MindPapers: 5.1b. Pleasure

Aydede, Murat (2000). An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570. (Cited by 20 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bedford, E. (1959). Pleasure and belief, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-92. (Google | Edit)

Blum, Alex (1991). A note on pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (October):367-70. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bradley, Francis H. (1888). On pleasure, pain, desire and volition. Mind 13 (49):1-36. (Google | More links | Edit)

Drake, Durant (1919). Is pleasure objective? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (24):665-668. (Google | More links | Edit)

Duncker, Karl (1941). On pleasure, emotion, and striving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (June):391-430. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links | Edit)

Edwards, R. (1975). Do pleasures and pains differ qualitatively? Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (4):270-81. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Fuchs, Alan E. (1976). The production of pleasure by stimulation of the brain: An alleged conflict between science and philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (June):494-505. (Google | More links | Edit)

Gallie, W. B. (1954). Pleasure, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 147:147-164. (Google | Edit)

Goldstein, Irwin (1981). Cognitive pleasure and distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Goldstein, Irwin (1999). Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Goldstein, Irwin (1989). Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Goldstein, Irwin (1980). Why people prefer pleasure to pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Gosling, Justin C. B. (1969). Pleasure And Desire: The Case For Hedonism Reviewed. Oxford,: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 15 | Google | Edit)

Heathwood, Chris (online). The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: sub> One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation quali?es as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible for- mulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections

Helm, Bennett W. (2002). Felt evaluations: A theory of pleasure and pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- stitutive of that import by virtue of the broader rational patterns of which they are a part and that they serve to de?ne. This account of felt eval- uations makes sense of the way in which pleasures and pains grab our attention and motivate us to act and of the peculiar dual objectivity and subjectivity of their implicit evaluations, while o?ering a phenomenology adequate to both emotional and bodily pleasures and pains

Johannson, Ingvar (2001). Species and dimensions of pleasure. Metaphysica 2 (2):39-72. (Google | Edit)

Jones, Ward E. (2006). The function and content of amusement. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):126-137. (Google | More links | Edit)

Macintyre, Alasdair (1965). Pleasure as a reason for action. The Monist 49 (April):215-233. (Google | Edit)

Manser, A. R. (1961). Pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:223-238. (Google | Edit)

Mccloskey, Mary A. (1971). Pleasure. Mind 80 (October):542-551. (Google | More links | Edit)

Mezes, Sidney E. (1895). Pleasure and pain defined. Philosophical Review 4 (1):22-46. (Google | More links | Edit)

Momeyer, Richard W. (1975). Is pleasure a sensation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):113-21. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Myers, Gerald E. (1957). Ryle on pleasure. Journal of Philosophy 54 (March):181-187. (Google | More links | Edit)

Nichols, Herbert (1892). The origin of pleasure and pain, II. Philosophical Review 1 (5):518-534. (Google | More links | Edit)

Nichols, Herbert (1892). The origin of pleasure and pain, I. Philosophical Review 1 (4):403-432. (Google | More links | Edit)

Olsaretti, Serena (forthcoming). The limits of hedonism: Feldman on the value of attitudinal pleasure. Philosophical Studies. (Google | More links | Edit)

O'shaughnessy, R. J. (1966). Enjoying and suffering. Analysis 26 (April):153-160. (Google | Edit)

Ossowska, Maria (1961). Remarks on the ancient distinction between bodily and mental pleasures. Inquiry 4:123-127. (Google | Edit)

Penelhum, Terence W. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (June):488-503. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Perry, David L. (1967). The Concept Of Pleasure. Ny: Humanities Press. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Plochmann, George K. (1950). Some neglected considerations on pleasure and pain. Ethics 61 (October):51-55. (Google | More links | Edit)

Puccetti, Roland (1969). The sensations of pleasure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (October):239-245. (Google | More links | Edit)

Quinn, Warren S. (1968). Pleasure -- disposition or episode? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (June):578-86. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Rachels, Stuart (2000). Is unpleasantness intrinsic to unpleasant experiences? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):187-210. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Unpleasant experiences include backaches, moments of nausea, moments of nervousness, phantom pains, and so on. What does their unpleasantness consist in? The unpleasantness of an experience has been thought to consist in: (1) its representing bodily damage; (2) its inclining the subject to fight its continuation; (3) the subject?s disliking it; (4) features intrinsic to it. I offer compelling objections to (1) and (2) and less compelling objections to (3). I defend (4) against five challenging objections and offer two reasons to believe it. Hence, I advocate ?Intrinsic Nature,? the idea that unpleasantness is intrinsic to unpleasant experiences

Rachels, Stuart (2004). Six theses about pleasure. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I defend these claims: (1) ?Pleasure? has exactly one English antonym: ?unpleasure?. (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren?t pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn?t be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims

Robinson, William S. (2006). What is it like to like? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations

Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1892). Pleasure-pain and sensation. Philosophical Review 1 (6):625-648. (Google | Edit)

Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1893). Prof. Bain on pleasure and pain. Mind 2 (5):89-93. (Google | Edit)

Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1889). The classification of pleasure and pain. Mind 14 (56):511-536. (Google | Edit)

Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. (II.). Mind 16 (64):470-497. (Google | Edit)

Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. Mind 16 (63):327-354. (Google | Edit)

Ryle, Gilbert (1954). Pleasure, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 135:135-146. (Google | Edit)

Sagawa, Y.; Sawai, H. & Sakai, N. (2002). A hypothesis concerning a relationship between pleasantness and unpleasantness. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Schroeder, Timothy (2001). Pleasure, displeasure, and representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):507-530. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Stanley, Hiram M. (1889). Relation of feeling to pleasure and pain. Mind 14 (56):537-544. (Google | More links | Edit)

Taylor, C. C. W. (1963). Pleasure. Analysis 23 (January):2-20. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Wallis, Wilson D. (1919). The objectivity of pleasure. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (12):324-327. (Google | More links | Edit)

Wallis, Wilson D. (1919). What is real pleasure? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (14):384-386. (Google | More links | Edit)

Wielenberg, Erik (2002). Pleasure, pain, and moral character and development. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):282-299. (Google | More links | Edit)

Williams, Bernard A. O. (1959). Pleasure and belief, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:57-72. (Google | Edit)

Williams, Bernard A. O. (1959). Pleasure and belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Wilker, David & Nelson, Jack (1975). Pleasure and the intrinsically desired. Analysis 35 (April):152-159. (Google | Edit)

5.1a	Pain [117]

5.1b	Pleasure [53]

5.1c	Emotions [343]

5.1d	Dreams [63]

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