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5.1c.1. Bodily Awareness (Bodily Awareness on PhilPapers)

Bayne, Tim & Levy, Neil (2005). Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had been transformed for the better by the operation [1]. A second patient was also reported as having been satisfied with his amputation [2]
Berm, (2001). Bodily self-awareness and the will: Reply to power. Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.   (Google | More links)
Bermúdez, José Luis (2005). The phenomenology of bodily awareness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Berm, (2005). The phenomenology of bodily awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boyle, Marjorie O'Rourke (1998). Senses of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity From Michelangelo to Calvin. Brill.   (Google)
Brewer, Bill (1995). Bodily awareness and the self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and The Self. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Abstract: In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of common sense anti-Cartesianism. Progress in this direction depends upon a far more psychologically informed understanding of normal and abnormal bodily awareness than is generally found in philosophical discussions of these issues. In the context of my attempt at some such understanding, I go on to assess the potential of this more direct line of argument
Brugger, Peter (2006). From phantom limb to phantom body: Varieties of extracorporeal awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chen, Cheryl K. (forthcoming). Bodily awareness and immunity to error through misidentification. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: Some first person statements, such as 'I am in pain', are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine whether some physical self-ascriptions are in fact IEM, and—if they are—what role that fact is supposed to play in arguments for the anti-Cartesian claim that self-consciousness is consciousness of oneself as a material object. I will argue that if we accept the assumptions required to show that physical self-ascriptions are IEM, then IEM cannot play the role it needs to play in these anti-Cartesian arguments
Cole, Jonathan; Depraz, Natalie & Gallagher, Shaun (online). Unity and disunity in bodily awareness: Phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Google)
Conway, David A. (1973). Sensations and bodily position: A conclusive argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.   (Google | More links)
de Vignemont, Frederique (2007). Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Bodily self-awareness and object perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):in press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press
Holmes, Nicholas P. & Spence, Charles (2006). Beyond the body schema: Visual, prosthetic, and technological contributions to bodily perception and awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.   (Google)
Abstract: De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.
Legrand, D.; Grünbaum, T. & Krueger, J. (2009). Dimensions of bodily subjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):279-283.   (Google)
Legrand, Dorothée & Ravn, Susanne (2009). Perceiving subjectivity in bodily movement: The case of dancers. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form of reflective access to subjectivity at the bodily level. In particular, we argue that subjectivity is bodily expressed, thereby allowing the experience of the body′s subjectivity directly during perceptual experiences of the body. We use an interweaving of phenomenological explorations and ethnographical methods which allows validating this proposal by considering the experience of body experts (dancers)
Legrand, Doroth (2006). The bodily self: The sensori-motor roots of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is
Lenggenhager, Bigna; Tadi, Tej; Metzinger, Thomas & Blanke, Olaf (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.   (Google)
Lott, Tommy L. (1989). Anscombe on justifying claims to know one's bodily position. Philosophical Investigations 12 (October):293-307.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1995). Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Meeks, Roblin (online). Awareness of the body "from the inside": Identification, ownership, and error.   (Google)
Mizumoto, Masaharu & Ishikawa, Masato (2005). Immunity to error through misidentification and the bodily illusion experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):3-19.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we introduce a paradigm of experiment which, we believe, is of interest both in psychology and philosophy. There the subject wears an HMD (head-mount display), and a camera is set up at the upper corner of the room, in which the subject is. As a result, the subject observes his own body through the HMD. We will mainly focus on the philosophical relevance of this experiment, especially to the thesis of so-called 'immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun'. We will argue that one experiment conducted in this setting, which we call the bodily illusion experiment, provides a counterexample to that thesis
Montero, Barbara (2010). Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled movement? Inquiry 53 (2):105 – 122.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere with well-developed rote skills, like climbing stairs, I suggest that it is typically not detrimental to the skills of expert athletes, performing artists, and other individuals who endeavor to achieve excellence. Along the way, I present a critical analysis of some philosophical theories and behavioral studies on the relationship between attention and bodily movement, an explanation of why attention may be beneficial at the highest level of performance and an error theory that explains why many have thought the contrary. Though tentative, I present my view as a challenge to the widespread starting assumption in research on highly skilled movement that at the pinnacle of skill attention to one's movement is detrimental
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, I. Mind 10 (38):227-244.   (Google | More links)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, II. Mind 10 (39):377-398.   (Google | More links)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, III. Mind 10 (40):512-531.   (Google | More links)
Murray, Craig D. & Gordon, Michael S. (2001). Changes in bodily awareness induced by immersive virtual reality. CyberPsychology and Behavior 4 (3):365-371.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Newstead, Anne (2006). Evans's anti-cartesian argument: A critical evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract This paper evaluates the anti-Cartesian argument given by Evans in chapter seven of The Varieties of Reference. It focuses on Evans’ claim that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to errors of misidentification. However, Evans’s argument suffers from a crucial ambiguity. Once disambiguated, it turns out that Evans’s argument either begs the question against the Cartesian or fails to be plausible. Nonetheless, the argument is important for drawing our attention to the idea that bodily modes of awareness should be taken seriously as possible forms of self-awareness.
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1998). Proprioception and the body image. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links)
Reynaert, Peter (2006). What is it like to be embodied, naturalizing bodily self-awareness? In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume LXXXIX: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos, Book Two. Dordrecht: Springer.   (Google)
Ring, Merrill (1982). Sensations and kinaesthetic knowledge. Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2010). Consciousness, the self and bodily location. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (2008). Reply to Tsakiris and Fotopoulou "Is my body the sum of online and offline body representations. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1321):1323.   (Google)
Abstract: I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online/offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I advocate in the target article. Third they claim that my model makes a false prediction. I agree with the first two lines of criticism. As to the first I will clarify and tone down the claims made about the role of the sense of embodiment in self recognition tasks. However, I will argue that the sense of embodiment is measured in van den Bos and Jeannerod’s study. I strongly welcome the second line of criticism Tsakiris and Fotopoulou offer. I will add some reasons to agree that the ‘serial construction’ account of the relationship between online and offline representations cannot be true. I maintain, however, that this does not affect the central thesis of target article, namely that it is an offline representation of the body that underlies the sense of embodiment. Finally, I will defend the model by arguing that it does not make the false prediction Tsakiris and Fotopoulou attribute to it.
Montgomery, E. (1885). Space and Touch (i). Mind 10 (38):227-44.   (Google)
Smith, Joel (2006). Bodily awareness, imagination, and the self. European Journal Of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title
Carruthers, Glenn (2008). Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.