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5.1f.3. Aspects of Emotion (Aspects of Emotion on PhilPapers)

Benson, John (1967). Emotion and expression. Philosophical Review 76 (3):335-357.   (Google | More links)

5.1f.3.1 Knowledge of Emotion

Ayton, Peter; Pott, Alice & Elwakili, Najat (2007). Affective forecasting: Why can't people predict their emotions? Thinking and Reasoning 13 (1):62 – 80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers overestimated the duration of their disappointment. Greater previous experience of this emotional event did not lead to any greater accuracy of the forecasts, suggesting that learning about one's own emotions is difficult. Failers' self-assessed chances of passing were lower a week after the test than immediately prior to the test; this difference correlated with the magnitude of individual immediate disappointments, suggesting the presence of a cognitive strategy for recovering from disappointments. A second study investigated the theory that undue focus on the differences between present and future biases affective forecasts. “Defocusing” that induced low-level construals of the future reduced the extremeness of affective forecasts but a higher-level construal did not. We conclude that a focusing effect may bias affective forecasts
Baier, Annette C. (1987). Getting in touch with our own feelings. Topoi 6 (September):89-97.   (Google | More links)
Debes, Remy (2010). Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion. Synthese 175 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy
Ellis, Ralph D. (1999). Why isn't consciousness empirically observable? Emotion, self-organization, and nonreductive physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.   (Google)
Fox, Michael (1973). On unconscious emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (December):151-170.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldie, Peter (1999). How we think of others' emotions. Mind and Language 14 (4):394-423.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell (2010). Perceiving emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights
Green, Mitchell S. (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I reply to the main criticisms and suggestions for further clarification made by the contributors to this symposium on my book, Self-Expression . These replies are organized into the following sections: (1) What's in the name?, (2) Showing, expressing and indicating, (3) Expressing and signaling, (4) Perceiving emotions, (5) Voluntary/involuntary, (6) Expression and handicaps, (7) Expression and aesthetics, and (8) Looking ahead
Herzberg, Larry A. (2008). Constitutivism, belief, and emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.   (Google)
Abstract: Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M , then S has M . Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, arguing that although the principle applies when M is a belief, it does not apply when M is an emotion. I account for this asymmetry by focusing on differences in the commitments that belief and emotion conceptually involve, and briefly sketch out a psychological explanation of those differences. I conclude that one can reasonably split one's epistemological loyalties between constitutivism regarding meta-beliefs and non-constitutivism regarding beliefs about one's emotions
Lacewing, Michael (2007). Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings? Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments that can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed
Lacewing, Michael (2005). Emotional self-awareness and ethical deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Self-deception, self-pretence, and emotional detachment. Mind 88 (July):441-446.   (Google | More links)
Mullane, Harvey (1976). Unconscious and disguised emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):403-411.   (Google)
Mullane, Harvey (1965). Unconscious emotion. Theoria 31:181-190.   (Google)
Myers, Gerald E. (1963). Feelings into words. Journal of Philosophy 60 (December):801-810.   (Google | More links)
Neisser, Joe (2006). Making the case for unconscious feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.   (Google)
Parr, Lisa A. (2001). Understanding other's emotions: From affective resonance to empathic action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):44-45.   (Google)
Abstract: Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic
Perkins, Moreland (1966). Seeing and hearing emotions. Analysis 26 (June):193-197.   (Google)
Pessoa, Luiz; Japee, Shruti & Ungerleider, Leslie G. (2005). Visual awareness and the detection of fearful faces. Emotion 5 (2):243-247.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Pickard, Hanna (2003). Emotions and the problem of other minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1995). Feeling one's emotions and knowing oneself. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):319-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sahdra, Baljinder & Thagard, Paul R. (2003). Self-deception and emotional coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self
Salmela, Mikko (2005). What is emotional authenticity? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2002). Emotional introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Smith, Stephen D. & Bulman-Fleming, M. Barbara (2004). A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion. Brain and Cognition 55 (3):452-457.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sneddon, Andrew (2008). Two views of emotional perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)

5.1f.3.2 Emotional Expression

Barwell, Ismay (1986). How does art express emotion? Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 45 (2):175-181.   (Google | More links)
Betzler, Monika (2007). Making sense of actions expressing emotions. Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (2002). Emotion and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating or the secretion of adrenalin, and reasoned actions done ‘out of an emotion’, such as breathing deeply to clam down, or writing a letter of complaint, for which a standard rationalizing explanation can be given.1 I pursue the relation between this experience and expression in a somewhat roundabout manner. First, I note an analogy between a problem of other minds, and Berkeley’s (1975) challenge to Locke’s (1975) realism. Second, I sketch what I regard as the correct strategy for meeting this challenge. Third, I develop and defend a parallel response to the problem of other minds, as this applies to certain basic directed emotions. This yields the following answer to my opening question. Reference to the appropriate expressive behaviour is essential to the identification of the way in which various emotional experiences present their worldly objects
Eastwood, John D. (online). From unconscious to conscious perception: Emotionally expressive faces and visual awareness.   (Google)
Goldie, Peter (2000). Explaining expressions of emotion. Mind 109 (433):25-38.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The question is how to explain expressions of emotion. It is argued that not all expressions of emotion are open to the same sort of explanation. Those expressions which are actions can be explained, like other sorts of action, by reference to a belief and a desire; however, no genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end. Certain expressions of emotion which are actions can also be given a deeper explanation as being expressive of a wish. Expressions of emotion which are not actions cannot be given a belief-desire explanation: no belief is involved, and a desire is involved only in an honorific sense of 'desire'. The distinction amongst expressions of emotion between those which are actions and those which are not is not a precise one, and the paper concludes with some speculative remarks about borderline cases such as jumping for joy
Hansen, Forest (1972). The adequacy of verbal articulation of emotions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (2):249-253.   (Google | More links)
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Unprincipled engagement: Emotional experience, expression and response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Ivet, P. (2002). Emotions, revision, and the explanation of emotional action. European Review of Philosophy 5.   (Google)
Koch, Philip J. (1983). Expressing emotion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (April):176-189.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pierce, A. H. (1906). Emotional expression and the doctrine of mutations. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (21):573-575.   (Google | More links)
Shapiro, Debbie (2006). Your Body Speaks Your Mind: Decoding the Emotional, Psychological, and Spiritual Messages That Underlie Illness. Sounds True.   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Thalberg, Irving (1962). Natural expressions of emotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (March):387-392.   (Google | More links)

5.1f.3.3 Aspects of Emotion, Misc

5.1f.3.4 Emotion and Reason

Angelette, Will (ms). Rationality, emotion, and belief revision: Waller's move beyond CBT & REBT.   (Google)
Abstract:      Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views
Badcock, C. (2004). Emotion verses reason as a genetic conflict. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Betzler, Monika (2007). Making sense of actions expressing emotions. Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.   (Google | More links)
Birtchnell, John (2003). The Two of Me: The Rational Outer Me and the Emotional Inner Me. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book attempts to answer the question: How much of what we do is the result of conscious and deliberate decisions and how much originates in unconscious, unthought out, automatic directives? The answer is that far more than what we might imagine falls into the second category. We tend to assume responsibility for our unconsciously determined thoughts and actions, and even though we do not know why we think and act the way we do, we make up reasons for it, which we truly believe. Each one of us is really two people in the same body, who in many respects, function quite independently of each other, and yet somehow manage to get along with things, while the other, the outer brain, serves as the spokesperson for both of them. The inner brain is the source of our objectives and generates the emotions that keep us on track in our attainment of them. This book explores the strange relationship between these two parts of us across a spectrum of mental processes including, memory, language, problem-solving, dreams, delusions and hallucinations, and more complex pursuits sucs as the arts, humor and religion
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected
Brady, Michael S. (2008). Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4).   (Google)
Cairns, Dorion (2000). Reason and emotion. Husserl Studies 17 (1).   (Google)
D'arms, Justin (2004). Bennett Helm, emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001), pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (1979). The rationality of emotions. Dialogue.   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1994). Rationality, emotions, and social norms. Synthese 98 (1).   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1996). Rationality and the emotions. Economic Journal 106:1386-97.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an earlier paper (Elster, 1989 a), I discussed the relation between rationality and social norms. Although I did mention the role of the emotions in sustaining social norms, I did not focus explicitly on the relation between rationality and the emotions. That relation is the main topic of the present paper, with social norms in a subsidiary part
Evans, D. (2002). The search hypothesis of emotions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):497-509.   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ?the search hypothesis of emotion?. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are. 1 Introduction 2 The search hypothesis of emotion 3 A red herring: the frame problem 4 The search problem 5 Two readings of the search hypothesis 6 Two final remarks 7 Conclusion
Farell, Daniel (2004). Rationality and the emotions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):241-251.   (Google)
Fernandez-Berrocal, Pablo & Extremera, Natalio (2005). About emotional intelligence and moral decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
Fine, Cordelia (2006). Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the 'automatization' of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Fisher, Mark (1977). Reason, emotion, and love. Inquiry 20 (1-4):189 – 203.   (Google)
Abstract: Wittgenstein's private language argument is interpreted as an example of a kind of transcendental argument which, if valid, explains why a certain concept must possess certain features. Cognition and affect are shown to require each other by an application of Bennett's account of what beings capable of true cognition must be capable of, and the necessity of certain emotions to the existence of any rules in a community is argued in similar fashion. Hume's account of love and admiration being rejected, an account of love, intended to explain some of love's familiar features, is defended, and various proposed additions to the analysis are rejected. The idea of love is linked to those of value, agency, and the transcendental self by argument showing that each of these ideas requires all of the others. Finally, the idea of love is linked by a direct argument to that of the transcendental self
Frank, Robert H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. Norton.   (Cited by 1574 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Emotions, rationality, and mind-body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Practical reasoning and emotion. In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). The import of human action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action. Automatic Press/Vip.   (Google)
Abstract: My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account of the relation between the mind and the body. Here I have in mind not the thought that we must provide a compatibilist account of free will (though I do think that is true) but rather the thought that it is all to easy for philosophers of action to make what turn out to be false presuppositions about the nature of psychological capacities like belief and desire and the role they play in motivation. Conversely, I think, philosophers of mind, focused too narrowly on worries about intentionality and consciousness, have offered accounts of various psychological capacities that are inadequate to understanding the sort of agency characteristic of us persons. Before I begin, I need to acknowledge my general orientation in philosophy of mind. Mental states and capacities are to be understood in terms of their place within an explanatory framework. Psychological explanation, however, I take to be fundamentally normative, a matter of locating particular phenomena within a broader pattern of rationality. This is a broadly Davidsonian or Dennettian orientation to the mind, according to which, as Davidson says, rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental.1 In..
Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002). Review: Emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation and the nature of value. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Janaway, Christopher (2005). Nietzsche on reason and emotion. .   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2004). Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality. In Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Korpalo, Olga (1999). Rationality and emotions (the perspectives of logical-cognitive analysis). Theoria 14 (34):109-127.   (Google)
Macmurray, John (1962). Reason and Emotion. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mameli, Matteo (2004). The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McCullagh, C. B. (1990). The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):44-58.   (Google | More links)
Muzio, Isabella (2001). Emotions and rationality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):135-145.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun, Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Parsons, Howard L. (1958). Reason and affect: Some of their relations and functions. Journal of Philosophy 55 (March):221-229.   (Google | More links)
Parkinson, B. (2004). Unpicking reasonable emotions. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1978). Explaining emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Ross, Steven L. (1984). Evaluating the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):309-326.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2006). True emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion..
Verbeek, Bruno (2001). Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions, Jon Elster. Cambridge university press, 1999, IX + 416 pages. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):121-145.   (Google)

5.1f.3.5 Objects and Contents of Emotions

Adam, C.; Herzig, A. & Longin, D. (2009). A logical formalization of the occ theory of emotions. Synthese 168 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’ mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory
Alanen, Lilli K. (2003). What are emotions about? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):311-354.   (Google | More links)
Aquila, Richard E. (1975). Causes and constituents of occurrent emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):346-349.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Aquila, Richard E. (1974). Emotions, objects, and causal relations. Philosophical Studies 26 (November):279-285.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette C. (1990). What emotions are about. Philosophical Perspectives 4:1-29.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Barrett, Lisa; Mesquita, Batja; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, ­James J. (ms). The experience of emotion.   (Google)
Abstract:      Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological terms, how the experience of emotion emerges from more basic processes. We then discuss the role of such experiences in the economy of the mind and behavior
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Intentionality and feelings in theories of emotions: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):263-271.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2000). 'I only have eyes for you': The partiality of positive emotions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (3):341–351.   (Google | More links)
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected
Brown, Robert (1987). Analyzing Love. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgments and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as anger and fear, and, more generally, deciding where love stands in the contrast between emotions and attitudes. Finally, the book examines how we justify our loves: can we have, and do we need, reasons for loving? What types of judgment are appropriate to love? Can we criticize a lover for his or her choices?
Charland, Louis C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about intrinsic value made by Brentano and his students, and discusses their relevance to theodicy and the problem of evil. Brentano, as the teacher of Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, and others, stands at the origin of the phenomenological tradition and of the Polish school of philosophy that developed after World War I. He has also had considerable influence on Anglo-American philosophy. This book will interest those concerned with the origins of phenomenological value theory and more generally with the connections between ethics and philosophical psychology
Choi, Jinhee (2003). All the right responses: Fiction films and warranted emotions. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive theories of emotions have provided us with explanations of how we emotionally engage with fiction, when we are aware that what is depicted is fictional. However, these theories left an important question unanswered: namely, what kinds of emotional responses to fiction are warranted responses. The main focus of this paper is how our emotional responses to fiction can be aesthetically warranted—that is, how emotions directed to fiction can be warranted given the fact that its object is an artwork. I consider three possible explanations of this phenomenon: the real-life principle, a correspondence model, and a functional model. I argue that the real-life principle and the correspondence model fall short of explaining how our emotional responses to film are aesthetically warranted, and instead I argue that a functional model provides such an explanation. In this paper, I will primarily focus on fiction films, although I will address novels and other art forms where necessary
Cohon, Rachel & Owen, David, Hume on representation, reason and motivation.   (Google)
Abstract: A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (T 415)
Crane, Tim (2006). Intentionality and emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Crane, Tim, Intentionality and emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto section 4). is seems to me to be a good starting point for any account of the ascription and epistemology of emotions, an excellent description of data that any theory of the emotions has to take into account. What I find puzzling is that Hutto seems to believe that this view is in opposition to certain widely accepted ...
Cunningham, Suzanne (1997). Two faces of intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.   (Google | More links)
Dalgleish, Tim (1997). An anti-anti-essentialist view of the emotions: A reply to Kupperman. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):85-90.   (Google)
Abstract: Kupperman (1995) advances an anti-essentialist view of emotions in which he suggests that there can be emotion without feeling or affect, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is about that object in some way. In this reply to Kupperman's essay, I suggest a number of problems with his rejection of the essentialist position. I argue that in his discussion of feelings Kupperman is crucially not clear about the distinction between the ascription of emotions by others versus the experience of emotions by an individual. Furthermore, I also question his analysis of the role of linguistic empiricism in philosophy and psychology. With respect to Kupperman's analysis of intentionality, I argue that he confuses the ability to readily identify intentional objects with the issue of their actual existence. Finally, I suggest that Kupperman confuses the concepts of action and motivation in his discussion of motivation
Debus, Dorothea (2007). Being emotional about the past: On the nature and role of past-directed emotions. Noûs 41 (4):758-779.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Deigh, John (1994). Cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Deigh, John (2008). Emotions, Values, and the Law. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions, Values, and the Law brings together ten of John Deigh's essays written over the past fifteen years. In the first five essays, Deigh ask questions about the nature of emotions and the relation of evaluative judgment to the intentionality of emotions, and critically examines the cognitivist theories of emotion that have dominated philosophy and psychology over the past thirty years. A central criticism of these theories is that they do not satisfactorily account for the emotions of babies or animals other than human beings. Drawing on this criticism, Deigh develops an alternative theory of the intentionality of emotions on which the education of emotions explains how human emotions, which innately contain no evaluative thought, come to have evaluative judgments as their principal cognitive component. The second group of five essays challenge the idea of the voluntary as essential to understanding moral responsibility, moral commitment, political obligation, and other moral and political phenomena that have traditionally been thought to depend on people's will. Each of these studies focuses on a different aspect of our common moral and political life and shows, contrary to conventional opinion, that it does not depend on voluntary action or the exercise of a will constituted solely by rational thought. Together, the essays in this collection represent an effort to shift our understanding of the phenomena traditionally studied in moral and political philosophy from that of their being products of reason and will, operating independently of feeling and sentiment to that of their being manifestations of the work of emotion
DeLancey, Craig (2000). Affect programs, intentionality, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):197-198.   (Google)
Abstract: I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emotions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions. I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident
Delancey, Craig Stephen (2006). Basic moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods
Deonna, Julien A. & Scherer, Klaus R. (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
Deonna, Julien A. (2007). The structure of empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call the parallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises. Key Words: empathy • emotion • philosophy • psychology • simulation
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald (2002). Emotional truth: Ronald de sousa. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247–263.   (Google | More links)
Dipert, Randall R. (ms). The nature and structure of emotions.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have almost always said something about emotions and passions whenever they have discussed human mental life. Many have asserted that it is some emotions or, more broadly, passions, that are to be primarily valued and sought. These valued passionate states of mind might include emotions, moods, desires, belief-like feelings of conviction and commitment, and romantic or erotic love, which are typically scarcely distinguished. Not only are these states of mind lumped together, but the reasons why they are valued may likewise be various: they may be valued because of their intrinsic feeling (especially insofar as they are intense), through their long-term or deep effects on the rest of our practical and mental lives, through their effects on others’ lives, or even in the glimpse they give us of an object that transcends our mundane and superficial concerns, as in love, peak experiences, or intimations of God, Beauty, or Nature. Others have claimed that it is in the subduing or elimination of some or all of these passions that the ideal human life consists. Again, what precisely are the objectionable passions is typically not delineated, and why such mental states are objectionable may be diverse and even unspecified. One might resent their "disruptive" nature on our mental life, especially insofar as some of them stem from external, uncontrollable sources, and instead seek a calm state that is within one’s control and not subject to these whimsical externalities. Or one can see many or all passions as disruptive of control and success in our inner or outer life, or in the lives of others. We might call this latter group the anti-emotional Rationalists, and the former group the pro-emotional Romantics
Donnellan, Keith S. (1970). Causes, objects, and producers of the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 67 (November):947-950.   (Google | More links)
Döring, Sabine A. (2003). Explaining action by emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John J. (2004). 'Cognitive impenetrability' and the complex intentionality of the emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):109-126.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). Curious Emotions: Roots of Consciousness and Personality in Motivated Action. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Emotion drives all cognitive processes, largely determining their qualitative feel, their structure, and in part even their content.
Fish, William (2005). Emotions, moods, and intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.   (Google)
Abstract: Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s poor performance in the World Cup, or angry with her errant child. Although the ways we find natural to talk in such situations can alter (afraid of, sad about, angry with, and so on), in each case the emotion has what Ronald de Sousa, following Wittgenstein, calls a target—“an actual particular to which that emotion relates.” (de Sousa, 1987, p.116)
Goldie, Peter (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences
Gordon, Robert M. (1974). The aboutness of emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (January):11-36.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Emotions, rationality, and mind-body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts
Greenspan, Patricia (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment
Griffiths, Paul E., Appraisal and machiavellian emotion.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal are thus best conceived, not as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of the environment are what the environment ‘affords’ the organism. Some of these affordances are ‘goal-affordances’ - possibilities for future action. This perspective on emotional appraisal lends support to the idea that emotional appraisal is in part ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘strategic’. Organisms take into account the payoffs resulting from an emotional response when determining whether the eliciting situation ‘warrants’ that emotion
Griffiths, Paul E. (1990). Modularity, and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure of the adaptive responses is innate, the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt. The circuits subserving the adaptive responses are probably located in the limbic system. This theory of emotion is directly applicable only to a small sub-domain of the traditional realm of emotion. It can be used, however, to explain the grouping of various other phenomena under the heading of emotion, and to explain various characteristic failings of the pre-scientific conception of emotion
Gunther, York H. (online). A theory of emotional content.   (Google)
Abstract: The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and anthropology. In fact, it’s not uncommon for a single author to assume more than one disciplinary perspective on the features and roles of emotion
Gunther, York H. (2003). Emotion and force. In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks recognize that emotions are intentional but, by reducing them to judgments, beliefs, desires, etc., fail to capture their distinctiveness as mental causes (see Solomon 1976 and Marks 1982). In other words, their place within intentional psychology is acknowledged at the price of denying them their uniqueness
Gunther, York H. (2004). The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Hacker, Peter M. S. (2004). The conceptual framework for the investigation of the emotions. International Review of Psychiatry 16 (3):199-208.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The experimental study of the emotions as pursued by LeDoux and Damasio is argued to be flawed as a consequence of the inadequate conceptual framework inherited from the work of William James. This paper clarifes the conceptual structures necessary for any discussion of the emotions. Emotions are distinguished from appetites and other non-emotional feelings, as well as from agitations and moods. Emotional perturbations are distinguished from emotional attitudes and motives. The causes of an emotion are differentiated from the objects of an emotion, and the objects of an emotion are distinguished into formal and material ones. The links between emotions and reasons for the emotion, for associated beliefs and for action are explored, as well as the connection between emotion and care or concern, and between emotion and fantasy. The behavioural criteria for the ascription of an emotion are clarified. In the light of this conceptual network, Damasio’s theory of the emotions is subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting
Hatzimoysis, Anthony E. (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Review by Dina Mendonça, Ph.D. on Jun 12th 2005 Volume: 9, Number: 23
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). Emotions as evaluative feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and so coming to see emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation
Jäger, Christoph & Bartsch, Anne (2006). Meta-emotions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt
Johnson, Gregory (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):739 - 757.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
Järvilehto, Timo (2001). Feeling as knowing--part II: Emotion, consciousness and brain activity. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.   (Google)
Abstract: In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the advent of personal consciousness and individuality, being expressed in conscious emotions. However, the conscious emotion is not confined to the individual only, but it gets its content and the emotional quale in the social context, and in relation to the norms of the given culture. Emotion is fundamentally the process of ascription of meaning to the parts of the world which are relevant in the achievement of results of behavior. Although emotions may be studied as reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system with the help of physiological recordings and behavioral observations, it is argued — in contrast to the mainstream cognitive science — that emotions cannot be localized in the brain, although the brain is important in their generation as a part of the organism-environment system. It is suggested that the parts of the brain most closely related to emotional expression contain neurons subserving functional systems which are formed in early development, and which are therefore most intimately related to reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system
Kenny, A. J. P. (1963). Action, Emotion And Will. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Emotional content. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):213-230.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kupperman, Joel J. (1995). An anti-essentialist view of the emotions. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look like troublesome cases of emotions can be regarded as having a global intentionality or as being “mood-like”. Alternatively surges of non-intentional joy or ecstasy can be regarded as merely feelings rather than as emotions, and what people experience in response to absolute music can be treated similarly. A clear view of how we normally talk about moods, emotions, and feelings however undermines these defences; and in particular we can understand the role of emotions in relation to absolute music once we become clear about the way in which musical content stands in for intentional objects
Lamb, Roger E. (1987). Objectless emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):107-117.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lau, Joe (ms). The nature of emotions comments on Martha Nussbaum's upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions.   (Google)
Abstract: Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering
Mameli, Matteo (2006). Norms for emotions: Biological functions and representational contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Normative standards are often applied to emotions. Are there normative standards that apply to emotions in virtue solely of facts about their nature? I will argue that the answer is no. The psychological, behavioural, and neurological evidence suggests that emotions are representational brain states with various kinds of biological functions. Facts about biological functions are not (and do not by themselves entail) normative facts. Hence, there are no nor- mative standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of their having various kinds of biolog- ical functions. Moreover, the peculiar features of emotions make the view that representational content is essentially normative very implausible. Hence, the representational properties of emotions cannot be seen as entailing normative standards. The conclusion is that there are no normative standards that apply to emotions solely in virtue of their nature. Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
Matravers, Derek (2008). True to our feelings: What our emotions are really telling us – Robert C. Solomon. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):751-753.   (Google)
Montague, Michelle (2009). The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.   (Google)
Abstract: My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach
Mulligan, Kevin (1997). The spectre of inverted emotions and the space of emotions. Acta Analytica 18 (18):89-105.   (Google)
Myin, Erik & De Nul, Lars (2006). Feelings and objects. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Neu, Jerome (1977). Emotion, Thought, and Therapy. Routledge.   (Google)
Oatley, Aaron Ben-ze'ev Andkeith (1996). The intentional and social nature of human emotions: Reconsideration of the distinction between basic and non-basic emotions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (1):81–94.   (Google | More links)
Owen, David, Hume on representation, reason and motivation.   (Google)
Abstract: A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (T 415)
Pitcher, George (1965). Emotion. Mind 74 (July):326-346.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2003). Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Price, Carolyn S. (2006). Fearing fluffy: The content of an emotional appraisal. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pugmire, David (2002). Narcissism in emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2005). William James on emotion and intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James rejects a number of commonplace assumptions concerning the nature of our cognitive relationship with the world, assumptions that many of his critics take for granted
Robinson, Jenefer (2008). Do all musical emotions have the music itself as their intentional object? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):592-593.   (Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1996). Propositions and animal emotion. Philosophy 71 (275):147-56.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Roberts, Robert C. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1978). Explaining emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Rudd, Anthony (2006). Unnatural feelings: A non-naturalistic perspective on the emotions. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Salmela, Mikko (2002). Intentionality and feeling. A sketch for a two-level account of emotional affectivity. Philosophia 3 (1):56-75.   (Google)
Salmela, Mikko (2003). Intentionality and feeling in emotions: A reply to Ben-ze'ev. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):291-305.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2006). True emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shiner, Roger A. (1971). Classifying objects of acts and emotions. Dialogue 10 (December):751-767.   (Google)
Shiner, Roger A. (1975). Wilson on emotion, object, and cause. Metaphilosophy 6 (January):72-96.   (Google | More links)
Slaby, Jan (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind
Sloman, Aaron (1982). Towards a grammar of emotions. New Universities Quarterly 36 (3):230-238.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: My favourite leading question when teaching Philosophy of Mind is ‘Could a goldfish long for its mother?’ This introduces the philosophical technique of ‘conceptual analysis’, essential for the study of mind (Sloman 1978, ch. 4). By analysing what we mean by ‘A longs for B’, and similar descriptions of emotional states we see that they inv olve rich cognitive structures and processes, i.e. computations. Anything which could long for its mother, would have to hav e some sort of representation of its mother, would have to believe that she is not in the vicinity, would have to be able to represent the _possibility _of being close to her, would have to desire that possibility, and would have to be to some extent pre-occupied or obsessed with that desire. That is, it should intrude into and interfere with other activities, like admiring the scenery, catching smaller fish, etc. If the desire were there, but could be calmly put aside, whilst other interests were pursued, then it would not be truly a state of longing. It might be a state of preferring. Thus longing involves computational interrupts. The same seems to be true of all emotions
Solomon, Robert C. (2002). Emotions, cognition, affect: On Jerry Neu's A Tear is an Intellectual Thing. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):133-142.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Jerome Neu has been one of the most prominent voices in the philosophy of emotions for more than twenty years, that is, before the field was even a field. His Emotions, Thought, and Therapy (1977) was one of its most original and ground-breaking books. Neu is an uncompromising defender of what has been called the cognitive theory of emotions (as am I). But the ambiguity, controversy, and confusions own by the notion of a cognitive theory of emotion is what I would like to focus on here. In so doing I will indicate some of the way sin which my own theory has developed
Solomon, Robert C. (1977). The logic of emotion. Noûs 11 (1):41-49.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (1984). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Doubleday.   (Cited by 191 | Google)
Starkey, Charles (2008). Emotion and full understanding. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding
Teroni, Fabrice (2007). Emotions and formal objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories.
Tietz, John (1973). Emotional objects and criteria. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (December):213-224.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tye, Michael (ms). The experience of emotion: An intentionalist theory.   (Google)
Abstract: The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is not un- controversial that emotional experiences are always intentional. John Searle, for exam- ple, remarks, AMany conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation . . .@ (1983, p. 2). Moreover, many animals experience emotions and it is natural to sup- pose that such emotions lack the sophistication of beliefs or thoughts. When a dog ex- periences delight in seeing its master after an absence of several days, the suggestion that at least part of the dog=s experience of delight is a belief (or thought) that its master has returned home seems to import into the experience something that at best is associ- ated with it and perhaps is not really a state to which the dog is subject at all. And even in the case of human beings, emotional experience often does not seem to involve thought. Consider the experience of disgust, to take one obvious example.1 Nor is a sali- ent belief required. One may have a strong fear of spiders and yet not believe that spi- ders typically pose any risk to humans. But if emotional experiences need not involve beliefs or thoughts, then just how are they intentional?2..
Wertheimer, Roger (1991). Review of Robert Brown, Analyzing Love. Philosophy & Phenomonological Research 51 (1):244-45.   (Google)
Whiting, Demian (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited
Whiting, Demian (forthcoming). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something . To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions
Wilson, J. R. S. (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)