Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

5.1b. Belief (Belief on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ackermann, Robert John (1972). Belief and Knowledge. Garden City, N.Y.,Anchor Books.   (Google)
Allison, Jay & Gediman, Dan (eds.) (2008). This I Believe Ii: More Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. Henry Holt.   (Google)
Abstract: A new collection of inspiring personal philosophies from another noteworthy group of people This second collection of This I Believe essays gathers seventyfive essayists—ranging from famous to previously unknown—completing the thought that begins the book’s title. With contributors who run the gamut from cellist Yo-Yo Ma to ordinary folks like a diner waitress, an Iraq War veteran, a farmer, a new husband, and many others, This I Believe II , like the first New York Times bestselling collection, showcases moving and irresistible essays. Included are Sister Helen Prejean writing about learning what she truly believes through watching her own actions, singer Jimmie Dale Gilmore writing about a hard-won wisdom based on being generous to others, and Robert Fulghum writing about dancing all the dances for as long as he can. Readers will also find wonderful and surprising essays about forgiveness, personal integrity, and honoring life and change. Here is a welcome, stirring, and provocative communion with the minds and hearts of a diverse, new group of people—whose beliefs and the remarkably varied ways in which they choose to express them reveal the American spirit at its best
Almaas, A. H. (1986). The Void: A Psychodynamic Investigation of the Relationship Between Mind and Space. Almaas Publications.   (Google)
Audi, Robert (1972). The concept of 'believing'. Personalist 53:43-52.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2003). Belief ascription and the illusion of depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.   (Google)
Beckerman, A. (2001). The real reason for the standard view. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Lynne Baker, there are three main arguments for the
Bogdan, R. (ed.) (1986). Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: Some of the topics presented in this volume of original essays on contemporary approaches to belief include the problem of misrepresentation and false belief, conscious versus unconscious belief, explicit versus tacit belief, and the durable versus ephemeral question of the nature of belief. The contributors, Fred Dretske, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Stephen Schiffer, Stephen P. Stich, and the editor, Radu Bogdan, focus on the mental realization of belief, its cognitive and behavioral aspects, and the semantic aspects of its content. This interdisciplinary study takes advantage of many new theories in what has become an important area of research
Bogdan, Radu J. (1986). The manufacture of belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Borhek, James T. (1983). A Sociology of Belief. R.E. Krieger Pub. Co..   (Google)
Botwinick, Aryeh (1997). Skepticism, Belief, and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bovens, Luc (1999). Do beliefs supervene on degrees of confidence? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Google)
Brown, Curtis (1992). Direct and indirect belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Caporale, Rocco & Grumelli, Antonio (eds.) (1971). The Culture of Unbelief. Berkeley,University of California Press.   (Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1996). Does belief exist? In A. Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Collins, Arthur W. (1979). Could our beliefs be representations in our brains? Journal of Philosophy 76 (May):225-243.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
D'Arcy, Martin Cyril (1976). The Nature of Belief. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Davies, Martin (2001). Explicit and implicit knowledge: Philosophical aspects. In N.J. Smelser & P.B Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd.   (Google)
Abstract: from the fact that the subject reacts faster to those words than to words that were not on the list. The subject
Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Beyond belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Ellis, B. D. (1979). Rational Belief Systems. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Engel, Pascal (1998). Believing, accepting, and holding true. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Evans, G. R. (2006). Belief: A Short History for Today. I.B. Tauris.   (Google)
Abstract: What is reasonable? -- Godness -- God's in his heaven; all's right with the world -- A high-risk strategy -- Repair -- A nice place to be -- Is there a future for 'me'? -- Heavenly community.
Frankish, Keith (1998). A matter of opinion. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett
Garfield, Jay L. (1988). Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gilbert, M. (2002). Belief and acceptance as features of groups. Protosociology 16:35-69.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Ginsberg, Mitchell (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Google)
Gupta, Sen & Chandra, Santosh (1971). Belief, Faith, and Knowledge. Santiniketan,Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati.   (Google)
Guttenplan, Samuel D. (1994). Belief, knowledge, and the origins of content. Dialectica 48 (3-4):287-305.   (Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (2004). On the ontology of belief. In Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. _The project_ Over the last two and a half centuries three main strands of opinion can be discerned in philosophers
Helm, Paul (1994). Belief Policies. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? It is widely accepted that what we believe is determined by evidence, and is therefore not directly under our control; but according to what criteria is the credibility of the evidence established? Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike single beliefs, belief-policies are directly subject to the will, and therefore to the possibility of weakness of will and self-deception. Helm sets out to interpret standard epistemological positions in terms of belief-policies, and to illustrate their operation in the history of philosophy. He establishes connections between belief-policies, responsibility for beliefs, and the desirability of toleration, before reassessing fideism in the light of his argument
Helm, Paul (1973). The Varieties of Belief. New York,Humanities Press.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. & Schechter, Joshua (2007). Hawthorne's lottery puzzle and the nature of belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that practical reasoning has more to do with rational degrees of belief than with states of knowledge.
Žižek, Slavoj (2001). On Belief. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: What happens to our supposedly atheistic, secular beliefs when they meet the internet, consumerism and New Age mysticism? Zizek, the renowned philosopher and cultural critic, shows in his controversial and witty new book that, despite postmodern warnings that belief is groundless, we are secretly believers. From "cyberspace reason" to the paradox of "Western Buddhism," On Belief traces the contours of the often unconscious beliefs that structure our daily experience
James, William (1889). The psychology of belief. Mind 14 (55):321-352.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Jones, Todd (2001). What CBS wants: How groups can have (difficult to uncover) beliefs. Philosophical Forum 32 (3):221-251.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Laird, John (1972). Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion. [Hamden, Conn.]Archon Books.   (Google)
Landesman, Charles (1964). A note on belief. Analysis 24 (April):180-182.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1983). Belief, acceptance, and cognition. In Herman Parret (ed.), On Believing. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1974). Knowledge. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Leon, Mark . (1992). Rationalising belief. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):299-314.   (Google)
Levi, Isaac & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1964). Belief and disposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (July):221-232.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Levi, Isaac (2004). Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals. He compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for "mild contractions." These are formally the same as the "severe withdrawals" considered by Pagnucco and Rott. The rationale, however, is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing and to accounts of conditionals. Mild Contraction will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism
Levi, Isaac (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists
Löffler, Winfried & Weingartner, Paul (eds.) (2004). Knowledge and Belief: Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 3rd to 9th August 2003, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria). Öbv & Hpt.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1986). Tacit belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1991). I believe that "p"'. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Maloney, J. Christopher (1990). It's hard to believe. Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Manfredi, Pat A. (1993). Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Marcus, Rutharcan B. (1990). Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:133-153.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1995). The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs. Dialectica 49 (2-4):113-30.   (Google)
McKinnon, Alastair (1970). Falsification and Belief. The Hague,Mouton.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1994). Individuating beliefs. Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (1998). The grammar of belief. In William J. Rapaport & F. Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Kluwer.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mclean, Murdith (1970). Episodic belief. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):389-396.   (Google | More links)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (1999). Believing and accepting as a group. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Meihers, A. W. M. (ed.) (1999). Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press.   (Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meyering, Theo C. (2001). The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2003). Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):277-95.   (Google)
Mosterin, J. (2002). Acceptance without belief. Manuscrito 25 (2):313-35.   (Google)
Nathan, N. M. L. (2001). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument. Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments against justified and rational belief
Needham, Rodney (1972). Belief, Language, and Experience. Oxford,Blackwell.   (Google)
Nelson, Raymond J. (1978). Objects of occasion beliefs. Synthese 39 (September):105-139.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Newen, Albert (2001). Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Novak, Michael (1965). Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge: With a New Preface. University Press of America.   (Google)
O'Connor, D. J. (1969). Beliefs, dispositions and actions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:1-16.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Paglieri, Fabio (2007). Changing minds: The role of beliefs in cognitive dynamics. Synthese 155 (2):163-166.   (Google | More links)
Parrett, H. (ed.) (1983). On Believing. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Parret, Herman (ed.) (1983). On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. W. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Pendlebury, Michael J. (1982). Indexical reference and the ontology of belief. South African Journal of Philosophy 1:65-74.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Penco, Carlo (2005). Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper gives attention to a special point in Brandom
Perry, John (1996). Rip Van winkle and other characters. European Review of Philosophy 2:13-39.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this essay I first review Kaplan’s theory of linguistic character, and then explain and motivate a concept of doxastic character. I then develop some concepts for dealing with the topic of belief retention and then, finally, discuss Rip Van Winkle. I come down on Kaplan’s side with respect to the Frege-inspired strategy, narrowly construed. But I advocate something like the Frege-inspired strategy, if it is construed more broadly. On my view it is remarkably easy to retain a belief, and I think Evans is quite wrong about Rip and Kaplan. The central concept I develop, however, that of an information game, is in the spirit of much of Evans’ work. I also borrow some of his terminology.
Pieper, Josef (1975). Belief and Faith: A Philosophical Tract. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Prior, A. N. (1971). Objects of Thought. Oxford,Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief
Quine, W. V. (1970). The Web of Belief. New York,Random House.   (Google)
Ramsey, William (1992). Belief and cognitive architecture. Dialogue 31 (1):115-120.   (Google)
Recanati, F. (1997). Can we believe what we do not understand? Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Rigterink, Roger J. (1991). What are beliefs (if they are anything at all)? Metaphilosophy 22 (January-April):101-14.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1990). States and beliefs. Mind 99 (393):33-51.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Are beliefs brain states? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, are brain states. I call this conception of belief
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2001). Practical realism defended: Replies to critics. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Reply to Van Gulick. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):217-221.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1993). What beliefs are not. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Samraj, Tennyson (2001). What is Your Belief Quotient? Monograph Publishers.   (Google)
Sanyal, Manidipa (2006). The Web of Belief. Allied Publishers.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (ms). Acting contrary to our (professed) beliefs.   (Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (online). Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2001). In-between believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Schmitt, Frederick F. (1992). Knowledge and Belief. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the historically dominant epistemology by examining closely the epistemological principles that underlie the treatment of skepticism in Plato, the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics, Descartes and Hume. Schmitt develops a sustained, detailed argument against many forms of internalism in favor of a reliabilist/externalist epistemology. His version of reliabilism, though strictly externalist, accommodates and explains the most durable intuitions alleged to support internalism. Knowledge and Belief assumes no knowledge of epistemology or its history. Readers of philosophy will find this an excellent introduction to ancient and modern epistemology; this systematic study of the internalist and externalist debate is the first of its kind
Schiller, F. C. S. (1924). Problems of Belief. Ams Press.   (Google)
Sesonske, Alexander (1959). On believing. Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):486-492.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sinclair, Neil (2007). Propositional clothing and belief. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342�362.   (Google | More links)
Skokowski, Paul G. (2004). Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to a better grasp of how representational content can be carried by systems without an explicit representation
Sobel, David & Copp, David (2001). Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Speaks, Jeff (2010). Explaining the disquotational principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):pp. 211-238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Questions about the relationship between thought and language, while central to an understanding of the nature of intentionality, are often obscure. I suggest that such questions be framed by asking whether necessary truths which connect mental and linguistic properties are to be explained in terms of the essence of the mental, or of the linguistic, properties. I argue, first, that the disquotational principle, which connects the contents of the beliefs of agents with the meanings of sentences of their language, is such a necessary truth; second, that its necessity requires explanation; third, that it cannot be explained in terms of the `interdependence' of meaning and belief; and fourth, that it cannot be explained in terms of a theory of meaning which takes the meanings of sentences to be inherited from the beliefs with which they are correlated. I conclude by arguing that the view that social facts about public language meaning are part of the story about what it is to have a belief with a given content is more plausible than is usually thought.
Sperber, Dan (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.   (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts
Sperry, Roger W. (1985). The cognitive role of belief: Implications of the new mentalism. Contemporary Philosophy 10 (10).   (Google)
Spohn, Wolfgang (1996). On the objects of belief. In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When I talk about the objects of belief I do not mean, e.g., the sun to which my thought that the sun will rise tomorrow refers; I do not mean the objects we think about. I take objects rather in a general philosophical sense; they simply are the bearers of properties and the relata of relations. I am thus concerned with the objects that are related by the belief relation „_a_ believes that _p_“. In this scheme „ _a _“ represents a person or an epistemic subject; but I am not going to discuss what a person is. „ _p _“ or „that _p _“ represents an object, namely the object of belief; and I am going to discuss what this is. In other words, I am interested in belief contents – to use a less neutral, narrower and equally unclear term
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1970). Facts, Words and Beliefs. New York,Humanities P..   (Google)
Stainton, Robert J. (1999). Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction. Disputatio 6.   (Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1983). Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief. In Stephen P. Stich (ed.), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Google)
Stout, G. F. (1891). Belief. Mind 16 (64):449-469.   (Google | More links)
Suppes, Patrick (2006). Ramsey's psychological theory of belief. In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.   (Google)
Thomson, Allan (ed.) (1993). What I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Twenty-Two New Zealanders. Gp Publications.   (Google)
Todd, William L. (1977). Beliefs, feelings, and actions. Philosophy Research Archives 1173.   (Google)
Toribio, Josefa (2003). Free belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.   (Google | More links)
Toribio, Josefa (2002). Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds. Theoria 68 (3):224-49.   (Google)
Tuomela, Raimo (1990). Can collectives have beliefs? Acta Philosophica Fennica 49:454-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gulick, Robert (1994). Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.   (Google | More links)
Velleman, David (2000). On the aim of belief. In David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics
Voltolini, Alberto (1987). Belief and intentionality. Topoi 6 (September):121-131.   (Google | More links)
Weirich, Paul (2004). Belief and acceptance. In Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wolgast, Elizabeth Hankins (1977). Paradoxes of Knowledge. Cornell University Press.   (Google)

5.1b.1 Belief, Misc

Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits.
Bortolotti, Lisa & Cox, Rochelle (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Intentionality without rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description
Bortolotti, Lisa (2008). What does Fido believe? Think 7 (19):7-15.   (Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A., Acceptance does not entail belief.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: D.S. Clarke has defended the claim that accepting that p entails believing that p. He refers to this thesis as “the entailment thesis.” In this paper I argue that we ought to reject the entailment thesis. Many philosophers have defended the claim that acceptance and belief are different types of mental states, or, at the very least, that there are ways of accepting propositions that are distinct from doxastic acceptance.1 Many would claim that belief and non-doxastic acceptance differ in some or all of the following six ways. First, belief aims at truth, while acceptance aims at utility or success. Second, belief is shaped by evidence; acceptance need not be shaped by evidence. Third, belief is contextindependent insofar as it is not shaped by an agent’s purposes, but acceptance is often context-dependent and shaped by an agent’s purposes. Fourth, belief is subject to an ideal of agglomeration, and acceptance is not regulated by any such ideal. Fifth, belief comes in degrees while acceptance is all or nothing. Finally, belief is not subject to direct voluntary control, while acceptance can be under our direct voluntary control (some holding that acceptance is also a mental action type). Not all of those who claim that there is a real difference between (non-doxastic) acceptance and belief take it that all of six of these are real distinctions between the two types of attitudes. And some take ‘acceptance’ to be a rather broad type that includes attitudes such as assuming, having faith, hypothesizing, imagining, trusting, and believing as ways of accepting propositions
Funkhouser, Eric & Spaulding, Shannon (2009). Imagination and other scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief–desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script . We generalize the script concept to show how things besides imagination can occupy this same role in both pretense and non-pretense actions. The Humean Theory of Motivation should then be modified to cover this script role
Mele, Alfred R. (1986). Incontinent believing. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at odds with his performing the action at issue. More precisely, in intentionally and freely A-ing at t, S performs a full-blown akratic action if and only if, at t, S consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not doing an A at t. What I am after in this paper is an account of a comparable, full-blown variety of incontinent believing, and an explanation of its possibility.
Sandis, Constantine (2008). Jessica brown, anti-individualism and knowledge. Minds and Machines 18 (1).   (Google)
Shaffer, Michael J. (2006). The publicity of belief, epistemic wrongs and moral wrongs. Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide belief cannot be separated from action. It is then also suggested that we should accept a form of W. K. Clifford's evidentialism. When these theses are jointly accepted in conjunction with the basic principle of ethics that it is prima facie wrong to act in such a way that may subject others to serious but unnecessary and avoidable harm, it follows that many beliefs are morally wrong
Shieber, Joseph (2009). Understanding Assertion: Lessons from the False Belief Task. Language & Communication 29 (1):47-60.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper uses recent research in developmental psychology regarding the acquisition of the concept of belief in young children to explore the contrast between a disposition-based account of the principles underlying linguistic communication and the representative and highly influential intention-based accounts of assertional practice advanced by David Lewis and Donald Davidson. Indeed, evidence from recent work in developmental psychology would seem to suggest that disposition-based accounts are not only possible accounts of the acquisition of competence in assertional practice, but are in fact better than their rivals in explaining the way such competence is actually acquired.
Stalnaker, Robert C. (1981). Indexical belief. Synthese 49 (1).   (Google)

5.1b.2 Collective Belief

Gilbert, Margaret (1987). Modelling collective belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group beliefs according to the joint acceptance model are important phenomena whose aetiology and development require investigation. There is an analogous phenomenon of social or group preference, which social choice theory tends to ignore
Gilbert, Margaret P. (1994). Remarks on collective belief. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Abstract:      The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain proposition as a body. This joint commitment puts speakers under an obligation to refrain from speaking in certain ways, and gives hearers a correlative right to such refraining, and hence a basis for offended rebukes
Wray, K. Brad (2001). Collective belief and acceptance. Synthese 129 (3):319-33.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)

5.1b.3 De Re Belief

Bach, Kent (1982). "De re" belief and methodological solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1982). De re belief in action. Philosophical Review 91 (3):363-387.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder & Wald, Jan David (1979). Indexical reference and de re belief. Philosophical Studies 36 (3).   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2005). Indexical propositions and de re belief ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism
Cresswell, Maxwell J. & Stechow, Arnim (1982). De re belief generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4).   (Google)
Cusmariu, Arnold (1977). About Belief De Re. Logique et Analyse 77 (2):138-147.   (Google)
Abstract: I give the following analysis of de re belief: S believes with respect to X that it has the property F =df S believes a proposition which is for S extensionally to the effect that it has the property F. I spell this definition out and defend it against objections by M. Pastin, commenting also on his account of de re belief.
Daly, Chris John (2007). Acquaintance and de re thought. Synthese 156 (1).   (Google)
Eaker, Erin L. (2004). David Kaplan on de re belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):379–395.   (Google | More links)
Pastin, Mark J. (1974). About de re belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):569-575.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (2009). What is de re belief? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Zong, Desheng (forthcoming). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. The Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation. I argue that the belief is unfounded. Briefly: a notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation only if it includes as a constituent psychological properties whose relation with their bearer is one-many or many-one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state (a psychological state with indexical content) and its bearer in which it is first tokened is not a one-many or many-one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one-many or many-one form. Since the Lockean account of personal identity relies on the availability of a notion of psychological continuity featuring indexical psychological states, the conclusion of this paper cast strong doubt on the plausibility of the Lockean theory.

5.1b.4 The Nature of Belief

Adler, Jonathan E. (2002). Akratic believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
Adler, Jonathan E. (1999). The ethics of belief: Off the wrong track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.   (Google | More links)
Audi, Robert (1982). Believing and affirming. Mind 91 (361):115-120.   (Google | More links)
Audi, Robert N. (1994). Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Brown, Curtis (1986). What is a belief state? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within each noninternal psychological state that enters into the explanation of some action or behavior we can locate an ?internal core state? which can assume the causal-explanatory role of the noninternal state."2 In the same vein, Stephen Stich writes that "nonautonomous" states, like belief, are best viewed as "conceptually complex hybrids" made up of an autonomous component together with historical and contextual features.3 John Perry, whose term I have adopted, distinguishes between belief states, which are determined by an individual?s intrinsic properties, and objects of belief, which are not.4 And Daniel Dennett makes use of the same notion when he asks:5
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2004). Acceptance and deciding to believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):173-190.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2005). Can faith be a doxastic venture? Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture that involves pragmatically assuming that God exists
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Doxastic decisions and controlling belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1).   (Google | More links)
Buleandra, Andrei (2009). Doxastic transparency and prescriptivity. Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.   (Google)
Abstract: Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, given his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain
Chan, Timothy (2008). Belief, assertion and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are, in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions
Chan, Timothy (2010). Moore's paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox. Synthese 173 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox
Chien, A. J. (1985). Demonstratives and belief states. Philosophical Studies 47 (2).   (Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 104 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science
Crimmins, Mark (1992). Tacitness and virtual beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). Methodological reflections on belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Cusmariu, Arnold (1982). Translation and Belief. Analysis 42 (1):12-16.   (Google)
Abstract: I present a formally explicit statement of Church's celebrated argument against Carnap's analysis of belief and defend it against well-known objections by W.V.O. Quine, R.M. Martin, and Michael Dummett.
Cusmariu, Arnold (1983). Translation and Belief Again. Analysis 43 (1):23-25.   (Google)
Abstract: In "Translation and Belief" I presented a two-stage version of Church's translation argument against Carnap's analysis of belief. Here I show that the first stage is sufficient to establish a weaker, though no less significant conclusion, if supplemented with the principle that the same thought or idea can be expressed in different languages.
Falvey, Kevin (1999). A natural history of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Frankish, Keith (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists
Frankish, Keith (1998). Natural language and virtual belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). Alief and belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript]
Gendler, Tamar (2009). Alief in action (and reaction). Mind & Language 23 (5):552-585.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content
Gibbard, Allan (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.   (Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Gozzano, Simone (1994). Rationality, folk psychology, and the belief-opinion distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a useful treatment of the paradoxes can be obtained by revising the rationality assumption
Hawthorne, James (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may be just rational degree of confidence above some threshold level that the agent deems sufficient for belief. He finds hints of this view in Locke’s discussion of probability and degrees of assent, so he calls it the Lockean Thesis.1 The Lockean Thesis has important implications for the logic of belief. Most prominently, it implies that even a logically ideal agent whose degrees of confidence satisfy the axioms of probability theory may quite rationally believe each of a large body of propositions that are jointly inconsistent. For example, an agent may legitimately believe that on each given occasion her well-maintained car will start, but nevertheless believe that she will eventually encounter a..
Hendricks, Scott (2006). The frame problem and theories of belief. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief
Holton, Richard (2008). Partial belief, partial intention. Mind 117 (465):27-58.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
Hookway, Christopher (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:75-89.   (Google)
Horst, Steven (1995). Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Folk belief and commonplace belief. Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2007). Is belief an internal state? Philosophical Studies 132 (3):571-580.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1985). Beliefs, dispositions and demonstratives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (June):167-176.   (Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.   (Google | More links)
Moore, Joseph G. (1999). Misdisquotation and substitutivity: When not to infer belief from assent. Mind 108 (430):335-365.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is not always maintained when co-referential names are intersubstituted in belief reports. I argue here that our disquotational practice is sensitive to certain shifts in conversational context, and it is only if we overlook these shifts - if we 'misdisquote' - that we can draw the conclusions Kripke wants to draw from his examples. In the wake of this conclusion, I provide a 'contextualist' treatment of Kripke's puzzle cases. I show how this treatment is motivated by certain norms of rationality, and I defend these norms against an intriguing 'anti-Cartesian' theory of mind. Throughout the paper, I develop the larger implications that my treatment of Kripke's argument has for the semantic theory of names and belief reports, and, more generally, for our picture of the relation between linguistic behaviour and our states of mind
Owens, David J. (2003). Does belief have an aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs
Peacocke, Christopher (1998). Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Perry, John (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." Postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," "From Worlds to Situations," and "The Prince and the Phone Booth" are a number of important essays that have been less accessible and that discuss important aspects of Perry's views, referred to as "Critical Referentialism," on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind
Pugmire, David (1972). A doubt about the normative theory of belief. Mind 81 (324):584-586.   (Google | More links)
Railton, Peter (1994). Truth, reason, and the regulation of belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.   (Google | More links)
Rowbottom, Darrell P. (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.   (Google)
Abstract: Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative.
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1991). Dretske on the explanatory role of belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Sandis, Constantine (2008). Jessica brown, anti-individualism and knowledge. Minds and Machines 18 (1).   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it
Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument
Shah, Nishi (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (2006). No Norm needed: On the aim of belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.   (Google)
Abstract: Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (forthcoming). The truth norm and guidance: a reply to Glüer and Wikforss. Mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (2009) argue that any truth norm for belief, linking the correctness of believing p with the truth of p, is bound to be uninformative since applying the norm to determine the correctness of a belief as to whether p, would itself require forming such a belief. I argue that this objection conflates the condition under which the norm deems beliefs correct, with the psychological state an agent must be in to apply the norm. I also show that since the truth norm conflicts with other possible norms that clearly are informative, the truth norm must itself be informative.
Tiffany, E. C. (2001). The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   If mental anomalism is to be interpreted as a thesisunique to psychology, the anomalousness must begrounded in some feature unique to the mental,presumably its rational nature. While the ground forsuch arguments from normativity has been notoriouslyslippery terrain, there are two recently influentialstrategies which make the argument precise. The firstis to deny the possibility of psychophysical bridgelaws because of the different constitutive essences ofmental and physical laws, and the second is to arguethat mental anomalism follows from the uncodifiabilityof rationality. In this paper I argue that bothstrategies fail – the latter because it conflates primafacie and all things considered rationality and theformer because it rests on a false premise, theprinciple of the rational character of belief. Idistinguish four different formulations of thisprinciple and argue that those formulations which areplausible cannot support the argument for mentalanomalism
Tomkow, Terrance (ms). Now, Me.   (Google | More links)
Vahid, Hamid (2006). Aiming at truth: Doxastic vs. epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin by critically examining a number of recent attempts to unpack the metaphor. I shall then proceed to highlight an error that seems to cripple most of these attempts. This involves the confusion between, what I call, doxastic and epistemic goals. Finally, having offered my own positive account of the aim-of-belief thesis, I shall underline its deflationary nature by distinguishing between aiming at truth and hitting that target (truth). I end by comparing the account with certain prominent inflationary theories of the nature of belief
Vahid, Hamid (forthcoming). Rationalizing beliefs: Evidential vs. pragmatic reasons. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truth-conducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by non-epistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant
Wedgwood, Ralph (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires that, if one considers a proposition at all, one should believe it if and only if it is true
Whiting, Daniel (2010). Should I believe the truth? Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-107.   (Google)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2007). The nature of belief. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to behaviour than most contemporary functionalists allow

5.1b.5 Tacit and Dispositional Belief