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5.1b.3. De Re Belief (De Re Belief on PhilPapers)

Bach, Kent (1982). "De re" belief and methodological solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1982). De re belief in action. Philosophical Review 91 (3):363-387.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder & Wald, Jan David (1979). Indexical reference and de re belief. Philosophical Studies 36 (3).   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2005). Indexical propositions and de re belief ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism
Cresswell, Maxwell J. & Stechow, Arnim (1982). De re belief generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4).   (Google)
Cusmariu, Arnold (1977). About Belief De Re. Logique et Analyse 77 (2):138-147.   (Google)
Abstract: I give the following analysis of de re belief: S believes with respect to X that it has the property F =df S believes a proposition which is for S extensionally to the effect that it has the property F. I spell this definition out and defend it against objections by M. Pastin, commenting also on his account of de re belief.
Daly, Chris John (2007). Acquaintance and de re thought. Synthese 156 (1).   (Google)
Eaker, Erin L. (2004). David Kaplan on de re belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):379–395.   (Google | More links)
Pastin, Mark J. (1974). About de re belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):569-575.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (2009). What is de re belief? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Zong, Desheng (forthcoming). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. The Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation. I argue that the belief is unfounded. Briefly: a notion of psychological continuity expresses a one-many or many-one relation only if it includes as a constituent psychological properties whose relation with their bearer is one-many or many-one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state (a psychological state with indexical content) and its bearer in which it is first tokened is not a one-many or many-one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one-many or many-one form. Since the Lockean account of personal identity relies on the availability of a notion of psychological continuity featuring indexical psychological states, the conclusion of this paper cast strong doubt on the plausibility of the Lockean theory.