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5.1f.2.4. Emotions and Feelings (Emotions and Feelings on PhilPapers)

Aune, Bruce (1963). Feelings, moods, and introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Emotions or emotional feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23:192-194.   (Google)
Abstract: It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only bats, but also a great portion of the animal kingdom, perhaps all animal species except humans, turn out to lack phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, even human babies, and perhaps infants before the early stages of acquiring their first language, are likely to lack such consciousness, if one considers the level of conceptual sophistication required by the HOLT hypothesis. In order to have a higher-order thought, one needs to have the concept of a
Barrett, Lisa; Mesquita, Batja; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, ­James J. (ms). The experience of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract:      Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological terms, how the experience of emotion emerges from more basic processes. We then discuss the role of such experiences in the economy of the mind and behavior
Ben-Ze?ev, A. (2002). Emotions are not feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Emotions are not feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Browning, Douglas (1965). The philosophy of mind, part I: The privacy of feelings. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.   (Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.   (Cited by 2364 | Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Falk, Barrie (1996). Feeling and cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gean, William D. (1979). Emotion, emotional feeling and passive body change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.   (Google | More links)
Goldstein, Irwin (2002). Are emotions feelings? A further look at hedonic theories of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings
Goldie, Peter (2006). Emotional experience and understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Green, Mitchell S. (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, the philosophy of language, social psychology, pragmatics, aesthetics, and neuroscience to present a stimulating and accessible interdisciplinary work
Gunther, York H. (2004). The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). Did Descartes have a Jamesian theory of the emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Emotional feelings and intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). Emotions as evaluative feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and so coming to see emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Unprincipled engagement: Emotional experience, expression and response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
James, William (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.   (Cited by 744 | Google | More links)
Kamler, Howard F. (1973). Emotional feelings. Philosophia 3 (October):381-411.   (Google | More links)
Kieran, Matthew (1998). Valuing emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth hegeman. Cambridge university press, 1996, pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 hb, £15.95 pb. Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.   (Google)
Koch, Philip J. (1987). Bodily feeling in emotion. Dialogue 26:59-75.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
LeDoux, Joseph (2008). Emotional coloration of consciousness: How feelings come about. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Leighton, Stephen R. (1984). Feelings and emotion. Review of Metaphysics 38 (December):303-320.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lyons, William E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1977). Emotions and feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.   (Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. & Ridley, Aaron (1997). Emotion and feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey (1997). Emotion and feeling: Geoffrey Madell. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):147–162.   (Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (1989). Akratic feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):277-288.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Elsewhere, I have argued for the possibility of strict or full-blown akratic action - roughly, free (or uncompelled), intentional action against the agent's better judgment.' My aim in the present paper is to defend and account for the possibility of an analogous variety of akratic feeling.
Myin, Erik & De Nul, Lars (2006). Feelings and objects. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Northoff, Georg (2008). Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james–lange theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Emotion and feeling. Philosophical Review 75 (April):139-160.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). Are emotions feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.   (Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse (2004). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all. Perhaps James and Lange offer a theory that is not merely incomplete, but entirely off base. Where they view judgments as contingent and non-constitutive concomitants of emotions, it is actually bodily perceptions that deserve this demotion. Perhaps emotions can be, and often are, disembodied in some fundamental sense
Prinz, Jesse J. (2003). Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2005). The feeling of being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ridley, Aaron (1997). Emotion and feeling: Aaron Ridley. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):163–176.   (Google | More links)
Schroeder, Timothy (2008). Unexpected pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive tract, feels an impressive number of the sensations felt by someone who is gut-wrenchingly sad. Yet, unless she feels bad, the way she feels is only a pale echo of the feeling of sadness. If she feels good in spite of the burrito and the wind, then she does not feel at all the way she would if she were sad. Likewise, a man falling asleep can hardly fail to feel his muscles relax, his heart rate fall, and so on, but unless he feels good his state is only a shadow of feeling content. This paper will begin with a sketch of the nature of pleasure and displeasure, and the relation between them and the feelings that are characteristic of emotions. It will then argue that the capacity to feel pleased and displeased is, quite literally, a sense modality: one allowing us to perceive net change in the satisfaction of our intrinsic desires. As with any sense modality, the capacity to feel pleased and displeased displays substantial modularity. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the modularity of pleasure and displeasure contributes to effects that might reasonably be called “the modularity of the emotions.”
Sizer, Laura (2006). What feelings can't do. Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data
Slaby, Jan (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind
Solomon, Robert C. (1986). Emotions, feelings, and contexts. Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):653-654.   (Google | More links)
Stanley, Hiram M. (1886). Feeling and emotion. Mind 11 (41):66-76.   (Google | More links)
Stocker, Michael (1983). Psychic feelings: Their importance and irreducibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (March):5-26.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Stocker, Michael (2002). Some problems about affectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):151-158.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless
Whiting, Demian (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited
Whiting, Demian (forthcoming). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something . To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions