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5.1f. Emotions (Emotions on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adams, E. M. (1998). Emotional intelligence and wisdom. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-14.   (Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2004). 'Edison' & 'Russel': Definitions versus inventions in the analysis of emotion. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ahumada, Rodolfo (1969). Emotion, knowledge and belief. Personalist 50:371-382.   (Google)
Allen, Richard (1973). Emotion, religion and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 7 (2):181–194.   (Google | More links)
Allen, James Smith (2003). Navigating the social sciences: A theory for the meta–history of emotions. History and Theory 42 (1):82–93.   (Google | More links)
Anders, Guenther Stern (1950). Emotion and reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (4):553-562.   (Google | More links)
Annis, David B. (1988). Emotion, love and friendship. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (2):1-7.   (Google)
Arbib, Michael A. (2004). Beware the passionate robot. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Emotions or emotional feelings? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.   (Google)
Abstract: I criticize Rolls's account of what makes emotional states conscious
Baier, Annette C. (2004). Feelings that matter. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Baltzly, D. (2002). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):235 – 236.   (Google)
Abstract: Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, £30
Baltzly, Dirk (2007). The stoic life: Emotions, duty, fate. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):855-856.   (Google)
Barbalet, J. M. (1993). Confidence: Time and emotion in the sociology of action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):229–247.   (Google | More links)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Gendron, Maria & Huang, Yang-Ming (2009). Do discrete emotions exist? Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427 – 437.   (Google)
Abstract: In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to emotion. Second, we discuss misconceptions of our Conceptual Act Model. Finally, we briefly comment on Columbetti's Dynamical Discrete Emotion model
Bartlett, S. (2000). Review of “strange fits of passion: Epistemologies of emotion, Hume to austen” by Adela Pinch. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):187-191.   (Google)
Ben-ze'ev, A. (2003). The logic of emotions. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Berger, Harris M. (2009). Stance: Ideas About Emotion, Style, and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture. Wesleyan University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Locating stance -- Structures of stance in lived experience -- Stance and others, stance and lives -- The social life of stance and the politics of expressive culture.
Bett, Richard (2002). Review: Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Mind 111 (443).   (Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (1996). Commentary on towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):135-136.   (Google)
Breazeal, C. & Brooks, Rodney (2004). Robot emotions: A functional perspective. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Calhoun, C. (2004). Subjectivity and emotion. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Campbell, S. (1997). Emotion as an explanatory principle in early evolutionary theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):453-473.   (Google)
Castelfranchi, Cristiano & Miceli, Maria (1996). Commentary on towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):129-133.   (Google)
Cataldi, Sue L. (1993). Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space -- Reflections on Merleau-Ponty'S Philosophy of Embodiment. Suny Pressmerleau-Ponty.   (Google)
Abstract: This book philosophically explores the topic of emotional depth through phenomenological description and analyses. The insights of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and James J Gibson on the nature of perceived depth are extended to the dynamics of emotional experience. Several senses of depth and emotional depth are uncovered and examined. Emotional experience is also examined in the context of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment, his later Flesh ontology and Gibson's theory of affordances. Emotional and perceived depths are shown to be intermingled and connected to changes in self-identity or self-understanding
Charles, David (2004). Emotion, cognition and action. Philosophy 55:105-136.   (Google)
Chan, Sin Yee (1999). Standing emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):495-513.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2005). The heat of emotion: Valence and the demarcation problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Chella, Antonio (2005). An intermediate level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal-emotion dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry
Clark, Stephen R. L. (2002). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation by Richard Sorabji, clarendon press: Oxford 2000. Pp. XII+499pp., £30.00, ISBN 019-8250053. Philosophy 77 (1):125-141.   (Google)
Clarke, Stanley G. (1986). Emotions: Rationality without cognitivism. Dialogue 25:663-674.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Clarke, Simon (2003). Psychoanalytic sociology and the interpretation of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (2):145–163.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1987). The description and evaluation of animal emotion. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (2009). Emotion, expression and conversation. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (1994). Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures). Philosophy 69:135-50.   (Google)
Cogan, John (1994). A place for emotion in critical study. Human Studies 17 (2).   (Google)
Cohen, Marc A. (2005). Against basic emotions, and toward a comprehensive theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):229-254.   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S.J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. I show that this overintellectualization goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that the body is a vehicle of meaning. I explain why I think that this over-intellectualization is problematic, and try to reconceptualize the notion of evaluation in emotion theory in a way that is consistent and continuous with the autopoietic notion of sense-making
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dadlez, E. M. (2009). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: How literature can be a thought experiment: alternatives to and elaborations of original accounts -- Literary form and philosophical content -- Kantian and Aristotelian accounts of Austen -- Hume and Austen on pleasure, sentiment, and virtue -- Hume and Austen on sympathy -- Hume's general point of view and the novels of Jane Austen -- The useful and the good in Hume and Austen -- Aesthetics and Humean aesthetic norms in the novels of Jane Austen -- Hume and Austen on good people and good reasoning -- Lovers, friends, and other endearing appellations: marriage in Hume and Austen -- Hume and Austen on pride -- Hume and Austen on jealousy, envy, malice, and the principle of comparison -- Indolence and industry in Hume and Austen -- What Hume's philosophy contributes to our understanding of Austen's fiction -- What Austen's fiction contributes to our understanding of Hume's philosophy.
Dalgleish, Tim (1997). Once more with feeling: The role of emotion in self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):110-111.   (Google)
Abstract: In an analysis of the role of emotion in self-deception is presented. It is argued that instances of emotional self-deception unproblematically meet Mele's jointly sufficient criteria. It is further proposed that a consideration of different forms of mental representation allows the possibility of instances of self-deception in which contradictory beliefs (in the form p and ~p) are held simultaneously with full awareness
Damasio, Antonio R. (2001). Reflections on the neurobiology of emotion and feeling. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Danion, Jean-Marie; Huron, Caroline; Rizzo, Lydia & Vidailhet, Pierre (2004). Emotion, memory, and conscious awareness in schizophrenia. In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
D'Argembeau, Arnaud & Van der Linden, Martial (2007). Emotional aspects of mental time travel. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):320-321.   (Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (1988). Expression of emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):279-291.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
DeLancey, Craig (1997). Emotion and the computational theory of mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (1998). Real emotions. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):467-487.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction of the desires that could plausibly be said to motivate the agent. As a contrast to a realist position about emotions I examine interpretationist theories of mind, using Dennett and Davidson as examples, and show that the emotional actions in question will fail to be explained by these theories. In conclusion, I provide one weak version of a natural realist view of emotions, and show how it succeeds where interpretationism fails
DeLancey, Craig (2009). Review of Georg Brun, ulvi doguoglu, Dominique kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).   (Google)
del Giudice, E. (2004). The psycho-emotional-physical unity of living organisms as an outcome of quantum physics. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of an individual’s specific evaluative perspective — as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile — appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective.
Depraz, Natalie (2008). The Rainbow of emotions: At the crossroads of neurobiology and phenomenology. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and breath can become constitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view, we give an account of the specific circular and systemic dynamic that we call “the rainbow of emotions.” This dynamic, we argue, is composed of both structural and experiential components and better evidences the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experiential
de Sousa, Ronald (2008). Against emotional modularity. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2002). Emotional truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):247-63.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2004). Emotions: What I know, what I'd like to think I know, and what I'd like to think. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Devon, Mark (ms). The Origin of Emotions.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Origin of Emotions identifies the purpose, trigger and effect of each emotion
Dilman, Ilham (1989). False emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 287:287-295.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dryden, Donald (1999). Human emotions and evolutionary homologies. Metascience 8 (1):25-35.   (Google)
Dubreuil, Benoît (2010). Punitive emotions and Norm violations. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.   (Google)
Abstract: The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism
Dumouchel, Paul (2008). Biological modules and emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Dumsday, Travis (2007). Emotional experience and religious understanding: Integrating perception, conception and feeling. Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.   (Google)
Dutton, Blake (2006). Emotions in ancient and medieval philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):162-163.   (Google)
Elkholy, Sharin N. (2002). Upheavels of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (2):235-238.   (Google)
Ethics, (1969). Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence. Inquiry 12 (1-4):66 – 104.   (Google)
Abstract: A set of basic static predicates, 'in itself, 'existing through itself, 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λ μβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself, 'freedom', etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems
Evans, D. & Cruse, Pierre (2004). Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Fellous, J. (ed.) (2004). Who Needs Emotions: The Brain Meets the Robot. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: By contrast, the editors of this book have assembled a panel of experts in neuroscience and artificial intelligence who have dared to tackle the issue of...
Findlay, J. N. (1935). Emotional presentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):111 – 121.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, Agneta H. & Jansz, Jeroen (1995). Reconciling emotions with western personhood. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (1):59–80.   (Google | More links)
F., S. (2000). Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen the emotions in hellenistic philosophy. New synthese historical library, 46. (dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). Pp. XII + 380. £116·00, US×184·00 (hbk). ISBN 0792353188. Religious Studies 36 (4):505-507.   (Google)
Flam, Helena & King, Debra (2010). Emotions and social movements. In Ann Brooks (ed.), Social Theory in Contemporary Asia. Routledge.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (2002). Emotions and motivational states. European Review of Philosophy 5:11-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Furtak, Rick Anthony (2010). Emotion, the bodily, and the cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.   (Google)
Abstract: In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking at evidence from neuroscience and social psychology, as well as thought experiments and theoretical arguments, I conclude that it is necessary to acknowledge both that emotions have intentional content and that they involve somatic agitation. I also point out some of the more promising directions for future research in this area
Gainotti, Guido (2005). Emotions, unconscious processes, and the right hemisphere. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 7 (1):71-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gershenson, Carlos, Modelling emotions with multidimensional logic.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the objectives of Artificial Intelligence has been the modelling of "human" characteristics, such as emotions, behaviour, conscience, etc. But in such characteristics we might find certain degree of contradiction. Previous work on modelling emotions and its problems are reviewed. A model for emotions is proposed using multidimensional logic, which handles the degree of contradiction that emotions might have. The model is oriented to simulate emotions in artificial societies. The proposed solution is also generalized for actions which might overcome contradiction (conflictive goals in agents, for example.)
Goebel, Bernd & Hösle, Vittorio (2005). Reasons, emotions, and God's presence in Anselm of canterbury's cur deus homo. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 87 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper deals with the peculiar nature of Anselm’s rationalism, focussing on the dialogue Cur deus homo. On the one hand, the argument in Cur deus homois based on reason alone. On the other hand, the dialogic nature of the work allows Anselm to unfold emotional states in a way that almost anticipates Kierkegaard. Anselm’s rationalism does not exclude the experience of anxiety and despair, and this is where faith comes to the rescue. Finally, God’s presence in the search is shown to be logically compatible with the rationalist nature of the search
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotion, personality and simulation. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Goldie, Peter (2004). Emotion, reason, and virtue. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Goleman, Daniel (ed.) (2003). Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions, and Health. Shambhala.   (Google)
Abstract: Can the mind heal the body? The Buddhist tradition says yes--and now many Western scientists are beginning to agree. Healing Emotions is the record of an extraordinary series of encounters between the Dalai Lama and prominent Western psychologists, physicians, and meditation teachers that sheds new light on the mind-body connection. Topics include: compassion as medicine; the nature of consciousness; self-esteem; and the meeting points of mind, body, and spirit. This edition contains a new foreword by the editor
Goldie, Peter (2007). Not passion's slave: Emotions and choice, by Robert C. Solomon and from passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological category, by Thomas Dixon. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):106–110.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2000). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own and other people's emotions, and how we can explain the very human things which emotions lead us to do. He argues that it is only from the personal point of view that thoughts, reasons, feelings, and actions come into view. This fascinating book gives an accessible but penetrating exploration of an important but mysterious subject. Any reader interested in emotion and its role in understanding our lives will find much to think about here
Golightly, Cornelius L. (1953). The James-Lange theory: A logical post-mortem. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):286-299.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (ed.) (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gordon, Lorenne M. (1969). Conventional expressions of emotion. Mind 78 (January):35-44.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1969). Emotions and knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1978). Emotion labelling and cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.   (Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1986). The passivity of emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1987). The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 71 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or ‘folk’) psychology in general
Gotlind, Erik (1958). Three Theories Of Emotion: Some Views On Philosophical Method. Lund,: Gleerup.   (Google)
Graham, George (2002). Review of Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (5).   (Google)
Grafman, Jordan (2000). Structuring an emotional world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):200-201.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls emphasizes the role of emotion in behavior. My commentary provides some balance to that position by arguing that stored social knowledge dominates our behavior and controls emotional states, thereby reducing emotions to a subservient role in behavior
Graver, Margaret (2007). Stoicism & Emotion. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: On the surface, stoicism and emotion seem like contradictory terms. Yet the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were deeply interested in the emotions, which they understood as complex judgments about what we regard as valuable in our surroundings. Stoicism and Emotion shows that they did not simply advocate an across-the-board suppression of feeling, as stoicism implies in today’s English, but instead conducted a searching examination of these powerful psychological responses, seeking to understand what attitude toward them expresses the deepest respect for human potential. In this elegant and clearly written work, Margaret Graver gives a compelling new interpretation of the Stoic position. Drawing on a vast range of ancient sources, she argues that the chief demand of Stoic ethics is not that we should suppress or deny our feelings, but that we should perfect the rational mind at the core of every human being. Like all our judgments, the Stoics believed, our affective responses can be either true or false and right or wrong, and we must assume responsibility for them. Without glossing over the difficulties, Graver also shows how the Stoics dealt with those questions that seem to present problems for their theory: the physiological basis of affective responses, the phenomenon of being carried away by one’s emotions, the occurrence of involuntary feelings and the disordered behaviors of mental illness. Ultimately revealing the deeper motivations of Stoic philosophy, Stoicism and Emotion uncovers the sources of its broad appeal in the ancient world and illuminates its surprising relevance to our own
Greenspan, Patricia, Craving the right: Emotions and moral reasons.   (Google)
Abstract: I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as moral motivators to be hard to miss. Of course, philosophers and others sometimes rightly insist that we need to put emotions aside in order to formulate satisfying moral principles, but I would have been surprised to hear anyone deny that moral motivation typically rests on emotion and that we need that basis in early life in order to get to the stage of acting on moral principles. However, I have since come to think that none of the main philosophical approaches to ethics fully appreciates the significance of emotion, in part because of a misconception of practical reasons. Reasons for action are commonly taken as prima facie requirements, so that moral reasons would yield requirements just insofar as they outweigh competing reasons such as reasons of simple self-interest. Someone who recognizes a moral reason as holding “all things considered” would be irrational not to act on it. But I argue in recent work (starting with Greenspan 2005) that even all-things-considered reasons may in one sense be optional: a rational agent can legitimately “discount” them, cancelling their deliberative weight and their force for motivation. What keeps us from setting aside reasons of the sort that underlie moral..
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1981). Emotions as evaluations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (April):158-169.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1987). Emotion and error. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (4).   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (ms). Emotions, innateness, and ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: My discussion below is an highly abbreviated version of a paper in preparation for a conference on innateness . I allow for both types of influence but suggest that more attention should be paid to mechanisms of social transfer of emotions, as a possible innate source of plasticity in moral learning via emotions - and hence of cultural variation in moral codes
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1980). Emotions, reasons, and 'self-involvement'. Philosophical Studies 38 (2).   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (2000). Emotional strategies and rationality. Ethics 110 (3).   (Google | More links)
Greenspan, Patricia (ms). Learning emotions and ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Innate emotional bases of ethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance of emotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components of emotions need not be limited to what psychologists think of as basic emotions. But in that case, innate mechanisms of social transfer of emotion, such as infants’ tendency to facial imitation, gaze-following, and emotional contagion or empathy, provide a source of plasticity in developing the basic elements that lets emotions incorporate cultural influence from early on. This leaves room later for cognitive components of adult human emotions and hence for the further role of language in conveying cultural influence. We can thus see how moral judgment might depend on innate emotional capacities that are both modifiable by culture and capable of registering objective values. I use Rawls’s treatment of the development of moral sentiments to illustrate the kind of supportive role that emotions can play in a principle-based account – though my own account involves modifications I go on to indicate
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a socially based version of moral realism
Greenspan, Patricia (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral dilemmas in the strict sense - cases where all options are morally forbidden, through no prior fault of the agent's - are dismissed by some philosophers as unintelligible. The author argues that the possibility of such cases is a consequence of a system of social rules that is simple enough to be teachable. The motivational force of the moral judgments pitted against each other in dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion in ethics
Green, O. Harvey (1970). The expression of emotion. Mind 79 (October):551-568.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Griffiths, Morwenna (1984). Emotions and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):223–231.   (Google | More links)
Griffiths, Paul E. & Scarantino, Andrea (2005). Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul E Griffiths Biohumanities Project University of Queensland St Lucia 4072 Australia paul.griffiths@uq.edu.au
Gross, Daniel M. (2001). Early modern emotion and the economy of scarcity. Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (4).   (Google)
Gross, Daniel M. (2006). The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Princess Diana’s death was a tragedy that provoked mourning across the globe; the death of a homeless person, more often than not, is met with apathy. How can we account for this uneven distribution of emotion? Can it simply be explained by the prevailing scientific understanding? Uncovering a rich tradition beginning with Aristotle, The Secret History of Emotion offers a counterpoint to the way we generally understand emotions today. Through a radical rereading of Aristotle, Seneca, Thomas Hobbes, Sarah Fielding, and Judith Butler, among others, Daniel M. Gross reveals a persistent intellectual current that considers emotions as psychosocial phenomena. In Gross’s historical analysis of emotion, Aristotle and Hobbes’s rhetoric show that our passions do not stem from some inherent, universal nature of men and women, but rather are conditioned by power relations and social hierarchies. He follows up with consideration of how political passions are distributed to some people but not to others using the Roman Stoics as a guide. Hume and contemporary theorists like Judith Butler, meanwhile, explain to us how psyches are shaped by power. To supplement his argument, Gross also provides a history and critique of the dominant modern view of emotions, expressed in Darwinism and neurobiology, in which they are considered organic, personal feelings independent of social circumstances. The result is a convincing work that rescues the study of the passions from science and returns it to the humanities and the art of rhetoric
Gustafsson, Ylva; Kronqvist, Camilla & McEachrane, Michael (eds.) (2009). Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This unique collection of articles on emotion by Wittgensteinian philosophers provides a fresh perspective on the questions framing the current philosophical and scientific debates about emotions and offers significant insights into the role of emotions for understanding interpersonal relations and the relation between emotion and ethics
Halpern, Jodi (forthcoming). When concretized emotion-belief complexes derail decision-making capacity. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an important gap in philosophical, clinical and bioethical conceptions of decision-making capacity. These fields recognize that when traumatic life circumstances occur, people not only feel afraid and demoralized, but may develop catastrophic thinking and other beliefs that can lead to poor judgment. Yet there has been no articulation of the ways in which such beliefs may actually derail decision-making capacity. In particular, certain emotionally grounded beliefs are systematically unresponsive to evidence, and this can block the ability to deliberate about alternatives. People who meet medico-legal criteria for decision-making capacity can react to health and personal crises with such capacity-derailing reactions. One aspect of this is that a person who is otherwise cognitively intact may be unable to appreciate her own future quality of life while in this complex state of mind. This raises troubling ethical challenges. We cannot rely on the current standard assessment of cognition to determine decisional rights in medical and other settings. We need to understand better how emotionally grounded beliefs interfere with decision-making capacity, in order to identify when caregivers have an obligation to intervene
Hamlyn, David W. (1989). False emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 275:275-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hamilton, Christopher (2005). Mark R. Wynn emotional experience and religious understanding: Integrating perception, conception, and feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (hbk); £16.99 (pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (hbk); 0521549892 (pbk). Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.   (Google)
Hanoch, Yaniv (2005). One theory to fit them all: The search hypothesis of emotion revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):135-145.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a recent paper, Dylan Evans proposed that emotions could help solve what has been known as ?the frame problem?. In the process, he first questioned the utility of using the frame problem as a framework. After tackling this issue, he provided an alternative terminology to the frame problem?termed ?the search hypothesis of emotion??in order to re-examine how emotions aid rational agents. His new terminology, however, opens itself to other critiques. While accepting the basic tenets of his analysis, I question (i) whether a single search theory of emotion is adequate, and (ii) whether his theory would have been better termed ?the search hypothesis of feeling?. Finally, I extend some of the ideas developed in Evans' paper. Introduction Emotion, reason and ends The search hypothesis of emotion revisited Conclusion
Harré, Rom (1997). Are emotions significant in psychology only as motives? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (4):503–505.   (Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1999). It's ok to be complicated: The case of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):237-249.   (Google)
Harrison, Andrew (1993). Music and the emotions: The philosophical theories. Cogito 7 (2):157-159.   (Google)
Heinzel, Alexander & Northoff, Georg (2009). Emotional feeling and the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex: Theoretical and empirical considerations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):443 – 464.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional feeling can be defined as the affective constituent of emotions representing a subjective experience such as, for example, feeling love or hate. Several recent neuroimaging studies have focused on this affective component of emotions thereby aiming to characterise the underlying neural correlates. These studies indicate that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in the processing of emotional feeling. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the extent to which the present state of the art in neuroscience enables emotional feeling to be related to specific brain regions. In the first step, methodological and theoretical problems in the investigation of emotional feeling will be discussed leading to the characterisation of a “twofold gap.” This gap represents (a) the theoretical difficulties encountered in transforming vivid subjective experience into a theoretical psychological concept, and (b) the problems of implementing such a concept by performing empirical studies. Based on these considerations we suggest approaches for future empirical studies. In the second step, a group of functional neuroimaging studies focusing on the affective constituent of emotions will be discussed in detail with regard to the theoretical problems outlined in the first step
Herzberg, Larry A. (2009). Direction, causation, and appraisal theories of emotion. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):167 – 186.   (Google)
Abstract: Appraisal theories of emotion generally presuppose that emotions are “directed at” various items. They also hold that emotions have motivational properties. However, although it coheres well with their views, they have yet to seriously develop the idea that the function of emotional direction is to guide those properties. I argue that this “guidance hypothesis” can open up a promising new field of research in emotion theory. But I also argue that before appraisal theorists can take full advantage of it, they must drop their further assumption that to determine an emotion's direction, one need only retrace the process that caused it. Contrary to this “retracing view,” I argue for an “independence thesis”: directed emotions are produced by two functionally independent sub-processes. The first, “affect-causation,” functions in part to produce a state with certain motivational properties given certain representations. The second, “affect-direction,” has the function of optimally guiding those motivational properties by associating them with representations that may properly be quite dissimilar from the causal ones. By provisionally adopting the independence thesis and empirically testing the guidance hypothesis, I argue that appraisal theorists stand a good chance of significantly increasing the explanatory power of their theories
Hermerén, Göran (1993). Emotive properties: The role of abstraction, introspection and projection. Theoria 59 (1-3):80-112.   (Google)
Hershock, Peter D. (2003). Renegade emotion: Buddhist precedents for returning rationality to the heart. Philosophy East and West 53 (2):251-270.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: : By drawing out the critical implications of a Buddhist understanding of persons and emotions, it is suggested here that we see emotions as relational transformations through which the direction and qualitative intensities of our interdependence are situationally negotiated, enhanced, and revised. Historical and critical precedents are then offered for reassessing the association of reasoning with the practices of definition and argument, and the consequent association of the operational structure of rationality with that of reality. Reason is better seen as an emotion that has long been renegade and that--especially as institutionalized in the form of global, control-biased technological development--can remain so only at considerable social, cultural, and spiritual risk
Howard, A., Ritual, memory, and emotion: Comparing two cognitive hypotheses.   (Google)
Abstract: Without systems of public, external symbols for recording information, nonliterate communities have to rely on human memory for the retention and transmission of cultural knowledge. Religious expressions either evolved in directions that rendered them memorable or they were--quite literally--forgotten. Most religious systems, including all of the great world religions, emerged among populations that were mostly illiterate (even if there was a literate elite). Thus, it should come as no surprise that religious systems and ritual systems, in particular, have evolved so as to exploit variables that facilitate memory. No doubt, the invention of literacy ameliorates these variables' influence, however, the availability of such cultural tools neither eliminates that influence nor even surmounts it. Experimental psychologists have clarified variables that contribute to extraordinary recall for events that arise in the normal course of life. Probably, the most obvious is frequency. Experiencing events of the same type frequently aids memory for that type of event, though not necessarily for the details of any of the particular instances of that type. When Jains carry out the Puja ritual day after day, they become adept at its performance. Although they are fluent with the ritual's details, it is possible that they do not remember even one of their previous performances distinctively
Hurley, Elisa A. (2007). Working passions: Emotions and creative engagement with value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):79-104.   (Google)
Abstract: It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglectcentral intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts’ attempts to reduce them to other mental states andtoward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions’ distinctive function is to engage us with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions’ work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives
Hutchinson, Phil (2009). Emotion-philosophy-science. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hutto, Daniel D. (2002). The world is not enough: Shared emotions and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Im, Manyul (2002). Action, emotion, and inference in mencius. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29 (2):227–249.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1895). The physical basis of emotion: A reply. Mind 4 (13):92-99.   (Google | More links)
Isay, Gad C. (2009). A humanist synthesis of memory, language, and emotions: Q Ian mu's interpretation of confucIan philosophy. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (4):425-437.   (Google)
Abstract: While Q ian Mu intentionally avoided systematic philosophical arguments, his references to memory, language, and emotions, as expressed in a book he wrote in 1948, were suggestive of new interpretations of traditional Chinese, and especially Confucian, ideas such as human autonomy, mind, human nature, morality, immortality, and spirituality. The foremost contribution of Qian’s humanist synthesis rests in its articulation of the idea of the person. Across the context of memory, language, and emotions, the tiyong dynamics of mind and human nature recreate, in modern terms, the traditional Chinese concept of the person who is individually unique and simultaneously interrelated. Avoiding the extreme polarities of individualism and collectivism, he stresses rather their coexistence. His synthesis explains to the Chinese people something about who they are, the meaning in life in the framework of their culture, and how their (revitalized) way of life is at its best in the most important area, that of human relations
Izard, Carroll E.; Trentacosta, Christopher J. & King, Kristen A. (2005). Brain, emotions, and emotion-cognition relations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):208-209.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis makes a strong case for the interdependence and integration of emotion and cognitive processes. Yet, these processes exhibit considerable independence in early life, as well as in certain psychopathological conditions, suggesting that the capacity for their integration emerges as a function of development. In some circumstances, the concept of highly interactive emotion and cognitive systems seems a viable alternative hypothesis to the idea of systems integration
Jacobson, Anne J. (2008). Empathy, primitive reactions and the modularity of emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
James, Susan (1997). Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Passion and Action is an exploration of the role of the passions in seventeenth-century thought. Susan James offers fresh readings of a broad range of thinkers, including such canonical figures as Hobbes, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Pascal, and Locke, and shows that a full understanding of their philosophies must take account of their interpretations of our affective life. This ground-breaking study throws new light upon the shaping of our ideas about the mind, knowledge, and action, and provides a historical context for burgeoning current debates about the emotions
Johnson, A. B. (1854). The Meaning of Words: Analysed Into Words and Unverbal Things, and Unverbal Things Classified Into Intellections, Sensations and Emotions. Milwaukee, J.W. Chamberlin.   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2008). How to Change the Past. In Kim Atkins & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2006). Quick and Smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:3-27.   (Google)
Jonas, Monique F. (2005). Robert C. Roberts: Emotions: An essay in aid of moral psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5).   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2007). Review of Robert Solomon (ed.), Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotion. Sophia 46 (1).   (Google)
Kaag, John (2009). Getting under my skin: William James on the emotions, sociality, and transcendence. Zygon 44 (2):433-450.   (Google)
Abstract: "You are really getting under my skin!" This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to "get under one's skin." I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence
Kafetsios, Konstantinos & LaRock, Eric (2005). Cognition and emotion: Aristotelian affinities with contemporary emotion research. Theory and Psychology 15 (5):639-657.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kaster, Robert A. (2006). Review of David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).   (Google)
Kent, Bonnie (2005). Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation. Richard Sorabji oxford: Oxford university press, 2000. Pp. XI, 499. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):245–247.   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, George A. (1994). Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion. Ancient Philosophy 14 (2):428-431.   (Google)
Killcross, Simon (2000). Reinforcement and punishment: Dissociable systems for action and emotion? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-205.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls presents a theory of emotion based on the premise that emotions are evoked by events that are capable of being instrumental reinforcers and punishers. As support for this theory is drawn almost entirely from experiments in non-human primates, valuable insights into the relationship between punishment and reinforcement systems, and the nature of instrumentality, may have been overlooked
King, Peter, Emotions in medieval thought.   (Google)
Abstract: No single theory of the emotions dominates the whole of the Middle Ages. Instead, there are several competing accounts, and differences of opinion — sometimes quite dramatic — within each account. Yet there is consensus on the scope and nature of a theory of the emotions, as well as on its place in affective psychology generally. For most medieval thinkers, emotions are at once cognitively penetrable and somatic, which is to say that emotions are influenced by and vary with changes in thought and belief, and that they are also bound up, perhaps essentially, with their physiological manifestations. This ‘mixed’ conception of emotions was broad enough to anchor medieval disagreements over details, yet rich enough to distinguish it from other parts of psychology and medicine. In particular, two kinds of phenomena, thought to be purely physiological, were not considered emotions even on this broad conception. First, what we now classify as drives or urges, for instance hunger and sexual arousal, were thought in the Middle Ages to be at best ‘pre-emotions’ fpropayyioney): mere biological motivations for action, not having any intrinsic cognitive object. Second, moods were likewise thought to be non-objectual somatic states, completely explicable as an imbalance of the bodily humours. Depression fmelancholia), for example, is the pathological condition of having an excess of black bile. Medieval theories of emotions, therefore, concentrate on paradigm cases that fall under the broad conception: delight, anger, distress, fear, and the like. The enterprise of constructing an adequate philosophical theory of the emotions in the Middle Ages had its counterpart in a large body of practical know-how. The medical literature on the emotions, for instance, was extensive, covering such subjects as the causal role of emotions in disease and recovery, the nerves as connecting the brain to the organs involved in the physiological manifestations of the emotions, and the effect of diet and nutrition on emotional responses..
Klebanov, Michael, Utilitarian judgments and an intuitive moral system: Can John Mikhail's model accommodate autism and social emotion?   (Google)
Abstract: In the attempt to understand moral knowledge, a framework of “universal moral grammar” (“UMG”) has gained traction. Instead of relying on justifications provided after moral judgments, or claiming that our moral judgments are determined by reason, emotion, or some combination of the two, UMG seeks to explain moral cognition by modeling our intuitive judgments in moral scenarios. John Mikhail proposes a model of how our mind computes structural descriptions. In this paper, I will outline the justifications for his system, and then review how his system would work in practice. I will then focus on how Mikhail’s model can account for the discrepancy between autistic and non-autistic individuals’ performance in the same types of experiments. Finally, after considering the similarity between the moral judgments of autistics and the judgments of people with damage to their prefrontal cortex, I will investigate possible deficiencies in Mikhail’s model, and briefly conclude with suggestions for further research
Knuuttila, Simo (2004). Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions are the focus of intense debate both in contemporary philosophy and psychology, and increasingly also in the history of ideas. Simo Knuuttila presents a comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of emotion from Plato to Renaissance times, combining rigorous philosophical analysis with careful historical reconstruction. The first part of the book covers the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle and later ancient views from Stoicism to Neoplatonism and, in addition, their reception and transformation by early Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen to Augustine and Cassian. Knuuttila then proceeds to a discussion of ancient themes in medieval thought, and of new medieval conceptions, codified in the so-called faculty psychology from Avicenna to Aquinas, in thirteenth century taxonomies, and in the voluntarist approach of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and their followers. Philosophers, classicists, historians of philosophy, historians of psychology, and anyone interested in emotion will find much to stimulate them in this fascinating book
Koch, Philip J. (1987). Emotional ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):257-279.   (Google | More links)
Korpalo, Olga (1999). Rationality and emotions: (The perspectives of logical-cognitive analysis). Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (1):109-127.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - belief and desire. The fourth chapter will present the instrumental typology of certain emotional concepts. The final chapter represents preliminary logical schema of the meanings of emotional concepts
Korb, Kevin B. & Nicholson, Ann E. (2000). The essential roles of emotion in cognitive architecture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-206.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls's presentation of emotion as integral to cognition is a welcome counter to a long tradition of treating them as antagonists. His eduction of experimental evidence in support of this view is impressive. However, we find his excursion into the philosophy of consciousness less successful. Rolls gives syntactical manipulation the central role in consciousness (in stark contrast to Searle, for whom “mere” syntax inevitably falls short of consciousness), and leaves us wondering about the roles left for emotion after all
Kovach, Adam & De Lancey, Craig (2005). On emotions and the explanation of behavior. Noûs 39 (1):106-22.   (Google | More links)
Kraemer, Felicitas (forthcoming). Authenticity anyone? The enhancement of emotions via neuro-psychopharmacology. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The literature provided by the philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement’ provides good reasons to include real world examples. Such case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like themselves’ for the first time in their lives. Beginning with these accounts, this article suggests three non-naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not always the only valid one, but that the other two ways of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the normative implications if not ethical intricacies that accompany the enhancement of emotions
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2008). Expendable emotions. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):5-22.   (Google)
Abstract: Are there any morally expendable emotions? That is, are there any emotions that could ideally, from a moral point of view, be eradicated from human life? Aristotle may have subscribed to the view that there are no such emotions, and for that reason—though not only for that reason—it merits investigation. I first suggest certain revisions of the specifics of Aristotle’s non-expendability claim that render it less counter-intuitive. I then show that the plausibility of Aristotle’s claim turns largely on the question of how emotions are to be individuated. After probing that question in relation to contemporary theories of emotion, I explore how our emotions and moral virtues relate to distinct spheres of human experience, and how emotion concepts can best carve up the emotional landscape. I argue finally that there exist certain normative reasons for specifying emotion concepts such that Aristotle’s view holds good
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2010). Educating moral emotions or moral selves: A false dichotomy? Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (4):397-409.   (Google)
Abstract: In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a 'moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as 'identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2010). The Self and its Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- What selves are -- Exploring selves -- The emotional self -- Self-concept : self-esteem and self-confidence -- The self as moral character -- Self-respect -- Multicultural selves -- Self-pathologies -- Self-change and self-education.
Kruger, Robert S. (2009). The assessment of emotional awareness : Can technology make a contribution? In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kuhn, James W. (1998). Emotion as well as reason: Getting students beyond "interpersonal accountability". Journal of Business Ethics 17 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper notes the recent spread of business ethics courses in American higher education, observing that teachers trained in economics have not readily incorporated ethical notions or theory into regular courses, such as finance, management, accounting, and marketing. The presumed ethically neutral, value-free approach of economists, who dominate business courses, is increasingly inadequate to meet the needs of business managers – or of business students. Technological and political changes, creating an interdependent environment within which managers operate, have eroded older ethics based on tradition and common backgrounds. They have also raised ethical issues of new orders of complexity. With corporate business managers finding ethical concerns more pressing matters than do many teachers, the paper offers some tentative answers to three questions about how to interest business students in ethical issues: What Approach to Business Ethics Gets student's Attention? What Is the Value of Simulations and Games? What Can Be Said About the Business System And Its Values?The answer to the first question is simulations and games. Case method analysis is serviceable, engaging students' intellect, but all too often without emotional involvement or self-revelation. Experiential learning through class-room games accomplish both engagement and involvement in ways that are exceedingly helpful to business students, who have had "less occasion for critical reflection on self and world than have others of their age."
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Leary, Mark R. (ms). Motivational and emotional aspects of the self.   (Google)
Abstract:      Recent theory and research are reviewed regarding self-related motives (self-enhancement, self-verification, and self-expansion) and self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, pride, social anxiety, and embarrassment), with an emphasis on how these motivational and emotional aspects of the self might be related. Specifically, these motives and emotions appear to function to protect people's social well-being. The motives to self-enhance, self-verify, and self-expand are partly rooted in people's concerns with social approval and acceptance, and self-conscious emotions arise in response to events that have real or imagined implications for others' judgments of the individual. Thus, these motives and emotions do not operate to maintain certain states of the self, as some have suggested, but rather to facilitate people's social interactions and relationships
Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be useful to consider the role emotion plays in the respective interpretive processes. I give reasons for believing that affective processes are more heavily involved in simulation (especially in situations of practical judgment and practical reasoning) than in theory-application. But affective processes have distinctive neurological and metabolic properties. These distinctive features of emotion may not only enrich our understanding of the simulation process, but also afford us a step towards responding to Perner's challenge
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Abstract: Emotions have not received sufficient attention in business ethics. This paper identifies the positive role of emotions in human judgment and attitudes. It then argues that emotions as well as feelings on the part of managers and their employees can be positive forces for both business managers and for the organizations they lead. Allowing emotions a stronger role in business affairs could serve in putting a more human face on both managers and their organizations
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Lyons, William E. (1978). Emotions and behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):410-418.   (Google | More links)
Mackenzie, Catriona (2002). Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation impairs the capacity for autonomy
Maclaren, Kym (2009). Emotional metamorphoses : The role of others in becoming a subject. In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: Reason in the emotional life. I-III.--Education of the emotions.--The early discipline of personality.--The personal life.--The virtue of chastity.--Art and the future.--Science and religion.--Reason and religion.--Religious reality.--The maturity of religion. I-II.--The conservation of personality
Mackenzie, Catriona (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , ed., moral psychology, volume 3. the neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development , cambridge, ma: Mit press, 2008, pp. XIX + 569, us $30 (paperback). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):528 – 532.   (Google)
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Abstract: This book broadens the inquiry into emotion to comprehend a comparative cultural outlook. It begins with an overview of recent work in the West, and then proceeds to the main business of scrutinizing various relevant issues from both Asian and comparative perspectives. Finally, Robert Solomon comments and summarizes.
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1895). Emotions versus pleasure-pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Thomas (1998). The role of emotion in Sartre's portrait of anti-semitism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):141 – 151.   (Google)
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Mees, Ulrich & Schmitt, Annette (2008). Goals of action and emotional reasons for action. A modern version of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):157–178.   (Google | More links)
Megill, Jason L. & Cogburn, Jon (2005). Easy's gettin' harder all the time: The computational theory and affective states. Ratio 18 (3):306-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Mele, Alfred R. (2000). Self-deception and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires nor causally mediated by desires. It is argued that (1) is false and that (3) is defensible and more defensible than (2)
Mendl, M. & Paul, E. S. (2004). Consciousness, emotion and animal welfare: Insights from cognitive science. Animal Welfare 13:17- 25.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
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Abstract: The twin concepts of ethics and emotions are used in this paper to examine experiences of doing research on the topic of violence. Ethical questions are of significance when carrying out research which is potentially distressing to the research participant. Through field experiences in South Africa the author argues, however, that despite the growing concern among geographers over the ethical dimensions of their work, the implementation of ethically guided research practice is often less simple in reality. The concept of emotions is used to explore the less well examined issue of the impact of distressing research on the researcher and research assistants. The paper concludes that it is often difficult to separate out ethics from emotions
Mirk, Marjorie (1930). The difference of emotional stability in girls of different ages. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):229 – 232.   (Google)
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Abstract: Species, endowed with an open-ended capacity for learning, which is one of the highest evolutionary achievements,will profit most from this ability, if they are urged one way or other to invest any surplus of energy in expanding and refining their behavioural repertoire and in adapting it to prevailing circumstances, while incurring as little risk and stress as possible.It is therefore argued that an open-ended capacity for learning is maximally adding to survival if paired to two distinct tendencies:1) a tendency to seek high-arousal evoking situations whenever surplus energy is available, and 2) a tendency to seek arousal reducing situations as soon as the surplus energy is exhausted
Moore, Simon C. (ed.) (2002). Emotional Cognition: From Brain to Behaviour. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Mooney, Ed (2005). Review of Rick Anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2002). Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):265-275.   (Google)
Morton, Adam (2002). Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy: Adam Morton. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):265–275.   (Google | More links)
Morgan, Jeffrey (1994). Learning to live with emotion. Educational Philosophy and Theory 26 (2):67–81.   (Google | More links)
Myers, Charles S. (1901). Experimentation on emotion. Mind 10 (37):114-115.   (Google | More links)
Naess, Arne (1969). Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence. Inquiry 12 (1-4):66 – 104.   (Google)
Neu, Jerome (2004). Emotions and freedom. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Neu, Jerome (2007). Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In Sticks and Stones, philosopher Jerome Neu probes the nature, purpose, and effects of insults, exploring how and why they humiliate, embarrass, infuriate,...
Neville, Bernie (1989). Educating Psyche: Emotion, Imagination, and the Unconscious in Learning. Collins Dove.   (Google)
Ngoka, C. D. (2006). Reflections: Philosophical Essays on the Minds, Thoughts, Emotions, and Action of Men: (Evangelism Documented). Alphabet Nigeria Publishers.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun (2002). On the genealogy of norms: A case for the role of emotion in cultural evolution. Philosophy of Science 69 (2).   (Google | More links)
Nieuwenburg, P. (2002). Emotion and perception in Aristotle's rhetoric. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):86 – 100.   (Google | More links)
Nielsen, Lisbeth (2002). The simulation of emotion experience: On the emotional foundations of theory of mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation of infants' understanding of other minds is built upon an early-developing capacity to share others' emotion experiences. The emotion experiences elicited in interactions between caregivers and infants enable the elaboration of this primitive understanding into a more fully developed understanding of psychological subjects. The evidence presented in support of these claims derives from a wide range of studies of the phenomena of emotional contagion, affective communication, and emotion regulation involving infants, young children, and adults
Nobis, Nathan (online). Rational engagement, emotional response and the prospects for progress in animal use ‘debates’.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is designed to help people rationally engage moral issues regarding the treatment of animals, specifically uses of animals in medical and psychological experimentation, basic research, drug development, education and training, consumer product testing and other areas
Northoff, Georg (2005). Emotional-cognitive integration, the self, and cortical midline structures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):211-212.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis discusses the dynamic mechanisms of emotional-cognitive integration. I argue that he neglects the self and its neural correlate. The self can be characterized as an emotional-cognitive unity, which may be accounted for by the interplay between anterior and posterior medial cortical regions. I propose that these regions form an anatomical, physiological, and psychological unity, the cortical midline structures (CMSs)
Næss, Arne (1975). Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's Ethics. Universitetsforl..   (Google)
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Nussbaum, Charles (2003). Another look at functionalism and the emotions. Brain and Mind 4 (3):353-383.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two chronic problems have plagued functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The first is the chauvinism/liberalism dilemma, the second the absent qualia problem. The first problem is addressed by blocking excessively liberal counterexamples at a level of functional abstraction that is high enough to avoid chauvinism. This argument introduces the notion of emotional functional organization (EFO). The second problem is addressed by granting Block's skeptical conclusions with respect to mentality as such, while arguing that qualitative experience is a concomitant of human mentality considered as a special case: a system with EFO implemented in an organic substrate
Nussbaum, Martha C. (1990). Love's Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 573 | Google | More links)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2006). Radical evil in the Lockean state: The neglect of the political emotions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: All modern liberal democracies have strong reasons to support an idea of toleration, understood as involving respect, not only grudging acceptance, and to extend it to all religious and secular doctrines, limiting only conduct that violates the rights of other citizens. There is no modern democracy, however, in which toleration of this sort is a stable achievement. Why is toleration, attractive in principle, so difficult to achieve? The normative case for toleration was well articulated by John Locke in his influential A Letter Concerning Toleration , although his attractive proposal thus rests on a fragile foundation. Kant did much more, combining a Lockean account of the state with a profound diagnosis of ‘radical evil’, the tendencies in all human beings to militate against stable toleration and respect. But Kant proposed no mechanism through which the state might mitigate the harmful influence of ‘radical evil’, thus rendering toleration stable. One solution to this problem was proposed by Rousseau, but it has deep problems. How, then, can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile human basis of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only within each state, but also among peoples and states, in this interlocking world? Key Words: toleration • emotion • evil • liberal democracy • Locke • Mill • Kant • Rousseau
Oakley, Justin (1992). Morality and the Emotions. Routledge.   (Google)
Oaklander, Nathan L. & Gull, Richard (1978). The emotions. Philosophy Research Archives 1272.   (Google)
O'Brien, Patrick (1950). Emotions and Morals. New York, Grune & Stratton.   (Google)
O'Grady, Jane (2005). From passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological category by Thomas Dixon. Cambridge university press, 2003, 297pp., Hb ??45.00 the navigation of feeling: A framework for the history of emotions by William M. Reddy. Cambridge university press, 2001, 380pp., Pb ??17.99. Philosophy 80 (1):156-159.   (Google)
Onkal, Dilek, Cognitive and emotional representations of terror attacks: A cross-cultural exploration.   (Google)
Abstract:      A questionnaire measuring cognitive and affective representations of terror risk was developed and tested in Turkey and Israel. Participants in the study were university students from the two countries (n = 351). Four equivalent factors explained terror risk cognitions in each sample: costs, vulnerability, trust, and control.Asingle negative emotionality factor explained the affective component of terror risk representations in both samples. All factors except control could be measured reliably. Results supported the validity of the questionnaire by showing expected associations between cognitions and emotions, as well as indicating gender differences and cultural variations. Current findings are discussed in relation to previous results, theoretical approaches, and practical implications
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2002). The role of emotions in the explanation of action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Palencik, Joseph T. (2007). Amusement and the philosophy of emotion: A neuroanatomical approach. Dialogue 46 (3):419-434.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers who discuss the emotions have usually treated amusement as a non-emotional mental state. Two prominent philosophers making this claim are Henri Bergson and John Morreall, who maintain that amusement is too abstract and intellectual to qualify as an emotion. Here, the merit of this claim is assessed. Through recent work in neuroanatomy there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of dichotomies that separate emotion and the intellect. Findings suggest that the neuroanatomical structure of amusement is similar to other commonly recognized emotion states. On the basis of these it is argued that amusement should be considered an emotion. Les philosophes qui adressent la question des émotions traitent généralement l’état d’amusement comme un êtat mental excluant l’émotion. Parmi les philosophes importants à défendre cette thèse, Henri Bergson et John Morreall soutiennent que l’amusement est trop abstrait et intellectuel pour être tenu pour une émotion. Nous réévaluons cette thèse. De récents travaux en neuroanatomie fournissent des raisons de douter de la légitimité de la dichotomie entre émotion et intellect. Certaines autres découvertes suggèrent que la structure neuroanatomique de l’amusement est très similaire à d’autres états émotifs. Sur la base de ces travaux, nous argumentons que l’amusement doit être considéré comme une émotion
Palencik, Joseph T. (2007). William James and the psychology of emotions: From 1884 to the present. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper addresses the significance of William James's theory of emotion in contemporary emotion theory. While many of James's detractors have pointed to the problems with his definition of emotion, the bearing his theory of emotion generation would have on modern approaches in psychology suggests a different point of view
Panksepp, Jaak; Gordon, Nakia & Burgdorf, Jeff (2001). Empathy and the action-perception resonances of basic socio-emotional systems of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):43-44.   (Google)
Abstract: Mammalian brains contain a variety of self-centered socio-emotional systems. An understanding of how they interact with more recent cognitive structures may be essential for understanding empathy. Preston & de Waal have neglected this vast territory of proximal brain issues in their analysis
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Emotional dynamics of the organism and its parts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):212-213.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotion-science without basic brain-science is only superficially satisfying. Dynamic systems approaches to emotions presently provide a compelling metaphor that raises more difficult empirical questions than substantive scientific answers. How might we close the gap between theory and empirical observations? Such theoretical views still need to be guided by linear cross-species experimental approaches more easily implement in the laboratory
Panksepp, Jaak (2007). Emotional feelings originate below the neocortex: Toward a neurobiology of the soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):101-103.   (Google)
Abstract: Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). Neural behaviorism: From brain evolution to human emotion at the speed of an action potential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):212-213.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls shares important data on hunger, thirst, sexuality, and learned behaviors, but is it pertinent to understanding the fundamental nature of emotionality? Important as such work is for understanding the motivated behaviors of animals, Rolls builds a constructivist theory of emotions and primary-process affective consciousness without considering past evidence on specific types of emotional tendencies and their diverse neural substrates
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The cradle of consciousness: A periconscious emotional homunculus? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):24-32.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). “The dream of reason creates monsters” . . . Especially when we neglect the role of emotions in Rem-states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):988-990.   (Google)
Abstract: As highlighted by Solms, and to a lesser extent by Hobson et al. and Nielsen, dreaming and REM sleep can be dissociated. Meanwhile Vertes & Eastman and Revonsuo provide distinct views on the functions of REM sleep and dreaming. A resolution of such divergent views may clarify the fundamental nature of these processes. As dream commentators have long noted, with Revonsuo taking the lead among the present authors, emotionality is a central and consistent aspect of REM dreams. A deeper consideration of emotions in REM dreams may serve as the conceptual salve to help heal the emerging rifts in this field of inquiry. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]
Parker, Thomas (2008). Volition, Rhetoric, and Emotion in the Work of Pascal. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This study identifies and analyzes a compelling theory and practice of persuasion that integrates the complexity of human desire. It demonstrates how the philosophical component in Pascal's description of the will makes a seamless integration into a vehicle of persuasion and poetics, providing a privileged viewpoint for understanding the author's complete works, arguing that the notion of will is of fundamental importance in Pascal's anthropology as well as in his rhetoric. This avenue of interpretation is both fruitful and difficult, because the word volonte means very different things in Pascal and in modern French
Parr, Hester & Davidson, Joyce (2008). Virtual trust": Online emotional intimacies in mental health support. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Pascual-Leone, Juan (2005). Not a bridge but an organismic (general and causal) neuropsychology should make a difference in emotion theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):213-214.   (Google)
Abstract: Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”
Persson, Ingmar (1991). A determinist dilemma. Ratio 4 (1):38-58.   (Google)
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Emotion and the concept of behavior. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):291-298.   (Google)
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Peters, R. S. & Mace, C. A. (1962). Emotions and the category of passivity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:117-142.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Petersen, Stephen (2004). Functions, creatures, learning, emotion. Hudlicka and Canamero.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: I propose a conceptual framework for emotions according to which they are best understood as the feedback mechanism a creature possesses in virtue of its function to learn. More specifically, emotions can be neatly modeled as a measure of harmony in a certain kind of constraint satisfaction problem. This measure can be used as error for weight adjustment (learning) in an unsupervised connectionist network.
Pettinelli, Mark (2007). The Psychology Of Emotions, Feelings and Thoughts. Mark Pettinelli.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This book puts forth the idea that life is divided into three groups, emotion, thinking, and feeling.
Pinch, Adela (1996). Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book contends that when late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers sought to explain the origins of emotions, they often discovered that their feelings may not really have been their own. It explores the paradoxes of representing feelings in philosophy, aesthetic theory, gender ideology, literature, and popular sentimentality, and it argues that this period's obsession with sentimental, wayward emotion was inseparable from the dilemmas resulting from attempts to locate the origins of feelings in experience. The book shows how these epistemological dilemmas became gendered by studying a series of extravagantly affective scenes in works by Hume, Wordsworth, Charlotte Smith, and Jane Austen. Making its argument through a provocative conjunction of texts that range across genres and genders and across the divide between the eighteenth century and Romanticism, Strange Fits of Passion rediscovers the relationship of empiricism to the culture of sentimentality, and the significance of emotion to Romanticism
Pizzagalli, Diego A. (2005). The role of frontocingulate pathways in the emotion-cognition interface: Emerging clues from depression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):214-215.   (Google)
Abstract: By emphasizing nonlinear dynamics between appraisal and emotions, Lewis's model provides a valuable platform for integrating psychological and neural perspectives on the emotion-cognition interface. In this commentary, I discuss the role of neuroscience in shaping new conceptualizations of emotion and the putative role of theta oscillation within frontocingulate pathways in depression, a syndrome in which emotion-cognition relations are dysfunctional
Plantinga, Carl (2009). Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Trauma, pleasure, and emotion in the viewing of titanic: A cognitive approach. In Warren Buckland (ed.), Film Theory & Contemporary Hollywood Movies. Routledge.   (Google)
Plantinga, Carl (2009). Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Trauma, pleasure, and emotion in the viewing of titanic: A cognitive approach. In Warren Buckland (ed.), Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies. Routledge.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2002). Consciousness, computation, and emotion. In Simon C. Moore & Mike Oaksford (eds.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Promislow, Sharon (1999). Making the Brain/Body Connection: A Playful Guide to Releasing Mental, Physical & Emotional Blocks to Success. Kinetic Pub. Corp..   (Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2003). Review of Robert Solomon, Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (7).   (Google)
Reddy, William M. (2001). The logic of action: Indeterminacy, emotion, and historical narrative. History and Theory 40 (4):10–33.   (Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1980). Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining Emotions. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. University of California Press.   (Google)
Reydams-Schils, Gretchen (2006). Review of Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
Richardson, Pamela (2004). Agricultural ethics, neurotic natures and emotional encounters: An application of actor-network theory. Ethics, Place and Environment 7 (3):195 – 201.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fieldwork experiences in the summer of 2003 resulted in confusion regarding the ethical positioning of myself (the interviewer) in relation to the multiple 'actants' that constituted the research subject(s). This paper explores some of these personal issues and conflicts in order to clarify, gain perspective on and critique the nature (and indeed the 'Nature') of my fieldwork. The multiple positioning of participants within networks of agricultural and social ethics is addressed. I borrow Lewis Holloway's idea of relational ethical identity, in order to resituate and rethink the interviews in terms of actor-network theory. This paper argues that ethical identities and ethical 'natures' can be understood as relationally constructed and constituted within networks. The ways in which notions of (un)ethical agricultural relations shaped each interview experience are also explored. Specifically, how did my ideas of (un)ethical farming influence my 'ethical take' on how different farmers operated? I also argue that all encounters are ethically charged and, as such, encounters result in emotional tensions
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Rietti, Sophie (2009). Emotional intelligence and moral agency: Some worries and a suggestion. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):143 – 165.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional intelligence (EI) has been put forward as a distinctive kind of intelligence and, by popularizers such as Daniel Goleman, as an indicator of moral and life skills. Critics, however, have been concerned EI-testing measures conformity or the ability to manipulate own or others' emotions, and relies on a problematic assumption that there are definitive, universal “right” answers when it comes to feelings. Such worries have also been raised about the original concept developed by Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer; that version is the focus here. While it improves on the largely unreflective reliance on particular belief- and value-systems in Goleman's account, however, it does not entirely succeed in being context- and value-neutral. A useful way forward is to apply Ronald de Sousa's notion that emotions are shaped by ideology: this in turn affects attempts to measure any putative “intelligence” with respect to them. Once the ideological dimension is bracketed, a clearer picture of both the usefulness and the limitations of the EI-concept can emerge—and also a better sense of its possible contributions to value theory and moral psychology. The ideological dimension itself may also be unavoidable; squarely facing this possibility is preferable to ignoring it
Robinson, Jenefer (2010). Emotion and the understanding of narrative. In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert (online). Emotions in the Christian tradition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Robinson, Jenefer M. (1983). Emotion, judgement, and desire. Journal of Philosophy 80 (November):731-740.   (Google | More links)
Robichaud, Allyson L. (2003). Healing and feeling: The clinical ontology of emotion. Bioethics 17 (1):59–68.   (Google | More links)
Roberts, Robert C. (2009). The sophistication of non-human emotion. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Rocco, Michael Della (2008). Rationalism run amok : Representation and the reality of emotions in Spinoza. In Charles Huenemann (ed.), Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Roessler, Johannes (2002). Action, emotion, and the development of self-awareness. European Review of Philosophy 5:33-52.   (Google)
Rolls, Edmund T. (2008). Emotion, higher-order syntactic thoughts, and consciousness. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rolls, Edmund T. (2000). On the brain and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):219-228.   (Google)
Abstract: There are many advantages to defining emotions as states elicited by reinforcers, with the states having a set of different functions. This approach leads towards an understanding of the nature of emotion, of its evolutionary adaptive value, and of many principles of brain design. It also leads towards a foundation for many of the processes that underlie evolutionary psychology and behavioral ecology. It is shown that recent as well as previous evidence implicates the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in positive as well as negative emotions. The issue of why emotional states feel like something is part of the much larger problem of phenomenal consciousness. It is argued that thinking about one's own thoughts would have adaptive value by enabling first order linguistic thoughts to be corrected. It is suggested that reflecting on and correcting one's own thoughts and plans would feel like something, and that phenomenal consciousness may occur when this type of monitoring process is taking place
Rolls, Edmund T. (2004). What are emotions, why do we have emotions, and what is their computational basis in the brain? In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (2004). Enough already with "theories of the emotions". In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1983). Emotions and the self. In K. Irani & Gerald E. Myers (eds.), Emotion: Philosophical Studies. Haven.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Much of the perplexity that motivates modern discussion of the nature of mind derives indirectly from the striking success of physical explanation. Not only has physics itself advanced at a remarkable pace in the last four centuries; every hope has been held out that, in principle, all science can be understood and ultimately studied in terms of mechanisms proper to physics. Seeing all natural phenomena as explicable in terms appropriate to physics, however, makes the mental seem to be a singularity in nature. Chemistry and biology may well be reducible to physics, but the same seems hardly possible for the mental. The gulf between mind and physics seems too great to bridge, and the success of physics guarantees its standing. The place of mind in nature is thereby rendered problematic. This line of reasoning has tempted thinkers since Descartes to see the mind as not only independent of other natural phenomena, but as even somehow lying outside the natural order itself
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Abstract: A dynamic systems (DS) approach uncovers important connections between emotion and neurophysiology. It is critical, however, to include a developmental perspective. Strides in the understanding of emotional development, as well as the present use of DS in developmental science, add significantly to the study of emotion. Examples include stranger fear during infancy, intermodal perception of emotion, and development of individual emotional systems
Wang, Yunping (2008). Confucian ethics and emotions. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   The Confucian understanding of emotions and their ethical importance confirms and exemplifies the contemporary Western renewed understanding of the nature of emotions. By virtue of a systematic conceptual analysis of Confucian ethics, one can see that, according to Confucians, the ethical significance of emotions, lies in that an ethical life is also emotional and virtues are inclinational. And a further exploration shows that the reason for the ethical significance is both that emotions are heavenly-endowed and that there exists a union of emotions and reason in Confucian ethics. This will constitute a challenge to the so-called mainstream ethical theories which have been popularly engaged in seeking justifications for abstract moral rules
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Wasilewski, Bohdan W. (2004). Homeopathic remedies as placebo alternatives — verification on the example of treatment of menopause-related vegetative and emotional disturbances. Science and Engineering Ethics 10 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:  With the example of treatment of menopause-related vegetative and emotional disturbances, the author verifies the effectiveness of the use of Ignatia amara containing complex homeopathic remedies (IACCHR) as an alternative to placebo. Substantial improvement in psychological and psychosomatic symptoms was observed. Climacteric complaints diminished or disappeared completely in the majority of women (95.7% by patient evaluation and 96.2% by physician evaluation). Compared to standard pharmaceuticals, IACCHR treatment was tolerated better and lower risk of side effects was observed. The results obtained in this work indicate the significant therapeutic potential of this group of treatments, which is in line with the therapeutic effect of the placebo. Nevertheless, the showing of specific effects in pharmacological tests disqualifies the investigated treatments from use in a clinical trial in place of a placebo
Wasserman, David & Liao, S. Matthew (2008). Issues in the pharmacological induction of emotions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):178-192.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: abstract   In this paper, we examine issues raised by the possibility of regulating emotions through pharmacological means. We argue that emotions induced through these means can be authentic phenomenologically, and that the manner of inducing them need not make them any less our own than emotions arising 'naturally'. We recognize that in taking drugs to induce emotions, one may lose opportunities for self-knowledge; act narcissistically; or treat oneself as a mere means. But we propose that there are circumstances in which none of these concerns arise. Finally, we consider how the possibility of drug-regulation might affect duties to feel emotions
Watson, Gary (1978). Appropriate emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (11):699.   (Google | More links)
Waterfield, Robin (2008). The emotions of the ancient greeks: Studies in Aristotle and classical literature. By David Konstan. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):477–478.   (Google | More links)
Weberman, David (1996). Heidegger and the disclosive character of the emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):379-410.   (Google)
Weber, Alden O. & Rapaport, David (1941). Teleology and the emotions. Philosophy of Science 8 (January):69-82.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Weisfeld, Glenn E. & LaFreniere, Peter (2007). Emotions, not just decision-making processes, are critical to an evolutionary model of human behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):43-44.   (Google)
Abstract: An evolutionary model of human behavior should privilege emotions: essential, phylogenetically ancient behaviors that learning and decision making only subserve. Infants and non-mammals lack advanced cognitive powers but still survive. Decision making is only a means to emotional ends, which organize and prioritize behavior. The emotion of pride/shame, or dominance striving, bridges the social and biological sciences via internalization of cultural norms. (Published Online April 27 2007)
Weisfeld, Glenn E. (2004). Some ethological perspectives on the fitness consequences and social emotional symptoms of schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):867-867.   (Google)
Abstract: Schizophrenia may not have reduced reproductive success in ancestral times as much as it does today, so explaining how genes for it evolved is more understandable given this prehistoric perspective. Ethological analysis of schizophrenia – understanding how basic emotional behaviors, such as dominance striving, are affected by the condition – might prove useful for comprehending and treating its social emotional symptoms
Wemelsfelder, F. (2001). The inside and outside aspects of consciousness: Complementary approaches to the study of animal emotion. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:129- 139.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Westen, Drew; Weinberger, Joel & Bradley, Rebekah (2007). Motivation, decision making, and consciousness: From psychodynamics to subliminal priming and emotional constraint satisfaction. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Wheater, Isabella (2004). Literature and philosophy: Emotion and knowledge? Philosophy 79 (2):215-245.   (Google)
Abstract: Nussbaum attempts to undermine the sharp distinction between literature and philosophy by arguing that literary texts (tragic poetry particularly) distinctively appeal to emotion and imagination, that our emotional response itself is cognitive, and that Aristotle thought so too. I argue that emotional response is not cognitive but presupposes cognition. Aristotle argued that we learn from the mimesis of action delineated in the plot, not from our emotional response. The distinctions between emotional and intellectual writing, poetry and prose, literature and philosophy, the imaginative and the unimaginative do not cut along the same lines. That between literature and philosophy is not hard and fast: philosophy can be dramatic (eg Plato's dialogues) and drama can be philosophical (eg some of Shakespeare's plays), but whether either is emotional or not, or written in poetry or prose, are other questions
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Whisner, William (2003). A new theory of emotion: Moral reasoning and emotion. Philosophia 31 (1-2).   (Google)
White, Kevin (2008). Emotions in ancient and medieval philosophy (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 316-317.   (Google)
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White, John (1984). The education of the emotions. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):233–244.   (Google | More links)
Wider, Kathleen (2006). Emotion and self-consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Wider, Kathleen (2007). Emotional communication and the development of self. Sartre Studies International 13 (2):1-26.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the role of emotions in the initial development of self-awareness through intersubjective communication between mother and infant. I argue that the empirical evidence suggests that the infant's ability to communicate is initially an ability of the infant to share emotions with the mother. In section one I examine the biological foundations that allow infants from birth to interact with others of their own kind, focusing on the abilities which allow them to engage in emotional relationships with others. These include an infant's ability to express, share, and regulate emotions as well as her brain's ability to imitate the neuronal activity of another. In section two, I explore the fit between Sartre's phenomenologically-based account of intersubjectivity in Being and Nothingness and the accounts from psychology and neuroscience that I've examined in section one, focusing on his phenomenology of the Look and the emotional response he claims it elicits. In section three I examine the explanatory gap objection that Sartre among others could raise to my attempt to understand phenomenological accounts of human reality and scientific ones in light of each other. I don't have any final answer to this objection, but I offer some thoughts on why I think it's less of a problem than it might first appear to be
Wigodsky, Michael (2004). Emotions and immortality in philodemus on the gods 3 and the aeneid. In David Armstrong (ed.), Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans. University of Texas Press.   (Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2004). Book review: The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousnerss. Minds and Machines 14 (3).   (Google)
Wilson, John (1973). Emotion, religion and education: A reply to Richard Allen. Journal of Philosophy of Education 7 (2):195–203.   (Google | More links)
Wilkinson, Jennifer (1998). Feeling an emotion. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):62-74.   (Google)
Wilson, David C. (1984). Functionalism and moral personhood: One view considered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):521-530.   (Google | More links)
Wilkinson, S. (2000). Is 'normal grief' a mental disorder? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):289-305.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Wilce, James MacLynn (2009). Language and Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1966). Morality and the Emotions: An Inaugural Lecture. London, Bedford College.   (Google)
Wilshire, Bruce (1997). Review of Glen A. Mazis, emotion and embodiment: Fragile ontology. Human Studies 20 (4).   (Google)
Winston, David (2008). Philo of alexandria on the rational and irrational emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Winkielman, P.; Niedenthal, P. M. & Oberman, L. (2008). The embodiment of emotion. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Witt, Reviewed by Charlotte (2000). John M. Cooper, reason and emotion. Ethics 110 (4).   (Google)
Wollheim, R. (2003). Emotions and their philosophy of mind. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wolfe, A. B. (1922). Emotion, blame, and the scientific attitude in relation to radical leadership and method. International Journal of Ethics 32 (2):142-159.   (Google | More links)
Wollheim, Richard (1999). On the Emotions. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Wong, David B. (2009). Emotion and the cognition of reasons in moral motivation. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):343-367.   (Google)
Wong, David B. (1991). Is there a distinction between reason and emotion in mencius? Philosophy East and West 41 (1):31-44.   (Google | More links)
Woody, Erik & Szechtman, Henry (2007). To see feelingly: Emotion, motivation, and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Wright, R. George (ms). An emotion-based approach to freedom of speech.   (Google)
Abstract:      Free speech law often protects emotional expression. However, we lack an understanding of the scope and limits of protection for emotional expression. This Essay seeks to make progress toward such an understanding because a better understanding and grasp of the nature of emotion itself is crucial to achieving this goal. If we can arrive at an improved understanding of emotions and how they can be expressed, we will be better able to explain when we do and do not constitutionally protect the expression of emotion
Wright, H. W. (1945). Intellect versus emotion in political co-operation. Ethics 56 (1):19-29.   (Google | More links)
Wringe, Bill (2003). Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wright, Ian; Sloman, Aaron & Beaudoin, Luc (1996). Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: he design-based approach is a methodology for investigating mechanisms capable of generating mental phenomena, whether introspectively or externally observed, and whether they occur in humans, other animals or robots. The study of designs satisfying requirements for autonomous agency can provide new deep theoretical insights at the information processing level of description of mental mechanisms. Designs for working systems (whether on paper or implemented on computers) can systematically explicate old explanatory concepts and generate new concepts that allow new and richer interpretations of human phenomena. To illustrate this, some aspects of human grief are analysed in terms of a particular information processing architecture being explored in our research group. We do not claim that this architecture is part of the causal structure of the human mind; rather, it represents an early stage in the iterative search for a deeper and more general architecture, capable of explaining more phenomena. However even the current early design provides an interpretative ground for some familiar phenomena, including characteristic features of certain emotional episodes, particularly the phenomenon of perturbance (a partial or total loss of control of attention). The paper attempts to expound and illustrate the design-based approach to cognitive science and philosophy, to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the approach in generating interpretative possibilities, and to provide first steps towards an information processing account of `perturbant', emotional episodes
Wynn, Mark (2005). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this book Mark Wynn argues that the landscape of philosophical theology looks rather different from the perspective of a re-conceived theory of emotion. In matters of religion, we do not need to opt for objective content over emotional form or vice versa. On the contrary, these strategies are mistaken at root, since form and content are not properly separable here - because 'inwardness' may contribute to 'thought-content', or because (to use the vocabulary of the book) emotional feelings can themselves constitute thoughts; or because, to put the point a further way, in religious contexts, perception and conception are often infused by feeling. Wynn uses this perspective to forge a distinctive approach to a range of established topics in philosophy of religion, notably: religious experience; the problem of evil; the relationship of religion and ethics, and religion and art; and in general, the connection of 'feeling' to doctrine and tradition
Wynn, M. (2002). Valuing the world: The emotions as data for the philosophy of religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2).   (Google)
Yanchyshyn, Gordon (2006). Between emotion and cognition: The generative unconscious. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis 14 (1):143-146.   (Google)
Yijie, Tang; Bruya, Brian & Wen, Hai-ming (2003). Emotion in pre-Qin ruist moral theory: An explanation of "dao begins in Qing". Philosophy East and West 53 (2):271-281.   (Google | More links)
Zachar, Peter & Bartlett, S. (2002). Basic emotions and their biological substrates: A nominalistic interpretation. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):189-221.   (Google)
Abstract: The thesis of this article is that an attitude akin to pragmatism is internal to the scientific enterprise itself, and as a result many scientists will make the same types of non-essentialistic interpretations of their subject matter that are made by pragmatists. This is demonstrably true with respect to those scientists who study the biological basis of emotion such as Panksepp, LeDoux, and Damasio. Even though these scientists are also influenced by what cognitive psychologists call the essentialist bias, their research programs are coherent with Peter Zachar?s rejection of natural kinds in favor of practical kinds. When the confrontation with complexity leads a scientist to offer non-essentialist interpretations, two popular options are to go eliminativist or go nominalist. Pragmatists prefer the nominalistic option, and we provide reasons for suggesting that scientists should as well
Zachar, P. (2000). Review of “the feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness” by Antonio Damasio and of “the evolution of the emotion-processing mind: With an introduction to mental darwinism” by Robert langs. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):181-187.   (Google)
Zahn-Waxler, Carolyn (2001). Caregiving, emotion, and concern for others. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):48-49.   (Google)
Abstract: Few individuals are constitutionally incapable of showing concern for others at an early age, and malleability is possible. Individual variations will be best understood through study of the representational prerequisites of empathy in close conjunction with caregiving environments and affective underpinnings
Zhu, Jing & Thagard, Paul (2002). Emotion and action. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.   (Google)
Abstract: The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotion's place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent research in cognitive neuroscience that emotions may significantly affect action generation as well as action execution and control. Moreover, emotions also play a crucial role in people's explanation of action. We conclude that the concept of emotion deserves a more distinctive and central place in philosophical theories of action
Zimmerman, David (2001). Thinking with your hypothalamus: Reflections on a cognitive role for the reactive emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):521-541.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

5.1f.1 Theories of Emotion

Ben-ze'ev, A. (1987). The nature of emotions. Philosophical Studies 52 (November):393-409.   (Google)
Browning, Robert W. (1959). Broad's theory of emotion. In P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy Of C. D. Broad. Tudor.   (Google)
Cabestan, Philippe (2004). What is it to move oneself emotionally? Emotion and affectivity according to Jean-Paul Sartre. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotion is traditionally described as a phenomenon that dominates the subject because one does not choose to be angry, sad, or happy. However, would it be totally absurd to conceive emotion as behaviour and a manifestation of the spontaneity and liberty of consciousness? In his short text, Esquisse d''une theorie des émotions, Sartre proposes a phenomenological description of this psychological phenomenon. He distinguishes between constituted affectivity, which gives rise to emotions, and an original affectivity lacking intentionality, and tied closely to bodily processes. It appears that emotion is first and foremost a magical attitude toward the world, an attitude freely adopted by the subject. Against what is often written, this thesis doesn''t mean that emotion would be a pure comedy but only that, in spite of appearances, this behaviour isn''t a matter of what Descartes calls soul''s passions
Colombetti, Giovanna (2009). From affect programs to dynamical discrete emotions. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407 – 425.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more naturally than traditional Discrete Emotion Theory for the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions
Dewey, John, Theory of emotions, the: The significance of emotions.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). Generating predictions from a dynamical systems emotion theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):202-203.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis's dynamical systems emotion theory continues a tradition including Merleau-Ponty, von Bertallanfy, and Aristotle. Understandably for a young theory, Lewis's new predictions do not follow strictly from the theory; thus their failure would not disconfirm the theory, nor their success confirm it – especially given that other self-organizational approaches to emotion (e.g., those of Ellis and of Newton) may not be inconsistent with these same predictions
Emerick, Rex (1999). Sartre's theory of emotions. Sartre Studies International 5 (2):75-91.   (Google)
Faucher, Luc & Tappolet, Christine (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1793 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.
Goldie, Peter (2007). Emotion. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):928–938.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2008). Teaching & learning guide for: Emotion. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1097-1099.   (Google)
Abstract: The emotions were a neglected topic in philosophy twenty or so years ago, but things have now changed. It is now appreciated how important it is to understand the emotions as an independent aspect of our mental economy – one that has to be properly taken into account in any worthwhile philosophising in ethics or moral psychology, in epistemology, in aesthetics, and generally in philosophical issues surrounding value and how the mind engages with value in the world. There is now a wide range of philosophical theories of emotion 'on the market', and whilst this Guide and the related Article are not the place to argue for one or the other of these, anyone working in areas which overlap with emotion research ought to be aware of what these theories are, and ought to consider what the implications of their own views are in order not to be committed to an ultimately untenable account of the emotions, and of their place in our lives. Author Recommends Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). This is a classic, full of fascinating insights. Best not read straight through; use it selectively, depending on where your research is going. Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976). Another classic. Solomon was one of the pioneers to resurrect emotion to its rightful place in philosophy. Solomon was greatly influenced by the existentialists, and he argued not only that emotions are rational, but also that we choose our emotions. Since then, Solomon has nuanced his position considerably, but this early work merits close study. Robert Solomon, ed., Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). This collection contains 17 chapters on emotion from contemporary philosophers, plus an Introduction by Solomon. It gives an excellent feeling for the central issues in the current debates. John Deigh, 'Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions', Ethics 104 (1994): 824–54. Deigh argues for a cognitive theory of the emotions, and considers how such a theory can accommodate emotions in non-human animals and in babies. William James, 'What is an Emotion?', Mind 9 (1884): 188–205. This article, and the related (and later) discussion in his The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981, ch. 25), has had an enormous influence on psychologists, and on philosophers who argue for various versions of non-cognitivism in the emotions. It merits reading in the original. Robert Zajonc, 'On the Primacy of Affect', American Psychologist 39 (1984): 117–23. This article, 100 years after James, has also been enormously influential on non-cognitivists. Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Prinz is one of the proponents of non-cognitivism, and the influence of James and Zajonc will be clear. Peter Goldie, 'Emotion', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 928–38, doi: [DOI link]. My own survey of the current literature. Online Materials: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/ de Sousa on Emotion in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: An excellent survey of the current literature. Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Cognitive-rationalist theories of emotion R. Solomon, 'The Rationality of emotions', Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8 (1977): 105–14. G. Taylor, 'Justifying the Emotions', Mind 84 (1975): 390–402. M. Nussbaum, 'Emotions as Judgements of Value and Importance', in Thinking about Feeling, ed. R. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 183–99. Week 2: Non-cognitive feeling theories of emotion W. James, 'What is an Emotion?', Mind 9 (1884): 188–205. J. Prinz, 'Embodied Appraisals', in Thinking about Feeling, ed. R. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 44–60. Week 3: Perceptual and sui generis theories of emotion Robert Roberts, Emotion: An Aid in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 2, sections 2.1–2.4. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 6. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), ch. 3. Week 4: Expression of emotion Michael Smith, 'The Humean Theory of Motivation', Mind 96 (1987): 36–61. Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Arational Actions', Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 57–68. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), ch. 5. Week 5: Emotional sincerity and authenticity Mikko Salmela, "What is Emotional Authenticity?", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 35.3 (2005): 209–39. David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 2 and 7 especially. Week 6: Morality and the emotions A. J. Ayer, 'Critique of Ethics and Theology', Language, Truth and Logic (London: Penguin, 1936), chapter VI. Bernard Williams, 'Morality and the Emotions', Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 207–229. Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chapter 6. Focus Questions1. What element of truth is there in the idea that emotions are judgements? How can such a theory allow for the possibility of conflict between emotion and judgement?2. James argues that feelings are essential to emotion: no feeling, then no emotion. How does a non-cognitive theory of emotion seek to account for this, and is such a theory the only way of doing so?3. Roberts argues that emotions are a kind of perception (a concern-based construal); de Sousa argues rather that there is only an analogy between emotion and perception and that emotion is an irreducible psychological category; Goldie argues that emotional feelings are sui generis'feelings towards'. How might one decide which of these more accurately captures the nature of emotion?4. Hursthouse argues that our expressions of emotion (kicking the chair in anger for example) are arational. What are her arguments for this, and are they sound?5. We often speak of someone's anger, for example, as not being sincere, or of her generosity as not being authentic. What do these claims mean, and how are the notions of sincerity and authenticity of emotion related conceptually?6. What is the role of emotion in our moral thought and talk?
Griffiths, Paul E. (2002). Emotions. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Emotions as natural and normative kinds. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):901-911.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not `natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by `natural kind', suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Is emotion a natural kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories_ I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by ?natural kind? and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on ?multi-level appraisal theory? in psychology
Griffiths, Paul E. (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 390 | Google)
Abstract: Paul E. Griffiths argues that most research on the emotions has been as misguided as Aristotelian efforts to study "superlunary objects" - objects...
Gunther, Y. H. (2001). On the emotions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):437 – 439.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Book Information On the Emotions. By R. Wollheim. Yale University Press. New Haven/London. 1999. Pp. xiii + 269. Hardback, US$25.00
Gurney, Edmund (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (35):421-426.   (Google | More links)
Henle, Mary (1974). In search of the structure of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:190-197.   (Google)
Irons, David (1895). Descartes and modern theories of emotion. Philosophical Review 4 (3):291-302.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1897). The nature of emotion. II. Philosophical Review 6 (5):471-496.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1897). The nature of emotion. Philosophical Review 6 (3):242-256.   (Google | More links)
Kenny, A. J. P. (1963). Action, Emotion And Will. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...
Marks, Joel (1993). Book reviews. Mind 102 (405).   (Google)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (36):615-617.   (Google | More links)
Mceachrane, M. (2006). Investigating emotions philosophically. Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):342-357.   (Google | More links)
Mcgill, V. J. & Welch, Livingston (1946). A behaviorist analysis of emotions. Philosophy of Science 13 (April):100-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
M`Cosh, James (1877). Elements involved in emotions. Mind 2 (7):413-415.   (Google | More links)
Moffat, D.; Frijda, N. H. & Phaf, R. H. (1993). Analysis of a computer model of emotions. In [Book Chapter].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the fields of psychology, AI, and philosophy there has recently been theoretical activity in the cognitively-based modelling of emotions. Using AI methodology it is possible to implement and test these complex models, and in this paper we examine an emotion model called ACRES. We propose a set of requirements any such model should satisfy, and compare ACRES against them. Then, analysing its behaviour in detail, we formulate more requirements and criteria that can be applied to future computational models of emotion. In arguing to support the new requirements, we find that they are desirable for autonomous systems in general. We also show how they can explain the psychological concept of regulation. Finally, we use the concepts developed to make a theoretical distinction between emotion and motivation
Nahm, Milton C. (1939). The philosophical implications of some theories of emotion. Philosophy of Science 6 (4):458-486.   (Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2000). Wundt's three-dimensional theory of emotion. In Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Atlanta: Rodopi.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert Campbell (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology
Robinson, Jenefer M. (2004). Emotion: Biological fact or social construction. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1939). Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Routledge.   (Google)
Segal, Gideon (2000). Beyond subjectivity: Spinoza's cognitivism of the emotions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was left with the cognitive aspects of emotions, keeping outside of his report the inner feeling which accompanies them. Spinoza's psychology, I claim, disregards any non-cognitive aspect of emotions
Solomon, Robert (1997). In defense of the emotions (and passions too). Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (4):489–497.   (Google | More links)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotion, motivation and action: The case of fear.   (Google)
Abstract: Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety of systems controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Your heart races, your breathing becomes strained and your start trembling. These changes are accompanied by an expression of fear on your face: your mouth opens and your eyes widen while you stare at the wolf. There is also a kind of experience that you undergo. You are likely to feel a sort of pang, something that might consist in the perception of the physiological changes you are going through. Moreover, a number of thoughts are likely to cross your mind. You might think that the wild beast is about to tear you into pieces and that you’ll never escape from this. In addition to this, your attention focuses on the wolf and its movement, as well as, possibly, ways of escaping or defending yourself. Last, but not least, your fear is likely to come with a motivation, such as an urge to run away or to strike back. Whatever the details of the story, it is clear that a typical emotion episode involves a number of different components. Roughly, these components are a) a sensory perception or more generally an informational component, b) a kind of appraisal, d) physiological changes, c) conscious feelings, d) cognitive and attentional processes, and e) an actiontendency or more generally a motivational component. One central question in the theory of emotion is which, if any, of these components, constitute the emotion..
Teroni, Fabrice (2007). Emotions and formal objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories.

5.1f.1.1 Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion

Barbalet, J. M. (1999). William James' theory of emotions: Filling in the picture. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):251–266.   (Google | More links)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Emotions are not feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carrette, Jeremy (2005). Pt. 2. James, psychology and religion. Listening to James a century later : The varieties as a resource for renewing the psychology of religion / David M. Wulff ; the varieties, the principles and psychology of religion : Unremitting inspiration from a different source / Jacob A. belzen ; passionate belief : William James, emotion and religious experience. In Jeremy R. Carrette (ed.), William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration. Routledge.   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna & Thompson, Evan (forthcoming). The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved beyond this disembodied stance by conceiving of emotions as involving both cognitive processes (perception, attention, and evaluation) and bodily events (arousal, behavior, and facial expressions), the legacy of cognitivism persists in the tendency to treat cognitive and bodily events as separate constituents of emotion. Thus the cognitive aspects of emotion are supposedly distinct and separate from the bodily ones. This separation indicates that cognitivism’s disembodied conception of cognition continues to shape the way emotion theorists conceptualize emotion
Coplan, Amy (2010). Feeling without thinking: Lessons from the ancients on emotion and virtue-acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue
Damasio, Antonio R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Putnam.   (Cited by 5770 | Google | More links)
D'arms, Justin (2008). Prinz's theory of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
Förster, J. & Friedman, R. S. (2008). The embodied emotional mind. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Irons, David (1894). Prof. James' theory of emotion. Mind 3 (9):77-97.   (Google | More links)
James, William (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.   (Cited by 744 | Google | More links)
Myers, Gerald E. (1969). William James's theory of emotion. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 5:67-89.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). Are emotions feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.   (Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Abstract: Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
Prinz, Jesse (2008). Précis of Gut reactions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.   (Google | More links)
Slaby, Jan (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind
Whiting, Demian (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited
Whiting, Demian (forthcoming). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something . To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions

5.1f.1.2 Perceptual Theories of Emotion

Brady, Michael S. (2010). Virtue, emotion, and attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity
Charland, Louis C. (1995). Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
D'arms, Justin (2008). Prinz's theory of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).   (Google)
Deonna, Julien A. (2006). Emotion, perception and perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2004). Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is a view of the emotions (I might tendentiously call it ‘cognitivism’) that has at present a certain currency. This view is of the emotions as playing an essential role in our gaining evaluative knowledge of the world. When we are angry at an insult, or afraid of the burglar, our emotions involve evaluative perceptions and thoughts, which are directed towards the way something is in the world that impinges on our well-being, or on the well-being of those that matter to us. Without emotions, we would be worse off, prudentially and morally: we would not see things as they are, and accordingly we would not act as we should. Emotions are, according to this view a Good Thing. No wonder we have evolved as creatures capable of emotion.[1]
Griffiths, Paul E. (2008). Jesse Prinz Gut reactions: A perceptual theory of emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3).   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse (online). Emotion and aesthetic value.   (Google)
Abstract: Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are related, of course, because they nature of appreciation may bear on what things are worthy of that response, or at least on what things are likely to elicit it. So I will have some things to say about the latter. But I want to focus in this discussion on appreciation itself. When we praise a work of art, when we say it has aesthetic value, what does our praise consist in? This is a question about aesthetic psychology. I am interested in what kind of mental state appreciation is. What kind of state are we expressing when we say a work of art is “good”? This question has parallels in other areas of value theory. In ethics, most notably, there has been much attention lavished on the question of what people express when they refer to an action as “morally good.” One popular class of theories, associated with the British moralists and their followers, posits a link between moral valuation and emotion. To call an act morally good is to express an emotion toward that act. I think this approach to morality is right on target (Prinz, 2007). Here I want to argue that an emotional account of aesthetic valuation is equally promising. There are important differences between the two domains, but both have an affective foundation. I suspect that valuing of all kinds involves the emotions. Here I will inquire into the role of emotions in aesthetic valuing. I will not claim that artworks express emotions or even that they necessarily evoke emotions..
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Abstract: Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2008). Is emotion a form of perception? In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse (2008). Précis of Gut reactions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.   (Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.   (Google)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review 1:214-222.   (Google)
Sneddon, Andrew (2008). Two views of emotional perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion..

5.1f.1.3 Cognitive Theories of Emotions

Adamos, Maria Magoula (2002). How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Addis, Laird (1995). The ontology of emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):261-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bedford, E. (1957). Emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:281-304.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1990). Describing the emotions: A review of the cognitive structure of emotions by Ortony, clore & Collins. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):305 – 317.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper critically examines Ortony, Clore & Collins's book The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. The book is found to present a very valuable, comprehensive and systematic account of emotions. Despite its obvious value the book has various flaws; these are discussed and an alternative is suggested
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2004). Emotions are not mere judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450-457.   (Google | More links)
Bernstein, H. R. (1981). Emotion, thought, and therapy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1).   (Google)
Bolender, John (2003). The genealogy of the moral modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources
Brennan, Jason (2008). What if Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions? In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional cognitivists, such as the Stoics and Aristotle, hold that emotions have cognitive content, whereas noncognitivists, like Plato and Kant, believe the emotions to be nonrational bodily movements. I ask, taking Martha Nussbaum's account of cognitivism, what if Kant had become convinced of a cognitive theory of the emotions, what changes would this require in his moral philosophy. Surprisingly, since this represents a radical shift in his psychology, it changes almost nothing. I show that Kant's account of continence, virtue, the evaluation of inclinations, and his argument for morality taking the form of categorical imperatives, are immune to such a change, despite the prima facie deep connection (on the received view) between these and his moral psychology.
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Cavell, Marcia (2003). Review: A tear is an intellectual thing: The meanings of emotion. Mind 112 (446).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Debes, Remy (2009). Neither here nor there: The cognitive nature of emotion. Philosophical Studies 146 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that this new account, despite tacit acceptance by all major theories of emotion, in fact rules out some of the most fundamental and controversial claims of one side of the nature-of-emotion debate, emotional cognitivism
Deigh, John (1994). Cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronnie (2007). Review of Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).   (Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Gordon, Robert M. (1973). Judgmental emotions. Analysis 34 (December):40-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1972). Emotions and belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 6:24-40.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1992). The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory. Kluwer.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Griffiths, Paul E. (1989). The degeneration of the cognitive theory of emotions. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):297-313.   (Google)
Abstract: The type of cognitive theory of emotion traditionally espoused by philosophers of mind makes two central claims. First, that the occurrence of propositional attitudes is essential to the occurrence of emotions. Second, that the identity of a particular emotional state depends upon the propositional attitudes that it involves. In this paper I try to show that there is little hope of developing a theory of emotion which makes these claims true. I examine the underlying defects of the programme, and show that several recent variants fail to repair these defects. Furthermore, even if such a theory could be developed, it would not achieve many of the things that we look to a theory of emotion for. I argue that philosophers should turn their attention to new and more promising approaches. These have been developed by various of the special sciences, while philosophy has remained enthralled by traditional, propositional attitude psychology
Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). Did Descartes have a Jamesian theory of the emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Hunt, Lester (2006). Martha Nussbaum on the emotions. Ethics 116 (3).   (Google)
Kerner, George C. (1982). Emotions are judgments of value. Topoi 1 (1-2).   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2001). Some remaining problems in cognitive theories of emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):393-410.   (Google)
Lau, Joe (ms). The nature of emotions comments on Martha Nussbaum's upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions.   (Google)
Abstract: Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering
Lazarus, Richard S. (1974). The self-regulation of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lyons, William E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1977). Emotions and feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1974). Physiological changes and emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (June):603-617.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marks, Joel (1982). A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):227-42.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Matravers, Derek (2008). True to our feelings: What our emotions are really telling us – Robert C. Solomon. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):751-753.   (Google)
Megill, Jason L. (2003). What role do the emotions play in cognition? Towards a new alternative to cognitive theories of emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio?s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras? and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing
Nash, R. A. (1989). Cognitive theories of emotion. Noûs 23 (September):481-504.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Neu, Jerome (2000). A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What is wrong with incest? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The discussion throughout is informed and motivated by the Spinozist hope that understanding our lives can help change them, can help make us more free
Neu, Jerome (1977). Emotion, Thought, and Therapy. Routledge.   (Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2004). Emotions as judgments of value and importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 494 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but as highly discriminating responses to...
Perler, Dominik (2005). Emotions and cognitions. Fourteenth-century discussions on the passions of the soul. Vivarium 43 (2):250-274.   (Google)
Abstract: Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations
Pitcher, George (1965). Emotion. Mind 74 (July):326-346.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.   (Google)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review 1:214-222.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: What is a cognitive theory of the emotions and does it neglect affectivity? In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Not Passion's Slave is a collection of Solomon's most significant essay-length publications on the nature of emotions over the past twenty-five years. He develops two essential themes throughout the volume: firstly, he presents a "cognitive" theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments; secondly, he proposes an "existentialist" perspective in which he defends the idea that we are responsible for our emotions and, in a limited sense, "choose" them. The final section presents his current philosophical position on the seeming "passivity" of the passions. Ultimately, Solomon advocates the idea that we have control over, and are essentially responsible for, the emotional and existential quality of our lives
Solomon, Robert C. (1984). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Doubleday.   (Cited by 191 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way
Sterling, Marvin C. (1979). The cognitive theory of emotions. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10:165-176.   (Google)
Stocker, Michael (2002). Some problems about affectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):151-158.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless

5.1f.1.4 Theories of Emotion, Misc

Coseru, Christian (2004). A Review Essay of Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11 (1):98-102.   (Google)
Armon-jones, Claire (1985). Prescription, explication and the social construction of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):1–22.   (Google | More links)
Auerill, James R. (1974). An analysis of psychophysiological symbolism and its influence on theories of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (2):147–190.   (Google | More links)
Ben-ze'ev, A. (2004). Emotion as a subtle mental mode. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bergeron, Vincent & Matthen, Mohan (2008). Assembling the emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
Borges, M. (2004). What can Kant teach us about emotions. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.   (Google)
Burrow, Sylvia (2005). The political structure of emotion: From dismissal to dialogue. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : How much power does emotional dismissal have over the oppressed's ability to trust outlaw emotions, or to stand for such emotions before others? I discuss Sue Campbell's view of the interpretation of emotion in light of the political significance of emotional dismissal. In response, I suggest that feminist conventions of interpretation developed within dialogical communities are best suited to providing resources for expressing, interpreting, defining, and reflecting on our emotions
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Charland, Louis C. (2008). Cognitive modularity of emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1995). Emotion as a natural kind: Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.   (Cited by 77 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers . The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework
Charland, Louis C. (2001). In defence of emotion: Critical notice of Paul E. Griffiths's what emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.   (Google)
Charland, Louis (ms). The heat of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is pro- posed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is..
Charland, Louis C. (2002). The natural kind status of emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct natural class of organisms whose behavior and development are governed by emotion. These are emoters. Two arguments for the natural kind status of emotion are considered. Both converge on the existence of emotion as a distinct natural domain governed by its own laws and regularities. There are then some reasons for being optimistic about the prospects for consilience in emotion theory. 1 The mantra 2 Griffiths on emotions as natural kinds 3 Panksepp on emotions as natural kinds 4 Emotion as a neurobiological kind 5 Emotion as a psychological kind 6 Response to the mantra 7 Unification or fragmentation? 8 Concluding remarks
Davidson, Richard J. & van Reekum, C. (2005). Emotion is not one thing. Psychological Inquiry 16:16-18.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Dewey, John, Theory of emotions, the: Emotional attitudes.   (Google)
Dixon, Thomas (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon argues that this domination by one single descriptive category is not healthy. Overinclusivity of 'the emotions' hampers attempts to argue with any subtlety about the enormous range of mental states and stances of which humans are capable. This book is an important contribution to the debate about emotion and rationality which has preoccupied western thinkers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has implications for contemporary debates
Cochrane, Tom (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions are: (1) attracted—repulsed, (2) powerful—weak, (3) free—constrained, (4) certain—uncertain, (5) generalized—focused, (6) future directed—past directed, (7) enduring—sudden, (8) socially connected—disconnected.
Fell, Joseph P. (1965). Emotion in the Thought of Sartre. New York, Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2002). Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics. Duckworth.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (2000). Emotion theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):199-200.   (Google)
Abstract: The book contains a masterly review of Rolls's single-neuron research reflecting rewards. It places that research in the context of the neo-behaviorist theory of emotions. That theory provides a useful first approximation to emotion-eliciting conditions but has little to tell about emotions as motivational states or response dispositions: nor does it give a rationale for what are considered to be primary rewarding stimuli
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2005). Imagination and the distorting power of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):127-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_ _on the dramatic irony involved in imagining these typical cases, where one_ _knows outside the scope of the imagining what one does not know as part of the_ _content of what one imagines: namely, that the imagined emotion is distorting_ _one’s reasoning. Moreover, imagining from an external perspective allows one_ _to evaluate the imagined events in a way that imagining from the inside does not._
Menant, Christophe (ms). Performances of self-awareness used to explain the evolutionary advantages of consciousness (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions
Sloman, Aaron (ms). What are emotion theories about?   (Google)
Abstract: findings from affective neuroscience research. I shall focus mainly on (a), but in a manner which, I hope is..
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Wertheimer, Roger (1991). Review of Robert Brown, Analyzing Love. Philosophy & Phenomonological Research 51 (1):244-45.   (Google)

5.1f.2 Varieties of Emotion

Barbalet, J. M. (1992). A macro sociology of emotion: Class resentment. Sociological Theory 10 (2):150-163.   (Google | More links)
Benn, A. W. (1914). Aristotle's theory of tragic emotion. Mind 23 (89):84-90.   (Google | More links)
Griffiths, Paul (2001). Basic emotions, complex emotions, machiavellian emotions. Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 52:39-67.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ?basic emotions? - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the relationship between basic emotions and these complex emotion episodes. In this paper, I add to the list of existing, not necessarily incompatible, proposals concerning the relationship between basic emotions and complex emotions. I analyze the writings of ?transactional? psychologists of emotion, particularly those who see their work as a contribution to behavioral ecology, and offer a view of the basic emotion that focuses as much on their interpersonal functions as on their intrapersonal functions. Locating basic emotions and their evolutionary development in a context of processes of social interaction, I suggest, provides a way to integrate our knowledge of basic emotions into an understanding of the larger emotional episodes that have more obvious implications for philosophical disciplines such as moral psychology
Griffiths, Paul E. (2003). Basic emotions, complex emotions, machiavellian emotions. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ‘basic emotions’ - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the relationship between basic emotions and these complex emotion episodes. In this paper, I add to the list of existing, not necessarily incompatible, proposals concerning the relationship between basic emotions and complex emotions. I analyze the writings of ‘transactional’ psychologists of emotion, particularly those who see their work as a contribution to behavioral ecology, and offer a view of the basic emotion that focuses as much on their interpersonal functions as on their intrapersonal functions. Locating basic emotions and their evolutionary development in a context of processes of social interaction, I suggest, provides a way to integrate our knowledge of basic emotions into an understanding of the larger emotional episodes that have more obvious implications for philosophical disciplines such as moral psychology
Hatzimoysis, Anthony (2007). The case against unconscious emotions. Analysis 67 (296):292–299.   (Google | More links)
Howarth, J. M. (1976). On thinking of what one fears. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76:53-74.   (Google)
Irons, David (1898). Primary emotions: Reply. Philosophical Review 7 (3):298-299.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1897). The primary emotions. Philosophical Review 6 (6):626-645.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lacewing, Michael (2007). Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings? Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments that can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed
Lambie, John A. & Marcel, Anthony J. (2002). Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework. Psychological Review 109 (2):219-259.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Milligan, Tony (2008). False emotions. Philosophy 83 (2):213-230.   (Google)
Morreal, J. (1983). Humor and emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July):297-304.   (Google)
Mullane, Harvey (1976). Unconscious and disguised emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):403-411.   (Google)
Mullane, Harvey (1965). Unconscious emotion. Theoria 31:181-190.   (Google)
Neisser, Joe (2006). Making the case for unconscious feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.   (Google)
Read, Rupert (2009). Extreme aversive emotions: A Wittgensteinian approach to dread. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotion, motivation and action: The case of fear.   (Google)
Abstract: Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety of systems controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Your heart races, your breathing becomes strained and your start trembling. These changes are accompanied by an expression of fear on your face: your mouth opens and your eyes widen while you stare at the wolf. There is also a kind of experience that you undergo. You are likely to feel a sort of pang, something that might consist in the perception of the physiological changes you are going through. Moreover, a number of thoughts are likely to cross your mind. You might think that the wild beast is about to tear you into pieces and that you’ll never escape from this. In addition to this, your attention focuses on the wolf and its movement, as well as, possibly, ways of escaping or defending yourself. Last, but not least, your fear is likely to come with a motivation, such as an urge to run away or to strike back. Whatever the details of the story, it is clear that a typical emotion episode involves a number of different components. Roughly, these components are a) a sensory perception or more generally an informational component, b) a kind of appraisal, d) physiological changes, c) conscious feelings, d) cognitive and attentional processes, and e) an actiontendency or more generally a motivational component. One central question in the theory of emotion is which, if any, of these components, constitute the emotion..

5.1f.2.1 Varieties of Emotion, Misc

Clapper, Gregory Scott (1989). John Wesley on Religious Affections: His Views on Experience and Emotion and Their Role in the Christian Life and Theology. Scarecrow Press.   (Google)
Cohen, Adam B.; Keltner, Dacher & Rozin, Paul (2004). Different religions, different emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):734-735.   (Google)
Abstract: Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) correctly claim that religion reduces emotions related to existential concerns. Our response adds to their argument by focusing on religious differences in the importance of emotion, and on other emotions that may be involved in religion. We believe that the important differences among religions make it difficult to have one theory to account for all religions
Duncker, Karl (1941). On pleasure, emotion, and striving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (June):391-430.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Hareli, Shlomo & Parkinson, Brian (2008). What's social about social emotions? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):131–156.   (Google | More links)
Singer, Irving (2009). The Nature of Love. Mit Press.   (Google)

5.1f.2.2 Classifying Emotions

Bell, Macalester (2005). A woman's scorn: Toward a feminist defense of contempt as a moral emotion. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. I argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male-dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. I begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the nature and moral significance of contempt, and argue that contempt can be morally and politically valuable for the same reasons that feminists have defended other negative emotions. I close by considering why feminists have been hesitant to defend contempt as a morally and politically important emotion
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Brown, Robert (1987). Analyzing Love. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgments and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as anger and fear, and, more generally, deciding where love stands in the contrast between emotions and attitudes. Finally, the book examines how we justify our loves: can we have, and do we need, reasons for loving? What types of judgment are appropriate to love? Can we criticize a lover for his or her choices?
Campbell, C. A. (1936). Are there `degrees' of the moral emotion? Mind 45 (180):492-497.   (Google | More links)
Chandler, Teresa (2001). Kinds of emotion. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1).   (Google | More links)
Clark, Jason A. (2010). Relations of homology between higher cognitive emotions and basic emotions. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology rather than in terms of shared function. This poses a direct challenge to the dominant philosophical view of how to define psychological categories, viz., ‘functionalism’. Although the implications of this position extend to all psychological traits, the debate has centered around ‘emotion’ as an example of a psychological category ripe for reinterpretation within this new framework of classification. I address arguments by Griffiths that emotions should be divided into at least two distinct classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and that these two classes require radically different theories to explain them. Griffiths argues that while basic emotions in humans are homologous to the corresponding states in other animals, higher cognitive emotions are dependent on mental capacities unique to humans, and are therefore not homologous to basic emotions. Using the example of shame, I argue that (a) many emotions that are commonly classified as being higher cognitive emotions actually correspond to certain basic emotions, and that (b) the “higher cognitive forms” of these emotions are best seen as being homologous to their basic forms
Colombetti, Giovanna (online). Envy as an empathic emotion (2003). Abstract for Conn.   (Google)
Abstract: (2003). Abstract for Consciousness and Experiential Psychology conference (Oxford)
Davis, Wayne A. (1981). A theory of happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Debus, Dorothea (2007). Being emotional about the past: On the nature and role of past-directed emotions. Noûs 41 (4):758-779.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Deigh, John (2004). Primitive emotions. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Deonna, Julien A. (2007). The structure of empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call the parallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises. Key Words: empathy • emotion • philosophy • psychology • simulation
de Sousa, Ronald (2001). Moral emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony
de Sousa, Ronald B. (1978). Self-deceptive emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):684-697.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John J. (2006). Respect as a moral emotion: A phenomenological approach. Husserl Studies 22 (1).   (Google)
Cochrane, Tom (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions are: (1) attracted—repulsed, (2) powerful—weak, (3) free—constrained, (4) certain—uncertain, (5) generalized—focused, (6) future directed—past directed, (7) enduring—sudden, (8) socially connected—disconnected.
Faucher, Luc & Tappolet, Christine (2002). Fear and the focus of attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):105-144.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fox, Michael (1976). Unconscious and disguised emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (3):403-414.   (Google | More links)
Fox, Michael (1976). Unconscious emotions: A reply to professor Mullane's unconscious and disguised emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):412-414.   (Google)
Goldie, Peter (2003). Review: Justifying emotions: Pride and jealousy. Mind 112 (447).   (Google)
Gosling, Justin C. B. (1962). Mental causes and fear. Mind 71 (July):289-306.   (Google | More links)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1986). Identificatory love. Philosophical Studies 50 (3).   (Google)
Gregory, Joshua C. (1923). Some theories of laughter. Mind 32 (127):328-344.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Is emotion a natural kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories_ I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by ?natural kind? and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on ?multi-level appraisal theory? in psychology
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Haybron, Daniel M. (2001). Happiness and pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness
Jäger, Christoph & Bartsch, Anne (2006). Meta-emotions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt
K., D. (2002). Kant's taxonomy of the emotions. Kantian Review 6 (1):109-128.   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2005). Justice and desert-based emotions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53 – 68.   (Google)
Abstract: A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent
Lahno, Bernd (2001). On the emotional character of trust. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude
Leighton, Stephen R. (1988). On feeling angry and elated. Journal of Philosophy 85 (May):253-264.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan (1998). Biological universals and the nature of fear. Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they must have an invariable essence. Emotions can be defined in this way too, in principle, but the theoretical understanding of homology necessary to do so is lacking at present.
Meynell, Hugo (2007). Justice and desert-based emotions. By Kristjan Kristjansson. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):664–666.   (Google | More links)
Neu, Jerome (2000). A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What is wrong with incest? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The discussion throughout is informed and motivated by the Spinozist hope that understanding our lives can help change them, can help make us more free
Newirth, Joseph (2006). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious: Humor as a fundamental emotional experience. Psychoanalytic Dialogues 16 (5):557-571.   (Google)
Nussbaum, Martha (1988). Narrative emotions: Beckett's genealogy of love. Ethics 98 (2):225-254.   (Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse, Is empathy necessary for morality?   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that empathy is a good thing, from a moral point of view. It is something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that’s true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is there little evidence for the claim that empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy might make us better people, but placing empathy at the center of our moral lives may be ill‐advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn’t centrally involve emotions. I think emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Prinz, 2007). It’s just that empathetic emotions are not ideally suited for these jobs. Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little more about the target of the attack. What is empathy? And what would it mean to say empathy is necessary for morality? With respect to the first question, much has been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathy as, “as an other‐oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person.” This is not the definition I will be using. Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic concern.” Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact, like a beautiful building that has into disrepair. Empathy, seems to connote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a find of feeling‐for an object and a feeling‐on‐behalf‐of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy, and I leave it as an open possibility that concern is highly important, if not necessary, for morality. Indeed, concern often seems to involve an element kind of moral anger, which I will argue is very important to morality. It is also important to distinguish empathy from sympathy. Suppose I feel outraged for someone who has been brainwashed into thinking she should follow a cult leader who is urging mass suicide. That would not necessarily qualify as empathy. As Darwall (1998: 261) points out, sympathy is a third‐person emotional response, whereas empathy involves putting oneself in another person’s shoes. But 1 Darwall’s definition is also somewhat problematic. He says, “Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings, whether one comes thereby to be concerned … or not.” This definition has two features, which I would like to avoid. First, the appeal to imagination seems overly intellectual. Imagination sounds like a kind of mental act that requires effort on the part of the imaginer. As Darwell recognizes, empathy in its simplest form empathy is just emotional contagion: catching the emotion that another person feels (Hatfield et al., 1994; Hoffman, 2000). It seems inflated to call contagion an imaginative act. Also, I want to resist Darwall’s application of “empathy” to cases where one has a feeling that someone should feel, but does not feel. The problem is that this tends to blur the distinction between empathy and sympathy. Suppose I encounter a member of a cult who is delighted by the cult leader’s nefarious plans. The cult member should by afraid, but is not. If I feel fear on the cult member’s behalf, that is not putting myself in the cult member’s shoes. As I will use the term, empathy requires a kind of emotional mimicry. I do not wish to imply that empathy is always an automatic process, in the way that emotional contagion is. Sometimes imagination is requires, and sometimes we experience emotions that we think someone would be experiencing, even if we have not seen direct evidence that the emotion is, in fact, being experienced. For example, one might feel empathetic hope for a marathon runner who is a few steps behind the runner is first place, or anxiety for the first place runner, and the second place runner catches up. We can experience these feelings even if the runners’ facial expressions reveal little more than muscular contortions associated with concentration and physical exertion. A situation can reveal a feeling. The core idea, as I will use the term, is that empathy is a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. And the “taking” here can be a matter of automatic contagion or the result of a complicated exercise of the imagination. I don’t think there is anything anachronistic about this notion of empathy. I think it has a long tradition in moral philosophy, even though the term “empathy” is only 100 years old. The British moralists, including David Hume and Adam Smith, used “sympathy” in way that is similar to the way I want to use “empathy.” Here is Smith (1759: II.i): “Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.” My question, in the pages that follow, is whether empathy so‐defined is necessary for morality. I should note again, in advance, that the empirical literature does not always distinguish between the constructs I have been discussing, but I do think that all the studies I discuss below can, by inference at least, shed some light on empathy as defined here. The suggestion that empathy is necessary for morality can be interpreted in at least three different ways. One might hold the view that empathy is necessary for making moral judgment. One might think empathy is necessary for moral development. And one might think empathy is necessary for motivating moral conduct. I think each of these conjectures is false. Empathy is not necessary for any of these things. We can have moral systems without empathy. Of course, it doesn’t follow directly that empathy should be eliminated from morality. One might think the modal question—Can there be morality without empathy?—and the related....
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Which emotions are basic? In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There are two major perspectives on the origin of emotions. According to one, emotions are the products of natural selection. They are evolved adaptations, best understood using the explanatory tools of evolutionary psychology. According to the other, emotions are socially constructed, and they vary across cultural boundaries. There is evidence supporting both perspectives. In light of this, some have argued both approaches are right. The standard strategy for compromise is to say that some emotions are evolved and others are constructed. The evolved emotions are sometimes given the label “basic,” and there is considerable agreement about a handful of emotions in this category. My goal here is to challenge all of these perspectives. I don’t think we should adopt a globally evolutionary approach, nor indulge the radical view that emotions derive entirely from us. I am equally dissatisfied with approaches that attempt to please Darwinians and constructivists by dividing emotions into two separate classes. I will defend another kind of ecumenicalism. Every emotion that we have a name for is the product of both nature and nurture. Emotions are evolved and constructed. The dichotomy between the two approaches cannot be maintained. This thesis will require making some claims that would be regarded as surprising to many emotion researchers. First, while there is a difference between basic emotions and nonbasic emotions, it is not a structural difference. All emotions are fundamentally alike. Second, the standard list of basic emotions, though by many to be universal across cultures, are not basic after all. We don’t have names for the basic emotions. All emotions that we talk about are culturally informed. And finally, this concession to constructivism does not imply that emotions are cognitive in any sense. Emotions are perceptual and embodied. They are gut reactions, and they are not unique to our species..
Putman, Daniel (2001). The emotions of courage. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):463–470.   (Google | More links)
Roberts, Robert C. (1988). Is amusement an emotion? American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):269-274.   (Google)
Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg (1998). The political sources of emotions: Greed and anger. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3).   (Google)
Royzman, Edward B. & Sabini, John (2001). Something it takes to be an emotion: The interesting case of disgust. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (1):29–59.   (Google | More links)
Sander, David (2008). Basic tastes and basic emotions: Basic problems and perspectives for a nonbasic solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):88-88.   (Google)
Sharpe, Robert A. (1975). Seven reasons why amusement is an emotion. Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3).   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2002). Back to basics: On the very idea of "basic emotions". Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (2):115–144.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (1984). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Doubleday.   (Cited by 191 | Google)
Standish, Paul (1992). In praise of the cognitive emotions. Journal of Philosophy of Education 26 (1):117–119.   (Google | More links)
Tangney, June P.; Stuewig, Jeff & Mashek, Debra J. (ms). Moral emotions and moral behavior.   (Google)
Abstract:      Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions. We first focus on a triad of negatively valenced "self-conscious" emotions - shame, guilt, and embarrassment. As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt. We review current thinking on the distinction between shame and guilt, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two moral emotions. Several new areas of research are highlighted: research on the domain-specific phenomenon of body shame, styles of coping with shame, psychobiological aspects of shame, the link between childhood abuse and later proneness to shame, and the phenomena of vicarious or "collective" experiences of shame and guilt. In recent years, the concept of moral emotions has been expanded to include several positive emotions - elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience of pride. Finally, we discuss briefly a morally relevant emotional process - other-oriented empathy
Velleman, J. David (1999). Love as a moral emotion. Ethics 109 (2).   (Google | More links)
Wright, William K. (1916). Conscience as reason and as emotion. Philosophical Review 25 (5):676-691.   (Google | More links)
Zinck, Alexandra & Newen, Albert (2008). Classifying emotion: A developmental account. Synthese 161 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology

5.1f.2.3 Emotions and Appraisals

Aogáin, Eoghan Mac (2000). Emotion, cognition, and free representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):210-210.   (Google)
Abstract: The representation of events, in primates at any rate, is a separate process from their emotional evaluation. The same holds for cognitive evaluation. Here too representation and evaluation are separate operations. Acknowledging the symmetry leads to the notion of free representation
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1997). Appraisal theories of emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):129-143.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cassin, Chrystine E. (1968). Emotions and evaluations. Personalist 49:563-571.   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna & Thompson, Evan (2005). Enacting emotional interpretations with feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams
Griffiths, Paul E., Appraisal and machiavellian emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal are thus best conceived, not as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of the environment are what the environment ‘affords’ the organism. Some of these affordances are ‘goal-affordances’ - possibilities for future action. This perspective on emotional appraisal lends support to the idea that emotional appraisal is in part ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘strategic’. Organisms take into account the payoffs resulting from an emotional response when determining whether the eliciting situation ‘warrants’ that emotion
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Toward a "machiavellian" theory of emotional appraisal. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of appraisal theory in the psychology of emotion is to identify the features of the emotion-eliciting situation that lead to the production of one emotion rather than another2. A model of emotional appraisal takes the form of a set of dimensions against which potentially emotion-eliciting situations are assessed. The dimensions of the emotion hyperspace might include, for example, whether the eliciting situation fulfills or frustrates the subject’s goals or whether an actor in the eliciting situation has violated a norm. Richard Lazarus’s well-known model of emotional appraisal has six dimensions, and the regions of the resulting hyperspace that correspond to particular emotions are summarized by Lazarus as the ‘core relational themes’ of those emotions. Anger, for examples, is elicited by the core relational theme ‘a demeaning offence against me and mine’, sadness by ‘having experienced an irrevocable loss’ and guilt by ‘having transgressed a moral imperative’ (Lazarus, 1991)
Lazarus, Richard S. (1974). The self-regulation of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Moors, Agnes & Kuppens, Peter (2008). Distinguishing between two types of musical emotions and reconsidering the role of appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):588-589.   (Google)
Northoff, Georg (2008). Is appraisal 'embodied' and 'embedded'? A neurophilosophical investigation of emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):68-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is to investigate which concept of appraisal, the 'disembedded' or the 'embedded' one, is better compatible with current neuroimaging data on emotion processing and thus neurophilosophically more tenable. The 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' concept implies distinct and independent brain regions underlying feeling and appraisal whereas 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal implies overlapping and dependent brain regions. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate that medial and lateral prefrontal cortical regions are involved in both feeling and appraisal and that there seems to be reciprocal modulation between these regions. Though preliminary, these data suggest that feeling and appraisal are associated with different patterns of neural activity across overlapping and interdependent brain regions. I therefore conclude that current neuroscientific evidence is rather in favor of the 'embodied' and 'embedded' concept of appraisal as relational than the one of 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational that is presupposed in current multicomponent theories of emotions
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2003). Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Price, Carolyn S. (2006). Fearing fluffy: The content of an emotional appraisal. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sander, David (2008). Basic tastes and basic emotions: Basic problems and perspectives for a nonbasic solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):88-88.   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way

5.1f.2.4 Emotions and Feelings

Aune, Bruce (1963). Feelings, moods, and introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Emotions or emotional feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23:192-194.   (Google)
Abstract: It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only bats, but also a great portion of the animal kingdom, perhaps all animal species except humans, turn out to lack phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, even human babies, and perhaps infants before the early stages of acquiring their first language, are likely to lack such consciousness, if one considers the level of conceptual sophistication required by the HOLT hypothesis. In order to have a higher-order thought, one needs to have the concept of a
Barrett, Lisa; Mesquita, Batja; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, ­James J. (ms). The experience of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract:      Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological terms, how the experience of emotion emerges from more basic processes. We then discuss the role of such experiences in the economy of the mind and behavior
Ben-Ze?ev, A. (2002). Emotions are not feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Emotions are not feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Browning, Douglas (1965). The philosophy of mind, part I: The privacy of feelings. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.   (Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.   (Cited by 2364 | Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Falk, Barrie (1996). Feeling and cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gean, William D. (1979). Emotion, emotional feeling and passive body change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.   (Google | More links)
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2006). Emotional experience and understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Green, Mitchell S. (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, the philosophy of language, social psychology, pragmatics, aesthetics, and neuroscience to present a stimulating and accessible interdisciplinary work
Gunther, York H. (2004). The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). Did Descartes have a Jamesian theory of the emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Emotional feelings and intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). Emotions as evaluative feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and so coming to see emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Unprincipled engagement: Emotional experience, expression and response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
James, William (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.   (Cited by 744 | Google | More links)
Kamler, Howard F. (1973). Emotional feelings. Philosophia 3 (October):381-411.   (Google | More links)
Kieran, Matthew (1998). Valuing emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth hegeman. Cambridge university press, 1996, pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 hb, £15.95 pb. Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.   (Google)
Koch, Philip J. (1987). Bodily feeling in emotion. Dialogue 26:59-75.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
LeDoux, Joseph (2008). Emotional coloration of consciousness: How feelings come about. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Leighton, Stephen R. (1984). Feelings and emotion. Review of Metaphysics 38 (December):303-320.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lyons, William E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1977). Emotions and feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.   (Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. & Ridley, Aaron (1997). Emotion and feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey (1997). Emotion and feeling: Geoffrey Madell. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):147–162.   (Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (1989). Akratic feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):277-288.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Elsewhere, I have argued for the possibility of strict or full-blown akratic action - roughly, free (or uncompelled), intentional action against the agent's better judgment.' My aim in the present paper is to defend and account for the possibility of an analogous variety of akratic feeling.
Myin, Erik & De Nul, Lars (2006). Feelings and objects. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Northoff, Georg (2008). Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james–lange theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Emotion and feeling. Philosophical Review 75 (April):139-160.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). Are emotions feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.   (Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2003). Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2005). The feeling of being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ridley, Aaron (1997). Emotion and feeling: Aaron Ridley. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):163–176.   (Google | More links)
Schroeder, Timothy (2008). Unexpected pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive tract, feels an impressive number of the sensations felt by someone who is gut-wrenchingly sad. Yet, unless she feels bad, the way she feels is only a pale echo of the feeling of sadness. If she feels good in spite of the burrito and the wind, then she does not feel at all the way she would if she were sad. Likewise, a man falling asleep can hardly fail to feel his muscles relax, his heart rate fall, and so on, but unless he feels good his state is only a shadow of feeling content. This paper will begin with a sketch of the nature of pleasure and displeasure, and the relation between them and the feelings that are characteristic of emotions. It will then argue that the capacity to feel pleased and displeased is, quite literally, a sense modality: one allowing us to perceive net change in the satisfaction of our intrinsic desires. As with any sense modality, the capacity to feel pleased and displeased displays substantial modularity. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the modularity of pleasure and displeasure contributes to effects that might reasonably be called “the modularity of the emotions.”
Sizer, Laura (2006). What feelings can't do. Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data
Slaby, Jan (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind
Solomon, Robert C. (1986). Emotions, feelings, and contexts. Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):653-654.   (Google | More links)
Stanley, Hiram M. (1886). Feeling and emotion. Mind 11 (41):66-76.   (Google | More links)
Stocker, Michael (1983). Psychic feelings: Their importance and irreducibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (March):5-26.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Stocker, Michael (2002). Some problems about affectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):151-158.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless
Whiting, Demian (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited
Whiting, Demian (forthcoming). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something . To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions

5.1f.2.5 Moods

Arregui, Jorge V. (1996). On the intentionality of moods: Phenomenology and linguistic analysis. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):397-411.   (Google)
Aune, Bruce (1963). Feelings, moods, and introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Brown, Robert (1965). Moods and motives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):277-294.   (Google | More links)
Delancey, Craig Stephen (2006). Basic moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods
Fish, William (2005). Emotions, moods, and intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.   (Google)
Abstract: Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s poor performance in the World Cup, or angry with her errant child. Although the ways we find natural to talk in such situations can alter (afraid of, sad about, angry with, and so on), in each case the emotion has what Ronald de Sousa, following Wittgenstein, calls a target—“an actual particular to which that emotion relates.” (de Sousa, 1987, p.116)
Graham, George (1990). Melancholic epistemology. Synthese 82 (3):399-422.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted. I argue that the effort of Aaron Beck to show that depressive reasoning is necessarily illogical and distorted is flawed. I identify an essential characteristic of that depression which is a mental illness. Finally, I describe the potential of depression to provide credal contact with important truths
Griffiths, Paul E. (1989). Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):17-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that moods are higher order-dispositions. This proposal is considered, and various shortcomings uncovered. The notion of a higher-order disposition is replaced by the more general notion of a higher-order functional state. An account is given in which moods are higher-order functional states, and the overall system of moods is a higher-order functional description of the mind. This proposal is defended in two ways. First, it is shown to capture some central features of our pre-scientific conception of moods. Secondly, it is argued that the account is more likely to be psychologically realistic (in a sense to be defined) than accounts which are behaviourally equivalent, but which do not employ a hierarchy of functional descriptions. It is suggested that the hierarchical structure of the model mirrors a feature of the physical states that realise moods and emotions
Lormand, Eric (1985). Toward a theory of moods. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2002). Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry
Rotenstreich, Nathan (1984). A conceptual analysis of a philosophy of mood. Philosophia 14 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Sizer, Laura (2000). Towards a computational theory of mood. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood I propose places them within the context of other mental phenomena and is consistent with the empirical data on moods
Staehler, Tanja (2007). How is a phenomenology of fundamental moods possible? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the division between authenticity and inauthenticity, the latter concepts need to be addressed first. Guided by Klaus Held's article 'Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture', the second part of the article argues that Heidegger's phenomenology of moods is indeed one-sided, favouring anxiety at the expense of awe. Finally, I argue that, contrary to Held's claims, this one-sidedness cannot be amended by the means one finds in Heidegger's analyses. Instead, it is necessary to undertake closer examination of those moods which necessarily involve the other person

5.1f.3 Aspects of Emotion

Benson, John (1967). Emotion and expression. Philosophical Review 76 (3):335-357.   (Google | More links)

5.1f.3.1 Knowledge of Emotion

Ayton, Peter; Pott, Alice & Elwakili, Najat (2007). Affective forecasting: Why can't people predict their emotions? Thinking and Reasoning 13 (1):62 – 80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers overestimated the duration of their disappointment. Greater previous experience of this emotional event did not lead to any greater accuracy of the forecasts, suggesting that learning about one's own emotions is difficult. Failers' self-assessed chances of passing were lower a week after the test than immediately prior to the test; this difference correlated with the magnitude of individual immediate disappointments, suggesting the presence of a cognitive strategy for recovering from disappointments. A second study investigated the theory that undue focus on the differences between present and future biases affective forecasts. “Defocusing” that induced low-level construals of the future reduced the extremeness of affective forecasts but a higher-level construal did not. We conclude that a focusing effect may bias affective forecasts
Baier, Annette C. (1987). Getting in touch with our own feelings. Topoi 6 (September):89-97.   (Google | More links)
Debes, Remy (2010). Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion. Synthese 175 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy
Ellis, Ralph D. (1999). Why isn't consciousness empirically observable? Emotion, self-organization, and nonreductive physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.   (Google)
Fox, Michael (1973). On unconscious emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (December):151-170.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (1999). How we think of others' emotions. Mind and Language 14 (4):394-423.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell (2010). Perceiving emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights
Green, Mitchell S. (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I reply to the main criticisms and suggestions for further clarification made by the contributors to this symposium on my book, Self-Expression . These replies are organized into the following sections: (1) What's in the name?, (2) Showing, expressing and indicating, (3) Expressing and signaling, (4) Perceiving emotions, (5) Voluntary/involuntary, (6) Expression and handicaps, (7) Expression and aesthetics, and (8) Looking ahead
Herzberg, Larry A. (2008). Constitutivism, belief, and emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.   (Google)
Abstract: Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M , then S has M . Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, arguing that although the principle applies when M is a belief, it does not apply when M is an emotion. I account for this asymmetry by focusing on differences in the commitments that belief and emotion conceptually involve, and briefly sketch out a psychological explanation of those differences. I conclude that one can reasonably split one's epistemological loyalties between constitutivism regarding meta-beliefs and non-constitutivism regarding beliefs about one's emotions
Lacewing, Michael (2007). Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings? Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments that can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed
Lacewing, Michael (2005). Emotional self-awareness and ethical deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Self-deception, self-pretence, and emotional detachment. Mind 88 (July):441-446.   (Google | More links)
Mullane, Harvey (1976). Unconscious and disguised emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):403-411.   (Google)
Mullane, Harvey (1965). Unconscious emotion. Theoria 31:181-190.   (Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1963). Feelings into words. Journal of Philosophy 60 (December):801-810.   (Google | More links)
Neisser, Joe (2006). Making the case for unconscious feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.   (Google)
Parr, Lisa A. (2001). Understanding other's emotions: From affective resonance to empathic action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):44-45.   (Google)
Abstract: Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Seeing and hearing emotions. Analysis 26 (June):193-197.   (Google)
Pessoa, Luiz; Japee, Shruti & Ungerleider, Leslie G. (2005). Visual awareness and the detection of fearful faces. Emotion 5 (2):243-247.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Pickard, Hanna (2003). Emotions and the problem of other minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1995). Feeling one's emotions and knowing oneself. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):319-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sahdra, Baljinder & Thagard, Paul R. (2003). Self-deception and emotional coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self
Salmela, Mikko (2005). What is emotional authenticity? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2002). Emotional introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Smith, Stephen D. & Bulman-Fleming, M. Barbara (2004). A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion. Brain and Cognition 55 (3):452-457.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sneddon, Andrew (2008). Two views of emotional perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)

5.1f.3.2 Emotional Expression

Barwell, Ismay (1986). How does art express emotion? Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 45 (2):175-181.   (Google | More links)
Betzler, Monika (2007). Making sense of actions expressing emotions. Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (2002). Emotion and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating or the secretion of adrenalin, and reasoned actions done ‘out of an emotion’, such as breathing deeply to clam down, or writing a letter of complaint, for which a standard rationalizing explanation can be given.1 I pursue the relation between this experience and expression in a somewhat roundabout manner. First, I note an analogy between a problem of other minds, and Berkeley’s (1975) challenge to Locke’s (1975) realism. Second, I sketch what I regard as the correct strategy for meeting this challenge. Third, I develop and defend a parallel response to the problem of other minds, as this applies to certain basic directed emotions. This yields the following answer to my opening question. Reference to the appropriate expressive behaviour is essential to the identification of the way in which various emotional experiences present their worldly objects
Eastwood, John D. (online). From unconscious to conscious perception: Emotionally expressive faces and visual awareness.   (Google)
Goldie, Peter (2000). Explaining expressions of emotion. Mind 109 (433):25-38.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The question is how to explain expressions of emotion. It is argued that not all expressions of emotion are open to the same sort of explanation. Those expressions which are actions can be explained, like other sorts of action, by reference to a belief and a desire; however, no genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end. Certain expressions of emotion which are actions can also be given a deeper explanation as being expressive of a wish. Expressions of emotion which are not actions cannot be given a belief-desire explanation: no belief is involved, and a desire is involved only in an honorific sense of 'desire'. The distinction amongst expressions of emotion between those which are actions and those which are not is not a precise one, and the paper concludes with some speculative remarks about borderline cases such as jumping for joy
Hansen, Forest (1972). The adequacy of verbal articulation of emotions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (2):249-253.   (Google | More links)
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Unprincipled engagement: Emotional experience, expression and response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Ivet, P. (2002). Emotions, revision, and the explanation of emotional action. European Review of Philosophy 5.   (Google)
Koch, Philip J. (1983). Expressing emotion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (April):176-189.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pierce, A. H. (1906). Emotional expression and the doctrine of mutations. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (21):573-575.   (Google | More links)
Shapiro, Debbie (2006). Your Body Speaks Your Mind: Decoding the Emotional, Psychological, and Spiritual Messages That Underlie Illness. Sounds True.   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Thalberg, Irving (1962). Natural expressions of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (March):387-392.   (Google | More links)

5.1f.3.3 Aspects of Emotion, Misc

5.1f.3.4 Emotion and Reason

Angelette, Will (ms). Rationality, emotion, and belief revision: Waller's move beyond CBT & REBT.   (Google)
Abstract:      Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views
Badcock, C. (2004). Emotion verses reason as a genetic conflict. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Betzler, Monika (2007). Making sense of actions expressing emotions. Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.   (Google | More links)
Birtchnell, John (2003). The Two of Me: The Rational Outer Me and the Emotional Inner Me. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book attempts to answer the question: How much of what we do is the result of conscious and deliberate decisions and how much originates in unconscious, unthought out, automatic directives? The answer is that far more than what we might imagine falls into the second category. We tend to assume responsibility for our unconsciously determined thoughts and actions, and even though we do not know why we think and act the way we do, we make up reasons for it, which we truly believe. Each one of us is really two people in the same body, who in many respects, function quite independently of each other, and yet somehow manage to get along with things, while the other, the outer brain, serves as the spokesperson for both of them. The inner brain is the source of our objectives and generates the emotions that keep us on track in our attainment of them. This book explores the strange relationship between these two parts of us across a spectrum of mental processes including, memory, language, problem-solving, dreams, delusions and hallucinations, and more complex pursuits sucs as the arts, humor and religion
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected
Brady, Michael S. (2008). Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4).   (Google)
Cairns, Dorion (2000). Reason and emotion. Husserl Studies 17 (1).   (Google)
D'arms, Justin (2004). Bennett Helm, emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001), pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (1979). The rationality of emotions. Dialogue.   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1994). Rationality, emotions, and social norms. Synthese 98 (1).   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1996). Rationality and the emotions. Economic Journal 106:1386-97.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an earlier paper (Elster, 1989 a), I discussed the relation between rationality and social norms. Although I did mention the role of the emotions in sustaining social norms, I did not focus explicitly on the relation between rationality and the emotions. That relation is the main topic of the present paper, with social norms in a subsidiary part
Evans, D. (2002). The search hypothesis of emotions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):497-509.   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ?the search hypothesis of emotion?. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are. 1 Introduction 2 The search hypothesis of emotion 3 A red herring: the frame problem 4 The search problem 5 Two readings of the search hypothesis 6 Two final remarks 7 Conclusion
Farell, Daniel (2004). Rationality and the emotions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):241-251.   (Google)
Fernandez-Berrocal, Pablo & Extremera, Natalio (2005). About emotional intelligence and moral decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
Fine, Cordelia (2006). Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the 'automatization' of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Fisher, Mark (1977). Reason, emotion, and love. Inquiry 20 (1-4):189 – 203.   (Google)
Abstract: Wittgenstein's private language argument is interpreted as an example of a kind of transcendental argument which, if valid, explains why a certain concept must possess certain features. Cognition and affect are shown to require each other by an application of Bennett's account of what beings capable of true cognition must be capable of, and the necessity of certain emotions to the existence of any rules in a community is argued in similar fashion. Hume's account of love and admiration being rejected, an account of love, intended to explain some of love's familiar features, is defended, and various proposed additions to the analysis are rejected. The idea of love is linked to those of value, agency, and the transcendental self by argument showing that each of these ideas requires all of the others. Finally, the idea of love is linked by a direct argument to that of the transcendental self
Frank, Robert H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. Norton.   (Cited by 1574 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Emotions, rationality, and mind-body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Practical reasoning and emotion. In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). The import of human action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action. Automatic Press/Vip.   (Google)
Abstract: My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account of the relation between the mind and the body. Here I have in mind not the thought that we must provide a compatibilist account of free will (though I do think that is true) but rather the thought that it is all to easy for philosophers of action to make what turn out to be false presuppositions about the nature of psychological capacities like belief and desire and the role they play in motivation. Conversely, I think, philosophers of mind, focused too narrowly on worries about intentionality and consciousness, have offered accounts of various psychological capacities that are inadequate to understanding the sort of agency characteristic of us persons. Before I begin, I need to acknowledge my general orientation in philosophy of mind. Mental states and capacities are to be understood in terms of their place within an explanatory framework. Psychological explanation, however, I take to be fundamentally normative, a matter of locating particular phenomena within a broader pattern of rationality. This is a broadly Davidsonian or Dennettian orientation to the mind, according to which, as Davidson says, rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental.1 In..
Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002). Review: Emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation and the nature of value. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Janaway, Christopher (2005). Nietzsche on reason and emotion. .   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2004). Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality. In Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Korpalo, Olga (1999). Rationality and emotions (the perspectives of logical-cognitive analysis). Theoria 14 (34):109-127.   (Google)
Macmurray, John (1962). Reason and Emotion. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mameli, Matteo (2004). The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McCullagh, C. B. (1990). The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):44-58.   (Google | More links)
Muzio, Isabella (2001). Emotions and rationality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):135-145.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun, Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Parsons, Howard L. (1958). Reason and affect: Some of their relations and functions. Journal of Philosophy 55 (March):221-229.   (Google | More links)
Parkinson, B. (2004). Unpicking reasonable emotions. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1978). Explaining emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Ross, Steven L. (1984). Evaluating the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):309-326.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2006). True emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion..
Verbeek, Bruno (2001). Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions, Jon Elster. Cambridge university press, 1999, IX + 416 pages. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):121-145.   (Google)

5.1f.3.5 Objects and Contents of Emotions

Adam, C.; Herzig, A. & Longin, D. (2009). A logical formalization of the occ theory of emotions. Synthese 168 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’ mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory
Alanen, Lilli K. (2003). What are emotions about? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):311-354.   (Google | More links)
Aquila, Richard E. (1975). Causes and constituents of occurrent emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):346-349.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Aquila, Richard E. (1974). Emotions, objects, and causal relations. Philosophical Studies 26 (November):279-285.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette C. (1990). What emotions are about. Philosophical Perspectives 4:1-29.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Barrett, Lisa; Mesquita, Batja; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, ­James J. (ms). The experience of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract:      Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological terms, how the experience of emotion emerges from more basic processes. We then discuss the role of such experiences in the economy of the mind and behavior
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Intentionality and feelings in theories of emotions: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):263-271.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2000). 'I only have eyes for you': The partiality of positive emotions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (3):341–351.   (Google | More links)
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected
Brown, Robert (1987). Analyzing Love. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgments and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as anger and fear, and, more generally, deciding where love stands in the contrast between emotions and attitudes. Finally, the book examines how we justify our loves: can we have, and do we need, reasons for loving? What types of judgment are appropriate to love? Can we criticize a lover for his or her choices?
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about intrinsic value made by Brentano and his students, and discusses their relevance to theodicy and the problem of evil. Brentano, as the teacher of Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, and others, stands at the origin of the phenomenological tradition and of the Polish school of philosophy that developed after World War I. He has also had considerable influence on Anglo-American philosophy. This book will interest those concerned with the origins of phenomenological value theory and more generally with the connections between ethics and philosophical psychology
Choi, Jinhee (2003). All the right responses: Fiction films and warranted emotions. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive theories of emotions have provided us with explanations of how we emotionally engage with fiction, when we are aware that what is depicted is fictional. However, these theories left an important question unanswered: namely, what kinds of emotional responses to fiction are warranted responses. The main focus of this paper is how our emotional responses to fiction can be aesthetically warranted—that is, how emotions directed to fiction can be warranted given the fact that its object is an artwork. I consider three possible explanations of this phenomenon: the real-life principle, a correspondence model, and a functional model. I argue that the real-life principle and the correspondence model fall short of explaining how our emotional responses to film are aesthetically warranted, and instead I argue that a functional model provides such an explanation. In this paper, I will primarily focus on fiction films, although I will address novels and other art forms where necessary
Cohon, Rachel & Owen, David, Hume on representation, reason and motivation.   (Google)
Abstract: A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (T 415)
Crane, Tim (2006). Intentionality and emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Crane, Tim, Intentionality and emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto section 4). is seems to me to be a good starting point for any account of the ascription and epistemology of emotions, an excellent description of data that any theory of the emotions has to take into account. What I find puzzling is that Hutto seems to believe that this view is in opposition to certain widely accepted ...
Cunningham, Suzanne (1997). Two faces of intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.   (Google | More links)
Dalgleish, Tim (1997). An anti-anti-essentialist view of the emotions: A reply to Kupperman. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):85-90.   (Google)
Abstract: Kupperman (1995) advances an anti-essentialist view of emotions in which he suggests that there can be emotion without feeling or affect, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is about that object in some way. In this reply to Kupperman's essay, I suggest a number of problems with his rejection of the essentialist position. I argue that in his discussion of feelings Kupperman is crucially not clear about the distinction between the ascription of emotions by others versus the experience of emotions by an individual. Furthermore, I also question his analysis of the role of linguistic empiricism in philosophy and psychology. With respect to Kupperman's analysis of intentionality, I argue that he confuses the ability to readily identify intentional objects with the issue of their actual existence. Finally, I suggest that Kupperman confuses the concepts of action and motivation in his discussion of motivation
Debus, Dorothea (2007). Being emotional about the past: On the nature and role of past-directed emotions. Noûs 41 (4):758-779.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Deigh, John (1994). Cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Deigh, John (2008). Emotions, Values, and the Law. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions, Values, and the Law brings together ten of John Deigh's essays written over the past fifteen years. In the first five essays, Deigh ask questions about the nature of emotions and the relation of evaluative judgment to the intentionality of emotions, and critically examines the cognitivist theories of emotion that have dominated philosophy and psychology over the past thirty years. A central criticism of these theories is that they do not satisfactorily account for the emotions of babies or animals other than human beings. Drawing on this criticism, Deigh develops an alternative theory of the intentionality of emotions on which the education of emotions explains how human emotions, which innately contain no evaluative thought, come to have evaluative judgments as their principal cognitive component. The second group of five essays challenge the idea of the voluntary as essential to understanding moral responsibility, moral commitment, political obligation, and other moral and political phenomena that have traditionally been thought to depend on people's will. Each of these studies focuses on a different aspect of our common moral and political life and shows, contrary to conventional opinion, that it does not depend on voluntary action or the exercise of a will constituted solely by rational thought. Together, the essays in this collection represent an effort to shift our understanding of the phenomena traditionally studied in moral and political philosophy from that of their being products of reason and will, operating independently of feeling and sentiment to that of their being manifestations of the work of emotion
DeLancey, Craig (2000). Affect programs, intentionality, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):197-198.   (Google)
Abstract: I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emotions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions. I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident
Delancey, Craig Stephen (2006). Basic moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods
Deonna, Julien A. & Scherer, Klaus R. (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
Deonna, Julien A. (2007). The structure of empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call the parallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises. Key Words: empathy • emotion • philosophy • psychology • simulation
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (2002). Emotional truth: Ronald de sousa. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247–263.   (Google | More links)
Dipert, Randall R. (ms). The nature and structure of emotions.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have almost always said something about emotions and passions whenever they have discussed human mental life. Many have asserted that it is some emotions or, more broadly, passions, that are to be primarily valued and sought. These valued passionate states of mind might include emotions, moods, desires, belief-like feelings of conviction and commitment, and romantic or erotic love, which are typically scarcely distinguished. Not only are these states of mind lumped together, but the reasons why they are valued may likewise be various: they may be valued because of their intrinsic feeling (especially insofar as they are intense), through their long-term or deep effects on the rest of our practical and mental lives, through their effects on others’ lives, or even in the glimpse they give us of an object that transcends our mundane and superficial concerns, as in love, peak experiences, or intimations of God, Beauty, or Nature. Others have claimed that it is in the subduing or elimination of some or all of these passions that the ideal human life consists. Again, what precisely are the objectionable passions is typically not delineated, and why such mental states are objectionable may be diverse and even unspecified. One might resent their "disruptive" nature on our mental life, especially insofar as some of them stem from external, uncontrollable sources, and instead seek a calm state that is within one’s control and not subject to these whimsical externalities. Or one can see many or all passions as disruptive of control and success in our inner or outer life, or in the lives of others. We might call this latter group the anti-emotional Rationalists, and the former group the pro-emotional Romantics
Donnellan, Keith S. (1970). Causes, objects, and producers of the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 67 (November):947-950.   (Google | More links)
Döring, Sabine A. (2003). Explaining action by emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John J. (2004). 'Cognitive impenetrability' and the complex intentionality of the emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):109-126.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). Curious Emotions: Roots of Consciousness and Personality in Motivated Action. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Emotion drives all cognitive processes, largely determining their qualitative feel, their structure, and in part even their content.
Fish, William (2005). Emotions, moods, and intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.   (Google)
Abstract: Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s poor performance in the World Cup, or angry with her errant child. Although the ways we find natural to talk in such situations can alter (afraid of, sad about, angry with, and so on), in each case the emotion has what Ronald de Sousa, following Wittgenstein, calls a target—“an actual particular to which that emotion relates.” (de Sousa, 1987, p.116)
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Gordon, Robert M. (1974). The aboutness of emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (January):11-36.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Gosling, Justin C. B. (1965). Emotion and object. Philosophical Review 74 (October):486-503.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Emotions, rationality, and mind-body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts
Greenspan, Patricia (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment
Griffiths, Paul E., Appraisal and machiavellian emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal are thus best conceived, not as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of the environment are what the environment ‘affords’ the organism. Some of these affordances are ‘goal-affordances’ - possibilities for future action. This perspective on emotional appraisal lends support to the idea that emotional appraisal is in part ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘strategic’. Organisms take into account the payoffs resulting from an emotional response when determining whether the eliciting situation ‘warrants’ that emotion
Griffiths, Paul E. (1990). Modularity, and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure of the adaptive responses is innate, the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt. The circuits subserving the adaptive responses are probably located in the limbic system. This theory of emotion is directly applicable only to a small sub-domain of the traditional realm of emotion. It can be used, however, to explain the grouping of various other phenomena under the heading of emotion, and to explain various characteristic failings of the pre-scientific conception of emotion
Gunther, York H. (online). A theory of emotional content.   (Google)
Abstract: The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and anthropology. In fact, it’s not uncommon for a single author to assume more than one disciplinary perspective on the features and roles of emotion
Gunther, York H. (2003). Emotion and force. In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks recognize that emotions are intentional but, by reducing them to judgments, beliefs, desires, etc., fail to capture their distinctiveness as mental causes (see Solomon 1976 and Marks 1982). In other words, their place within intentional psychology is acknowledged at the price of denying them their uniqueness
Gunther, York H. (2004). The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)