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5.1a.3. The Nature of Attention (The Nature of Attention on PhilPapers)

Chrisley, Ron & Parthemore, J. (2007). Synthetic phenomenology:Exploiting embodiment to specify the non-conceptual content of visual experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: 'synthetic phenomenology'. Explanations involving specific experiential events require a means of specifying the contents of experience; not all of them can be specified linguistically. One alternative, at least for the case of visual experience, is to use depictions that either evoke or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation of depictions through the use of an embodied, perceiving and acting agent, either virtual or real. Synthetic phenomenology, then, is the attempt to use the states, interactions and capacities of an artificial agent for the purpose of specifying the contents of conscious experience. This paper takes the first steps toward seeing how one might use a robot to specify the non- conceptual content of the visual experience of an (hypothetical) organism that the robot models
Mole, Christopher (2005). Attention is Cognitive Unison. Dissertation, Princeton University   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wu, Wayne (forthcoming). Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive Control. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that when perception, indeed perceptual attention, plays a guiding role in intentional bodily action, it is a necessary part or constituent of that action. The argument begins with a challenge that necessarily arises for embodied agents, what I call the Many-Many Problem: in the context of action, agents face too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. Action requires that the Many-Many Problem be solved by reducing the many-many set of options to a specific mapping between target and response. Throughout the execution of action, the agent must continue to perceptually select, and hence attend to, relevant information so as to guide the execution of specific movements. Since perceptual attention is a necessary part of solving the Many-Many Problem, it is a necessary part of action. Indeed, the whole of the process of implementing a solution to the Many-Many Problem, as constrained by the agent’s motivational state, just is the agent’s acting in a bodily way.