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5.1c.3. Bodily Sensations (Bodily Sensations on PhilPapers)

Armstrong, David M. (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1964). Vesey on bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Representationism1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say 'seem' because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye's (2004) heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference
Combes, Richard (1991). Disembodying 'bodily' sensations. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 107:107-131.   (Google)
Conway, David A. (1973). Sensations and bodily position: A conclusive argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.   (Google | More links)
de Vignemont, Frederique (2007). Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
Hyman, John (2006). Reply to Wyller. Philosophy 81 (317):531-534.   (Google | More links)
Ring, Merrill (1982). Sensations and kinaesthetic knowledge. Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485.   (Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1964). Armstrong on bodily sensations. Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1964). Bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):232-247.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1967). Margolis on the location of bodily sensations. Analysis 27 (April):174-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1961). The location of bodily sensations. Mind 70 (January):25-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)