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5.1f.1. Theories of Emotion (Theories of Emotion on PhilPapers)

Ben-ze'ev, A. (1987). The nature of emotions. Philosophical Studies 52 (November):393-409.   (Google)
Browning, Robert W. (1959). Broad's theory of emotion. In P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy Of C. D. Broad. Tudor.   (Google)
Cabestan, Philippe (2004). What is it to move oneself emotionally? Emotion and affectivity according to Jean-Paul Sartre. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotion is traditionally described as a phenomenon that dominates the subject because one does not choose to be angry, sad, or happy. However, would it be totally absurd to conceive emotion as behaviour and a manifestation of the spontaneity and liberty of consciousness? In his short text, Esquisse d''une theorie des émotions, Sartre proposes a phenomenological description of this psychological phenomenon. He distinguishes between constituted affectivity, which gives rise to emotions, and an original affectivity lacking intentionality, and tied closely to bodily processes. It appears that emotion is first and foremost a magical attitude toward the world, an attitude freely adopted by the subject. Against what is often written, this thesis doesn''t mean that emotion would be a pure comedy but only that, in spite of appearances, this behaviour isn''t a matter of what Descartes calls soul''s passions
Colombetti, Giovanna (2009). From affect programs to dynamical discrete emotions. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407 – 425.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more naturally than traditional Discrete Emotion Theory for the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions
Dewey, John, Theory of emotions, the: The significance of emotions.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). Generating predictions from a dynamical systems emotion theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):202-203.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis's dynamical systems emotion theory continues a tradition including Merleau-Ponty, von Bertallanfy, and Aristotle. Understandably for a young theory, Lewis's new predictions do not follow strictly from the theory; thus their failure would not disconfirm the theory, nor their success confirm it – especially given that other self-organizational approaches to emotion (e.g., those of Ellis and of Newton) may not be inconsistent with these same predictions
Emerick, Rex (1999). Sartre's theory of emotions. Sartre Studies International 5 (2):75-91.   (Google)
Faucher, Luc & Tappolet, Christine (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1793 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.
Goldie, Peter (2007). Emotion. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):928–938.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2008). Teaching & learning guide for: Emotion. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1097-1099.   (Google)
Abstract: The emotions were a neglected topic in philosophy twenty or so years ago, but things have now changed. It is now appreciated how important it is to understand the emotions as an independent aspect of our mental economy – one that has to be properly taken into account in any worthwhile philosophising in ethics or moral psychology, in epistemology, in aesthetics, and generally in philosophical issues surrounding value and how the mind engages with value in the world. There is now a wide range of philosophical theories of emotion 'on the market', and whilst this Guide and the related Article are not the place to argue for one or the other of these, anyone working in areas which overlap with emotion research ought to be aware of what these theories are, and ought to consider what the implications of their own views are in order not to be committed to an ultimately untenable account of the emotions, and of their place in our lives. Author Recommends Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). This is a classic, full of fascinating insights. Best not read straight through; use it selectively, depending on where your research is going. Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976). Another classic. Solomon was one of the pioneers to resurrect emotion to its rightful place in philosophy. Solomon was greatly influenced by the existentialists, and he argued not only that emotions are rational, but also that we choose our emotions. Since then, Solomon has nuanced his position considerably, but this early work merits close study. Robert Solomon, ed., Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). This collection contains 17 chapters on emotion from contemporary philosophers, plus an Introduction by Solomon. It gives an excellent feeling for the central issues in the current debates. John Deigh, 'Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions', Ethics 104 (1994): 824–54. Deigh argues for a cognitive theory of the emotions, and considers how such a theory can accommodate emotions in non-human animals and in babies. William James, 'What is an Emotion?', Mind 9 (1884): 188–205. This article, and the related (and later) discussion in his The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981, ch. 25), has had an enormous influence on psychologists, and on philosophers who argue for various versions of non-cognitivism in the emotions. It merits reading in the original. Robert Zajonc, 'On the Primacy of Affect', American Psychologist 39 (1984): 117–23. This article, 100 years after James, has also been enormously influential on non-cognitivists. Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Prinz is one of the proponents of non-cognitivism, and the influence of James and Zajonc will be clear. Peter Goldie, 'Emotion', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 928–38, doi: [DOI link]. My own survey of the current literature. Online Materials: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/ de Sousa on Emotion in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: An excellent survey of the current literature. Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Cognitive-rationalist theories of emotion R. Solomon, 'The Rationality of emotions', Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8 (1977): 105–14. G. Taylor, 'Justifying the Emotions', Mind 84 (1975): 390–402. M. Nussbaum, 'Emotions as Judgements of Value and Importance', in Thinking about Feeling, ed. R. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 183–99. Week 2: Non-cognitive feeling theories of emotion W. James, 'What is an Emotion?', Mind 9 (1884): 188–205. J. Prinz, 'Embodied Appraisals', in Thinking about Feeling, ed. R. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 44–60. Week 3: Perceptual and sui generis theories of emotion Robert Roberts, Emotion: An Aid in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 2, sections 2.1–2.4. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 6. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), ch. 3. Week 4: Expression of emotion Michael Smith, 'The Humean Theory of Motivation', Mind 96 (1987): 36–61. Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Arational Actions', Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 57–68. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), ch. 5. Week 5: Emotional sincerity and authenticity Mikko Salmela, "What is Emotional Authenticity?", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 35.3 (2005): 209–39. David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 2 and 7 especially. Week 6: Morality and the emotions A. J. Ayer, 'Critique of Ethics and Theology', Language, Truth and Logic (London: Penguin, 1936), chapter VI. Bernard Williams, 'Morality and the Emotions', Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 207–229. Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chapter 6. Focus Questions1. What element of truth is there in the idea that emotions are judgements? How can such a theory allow for the possibility of conflict between emotion and judgement?2. James argues that feelings are essential to emotion: no feeling, then no emotion. How does a non-cognitive theory of emotion seek to account for this, and is such a theory the only way of doing so?3. Roberts argues that emotions are a kind of perception (a concern-based construal); de Sousa argues rather that there is only an analogy between emotion and perception and that emotion is an irreducible psychological category; Goldie argues that emotional feelings are sui generis'feelings towards'. How might one decide which of these more accurately captures the nature of emotion?4. Hursthouse argues that our expressions of emotion (kicking the chair in anger for example) are arational. What are her arguments for this, and are they sound?5. We often speak of someone's anger, for example, as not being sincere, or of her generosity as not being authentic. What do these claims mean, and how are the notions of sincerity and authenticity of emotion related conceptually?6. What is the role of emotion in our moral thought and talk?
Griffiths, Paul E. (2002). Emotions. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Emotions as natural and normative kinds. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):901-911.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not `natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by `natural kind', suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004). Is emotion a natural kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories_ I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by ?natural kind? and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on ?multi-level appraisal theory? in psychology
Griffiths, Paul E. (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 390 | Google)
Abstract: Paul E. Griffiths argues that most research on the emotions has been as misguided as Aristotelian efforts to study "superlunary objects" - objects...
Gunther, Y. H. (2001). On the emotions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):437 – 439.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Book Information On the Emotions. By R. Wollheim. Yale University Press. New Haven/London. 1999. Pp. xiii + 269. Hardback, US$25.00
Gurney, Edmund (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (35):421-426.   (Google | More links)
Henle, Mary (1974). In search of the structure of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:190-197.   (Google)
Irons, David (1895). Descartes and modern theories of emotion. Philosophical Review 4 (3):291-302.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1897). The nature of emotion. II. Philosophical Review 6 (5):471-496.   (Google | More links)
Irons, David (1897). The nature of emotion. Philosophical Review 6 (3):242-256.   (Google | More links)
Kenny, A. J. P. (1963). Action, Emotion And Will. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...
Marks, Joel (1993). Book reviews. Mind 102 (405).   (Google)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (36):615-617.   (Google | More links)
Mceachrane, M. (2006). Investigating emotions philosophically. Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):342-357.   (Google | More links)
Mcgill, V. J. & Welch, Livingston (1946). A behaviorist analysis of emotions. Philosophy of Science 13 (April):100-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
M`Cosh, James (1877). Elements involved in emotions. Mind 2 (7):413-415.   (Google | More links)
Moffat, D.; Frijda, N. H. & Phaf, R. H. (1993). Analysis of a computer model of emotions. In [Book Chapter].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the fields of psychology, AI, and philosophy there has recently been theoretical activity in the cognitively-based modelling of emotions. Using AI methodology it is possible to implement and test these complex models, and in this paper we examine an emotion model called ACRES. We propose a set of requirements any such model should satisfy, and compare ACRES against them. Then, analysing its behaviour in detail, we formulate more requirements and criteria that can be applied to future computational models of emotion. In arguing to support the new requirements, we find that they are desirable for autonomous systems in general. We also show how they can explain the psychological concept of regulation. Finally, we use the concepts developed to make a theoretical distinction between emotion and motivation
Nahm, Milton C. (1939). The philosophical implications of some theories of emotion. Philosophy of Science 6 (4):458-486.   (Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2000). Wundt's three-dimensional theory of emotion. In Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Atlanta: Rodopi.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert Campbell (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology
Robinson, Jenefer M. (2004). Emotion: Biological fact or social construction. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1939). Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Routledge.   (Google)
Segal, Gideon (2000). Beyond subjectivity: Spinoza's cognitivism of the emotions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was left with the cognitive aspects of emotions, keeping outside of his report the inner feeling which accompanies them. Spinoza's psychology, I claim, disregards any non-cognitive aspect of emotions
Solomon, Robert (1997). In defense of the emotions (and passions too). Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (4):489–497.   (Google | More links)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotion, motivation and action: The case of fear.   (Google)
Abstract: Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety of systems controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Your heart races, your breathing becomes strained and your start trembling. These changes are accompanied by an expression of fear on your face: your mouth opens and your eyes widen while you stare at the wolf. There is also a kind of experience that you undergo. You are likely to feel a sort of pang, something that might consist in the perception of the physiological changes you are going through. Moreover, a number of thoughts are likely to cross your mind. You might think that the wild beast is about to tear you into pieces and that you’ll never escape from this. In addition to this, your attention focuses on the wolf and its movement, as well as, possibly, ways of escaping or defending yourself. Last, but not least, your fear is likely to come with a motivation, such as an urge to run away or to strike back. Whatever the details of the story, it is clear that a typical emotion episode involves a number of different components. Roughly, these components are a) a sensory perception or more generally an informational component, b) a kind of appraisal, d) physiological changes, c) conscious feelings, d) cognitive and attentional processes, and e) an actiontendency or more generally a motivational component. One central question in the theory of emotion is which, if any, of these components, constitute the emotion..
Teroni, Fabrice (2007). Emotions and formal objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories.

5.1f.1.1 Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion

Barbalet, J. M. (1999). William James' theory of emotions: Filling in the picture. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):251–266.   (Google | More links)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Emotions are not feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carrette, Jeremy (2005). Pt. 2. James, psychology and religion. Listening to James a century later : The varieties as a resource for renewing the psychology of religion / David M. Wulff ; the varieties, the principles and psychology of religion : Unremitting inspiration from a different source / Jacob A. belzen ; passionate belief : William James, emotion and religious experience. In Jeremy R. Carrette (ed.), William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration. Routledge.   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna & Thompson, Evan (forthcoming). The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved beyond this disembodied stance by conceiving of emotions as involving both cognitive processes (perception, attention, and evaluation) and bodily events (arousal, behavior, and facial expressions), the legacy of cognitivism persists in the tendency to treat cognitive and bodily events as separate constituents of emotion. Thus the cognitive aspects of emotion are supposedly distinct and separate from the bodily ones. This separation indicates that cognitivism’s disembodied conception of cognition continues to shape the way emotion theorists conceptualize emotion
Coplan, Amy (2010). Feeling without thinking: Lessons from the ancients on emotion and virtue-acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue
Damasio, Antonio R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Putnam.   (Cited by 5770 | Google | More links)
D'arms, Justin (2008). Prinz's theory of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
Förster, J. & Friedman, R. S. (2008). The embodied emotional mind. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Irons, David (1894). Prof. James' theory of emotion. Mind 3 (9):77-97.   (Google | More links)
James, William (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.   (Cited by 744 | Google | More links)
Myers, Gerald E. (1969). William James's theory of emotion. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 5:67-89.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). Are emotions feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.   (Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Abstract: Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
Prinz, Jesse (2008). Précis of Gut reactions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.   (Google | More links)
Slaby, Jan (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind
Whiting, Demian (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited
Whiting, Demian (forthcoming). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something . To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions

5.1f.1.2 Perceptual Theories of Emotion

Brady, Michael S. (2010). Virtue, emotion, and attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity
Charland, Louis C. (1995). Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
D'arms, Justin (2008). Prinz's theory of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.   (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).   (Google)
Deonna, Julien A. (2006). Emotion, perception and perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.   (Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (2004). Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is a view of the emotions (I might tendentiously call it ‘cognitivism’) that has at present a certain currency. This view is of the emotions as playing an essential role in our gaining evaluative knowledge of the world. When we are angry at an insult, or afraid of the burglar, our emotions involve evaluative perceptions and thoughts, which are directed towards the way something is in the world that impinges on our well-being, or on the well-being of those that matter to us. Without emotions, we would be worse off, prudentially and morally: we would not see things as they are, and accordingly we would not act as we should. Emotions are, according to this view a Good Thing. No wonder we have evolved as creatures capable of emotion.[1]
Griffiths, Paul E. (2008). Jesse Prinz Gut reactions: A perceptual theory of emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3).   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse (online). Emotion and aesthetic value.   (Google)
Abstract: Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are related, of course, because they nature of appreciation may bear on what things are worthy of that response, or at least on what things are likely to elicit it. So I will have some things to say about the latter. But I want to focus in this discussion on appreciation itself. When we praise a work of art, when we say it has aesthetic value, what does our praise consist in? This is a question about aesthetic psychology. I am interested in what kind of mental state appreciation is. What kind of state are we expressing when we say a work of art is “good”? This question has parallels in other areas of value theory. In ethics, most notably, there has been much attention lavished on the question of what people express when they refer to an action as “morally good.” One popular class of theories, associated with the British moralists and their followers, posits a link between moral valuation and emotion. To call an act morally good is to express an emotion toward that act. I think this approach to morality is right on target (Prinz, 2007). Here I want to argue that an emotional account of aesthetic valuation is equally promising. There are important differences between the two domains, but both have an affective foundation. I suspect that valuing of all kinds involves the emotions. Here I will inquire into the role of emotions in aesthetic valuing. I will not claim that artworks express emotions or even that they necessarily evoke emotions..
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Abstract: Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2008). Is emotion a form of perception? In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse (2008). Précis of Gut reactions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.   (Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.   (Google)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review 1:214-222.   (Google)
Sneddon, Andrew (2008). Two views of emotional perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion..

5.1f.1.3 Cognitive Theories of Emotions

Adamos, Maria Magoula (2002). How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Addis, Laird (1995). The ontology of emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):261-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bedford, E. (1957). Emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:281-304.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1990). Describing the emotions: A review of the cognitive structure of emotions by Ortony, clore & Collins. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):305 – 317.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper critically examines Ortony, Clore & Collins's book The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. The book is found to present a very valuable, comprehensive and systematic account of emotions. Despite its obvious value the book has various flaws; these are discussed and an alternative is suggested
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2004). Emotions are not mere judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450-457.   (Google | More links)
Bernstein, H. R. (1981). Emotion, thought, and therapy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1).   (Google)
Bolender, John (2003). The genealogy of the moral modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources
Brennan, Jason (2008). What if Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions? In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional cognitivists, such as the Stoics and Aristotle, hold that emotions have cognitive content, whereas noncognitivists, like Plato and Kant, believe the emotions to be nonrational bodily movements. I ask, taking Martha Nussbaum's account of cognitivism, what if Kant had become convinced of a cognitive theory of the emotions, what changes would this require in his moral philosophy. Surprisingly, since this represents a radical shift in his psychology, it changes almost nothing. I show that Kant's account of continence, virtue, the evaluation of inclinations, and his argument for morality taking the form of categorical imperatives, are immune to such a change, despite the prima facie deep connection (on the received view) between these and his moral psychology.
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Cavell, Marcia (2003). Review: A tear is an intellectual thing: The meanings of emotion. Mind 112 (446).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Debes, Remy (2009). Neither here nor there: The cognitive nature of emotion. Philosophical Studies 146 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that this new account, despite tacit acceptance by all major theories of emotion, in fact rules out some of the most fundamental and controversial claims of one side of the nature-of-emotion debate, emotional cognitivism
Deigh, John (1994). Cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronnie (2007). Review of Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).   (Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Gordon, Robert M. (1973). Judgmental emotions. Analysis 34 (December):40-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1972). Emotions and belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 6:24-40.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1992). The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory. Kluwer.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Griffiths, Paul E. (1989). The degeneration of the cognitive theory of emotions. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):297-313.   (Google)
Abstract: The type of cognitive theory of emotion traditionally espoused by philosophers of mind makes two central claims. First, that the occurrence of propositional attitudes is essential to the occurrence of emotions. Second, that the identity of a particular emotional state depends upon the propositional attitudes that it involves. In this paper I try to show that there is little hope of developing a theory of emotion which makes these claims true. I examine the underlying defects of the programme, and show that several recent variants fail to repair these defects. Furthermore, even if such a theory could be developed, it would not achieve many of the things that we look to a theory of emotion for. I argue that philosophers should turn their attention to new and more promising approaches. These have been developed by various of the special sciences, while philosophy has remained enthralled by traditional, propositional attitude psychology
Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). Did Descartes have a Jamesian theory of the emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Hunt, Lester (2006). Martha Nussbaum on the emotions. Ethics 116 (3).   (Google)
Kerner, George C. (1982). Emotions are judgments of value. Topoi 1 (1-2).   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2001). Some remaining problems in cognitive theories of emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):393-410.   (Google)
Lau, Joe (ms). The nature of emotions comments on Martha Nussbaum's upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions.   (Google)
Abstract: Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering
Lazarus, Richard S. (1974). The self-regulation of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lyons, William E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1977). Emotions and feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1974). Physiological changes and emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (June):603-617.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marks, Joel (1982). A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):227-42.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Matravers, Derek (2008). True to our feelings: What our emotions are really telling us – Robert C. Solomon. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):751-753.   (Google)
Megill, Jason L. (2003). What role do the emotions play in cognition? Towards a new alternative to cognitive theories of emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio?s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras? and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing
Nash, R. A. (1989). Cognitive theories of emotion. Noûs 23 (September):481-504.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Neu, Jerome (2000). A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What is wrong with incest? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The discussion throughout is informed and motivated by the Spinozist hope that understanding our lives can help change them, can help make us more free
Neu, Jerome (1977). Emotion, Thought, and Therapy. Routledge.   (Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2004). Emotions as judgments of value and importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 494 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but as highly discriminating responses to...
Perler, Dominik (2005). Emotions and cognitions. Fourteenth-century discussions on the passions of the soul. Vivarium 43 (2):250-274.   (Google)
Abstract: Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations
Pitcher, George (1965). Emotion. Mind 74 (July):326-346.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.   (Google)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review 1:214-222.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: What is a cognitive theory of the emotions and does it neglect affectivity? In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Not Passion's Slave is a collection of Solomon's most significant essay-length publications on the nature of emotions over the past twenty-five years. He develops two essential themes throughout the volume: firstly, he presents a "cognitive" theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments; secondly, he proposes an "existentialist" perspective in which he defends the idea that we are responsible for our emotions and, in a limited sense, "choose" them. The final section presents his current philosophical position on the seeming "passivity" of the passions. Ultimately, Solomon advocates the idea that we have control over, and are essentially responsible for, the emotional and existential quality of our lives
Solomon, Robert C. (1984). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Doubleday.   (Cited by 191 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way
Sterling, Marvin C. (1979). The cognitive theory of emotions. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10:165-176.   (Google)
Stocker, Michael (2002). Some problems about affectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):151-158.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless

5.1f.1.4 Theories of Emotion, Misc

Coseru, Christian (2004). A Review Essay of Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11 (1):98-102.   (Google)
Armon-jones, Claire (1985). Prescription, explication and the social construction of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):1–22.   (Google | More links)
Auerill, James R. (1974). An analysis of psychophysiological symbolism and its influence on theories of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (2):147–190.   (Google | More links)
Ben-ze'ev, A. (2004). Emotion as a subtle mental mode. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bergeron, Vincent & Matthen, Mohan (2008). Assembling the emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
Borges, M. (2004). What can Kant teach us about emotions. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.   (Google)
Burrow, Sylvia (2005). The political structure of emotion: From dismissal to dialogue. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : How much power does emotional dismissal have over the oppressed's ability to trust outlaw emotions, or to stand for such emotions before others? I discuss Sue Campbell's view of the interpretation of emotion in light of the political significance of emotional dismissal. In response, I suggest that feminist conventions of interpretation developed within dialogical communities are best suited to providing resources for expressing, interpreting, defining, and reflecting on our emotions
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Charland, Louis C. (2008). Cognitive modularity of emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1995). Emotion as a natural kind: Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.   (Cited by 77 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers . The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework
Charland, Louis C. (2001). In defence of emotion: Critical notice of Paul E. Griffiths's what emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.   (Google)
Charland, Louis (ms). The heat of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is pro- posed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is..
Charland, Louis C. (2002). The natural kind status of emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct natural class of organisms whose behavior and development are governed by emotion. These are emoters. Two arguments for the natural kind status of emotion are considered. Both converge on the existence of emotion as a distinct natural domain governed by its own laws and regularities. There are then some reasons for being optimistic about the prospects for consilience in emotion theory. 1 The mantra 2 Griffiths on emotions as natural kinds 3 Panksepp on emotions as natural kinds 4 Emotion as a neurobiological kind 5 Emotion as a psychological kind 6 Response to the mantra 7 Unification or fragmentation? 8 Concluding remarks
Davidson, Richard J. & van Reekum, C. (2005). Emotion is not one thing. Psychological Inquiry 16:16-18.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Dewey, John, Theory of emotions, the: Emotional attitudes.   (Google)
Dixon, Thomas (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon argues that this domination by one single descriptive category is not healthy. Overinclusivity of 'the emotions' hampers attempts to argue with any subtlety about the enormous range of mental states and stances of which humans are capable. This book is an important contribution to the debate about emotion and rationality which has preoccupied western thinkers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has implications for contemporary debates
Cochrane, Tom (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions are: (1) attracted—repulsed, (2) powerful—weak, (3) free—constrained, (4) certain—uncertain, (5) generalized—focused, (6) future directed—past directed, (7) enduring—sudden, (8) socially connected—disconnected.
Fell, Joseph P. (1965). Emotion in the Thought of Sartre. New York, Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2002). Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics. Duckworth.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (2000). Emotion theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):199-200.   (Google)
Abstract: The book contains a masterly review of Rolls's single-neuron research reflecting rewards. It places that research in the context of the neo-behaviorist theory of emotions. That theory provides a useful first approximation to emotion-eliciting conditions but has little to tell about emotions as motivational states or response dispositions: nor does it give a rationale for what are considered to be primary rewarding stimuli
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2005). Imagination and the distorting power of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):127-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_ _on the dramatic irony involved in imagining these typical cases, where one_ _knows outside the scope of the imagining what one does not know as part of the_ _content of what one imagines: namely, that the imagined emotion is distorting_ _one’s reasoning. Moreover, imagining from an external perspective allows one_ _to evaluate the imagined events in a way that imagining from the inside does not._
Menant, Christophe (ms). Performances of self-awareness used to explain the evolutionary advantages of consciousness (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions
Sloman, Aaron (ms). What are emotion theories about?   (Google)
Abstract: findings from affective neuroscience research. I shall focus mainly on (a), but in a manner which, I hope is..
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Wertheimer, Roger (1991). Review of Robert Brown, Analyzing Love. Philosophy & Phenomonological Research 51 (1):244-45.   (Google)