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5.1e. Dreams (Dreams on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ahmad, M. M. Zuhuruddin[from old catalog] (1936). A Peep Into the Spiritual Unconscious (a Philosophical Attempt to Explain the Phenomenon of Dreams). [Bombay, India Printing Works.   (Google)
Ardito, Rita B. (2000). Dreaming as an active construction of meaning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):907-908.   (Google)
Abstract: Although the work of Revonsuo is commendable for its attempt to use an evolutionary approach to formulate a hypothesis about the adaptive function of dreaming, the conclusions arrived at by this author cannot be fully shared. Particularly questionable is the idea that the specific function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events. I propose here a hypothesis in which the dream can have a different function. [Revonsuo]
Aristotle, , Dreams.   (Google)
Aristotle, , On dreams.   (Google | More links)
Augé, Marc (1999). The War of Dreams: Exercises in Ethno-Fiction. Pluto Press.   (Google)
Babbitt, Susan E. (1996). Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people
Baker, M. J. (1954). Sleeping and waking. Mind 63 (October):539-543.   (Google | More links)
Beenfeldt, Christian (2008). A wake up call—or more sweet slumber? A review of Daniel Dennett's sweet dreams: Philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. Think 7 (19):85-92.   (Google)
Bencivenga, Ermanno (1983). Descartes, dreaming, and professor Wilson. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1).   (Google)
Blagrove, Mark (2000). Dreams have meaning but no function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):910-911.   (Google)
Abstract: Solms shows the cortical basis for why dreams reflect waking concerns and goals, but with deficient volition. I argue the latter relates to Hobson et al.'s process I as well as M. A memory function for REM sleep is possible, but may be irrelevant to dream characteristics, which, contrary to Revonsuo, mirror the range of waking emotions, positive and negative. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Black, Donald (2000). Dreams of pure sociology. Sociological Theory 18 (3):343-367.   (Google | More links)
Blagrove, Mark (1996). Problems with the cognitive psychological modeling of dreaming. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):99-134.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bloom, Harold (1997). Book review: Omens of the millennium: The gnosis of angels, dreams, and resurrection. Philosophy and Literature 21 (2).   (Google)
Bodnar, John (2010). Memory. Bad dreams about the good war : Bataan. In Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair & Brian L. Ott (eds.), Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials. University of Alabama Press.   (Google)
Boland, Lawrence A. (2006). On reviewing machine dreams : Zoomed-in versus zoomed-out. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: continues to receive many reviews. Judging by recent reviews, this is a very controversial book. The question considered here is, how can one fairly review a controversial book—particularly when the book is widely popular and, for a history of economic thought book, a best seller? This essay uses Mirowski’s book as a case study to propose one answer for this question. In the process, it will examine how others seem to have answered this question. Key Words: methodology • reviews • Mirowski • Machine Dreams
Borbély, Alexander A. & Wittmann, Lutz (2000). Sleep, not Rem sleep, is the Royal road to dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):911-912.   (Google)
Abstract: The advent of functional imaging has reinforced the attempts to define dreaming as a sleep state-dependent phenomenon. PET scans revealed major differences between nonREM sleep and REM sleep. However, because dreaming occurs throughout sleep, the common features of the two sleep states, rather than the differences, could help define the prerequisite for the occurrence of dreams. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten (2007). Dreams in buddhism and western aesthetics: Some thoughts on play, style and space. Asian Philosophy 17 (1):65 – 81.   (Google)
Abstract: Several Buddhist schools in India, China and Japan concentrate on the interrelationships between waking and dreaming consciousness. In Eastern philosophy, reality can be seen as a dream and an obscure 'reality beyond' can be considered as real. In spite of the overwhelming Platonic-Aristotelian-Freudian influence existent in Western culture, some Western thinkers and artists - Valéry, Baudelaire, and Schnitzler, for example - have been fascinated by a kind of 'simple presence' contained in dreams. I show that this has consequences for a philosophy of space. According to the authors discussed, the dreamer and the player recognize that human space always means the entire cosmos
Botz–Bornstein, Thorsten (2003). The dream of language: Wittgenstein's concept of dreams in the context of style and lebensform. Philosophical Forum 34 (1):73–89.   (Google | More links)
Botterill, George (2008). The internal problem of dreaming: Detection and epistemic risk. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):139 – 160.   (Google)
Abstract: There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of: Dreams are experiences we have during sleep. Dream-experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences. We can tell that we are awake. (1)-(3) threaten to violate a requirement on discrimination: that we can only tell Xs from Ys if there is some detectable difference between Xs and Ys. Attempts to solve the problem by Descartes and Williams are considered. It is suggested that if we take account of levels of epistemic risk, we can use Descartes's criterion of lack of coherence, at least with hindsight - which is the time when we need to use it
Browne, Alice (1981). Dreams and picture-writing: Some examples of this comparison from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44:90-100.   (Google | More links)
Browne, Alice (1977). Descartes's dreams. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40:256-273.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Robert (1957). Sound sleep and sound scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (May):47-53.   (Google | More links)
Caldwell, Robert L. (1965). Malcolm and the criterion of sleep. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):339-352.   (Google | More links)
Cantwell Smith, Brian (1965). Dreaming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (May):48-57.   (Google)
Carney, Terry; Beaupert, Fleur Aileen; Perry, Julia & Tait, David, Advocacy and participation in mental health cases: Realisable rights or pipe-dreams?   (Google)
Abstract:      This article discusses Australian experiences of mental health clients, legal advocates and other stakeholders in the mental health review system. We review forms of advocacy, the reactions to these, and the contribution lawyers make to protecting rights within this field. Based on our fieldwork we suggest a mixed model of advocacy, one that includes legal representation that goes beyond simple 'following instructions', but also self-advocacy, systemic advocacy and mobilisation of support networks. We suggest that Jan Brakel was right to recently call for a re-conceptualisation of mental health advocacy, and indicate ways this might be achieved
Cartwright, Rosalind (2000). How and why the brain makes dreams: A report card on current research on dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):914-916.   (Google)
Abstract: The target articles in this volume address the three major questions about dreaming that have been most responsible for the delay in progress in this field over the past 25 years. These are: (1) Where in the brain is dreaming produced, given that dream reports can be elicited from sleep stages other than REM? (2) Do dream plots have any intrinsic meaning? (3) Does dreaming serve some specialized function? The answers offered here when added together support a new model of dreaming that is testable, and should revitalize this area of study. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Cavallero, Corrado (2000). Rem sieep = dreaming: The never-ending story. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):916-917.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been widely demonstrated that dreaming occurs throughout human sleep. However, we once again are facing new variants of the equation “REM sleep = Dreaming.” Nielsen proposes a model that assumes covert REM processes in NREM sleep. I argue against this possibility, because dream research has shown that REM sleep is not a necessary condition for dreaming to occur. [Nielson]
Chapman, Peter & Underwood, Geoffrey (2000). Mental states during dreaming and daydreaming: Some methodological loopholes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):917-918.   (Google)
Abstract: Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]
Chappell, Vere C. (1963). The concept of dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (July):193-213.   (Google | More links)
Cheyne, J. A. (2000). Play, dreams, and simulation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):918-919.   (Google)
Abstract: Threat themes are clearly over-represented in dreams. Threat is, however, not the only theme with potential evolutionary significance. Even for hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis, for which threat themes are far commoner than for ordinary dreaming, consistent non-threat themes have been reported. Revonsuo's simulation hypothesis represents an encouraging initiative to develop an evolutionary functional approach to dream-related experiences but it could be broadened to include evolutionarily relevant themes beyond threat. It is also suggested that Revonsuo's evolutionary re-interpretation of dreams might profitably be compared to arguments for, and models of, evolutionary functions of play. [Revonsuo]
Child, William (2007). Dreaming, calculating, thinking: Wittgenstein and anti-realism about the past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.   (Google | More links)
Chihara, C. (1965). What dreams are made of. Theoria 31:145-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Child, William (2009). Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer. Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):329-337.   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections
Chynoweth, Brad (2010). Descartes' resolution of the dreaming doubt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.   (Google)
Abstract: After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty that sensory experience must meet in the Sixth Meditation is lower than it must meet in the First
Clark, Andy (2005). The twisted matrix: Dream, simulation, or hybrid? In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. Oxford University Press New York.   (Google | More links)
Coenen, Anton (2000). The divorce of Rem sleep and dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):922-924.   (Google)
Abstract: The validity of dream recall is discussed. What is the relation between the actual dream and its later reflection? Nielsen proposes differential sleep mentation, which is probably determined by dream accessibility. Solms argues that REM sleep and dreaming are double dissociable states. Dreaming occurs outside REM sleep when cerebral activation is high enough. That various active sleep states correlate with vivid dream reports implies that REM sleep and dreaming are single dissociable states. Vertes & Eastman reject that REM sleep is involved in memory consolidation. Considerable evidence for this was obtained by REM deprivation studies with the dubious water tank technique. [Nielsen; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Combs, Allan; Kahn, David & Krippner, Stanley (2000). Dreaming and the self-organizing brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):4-11.   (Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Curley, Edwin M. (1975). Dreaming and conceptual revision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (August):119-41.   (Google | More links)
Curry, Robert (1974). Films and dreams. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1):83-89.   (Google | More links)
Davenport, Edward (1990). Review essays : Dreams and nightmares technology in 3-d. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1).   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
Desjardins, Sophie & Zadra, Antonio (2006). Is the threat simulation theory threatened by recurrent dreams? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):470-474.   (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (1966). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Analysis 26 (March):129-134.   (Google)
Doricchi, Fabrizio & Violani, Cristiano (2000). Mesolimbic dopamine and the neuropsychology of dreaming: Some caution and reconsiderations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):930-931.   (Google)
Abstract: New findings point to a role for mesolimbic DA circuits in the generation of dreaming. We disagree with Solms about these structures having an exclusive role in generating dreams. We review data suggesting that dreaming can be interrupted at different levels of processing and that anterior-subcortical lesions associated with dream cessation are unlikely to produce selective hypodopaminergic dynamic impairments. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1978). Belief in dreams. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):61-64.   (Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (ed.) (1977). Philosophical Essays on Dreaming. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Singer Jr, Edgar A. (1924). On pain and dreams. Journal of Philosophy 21 (22):589-601.   (Google | More links)
Emmett, Kathleen (1978). Oneiric experiences. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):445-50.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Fawcett, Douglas (1921). Dreams. Mind 30 (117):122-123.   (Google | More links)
Fawcett, Douglas (1921). To the editor of "mind". Dreams. Mind 30 (117).   (Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1995). Deconstructing dreams: The spandrels of sleep. Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):5-27.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Flanagan, Owen (2000). Dreaming is not an adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):936-939.   (Google)
Abstract: The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being different. To establish that some trait of character is an adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story about the fitness enhancing function it served when it evolved and possibly a story of how the maintenance of this function is fitness enhancing now. My aim is to evaluate the proposals put forward in these papers. My conclusion is that although sleep is almost certainly an adaptation, dreaming is not. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Flanagan, Owen J. (2000). Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What, if anything, do dreams tell us about ourselves? What is the relationship between types of sleep and types of dreams? Does dreaming serve any purpose? Or are dreams simply meaningless mental noise--"unmusical fingers wandering over the piano keys"? With expertise in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, Owen Flanagan is uniquely qualified to answer these questions. In this groundbreaking work, he provides both an accessible survey of the latest research on sleep and dreams and a compelling new theory about the nature and function of dreaming. Flanagan argues that while sleep has a clear biological function and adaptive value, dreams are merely side effects, "free riders," irrelevant from an evolutionary point of view. But dreams are hardly unimportant. Flanagan argues that dreams are self-expressive, the result of our need to find or to create meaning, even when we're sleeping. Written with remarkable insight, Dreaming Souls offers a fascinating new way of apprehending one of the oldest mysteries of mental life
Flanagan, Owen J. (1996). Self-expression in sleep: Neuroscience and dreams. In Self-Expressions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fort, Andrew O. (1985). Dreaming in advaita vedānta. Philosophy East and West 35 (4):377-386.   (Google | More links)
Foulkes, D. (1999). Children's Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book, which distills a lifetime of study, Foulkes shows that dreaming as we normally understand it--active stories in which the dreamer is an actor-...
Franzini, Carlo (2000). Sleep, dreaming, and brain activation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):939-940.   (Google)
Abstract: Both Solms and Nielsen acknowledge the difficulty of accounting for the similarities between REM and NREM sleep mentation with a two-generator model, and each link dreams, either explicitly (Solms) or implicitly (Nielsen), to brain activation. At present, however, no data indicate that brain activation can be demonstrated whenever vivid dream reports are obtained. [Nielsen; Solms]
Gallagher, Neil A. (1976). A plea to stop dreaming about dreaming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):423-424.   (Google | More links)
Gezgin, Dr Ulas Basar (ms). On Flanagan's ideas on dreams and ahead: An attempt to locate dreaming phenomenon under the superclass of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, Owen Flanagan’s ideas on dreaming phenomenon are discussed and a thought experiment with four parallel trials is presented as an attempt to locate dreaming phenomenon under the superclass of consciousness
Goguen, J. (2004). Musical qualia, context, time and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Gordijn, Bert (2005). Nanoethics: From utopian dreams and apocalyptic nightmares towards a more balanced view. Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Nanotechnology is a swiftly developing field of technology that is believed to have the potential of great upsides and excessive downsides. In the ethical debate there has been a strong tendency to strongly focus on either the first or the latter. As a consequence ethical assessments of nanotechnology tend to radically diverge. Optimistic visionaries predict truly utopian states of affairs. Pessimistic thinkers present all manner of apocalyptic visions. Whereas the utopian views follow from one-sidedly focusing on the potential benefits of nanotechnology, the apocalyptic perspectives result from giving exclusive attention to possible worst-case scenarios. These radically opposing evaluations hold the risk of conflicts and unwanted backlashes. Furthermore, many of these drastic views are based on simplified and outdated visions of a nanotechnology dominated by self-replicating assemblers and nanomachines. Hence, the present state of the ethical debate on nanotechnology calls for the development of more balanced and better-informed assessments. As a first step in this direction this contribution presents a new method of framing the ethical debate on nanotechnology. Thus, the focus of this paper is on methodology, not on normative analysis
Gottesmann, Claude (2005). Waking hallucinations could correspond to a mild form of dreaming sleep stage hallucinatory activity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):766-767.   (Google)
Abstract: There are strong resemblances between the neurobiological characteristics of hallucinations occurring in the particular case of schizophrenia and the hallucinatory activity observed during the rapid-eye-movement (dreaming) sleep stage: the same prefrontal dorsolateral deactivation; forebrain disconnectivity and disinhibition; sensory deprivation; and acetylcholine, monoamine, and glutamate modifications
Grau, Christopher (2005). Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix. In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore The Matrix. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gregory, Joshua C. (1916). Dreams as psychical explosions. Mind 25 (98):193-205.   (Google | More links)
Greenberg, Ramon (2005). Old wine (most of it) in new bottles: Where are dreams and what is the memory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):72-73.   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss how the work in Walker's article adds to the considerable body of research on dreaming, sleep, and memory that appeared in the early days of modern sleep research. I also consider the issue of REM-independent and REM-dependent kinds of learning. This requires including emotional issues in our discussion, and therefore emphasizes the importance of studying and understanding dreams
Gregory, Joshua C. (1922). Visual images, words and dreams. Mind 31 (123):321-334.   (Google | More links)
Groark, Kevin P. (2010). Willful souls : Dreaming and the dialectics of self-experience among the tzotzil Maya of Highland chiapas, mexico. In Keith M. Murphy & C. Jason Throop (eds.), Toward an Anthropology of the Will. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Gunderson, Keith (2000). The dramaturgy of dreams in pleistocene minds and our own. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):946-947.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]
Hacking, Ian (2001). Dreams in place. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (3):245–260.   (Google | More links)
Hampton, Howard (2007). Born in Flames: Termite Dreams, Dialectical Fairy Tales, and Pop Apocalypses. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Hanson, Robin, Dreams of autarky.   (Google)
Abstract: Genie nanotech, space colonies, Turing-test A.I., a local singularity, crypto credentials, and private law are all dreams of a future where some parts of the world economy and society have an unusually low level of dependence on the rest of the world. But it is the worldwide division of labor that has made us humans rich, and I suspect we won't let it go for a long time to come
Hanfling, Oswald (1998). The reality of dreams. Philosophical Investigations 21 (4):338-344.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Haskell, Robert E. (1986). Cognitive psychology and dream research: Historical, conceptual, and epistemological considerations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:131-159.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hengehold, Laura (2002). “In that sleep of death what dreams...”: Foucault, existential phenomenology, and the Kantian imagination. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Although Foucault's early writings were strongly influenced by the discourse of existential phenomenology, he later considered it an obstacle to a better understanding of social and political power. This essay seeks to understand some of the reasons for his shift, specifically with respect to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Foucault diverges from existential phenomenology according to an alternative tendency within the Kantian inheritance they both share: one which stresses the world-disruptive rather than the unifying or world-disclosive power of transcendental imagination. Examining the role played by dreams and death in Foucault's early introduction to Binswanger's Dream and Existence allows us to situate his later analysis of the historical and political (rather than existential) meaning of death with respect to larger philosophical currents
Herman, John (2000). Reflexive and orienting properties of Rem sleep dreaming and eye movements. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):950-950.   (Google)
Abstract: In this manuscript Hobson et al. propose a model exploring qualitative differences between the three states of consciousness, waking, NREM sleep, and REM sleep, in terms of state-related brain activity. The model consists of three factors, each of which varies along a continuum, creating a three-dimensional space: activation (A), information flow (I), and mode of information processing (M). Hobson has described these factors previously (1990; 1992a). Two of the dimensions, activation and modulation, deal directly with subcortical influences upon cortical structures – the reticular activation system, with regard to the activation dimension and the locus coeruleus and the pontine raphe neuclei, with regard to the modulation dimension. The focus of this review is a further exploration of the interaction between dreaming and the cortical and subcortical structures relevant to REM sleep eye movements. [Hobson et al. ]
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2000). Dream science 2000: A response to commentaries on dreaming and the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1019-1035.   (Google)
Abstract: Definitions of dreaming are not required to map formal features of mental activity onto brain measures. While dreaming occurs during all stages of sleep, intense dreaming is largely confined to REM. Forebrain structures and many neurotransmitters can contribute to sleep and dreaming without negating brainstem and aminergic-cholinergic control mechanisms. Reductionism is essential to science and AIM has considerable heuristic value. Recent findings support sleep's role in learning and memory. Emerging technologies may address long-standing issues in sleep and dream research
Hobson, J. Allan (2002). Sleep and dream suppression following a lateral medullary infarct: A first-person account. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):377-390.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Hodges, Michael P. & Carter, William R. (1969). Nelson on dreaming a pain. Philosophical Studies 20 (April):43-46.   (Google | More links)
Holowchak, Mark (2004). Lucretius on the Gates of horn and ivory: A psychophysical challenge to prophecy by dreams. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Lucretius' Epicurean account of dreams in Book IV of De Rerum Natura indicates that they are wholly void of prophetic significance and of little practical significance. Dreams, rightly apprehended, do little more than mirror our daily preoccupations. For Lucretius, all dreams pass through the gate of ivory and all are reducible to psychophysical phenomena.In this paper, I examine Lucretius' account of sleep and the formation of dreams in light of the Epicurean aims of the poem as a whole. In doing so, I give what I take to be a plausible sketch of the formation of dreams through what I call Lucretius' "selection model" of dreams. The selection model forbids, strictly speaking, the phenomenon of genuine prophecy through dreams, while at the same time it allows for a surprisingly rich psychophysical explanation of the genesis of seemingly prophetic dreams in sleepers. Thus, I argue, a proper grasp of the Lucretian account of oneiric formation is itself a significant part of the Epicurean cure for superstitions and religiously based ills of his day
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). Dreaming as play. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):953-953.   (Google)
Abstract: Dreaming can provide a marvelous opportunity for the “playful” exploration of dramatic events. But the chance to learn to deal with danger is only a small part of it. More important is the chance to discover what it is like to be the subject of strange but humanly significant mental states. [Revonsuo]
Hunt, Harry T. (2000). New multiplicities of dreaming and REMing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):953-955.   (Google)
Abstract: The five authors vary in the degree to which the recent neuroscience of the REM state leads them towards multiple dimensions and forms of dreaming consciousness (Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms) or toward all-explanatory single factor models (Vertes & Eastman, Revonsuo). The view of the REM state as a prolongation of the orientation response to novelty fits best with the former pluralisms but not the latter monisms. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Hunter, J. F. M. (1971). Some questions about dreaming. Mind 80 (January):70-92.   (Google | More links)
Hunter, J. F. M. (1983). The difference between dreaming and being awake. Mind 92 (January):80-93.   (Google | More links)
Infante, Mauricio & Wells, Lloyd A. (2004). Children's dreaming and the development of consciousness. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 43 (12):1519-1520.   (Google | More links)
Jacobs, Arthur M.; Rö, Frank & Sler, (1999). Dondersian dreams in brain-mappers' minds, or, still no cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):293-295.   (Google)
Abstract: Pulvermüller identifies two major flaws of the subtraction method of neuroimaging studies and proposes remedies. We argue that these remedies are themselves flawed and that the cognitive science community badly needs to take initial steps toward a cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers. Such steps could include the development of computational task models that transparently and falsifiably link the input (stimuli) and output (changes in blood flow or brain waves) of neuroimaging studies to changes in information processing activity that is the stuff of cognitive models
Joseph, R. (1988). The right cerebral hemisphere: Emotion, music, visual-spatial skills, body-image, dreams, and awareness. Journal of Clinical Psychology 44:630-673.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Kahn, D.; Pace-Schott, E. & Hobson, J. A. (2002). Emotion and cognition: Feeling and character identification in dreaming. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):34-50.   (Google)
Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain
Kahan, Tracey L. (2000). The “problem” of dreaming in NREM sleep continues to challenge reductionist (two generator) models of dream generation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):956-958.   (Google)
Abstract: The “problem” of dreaming in NREM sleep continues to challenge models that propose a causal relationship between REM mechanisms and the psychological features of dreaming. I suggest that, ultimately, efforts to identify correspondences among multiple levels of analysis will be more productive for dream theory than attempts to reduce dreaming to any one level of analysis. [Hobson et al. ; Nielsen]
Kant, Immanuel (1969). Dreams of a Spirit Seer. New York, Vantage Press.   (Google)
Kantor, Jay (1970). Pinching and dreaming. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2).   (Google)
Rosamond Kent Sprague, (1985). Aristotle on red mirrors (on dreams II 459b24 - 460a23). Phronesis 30 (3):323-325.   (Google)
Khambalia, Amina & Shapiro, Colin M. (2000). A new approach for explaining dreaming and Rem sleep mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):558-559.   (Google)
Abstract: The following review summarizes and examines Mark Solms's article Dreaming and REM Sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms, which argues why the understanding of REM sleep as the physiological equivalent of dreaming needs to be re-analyzed. An analysis of Solms's article demonstrates that he makes a convincing argument against the paradigmatic activation-synthesis model proposed by Hobson and McCarley and provides provocative evidence to support his claim that REM and dreaming are dissociable states. In addition, to situate Solms's findings in concurrent research, other studies are mentioned that are further elucidated by his argument. [Solms]
Kramer, Milton (2000). Dreaming has content and meaning not just form. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):959-961.   (Google)
Abstract: The biological theories of dreaming provide no explanation for the transduction from neuronal discharge to dreaming or waking consciousness. They cannot account for the variability in dream content between individuals or within individuals. Mind-brain isomorphism is poorly supported, as is dreaming's link to REM sleep. Biological theories of dreaming do not provide a function for dreaming nor a meaning for dreams. Evolutionary views of dreaming do not relate dream content to the current concerns of the dreamer and using the nightmare as the paradigm dream minimizes the impact of poor sleep on adaptations. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms]
Kramer, Martin (1962). Malcolm on dreaming. Mind 71 (January):81-86.   (Google | More links)
Krippner, Stanley (2006). Geomagnetic field effects in anomalous dreams and the akashic field. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):103 – 113.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ervin Laszlo has used the ancient concept of the Akashic Records for the basis of his "Akashic Field" (A-field) model, one that has obvious implications for parapsychology, the scientific study of anomalous human-human and human-environment interactions, that is, "psi." Experiments with "telepathic" and "precognitive" dreams are one example of parapsychological research that may fit the A-field model because of its information-carrying potential. Psi appears to be a complex system, one that may reflect the connective "web" posited by the A-field model. In other words, the "universal knowledge" implicit in the old descriptions of the Akashic Records may have a modern-day counterpart
Krieckhaus, E. E. (2000). Papez dreams: Mechanism and phenomenology of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):961-962.   (Google)
Abstract: I agree with Revonsuo that dreaming, particularly about risky scenes, has a great selective advantage. Although the paleoamygdala system generally facilitates stress and alarm, the system which inhibits stress and alarm, initiates bold actions, and mediates learning in risky scenes is the arche, hippocampal system (Papez circuit). Because all thalamic nuclei are inhibited during sleep except arche, Papez probably also dreams in risky scenes. [Revonsuo]
Kuhn, Annette (2002). Dreaming of Fred and Ginger: Cinema and Cultural Memory. New York University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "The main spine of this book stems from a comprehensive series of interviews with subjects recalling their experiences of 1930s cinemagoing. Your feel the breath of life in these spectators, a rarity in film studies, thanks to the painstaking work contracting the interview subjects and recording and tabulating their testimony."- JUMPCUT In the 1930s, Britain had the highest annual per capita cinema attendance in the world, far surpassing ballroom dancing as the nation's favorite pastime. It was, as historian A.J.P. Taylor said, the "essential social habit of the age." And yet, although we know something about the demographics of British cinemagoers, we know almost nothing of their experience of film, how film affected them, how it fit into their daily lives, what role cinema played in the larger culture of the time, and in what ways cinemagoing shaped the generation that came of age in the 1930s. In Dreaming of Fred and Ginger , Annette Kuhn draws upon contemporary publications, extensive interviews with cinemagoers themselves, and readings of selected film, to produce a provocative and perspective-altering ethno-historical study. Taking cinemagoers' accounts of their own experiences as both "the engine and product of investigation," Kuhn enters imaginatively into the world of 1930s cinema culture and analyzes its place in popular memory. Among the topics she examines are the physical space of the cinemas; the role film played in growing up; the experience of being a member of a cinema audience; film-inspired fantasies of American life; the importance of cinema to adolescence in offering role models, ideals of romance, as well as practical opportunities for courtship; and the sheer pleasure of watching such film stars as Fred Astaire, Ginger Rogers, Nelson Eddy, Ronald Colman, and many others. Engagingly written and painstakingly researched, with contributions to film history, cultural studies, and social history, Dreaming of Fred and Ginger offers an illuminating account of a key moment in British cultural memory
LaBerge, Stephen (2000). Lucid dreaming: Evidence and methodology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):962-964.   (Google)
Abstract: Lucid dreaming provides a test case for theories of dreaming. For example, whether or not “loss of self-reflective awareness” is characteristic of dreaming, it is not necessary to dreaming. The fact that lucid dreamers can remember to perform predetermined actions and signal to the laboratory allows them to mark the exact time of particular dream events, allowing experiments to establish precise correlations between physiology and subjective reports, and enabling the methodical testing of hypotheses. [Hobson et al.; Solms]
Ladd, George Trumbull (1892). Contribution to the psychology of visual dreams. Mind 1 (2):299-304.   (Google | More links)
Landesman, Charles (1964). Dreams: Two types of explanation. Philosophical Studies 15 (1-2):17-23.   (Google | More links)
Linsky, Leonard (1962). Illusions and dreams. Mind 71 (July):364-371.   (Google | More links)
Linsky, Leonard (1956). On misremembering dreams. Philosophical Studies 7 (6).   (Google)
Lipson, Morris (1989). Dreams, scepticism, and features of the world. Philosophical Studies 55 (2).   (Google)
Macdonald, Margaret (1953). Sleeping and waking. Mind 62 (April):202-215.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1962). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1957). Dreaming and scepticism: A rejoinder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (December):207-211.   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1961). Professor Ayer on dreaming. Journal of Philosophy 58 (11):294-297.   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1959). Stern's dreaming. Analysis 19 (December):47.   (Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1967). The concept of dreaming. In Harold Morick (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mannison, Don (1977). Believing and dreaming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):76 – 81.   (Google | More links)
Mannison, Donald S. (1975). Dreaming an impossible dream. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (June):663-75.   (Google)
Markie, Peter J. (1981). Dreams and deceivers in meditation one. Philosophical Review 90 (2):185-209.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Adrienne M., Hopes and dreams.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a commonplace in both the popular imagination and the philosophical literature that hope has a special kind of motivational force. This commonplace underwrites the conviction that hope alone is capable of bolstering us in despairinducing circumstances, as well as the strategy of appealing to hope in the political realm. In section 1, I argue that, to the contrary, hope’s motivational essence is not special or unique—it is simply that of an endorsed desire. The commonplace is not entirely mistaken, however, because standard ways of expressing hope do have motivational influence that is different in kind from that of desire. In sections 2 through 4, I examine one of these ways of expressing hope, fantasizing, and argue that fantasies can present us with reasons to modify our goals and projects in multiple ways
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1916). Retentiveness and dreams. Mind 25 (98):206-222.   (Google | More links)
Marsh, Leslie (2005). Review essay: Dennett's sweet dreams philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. Marsh, Leslie (2005) Review Essay.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Review Essay: Dennett’s Sweet Dreams Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness
Marshall, James D. (2008). Wittgenstein, Freud, dreaming and education: Psychoanalytic explanation as 'une façon de parler'. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):606-620.   (Google)
Abstract: Freud saw the dream as occupying a very important position in his theoretical model. If there were to be problems with his theoretical account of the dream then this would impinge upon proposed therapy and, of course, education as the right balance between the instincts and the institution of culture. Wittgenstein, whilst stating that Freud was interesting and important, raised several issues in relation to psychology/psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular. Why would Wittgenstein have seen Freud as having some important things to say, even though he was sharply critical of Freud's claims to be scientific? The major issues to be considered in this paper are, in Section 1, the scientific status of Freud's work—was it science or was it more like philosophy than science; the analysis of dreams; rationality, and dreams and madness. Section 2 considers Freud and education, including the indignity of Freud's notion of 'the talking cure.' Section 3 considers psychoanalytic explanations not as theory but as a manner of speaking: 'une façon de parler.'
Massing, Jean Michel (1986). Dürer's dreams. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 49:238-244.   (Google | More links)
Matthews, Gareth B. (1981). On being immoral in a dream. Philosophy 56 (January):47-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McCarthy, George E. (2009). Dreams in Exile: Rediscovering Science and Ethics in Nineteenth-Century Social Theory. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: conversing with traditions : ancients and moderns in nineteenth-century practical science -- Aristotle on the constitution of social justice and classical democracy -- Aristotle and classical social theory : social justice and moral economy in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim -- Kant on the critique of reason and science -- Kant and classical social theory : epistemology, logic, and methods in Marx, Weber, and Durkheim -- Conclusion: dreams of classical reason : historical science between existentialism and antiquity.
McGinn, Colin (2005). The Matrix of Dreams. In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. New York: Oxford University Press New York.   (Google)
Mealey, Linda (2000). The illusory function of dreams: Another example of cognitive bias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):971-972.   (Google)
Abstract: Patterns of dream content indicating a predominance of themes relating to threat are likely to reflect biases in dream recall and dream scoring techniques. Even if this pattern is not artifactual, it is yet reflective of threat-related biases in our conscious and nonconscious waking cognition, and is not special to dreams. [Revonsuo]
Metzinger, Thomas & Michelle Windt, Jennifer (2007). Dreams. In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming. Praeger Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: differences between dreaming and waking consciousness as well. In this chapter, we will argue that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of the dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, one must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious experiences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state. Finally, in order to arrive at a more differentiated understanding of dream consciousness, we will contrast our analysis of ordinary dreams with lucid dreams, as well as with the varying degrees of lucidity and cognitive clarity seen in semi-lucid and prelucid dreams
Miller, Tyrus (1996). From city-dreams to the dreaming collective: Walter Benjamin's political dream interpretation. Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: This essay discusses Walter Benjamin's development of 'dream' as a model for understanding 19th- and 20th-century urban culture. Following Bergson and surrealist poetics, Benjamin used 'dream' in the 1920s as an heuristic analogy for investigating child hood memories, kitsch art and literature; during the early 1930s, he also developed it into an historiographic concept for studying 19th- century Parisian culture. Benjamin's interpretative use of the dream cuts across Ricoeur's distinction between the hermeneutics of 'recol lection' and the hermeneutics of 'suspicion'. The political dream analyst seeks to discharge the 'fatal powers' of the ideological dream, while at the same time fostering the experience of waking in which dream elements may recollectively be grasped. Benjamin extends this dialectic of dreaming, interpreting and waking to the relation between historical epochs and the tasks of the materialist historian. Puzzling out the recent past's dreamlike rebuses may serve in the task of a present historical awakening. Key Words: Walter Benjamin • city • dream • hermeneutics • surrealism
Monroe, Will S. (1905). Mental elements of dreams. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (24):650-652.   (Google | More links)
Morgane, Peter J. & Mokler, David J. (2000). Dreams and sleep: Are new schemas revealing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):976-976.   (Google)
Abstract: In this series of articles, several new hypotheses on sleep and dreaming are presented. In each case, we feel the data do not adequately support the hypothesis. In their lengthy discourse, Hobson et al. represent to us the familiar reciprocal interaction model dressed in new clothes, but expanded beyond reasonable testability. Vertes & Eastman have proposed that REM sleep is not involved in memory consolidation. However, we do not find their arguments persuasive in that limited differences in activity in REM and waking do not lend credence to the idea that memory consolidation occurs in one state and not the other. Solms makes an argument that dreams are generated from the dopaminergic forebrain based largely on pathological lesion studies in humans. We recognize that this argument has some intuitive appeal and agree with some of the tenets but we do not feel that the arguments are completely convincing due to the lack of anatomical controls, including symmetry and laterality. On the whole, there are interesting arguments put forward in these target articles but the evidence does not convince us that new vistas are opened. No Holy Grail of sleep here! [Hobson et al.; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Mosley, Jerald (1981). Boardman's dreams and dramas. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (123):158-162.   (Google | More links)
Mullane, Harvey (1983). Defense, dreams and rationality. Synthese 57 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Are some mental activities rational but unconscious? Psychopathological symptoms, it is said, have a sense — they are seen as compromise-formations which express the intentions of agents even though the agents are totally unaware of bringing about such symptoms. Philosophers, who often claim that such a conception is simply contradictory or incoherent, have shed little light on the puzzles and apparent paradoxes that surround the issue. It is argued here that Freud's two models of explanation — the mechanistic and the intentionalistic — each fail to provide a basis for an explanatory account of the phenomenon of unconscious defense. An examination of the problem of dream composition helps explain why Freud's dependence upon rational homunculi is inappropriate and misleading. Finally, an alternative model which depends neither upon Freud's version of mechanism nor upon his lavish anthropormorphism is suggested.Ladies and Gentlemen, — It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of the treament that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense
Nair, Rukmini Bhaya (2010). The nature of narrative : Schemes, genes, memes, dreams, and screams! In Armin W. Geertz & Jeppe Sinding Jensen (eds.), Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative. Equinox Pub. Ltd..   (Google)
Ogilvie, Robert D.; Takeuchi, Tomoka & Murphy, Timothy I. (2000). Expanding Nielsen's Covert Rem model, questioning solms's approach to dreaming and Rem sleep, and reinterpreting the vertes & Eastman view of Rem sleep and memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):981-983.   (Google)
Abstract: Nielsen's covert REM process model explains much of the mentation found in REM and NREM sleep, but stops short of postulating an interaction of waking cognitive processes with the dream mechanisms of REM sleep. It ranks with the Hobson et al. paper as a major theoretical advance. The Solms article does not surmount the ever-present problem of defining dreams in a manner conducive to advancing dream theory. Vertes & Eastman review the REM sleep and learning literature, but make questionable assumptions in doing so. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Olberding, Amy (2008). Dreaming of the Duke of Zhou: Exemplarism and the analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35 (4):625-639.   (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (2002). Dreaming. Inquiry 45 (4):399-432.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of (A) understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, (B) the mental processes responsible for the state, and (C) the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the kinship between dream and consciousness. The dream world (A) proves to be a logically impossible world, limited by nothing more than sheer narratability. The internal world (B) of the dreamer is notable for the limitlessness of the scope allotted to the imagination (exactly taking over the offices of rational function), together with the presence of two important phenomena encountered in waking consciousness: a measure of interiority, and the positing of a world. Finally (C), the dream further replicates consciousness in so far as we seem in dreaming concretely to experience our physical surrounds in the form of perceptual imagining. These properties play their part in enabling the dream to be a seeming-consciousness. At the same time they are such as to necessitate its not being consciousness. It is proposed that in the light of these properties, and those composing the state of consciousness, the dream simply is the imagining of consciousness
Pace, David Paul (1988). As Dreams Are Made On: The Probable Worlds of a New Human Mind as Presaged in Quantum Physics, Information Theory, Modal Philosophy, and Literary Myth. Libra Publishers.   (Google)
Pagel, Jim F. (2004). Drug induced alterations in dreaming: An exploration of the dream data terrain outside activation-synthesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):702-707.   (Google)
Abstract: Two meta-analyses of pharmacological research are presented, demonstrating that psychoactive drugs have consistent effects on EEG and sleep outside of their effects on REM sleep, and demonstrating that drugs other than those affecting sleep neurotransmitter systems and REM sleep can also alter reported nightmare occurrence. These data suggest that the neurobiology data terrain outside activation-synthesis may include sleep and dream electrophysiology, cognitive reports of dreaming, effects of alterations in consciousness on dreaming, immunology and host defense, and clinical therapies for sleep disorders
Pagel, J. F. (2000). Dreaming is not a non-conscious electrophysiologic state. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):984-988.   (Google)
Abstract: There has been no generally accepted cognitive definition of dreaming. An electrophysiologic correlate (REM sleep) has become its defining characteristic. Dreaming and REM sleep are complex states for which the Dreaming + REMs model is over-simplified and limited. The target articles in this BBS special issue present strong evidence for a dissociation between dreaming and REM sleep. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen, Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Pearl, Leon (1970). Is theaetetus dreaming? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1):108-113.   (Google | More links)
Pearson, Michael (1990). Millennial Dreams and Moral Dilemmas: Seventh-Day Adventism and Contemporary Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent and rapid technological developments on many fronts have created in our society some extremely difficult moral predicaments. Previous generations have not had to face the dilemmas posed by, for example, the availability of safe abortions, sperm banks and prostoglandins. They have not had to come to terms with an unchecked exploitation of natural resources heralding imminent ecological crisis, or, worst of all, with the recognition that only in this current generation have people the capacity to destroy themselves and their environment. This book seeks to show how, and why, Seventh-day Adventism has addressed these moral issues, and that the ethical questions arising from these issues are especially relevant to the Adventist church and its development. Dr Pearson looks specifically at the moral decisions Adventists have made in the area of human sexuality, on such issues as contraception, abortion, the role and status of women, divorce and homosexuality, from the beginnings of the movement to 1985. He seeks to put such decision-making in perspective by providing the general social context in which it took place, and shows how Ellen White (whose charismatic leadership held the movement together in its first fifty years) has been a major source of moral authority in the Adventist church - her writings continuing to exercise authority in a contemporary society of turmoil and change. This important book, which conveys something of the general ethos of Adventism, is the first to investigate the ethics of the movement, ans so fill a notable gap in the literature
Pears, David F. (1961). Professor Norman Malcolm: Dreaming. Mind 70 (April):145-163.   (Google | More links)
Perry, E. K. & Piggott, M. A. (2000). Neurotransmitter mechanisms of dreaming: Implication of modulatory systems based on dream intensity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):990-992.   (Google)
Abstract: Based on increasing dream intensity and alterations in neurophysiological activity from waking, through NREM to REM sleep, dreaming appears to correlate with sustained midbrain dopaminergic and basal forebrain cholinergic, in conjunction with decreasing brainstem 5-HT and noradrenergic neuronal activities. This, model, with features in common with the modulatory transmitter models of Hobson et al. and Solms, is consistent with some clinical observations on drug induced alterations in dreaming and transmitter correlates of delusions. [Hobson et al.; Solms]
Prasad, Chakravarthi Ram (1993). Dreams and reality: The śaṅkarite critique of vijñānavada. Philosophy East and West 43 (3):405-455.   (Google | More links)
Anthony Preus, (1968). On dreams 2, 459b24-460a33, and Aristotle's. Phronesis 13 (s 1-2):175-182.   (Google)
Abstract: Block's hypothesis concerning the order of Aristotle's psychological writings can be defended against a criticism which arises from Lulofs' interpretation of Insomn. 2, 459b24-460a33. Such a defence results in the discovery of possible purely physiological senses of words heretofore thought essentially psychological
Pritchard, Duncan (2001). Scepticism and dreaming. Philosophia 28 (1-4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I claim that even on the supposition that Wright has indeed succeeded in setting-up such an argument, he nevertheless fails to follow-through with an adequate response. A diagnosis of the failure of Wright’s approach is then given in the context of the wider sceptical debate
Putnam, Hilary (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar'. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: First Series. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti & Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams: The bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):3-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti & Valli, Katja (2000). Dreaming and consciousness: Testing the threat simulation theory of the function of dreaming. Psyche 6 (8).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (2001). Dreaming and the place of consciousness in nature. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1000-1001.   (Google)
Abstract: The research program defended by O'Regan & Noë (O&N) cannot give any plausible explanation for the fact that during REM-sleep the brain regularly generates subjective experiences (dreams) where visual phenomenology is especially prominent. This internal experience is almost invariably organized in the form of “being-in-the-world.” Dreaming presents a serious unaccountable anomaly for the sensorimotor research program and reveals that some of its fundamental assumptions about the nature of consciousness are questionable
Revonsuo, Antti (2000). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.   (Google)
Abstract: Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is consistently and powerfully modulated by certain types of waking experiences. On the basis of this evidence, I put forward the hypothesis that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events, and to rehearse threat perception and threat avoidance. To evaluate this hypothesis, we need to consider the original evolutionary context of dreaming and the possible traces it has left in the dream content of the present human population. In the ancestral environment human life was short and full of threats. Any behavioral advantage in dealing with highly dangerous events would have increased the probability of reproductive success. A dream-production mechanism that tends to select threatening waking events and simulate them over and over again in various combinations would have been valuable for the development and maintenance of threat-avoidance skills. Empirical evidence from normative dream content, children's dreams, recurrent dreams, nightmares, post traumatic dreams, and the dreams of hunter-gatherers indicates that our dream-production mechanisms are in fact specialized in the simulation of threatening events, and thus provides support to the threat simulation hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Key Words: dream content; dream function; evolution of consciousness; evolutionary psychology; fear; implicit learning; nightmares; rehearsal; REM; sleep; threat perception
Rignano, Eugenio (1920). A new theory of sleep and dreams. Mind 29 (115):313-322.   (Google | More links)
Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (35):142-151.   (Google | More links)
Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and Scepticism--II. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (36):231-243.   (Google | More links)
Rogers, Mary F. (1992). Teaching, theorizing, storytelling: Postmodern rhetoric and modern dreams. Sociological Theory 10 (2):231-240.   (Google | More links)
Rossi, Ernest Lawrence (2004). Art, beauty and truth: The psychosocial genomics of consciousness, dreams, and brain growth in psychotherapy and mind-body healing. Annals of the American Psychotherapy Assn 7 (3):10-17.   (Google)
Salzarulo, Piero (2000). Time course of dreaming and sleep organization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1000-1000.   (Google)
Abstract: The complexity and mysteriousness of mental processes during sleep rule out thinking only in term of generators. How could we know exactly what mental sleep experience (MSE) is produced and when? To refer to REM versus NREM as separate time windows for MSE seems insufficient. We propose that in each cycle NREM and REM interact to allow mentation to reach a certain degree of complexity and consolidation in memory. Each successive cycle within a sleep episode should contribute to these processes with a different weight according to the time of night and distance from sleep onset. This view would avoid assuming too great a separation between REM and NREM functions and attributing psychological functions only to a single state. [Nielsen]
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Schroeder, Severin (2000). Dreams and grammar: Reply to Hanfling. Philosophical Investigations 23 (1):70–72.   (Google | More links)
Schredl, M. & Doll, E. (1998). Emotions in diary dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):634-646.   (Google)
Abstract: Even though various investigations found a preponderance of negative emotions in dreams, the conclusion that human dream life is, in general, negatively toned is limited by several methodological issues. The present study made use of three different approaches to measure dream emotions: dream intensity rated by the dreamer, intensity rated by a judge, and scoring of explicitly mentioned emotions (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966). Results indicate that only in the case of external raters' estimates do negative emotions outweigh the positive ones; but in the case of self-ratings (i.e., those made by the dreamer himself/herself), the ratio was balanced. Analyses showed that this is mainly due to the underestimation of positive emotions in the external ratings. Additionally, a positive correlation was found between the intensity of dream emotions and dream recall frequency, whereas gender differences were nonsignificant as regards the emotional tone of diary dreams
Schwarz, Astrid E. (2009). Green dreams of reason. Green nanotechnology between visions of excess and control. Nanoethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Nanotechnology has recently been identified with principles of sustainability and with a ‘green’ agenda generally . Some maintain that this green dream of nanotechnology is a rather ephemeral societal phenomenon that owes its existence to the campaign ploys of politics and business. This paper argues that deeper lying societal and cognitive structures are at work here that complement or even substantiate in some sense the seemingly manipulative saying of a greening of nanotechnologies. Taking seriously the concept of ‘green nano’, this paper examines the common ground between sustainability discourse and the discourse of nanotechnology. Green nanotechnology is understood as a boundary concept in which disparate discourses and concepts join together. The primary concern of the paper is to show that nanodiscourse and ecodiscourse share visions of control and of excess. Both ecotechnology and nanotechnology accept and incorporate arguments about limited growth, and each develops strategies of control—be it through a new-found precision in the control of material flows or through greater efficiency in product design
Schredl, Michael (2006). Repression and dreaming: An open empirical question. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):531-532.   (Google)
Abstract: From the perspective of modern dream research, Freud's hypotheses regarding repression and dreaming are difficult to evaluate. Several studies indicate that it is possible to study these topics empirically, but it needs a lot more empirical evidence, at least in the area of dream research, before arriving at a unified theory of repression
Schredl, Michael (2005). Rem sleep, dreaming, and procedural memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):80-81.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary the “incredibly robust” evidence for the relationship between sleep and procedural memory is questioned; inconsistencies in the existing data are pointed out. In addition, some suggestions about extending research are made, for example, studying REM sleep augmentation or memory consolidation in patients with sleep disorders. Last, the possibility of a relationship between dreaming and memory processes is discussed
Schroeder, S. (1997). The concept of dreaming: On three theses by Malcolm. Philosophical Investigations 20 (1):15-38.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: Dreams of chase or pursuit, falling, sex, flying, nudity, failing an examination, one's own and other's death, fire, teeth falling out and some other themes experienced, even if only rarely, by many people all over the world have been labelled 'typical dreams'. This essay argues that typical dreaming, rather a syndrome of themes than monothematic, reflects an extraordinary state of mind and brain. Odd and particularly memorable perceptions, as well as emerging awareness of sleep and dreaming -- i.e. parallels to lucid dreaming, sleep paralysis, complex partial seizure, epileptic and migraine auras, and aspects of dreaming after trauma -- can be traced with some plausibility in all prominent variants of typical dreaming. When viewed from this perspective, for example, dream pursuers are much more a shadow of the bodily self than a metaphor for the psycho- biographical situation or evolutionarily implemented sparring partners who make dreamers fit for the struggle for survival during waking hours
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Abstract: According to Revonsuo, dreams are the output of a evolved “threat simulation mechanism.” The author marshals a diverse and comprehensive array of empirical and theoretical support for this hypothesis. We propose that the hypothesized threat simulation mechanism might be more domain-specific in design than the author implies. To illustrate, we discuss the possible sex-differentiated design of the hypothesized threat simulation mechanism. [Revonsuo]
Shevrin, Howard & Eiser, Alan S. (2000). Continued vitality of the Freudian theory of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1004-1006.   (Google)
Abstract: A minority position is presented in which evidence will be cited from the Hobson, Solms, Revonsuo, and Nielsen target articles and from other sources, supporting major tenets of Freud's theory of dreaming. Support is described for Freud's view of dreams as meaningful, linked to basic motivations, differing qualitatively in mentation, and wish-fulfilling. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms]
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Solms, Mark (2000). Dreaming and Rem sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):843-850.   (Google)
Abstract: The paradigmatic assumption that REM sleep is the physiological equivalent of dreaming is in need of fundamental revision. A mounting body of evidence suggests that dreaming and REM sleep are dissociable states, and that dreaming is controlled by forebrain mechanisms. Recent neuropsychological, radiological, and pharmacological findings suggest that the cholinergic brain stem mechanisms that control the REM state can only generate the psychological phenomena of dreaming through the mediation of a second, probably dopaminergic, forebrain mechanism. The latter mechanism (and thus dreaming itself) can also be activated by a variety of nonREM triggers. Dreaming can be manipulated by dopamine agonists and antagonists with no concomitant change in REM frequency, duration, and density. Dreaming can also be induced by focal forebrain stimulation and by complex partial (forebrain) seizures during nonREM sleep, when the involvement of brainstem REM mechanisms is precluded. Likewise, dreaming is obliterated by focal lesions along a specific (probably dopaminergic) forebrain pathway, and these lesions do not have any appreciable effects on REM frequency, duration, and density. These findings suggest that the forebrain mechanism in question is the final common path to dreaming and that the brainstem oscillator that controls the REM state is just one of the many arousal triggers that can activate this forebrain mechanism. The “REM-on” mechanism (like its various NREM equivalents) therefore stands outside the dream process itself, which is mediated by an independent, forebrain “dream-on” mechanism. Key Words: acetylcholine; brainstem; dopamine; dreaming; forebrain; NREM; REM; sleep
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Abstract: The central question facing sleep and dream science today seems to be: What is the physiological basis of the subset of NREM dreams that are qualitatively indistinguishable from REM dreams (“apex dreams”)? Two competing answers have emerged: (1) all apex dreams are generated by REM sleep control mechanisms, albeit sometimes covertly; and (2) all such dreams are generated by forebrain mechanisms, independently of classical pontine sleep-cycle control mechanisms. The principal objection to the first answer is that it lacks evidential support. The principal objection to the second answer (which is articulated in my target article) is that it takes inadequate account of interactions that surely exist between the putative forebrain mechanisms and the well established brainstem mechanisms of conscious state control. My main response to this objection (elaborated below) is that it conflates nonspecific brainstem modulation – which supports consciousness in general – with a specific pontine mechanism that is supposed to generate apex dreaming in particular. The latter mechanism is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient for apex dreaming. The putative forebrain mechanisms, by contrast, are necessary for apex dreaming (although they are nor sufficient, in the limited sense that all conscious states of the forebrain are modulated by the brainstem)
Sparshott, F. E. (1974). Retractions and reiterations on films and dreams. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1):91-93.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: Although the cerebral cortex is deprived of messages from the external world in REM sleep and because these messages are inhibited in the thalamus, cortical neurons display high rates of spontaneous firing and preserve their synaptic excitability to internally generated signals during this sleep stage. The rich activity of neocortical neurons during NREM sleep consists of prolonged spike-trains that impose rhythmic excitation onto connected cells in the network, eventually leading to a progressive increase in their synaptic responsiveness, as in plasticity processes. Thus, NREM sleep may be implicated in the consolidation of memory traces acquired during wakefulness. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes & Eastman]
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Sutton, John (ms). Childrens’ dreams and the nature of dreaming.   (Google)
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Sutton, John (ms). Review of Michel jouvet, the paradox of sleep: The story of dreaming; and Patricia Cox Miller, dreams in late antiquity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This review describes central difficulties in the interdisciplinary study of dreaming, summarizes Jouvet's account of his role in the history of modern dream science, queries his positive speculations on the semantics of dreaming, and suggests work for historians of neuroscience
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Abstract: The pharmacological literature on negative dream experiences is reviewed with respect to Revonsuo's threat rehearsal theory of dreaming. Moderate support for the theory is found, although much more work is needed. Significant questions that remain include the precise role of acetylcholine in the generation of negative dream experiences and dissociations between the pharmacology of waking fear and anxiety and threatening dreams. [Revonsuo]
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Abstract: : Drawing on several feminist and anti-racist theorists, I use the trope of the vampire to unravel how whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality feed on the same set of disavowals—of the body, of the Other, of fluidity, of dependency itself. I then turn to Jewelle Gomez's The Gilda Stories (1991) for a counternarrative that, along with Donna Haraway's reading of vampires (1997), retools concepts of kinship and self that undergird racism, sexism, and heterosexism in contemporary U.S. culture
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Yost Jr, R. M. (1959). Professor Malcolm on dreaming and scepticism--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (April):142-151.   (Google)
Zadra, A. & Donderi, D. C. (2000). Threat perceptions and avoidance in recurrent dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1017-1018.   (Google)
Abstract: Revonsuo argues that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events and to rehearse threat avoidance behaviors. He views recurrent dreams as an example of this function. We present data and clinical observations suggesting that (1) many types of recurrent dreams do not include threat perceptions; (2) the nature of the threat perceptions that do occur in recurrent dreams are not always realistic; and (3) successful avoidance responses are absent from most recurrent dreams and possibly nightmares. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]

5.1e.1 Dreams, Misc

Aristotle, , On prophesying by dreams.   (Google | More links)

5.1e.2 The Nature of Dreaming

Ayer, A. J. (1960). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Journal of Philosophy 57 (August):517-534.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2009). Dreaming and imagination. Mind and Language 24 (1):103-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Penultimate draft; please refer to published version. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that contrary to an orthodox view, dreams do not typically involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experience while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. Rather, on my view, dreams involve mental imagery and propositional imagination. I defend the imagination model of dreaming from some objections
Sutton, John (forthcoming). Dreaming. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: for Paco Calvo and John Symons (eds), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (Routledge, November 2008)