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Miscellaneous Philosophy of Mind :: Aspects of Mind :: Memory

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Arcaya, Jose M. (1989). Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative. Philosophical Psychology 2:101-110.   (Google | Edit)
Baier, Annette C. (1976). Mixing memory and desire. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (July):213-20.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Barton Perry, Ralph (1906). The knowledge of past events. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (23):617-626.   (Google | Edit)
Beloff, John (1980). Is normal memory a paranormal phenomenon? Theoria to Theory 14 (September):145-162.   (Google | Edit)
Beloff, John (1981). Memory. Theoria to Theory 14 (March):187-204.   (Google | Edit)
Ben-Zeev, Aaron (1986). Two approaches to memory. Philosophical Investigations 9 (October):288-301.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Benjamin, B. S. (1956). Remembering. Mind 65 (July):312-331.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bergson, Henri (1991). Matter and Memory. MIT Press.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bradley, Francis H. (1908). On memory and judgment. Mind 17 (66):153-174.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bradley, Francis H. (1899). Some remarks on memory and inference. Mind 8 (30):145-166.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Brockelman, Paul T. (1975). Of memory and things past. International Philosophical Quarterly 15 (September):309-325.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1981). Memories and the world. Analysis 41 (June):141-145.   (Google | Edit)
Brown, Gordon D. A. & Chater, Nick (2001). The chronological organisation of memory. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Burge, Tyler (2004). Memory and persons. Philosophical Review 112 (3):289-337.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Campbell, J. (1997). The realism of memory. In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Campbell, J. (1997). The structure of time in autobiographical memory. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-17.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Much of ordinary memory is autobiographical; memory of what one saw and did, where and when. It may derive from your own past experiences, or from what other people told you about your past life. It may be phenomenologically rich, redolent of that autumn afternoon so long ago, or a few austere reports of what happened. But all autobiographical memory is first-person memory, stateable using ‘I’. It is a memory you would express by saying, ‘I remember I . . .’
Campbell, John (2001). Memory demonstratives. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Cantwell Smith, Brian (1966). Memory. Humanities Press.   (Google | Edit)
Cascardi, Anthony J. (1984). Remembering. Review of Metaphysics 38 (December):275-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Casey, Edward S. (1983). Keeping the past in mind. Review of Metaphysics 37 (September):77-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Casey, Edward S. (1993). Mind and memory. In Phenomenology: East and West: Essays in Honor of J.N. Mohanty. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google | Edit)
Casey, Edward S. (1979). Perceiving and remembering. Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):407-436.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Casey, Edward S. (1987). Remembering: A Phenomenological Study. Indiana University Press.   (Cited by 105 | Google | More links | Edit)
Cherniak, Christopher (1983). Rationality and the structure of human memory. Synthese 57 (November):163-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   A tacit and highly idealized model of the agent's memory is presupposed in philosophy. The main features of a more psychologically realistic duplex (orn-plex) model are sketched here. It is argued that an adequate understanding of the rationality of an agent's actions is not possible without a satisfactory theory of the agent's memory and of the trade-offs involved in management of the memory, particularly involving compartmentalization of the belief set. The discussion identifies some basic constraints on the organization of knowledge representations in general
Child, William (2006). Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Cockburn, David (2001). Memories, traces and the significance of the past. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Conway, Martin A. (2001). Phenomenological records and the self-memory system. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)
Cornman, James W. (1965). Malcolm's mistaken memory. Analysis 25 (April):161-167.   (Google | Edit)
Cornman, James W. (1966). More on mistaken memory. Analysis 26 (December):57-58.   (Google | Edit)
Debus, Dorothea (2007). Perspectives on the past: A study of the spatial perspectival characteristics of recollective memories. Mind and Language 22 (2):173-206.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: The following paper considers one important feature of our experiential or ‘recollective’ memories, namely their spatial perspectival characteristics. I begin by considering the ‘Past-Dependency-Claim’, which states that every recollective memory (or ‘R-memory’) has its spatial perspectival characteristics in virtue of the subject’s present awareness of the spatial perspectival characteristics of a relevant past perceptual experience. Although the Past-Dependency-Claim might for various reasons seem particularly attractive, I show that it is false. I then proceed to develop and defend the ‘Present-Dependency-Claim’, namely the claim that the spatial perspectival characteristics of an R-memory depend on the spatial perspectival characteristics of perceptual experiences that the subject has at the time at which the R-memory occurs. Lastly, I discuss the phenomenon of so-called ‘observer-memories’, which presents a special challenge for any attempt to account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of R-memories. I argue that we have no good reason to deny that the relevant experiences should count as memories, and I show that we can account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of observer-memories with the help of the ‘Present-Dependency-Claim’. More generally, the paper shows that certain events that occur in a subject’s mental life (namely, a subject’s R-memories) are necessarily dependent on other events that occur in the relevant subject’s mental life (namely, on certain perceptual experiences). This more general conclusion in turn should be relevant for any attempt to develop an appropriate account of a subject’s mental life as a whole
Deutscher, Max (1989). Remembering "remembering". In John Heil (ed.), Identity, Cause, and Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Dokic, Jérôme (2001). Is memory purely preservative? In Christoph Hoerl & . T. McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Douglas Fawcett, Edward (1912). Matter and memory. Mind 21 (82):201-232.   (Google | Edit)
Earle, W. (1956). Memory. Review of Metaphysics 10 (September):3-27.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Fernandez, Jordi (2006). Memory and perception: Remembering snowflake. Theoria 21 (56):147-164.   (Google | Edit)
Fernandez, Jordi (forthcoming). Memory and time. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having
Fernandez, Jordi (online). Memory, past and self.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: An important pre-theoretic intuition about memory is that memories are _about_ some things. Memories have content, in the minimal sense that a subject represents the world as having been in a certain way in virtue of remembering something. The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. What kind of entities do memories put us in cognitive contact with? Are those entities mental events? Are they events in the world?
Fernandez, Jordi (2006). The intentionality of memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them
Friedman, William J. (2001). Memory processes underlying humans' chronological sense of the past. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)
Furlong, E. J. (1951). A Study in Memory: A Philosophical Essay. Nelson.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Furlong, E. J. (1948). Memory. Mind 57 (January):16-44.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Furlong, E. J. (1956). The empiricist theory of memory. Mind 65 (October):542-47.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1992). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Annotation | Edit)
Gerrans, Philip (forthcoming). Mental time travel, somatic markers and “myopia for the future”. Synthese.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are often described as having impaired ability for planning and decision making despite retaining intact capacities for explicit reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis is that the VMPFC associates implicitly represented affective information with explicit representations of actions or outcomes. Consequently, when the VMPFC is damaged explicit reasoning is no longer scaffolded by affective information, leading to characteristic deficits. These deficits are exemplified in performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which subjects with VMPFC perform significantly worse than neurotypicals in a task which requires them learn from rewarding and punishing experience to make decisions. The somatic marker theory adopts a canonical theory of emotion, in which emotions function as part of a valencing system, to explain the role of affective processes. The first part of the paper argues against this canonical account. The second part provides a different account of the role of the role of the VMPFC in decision-making which does not depend on the canonical account of emotion. Together the first and second parts of the paper provide the basis for a different interpretation of results on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In fact the IGT may be probing a deficit in what has been called mental time travel: the ability to access and use information from previous experience and imaginatively rehearse future experiences as part of the process of deliberation
Haight, David F. & Haight, M. R. (1989). Time, memory, and self-remembering. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3:1-11.   (Google | Edit)
Hamilton, Andy (1998). False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims: A philosophical perspective. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):283-297.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Hamilton, Andy (2003). 'Scottish commonsense' about memory: A defence of Thomas Reid's direct knowledge account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):229-245.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Harrod, R. F. (1942). Memory. Mind 51 (January):47-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Hartshorne, Charles (1966). Determinism, memory, and the metaphysics of becoming. Pacific Philosophy Forum 4 (May):81-85.   (Google | Edit)
Heil, John (1978). Traces of things past. Philosophy of Science 45 (March):60-72.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph (2007). Episodic memory, autobiographical memory, narrative: On three key notions in current approaches to memory development. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):621 – 640.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: According to recent social interactionist accounts in developmental psychology, a child's learning to talk about the past with others plays a key role in memory development. Most accounts of this kind are centered on the theoretical notion of autobiographical memory and assume that socio-communicative interaction with others is important, in particular, in explaining the emergence of memories that have a particular type of connection to the self. Most of these accounts also construe autobiographical memory as a species of episodic memory, but its episodic character, as such, is not typically seen as falling within the remit of an explanation in social interactionist terms. I explore the idea that socio-communicative interaction centered on talk about the past might also have an important role to play, quite independently of considerations about the involvement of the self in memory, in accounting for the emergence of memories that are episodic in character, i.e., memories that involve the recollection of particular past events. In doing so, I also try to shed light on a distinctive role that talk about the past plays in socio-communicative interaction
Hoerl, Christoph (2005). Joint reminiscing as joint attention to the past. In Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph & McCormack, Teresa (2005). Joint Reminiscing As Attention to the Past. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph (1999). Memory, amnesia, and the past. Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: This paper defends the claim that, in order to have a concept of time, subjects must have memories of particular events they once witnessed. Some patients with severe amnesia arguably still have a concept of time. Two possible explanations of their grasp of this concept are discussed. They take as their respective starting points abilities preserved in the patients in question: (1) the ability to retain factual information over time despite being unable to recall the past event or situation that information stems from, and (2) the ability to remember at least some past events or situations themselves (typically because retrograde amnesia is not complete). It is argued that a satisfactory explanation of what it is for subjects to have a concept of time must make reference to their having episodic memories such as those mentioned under (2). It is also shown how the question as to whether subjects have such memories, and thus whether they possess a concept of time, enters into our explanation of their actions
Hoerl, Christoph & McCormack, Teresa (eds.) (2001). Time and Memory: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). The phenomenology of episodic recall. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Holland, A. (1974). Retained knowledge. Mind 83 (July):355-371.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Holland, R. F. (1954). The empiricist theory of memory. Mind 63 (October):464-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Judson, Lindsay (1988). Russell on memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:65-82.   (Google | Edit)
Kantor, Jacob Robert (1922). Memory: A triphase objective action. Journal of Philosophy 19 (23):624-639.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Kleinmuntz, Benjamin (ed.) (1967). Concepts And The Structure Of Memory. Wiley.   (Google | Edit)
Kourany, Janet A. (1965). Memory. Journal of Philosophy 62 (August):387-397.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Kurtzman, Howard S. (1983). Modern conceptions of memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (September):1-20.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Laird, John (1917). Recollection, association and memory. Mind 26 (104):407-427.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Landesman, Charles (1962). Philosophical problems of memory. Journal of Philosophy 59 (February):57-64.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Lawlor, Krista (2002). Memory, anaphora, and content preservation. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):97-119.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Tyler Burge defends the idea that memory preserves beliefswith their justifications, so that memory's role in inferenceadds no new justificatory demands. Against Burge's view,Christensen and Kornblith argue that memory is reconstructiveand so introduces an element of a posteriori justificationinto every inference. I argue that Burge is right,memory does preserve content, but to defend this viewwe need to specify a preservative mechanism. Toward thatend, I develop the idea that there is something worthcalling anaphoric thinking, which preserves content inBurge's sense of ``content preservation.'' I providea model on which anaphoric thought is a fundamentalfeature of cognitive architecture, consequentlyrejecting the idea that there are mental pronounsin a Language of Thought. Since preservativememory is a matter of anaphoric thinking, thereare limits on the analogy of memory and testimony
Lehrer, Keith & Richard, Joseph (1975). Remembering without knowing. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:121-126.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Lewis, Delmas (1983). Dualism and the causal theory of memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (September):21-30.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Locke, Don (1971). Memory. Macmillan.   (Cited by 16 | Google | Edit)
Lowe, E. J. (1998). Commentary on false memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):309-310.   (Google | Edit)
Mackay, D. S. (1945). The illusion of memory. Philosophical Review 54 (July):297-320.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Maitland, Jeffrey A. (1970). Rememberings. Philosophical Studies 21 (December):91-94.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Malcolm, Norman (1963). A definition of factual memory. In Knowledge and Certainty. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Malcolm, Norman (1977). Memory and Mind. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)
Malcolm, Norman (1970). Memory and representation. Noûs 4 (February):59-71.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Malcolm, Norman (1963). Memory and the past. The Monist 47:247-266.   (Google | Edit)
Martin, C. B. & Deutscher, Max (1966). Remembering. Philosophical Review 75 (April):161-96.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)
Martin, Michael G. F. (2001). Out of the past: Episodic recall as retained acquaintance. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | Edit)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1992). Perception, concepts, and memory. Philosophical Review 101 (4):745-63.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links | Edit)
Mcclung, Gary (1972). Malcolm and Zemach on the definition of memory. Dianoia 40:40-44.   (Google | Edit)
McCormack, Teresa (2001). Attributing episodic memory to animals and children. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 |