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5.1f.3.4. Emotion and Reason (Emotion and Reason on PhilPapers)

Angelette, Will (ms). Rationality, emotion, and belief revision: Waller's move beyond CBT & REBT.   (Google)
Abstract:      Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views
Badcock, C. (2004). Emotion verses reason as a genetic conflict. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Betzler, Monika (2007). Making sense of actions expressing emotions. Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.   (Google | More links)
Birtchnell, John (2003). The Two of Me: The Rational Outer Me and the Emotional Inner Me. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book attempts to answer the question: How much of what we do is the result of conscious and deliberate decisions and how much originates in unconscious, unthought out, automatic directives? The answer is that far more than what we might imagine falls into the second category. We tend to assume responsibility for our unconsciously determined thoughts and actions, and even though we do not know why we think and act the way we do, we make up reasons for it, which we truly believe. Each one of us is really two people in the same body, who in many respects, function quite independently of each other, and yet somehow manage to get along with things, while the other, the outer brain, serves as the spokesperson for both of them. The inner brain is the source of our objectives and generates the emotions that keep us on track in our attainment of them. This book explores the strange relationship between these two parts of us across a spectrum of mental processes including, memory, language, problem-solving, dreams, delusions and hallucinations, and more complex pursuits sucs as the arts, humor and religion
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected
Brady, Michael S. (2008). Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4).   (Google)
Cairns, Dorion (2000). Reason and emotion. Husserl Studies 17 (1).   (Google)
D'arms, Justin (2004). Bennett Helm, emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001), pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
de Sousa, Ronald (online). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (1979). The rationality of emotions. Dialogue.   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1994). Rationality, emotions, and social norms. Synthese 98 (1).   (Google)
Elster, Jon (1996). Rationality and the emotions. Economic Journal 106:1386-97.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an earlier paper (Elster, 1989 a), I discussed the relation between rationality and social norms. Although I did mention the role of the emotions in sustaining social norms, I did not focus explicitly on the relation between rationality and the emotions. That relation is the main topic of the present paper, with social norms in a subsidiary part
Evans, D. (2002). The search hypothesis of emotions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):497-509.   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ?the search hypothesis of emotion?. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are. 1 Introduction 2 The search hypothesis of emotion 3 A red herring: the frame problem 4 The search problem 5 Two readings of the search hypothesis 6 Two final remarks 7 Conclusion
Farell, Daniel (2004). Rationality and the emotions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):241-251.   (Google)
Fernandez-Berrocal, Pablo & Extremera, Natalio (2005). About emotional intelligence and moral decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
Fine, Cordelia (2006). Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the 'automatization' of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows
Fisher, Justin C. (online). Emotions as modes of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions
Fisher, Mark (1977). Reason, emotion, and love. Inquiry 20 (1-4):189 – 203.   (Google)
Abstract: Wittgenstein's private language argument is interpreted as an example of a kind of transcendental argument which, if valid, explains why a certain concept must possess certain features. Cognition and affect are shown to require each other by an application of Bennett's account of what beings capable of true cognition must be capable of, and the necessity of certain emotions to the existence of any rules in a community is argued in similar fashion. Hume's account of love and admiration being rejected, an account of love, intended to explain some of love's familiar features, is defended, and various proposed additions to the analysis are rejected. The idea of love is linked to those of value, agency, and the transcendental self by argument showing that each of these ideas requires all of the others. Finally, the idea of love is linked by a direct argument to that of the transcendental self
Frank, Robert H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. Norton.   (Cited by 1574 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions.   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Emotions, rationality, and mind-body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2004). Practical reasoning and emotion. In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenspan, Patricia (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Helm, Bennett W. (2009). The import of human action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action. Automatic Press/Vip.   (Google)
Abstract: My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account of the relation between the mind and the body. Here I have in mind not the thought that we must provide a compatibilist account of free will (though I do think that is true) but rather the thought that it is all to easy for philosophers of action to make what turn out to be false presuppositions about the nature of psychological capacities like belief and desire and the role they play in motivation. Conversely, I think, philosophers of mind, focused too narrowly on worries about intentionality and consciousness, have offered accounts of various psychological capacities that are inadequate to understanding the sort of agency characteristic of us persons. Before I begin, I need to acknowledge my general orientation in philosophy of mind. Mental states and capacities are to be understood in terms of their place within an explanatory framework. Psychological explanation, however, I take to be fundamentally normative, a matter of locating particular phenomena within a broader pattern of rationality. This is a broadly Davidsonian or Dennettian orientation to the mind, according to which, as Davidson says, rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental.1 In..
Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002). Review: Emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation and the nature of value. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Janaway, Christopher (2005). Nietzsche on reason and emotion. .   (Google)
Jones, Karen (2004). Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality. In Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Korpalo, Olga (1999). Rationality and emotions (the perspectives of logical-cognitive analysis). Theoria 14 (34):109-127.   (Google)
Macmurray, John (1962). Reason and Emotion. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Mameli, Matteo (2004). The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McCullagh, C. B. (1990). The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):44-58.   (Google | More links)
Muzio, Isabella (2001). Emotions and rationality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):135-145.   (Google)
Nichols, Shaun, Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Parsons, Howard L. (1958). Reason and affect: Some of their relations and functions. Journal of Philosophy 55 (March):221-229.   (Google | More links)
Parkinson, B. (2004). Unpicking reasonable emotions. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1978). Explaining emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Ross, Steven L. (1984). Evaluating the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):309-326.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2006). True emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tappolet, Christine, Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion..
Verbeek, Bruno (2001). Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions, Jon Elster. Cambridge university press, 1999, IX + 416 pages. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):121-145.   (Google)