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5.1h.3. Imagination and Pretense (Imagination and Pretense on PhilPapers)

Blaauw, Martijn (2006). Belief and pretense: A reply to Gendler. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):204-209.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion cases are for the relation between knowledge and imagination
Bogdan, Radu J. (2005). Pretending as imaginative rehearsal for cultural conformity. Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (1-2):191-213.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2003). Review of Gregory Currie, Ian Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).   (Google)
Currie, Gregory (2002). Desire in imagination. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (2002). Imagination as motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):201-16.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Currie, Gregory (1995). Imagination as simulation: Aesthetics meets cognitive science. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 90 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject
Doggett, Tyler & Egan, Andy (2007). Wanting things you don't want: The case for an imaginative analogue of desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”
Egan, Andy (2008). Pretense for the complete idiom. Noûs 42 (3):381-409.   (Google | More links)
Friend, Stacie (2007). Review of Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).   (Google)
Funkhouser, Eric & Spaulding, Shannon (2009). Imagination and other scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief–desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script . We generalize the script concept to show how things besides imagination can occupy this same role in both pretense and non-pretense actions. The Humean Theory of Motivation should then be modified to cover this script role
Gendler, Tamar (2002). Review of Paul Harris, The Work of the Imagination. Mind 111 (442):414-418.   (Google)
Abstract: I had a structural worry about the relation of Gaita’s three chapters on truth, interesting though these chapters are, to the rest of Gaita’s project. And I had some residual questions left after reading the book: What are persons? How do we know when we are encountering one, and when are we justified (we must be sometimes: compare the various sorts of animal) in a decision that something we encounter is not a person? Do evil actions always involve a sort of blindness to what is being done? If so, how easy is it to explain how agents who do evil can be held responsible for their cognitive deficiencies? These may of course be questions that Gaita was not trying to answer; but in any case, as I hope I have conveyed, I found A Common Humanity a striking and revelatory read, and I warmly recommend it
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2006). Imaginative contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2002). Review: The work of the imagination. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar (2007). Self-deception as pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding self-deception in this way is highly natural. And it provides a non-
paradoxical characterization of the phenomenon that explains both its distinctive patterns of instability and its ordinary association with irrationality. Why, then, has this diagnosis been overlooked? I suggest that the oversight is due to a failure to recognize the philosophical significance of a crucial fact about the human mind, namely, the degree to which attitudes other than belief often play a central role in our mental and practical lives, both by “influenc[ing our]. . . passions and imagination,” and by “governing. . .our actions.”
Goldie, Peter (2004). Recreative minds: Imagination in philosophy and psychology by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft, oxford: Clarendon press, 2002, pp. 233; ISBN 0 19 823809 6 (pbb) ??XX.Xx. Philosophy 79 (2):331-335.   (Google)
Harris, Paul L. (1995). Imagining and pretending. In Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Harris, Paul (2000). The Work of the Imagination. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Heal, Jane (2003). Mind, Reason, and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language
Liggins, David (forthcoming). The autism objection to pretence theories. Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: A pretence theory of a discourse is one which claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we utter when taking part in the discourse: instead, we are speaking from within a pretence. Jason Stanley argues that if a pretence account of a discourse is correct, people with autism should be incapable of successful participation in it; but since people with autism are capable of participiating successfully in the discourses which pretence theorists aim to account for, all these accounts should be rejected. I discuss how pretence theorists can respond, and apply this discussion to two pretence theories, Stephen Yablo's account of arithmetic and Kendall Walton's account of negative existentials. I show how Yablo and Walton can escape Stanley's objection
Nichols, Shaun (2002). Imagination and the puzzles of iteration. Analysis 62 (3):182-87.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Iteration presents opposing puzzles for a theory of the imagination. The first puzzle, noted by David Lewis, is that when a person pretends to pretend, the iteration is often preserved. Let’s call this the puzzle of ‘pre- served iteration’. At the other pole, Gregory Currie has noted that very often when we pretend to pretend, the iteration does collapse. We might call this the puzzle of ‘collapsed iteration’. Somehow a theory of the imagination must be able to address these two puzzles. I argue that an empirically inspired cognitive theory of the imagination (Nichols & Stich 2000) can accommodate both puzzles
Nichols, Shaun (ed.) (2006). The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This volume brings together specially written essays by leading researchers on the propositional imagination. This is the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that Holmes has a bad habit or that there are zombies. It plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with fiction, and indeed in everyday life. The Architecture of the Imagination capitalizes on recent attempts to give a cognitive account of this capacity, extending the theoretical picture and exploring the philosophical implications
Van Leeuwen, Neil (2011). Imagination is where the action is. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Imaginative representations are crucial to the generation of action--both pretense and plain action. But well-known theories of imagination on offer in the literature [1] fail to describe how perceptually-formatted imaginings (mental images) and motor imaginings function in the generation of action and [2] fail to recognize the important fact that spatially rich imagining can be integrated into one's perceptual manifold. In this paper, I present a theory of imagining that shows how spatially rich imagining functions in the generation of action. I also describe the imaginative structures behind two under-explored forms of action: semi-pretense and pretense layering. In addition, I suggest that my theory of imagining meshes better than the competitors with current work in cognitive and affective neuroscience.
van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.
Walton, Kendall L. (1991). Précis of mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational arts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):379-382.   (Google | More links)
Zeimbekis, John, Thought experiments and mental simulations.   (Google)
Abstract: Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical processes. They use mental models, which should not be confused with process-driven simulations. A convincing case can be made that thought experiments about hypothetical mental processes are mental simulations. Concerning moral thought experiments, I argue that construing them as simulations of mental processes favours certain moral theories over others. The scope of mental simulation in thought experiments is primarily limited by the constraint of relevant similarity on source and target processes: on one hand, this constraint disqualifies thought from simulating external natural processes; on the other hand, it is a source of epistemic bias in moral thought experiments. In view of these results, I conclude that thought experiments and mental simulations cannot be assimilated as means of acquiring knowledge.