comprehensive survey of recent work. So we must begin by limiting the scope of our inquiry. First, we will concentrate on work done in English or translated into English, simply to ensure ease of access to the texts under examination. Second, we will concentrate on work done in the last 15 years or so, since the early 1990s. Third, we will concentrate on those philosophers who treat both consciousness and the body together. Thus we will not treat philosophers who look at body representations in culture, nor philosophers who examine socio-political bodily practices with minimal or no reference to consciousness. Finally, even with the philosophers we choose to treat, we cannot be comprehensive and will instead make representative choices among their works. With that being said, we will have a fairly liberal definition of continental philosophy, operationally defined as that which makes (non-exclusive) reference to the classic phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Thus we will include the radical..
Rosenfield, Israel (2000). Consciousness and subjectivity: Memory, language and the "body image". Intellectica 31:111-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Montgomery, E. (1885). Space and Touch (i). Mind 10 (38):227-44.   (Google)
Shusterman, Richard (2008). Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Contemporary culture increasingly suffers from problems of attention, over-stimulation, and stress, and a variety of personal and social discontents generated by deceptive body images. This book argues that improved body consciousness can relieve these problems and enhance one’s knowledge, performance, and pleasure. The body is our basic medium of perception and action, but focused attention to its feelings and movements has long been criticized as a damaging distraction that also ethically corrupts through self-absorption. In Body Consciousness, Richard Shusterman refutes such charges by engaging the most influential twentieth-century somatic philosophers and incorporating insights from both Western and Asian disciplines of body-mind awareness
Todes, Samuel (1990). The Human Body as Material Subject of the World. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Waldenfels, Bernhard (2004). Bodily experience between selfhood and otherness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   In opposition to traditional forms of dualism and monism, the author holds that our bodily self includes certain aspects of otherness. This is shown concerning the phenomenological issues of intentionality, of self-awareness and of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing the dimension of pathos. We are affected by what happens to us before being able to respond to it by acts or actions. Every sense, myself and others are born out of pathos. The original alienness of our own body, including neurological processes, creates shifting degrees of nearness and remoteness, and allows for pathological deviations such as depersonalisation, paranoia or trauma. Such a phenomenology of body crosses the borderlines of different disciplines
Welton, Donn (ed.) (1998). Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Blackwell Publishers.   (Google)
Welton, Donn (ed.) (1999). The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Blackwell.   (Google)

5.1c.3 Bodily Sensations

Armstrong, David M. (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1964). Vesey on bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Representationism1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say 'seem' because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye's (2004) heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference
Combes, Richard (1991). Disembodying 'bodily' sensations. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 107:107-131.   (Google)
Conway, David A. (1973). Sensations and bodily position: A conclusive argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.   (Google | More links)
de Vignemont, Frederique (2007). Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
Hyman, John (2006). Reply to Wyller. Philosophy 81 (317):531-534.   (Google | More links)
Ring, Merrill (1982). Sensations and kinaesthetic knowledge. Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485.   (Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1964). Armstrong on bodily sensations. Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1964). Bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):232-247.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1967). Margolis on the location of bodily sensations. Analysis 27 (April):174-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1961). The location of bodily sensations. Mind 70 (January):25-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

5.1d Desire

Arlo-Costa, Horacio; Collins, John M. & Levi, Isaac (1995). Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.   (Google)
Bratman, Michael E. (2003). A desire of one's own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the hierarchical model. Indeed, it seems that, normally, if an agent's relevant higher-order attitudes are not to some extent shaped by her evaluative reflections and judgments her agency will be flawed. But this suggests a Platonic challenge to the hierarchical account of ownership. The challenge is to explain why we should not see such evaluative judgments---rather than broadly Frankfurtian higher-order attitudes---as the fundamental basis of ownership or rejection of desire. I do think that a systematic absence of connection between higher-order Frankfurtian attitude and evaluative judgment would be a breakdown in proper functioning. But I want to explain how we can grant this point and still block the Platonic challenge.
Bratman, Michael E. (1990). Dretske's desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):795-800.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bricke, John (2000). Desires, passions, and evaluations. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):59-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (2006). Desire, reward, feeling: Commentary on Schroeder's Three Faces of Desire. Dialogue 45 (1):157-164.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1992). The physiology of desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (1):69-88.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Chan, David K. (2004). Are there extrinsic desires? Noûs 38 (2):326-50.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cheney, J. E. (1978). The intentionality of desire and the intentions of people. Mind 87 (October):517-532.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Collins, D. (1988). Belief, desire, and revision. Mind 97 (July):333-42.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Davis, Wayne A. (1986). Two senses of desire. In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Daveney, T. F. (1961). Wanting. Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):135-144.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
De Sousa, Ronald (2006). Dust, ashes, and vice: On Tim Schroeder's theory of desire. Dialogue 45 (1):139-150.   (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1966). Ziring ziderata. Mind 75 (April):211-223.   (Google | More links)
Dwyer, Daniel (2006). A phenomenology of cognitive desire. Idealistic Studies 36 (1):47-60.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1984). Necessity and desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):1-13.   (Google | More links)
Framarin, Christopher G. (2006). The desire you are required to get rid of: A functionalist analysis of desire in the bhagavadgita. Philosophy East and West 56 (4):604-+.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: : Nisk?makarma is generally understood nonliterally as action done without desire of a certain sort. It is argued here that all desires are prohibited by nisk?makarma. Two objections are considered: (1) desire is a necessary condition of action, and (2) the Indian tradition as a whole accepts desire as a necessary condition of action. A distinction is drawn here between a goal and a desire, and it is argued that goals
Fuery, P. (1995). Theories of Desire. Melbourne University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Gert, Joshua (2005). Breaking the law of desire. Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers one formal reason why it may often be inappropriate to hold, of two conflicting desires, that the first must be weaker than, stronger than, or of the same strength as the second. The explanation of this fact does not rely on vagueness or epistemological problems in determining the strengths of desires. Nor does it make use of the problematic notion of incommensurability. Rather, the suggestion is that the motivational capacities of many desires might best be characterized by two values, neither of which should be interpreted as strength
Graff, Delia (2003). Desires, scope, and tense. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):141-163.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to discuss a certain argument for the claim that de?nite descriptions are ambiguous between a Russellian quanti?cational interpretation and a predicational interpretation.1 The argument is found in James McCawley
Hajek, A. & Pettit, Philip (2004). Desire beyond belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (ms). Comments on Timothy Schroeder's Three Faces of Desire.   (Google)
Abstract: Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912
Hoffman, Christopher A. (1993). Desires and the desirable. Philosophical Forum 25 (1):19-32.   (Google)
Hubin, Donald C. (2003). Desires, whims, and values. Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that anagent''s reasons for acting are grounded in theagent''s desires. Numerous objections have beenleveled against this view, but the mostcompelling concerns the problem of ``aliendesires''''
Hulse, Donovan; Read, Cynthia & Schroeder, Timothy (2004). The impossibility of conscious desire. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):73-80.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Humberstone, I. L. (1987). Wanting as believing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):49-62.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Humberstone, I. L. (1990). Wanting, getting, having. Philosophical Papers 99 (August):99-118.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kvart, Igal (1986). Beliefs and believing. Theoria 52:129-45.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Larson, E. (1994). Needs versus desires. Dialogue 37 (1):1-10.   (Google)
Latham, Noa (2006). Three compatible theories of desire. Dialogue 45 (1):131-138.   (Google)
Lewis, David (1988). Desire as belief. Mind 97 (418):323-32.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1996). Desire as belief II. Mind 105 (418):303-13.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Lumer, Christoph (1997). The content of originally intrinsic desires and of intrinsic motivation. Acta Analytica 18 (18):107-121.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marks, Joel (1982). A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):227-42.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Marks, J. (1986). On the need for theory of desire. In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent.   (Google)
Marks, Joel (ed.) (1986). The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting. Transaction Publishers.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Collection of original essays on the theory of desire by Robert Audi, Annette Baier, Wayne Davis, Ronald de Sousa, Robert Gordon, O.H. Green, Joel Marks, Dennis Stampe, Mitchell Staude, Michael Stocker, and C.C.W. Taylor.
McDaniel, Kris & Bradley, Ben (2008). Desires. Mind 117 (466).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional desire. From the failures of those attempts, we draw a moral that leads us to the correct account of conditional desires. We then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires. It emerges that desires do not have the structure that they have been thought to have. We attempt to explain the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desire in light of our account of desire. We show how to use our account to solve Wollheim's paradox of democracy and to save modus ponens. Finally, we extend the account of desire to related phenomena, such as conditional promises, intentions, and commands. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
McInerney, Peter K. (2004). Strength of desire. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):299-310.   (Google)
Meyers, Chris (2005). Wants and desires: A critique of conativist theory of motivation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:357-370.   (Google)
Morillo, Carolyn R. (1992). Reward event systems: Reconceptualizing the explanatory roles of motivation, desire and pleasure. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):7-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: A developing neurobiological/psychological theory of positive motivation gives a key causal role to reward events in the brain which can be directly activated by electrical stimulation (ESB). In its strongest form, this Reward Event Theory (RET) claims that all positive motivation, primary and learned, is functionally dependent on these reward events. Some of the empirical evidence is reviewed which either supports or challenges RET. The paper examines the implications of RET for the concepts of 'motivation', 'desire' and 'reward' or 'pleasure'. It is argued (1) that a 'causal base' as opposed to a functional' concept of motivation has theoretical advantages; (2) that a causal distinction between the focus' and the 'anchor' of desire suggests an ineliminable 'opacity' of desire; and (3) that some affective concept, such as 'pleasure', should play a key role in psychological explanation, distinct from that of motivational (or cognitive) concepts. A concept of 'reward' or 'pleasure' as intrinsically positive affect is defended, and contrasted with the more 'operational' definitions of 'reward' in some of the hypotheses of Roy Wise
Nolan, Daniel (2006). Selfless desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):665–679.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: final version in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2006 73.3: 665-679
Pettit, Philip & Price, Huw (1989). Bare functional desire. Analysis 49 (October):162-69.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Pojman, Louis P. (1985). Believing and willing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (March):37-56.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Price, Huw (1989). Defending desire-as-belief. Mind 98 (January):119-27.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Ross, Peter W. (2002). Explaining motivated desires. Topoi 21 (1-2):199-207.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Roth, Abraham S. (2005). The mysteries of desire: A discussion. Philosophical Studies 123 (3):273-293.   (Google | More links)
Russell, John M. (1984). Desires don't cause actions. Journal of Mind and Behavior 84:1-10.   (Google)
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey & Smith, Michael A. (ms). Desires and beliefs of one's own.   (Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2006). Desire. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):631–639.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Desires move us to action, give us urges, incline us to joy at their satisfaction, and incline us to sorrow at their frustration. Naturalistic work on desire has focused on distinguishing which of these phenomena are part of the nature of desire, and which are merely normal consequences of desiring. Three main answers have been proposed. The first holds that the central necessary fact about desires is that they lead to action. The second makes pleasure the essence of desire. And the third holds that the central necessary fact about desires is that they open us to reward-based learning.
Schueler, G. F. (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all.
Schueler, G. F. (1991). Pro-attitudes and direction of fit. Mind 100 (400):277-81.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Schroeder, Timothy (2006). Precis of Three Faces of Desire. Dialogue 45 (1):125-130.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper distinguishes two conceptions of representation at work in the philosophical literature. On the first, "contentive" conception (found, for example, in Searle and Fodor), something is a representation, roughly, if it has "propositional content". On the second, "indicative" conception (found, for example, in Dretske), representations must not only have content but also have the function of indicating something about the world. Desire is representational on the first view but not on the second. This paper argues that philosophers and psychologists have sometimes conflated these two conceptions, and it examines the consequences of this conflation for the developmental literature on the child's understanding of mind. Specifically, recent research by Gopnik and Perner on the child's understanding of desire is motivated by an argument that equivocates between the two conceptions of representation. Finally, the paper suggests that an examination of when the child understands the possibility of misrepresentation in art would be helpful in charting the child's understanding of indicative representation
Schroeder, Timothy (2006). Reply to critics. Dialogue 45 (1):165-174.   (Google)
Sidgwick, H. (1892). The feeling-tone of desire and aversion. Mind 1 (1):94-101.   (Google | More links)
Silverman, Hugh J. (ed.) (2000). Philosophy and Desire. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophy and Desire , the seventh book in the well-known Continental Philosophy series, examines questions of desire--desire for another person, desire for happiness, desire for knowledge, desire for a better world, desire for the impossible, desire in text, desire in language and desire for desire itself. The theme of desire is explored through readings of contemporary figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Levinas, Irigaray, Barthes, Derrida, and Derrida. A hot, timely topic in philosophy today Expands the contemporary debates
Smythe, Thomas W. (1972). Unconscious desires and the meaning of 'desire'. The Monist 56 (July):413-425.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Stampe, Dennis W. (1994). Desire. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stampe, Dennis W. (1990). Desires as reasons--discussion notes on Fred Dretske's explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):787-793.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Stampe, Dennis W. (1986). Defining desire. In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Stampe, Dennis W. (1987). The authority of desire. Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Teichmann, Roger (1992). Whyte on the individuation of desires. Analysis 52 (2):103-7.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Frankfurt, Harry (1992). The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.   (Google)
Thagard, Paul R. (2006). Desires are not propositional attitudes. Dialogue 45 (1):151-156.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Vadas, Melinda (1984). Affective and nonaffective desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):273-80.   (Google | More links)
Whyte, J. T. (1992). Weak-kneed desires. Analysis 52 (2):107-11.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1982). Desire, intentional content and teleological explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:69-88.   (Google)

5.1d.1 Desire as Belief

Bradley, Richard & List, Christian (2009). Desire-as-belief revisited. Analysis 69 (1).   (Google)
Brown, Curtis (1986). What is a belief state? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within each noninternal psychological state that enters into the explanation of some action or behavior we can locate an ?internal core state? which can assume the causal-explanatory role of the noninternal state."2 In the same vein, Stephen Stich writes that "nonautonomous" states, like belief, are best viewed as "conceptually complex hybrids" made up of an autonomous component together with historical and contextual features.3 John Perry, whose term I have adopted, distinguishes between belief states, which are determined by an individual?s intrinsic properties, and objects of belief, which are not.4 And Daniel Dennett makes use of the same notion when he asks:5
Collins, John, Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference.   (Google)
Abstract: Rationalizations of deliberation often make reference to two kinds of mental state, which we call belief and desire. It is worth asking whether these kinds are necessarily distinct, or whether it might be possible to construe desire as belief of a certain sort — belief, say, about what would be good. An expected value theory formalizes our notions of belief and desire, treating each as a matter of degree. In this context the thesis that desire is belief might amount to the claim that the degree to which an agent desires any proposition A equals the degree to which the agent believes the proposition that A would be good. We shall write this latter proposition ‘A◦’ (pronounced ‘A halo’). The Desire-as-Belief Thesis states, then, that to each proposition A there corresponds another proposition A◦, where the probability of A◦ equals the expected value of A
Hajek, Alan (ms). Desire beyond belief Alan hájek and Philip Pettit.   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis [1988, 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the ‘Desire-as-Belief Thesis’. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis’. We explore ways of being anti- Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory, and on Lewis’ negative results. We then introduce what we call the indexicality loophole: if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent’s mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus we propose a variant of Desire-as-Belief that exploits this loophole. We argue that a number of meta-ethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, we show that with one central sort of evaluative belief — the belief that an option is right — the indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, ‘good’ is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti- Humean can dodge the negative results
Pettit, Philip & Hájek, Alan (2004). Desire beyond belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77 – 92.   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. We then introduce what we call the indexicality loophole: if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent's mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus we propose a variant of Desire-as-Belief that exploits this loophole. We argue that a number of meta-ethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, we show that with one central sort of evaluative belief--the belief that an option is right--the indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, 'good' is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti-Humean can dodge the negative results
Pettit, Philip (ms). Desire beyond belief.   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the `Desire-as- Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. We then introduce what we call the indexicality loophole: if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent's mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus we propose a variant of Desire-as- Belief that exploits this loophole. We argue that a number of meta-ethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, we show that with one central sort of evaluative beliefÐthe belief that an option is rightÐthe indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, `good' is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti-Humean can dodge the negative results

5.1d.2 Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being

Heathwood, Chris (2006). Desire satisfactionism and hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (

5.1d.3 Pleasure and Desire

Morillo, Carolyn R. (1990). The reward event and motivation. Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):169-186.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In philosophy, the textbook case for the discussion of human motivation is the examination (and almost always, the refutation) of psychological egoism. The arguments have become part of the folklore of our tribe, from their inclusion in countless introductory texts. [...] One of my central aims has been to define the issues empirically, so we do not just settle them by definition. Although I am inclined at present to put my bets on the reward-event theory, with its internalism, monism, and causal primacy of satisfaction, I think we are very far from knowing enough to settle these questions concerning motivation, human or otherwise. The winds of science will blow where they may. In the meantime, we can be a bit more circumspect about what we put in our tribal folklore.
Schroeder, Timothy (2010). Desire and pleasure in John Pollock's thinking about acting. Philosophical Studies 148 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical objections that might be raised)
Schroeder, Timothy (2004). Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: To desire something is a condition familiar to everyone. It is uncontroversial that desiring has something to do with motivation, something to do with pleasure, and something to do with reward. Call these "the three faces of desire." The standard philosophical theory at present holds that the motivational face of desire presents its unique essence--to desire a state of affairs is to be disposed to act so as to bring it about. A familiar but less standard account holds the hedonic face of desire to reveal to true nature of desire. In this view, to desire something is to tend to pleasure if it seems that the desired state of affairs has been achieved, or displeasure if it seems otherwise, thus tying desire to feelings instead of actions. In Three Faces of Desire, Schroeder goes beyond actions and feelings to advance a novel and controversial theory of desire that puts the focus on desire's neglected face, reward. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, Three Faces of Desire discusses recent scientific discoveries that tell us much about the way that actions and feelings are produced in the brain. In particular, recent experiments reveal that a distinctive system is responsible for promoting action, on the one hand, and causing feelings of pleasure and displeasure, on the other. This system, the brain's reward system, is the causal origin of both action and feeling, and is the key to understanding the nature of desire

5.1d.4 Theories of Desire, Misc

Schroeder, Timothy (2009). Desire. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire. Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to have been born, preferring mangoes to peaches, craving gin, having world conquest as one's goal, having a purpose in sneaking out to the shed, or being inclined to provoke just for the sake of provocation. These varied states of mind have all been grouped together under the heading of ‘pro attitudes’, but whether the pro attitudes are fundamentally one mental state or many is disputed.
Schroeder, Timothy (2004). Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: To desire something is a condition familiar to everyone. It is uncontroversial that desiring has something to do with motivation, something to do with pleasure, and something to do with reward. Call these "the three faces of desire." The standard philosophical theory at present holds that the motivational face of desire presents its unique essence--to desire a state of affairs is to be disposed to act so as to bring it about. A familiar but less standard account holds the hedonic face of desire to reveal to true nature of desire. In this view, to desire something is to tend to pleasure if it seems that the desired state of affairs has been achieved, or displeasure if it seems otherwise, thus tying desire to feelings instead of actions. In Three Faces of Desire, Schroeder goes beyond actions and feelings to advance a novel and controversial theory of desire that puts the focus on desire's neglected face, reward. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, Three Faces of Desire discusses recent scientific discoveries that tell us much about the way that actions and feelings are produced in the brain. In particular, recent experiments reveal that a distinctive system is responsible for promoting action, on the one hand, and causing feelings of pleasure and displeasure, on the other. This system, the brain's reward system, is the causal origin of both action and feeling, and is the key to understanding the nature of desire

5.1d.5 Desire, Misc

Davis, Wayne A. (1984). A causal theory of intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.   (Google)
Abstract: My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes.
Davis, Wayne A. (1984). The two senses of desire. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.   (Google)
Abstract: It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
May, Joshua (forthcoming). Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson’s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.
Mele, Alfred R. (1990). Irresistible desires. Noûs 24 (3):455-72.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The topic of irresistible desires arises with unsurprising frequency in discussions of free agency and moral responsibility. Actions motivated by such desires are standardly viewed as compelled, and hence unfree. Agents in the grip of irresistible desires are often plausibly exempted from moral blame for intentional deeds in which the desires issue. Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the analysis of irresistible desire. Moreover, a popular analysis is fatally flawed. My aim in this paper is to construct and defend a new analysis of irresistible desire. Although, to render the discussion manageable, I shall keep the issues of freedom and responsibility to one side, readers will see them in the background at every major turn.

5.1e Dreams

Ahmad, M. M. Zuhuruddin[from old catalog] (1936). A Peep Into the Spiritual Unconscious (a Philosophical Attempt to Explain the Phenomenon of Dreams). [Bombay, India Printing Works.   (Google)
Ardito, Rita B. (2000). Dreaming as an active construction of meaning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):907-908.   (Google)
Abstract: Although the work of Revonsuo is commendable for its attempt to use an evolutionary approach to formulate a hypothesis about the adaptive function of dreaming, the conclusions arrived at by this author cannot be fully shared. Particularly questionable is the idea that the specific function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events. I propose here a hypothesis in which the dream can have a different function. [Revonsuo]
Aristotle, , Dreams.   (Google)
Aristotle, , On dreams.   (Google | More links)
Augé, Marc (1999). The War of Dreams: Exercises in Ethno-Fiction. Pluto Press.   (Google)
Babbitt, Susan E. (1996). Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people
Baker, M. J. (1954). Sleeping and waking. Mind 63 (October):539-543.   (Google | More links)
Beenfeldt, Christian (2008). A wake up call—or more sweet slumber? A review of Daniel Dennett's sweet dreams: Philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. Think 7 (19):85-92.   (Google)
Bencivenga, Ermanno (1983). Descartes, dreaming, and professor Wilson. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1).   (Google)
Blagrove, Mark (2000). Dreams have meaning but no function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):910-911.   (Google)
Abstract: Solms shows the cortical basis for why dreams reflect waking concerns and goals, but with deficient volition. I argue the latter relates to Hobson et al.'s process I as well as M. A memory function for REM sleep is possible, but may be irrelevant to dream characteristics, which, contrary to Revonsuo, mirror the range of waking emotions, positive and negative. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Black, Donald (2000). Dreams of pure sociology. Sociological Theory 18 (3):343-367.   (Google | More links)
Blagrove, Mark (1996). Problems with the cognitive psychological modeling of dreaming. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):99-134.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bloom, Harold (1997). Book review: Omens of the millennium: The gnosis of angels, dreams, and resurrection. Philosophy and Literature 21 (2).   (Google)
Bodnar, John (2010). Memory. Bad dreams about the good war : Bataan. In Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair & Brian L. Ott (eds.), Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials. University of Alabama Press.   (Google)
Boland, Lawrence A. (2006). On reviewing machine dreams : Zoomed-in versus zoomed-out. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: continues to receive many reviews. Judging by recent reviews, this is a very controversial book. The question considered here is, how can one fairly review a controversial book—particularly when the book is widely popular and, for a history of economic thought book, a best seller? This essay uses Mirowski’s book as a case study to propose one answer for this question. In the process, it will examine how others seem to have answered this question. Key Words: methodology • reviews • Mirowski • Machine Dreams
Borbély, Alexander A. & Wittmann, Lutz (2000). Sleep, not Rem sleep, is the Royal road to dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):911-912.   (Google)
Abstract: The advent of functional imaging has reinforced the attempts to define dreaming as a sleep state-dependent phenomenon. PET scans revealed major differences between nonREM sleep and REM sleep. However, because dreaming occurs throughout sleep, the common features of the two sleep states, rather than the differences, could help define the prerequisite for the occurrence of dreams. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten (2007). Dreams in buddhism and western aesthetics: Some thoughts on play, style and space. Asian Philosophy 17 (1):65 – 81.   (Google)
Abstract: Several Buddhist schools in India, China and Japan concentrate on the interrelationships between waking and dreaming consciousness. In Eastern philosophy, reality can be seen as a dream and an obscure 'reality beyond' can be considered as real. In spite of the overwhelming Platonic-Aristotelian-Freudian influence existent in Western culture, some Western thinkers and artists - Valéry, Baudelaire, and Schnitzler, for example - have been fascinated by a kind of 'simple presence' contained in dreams. I show that this has consequences for a philosophy of space. According to the authors discussed, the dreamer and the player recognize that human space always means the entire cosmos
Botz–Bornstein, Thorsten (2003). The dream of language: Wittgenstein's concept of dreams in the context of style and lebensform. Philosophical Forum 34 (1):73–89.   (Google | More links)
Botterill, George (2008). The internal problem of dreaming: Detection and epistemic risk. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):139 – 160.   (Google)
Abstract: There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of: Dreams are experiences we have during sleep. Dream-experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences. We can tell that we are awake. (1)-(3) threaten to violate a requirement on discrimination: that we can only tell Xs from Ys if there is some detectable difference between Xs and Ys. Attempts to solve the problem by Descartes and Williams are considered. It is suggested that if we take account of levels of epistemic risk, we can use Descartes's criterion of lack of coherence, at least with hindsight - which is the time when we need to use it
Browne, Alice (1981). Dreams and picture-writing: Some examples of this comparison from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44:90-100.   (Google | More links)
Browne, Alice (1977). Descartes's dreams. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40:256-273.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Robert (1957). Sound sleep and sound scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (May):47-53.   (Google | More links)
Caldwell, Robert L. (1965). Malcolm and the criterion of sleep. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):339-352.   (Google | More links)
Cantwell Smith, Brian (1965). Dreaming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (May):48-57.   (Google)
Carney, Terry; Beaupert, Fleur Aileen; Perry, Julia & Tait, David, Advocacy and participation in mental health cases: Realisable rights or pipe-dreams?   (Google)
Abstract:      This article discusses Australian experiences of mental health clients, legal advocates and other stakeholders in the mental health review system. We review forms of advocacy, the reactions to these, and the contribution lawyers make to protecting rights within this field. Based on our fieldwork we suggest a mixed model of advocacy, one that includes legal representation that goes beyond simple 'following instructions', but also self-advocacy, systemic advocacy and mobilisation of support networks. We suggest that Jan Brakel was right to recently call for a re-conceptualisation of mental health advocacy, and indicate ways this might be achieved
Cartwright, Rosalind (2000). How and why the brain makes dreams: A report card on current research on dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):914-916.   (Google)
Abstract: The target articles in this volume address the three major questions about dreaming that have been most responsible for the delay in progress in this field over the past 25 years. These are: (1) Where in the brain is dreaming produced, given that dream reports can be elicited from sleep stages other than REM? (2) Do dream plots have any intrinsic meaning? (3) Does dreaming serve some specialized function? The answers offered here when added together support a new model of dreaming that is testable, and should revitalize this area of study. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Cavallero, Corrado (2000). Rem sieep = dreaming: The never-ending story. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):916-917.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been widely demonstrated that dreaming occurs throughout human sleep. However, we once again are facing new variants of the equation “REM sleep = Dreaming.” Nielsen proposes a model that assumes covert REM processes in NREM sleep. I argue against this possibility, because dream research has shown that REM sleep is not a necessary condition for dreaming to occur. [Nielson]
Chapman, Peter & Underwood, Geoffrey (2000). Mental states during dreaming and daydreaming: Some methodological loopholes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):917-918.   (Google)
Abstract: Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]
Chappell, Vere C. (1963). The concept of dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (July):193-213.   (Google | More links)
Cheyne, J. A. (2000). Play, dreams, and simulation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):918-919.   (Google)
Abstract: Threat themes are clearly over-represented in dreams. Threat is, however, not the only theme with potential evolutionary significance. Even for hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis, for which threat themes are far commoner than for ordinary dreaming, consistent non-threat themes have been reported. Revonsuo's simulation hypothesis represents an encouraging initiative to develop an evolutionary functional approach to dream-related experiences but it could be broadened to include evolutionarily relevant themes beyond threat. It is also suggested that Revonsuo's evolutionary re-interpretation of dreams might profitably be compared to arguments for, and models of, evolutionary functions of play. [Revonsuo]
Child, William (2007). Dreaming, calculating, thinking: Wittgenstein and anti-realism about the past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.   (Google | More links)
Chihara, C. (1965). What dreams are made of. Theoria 31:145-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Child, William (2009). Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer. Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):329-337.   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections
Chynoweth, Brad (2010). Descartes' resolution of the dreaming doubt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.   (Google)
Abstract: After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty that sensory experience must meet in the Sixth Meditation is lower than it must meet in the First
Clark, Andy (2005). The twisted matrix: Dream, simulation, or hybrid? In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. Oxford University Press New York.   (Google | More links)
Coenen, Anton (2000). The divorce of Rem sleep and dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):922-924.   (Google)
Abstract: The validity of dream recall is discussed. What is the relation between the actual dream and its later reflection? Nielsen proposes differential sleep mentation, which is probably determined by dream accessibility. Solms argues that REM sleep and dreaming are double dissociable states. Dreaming occurs outside REM sleep when cerebral activation is high enough. That various active sleep states correlate with vivid dream reports implies that REM sleep and dreaming are single dissociable states. Vertes & Eastman reject that REM sleep is involved in memory consolidation. Considerable evidence for this was obtained by REM deprivation studies with the dubious water tank technique. [Nielsen; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Combs, Allan; Kahn, David & Krippner, Stanley (2000). Dreaming and the self-organizing brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):4-11.   (Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Curley, Edwin M. (1975). Dreaming and conceptual revision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (August):119-41.   (Google | More links)
Curry, Robert (1974). Films and dreams. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1):83-89.   (Google | More links)
Davenport, Edward (1990). Review essays : Dreams and nightmares technology in 3-d. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1).   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
Desjardins, Sophie & Zadra, Antonio (2006). Is the threat simulation theory threatened by recurrent dreams? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):470-474.   (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (1966). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Analysis 26 (March):129-134.   (Google)
Doricchi, Fabrizio & Violani, Cristiano (2000). Mesolimbic dopamine and the neuropsychology of dreaming: Some caution and reconsiderations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):930-931.   (Google)
Abstract: New findings point to a role for mesolimbic DA circuits in the generation of dreaming. We disagree with Solms about these structures having an exclusive role in generating dreams. We review data suggesting that dreaming can be interrupted at different levels of processing and that anterior-subcortical lesions associated with dream cessation are unlikely to produce selective hypodopaminergic dynamic impairments. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1978). Belief in dreams. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):61-64.   (Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (ed.) (1977). Philosophical Essays on Dreaming. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Singer Jr, Edgar A. (1924). On pain and dreams. Journal of Philosophy 21 (22):589-601.   (Google | More links)
Emmett, Kathleen (1978). Oneiric experiences. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):445-50.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Fawcett, Douglas (1921). Dreams. Mind 30 (117):122-123.   (Google | More links)
Fawcett, Douglas (1921). To the editor of "mind". Dreams. Mind 30 (117).   (Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1995). Deconstructing dreams: The spandrels of sleep. Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):5-27.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Flanagan, Owen (2000). Dreaming is not an adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):936-939.   (Google)
Abstract: The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being different. To establish that some trait of character is an adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story about the fitness enhancing function it served when it evolved and possibly a story of how the maintenance of this function is fitness enhancing now. My aim is to evaluate the proposals put forward in these papers. My conclusion is that although sleep is almost certainly an adaptation, dreaming is not. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Flanagan, Owen J. (2000). Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What, if anything, do dreams tell us about ourselves? What is the relationship between types of sleep and types of dreams? Does dreaming serve any purpose? Or are dreams simply meaningless mental noise--"unmusical fingers wandering over the piano keys"? With expertise in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, Owen Flanagan is uniquely qualified to answer these questions. In this groundbreaking work, he provides both an accessible survey of the latest research on sleep and dreams and a compelling new theory about the nature and function of dreaming. Flanagan argues that while sleep has a clear biological function and adaptive value, dreams are merely side effects, "free riders," irrelevant from an evolutionary point of view. But dreams are hardly unimportant. Flanagan argues that dreams are self-expressive, the result of our need to find or to create meaning, even when we're sleeping. Written with remarkable insight, Dreaming Souls offers a fascinating new way of apprehending one of the oldest mysteries of mental life
Flanagan, Owen J. (1996). Self-expression in sleep: Neuroscience and dreams. In Self-Expressions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fort, Andrew O. (1985). Dreaming in advaita vedānta. Philosophy East and West 35 (4):377-386.   (Google | More links)
Foulkes, D. (1999). Children's Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book, which distills a lifetime of study, Foulkes shows that dreaming as we normally understand it--active stories in which the dreamer is an actor-...
Franzini, Carlo (2000). Sleep, dreaming, and brain activation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):939-940.   (Google)
Abstract: Both Solms and Nielsen acknowledge the difficulty of accounting for the similarities between REM and NREM sleep mentation with a two-generator model, and each link dreams, either explicitly (Solms) or implicitly (Nielsen), to brain activation. At present, however, no data indicate that brain activation can be demonstrated whenever vivid dream reports are obtained. [Nielsen; Solms]
Gallagher, Neil A. (1976). A plea to stop dreaming about dreaming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):423-424.   (Google | More links)
Gezgin, Dr Ulas Basar (ms). On Flanagan's ideas on dreams and ahead: An attempt to locate dreaming phenomenon under the superclass of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, Owen Flanagan’s ideas on dreaming phenomenon are discussed and a thought experiment with four parallel trials is presented as an attempt to locate dreaming phenomenon under the superclass of consciousness
Goguen, J. (2004). Musical qualia, context, time and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Gordijn, Bert (2005). Nanoethics: From utopian dreams and apocalyptic nightmares towards a more balanced view. Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Nanotechnology is a swiftly developing field of technology that is believed to have the potential of great upsides and excessive downsides. In the ethical debate there has been a strong tendency to strongly focus on either the first or the latter. As a consequence ethical assessments of nanotechnology tend to radically diverge. Optimistic visionaries predict truly utopian states of affairs. Pessimistic thinkers present all manner of apocalyptic visions. Whereas the utopian views follow from one-sidedly focusing on the potential benefits of nanotechnology, the apocalyptic perspectives result from giving exclusive attention to possible worst-case scenarios. These radically opposing evaluations hold the risk of conflicts and unwanted backlashes. Furthermore, many of these drastic views are based on simplified and outdated visions of a nanotechnology dominated by self-replicating assemblers and nanomachines. Hence, the present state of the ethical debate on nanotechnology calls for the development of more balanced and better-informed assessments. As a first step in this direction this contribution presents a new method of framing the ethical debate on nanotechnology. Thus, the focus of this paper is on methodology, not on normative analysis
Gottesmann, Claude (2005). Waking hallucinations could correspond to a mild form of dreaming sleep stage hallucinatory activity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):766-767.   (Google)
Abstract: There are strong resemblances between the neurobiological characteristics of hallucinations occurring in the particular case of schizophrenia and the hallucinatory activity observed during the rapid-eye-movement (dreaming) sleep stage: the same prefrontal dorsolateral deactivation; forebrain disconnectivity and disinhibition; sensory deprivation; and acetylcholine, monoamine, and glutamate modifications
Grau, Christopher (2005). Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix. In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore The Matrix. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gregory, Joshua C. (1916). Dreams as psychical explosions. Mind 25 (98):193-205.   (Google | More links)
Greenberg, Ramon (2005). Old wine (most of it) in new bottles: Where are dreams and what is the memory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):72-73.   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss how the work in Walker's article adds to the considerable body of research on dreaming, sleep, and memory that appeared in the early days of modern sleep research. I also consider the issue of REM-independent and REM-dependent kinds of learning. This requires including emotional issues in our discussion, and therefore emphasizes the importance of studying and understanding dreams
Gregory, Joshua C. (1922). Visual images, words and dreams. Mind 31 (123):321-334.   (Google | More links)
Groark, Kevin P. (2010). Willful souls : Dreaming and the dialectics of self-experience among the tzotzil Maya of Highland chiapas, mexico. In Keith M. Murphy & C. Jason Throop (eds.), Toward an Anthropology of the Will. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Gunderson, Keith (2000). The dramaturgy of dreams in pleistocene minds and our own. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):946-947.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]
Hacking, Ian (2001). Dreams in place. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (3):245–260.   (Google | More links)
Hampton, Howard (2007). Born in Flames: Termite Dreams, Dialectical Fairy Tales, and Pop Apocalypses. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Hanson, Robin, Dreams of autarky.   (Google)
Abstract: Genie nanotech, space colonies, Turing-test A.I., a local singularity, crypto credentials, and private law are all dreams of a future where some parts of the world economy and society have an unusually low level of dependence on the rest of the world. But it is the worldwide division of labor that has made us humans rich, and I suspect we won't let it go for a long time to come
Hanfling, Oswald (1998). The reality of dreams. Philosophical Investigations 21 (4):338-344.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Haskell, Robert E. (1986). Cognitive psychology and dream research: Historical, conceptual, and epistemological considerations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:131-159.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hengehold, Laura (2002). “In that sleep of death what dreams...”: Foucault, existential phenomenology, and the Kantian imagination. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Although Foucault's early writings were strongly influenced by the discourse of existential phenomenology, he later considered it an obstacle to a better understanding of social and political power. This essay seeks to understand some of the reasons for his shift, specifically with respect to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Foucault diverges from existential phenomenology according to an alternative tendency within the Kantian inheritance they both share: one which stresses the world-disruptive rather than the unifying or world-disclosive power of transcendental imagination. Examining the role played by dreams and death in Foucault's early introduction to Binswanger's Dream and Existence allows us to situate his later analysis of the historical and political (rather than existential) meaning of death with respect to larger philosophical currents
Herman, John (2000). Reflexive and orienting properties of Rem sleep dreaming and eye movements. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):950-950.   (Google)
Abstract: In this manuscript Hobson et al. propose a model exploring qualitative differences between the three states of consciousness, waking, NREM sleep, and REM sleep, in terms of state-related brain activity. The model consists of three factors, each of which varies along a continuum, creating a three-dimensional space: activation (A), information flow (I), and mode of information processing (M). Hobson has described these factors previously (1990; 1992a). Two of the dimensions, activation and modulation, deal directly with subcortical influences upon cortical structures – the reticular activation system, with regard to the activation dimension and the locus coeruleus and the pontine raphe neuclei, with regard to the modulation dimension. The focus of this review is a further exploration of the interaction between dreaming and the cortical and subcortical structures relevant to REM sleep eye movements. [Hobson et al. ]
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2000). Dream science 2000: A response to commentaries on dreaming and the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1019-1035.   (Google)
Abstract: Definitions of dreaming are not required to map formal features of mental activity onto brain measures. While dreaming occurs during all stages of sleep, intense dreaming is largely confined to REM. Forebrain structures and many neurotransmitters can contribute to sleep and dreaming without negating brainstem and aminergic-cholinergic control mechanisms. Reductionism is essential to science and AIM has considerable heuristic value. Recent findings support sleep's role in learning and memory. Emerging technologies may address long-standing issues in sleep and dream research
Hobson, J. Allan (2002). Sleep and dream suppression following a lateral medullary infarct: A first-person account. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):377-390.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Hodges, Michael P. & Carter, William R. (1969). Nelson on dreaming a pain. Philosophical Studies 20 (April):43-46.   (Google | More links)
Holowchak, Mark (2004). Lucretius on the Gates of horn and ivory: A psychophysical challenge to prophecy by dreams. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Lucretius' Epicurean account of dreams in Book IV of De Rerum Natura indicates that they are wholly void of prophetic significance and of little practical significance. Dreams, rightly apprehended, do little more than mirror our daily preoccupations. For Lucretius, all dreams pass through the gate of ivory and all are reducible to psychophysical phenomena.In this paper, I examine Lucretius' account of sleep and the formation of dreams in light of the Epicurean aims of the poem as a whole. In doing so, I give what I take to be a plausible sketch of the formation of dreams through what I call Lucretius' "selection model" of dreams. The selection model forbids, strictly speaking, the phenomenon of genuine prophecy through dreams, while at the same time it allows for a surprisingly rich psychophysical explanation of the genesis of seemingly prophetic dreams in sleepers. Thus, I argue, a proper grasp of the Lucretian account of oneiric formation is itself a significant part of the Epicurean cure for superstitions and religiously based ills of his day
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). Dreaming as play. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):953-953.   (Google)
Abstract: Dreaming can provide a marvelous opportunity for the “playful” exploration of dramatic events. But the chance to learn to deal with danger is only a small part of it. More important is the chance to discover what it is like to be the subject of strange but humanly significant mental states. [Revonsuo]
Hunt, Harry T. (2000). New multiplicities of dreaming and REMing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):953-955.   (Google)
Abstract: The five authors vary in the degree to which the recent neuroscience of the REM state leads them towards multiple dimensions and forms of dreaming consciousness (Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms) or toward all-explanatory single factor models (Vertes & Eastman, Revonsuo). The view of the REM state as a prolongation of the orientation response to novelty fits best with the former pluralisms but not the latter monisms. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Hunter, J. F. M. (1971). Some questions about dreaming. Mind 80 (January):70-92.   (Google | More links)
Hunter, J. F. M. (1983). The difference between dreaming and being awake. Mind 92 (January):80-93.   (Google | More links)
Infante, Mauricio & Wells, Lloyd A. (2004). Children's dreaming and the development of consciousness. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 43 (12):1519-1520.   (Google | More links)
Jacobs, Arthur M.; Rö, Frank & Sler, (1999). Dondersian dreams in brain-mappers' minds, or, still no cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):293-295.   (Google)
Abstract: Pulvermüller identifies two major flaws of the subtraction method of neuroimaging studies and proposes remedies. We argue that these remedies are themselves flawed and that the cognitive science community badly needs to take initial steps toward a cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers. Such steps could include the development of computational task models that transparently and falsifiably link the input (stimuli) and output (changes in blood flow or brain waves) of neuroimaging studies to changes in information processing activity that is the stuff of cognitive models
Joseph, R. (1988). The right cerebral hemisphere: Emotion, music, visual-spatial skills, body-image, dreams, and awareness. Journal of Clinical Psychology 44:630-673.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Kahn, D.; Pace-Schott, E. & Hobson, J. A. (2002). Emotion and cognition: Feeling and character identification in dreaming. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):34-50.   (Google)
Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain
Kahan, Tracey L. (2000). The “problem” of dreaming in NREM sleep continues to challenge reductionist (two generator) models of dream generation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):956-958.   (Google)
Abstract: The “problem” of dreaming in NREM sleep continues to challenge models that propose a causal relationship between REM mechanisms and the psychological features of dreaming. I suggest that, ultimately, efforts to identify correspondences among multiple levels of analysis will be more productive for dream theory than attempts to reduce dreaming to any one level of analysis. [Hobson et al. ; Nielsen]
Kant, Immanuel (1969). Dreams of a Spirit Seer. New York, Vantage Press.   (Google)
Kantor, Jay (1970). Pinching and dreaming. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2).   (Google)
Rosamond Kent Sprague, (1985). Aristotle on red mirrors (on dreams II 459b24 - 460a23). Phronesis 30 (3):323-325.   (Google)
Khambalia, Amina & Shapiro, Colin M. (2000). A new approach for explaining dreaming and Rem sleep mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):558-559.   (Google)
Abstract: The following review summarizes and examines Mark Solms's article Dreaming and REM Sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms, which argues why the understanding of REM sleep as the physiological equivalent of dreaming needs to be re-analyzed. An analysis of Solms's article demonstrates that he makes a convincing argument against the paradigmatic activation-synthesis model proposed by Hobson and McCarley and provides provocative evidence to support his claim that REM and dreaming are dissociable states. In addition, to situate Solms's findings in concurrent research, other studies are mentioned that are further elucidated by his argument. [Solms]
Kramer, Milton (2000). Dreaming has content and meaning not just form. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):959-961.   (Google)
Abstract: The biological theories of dreaming provide no explanation for the transduction from neuronal discharge to dreaming or waking consciousness. They cannot account for the variability in dream content between individuals or within individuals. Mind-brain isomorphism is poorly supported, as is dreaming's link to REM sleep. Biological theories of dreaming do not provide a function for dreaming nor a meaning for dreams. Evolutionary views of dreaming do not relate dream content to the current concerns of the dreamer and using the nightmare as the paradigm dream minimizes the impact of poor sleep on adaptations. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms]
Kramer, Martin (1962). Malcolm on dreaming. Mind 71 (January):81-86.   (Google | More links)
Krippner, Stanley (2006). Geomagnetic field effects in anomalous dreams and the akashic field. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):103 – 113.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ervin Laszlo has used the ancient concept of the Akashic Records for the basis of his "Akashic Field" (A-field) model, one that has obvious implications for parapsychology, the scientific study of anomalous human-human and human-environment interactions, that is, "psi." Experiments with "telepathic" and "precognitive" dreams are one example of parapsychological research that may fit the A-field model because of its information-carrying potential. Psi appears to be a complex system, one that may reflect the connective "web" posited by the A-field model. In other words, the "universal knowledge" implicit in the old descriptions of the Akashic Records may have a modern-day counterpart
Krieckhaus, E. E. (2000). Papez dreams: Mechanism and phenomenology of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):961-962.   (Google)
Abstract: I agree with Revonsuo that dreaming, particularly about risky scenes, has a great selective advantage. Although the paleoamygdala system generally facilitates stress and alarm, the system which inhibits stress and alarm, initiates bold actions, and mediates learning in risky scenes is the arche, hippocampal system (Papez circuit). Because all thalamic nuclei are inhibited during sleep except arche, Papez probably also dreams in risky scenes. [Revonsuo]
Kuhn, Annette (2002). Dreaming of Fred and Ginger: Cinema and Cultural Memory. New York University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "The main spine of this book stems from a comprehensive series of interviews with subjects recalling their experiences of 1930s cinemagoing. Your feel the breath of life in these spectators, a rarity in film studies, thanks to the painstaking work contracting the interview subjects and recording and tabulating their testimony."- JUMPCUT In the 1930s, Britain had the highest annual per capita cinema attendance in the world, far surpassing ballroom dancing as the nation's favorite pastime. It was, as historian A.J.P. Taylor said, the "essential social habit of the age." And yet, although we know something about the demographics of British cinemagoers, we know almost nothing of their experience of film, how film affected them, how it fit into their daily lives, what role cinema played in the larger culture of the time, and in what ways cinemagoing shaped the generation that came of age in the 1930s. In Dreaming of Fred and Ginger , Annette Kuhn draws upon contemporary publications, extensive interviews with cinemagoers themselves, and readings of selected film, to produce a provocative and perspective-altering ethno-historical study. Taking cinemagoers' accounts of their own experiences as both "the engine and product of investigation," Kuhn enters imaginatively into the world of 1930s cinema culture and analyzes its place in popular memory. Among the topics she examines are the physical space of the cinemas; the role film played in growing up; the experience of being a member of a cinema audience; film-inspired fantasies of American life; the importance of cinema to adolescence in offering role models, ideals of romance, as well as practical opportunities for courtship; and the sheer pleasure of watching such film stars as Fred Astaire, Ginger Rogers, Nelson Eddy, Ronald Colman, and many others. Engagingly written and painstakingly researched, with contributions to film history, cultural studies, and social history, Dreaming of Fred and Ginger offers an illuminating account of a key moment in British cultural memory
LaBerge, Stephen (2000). Lucid dreaming: Evidence and methodology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):962-964.   (Google)
Abstract: Lucid dreaming provides a test case for theories of dreaming. For example, whether or not “loss of self-reflective awareness” is characteristic of dreaming, it is not necessary to dreaming. The fact that lucid dreamers can remember to perform predetermined actions and signal to the laboratory allows them to mark the exact time of particular dream events, allowing experiments to establish precise correlations between physiology and subjective reports, and enabling the methodical testing of hypotheses. [Hobson et al.; Solms]
Ladd, George Trumbull (1892). Contribution to the psychology of visual dreams. Mind 1 (2):299-304.   (Google | More links)
Landesman, Charles (1964). Dreams: Two types of explanation. Philosophical Studies 15 (1-2):17-23.   (Google | More links)
Linsky, Leonard (1962). Illusions and dreams. Mind 71 (July):364-371.   (Google | More links)
Linsky, Leonard (1956). On misremembering dreams. Philosophical Studies 7 (6).   (Google)
Lipson, Morris (1989). Dreams, scepticism, and features of the world. Philosophical Studies 55 (2).   (Google)
Macdonald, Margaret (1953). Sleeping and waking. Mind 62 (April):202-215.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1962). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1957). Dreaming and scepticism: A rejoinder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (December):207-211.   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1961). Professor Ayer on dreaming. Journal of Philosophy 58 (11):294-297.   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1959). Stern's dreaming. Analysis 19 (December):47.   (Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1967). The concept of dreaming. In Harold Morick (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mannison, Don (1977). Believing and dreaming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):76 – 81.   (Google | More links)
Mannison, Donald S. (1975). Dreaming an impossible dream. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (June):663-75.   (Google)
Markie, Peter J. (1981). Dreams and deceivers in meditation one. Philosophical Review 90 (2):185-209.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Adrienne M., Hopes and dreams.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a commonplace in both the popular imagination and the philosophical literature that hope has a special kind of motivational force. This commonplace underwrites the conviction that hope alone is capable of bolstering us in despairinducing circumstances, as well as the strategy of appealing to hope in the political realm. In section 1, I argue that, to the contrary, hope’s motivational essence is not special or unique—it is simply that of an endorsed desire. The commonplace is not entirely mistaken, however, because standard ways of expressing hope do have motivational influence that is different in kind from that of desire. In sections 2 through 4, I examine one of these ways of expressing hope, fantasizing, and argue that fantasies can present us with reasons to modify our goals and projects in multiple ways
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1916). Retentiveness and dreams. Mind 25 (98):206-222.   (Google | More links)
Marsh, Leslie (2005). Review essay: Dennett's sweet dreams philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. Marsh, Leslie (2005) Review Essay.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Review Essay: Dennett’s Sweet Dreams Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness
Marshall, James D. (2008). Wittgenstein, Freud, dreaming and education: Psychoanalytic explanation as 'une façon de parler'. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):606-620.   (Google)
Abstract: Freud saw the dream as occupying a very important position in his theoretical model. If there were to be problems with his theoretical account of the dream then this would impinge upon proposed therapy and, of course, education as the right balance between the instincts and the institution of culture. Wittgenstein, whilst stating that Freud was interesting and important, raised several issues in relation to psychology/psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular. Why would Wittgenstein have seen Freud as having some important things to say, even though he was sharply critical of Freud's claims to be scientific? The major issues to be considered in this paper are, in Section 1, the scientific status of Freud's work—was it science or was it more like philosophy than science; the analysis of dreams; rationality, and dreams and madness. Section 2 considers Freud and education, including the indignity of Freud's notion of 'the talking cure.' Section 3 considers psychoanalytic explanations not as theory but as a manner of speaking: 'une façon de parler.'
Massing, Jean Michel (1986). Dürer's dreams. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 49:238-244.   (Google | More links)
Matthews, Gareth B. (1981). On being immoral in a dream. Philosophy 56 (January):47-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McCarthy, George E. (2009). Dreams in Exile: Rediscovering Science and Ethics in Nineteenth-Century Social Theory. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: conversing with traditions : ancients and moderns in nineteenth-century practical science -- Aristotle on the constitution of social justice and classical democracy -- Aristotle and classical social theory : social justice and moral economy in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim -- Kant on the critique of reason and science -- Kant and classical social theory : epistemology, logic, and methods in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim -- Conclusion: dreams of classical reason : historical science between existentialism and antiquity.
McGinn, Colin (2005). The Matrix of Dreams. In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. New York: Oxford University Press New York.   (Google)
Mealey, Linda (2000). The illusory function of dreams: Another example of cognitive bias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):971-972.   (Google)
Abstract: Patterns of dream content indicating a predominance of themes relating to threat are likely to reflect biases in dream recall and dream scoring techniques. Even if this pattern is not artifactual, it is yet reflective of threat-related biases in our conscious and nonconscious waking cognition, and is not special to dreams. [Revonsuo]
Metzinger, Thomas & Michelle Windt, Jennifer (2007). Dreams. In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming. Praeger Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: differences between dreaming and waking consciousness as well. In this chapter, we will argue that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of the dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, one must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious experiences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state. Finally, in order to arrive at a more differentiated understanding of dream consciousness, we will contrast our analysis of ordinary dreams with lucid dreams, as well as with the varying degrees of lucidity and cognitive clarity seen in semi-lucid and prelucid dreams
Miller, Tyrus (1996). From city-dreams to the dreaming collective: Walter Benjamin's political dream interpretation. Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: This essay discusses Walter Benjamin's development of 'dream' as a model for understanding 19th- and 20th-century urban culture. Following Bergson and surrealist poetics, Benjamin used 'dream' in the 1920s as an heuristic analogy for investigating child hood memories, kitsch art and literature; during the early 1930s, he also developed it into an historiographic concept for studying 19th- century Parisian culture. Benjamin's interpretative use of the dream cuts across Ricoeur's distinction between the hermeneutics of 'recol lection' and the hermeneutics of 'suspicion'. The political dream analyst seeks to discharge the 'fatal powers' of the ideological dream, while at the same time fostering the experience of waking in which dream elements may recollectively be grasped. Benjamin extends this dialectic of dreaming, interpreting and waking to the relation between historical epochs and the tasks of the materialist historian. Puzzling out the recent past's dreamlike rebuses may serve in the task of a present historical awakening. Key Words: Walter Benjamin • city • dream • hermeneutics • surrealism
Monroe, Will S. (1905). Mental elements of dreams. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (24):650-652.   (Google | More links)
Morgane, Peter J. & Mokler, David J. (2000). Dreams and sleep: Are new schemas revealing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):976-976.   (Google)
Abstract: In this series of articles, several new hypotheses on sleep and dreaming are presented. In each case, we feel the data do not adequately support the hypothesis. In their lengthy discourse, Hobson et al. represent to us the familiar reciprocal interaction model dressed in new clothes, but expanded beyond reasonable testability. Vertes & Eastman have proposed that REM sleep is not involved in memory consolidation. However, we do not find their arguments persuasive in that limited differences in activity in REM and waking do not lend credence to the idea that memory consolidation occurs in one state and not the other. Solms makes an argument that dreams are generated from the dopaminergic forebrain based largely on pathological lesion studies in humans. We recognize that this argument has some intuitive appeal and agree with some of the tenets but we do not feel that the arguments are completely convincing due to the lack of anatomical controls, including symmetry and laterality. On the whole, there are interesting arguments put forward in these target articles but the evidence does not convince us that new vistas are opened. No Holy Grail of sleep here! [Hobson et al.; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Mosley, Jerald (1981). Boardman's dreams and dramas. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (123):158-162.   (Google | More links)
Mullane, Harvey (1983). Defense, dreams and rationality. Synthese 57 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Are some mental activities rational but unconscious? Psychopathological symptoms, it is said, have a sense — they are seen as compromise-formations which express the intentions of agents even though the agents are totally unaware of bringing about such symptoms. Philosophers, who often claim that such a conception is simply contradictory or incoherent, have shed little light on the puzzles and apparent paradoxes that surround the issue. It is argued here that Freud's two models of explanation — the mechanistic and the intentionalistic — each fail to provide a basis for an explanatory account of the phenomenon of unconscious defense. An examination of the problem of dream composition helps explain why Freud's dependence upon rational homunculi is inappropriate and misleading. Finally, an alternative model which depends neither upon Freud's version of mechanism nor upon his lavish anthropormorphism is suggested.Ladies and Gentlemen, — It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of the treament that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense
Nair, Rukmini Bhaya (2010). The nature of narrative : Schemes, genes, memes, dreams, and screams! In Armin W. Geertz & Jeppe Sinding Jensen (eds.), Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative. Equinox Pub. Ltd..   (Google)
Ogilvie, Robert D.; Takeuchi, Tomoka & Murphy, Timothy I. (2000). Expanding Nielsen's Covert Rem model, questioning solms's approach to dreaming and Rem sleep, and reinterpreting the vertes & Eastman view of Rem sleep and memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):981-983.   (Google)
Abstract: Nielsen's covert REM process model explains much of the mentation found in REM and NREM sleep, but stops short of postulating an interaction of waking cognitive processes with the dream mechanisms of REM sleep. It ranks with the Hobson et al. paper as a major theoretical advance. The Solms article does not surmount the ever-present problem of defining dreams in a manner conducive to advancing dream theory. Vertes & Eastman review the REM sleep and learning literature, but make questionable assumptions in doing so. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Olberding, Amy (2008). Dreaming of the Duke of Zhou: Exemplarism and the analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35 (4):625-639.   (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (2002). Dreaming. Inquiry 45 (4):399-432.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of (A) understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, (B) the mental processes responsible for the state, and (C) the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the kinship between dream and consciousness. The dream world (A) proves to be a logically impossible world, limited by nothing more than sheer narratability. The internal world (B) of the dreamer is notable for the limitlessness of the scope allotted to the imagination (exactly taking over the offices of rational function), together with the presence of two important phenomena encountered in waking consciousness: a measure of interiority, and the positing of a world. Finally (C), the dream further replicates consciousness in so far as we seem in dreaming concretely to experience our physical surrounds in the form of perceptual imagining. These properties play their part in enabling the dream to be a seeming-consciousness. At the same time they are such as to necessitate its not being consciousness. It is proposed that in the light of these properties, and those composing the state of consciousness, the dream simply is the imagining of consciousness
Pace, David Paul (1988). As Dreams Are Made On: The Probable Worlds of a New Human Mind as Presaged in Quantum Physics, Information Theory, Modal Philosophy, and Literary Myth. Libra Publishers.   (Google)
Pagel, Jim F. (2004). Drug induced alterations in dreaming: An exploration of the dream data terrain outside activation-synthesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):702-707.   (Google)
Abstract: Two meta-analyses of pharmacological research are presented, demonstrating that psychoactive drugs have consistent effects on EEG and sleep outside of their effects on REM sleep, and demonstrating that drugs other than those affecting sleep neurotransmitter systems and REM sleep can also alter reported nightmare occurrence. These data suggest that the neurobiology data terrain outside activation-synthesis may include sleep and dream electrophysiology, cognitive reports of dreaming, effects of alterations in consciousness on dreaming, immunology and host defense, and clinical therapies for sleep disorders
Pagel, J. F. (2000). Dreaming is not a non-conscious electrophysiologic state. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):984-988.   (Google)
Abstract: There has been no generally accepted cognitive definition of dreaming. An electrophysiologic correlate (REM sleep) has become its defining characteristic. Dreaming and REM sleep are complex states for which the Dreaming + REMs model is over-simplified and limited. The target articles in this BBS special issue present strong evidence for a dissociation between dreaming and REM sleep. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen, Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Pearl, Leon (1970). Is theaetetus dreaming? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1):108-113.   (Google | More links)
Pearson, Michael (1990). Millennial Dreams and Moral Dilemmas: Seventh-Day Adventism and Contemporary Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent and rapid technological developments on many fronts have created in our society some extremely difficult moral predicaments. Previous generations have not had to face the dilemmas posed by, for example, the availability of safe abortions, sperm banks and prostoglandins. They have not had to come to terms with an unchecked exploitation of natural resources heralding imminent ecological crisis, or, worst of all, with the recognition that only in this current generation have people the capacity to destroy themselves and their environment. This book seeks to show how, and why, Seventh-day Adventism has addressed these moral issues, and that the ethical questions arising from these issues are especially relevant to the Adventist church and its development. Dr Pearson looks specifically at the moral decisions Adventists have made in the area of human sexuality, on such issues as contraception, abortion, the role and status of women, divorce and homosexuality, from the beginnings of the movement to 1985. He seeks to put such decision-making in perspective by providing the general social context in which it took place, and shows how Ellen White (whose charismatic leadership held the movement together in its first fifty years) has been a major source of moral authority in the Adventist church - her writings continuing to exercise authority in a contemporary society of turmoil and change. This important book, which conveys something of the general ethos of Adventism, is the first to investigate the ethics of the movement, ans so fill a notable gap in the literature
Pears, David F. (1961). Professor Norman Malcolm: Dreaming. Mind 70 (April):145-163.   (Google | More links)
Perry, E. K. & Piggott, M. A. (2000). Neurotransmitter mechanisms of dreaming: Implication of modulatory systems based on dream intensity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):990-992.   (Google)
Abstract: Based on increasing dream intensity and alterations in neurophysiological activity from waking, through NREM to REM sleep, dreaming appears to correlate with sustained midbrain dopaminergic and basal forebrain cholinergic, in conjunction with decreasing brainstem 5-HT and noradrenergic neuronal activities. This, model, with features in common with the modulatory transmitter models of Hobson et al. and Solms, is consistent with some clinical observations on drug induced alterations in dreaming and transmitter correlates of delusions. [Hobson et al.; Solms]
Prasad, Chakravarthi Ram (1993). Dreams and reality: The śaṅkarite critique of vijñānavada. Philosophy East and West 43 (3):405-455.   (Google | More links)
Anthony Preus, (1968). On dreams 2, 459b24-460a33, and Aristotle's. Phronesis 13 (s 1-2):175-182.   (Google)
Abstract: Block's hypothesis concerning the order of Aristotle's psychological writings can be defended against a criticism which arises from Lulofs' interpretation of Insomn. 2, 459b24-460a33. Such a defence results in the discovery of possible purely physiological senses of words heretofore thought essentially psychological
Pritchard, Duncan (2001). Scepticism and dreaming. Philosophia 28 (1-4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I claim that even on the supposition that Wright has indeed succeeded in setting-up such an argument, he nevertheless fails to follow-through with an adequate response. A diagnosis of the failure of Wright’s approach is then given in the context of the wider sceptical debate
Putnam, Hilary (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar'. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: First Series. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti & Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams: The bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):3-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti & Valli, Katja (2000). Dreaming and consciousness: Testing the threat simulation theory of the function of dreaming. Psyche 6 (8).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (2001). Dreaming and the place of consciousness in nature. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1000-1001.   (Google)
Abstract: The research program defended by O'Regan & Noë (O&N) cannot give any plausible explanation for the fact that during REM-sleep the brain regularly generates subjective experiences (dreams) where visual phenomenology is especially prominent. This internal experience is almost invariably organized in the form of “being-in-the-world.” Dreaming presents a serious unaccountable anomaly for the sensorimotor research program and reveals that some of its fundamental assumptions about the nature of consciousness are questionable
Revonsuo, Antti (2000). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.   (Google)
Abstract: Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is consistently and powerfully modulated by certain types of waking experiences. On the basis of this evidence, I put forward the hypothesis that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events, and to rehearse threat perception and threat avoidance. To evaluate this hypothesis, we need to consider the original evolutionary context of dreaming and the possible traces it has left in the dream content of the present human population. In the ancestral environment human life was short and full of threats. Any behavioral advantage in dealing with highly dangerous events would have increased the probability of reproductive success. A dream-production mechanism that tends to select threatening waking events and simulate them over and over again in various combinations would have been valuable for the development and maintenance of threat-avoidance skills. Empirical evidence from normative dream content, children's dreams, recurrent dreams, nightmares, post traumatic dreams, and the dreams of hunter-gatherers indicates that our dream-production mechanisms are in fact specialized in the simulation of threatening events, and thus provides support to the threat simulation hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Key Words: dream content; dream function; evolution of consciousness; evolutionary psychology; fear; implicit learning; nightmares; rehearsal; REM; sleep; threat perception
Rignano, Eugenio (1920). A new theory of sleep and dreams. Mind 29 (115):313-322.   (Google | More links)
Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (35):142-151.   (Google | More links)
Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and Scepticism--II. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (36):231-243.   (Google | More links)
Rogers, Mary F. (1992). Teaching, theorizing, storytelling: Postmodern rhetoric and modern dreams. Sociological Theory 10 (2):231-240.   (Google | More links)
Rossi, Ernest Lawrence (2004). Art, beauty and truth: The psychosocial genomics of consciousness, dreams, and brain growth in psychotherapy and mind-body healing. Annals of the American Psychotherapy Assn 7 (3):10-17.   (Google)
Salzarulo, Piero (2000). Time course of dreaming and sleep organization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1000-1000.   (Google)
Abstract: The complexity and mysteriousness of mental processes during sleep rule out thinking only in term of generators. How could we know exactly what mental sleep experience (MSE) is produced and when? To refer to REM versus NREM as separate time windows for MSE seems insufficient. We propose that in each cycle NREM and REM interact to allow mentation to reach a certain degree of complexity and consolidation in memory. Each successive cycle within a sleep episode should contribute to these processes with a different weight according to the time of night and distance from sleep onset. This view would avoid assuming too great a separation between REM and NREM functions and attributing psychological functions only to a single state. [Nielsen]
Sarma, R. Naga Raja (1929). Ethical values in dreams: Light from upanishadic sources. International Journal of Ethics 40 (1):56-72.   (Google | More links)
Schroeder, Severin (2000). Dreams and grammar: Reply to Hanfling. Philosophical Investigations 23 (1):70–72.   (Google | More links)
Schredl, M. & Doll, E. (1998). Emotions in diary dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):634-646.   (Google)
Abstract: Even though various investigations found a preponderance of negative emotions in dreams, the conclusion that human dream life is, in general, negatively toned is limited by several methodological issues. The present study made use of three different approaches to measure dream emotions: dream intensity rated by the dreamer, intensity rated by a judge, and scoring of explicitly mentioned emotions (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). Results indicate that only in the case of external raters' estimates do negative emotions outweigh the positive ones; but in the case of self-ratings (i.e., those made by the dreamer himself/herself), the ratio was balanced. Analyses showed that this is mainly due to the underestimation of positive emotions in the external ratings. Additionally, a positive correlation was found between the intensity of dream emotions and dream recall frequency, whereas gender differences were nonsignificant as regards the emotional tone of diary dreams
Schwarz, Astrid E. (2009). Green dreams of reason. Green nanotechnology between visions of excess and control. Nanoethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Nanotechnology has recently been identified with principles of sustainability and with a ‘green’ agenda generally . Some maintain that this green dream of nanotechnology is a rather ephemeral societal phenomenon that owes its existence to the campaign ploys of politics and business. This paper argues that deeper lying societal and cognitive structures are at work here that complement or even substantiate in some sense the seemingly manipulative saying of a greening of nanotechnologies. Taking seriously the concept of ‘green nano’, this paper examines the common ground between sustainability discourse and the discourse of nanotechnology. Green nanotechnology is understood as a boundary concept in which disparate discourses and concepts join together. The primary concern of the paper is to show that nanodiscourse and ecodiscourse share visions of control and of excess. Both ecotechnology and nanotechnology accept and incorporate arguments about limited growth, and each develops strategies of control—be it through a new-found precision in the control of material flows or through greater efficiency in product design
Schredl, Michael (2006). Repression and dreaming: An open empirical question. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):531-532.   (Google)
Abstract: From the perspective of modern dream research, Freud's hypotheses regarding repression and dreaming are difficult to evaluate. Several studies indicate that it is possible to study these topics empirically, but it needs a lot more empirical evidence, at least in the area of dream research, before arriving at a unified theory of repression
Schredl, Michael (2005). Rem sleep, dreaming, and procedural memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):80-81.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary the “incredibly robust” evidence for the relationship between sleep and procedural memory is questioned; inconsistencies in the existing data are pointed out. In addition, some suggestions about extending research are made, for example, studying REM sleep augmentation or memory consolidation in patients with sleep disorders. Last, the possibility of a relationship between dreaming and memory processes is discussed
Schroeder, S. (1997). The concept of dreaming: On three theses by Malcolm. Philosophical Investigations 20 (1):15-38.   (Google | More links)
Schonhammer, Rainer (2005). 'Typical dreams' reflections of arousal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (s 4-5):18-37.   (Google)
Abstract: Dreams of chase or pursuit, falling, sex, flying, nudity, failing an examination, one's own and other's death, fire, teeth falling out and some other themes experienced, even if only rarely, by many people all over the world have been labelled 'typical dreams'. This essay argues that typical dreaming, rather a syndrome of themes than monothematic, reflects an extraordinary state of mind and brain. Odd and particularly memorable perceptions, as well as emerging awareness of sleep and dreaming -- i.e. parallels to lucid dreaming, sleep paralysis, complex partial seizure, epileptic and migraine auras, and aspects of dreaming after trauma -- can be traced with some plausibility in all prominent variants of typical dreaming. When viewed from this perspective, for example, dream pursuers are much more a shadow of the bodily self than a metaphor for the psycho- biographical situation or evolutionarily implemented sparring partners who make dreamers fit for the struggle for survival during waking hours
Seligman, M. & Yellen, A. (1987). What is a dream? Behavior Research and Therapy 25:1-24.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Sharma, Ramesh Kumar (2003). A reply to A. Kanthamani's comments on my views concerning consciousness vs. dreamless sleep. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):208-213.   (Google)
Shanon, Benny (1983). Descartes' puzzle -- an organismic approach. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:185-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shackelford, Todd K. & Weekes-Shackelford, Viviana A. (2000). Hreat simulation, dreams, and domain-specificity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1004-1004.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Revonsuo, dreams are the output of a evolved “threat simulation mechanism.” The author marshals a diverse and comprehensive array of empirical and theoretical support for this hypothesis. We propose that the hypothesized threat simulation mechanism might be more domain-specific in design than the author implies. To illustrate, we discuss the possible sex-differentiated design of the hypothesized threat simulation mechanism. [Revonsuo]
Shevrin, Howard & Eiser, Alan S. (2000). Continued vitality of the Freudian theory of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1004-1006.   (Google)
Abstract: A minority position is presented in which evidence will be cited from the Hobson, Solms, Revonsuo, and Nielsen target articles and from other sources, supporting major tenets of Freud's theory of dreaming. Support is described for Freud's view of dreams as meaningful, linked to basic motivations, differing qualitatively in mentation, and wish-fulfilling. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms]
Siegler, Frederick A. (1967). Remembering dreams. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (January):14-24.   (Google | More links)
Singer Jr, Edgar A. (1924). On pain and dreams. Journal of Philosophy 21 (22):589-601.   (Google)
Smith, Brian (1965). Dreaming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):48 – 57.   (Google | More links)
Solms, Mark (2000). Dreaming and Rem sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):843-850.   (Google)
Abstract: The paradigmatic assumption that REM sleep is the physiological equivalent of dreaming is in need of fundamental revision. A mounting body of evidence suggests that dreaming and REM sleep are dissociable states, and that dreaming is controlled by forebrain mechanisms. Recent neuropsychological, radiological, and pharmacological findings suggest that the cholinergic brain stem mechanisms that control the REM state can only generate the psychological phenomena of dreaming through the mediation of a second, probably dopaminergic, forebrain mechanism. The latter mechanism (and thus dreaming itself) can also be activated by a variety of nonREM triggers. Dreaming can be manipulated by dopamine agonists and antagonists with no concomitant change in REM frequency, duration, and density. Dreaming can also be induced by focal forebrain stimulation and by complex partial (forebrain) seizures during nonREM sleep, when the involvement of brainstem REM mechanisms is precluded. Likewise, dreaming is obliterated by focal lesions along a specific (probably dopaminergic) forebrain pathway, and these lesions do not have any appreciable effects on REM frequency, duration, and density. These findings suggest that the forebrain mechanism in question is the final common path to dreaming and that the brainstem oscillator that controls the REM state is just one of the many arousal triggers that can activate this forebrain mechanism. The “REM-on” mechanism (like its various NREM equivalents) therefore stands outside the dream process itself, which is mediated by an independent, forebrain “dream-on” mechanism. Key Words: acetylcholine; brainstem; dopamine; dreaming; forebrain; NREM; REM; sleep
Solms, Mark (2000). Forebrain mechanisms of dreaming are activated from a variety of sources. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1035-1040.   (Google)
Abstract: The central question facing sleep and dream science today seems to be: What is the physiological basis of the subset of NREM dreams that are qualitatively indistinguishable from REM dreams (“apex dreams”)? Two competing answers have emerged: (1) all apex dreams are generated by REM sleep control mechanisms, albeit sometimes covertly; and (2) all such dreams are generated by forebrain mechanisms, independently of classical pontine sleep-cycle control mechanisms. The principal objection to the first answer is that it lacks evidential support. The principal objection to the second answer (which is articulated in my target article) is that it takes inadequate account of interactions that surely exist between the putative forebrain mechanisms and the well established brainstem mechanisms of conscious state control. My main response to this objection (elaborated below) is that it conflates nonspecific brainstem modulation – which supports consciousness in general – with a specific pontine mechanism that is supposed to generate apex dreaming in particular. The latter mechanism is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient for apex dreaming. The putative forebrain mechanisms, by contrast, are necessary for apex dreaming (although they are nor sufficient, in the limited sense that all conscious states of the forebrain are modulated by the brainstem)
Sparshott, F. E. (1974). Retractions and reiterations on films and dreams. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1):91-93.   (Google | More links)
Squires, Roger (1995). Dream time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:83-91.   (Google)
Stern, K. (1959). Malcolm's dreaming. Analysis 19 (December):44-46.   (Google)
Steriade, M. (2000). Neuronal basis of dreaming and mentation during slow-wave (non-REM) sleep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1009-1011.   (Google)
Abstract: Although the cerebral cortex is deprived of messages from the external world in REM sleep and because these messages are inhibited in the thalamus, cortical neurons display high rates of spontaneous firing and preserve their synaptic excitability to internally generated signals during this sleep stage. The rich activity of neocortical neurons during NREM sleep consists of prolonged spike-trains that impose rhythmic excitation onto connected cells in the network, eventually leading to a progressive increase in their synaptic responsiveness, as in plasticity processes. Thus, NREM sleep may be implicated in the consolidation of memory traces acquired during wakefulness. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes & Eastman]
Stone, Jim (1984). Dreaming and certainty. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):353-368.   (Google | More links)
Strawson, Galen (2002). Dreams of final responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sutton, John (ms). Childrens’ dreams and the nature of dreaming.   (Google)
Abstract: (2004) On the philosophical implications of David Foulkes’ experimental results [presented at ESPP/ SPP, Barcelona 2004 but currently stalled]
Sutton, John (ms). Review of Michel jouvet, the paradox of sleep: The story of dreaming; and Patricia Cox Miller, dreams in late antiquity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This review describes central difficulties in the interdisciplinary study of dreaming, summarizes Jouvet's account of his role in the history of modern dream science, queries his positive speculations on the semantics of dreaming, and suggests work for historians of neuroscience
Thomas, I. E. (1956). Dreams, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 197:197-207.   (Google)
Tiles, Mary (1990). Of heroes and butterflies: Technological dreams and human realities. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):89 – 100.   (Google)
Tollefsen, Christopher (2003). Experience machines, dreams, and what matters. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2).   (Google)
von Leyden, W. (1956). Sleeping and waking. Mind 65 (April):241-245.   (Google | More links)
Wagemaker, Allard (2009). Armed intervention and democratic dreams : Small western liberal democracies and multinational intervention. In Ted van Baarda & Désirée Verweij (eds.), The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare: Counter-Terrorism, Democratic Values and Military Ethics. Martinus Nijhoff.   (Google)
Walton, Jean (2001). Fair Sex, Savage Dreams: Race, Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference. Duke University Press.   (Google)
Watt, Douglas F. (2002). Commentary on professor Hobson's first-person account of a lateral medullary stroke (CVA): Affirmative action for the brainstem in consciousness studies? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):391-395.   (Google)
White, Carol J. & Gillespie, Thomas C. (1982). Markie on dreams and deceivers. Philosophical Studies 42 (2).   (Google)
Wichlinski, Lawrence J. (2000). The pharmacology of threatening dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1016-1017.   (Google)
Abstract: The pharmacological literature on negative dream experiences is reviewed with respect to Revonsuo's threat rehearsal theory of dreaming. Moderate support for the theory is found, although much more work is needed. Significant questions that remain include the precise role of acetylcholine in the generation of negative dream experiences and dissociations between the pharmacology of waking fear and anxiety and threatening dreams. [Revonsuo]
Wijsenbeek-Wijler, H. (1978). Aristotle's Concept of Soul, Sleep and Dreams. [Uithoorn, Herman De Manlaan 8], Hakkert.   (Google)
Wilshire, Bruce (2006). On Ernest Sosa's "on dreaming". Pluralist 1 (1):53-62.   (Google)
Wilde, Lyn Webster (1987). Working with Your Dreams: Linking the Conscious and Unconscious in Self-Discovery. Blandford.   (Google)
Winnubst, Shannon (2003). Vampires, anxieties, and dreams: Race and sex in the contemporary united states. Hypatia 18 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : Drawing on several feminist and anti-racist theorists, I use the trope of the vampire to unravel how whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality feed on the same set of disavowals—of the body, of the Other, of fluidity, of dependency itself. I then turn to Jewelle Gomez's The Gilda Stories (1991) for a counternarrative that, along with Donna Haraway's reading of vampires (1997), retools concepts of kinship and self that undergird racism, sexism, and heterosexism in contemporary U.S. culture
Wolfe, Julian (1971). Dreaming and scepticism. Mind 80 (320):605-606.   (Google | More links)
Wolf, Fred Alan (1996). On the quantum mechanics of dreams and the emergence of self-awareness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Wright, Crispin (1991). Scepticism and dreaming: Imploding the demon. Noûs 25 (2):205.   (Google | More links)
Yates, John (ms). A study of attempts at precognition, particularly in dreams, using some of the methods of experimental philosophy.   (Google)
Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (April):142-151.   (Google)
Zadra, A. & Donderi, D. C. (2000). Threat perceptions and avoidance in recurrent dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1017-1018.   (Google)
Abstract: Revonsuo argues that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events and to rehearse threat avoidance behaviors. He views recurrent dreams as an example of this function. We present data and clinical observations suggesting that (1) many types of recurrent dreams do not include threat perceptions; (2) the nature of the threat perceptions that do occur in recurrent dreams are not always realistic; and (3) successful avoidance responses are absent from most recurrent dreams and possibly nightmares. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]

5.1e.1 Dreams, Misc

Aristotle, , On prophesying by dreams.   (Google | More links)

5.1e.2 The Nature of Dreaming

Ayer, A. J. (1960). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Journal of Philosophy 57 (August):517-534.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2009). Dreaming and imagination. Mind and Language 24 (1):103-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Penultimate draft; please refer to published version. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that contrary to an orthodox view, dreams do not typically involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experience while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. Rather, on my view, dreams involve mental imagery and propositional imagination. I defend the imagination model of dreaming from some objections
Sutton, John (forthcoming). Dreaming. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: for Paco Calvo and John Symons (eds), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (Routledge, November 2008)

5.1f Emotions

Adams, E. M. (1998). Emotional intelligence and wisdom. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-14.   (Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2004). 'Edison' & 'Russel': Definitions versus inventions in the analysis of emotion. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ahumada, Rodolfo (1969). Emotion, knowledge and belief. Personalist 50:371-382.   (Google)
Allen, Richard (1973). Emotion, religion and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 7 (2):181–194.   (Google | More links)
Allen, James Smith (2003). Navigating the social sciences: A theory for the meta–history of emotions. History and Theory 42 (1):82–93.   (Google | More links)
Anders, Guenther Stern (1950). Emotion and reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (4):553-562.   (Google | More links)
Annis, David B. (1988). Emotion, love and friendship. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (2):1-7.   (Google)
Arbib, Michael A. (2004). Beware the passionate robot. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Emotions or emotional feelings? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.   (Google)
Abstract: I criticize Rolls's account of what makes emotional states conscious
Baier, Annette C. (2004). Feelings that matter. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Baltzly, D. (2002). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):235 – 236.   (Google)
Abstract: Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, £30
Baltzly, Dirk (2007). The stoic life: Emotions, duty, fate. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):855-856.   (Google)
Barbalet, J. M. (1993). Confidence: Time and emotion in the sociology of action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):229–247.   (Google | More links)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Gendron, Maria & Huang, Yang-Ming (2009). Do discrete emotions exist? Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427 – 437.   (Google)
Abstract: In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to emotion. Second, we discuss misconceptions of our Conceptual Act Model. Finally, we briefly comment on Columbetti's Dynamical Discrete Emotion model
Bartlett, S. (2000). Review of “strange fits of passion: Epistemologies of emotion, Hume to austen” by Adela Pinch. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):187-191.   (Google)
Ben-ze'ev, A. (2003). The logic of emotions. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Berger, Harris M. (2009). Stance: Ideas About Emotion, Style, and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture. Wesleyan University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Locating stance -- Structures of stance in lived experience -- Stance and others, stance and lives -- The social life of stance and the politics of expressive culture.
Bett, Richard (2002). Review: Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Mind 111 (443).   (Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (1996). Commentary on towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):135-136.   (Google)
Breazeal, C. & Brooks, Rodney (2004). Robot emotions: A functional perspective. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Calhoun, C. (2004). Subjectivity and emotion. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Campbell, S. (1997). Emotion as an explanatory principle in early evolutionary theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):453-473.   (Google)
Castelfranchi, Cristiano & Miceli, Maria (1996). Commentary on towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):129-133.   (Google)
Cataldi, Sue L. (1993). Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space -- Reflections on Merleau-Ponty'S Philosophy of Embodiment. Suny Pressmerleau-Ponty.   (Google)
Abstract: This book philosophically explores the topic of emotional depth through phenomenological description and analyses. The insights of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and James J Gibson on the nature of perceived depth are extended to the dynamics of emotional experience. Several senses of depth and emotional depth are uncovered and examined. Emotional experience is also examined in the context of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment, his later Flesh ontology and Gibson's theory of affordances. Emotional and perceived depths are shown to be intermingled and connected to changes in self-identity or self-understanding
Charles, David (2004). Emotion, cognition and action. Philosophy 55:105-136.   (Google)
Chan, Sin Yee (1999). Standing emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):495-513.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2005). The heat of emotion: Valence and the demarcation problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Chella, Antonio (2005). An intermediate level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal-emotion dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry
Clark, Stephen R. L. (2002). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation by Richard Sorabji, clarendon press: Oxford 2000. Pp. XII+499pp., £30.00, ISBN 019-8250053. Philosophy 77 (1):125-141.   (Google)
Clarke, Stanley G. (1986). Emotions: Rationality without cognitivism. Dialogue 25:663-674.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Clarke, Simon (2003). Psychoanalytic sociology and the interpretation of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (2):145–163.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1987). The description and evaluation of animal emotion. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (2009). Emotion, expression and conversation. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (1994). Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures). Philosophy 69:135-50.   (Google)
Cogan, John (1994). A place for emotion in critical study. Human Studies 17 (2).   (Google)
Cohen, Marc A. (2005). Against basic emotions, and toward a comprehensive theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):229-254.   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S.J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. I show that this overintellectualization goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that the body is a vehicle of meaning. I explain why I think that this over-intellectualization is problematic, and try to reconceptualize the notion of evaluation in emotion theory in a way that is consistent and continuous with the autopoietic notion of sense-making
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dadlez, E. M. (2009). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: How literature can be a thought experiment: alternatives to and elaborations of original accounts -- Literary form and philosophical content -- Kantian and Aristotelian accounts of Austen -- Hume and Austen on pleasure, sentiment, and virtue -- Hume and Austen on sympathy -- Hume's general point of view and the novels of Jane Austen -- The useful and the good in Hume and Austen -- Aesthetics and Humean aesthetic norms in the novels of Jane Austen -- Hume and Austen on good people and good reasoning -- Lovers, friends, and other endearing appellations: marriage in Hume and Austen -- Hume and Austen on pride -- Hume and Austen on jealousy, envy, malice, and the principle of comparison -- Indolence and industry in Hume and Austen -- What Hume's philosophy contributes to our understanding of Austen's fiction -- What Austen's fiction contributes to our understanding of Hume's philosophy.
Dalgleish, Tim (1997). Once more with feeling: The role of emotion in self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):110-111.   (Google)
Abstract: In an analysis of the role of emotion in self-deception is presented. It is argued that instances of emotional self-deception unproblematically meet Mele's jointly sufficient criteria. It is further proposed that a consideration of different forms of mental representation allows the possibility of instances of self-deception in which contradictory beliefs (in the form p and ~p) are held simultaneously with full awareness
Damasio, Antonio R. (2001). Reflections on the neurobiology of emotion and feeling. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Danion, Jean-Marie; Huron, Caroline; Rizzo, Lydia & Vidailhet, Pierre (2004). Emotion, memory, and conscious awareness in schizophrenia. In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
D'Argembeau, Arnaud & Van der Linden, Martial (2007). Emotional aspects of mental time travel. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):320-321.   (Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (1988). Expression of emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):279-291.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
DeLancey, Craig (1997). Emotion and the computational theory of mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (1998). Real emotions. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):467-487.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction of the desires that could plausibly be said to motivate the agent. As a contrast to a realist position about emotions I examine interpretationist theories of mind, using Dennett and Davidson as examples, and show that the emotional actions in question will fail to be explained by these theories. In conclusion, I provide one weak version of a natural realist view of emotions, and show how it succeeds where interpretationism fails
DeLancey, Craig (2009). Review of Georg Brun, ulvi doguoglu, Dominique kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).   (Google)
del Giudice, E. (2004). The psycho-emotional-physical unity of living organisms as an outcome of quantum physics. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of an individual’s specific evaluative perspective — as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile — appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective.
Depraz, Natalie (2008). The Rainbow of emotions: At the crossroads of neurobiology and phenomenology. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and breath can become constitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view, we give an account of the specific circular and systemic dynamic that we call “the rainbow of emotions.” This dynamic, we argue, is composed of both structural and experiential components and better evidences the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experiential
de Sousa, Ronald (2008). Against emotional modularity. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2002). Emotional truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):247-63.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2004). Emotions: What I know, what I'd like to think I know, and what I'd like to think. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Devon, Mark (ms). The Origin of Emotions.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Origin of Emotions identifies the purpose, trigger and effect of each emotion
Dilman, Ilham (1989). False emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 287:287-295.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dryden, Donald (1999). Human emotions and evolutionary homologies. Metascience 8 (1):25-35.   (Google)
Dubreuil, Benoît (2010). Punitive emotions and Norm violations. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.   (Google)
Abstract: The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism
Dumouchel, Paul (2008). Biological modules and emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Dumsday, Travis (2007). Emotional experience and religious understanding: Integrating perception, conception and feeling. Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.   (Google)
Dutton, Blake (2006). Emotions in ancient and medieval philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):162-163.   (Google)
Elkholy, Sharin N. (2002). Upheavels of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (2):235-238.   (Google)
Ethics, (1969). Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence. Inquiry 12 (1-4):66 – 104.   (Google)
Abstract: A set of basic static predicates, 'in itself, 'existing through itself, 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λ μβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself, 'freedom', etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems
Evans, D. & Cruse, Pierre (2004). Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Fellous, J. (ed.) (2004). Who Needs Emotions: The Brain Meets the Robot. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: By contrast, the editors of this book have assembled a panel of experts in neuroscience and artificial intelligence who have dared to tackle the issue of...
Findlay, J. N. (1935). Emotional presentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):111 – 121.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, Agneta H. & Jansz, Jeroen (1995). Reconciling emotions with western personhood. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (1):59–80.   (Google | More links)
F., S. (2000). Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen the emotions in hellenistic philosophy. New synthese historical library, 46. (dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). Pp. XII + 380. £116·00, US×184·00 (hbk). ISBN 0792353188. Religious Studies 36 (4):505-507.   (Google)
Flam, Helena & King, Debra (2010). Emotions and social movements. In Ann Brooks (ed.), Social Theory in Contemporary Asia. Routledge.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (2002). Emotions and motivational states. European Review of Philosophy 5:11-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Furtak, Rick Anthony (2010). Emotion, the bodily, and the cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.   (Google)
Abstract: In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking at evidence from neuroscience and social psychology, as well as thought experiments and theoretical arguments, I conclude that it is necessary to acknowledge both that emotions have intentional content and that they involve somatic agitation. I also point out some of the more promising directions for future research in this area
Gainotti, Guido (2005). Emotions, unconscious processes, and the right hemisphere. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 7 (1):71-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gershenson, Carlos, Modelling emotions with multidimensional logic.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the objectives of Artificial Intelligence has been the modelling of "human" characteristics, such as emotions, behaviour, conscience, etc. But in such characteristics we might find certain degree of contradiction. Previous work on modelling emotions and its problems are reviewed. A model for emotions is proposed using multidimensional logic, which handles the degree of contradiction that emotions might have. The model is oriented to simulate emotions in artificial societies. The proposed solution is also generalized for actions which might overcome contradiction (conflictive goals in agents, for example.)
Goebel, Bernd & Hösle, Vittorio (2005). Reasons, emotions, and God's presence in Anselm of canterbury's cur deus homo. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 87 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper deals with the peculiar nature of Anselm’s rationalism, focussing on the dialogue Cur deus homo. On the one hand, the argument in Cur deus homois based on reason alone. On the other hand, the dialogic nature of the work allows Anselm to unfold emotional states in a way that almost anticipates Kierkegaard. Anselm’s rationalism does not exclude the experience of anxiety and despair, and this is where faith comes to the rescue. Finally, God’s presence in the search is shown to be logically compatible with the rationalist nature of the search
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotion, personality and simulation. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Goldie, Peter (2004). Emotion, reason, and virtue. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Goleman, Daniel (ed.) (2003). Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions, and Health. Shambhala.   (Google)
Abstract: Can the mind heal the body? The Buddhist tradition says yes--and now many Western scientists are beginning to agree. Healing Emotions is the record of an extraordinary series of encounters between the Dalai Lama and prominent Western psychologists, physicians, and meditation teachers that sheds new light on the mind-body connection. Topics include: compassion as medicine; the nature of consciousness; self-esteem; and the meeting points of mind, body, and spirit. This edition contains a new foreword by the editor
Goldie, Peter (2007). Not passion's slave: Emotions and choice, by Robert C. Solomon and from passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological category, by Thomas Dixon. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):106–110.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2000). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own and other people's emotions, and how we can explain the very human things which emotions lead us to do. He argues that it is only from the personal point of view that thoughts, reasons, feelings, and actions come into view. This fascinating book gives an accessible but penetrating exploration of an important but mysterious subject. Any reader interested in emotion and its role in understanding our lives will find much to think about here
Golightly, Cornelius L. (1953). The James-Lange theory: A logical post-mortem. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):286-299.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (ed.) (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gordon, Lorenne M. (1969). Conventional expressions of emotion. Mind 78 (January):35-44.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1969). Emotions and knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1978). Emotion labelling and cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.   (Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1986). The passivity of emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1987). The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 71 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or ‘folk’) psychology in general
Gotlind, Erik (1958). Three Theories Of Emotion: Some Views On Philosophical Method. Lund,: Gleerup.   (Google)
Graham, George (2002). Review of Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (5).   (Google)
Grafman, Jordan (2000). Structuring an emotional world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):200-201.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls emphasizes the role of emotion in behavior. My commentary provides some balance to that position by arguing that stored social knowledge dominates our behavior and controls emotional states, thereby reducing emotions to a subservient role in behavior
Graver, Margaret (2007). Stoicism & Emotion. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: On the surface, stoicism and emotion seem like contradictory terms. Yet the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were deeply interested in the emotions, which they understood as complex judgments about what we regard as valuable in our surroundings. Stoicism and Emotion shows that they did not simply advocate an across-the-board suppression of feeling, as stoicism implies in today’s English, but instead conducted a searching examination of these powerful psychological responses, seeking to understand what attitude toward them expresses the deepest respect for human potential. In this elegant and clearly written work, Margaret Graver gives a compelling new interpretation of the Stoic position. Drawing on a vast range of ancient sources, she argues that the chief demand of Stoic ethics is not that we should suppress or deny our feelings, but that we should perfect the rational mind at the core of every human being. Like all our judgments, the Stoics believed, our affective responses can be either true or false and right or wrong, and we must assume responsibility for them. Without glossing over the difficulties, Graver also shows how the Stoics dealt with those questions that seem to present problems for their theory: the physiological basis of affective responses, the phenomenon of being carried away by one’s emotions, the occurrence of involuntary feelings and the disordered behaviors of mental illness. Ultimately revealing the deeper motivations of Stoic philosophy, Stoicism and Emotion uncovers the sources of its broad appeal in the ancient world and illuminates its surprising relevance to our own
Greenspan, Patricia, Craving the right: Emotions and moral reasons.   (Google)
Abstract: I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as moral motivators to be hard to miss. Of course, philosophers and others sometimes rightly insist that we need to put emotions aside in order to formulate satisfying moral principles, but I would have been surprised to hear anyone deny that moral motivation typically rests on emotion and that we need that basis in early life in order to get to the stage of acting on moral principles. However, I have since come to think that none of the main philosophical approaches to ethics fully appreciates the significance of emotion, in part because of a misconception of practical reasons. Reasons for action are commonly taken as prima facie requirements, so that moral reasons would yield requirements just insofar as they outweigh competing reasons such as reasons of simple self-interest. Someone who recognizes a moral reason as holding “all things considered” would be irrational not to act on it. But I argue in recent work (starting with Greenspan 2005) that even all-things-considered reasons may in one sense be optional: a rational agent can legitimately “discount” them, cancelling their deliberative weight and their force for motivation. What keeps us from setting aside reasons of the sort that underlie moral..
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1981). Emotions as evaluations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (April):158-169.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1987). Emotion and error. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (4).   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (ms). Emotions, innateness, and ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: My discussion below is an highly abbreviated version of a paper in preparation for a conference on innateness . I allow for both types of influence but suggest that more attention should be paid to mechanisms of social transfer of emotions, as a possible innate source of plasticity in moral learning via emotions - and hence of cultural variation in moral codes
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1980). Emotions, reasons, and 'self-involvement'. Philosophical Studies 38 (2).   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (2000). Emotional strategies and rationality. Ethics 110 (3).   (Google | More links)
Greenspan, Patricia (ms). Learning emotions and ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Innate emotional bases of ethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance of emotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components of emotions need not be limited to what psychologists think of as basic emotions. But in that case, innate mechanisms of social transfer of emotion, such as infants’ tendency to facial imitation, gaze-following, and emotional contagion or empathy, provide a source of plasticity in developing the basic elements that lets emotions incorporate cultural influence from early on. This leaves room later for cognitive components of adult human emotions and hence for the further role of language in conveying cultural influence. We can thus see how moral judgment might depend on innate emotional capacities that are both modifiable by culture and capable of registering objective values. I use Rawls’s treatment of the development of moral sentiments to illustrate the kind of supportive role that emotions can play in a principle-based account – though my own account involves modifications I go on to indicate
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a socially based version of moral realism
Greenspan, Patricia (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral dilemmas in the strict sense - cases where all options are morally forbidden, through no prior fault of the agent's - are dismissed by some philosophers as unintelligible. The author argues that the possibility of such cases is a consequence of a system of social rules that is simple enough to be teachable. The motivational force of the moral judgments pitted against each other in dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion in ethics
Green, O. Harvey (1970). The expression of emotion. Mind 79 (October):551-568.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Griffiths, Morwenna (1984). Emotions and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):223–231.   (Google | More links)
Griffiths, Paul E. & Scarantino, Andrea (2005). Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul E Griffiths Biohumanities Project University of Queensland St Lucia 4072 Australia
Gross, Daniel M. (2001). Early modern emotion and the economy of scarcity. Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (4).   (Google)
Gross, Daniel M. (2006). The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Princess Diana’s death was a tragedy that provoked mourning across the globe; the death of a homeless person, more often than not, is met with apathy. How can we account for this uneven distribution of emotion? Can it simply be explained by the prevailing scientific understanding? Uncovering a rich tradition beginning with Aristotle, The Secret History of Emotion offers a counterpoint to the way we generally understand emotions today. Through a radical rereading of Aristotle, Seneca, Thomas Hobbes, Sarah Fielding, and Judith Butler, among others, Daniel M. Gross reveals a persistent intellectual current that considers emotions as psychosocial phenomena. In Gross’s historical analysis of emotion, Aristotle and Hobbes’s rhetoric show that our passions do not stem from some inherent, universal nature of men and women, but rather are conditioned by power relations and social hierarchies. He follows up with consideration of how political passions are distributed to some people but not to others using the Roman Stoics as a guide. Hume and contemporary theorists like Judith Butler, meanwhile, explain to us how psyches are shaped by power. To supplement his argument, Gross also provides a history and critique of the dominant modern view of emotions, expressed in Darwinism and neurobiology, in which they are considered organic, personal feelings independent of social circumstances. The result is a convincing work that rescues the study of the passions from science and returns it to the humanities and the art of rhetoric
Gustafsson, Ylva; Kronqvist, Camilla & McEachrane, Michael (eds.) (2009). Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This unique collection of articles on emotion by Wittgensteinian philosophers provides a fresh perspective on the questions framing the current philosophical and scientific debates about emotions and offers significant insights into the role of emotions for understanding interpersonal relations and the relation between emotion and ethics
Halpern, Jodi (forthcoming). When concretized emotion-belief complexes derail decision-making capacity. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an important gap in philosophical, clinical and bioethical conceptions of decision-making capacity. These fields recognize that when traumatic life circumstances occur, people not only feel afraid and demoralized, but may develop catastrophic thinking and other beliefs that can lead to poor judgment. Yet there has been no articulation of the ways in which such beliefs may actually derail decision-making capacity. In particular, certain emotionally grounded beliefs are systematically unresponsive to evidence, and this can block the ability to deliberate about alternatives. People who meet medico-legal criteria for decision-making capacity can react to health and personal crises with such capacity-derailing reactions. One aspect of this is that a person who is otherwise cognitively intact may be unable to appreciate her own future quality of life while in this complex state of mind. This raises troubling ethical challenges. We cannot rely on the current standard assessment of cognition to determine decisional rights in medical and other settings. We need to understand better how emotionally grounded beliefs interfere with decision-making capacity, in order to identify when caregivers have an obligation to intervene
Hamlyn, David W. (1989). False emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 275:275-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hamilton, Christopher (2005). Mark R. Wynn emotional experience and religious understanding: Integrating perception, conception, and feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (hbk); £16.99 (pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (hbk); 0521549892 (pbk). Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.   (Google)
Hanoch, Yaniv (2005). One theory to fit them all: The search hypothesis of emotion revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):135-145.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a recent paper, Dylan Evans proposed that emotions could help solve what has been known as ?the frame problem?. In the process, he first questioned the utility of using the frame problem as a framework. After tackling this issue, he provided an alternative terminology to the frame problem?termed ?the search hypothesis of emotion??in order to re-examine how emotions aid rational agents. His new terminology, however, opens itself to other critiques. While accepting the basic tenets of his analysis, I question (i) whether a single search theory of emotion is adequate, and (ii) whether his theory would have been better termed ?the search hypothesis of feeling?. Finally, I extend some of the ideas developed in Evans' paper. Introduction Emotion, reason and ends The search hypothesis of emotion revisited Conclusion
Harré, Rom (1997). Are emotions significant in psychology only as motives? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (4):503–505.   (Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1999). It's ok to be complicated: The case of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):237-249.   (Google)
Harrison, Andrew (1993). Music and the emotions: The philosophical theories. Cogito 7 (2):157-159.   (Google)
Heinzel, Alexander & Northoff, Georg (2009). Emotional feeling and the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex: Theoretical and empirical considerations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):443 – 464.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional feeling can be defined as the affective constituent of emotions representing a subjective experience such as, for example, feeling love or hate. Several recent neuroimaging studies have focused on this affective component of emotions thereby aiming to characterise the underlying neural correlates. These studies indicate that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in the processing of emotional feeling. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the extent to which the present state of the art in neuroscience enables emotional feeling to be related to specific brain regions. In the first step, methodological and theoretical problems in the investigation of emotional feeling will be discussed leading to the characterisation of a “twofold gap.” This gap represents (a) the theoretical difficulties encountered in transforming vivid subjective experience into a theoretical psychological concept, and (b) the problems of implementing such a concept by performing empirical studies. Based on these considerations we suggest approaches for future empirical studies. In the second step, a group of functional neuroimaging studies focusing on the affective constituent of emotions will be discussed in detail with regard to the theoretical problems outlined in the first step
Herzberg, Larry A. (2009). Direction, causation, and appraisal theories of emotion. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):167 – 186.   (Google)
Abstract: Appraisal theories of emotion generally presuppose that emotions are “directed at” various items. They also hold that emotions have motivational properties. However, although it coheres well with their views, they have yet to seriously develop the idea that the function of emotional direction is to guide those properties. I argue that this “guidance hypothesis” can open up a promising new field of research in emotion theory. But I also argue that before appraisal theorists can take full advantage of it, they must drop their further assumption that to determine an emotion's direction, one need only retrace the process that caused it. Contrary to this “retracing view,” I argue for an “independence thesis”: directed emotions are produced by two functionally independent sub-processes. The first, “affect-causation,” functions in part to produce a state with certain motivational properties given certain representations. The second, “affect-direction,” has the function of optimally guiding those motivational properties by associating them with representations that may properly be quite dissimilar from the causal ones. By provisionally adopting the independence thesis and empirically testing the guidance hypothesis, I argue that appraisal theorists stand a good chance of significantly increasing the explanatory power of their theories
Hermerén, Göran (1993). Emotive properties: The role of abstraction, introspection and projection. Theoria 59 (1-3):80-112.   (Google)
Hershock, Peter D. (2003). Renegade emotion: Buddhist precedents for returning rationality to the heart. Philosophy East and West 53 (2):251-270.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: : By drawing out the critical implications of a Buddhist understanding of persons and emotions, it is suggested here that we see emotions as relational transformations through which the direction and qualitative intensities of our interdependence are situationally negotiated, enhanced, and revised. Historical and critical precedents are then offered for reassessing the association of reasoning with the practices of definition and argument, and the consequent association of the operational structure of rationality with that of reality. Reason is better seen as an emotion that has long been renegade and that--especially as institutionalized in the form of global, control-biased technological development--can remain so only at considerable social, cultural, and spiritual risk
Howard, A., Ritual, memory, and emotion: Comparing two cognitive hypotheses.   (Google)
Abstract: Without systems of public, external symbols for recording information, nonliterate communities have to rely on human memory for the retention and transmission of cultural knowledge. Religious expressions either evolved in directions that rendered them memorable or they were--quite literally--forgotten. Most religious systems, including all of the great world religions, emerged among populations that were mostly illiterate (even if there was a literate elite). Thus, it should come as no surprise that religious systems and ritual systems, in particular, have evolved so as to exploit variables that facilitate memory. No doubt, the invention of literacy ameliorates these variables' influence, however, the availability of such cultural tools neither eliminates that influence nor even surmounts it. Experimental psychologists have clarified variables that contribute to extraordinary recall for events that arise in the normal course of life. Probably, the most obvious is frequency. Experiencing events of the same type frequently aids memory for that type of event, though not necessarily for the details of any of the particular instances of that type. When Jains carry out the Puja ritual day after day, they become adept at its performance. Although they are fluent with the ritual's details, it is possible that they do not remember even one of their previous performances distinctively
Hurley, Elisa A. (2007). Working passions: Emotions and creative engagement with value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):79-104.   (Google)
Abstract: It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglectcentral intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts’ attempts to reduce them to other mental states andtoward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions’ distinctive function is to engage us with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions’ work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives
Hutchinson, Phil (2009). Emotion-philosophy-science. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hutto, Daniel D. (2002). The world is not enough: Shared emotions and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Im, Manyul (2002). Action, emotion, and inference in mencius. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29 (2):227–249.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1895). The physical basis of emotion: A reply. Mind 4 (13):92-99.   (Google | More links)
Isay, Gad C. (2009). A humanist synthesis of memory, language, and emotions: Q Ian mu's interpretation of confucIan philosophy. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (4):425-437.   (Google)
Abstract: While Q ian Mu intentionally avoided systematic philosophical arguments, his references to memory, language, and emotions, as expressed in a book he wrote in 1948, were suggestive of new interpretations of traditional Chinese, and especially Confucian, ideas such as human autonomy, mind, human nature, morality, immortality, and spirituality. The foremost contribution of Qian’s humanist synthesis rests in its articulation of the idea of the person. Across the context of memory, language, and emotions, the tiyong dynamics of mind and human nature recreate, in modern terms, the traditional Chinese concept of the person who is individually unique and simultaneously interrelated. Avoiding the extreme polarities of individualism and collectivism, he stresses rather their coexistence. His synthesis explains to the Chinese people something about who they are, the meaning in life in the framework of their culture, and how their (revitalized) way of life is at its best in the most important area, that of human relations
Izard, Carroll E.; Trentacosta, Christopher J. & King, Kristen A. (2005). Brain, emotions, and emotion-cognition relations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):208-209.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis makes a strong case for the interdependence and integration of emotion and cognitive processes. Yet, these processes exhibit considerable independence in early life, as well as in certain psychopathological conditions, suggesting that the capacity for their integration emerges as a function of development. In some circumstances, the concept of highly interactive emotion and cognitive systems seems a viable alternative hypothesis to the idea of systems integration
Jacobson, Anne J. (2008). Empathy, primitive reactions and the modularity of emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
James, Susan (1997). Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Passion and Action is an exploration of the role of the passions in seventeenth-century thought. Susan James offers fresh readings of a broad range of thinkers, including such canonical figures as Hobbes, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Pascal, and Locke, and shows that a full understanding of their philosophies must take account of their interpretations of our affective life. This ground-breaking study throws new light upon the shaping of our ideas about the mind, knowledge, and action, and provides a historical context for burgeoning current debates about the emotions
Johnson, A. B. (1854). The Meaning of Words: Analysed Into Words and Unverbal Things, and Unverbal Things Classified Into Intellections, Sensations and Emotions. Milwaukee, J.W. Chamberlin.   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2008). How to Change the Past. In Kim Atkins & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2006). Quick and Smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:3-27.   (Google)
Jonas, Monique F. (2005). Robert C. Roberts: Emotions: An essay in aid of moral psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5).   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2007). Review of Robert Solomon (ed.), Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotion. Sophia 46 (1).   (Google)
Kaag, John (2009). Getting under my skin: William James on the emotions, sociality, and transcendence. Zygon 44 (2):433-450.   (Google)
Abstract: "You are really getting under my skin!" This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to "get under one's skin." I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence
Kafetsios, Konstantinos & LaRock, Eric (2005). Cognition and emotion: Aristotelian affinities with contemporary emotion research. Theory and Psychology 15 (5):639-657.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kaster, Robert A. (2006). Review of David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).   (Google)
Kent, Bonnie (2005). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Richard Sorabji oxford: Oxford university press, 2000. Pp. XI, 499. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):245–247.   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, George A. (1994). Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion. Ancient Philosophy 14 (2):428-431.   (Google)
Killcross, Simon (2000). Reinforcement and punishment: Dissociable systems for action and emotion? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-205.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls presents a theory of emotion based on the premise that emotions are evoked by events that are capable of being instrumental reinforcers and punishers. As support for this theory is drawn almost entirely from experiments in non-human primates, valuable insights into the relationship between punishment and reinforcement systems, and the nature of instrumentality, may have been overlooked
King, Peter, Emotions in medieval thought.   (Google)
Abstract: No single theory of the emotions dominates the whole of the Middle Ages. Instead, there are several competing accounts, and differences of opinion — sometimes quite dramatic — within each account. Yet there is consensus on the scope and nature of a theory of the emotions, as well as on its place in affective psychology generally. For most medieval thinkers, emotions are at once cognitively penetrable and somatic, which is to say that emotions are influenced by and vary with changes in thought and belief, and that they are also bound up, perhaps essentially, with their physiological manifestations. This ‘mixed’ conception of emotions was broad enough to anchor medieval disagreements over details, yet rich enough to distinguish it from other parts of psychology and medicine. In particular, two kinds of phenomena, thought to be purely physiological, were not considered emotions even on this broad conception. First, what we now classify as drives or urges, for instance hunger and sexual arousal, were thought in the Middle Ages to be at best ‘pre-emotions’ fpropayyioney): mere biological motivations for action, not having any intrinsic cognitive object. Second, moods were likewise thought to be non-objectual somatic states, completely explicable as an imbalance of the bodily humours. Depression fmelancholia), for example, is the pathological condition of having an excess of black bile. Medieval theories of emotions, therefore, concentrate on paradigm cases that fall under the broad conception: delight, anger, distress, fear, and the like. The enterprise of constructing an adequate philosophical theory of the emotions in the Middle Ages had its counterpart in a large body of practical know-how. The medical literature on the emotions, for instance, was extensive, covering such subjects as the causal role of emotions in disease and recovery, the nerves as connecting the brain to the organs involved in the physiological manifestations of the emotions, and the effect of diet and nutrition on emotional responses..
Klebanov, Michael, Utilitarian judgments and an intuitive moral system: Can John Mikhail's model accommodate autism and social emotion?   (Google)
Abstract: In the attempt to understand moral knowledge, a framework of “universal moral grammar” (“UMG”) has gained traction. Instead of relying on justifications provided after moral judgments, or claiming that our moral judgments are determined by reason, emotion, or some combination of the two, UMG seeks to explain moral cognition by modeling our intuitive judgments in moral scenarios. John Mikhail proposes a model of how our mind computes structural descriptions. In this paper, I will outline the justifications for his system, and then review how his system would work in practice. I will then focus on how Mikhail’s model can account for the discrepancy between autistic and non-autistic individuals’ performance in the same types of experiments. Finally, after considering the similarity between the moral judgments of autistics and the judgments of people with damage to their prefrontal cortex, I will investigate possible deficiencies in Mikhail’s model, and briefly conclude with suggestions for further research
Knuuttila, Simo (2004). Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions are the focus of intense debate both in contemporary philosophy and psychology, and increasingly also in the history of ideas. Simo Knuuttila presents a comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of emotion from Plato to Renaissance times, combining rigorous philosophical analysis with careful historical reconstruction. The first part of the book covers the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle and later ancient views from Stoicism to Neoplatonism and, in addition, their reception and transformation by early Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen to Augustine and Cassian. Knuuttila then proceeds to a discussion of ancient themes in medieval thought, and of new medieval conceptions, codified in the so-called faculty psychology from Avicenna to Aquinas, in thirteenth century taxonomies, and in the voluntarist approach of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and their followers. Philosophers, classicists, historians of philosophy, historians of psychology, and anyone interested in emotion will find much to stimulate them in this fascinating book
Koch, Philip J. (1987). Emotional ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):257-279.   (Google | More links)
Korpalo, Olga (1999). Rationality and emotions: (The perspectives of logical-cognitive analysis). Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (1):109-127.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - belief and desire. The fourth chapter will present the instrumental typology of certain emotional concepts. The final chapter represents preliminary logical schema of the meanings of emotional concepts
Korb, Kevin B. & Nicholson, Ann E. (2000). The essential roles of emotion in cognitive architecture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-206.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls's presentation of emotion as integral to cognition is a welcome counter to a long tradition of treating them as antagonists. His eduction of experimental evidence in support of this view is impressive. However, we find his excursion into the philosophy of consciousness less successful. Rolls gives syntactical manipulation the central role in consciousness (in stark contrast to Searle, for whom “mere” syntax inevitably falls short of consciousness), and leaves us wondering about the roles left for emotion after all
Kovach, Adam & De Lancey, Craig (2005). On emotions and the explanation of behavior. Noûs 39 (1):106-22.   (Google | More links)
Kraemer, Felicitas (forthcoming). Authenticity anyone? The enhancement of emotions via neuro-psychopharmacology. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The literature provided by the philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement’ provides good reasons to include real world examples. Such case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like themselves’ for the first time in their lives. Beginning with these accounts, this article suggests three non-naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not always the only valid one, but that the other two ways of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the normative implications if not ethical intricacies that accompany the enhancement of emotions
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2008). Expendable emotions. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):5-22.   (Google)
Abstract: Are there any morally expendable emotions? That is, are there any emotions that could ideally, from a moral point of view, be eradicated from human life? Aristotle may have subscribed to the view that there are no such emotions, and for that reason—though not only for that reason—it merits investigation. I first suggest certain revisions of the specifics of Aristotle’s non-expendability claim that render it less counter-intuitive. I then show that the plausibility of Aristotle’s claim turns largely on the question of how emotions are to be individuated. After probing that question in relation to contemporary theories of emotion, I explore how our emotions and moral virtues relate to distinct spheres of human experience, and how emotion concepts can best carve up the emotional landscape. I argue finally that there exist certain normative reasons for specifying emotion concepts such that Aristotle’s view holds good
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2010). Educating moral emotions or moral selves: A false dichotomy? Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (4):397-409.   (Google)
Abstract: In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a 'moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as 'identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2010). The Self and its Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- What selves are -- Exploring selves -- The emotional self -- Self-concept : self-esteem and self-confidence -- The self as moral character -- Self-respect -- Multicultural selves -- Self-pathologies -- Self-change and self-education.
Kruger, Robert S. (2009). The assessment of emotional awareness : Can technology make a contribution? In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kuhn, James W. (1998). Emotion as well as reason: Getting students beyond "interpersonal accountability". Journal of Business Ethics 17 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper notes the recent spread of business ethics courses in American higher education, observing that teachers trained in economics have not readily incorporated ethical notions or theory into regular courses, such as finance, management, accounting, and marketing. The presumed ethically neutral, value-free approach of economists, who dominate business courses, is increasingly inadequate to meet the needs of business managers – or of business students. Technological and political changes, creating an interdependent environment within which managers operate, have eroded older ethics based on tradition and common backgrounds. They have also raised ethical issues of new orders of complexity. With corporate business managers finding ethical concerns more pressing matters than do many teachers, the paper offers some tentative answers to three questions about how to interest business students in ethical issues: What Approach to Business Ethics Gets student's Attention? What Is the Value of Simulations and Games? What Can Be Said About the Business System And Its Values?The answer to the first question is simulations and games. Case method analysis is serviceable, engaging students' intellect, but all too often without emotional involvement or self-revelation. Experiential learning through class-room games accomplish both engagement and involvement in ways that are exceedingly helpful to business students, who have had "less occasion for critical reflection on self and world than have others of their age."
Kupperman, Joel J. (1997). Felt and unfelt emotions: A rejoinder to Dalgleish. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):91.   (Google)
Lajberich, C.-M. (1956). De quelques reactions emotionnelles irrationnelles chez l'enfant et notamment chez l'enfant slave. Synthese 10 (1).   (Google)
Lanoix, Monique (2004). Émotions et valeurs. Dialogue 43 (3):609-612.   (Google)
Lauritzen, Paul (1991). Errors of an ill-reasoning reason: The disparagement of emotions in the moral life. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1).   (Google)
Leary, Mark R. (ms). Motivational and emotional aspects of the self.   (Google)
Abstract:      Recent theory and research are reviewed regarding self-related motives (self-enhancement, self-verification, and self-expansion) and self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, pride, social anxiety, and embarrassment), with an emphasis on how these motivational and emotional aspects of the self might be related. Specifically, these motives and emotions appear to function to protect people's social well-being. The motives to self-enhance, self-verify, and self-expand are partly rooted in people's concerns with social approval and acceptance, and self-conscious emotions arise in response to events that have real or imagined implications for others' judgments of the individual. Thus, these motives and emotions do not operate to maintain certain states of the self, as some have suggested, but rather to facilitate people's social interactions and relationships
Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be useful to consider the role emotion plays in the respective interpretive processes. I give reasons for believing that affective processes are more heavily involved in simulation (especially in situations of practical judgment and practical reasoning) than in theory-application. But affective processes have distinctive neurological and metabolic properties. These distinctive features of emotion may not only enrich our understanding of the simulation process, but also afford us a step towards responding to Perner's challenge
Leighton, Stephen R. (1985). A new view of emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (April):133-142.   (Google)
Stephen R. Leighton, (1982). A ristotle and the emotions. Phronesis 27 (s 1-2):144-174.   (Google)
Leighton, Stephen R. (1988). Modern theories of emotion. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2:206-224.   (Google)
Leighton, Stephen R. (1986). Unfelt feelings in pain and emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:69-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lemaire, S. (2002). From emotions to desires. European Review of Philosophy 5:109-136.   (Google)
Lemos, Noah M. (1989). Warrant, emotion, and value. Philosophical Studies 57 (2).   (Google)
Lesch, Walter (2001). Cultivating emotions: Some ethical perspectives. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Letwin, Oliver (1987). Ethics, Emotion, and the Unity of the Self. Croom Helm.   (Google)
Levi, Don S. (2000). Elster on the emotions. Inquiry 43 (3):359-378.   (Google | More links)
Linquist, Stefan (2007). Review of Paul Thagard, Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).   (Google)
Linyu, G.u. (2009). Time as emotion versus time as moralization: Whitehead and the yijing " . Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36:129-151.   (Google)
Livet, Pierre (2002). Emotions, revision, and the explanation of actions. European Review of Philosophy 5:93-108.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1996). Commentary on towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):127-128.   (Google)
Lloyd, Genevieve (2000). The emotions in the seventeenth century. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1):141 – 147.   (Google)
Lurie, Yotam (2004). Humanizing business through emotions: On the role of emotions in ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions have not received sufficient attention in business ethics. This paper identifies the positive role of emotions in human judgment and attitudes. It then argues that emotions as well as feelings on the part of managers and their employees can be positive forces for both business managers and for the organizations they lead. Allowing emotions a stronger role in business affairs could serve in putting a more human face on both managers and their organizations
Lyons, William E. (1973). A note on emotion statements. Ratio 15 (June):132-135.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1978). Emotions and behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):410-418.   (Google | More links)
Mackenzie, Catriona (2002). Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation impairs the capacity for autonomy
Maclaren, Kym (2009). Emotional metamorphoses : The role of others in becoming a subject. In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Maclaren, Kym (2005). Life is inherently expressive: A Merleau-Pontian response to darwin's the expression of the emotions in man and animals. Chiasmi International 7:241-260.   (Google)
Macmurray, John (1937). Reason and Emotion. London, D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated.   (Google)
Abstract: Reason in the emotional life. I-III.--Education of the emotions.--The early discipline of personality.--The personal life.--The virtue of chastity.--Art and the future.--Science and religion.--Reason and religion.--Religious reality.--The maturity of religion. I-II.--The conservation of personality
Mackenzie, Catriona (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , ed., moral psychology, volume 3. the neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development , cambridge, ma: Mit press, 2008, pp. XIX + 569, us $30 (paperback). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):528 – 532.   (Google)
Ames, Roger; Solomon, Robert C. & Marks, Joel (eds.) (1995). Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy. SUNY Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book broadens the inquiry into emotion to comprehend a comparative cultural outlook. It begins with an overview of recent work in the West, and then proceeds to the main business of scrutinizing various relevant issues from both Asian and comparative perspectives. Finally, Robert Solomon comments and summarizes.
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1895). Emotions versus pleasure-pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Thomas (1998). The role of emotion in Sartre's portrait of anti-semitism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):141 – 151.   (Google)
Mazis, Glen A. (1983). A New Approach to Sartre's Theory of Emotions: Towards a Phenomenology of Emotions. Philosophy Today (3):183-200.   (Google)
Mazis, Glen (1994). Emotion and Embodiment: Fragile Ontology. Peter Lang Press.   (Google)
Mazis, Glen (2001). Emotion and Embodiment within the Medical World. In Kay Toombs (ed.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Kluwer.   (Google)
Mazis, Glen A. (1989). Merleau Ponty, Inhabitation and the Emotions. In Henry Pietersma (ed.), Merleau Ponty: Critical Essays. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Neil (1996). Nazism, nationalism, and the sociology of emotions: Escape from freedom revisited. Sociological Theory 14 (3):241-261.   (Google | More links)
Mees, Ulrich & Schmitt, Annette (2008). Goals of action and emotional reasons for action. A modern version of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):157–178.   (Google | More links)
Megill, Jason L. & Cogburn, Jon (2005). Easy's gettin' harder all the time: The computational theory and affective states. Ratio 18 (3):306-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Emotion and desire in self-deception. Philosophy 52:163-179.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2000). Self-deception and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires nor causally mediated by desires. It is argued that (1) is false and that (3) is defensible and more defensible than (2)
Mendl, M. & Paul, E. S. (2004). Consciousness, emotion and animal welfare: Insights from cognitive science. Animal Welfare 13:17- 25.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Metz, Thaddeus (2009). Love and emotional reactions to necessary evils. In Pedro Alexis Tabensky (ed.), The Positive Function of Evil. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Meth, Paula & Malaza, Knethiwe (2003). Violent research: The ethics and emotions of doing research with women in south Africa. Ethics, Place and Environment 6 (2):143 – 159.   (Google)
Abstract: The twin concepts of ethics and emotions are used in this paper to examine experiences of doing research on the topic of violence. Ethical questions are of significance when carrying out research which is potentially distressing to the research participant. Through field experiences in South Africa the author argues, however, that despite the growing concern among geographers over the ethical dimensions of their work, the implementation of ethically guided research practice is often less simple in reality. The concept of emotions is used to explore the less well examined issue of the impact of distressing research on the researcher and research assistants. The paper concludes that it is often difficult to separate out ethics from emotions
Mirk, Marjorie (1930). The difference of emotional stability in girls of different ages. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):229 – 232.   (Google)
Molen, P. P. (1984). BI-stability of emotions and motivations: An evolutionary consequence of the open-ended capacity for learning. Acta Biotheoretica 33 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Species, endowed with an open-ended capacity for learning, which is one of the highest evolutionary achievements,will profit most from this ability, if they are urged one way or other to invest any surplus of energy in expanding and refining their behavioural repertoire and in adapting it to prevailing circumstances, while incurring as little risk and stress as possible.It is therefore argued that an open-ended capacity for learning is maximally adding to survival if paired to two distinct tendencies:1) a tendency to seek high-arousal evoking situations whenever surplus energy is available, and 2) a tendency to seek arousal reducing situations as soon as the surplus energy is exhausted
Moore, Simon C. (ed.) (2002). Emotional Cognition: From Brain to Behaviour. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Mooney, Ed (2005). Review of Rick Anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2002). Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):265-275.   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2002). Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy: Adam Morton. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):265–275.   (Google | More links)
Morgan, Jeffrey (1994). Learning to live with emotion. Educational Philosophy and Theory 26 (2):67–81.   (Google | More links)
Myers, Charles S. (1901). Experimentation on emotion. Mind 10 (37):114-115.   (Google | More links)
Naess, Arne (1969). Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence. Inquiry 12 (1-4):66 – 104.   (Google)
Neu, Jerome (2004). Emotions and freedom. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Neu, Jerome (2005). Not passion's slave: Emotions and choice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):741-744.   (Google)
Neu, Jerome (2007). Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In Sticks and Stones, philosopher Jerome Neu probes the nature, purpose, and effects of insults, exploring how and why they humiliate, embarrass, infuriate,...
Neville, Bernie (1989). Educating Psyche: Emotion, Imagination, and the Unconscious in Learning. Collins Dove.   (Google)
Ngoka, C. D. (2006). Reflections: Philosophical Essays on the Minds, Thoughts, Emotions, and Action of Men: (Evangelism Documented). Alphabet Nigeria Publishers.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun (2002). On the genealogy of norms: A case for the role of emotion in cultural evolution. Philosophy of Science 69 (2).   (Google | More links)
Nieuwenburg, P. (2002). Emotion and perception in Aristotle's rhetoric. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):86 – 100.   (Google | More links)
Nielsen, Lisbeth (2002). The simulation of emotion experience: On the emotional foundations of theory of mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation of infants' understanding of other minds is built upon an early-developing capacity to share others' emotion experiences. The emotion experiences elicited in interactions between caregivers and infants enable the elaboration of this primitive understanding into a more fully developed understanding of psychological subjects. The evidence presented in support of these claims derives from a wide range of studies of the phenomena of emotional contagion, affective communication, and emotion regulation involving infants, young children, and adults
Nobis, Nathan (online). Rational engagement, emotional response and the prospects for progress in animal use ‘debates’.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is designed to help people rationally engage moral issues regarding the treatment of animals, specifically uses of animals in medical and psychological experimentation, basic research, drug development, education and training, consumer product testing and other areas
Northoff, Georg (2005). Emotional-cognitive integration, the self, and cortical midline structures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):211-212.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis discusses the dynamic mechanisms of emotional-cognitive integration. I argue that he neglects the self and its neural correlate. The self can be characterized as an emotional-cognitive unity, which may be accounted for by the interplay between anterior and posterior medial cortical regions. I propose that these regions form an anatomical, physiological, and psychological unity, the cortical midline structures (CMSs)
Næss, Arne (1975). Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's Ethics. Universitetsforl..   (Google)
Næss, Arne (1972). Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence. [Oslo]Universitetsforlaget.   (Google)
Nussbaum, Charles (2003). Another look at functionalism and the emotions. Brain and Mind 4 (3):353-383.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two chronic problems have plagued functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The first is the chauvinism/liberalism dilemma, the second the absent qualia problem. The first problem is addressed by blocking excessively liberal counterexamples at a level of functional abstraction that is high enough to avoid chauvinism. This argument introduces the notion of emotional functional organization (EFO). The second problem is addressed by granting Block's skeptical conclusions with respect to mentality as such, while arguing that qualitative experience is a concomitant of human mentality considered as a special case: a system with EFO implemented in an organic substrate
Nussbaum, Martha C. (1990). Love's Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 573 | Google | More links)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2006). Radical evil in the Lockean state: The neglect of the political emotions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: All modern liberal democracies have strong reasons to support an idea of toleration, understood as involving respect, not only grudging acceptance, and to extend it to all religious and secular doctrines, limiting only conduct that violates the rights of other citizens. There is no modern democracy, however, in which toleration of this sort is a stable achievement. Why is toleration, attractive in principle, so difficult to achieve? The normative case for toleration was well articulated by John Locke in his influential A Letter Concerning Toleration , although his attractive proposal thus rests on a fragile foundation. Kant did much more, combining a Lockean account of the state with a profound diagnosis of ‘radical evil’, the tendencies in all human beings to militate against stable toleration and respect. But Kant proposed no mechanism through which the state might mitigate the harmful influence of ‘radical evil’, thus rendering toleration stable. One solution to this problem was proposed by Rousseau, but it has deep problems. How, then, can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile human basis of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only within each state, but also among peoples and states, in this interlocking world? Key Words: toleration • emotion • evil • liberal democracy • Locke • Mill • Kant • Rousseau
Oakley, Justin (1992). Morality and the Emotions. Routledge.   (Google)
Oaklander, Nathan L. & Gull, Richard (1978). The emotions. Philosophy Research Archives 1272.   (Google)
O'Brien, Patrick (1950). Emotions and Morals. New York, Grune & Stratton.   (Google)
O'Grady, Jane (2005). From passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological category by Thomas Dixon. Cambridge university press, 2003, 297pp., Hb ??45.00 the navigation of feeling: A framework for the history of emotions by William M. Reddy. Cambridge university press, 2001, 380pp., Pb ??17.99. Philosophy 80 (1):156-159.   (Google)
Onkal, Dilek, Cognitive and emotional representations of terror attacks: A cross-cultural exploration.   (Google)
Abstract:      A questionnaire measuring cognitive and affective representations of terror risk was developed and tested in Turkey and Israel. Participants in the study were university students from the two countries (n = 351). Four equivalent factors explained terror risk cognitions in each sample: costs, vulnerability, trust, and control.Asingle negative emotionality factor explained the affective component of terror risk representations in both samples. All factors except control could be measured reliably. Results supported the validity of the questionnaire by showing expected associations between cognitions and emotions, as well as indicating gender differences and cultural variations. Current findings are discussed in relation to previous results, theoretical approaches, and practical implications
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2002). The role of emotions in the explanation of action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Palencik, Joseph T. (2007). Amusement and the philosophy of emotion: A neuroanatomical approach. Dialogue 46 (3):419-434.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers who discuss the emotions have usually treated amusement as a non-emotional mental state. Two prominent philosophers making this claim are Henri Bergson and John Morreall, who maintain that amusement is too abstract and intellectual to qualify as an emotion. Here, the merit of this claim is assessed. Through recent work in neuroanatomy there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of dichotomies that separate emotion and the intellect. Findings suggest that the neuroanatomical structure of amusement is similar to other commonly recognized emotion states. On the basis of these it is argued that amusement should be considered an emotion. Les philosophes qui adressent la question des émotions traitent généralement l’état d’amusement comme un êtat mental excluant l’émotion. Parmi les philosophes importants à défendre cette thèse, Henri Bergson et John Morreall soutiennent que l’amusement est trop abstrait et intellectuel pour être tenu pour une émotion. Nous réévaluons cette thèse. De récents travaux en neuroanatomie fournissent des raisons de douter de la légitimité de la dichotomie entre émotion et intellect. Certaines autres découvertes suggèrent que la structure neuroanatomique de l’amusement est très similaire à d’autres états émotifs. Sur la base de ces travaux, nous argumentons que l’amusement doit être considéré comme une émotion
Palencik, Joseph T. (2007). William James and the psychology of emotions: From 1884 to the present. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper addresses the significance of William James's theory of emotion in contemporary emotion theory. While many of James's detractors have pointed to the problems with his definition of emotion, the bearing his theory of emotion generation would have on modern approaches in psychology suggests a different point of view
Panksepp, Jaak; Gordon, Nakia & Burgdorf, Jeff (2001). Empathy and the action-perception resonances of basic socio-emotional systems of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):43-44.   (Google)
Abstract: Mammalian brains contain a variety of self-centered socio-emotional systems. An understanding of how they interact with more recent cognitive structures may be essential for understanding empathy. Preston & de Waal have neglected this vast territory of proximal brain issues in their analysis
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Emotional dynamics of the organism and its parts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):212-213.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotion-science without basic brain-science is only superficially satisfying. Dynamic systems approaches to emotions presently provide a compelling metaphor that raises more difficult empirical questions than substantive scientific answers. How might we close the gap between theory and empirical observations? Such theoretical views still need to be guided by linear cross-species experimental approaches more easily implement in the laboratory
Panksepp, Jaak (2007). Emotional feelings originate below the neocortex: Toward a neurobiology of the soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):101-103.   (Google)
Abstract: Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). Neural behaviorism: From brain evolution to human emotion at the speed of an action potential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):212-213.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls shares important data on hunger, thirst, sexuality, and learned behaviors, but is it pertinent to understanding the fundamental nature of emotionality? Important as such work is for understanding the motivated behaviors of animals, Rolls builds a constructivist theory of emotions and primary-process affective consciousness without considering past evidence on specific types of emotional tendencies and their diverse neural substrates
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The cradle of consciousness: A periconscious emotional homunculus? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):24-32.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). “The dream of reason creates monsters” . . . Especially when we neglect the role of emotions in Rem-states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):988-990.   (Google)
Abstract: As highlighted by Solms, and to a lesser extent by Hobson et al. and Nielsen, dreaming and REM sleep can be dissociated. Meanwhile Vertes & Eastman and Revonsuo provide distinct views on the functions of REM sleep and dreaming. A resolution of such divergent views may clarify the fundamental nature of these processes. As dream commentators have long noted, with Revonsuo taking the lead among the present authors, emotionality is a central and consistent aspect of REM dreams. A deeper consideration of emotions in REM dreams may serve as the conceptual salve to help heal the emerging rifts in this field of inquiry. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Parker, Thomas (2008). Volition, Rhetoric, and Emotion in the Work of Pascal. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This study identifies and analyzes a compelling theory and practice of persuasion that integrates the complexity of human desire. It demonstrates how the philosophical component in Pascal's description of the will makes a seamless integration into a vehicle of persuasion and poetics, providing a privileged viewpoint for understanding the author's complete works, arguing that the notion of will is of fundamental importance in Pascal's anthropology as well as in his rhetoric. This avenue of interpretation is both fruitful and difficult, because the word volonte means very different things in Pascal and in modern French
Parr, Hester & Davidson, Joyce (2008). Virtual trust": Online emotional intimacies in mental health support. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Pascual-Leone, Juan (2005). Not a bridge but an organismic (general and causal) neuropsychology should make a difference in emotion theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):213-214.   (Google)
Abstract: Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”
Persson, Ingmar (1991). A determinist dilemma. Ratio 4 (1):38-58.   (Google)
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Emotion and the concept of behavior. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):291-298.   (Google)
Perkins, Franklin (2002). Mencius, emotion, and autonomy. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29 (2):207–226.   (Google | More links)
Peters, R. S. & Mace, C. A. (1962). Emotions and the category of passivity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:117-142.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Petersen, Stephen (2004). Functions, creatures, learning, emotion. Hudlicka and Canamero.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: I propose a conceptual framework for emotions according to which they are best understood as the feedback mechanism a creature possesses in virtue of its function to learn. More specifically, emotions can be neatly modeled as a measure of harmony in a certain kind of constraint satisfaction problem. This measure can be used as error for weight adjustment (learning) in an unsupervised connectionist network.
Pettinelli, Mark (2007). The Psychology Of Emotions, Feelings and Thoughts. Mark Pettinelli.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This book puts forth the idea that life is divided into three groups, emotion, thinking, and feeling.
Pinch, Adela (1996). Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book contends that when late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers sought to explain the origins of emotions, they often discovered that their feelings may not really have been their own. It explores the paradoxes of representing feelings in philosophy, aesthetic theory, gender ideology, literature, and popular sentimentality, and it argues that this period's obsession with sentimental, wayward emotion was inseparable from the dilemmas resulting from attempts to locate the origins of feelings in experience. The book shows how these epistemological dilemmas became gendered by studying a series of extravagantly affective scenes in works by Hume, Wordsworth, Charlotte Smith, and Jane Austen. Making its argument through a provocative conjunction of texts that range across genres and genders and across the divide between the eighteenth century and Romanticism, Strange Fits of Passion rediscovers the relationship of empiricism to the culture of sentimentality, and the significance of emotion to Romanticism
Pizzagalli, Diego A. (2005). The role of frontocingulate pathways in the emotion-cognition interface: Emerging clues from depression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):214-215.   (Google)
Abstract: By emphasizing nonlinear dynamics between appraisal and emotions, Lew