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5.1f.1.3. Cognitive Theories of Emotions (Cognitive Theories of Emotions on PhilPapers)

Adamos, Maria Magoula (2002). How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Addis, Laird (1995). The ontology of emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):261-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bedford, E. (1957). Emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:281-304.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1990). Describing the emotions: A review of the cognitive structure of emotions by Ortony, clore & Collins. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):305 – 317.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper critically examines Ortony, Clore & Collins's book The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. The book is found to present a very valuable, comprehensive and systematic account of emotions. Despite its obvious value the book has various flaws; these are discussed and an alternative is suggested
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2004). Emotions are not mere judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450-457.   (Google | More links)
Bernstein, H. R. (1981). Emotion, thought, and therapy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1).   (Google)
Bolender, John (2003). The genealogy of the moral modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources
Brennan, Jason (2008). What if Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions? In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional cognitivists, such as the Stoics and Aristotle, hold that emotions have cognitive content, whereas noncognitivists, like Plato and Kant, believe the emotions to be nonrational bodily movements. I ask, taking Martha Nussbaum's account of cognitivism, what if Kant had become convinced of a cognitive theory of the emotions, what changes would this require in his moral philosophy. Surprisingly, since this represents a radical shift in his psychology, it changes almost nothing. I show that Kant's account of continence, virtue, the evaluation of inclinations, and his argument for morality taking the form of categorical imperatives, are immune to such a change, despite the prima facie deep connection (on the received view) between these and his moral psychology.
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Cavell, Marcia (2003). Review: A tear is an intellectual thing: The meanings of emotion. Mind 112 (446).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Debes, Remy (2009). Neither here nor there: The cognitive nature of emotion. Philosophical Studies 146 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that this new account, despite tacit acceptance by all major theories of emotion, in fact rules out some of the most fundamental and controversial claims of one side of the nature-of-emotion debate, emotional cognitivism
Deigh, John (1994). Cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronnie (2007). Review of Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).   (Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Gordon, Robert M. (1973). Judgmental emotions. Analysis 34 (December):40-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1972). Emotions and belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 6:24-40.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Green, O. Harvey (1992). The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory. Kluwer.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Griffiths, Paul E. (1989). The degeneration of the cognitive theory of emotions. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):297-313.   (Google)
Abstract: The type of cognitive theory of emotion traditionally espoused by philosophers of mind makes two central claims. First, that the occurrence of propositional attitudes is essential to the occurrence of emotions. Second, that the identity of a particular emotional state depends upon the propositional attitudes that it involves. In this paper I try to show that there is little hope of developing a theory of emotion which makes these claims true. I examine the underlying defects of the programme, and show that several recent variants fail to repair these defects. Furthermore, even if such a theory could be developed, it would not achieve many of the things that we look to a theory of emotion for. I argue that philosophers should turn their attention to new and more promising approaches. These have been developed by various of the special sciences, while philosophy has remained enthralled by traditional, propositional attitude psychology
Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). Did Descartes have a Jamesian theory of the emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Hunt, Lester (2006). Martha Nussbaum on the emotions. Ethics 116 (3).   (Google)
Kerner, George C. (1982). Emotions are judgments of value. Topoi 1 (1-2).   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2001). Some remaining problems in cognitive theories of emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):393-410.   (Google)
Lau, Joe (ms). The nature of emotions comments on Martha Nussbaum's upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions.   (Google)
Abstract: Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering
Lazarus, Richard S. (1974). The self-regulation of emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lyons, William E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1977). Emotions and feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1974). Physiological changes and emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (June):603-617.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marks, Joel (1982). A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):227-42.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Matravers, Derek (2008). True to our feelings: What our emotions are really telling us – Robert C. Solomon. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):751-753.   (Google)
Megill, Jason L. (2003). What role do the emotions play in cognition? Towards a new alternative to cognitive theories of emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio?s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras? and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing
Nash, R. A. (1989). Cognitive theories of emotion. Noûs 23 (September):481-504.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Neu, Jerome (2000). A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What is wrong with incest? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The discussion throughout is informed and motivated by the Spinozist hope that understanding our lives can help change them, can help make us more free
Neu, Jerome (1977). Emotion, Thought, and Therapy. Routledge.   (Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2004). Emotions as judgments of value and importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 494 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but as highly discriminating responses to...
Perler, Dominik (2005). Emotions and cognitions. Fourteenth-century discussions on the passions of the soul. Vivarium 43 (2):250-274.   (Google)
Abstract: Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations
Pitcher, George (1965). Emotion. Mind 74 (July):326-346.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: Naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.   (Google)
Reisenzein, Rainer (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review 1:214-222.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: What is a cognitive theory of the emotions and does it neglect affectivity? In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Not Passion's Slave is a collection of Solomon's most significant essay-length publications on the nature of emotions over the past twenty-five years. He develops two essential themes throughout the volume: firstly, he presents a "cognitive" theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments; secondly, he proposes an "existentialist" perspective in which he defends the idea that we are responsible for our emotions and, in a limited sense, "choose" them. The final section presents his current philosophical position on the seeming "passivity" of the passions. Ultimately, Solomon advocates the idea that we have control over, and are essentially responsible for, the emotional and existential quality of our lives
Solomon, Robert C. (1984). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Doubleday.   (Cited by 191 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way
Sterling, Marvin C. (1979). The cognitive theory of emotions. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10:165-176.   (Google)
Stocker, Michael (2002). Some problems about affectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):151-158.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless