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5.1f.1.4. Theories of Emotion, Misc (Theories of Emotion, Misc on PhilPapers)

Coseru, Christian (2004). A Review Essay of Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11 (1):98-102.   (Google)
Armon-jones, Claire (1985). Prescription, explication and the social construction of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):1–22.   (Google | More links)
Auerill, James R. (1974). An analysis of psychophysiological symbolism and its influence on theories of emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (2):147–190.   (Google | More links)
Ben-ze'ev, A. (2004). Emotion as a subtle mental mode. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bergeron, Vincent & Matthen, Mohan (2008). Assembling the emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
Borges, M. (2004). What can Kant teach us about emotions. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.   (Google)
Burrow, Sylvia (2005). The political structure of emotion: From dismissal to dialogue. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : How much power does emotional dismissal have over the oppressed's ability to trust outlaw emotions, or to stand for such emotions before others? I discuss Sue Campbell's view of the interpretation of emotion in light of the political significance of emotional dismissal. In response, I suggest that feminist conventions of interpretation developed within dialogical communities are best suited to providing resources for expressing, interpreting, defining, and reflecting on our emotions
Calhoun, Cheshire & Solomon, Robert C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers
Charland, Louis C. (2008). Cognitive modularity of emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1995). Emotion as a natural kind: Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.   (Cited by 77 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers . The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework
Charland, Louis C. (2001). In defence of emotion: Critical notice of Paul E. Griffiths's what emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.   (Google)
Charland, Louis (ms). The heat of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is pro- posed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is..
Charland, Louis C. (2002). The natural kind status of emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct natural class of organisms whose behavior and development are governed by emotion. These are emoters. Two arguments for the natural kind status of emotion are considered. Both converge on the existence of emotion as a distinct natural domain governed by its own laws and regularities. There are then some reasons for being optimistic about the prospects for consilience in emotion theory. 1 The mantra 2 Griffiths on emotions as natural kinds 3 Panksepp on emotions as natural kinds 4 Emotion as a neurobiological kind 5 Emotion as a psychological kind 6 Response to the mantra 7 Unification or fragmentation? 8 Concluding remarks
Davidson, Richard J. & van Reekum, C. (2005). Emotion is not one thing. Psychological Inquiry 16:16-18.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Dewey, John, Theory of emotions, the: Emotional attitudes.   (Google)
Dixon, Thomas (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon argues that this domination by one single descriptive category is not healthy. Overinclusivity of 'the emotions' hampers attempts to argue with any subtlety about the enormous range of mental states and stances of which humans are capable. This book is an important contribution to the debate about emotion and rationality which has preoccupied western thinkers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has implications for contemporary debates
Cochrane, Tom (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions are: (1) attracted—repulsed, (2) powerful—weak, (3) free—constrained, (4) certain—uncertain, (5) generalized—focused, (6) future directed—past directed, (7) enduring—sudden, (8) socially connected—disconnected.
Fell, Joseph P. (1965). Emotion in the Thought of Sartre. New York, Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2002). Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics. Duckworth.   (Google)
Frijda, Nico H. (2000). Emotion theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):199-200.   (Google)
Abstract: The book contains a masterly review of Rolls's single-neuron research reflecting rewards. It places that research in the context of the neo-behaviorist theory of emotions. That theory provides a useful first approximation to emotion-eliciting conditions but has little to tell about emotions as motivational states or response dispositions: nor does it give a rationale for what are considered to be primary rewarding stimuli
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2005). Imagination and the distorting power of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):127-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_ _on the dramatic irony involved in imagining these typical cases, where one_ _knows outside the scope of the imagining what one does not know as part of the_ _content of what one imagines: namely, that the imagined emotion is distorting_ _one’s reasoning. Moreover, imagining from an external perspective allows one_ _to evaluate the imagined events in a way that imagining from the inside does not._
Menant, Christophe (ms). Performances of self-awareness used to explain the evolutionary advantages of consciousness (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions
Sloman, Aaron (ms). What are emotion theories about?   (Google)
Abstract: findings from affective neuroscience research. I shall focus mainly on (a), but in a manner which, I hope is..
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Wertheimer, Roger (1991). Review of Robert Brown, Analyzing Love. Philosophy & Phenomonological Research 51 (1):244-45.   (Google)