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5.1h.4. Imagination, Misc (Imagination, Misc on PhilPapers)

Almeida, Michael J. (2008). The enlargement of life: Moral imagination at work – John Kekes. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):374–377.   (Google | More links)
Aquila, Richard E. (1988). Self-consciousness, self-determination, and imagination in Kant. Topoi 7 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one''s self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one''s consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one''s own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One''s self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation
Babbitt, Susan E. (1996). Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people
Banham, Gary (2005). Kant's Transcendental Imagination. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: The role and place of transcendental psychology in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been a source of some contention. This work presents a detailed argument for restoring transcendental psychology to a central place in the interpretation of Kant's Analytic, in the process providing a detailed response to more "austere" analytic readings
Blocker, H. Gene (1972). Another look at aesthetic imagination. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 30 (4):529-536.   (Google | More links)
Blocker, Harry (1965). Kant's theory of the relation of imagination and understanding in aesthetic judgements of taste. British Journal of Aesthetics 5 (1).   (Google)
Blunt, Anthony (1943). Blake's pictorial imagination. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 6:190-212.   (Google | More links)
Brady, Emily (1998). Imagination and the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (2):139-147.   (Google | More links)
Brumbaugh, Robert Sherrick (1954). Plato's Mathematical Imagination. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.   (Google)
Bundy, Murray Wright (1927). The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought. R. West.   (Google)
Abstract: Pre-Socratic philosophy. - Plato. - Aristotle. - Post-Aristotelian philosophy. - The Theory of art: Quintilian, Longinus, and Philostratus. - Plotinus. - The lesser Neoplatonists. - Neoplatonic views of three early Christians. - Mediaeval descriptive psychology. - The psychology of the mystics. - Dante's theory of vision. - Conclusion.
Byrne, Alex (2010). Recollection, perception, imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is
Carrier, David (1973). Three kinds of imagination. Journal of Philosophy 70 (22):819-831.   (Google | More links)
Casey, Edward S. (1976). Comparative phenomenology of mental activity: Memory, hallucination, and fantasy contrasted with imagination. Research in Phenomenology 6 (1):1-25.   (Google)
Casey, John (1984). Emotion and imagination. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (134):1-14.   (Google | More links)
Casey, Edward S. (1976). Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Indiana University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Casey, Edward S. (1977). Imagining and remembering. Review of Metaphysics 31 (December):187-209.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Casey, Edward S. (2003). Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory. In J. Philips & James Morley (eds.), Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press.   (Google)
Casey, Edward S. (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Casey, Edward S. (1978). Imagining, perceiving, and thinking. Humanitas 14 (May):173-196.   (Google)
Castoriadis, Cornelius (1997). World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This collection presents a broad and compelling overview of the most recent work by a world-renowned figure in contemporary thought. The book is in four parts: Koinonia, Polis, Psyche, Logos. The opening section begins with a general introduction to the author's views on being, time, creation, and the imaginary institution of society and continues with reflections on the role of the individual psyche in racist thinking and acting. The second part is a critique of those who now belittle and distort the meaning of May 1968 and other movements of the sixties as well as the French Revolution. In part three, Castoriadis shows how psychoanalysis, like politics, can contribute to the project of individual and collective autonomy and challenges Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida, and others in his report on 'The State and Subject Today'. Finally he examines how Aristotle's original aporetic discovery and cover-up of the imagination were repeated by Kant, Freud, Heidegger, and even Merleau-Ponty
Chambliss, J. J. (1974). Imagination and Reason in Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Rousseau, and Keats. The Hague,Nijhoff.   (Google)
Choi, Jinhee (2005). Leaving it up to the imagination: POV shots and imagining from the inside. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):17–25.   (Google | More links)
Church, Jennifer (2003). Depression, depth, and the imagination. In J. Philips & James Morley (eds.), Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press.   (Google)
Ciulla, Joanne B. (1996). Business leadership and moral imagination in the twenty-first century. In Andrew R. Cecil & W. Lawson Taitte (eds.), Moral Values: The Challenge of the Twenty-First Century. Distributed by the University of Texas Press.   (Google)
Clausen, Christopher (1986). The Moral Imagination: Essays on Literature and Ethics. University of Iowa Press.   (Google)
Coates, Paul (2009). Perception, imagination and demonstrative reference : A Sellarsian account. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Coble, Don Kelly (1997). Nietzsche, the imagination, and its multiple drives. Research in Phenomenology 27 (1):270-277.   (Google)
Cocking, J. M. (1991). Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Many writers have paid tribute to its power: Shakespeare urged his audiences to use it to create a setting; Hobbes asserted that "imagination and memory are but one thing;" for Wordsworth it was "the mightiest leveler known to moral world;" and to Baudelaire it represented "the queen of truth." Imagination as artistic, poetic, and cultural predicate remains one of the most influential ideas in the history of Western thought. It has been simultaneously feared as a dangerous, uncontrollable force, and revered as the supreme visionary power. The questions of its origins, nature, function, and effects have absorbed writers, theologians, and philosophers alike. J. M. Cocking's Imagination shows how these questions have recurred, through the ages and in various cultures. Exploring this theme, from antiquity to the Renaissance, it opens with a discussion of the treatment of imagination in the writings of Aristotle and Plato. Tracing its development in the Middle Ages, Cocking pays particular attention to the parallel tradition in Islamic thought of the period. The book pursues the concept through the theories of Dante and the neo-Platonists, concluding with the High Renaissance
Coeckelbergh, Mark (2007). Imagination and Principles: An Essay on the Role of Imagination in Moral Reasoning. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean to say that imagination plays a role in moral reasoning, and what are the theoretical and practical implications? Engaging with three traditions in moral theory and confronting them with three contexts of moral practice, this book offers a more comprehensive framework to think about these questions. The author develops an argument about the relation between imagination and principles that moves beyond competition metaphors and center-periphery schemas. He shows that both cooperate and are equally necessary to cope with moral problems, and combines insights of different theories and disciplines to explore how this works in practice
Coeckelbergh, Mark (2007). Principles or imagination? Two approaches to global justice. Journal of Global Ethics 3 (2):203 – 221.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean to introduce the notion of imagination in the discussion about global justice? What is gained by studying the role of imagination in thinking about global justice? Does a focus on imagination imply that we must replace existing influential principle-centred approaches such as that of John Rawls and his critics? We can distinguish between two approaches to global justice. One approach is Rawlsian and Kantian in inspiration. Discussions within this tradition typically focus on the question whether Rawls's theory of justice (1971), designed for the national level, can or should be applied to the global level. Can and should Rawls's Difference Principle be globalized, as Thomas Pogge argues? Is this proposal superior to Rawls's Law of Peoples (1999)? Another approach to global justice has been developed by Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity (1997), Poetic Justice (1995), and other work. I will construct her view and critically examine it by looking at her arguments about the relation between empathy, literature, and global justice. At first sight, these two approaches seem to be opposed. The former puts an emphasis on principles, universal reason, and the moral aspects of institutions and their policies, whereas the latter is rather concerned with the relation between imagination and justice, with the particular, and with the individual moral development. But is this necessarily so? I will show that both approaches could benefit from each other's insights to strengthen their own position. Moreover, I will argue for middle way between, or an integration of the two approaches that combines principles and imagination. In this way, we can move towards a more comprehensive account of global justice
Coeckelbergh, Mark & Mesman, Jessica (2007). With hope and imagination: Imaginative moral decision-making in neonatal intensive care units. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature, points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research, we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination aids medical practitioners demarcating moral categories, tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions. We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with hope and imagination
Cornell, Drucilla (1993). Transformations: Recollective Imagination and Sexual Difference. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: At a time when the political left have watched the apparent decline of socialism, and with it the cynical rejection of political hope, the question of how to rethink political transformation has become a pressing question. In Transformations Drucilla Cornell offers us a unique conception of recollective imagination which allows us to preserve and re-articulate the tradition of critical social theory. Cornell argues that psychoanalysis must play a role in social theory because we need to understand the connection between our constitution as gendered subjects and social, political and legal transformation. We cannot avoid the question of how the subject is constituted if we are to provide a new conception of radical change. A remarkable work combining the insights of recent feminist and critical theory with the concerns for social change
Crick, Nathan (2004). Conquering our imagination: Thought experiments and enthymemes in scientific argument. Philosophy and Rhetoric 37 (1).   (Google)
Crittenden, Charles (2007). Review of Stephen Mulhall, Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, ##243-315. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).   (Google)
Currie, Gregory (2000). Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 90 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject
Dallmayr, Fred (2001). Memory and social imagination: Latin american reflections. Critical Horizons 2 (2):153-171.   (Google)
Abstract: The imagination opens onto a reconciliation of the past with the future, especially when it is activated as a retrieval of the memories of collective suffering. This is especially the case with the Latin American experience, with its history of military governments and their 'dirty wars' against their civilians. Using Ricoeur's notion of the metaphorical imagination, and drawing on Dussel's work on ethical hermeneutics, this paper argues that, in the act of remembering, other social imaginaries can be created as possibilities that go beyond the concrete present, and which occur from the vantage points of oppressed others
Degenhardt, M. A. B. (1975). Sartre, imagination and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 9 (1):72–92.   (Google | More links)
De Mey, Tim (2006). Imagination's grip on science. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):222-239.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In part because "imagination" is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully
Desmond, W. (1976). Collingwood, imagination and epistemology. Philosophical Studies 24:82-103.   (Google)
Dilworth, John B. (2008). Imaginative Versus Analytical Experiences of Wines. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Wine and Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: The highly enjoyable experiences associated with drinking good wines have been widely misunderstood. It is common to regard wine appreciation as an analytical or quasi-scientific kind of activity, in which wine experts carefully distinguish the precise sensory qualities of each wine, and then pass on their accumulated factual knowledge to less experienced wine enthusiasts. However, this model of wine appreciation is seriously defective. One good way to show its defects is to provide a better and more fundamental scientific account of what is involved in wine appreciation. In order to do so, I outline a novel, evolutionarily based theory of perceptual consciousness that explains why there must be imaginative as well as analytical kinds of experiences of wines. In addition, imaginative wine experiences, unlike typical imaginative artistic experiences, may be shown to involve highly individualistic, improvisatory elements that help to give wine drinking a unique place among the recreational arts
Doggett, Tyler & Egan, Andy (2007). Wanting things you don't want: The case for an imaginative analogue of desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”
Dorsch, Fabian, Imagination and depiction.   (Google)
Abstract: It has not been uncommon to maintain that our experiences of pictures are essentially, even if only partially, imaginative.1 This view seems, however, incompatible with what may be called the Agency Account of imaginings, according to which imaginings are mental actions of a certain kind. In this paper, I would like to contribute to the defence of this promising theory of imaginings by trying to undermine the idea that pictorial experience should be accounted for in terms of imagining
Egan, Andy (online). Imagination, delusion, and self-deception.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor.3
Elliott, Brian (2005). Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Phenomenology is one of the most pervasive and influential schools of thought in twentieth-century European philosophy. This book provides a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the idea of the imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. The author also locates phenomenology within the broader context of a philosophical world dominated by Kantian thought, arguing that the location of Husserl within the Kantian landscape is essential to an adequate understanding of phenomenology both as a historical event and as a legacy for present and future philosophy
Engmann, Joyce (1976). Imagination and truth in Aristotle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (3).   (Google)
Foti, Veronique M. (1986). The cartesian imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4).   (Google)
Freydberg, Bernard (1999). Sallis, Brann, and the problem of imagination. Research in Phenomenology 29 (1):106-118.   (Google)
Fóti, Véronique M. (1986). The cartesian imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):631-642.   (Google | More links)
Furlong, E. J. (1970). Mr. Urmson on memory and imagination. Mind 79 (313):137-138.   (Google | More links)
Gans, Eric Lawrence (2008). The Scenic Imagination: Originary Thinking From Hobbes to the Present Day. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The Scenic Imagination argues that the uniquely human phenomenon of representation, as manifested in language, art, and ritual, is a scenic event focused on a central object designated by a sign. The originary hypothesis posits the necessity of conceiving the origin of the human as such an event. In traditional societies, the scenic imagination through which this scene of origin is conceived manifests itself in sacred creation narratives. Modern thought is defined by the independent use of the scenic imagination to create anthropological models of the origin of human institutions, beginning with the social contract scene in Hobbes’s Leviathan that puts an end to the reciprocal violence of the state of nature. Eric Gans follows the work of the scenic imagination in selected writings of twenty thinkers including Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Durkheim, Boas, and Freud and concludes his book with a critical examination of contemporary writing on the origins of religion and language. In the process, he demonstrates that the originary hypothesis offers the most cohesive explanation of the origin and function of these fundamental institutions
Garrett, Don (2008). Representation and consciousness in Spinoza's naturalistic theory of the imagination. In Charles Huenemann (ed.), Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gert, Bernard (1965). Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16 (3):44-47.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gibbons, Sarah L. (1994). Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book departs from much of the scholarship on Kant by demonstrating the centrality of imagination to Kant's philosophy as a whole. In Kant's works, human experience is simultaneously passive and active, thought and sensed, free and unfree: these dualisms are often thought of as unfortunate byproducts of his system. Gibbons, however, shows that imagination performs a vital function in "bridging gaps" between the different elements of cognition and experience. Thus, the role imagination plays in Kant's works expresses his fundamental insight into the complexity of cognition for finite rational beings such as ourselves
Goldie, Peter (2005). Imagination and the distorting power of emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):127-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_ _on the dramatic irony involved in imagining these typical cases, where one_ _knows outside the scope of the imagining what one does not know as part of the_ _content of what one imagines: namely, that the imagined emotion is distorting_ _one’s reasoning. Moreover, imagining from an external perspective allows one_ _to evaluate the imagined events in a way that imagining from the inside does not._
Goldie, Peter (2006). Wollheim on emotion and imagination. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):1-17.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gornall, Thomas & S., J. (1963). A note on imagination and thought about God. Heythrop Journal 4 (2):135–140.   (Google | More links)
Grant, Edward (2004). Scientific imagination in the middle ages. Perspectives on Science 12 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Following Aristotle, medieval natural philosophers believed that knowledge was ultimately based on perception and observation; and like Aristotle, they also believed that observation could not explain the "why" of any perception. To arrive at the "why," natural philosophers offered theoretical explanations that required the use of the imagination. This was, however, only the starting point. Not only did they apply their imaginations to real phenomena, but expended even more intellectual energy on counterfactual phenomena, both extracosmic and intracosmic, extensively discussing, among other themes, the possible existence of other worlds and the possibility of an infinite extracosmic space. The application of the imagination to scientific problems during the Middle Ages was not an empty exercise, but, as I shall show, played a significant role in the development of early modern science
Grenberg, Jeanine (2007). Imagination in Kant's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2).   (Google)
Guevara, Daniel (2009). Kant and the power of imagination (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (4):pp. 629-630.   (Google)
Guggenbühl, Allan (2008). Education and imagination : A contradiction? Experiences from mythodramatic crisis intervention in schools. In Raya A. Jones (ed.), Education and Imagination: Post-Jungian Perspectives. Routledge.   (Google)
Hall, Steven (2008). Review of Stephen Mulhall, Wittgenstein's private language: Grammar, nonsense, and imagination in philosophical investigations §§243–315. Philosophical Investigations 31 (3):272–280.   (Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert (2003). Review of Martin Weatherston, Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination, and Temporality. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (8).   (Google)
Harding, F. J. W. (1964). Fantasy, imagination and Shakespeare. British Journal of Aesthetics 4 (4).   (Google)
Heal, Jane (2003). Mind, Reason, and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language
Hengehold, Laura (2002). “In that sleep of death what dreams...”: Foucault, existential phenomenology, and the Kantian imagination. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Although Foucault's early writings were strongly influenced by the discourse of existential phenomenology, he later considered it an obstacle to a better understanding of social and political power. This essay seeks to understand some of the reasons for his shift, specifically with respect to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Foucault diverges from existential phenomenology according to an alternative tendency within the Kantian inheritance they both share: one which stresses the world-disruptive rather than the unifying or world-disclosive power of transcendental imagination. Examining the role played by dreams and death in Foucault's early introduction to Binswanger's Dream and Existence allows us to situate his later analysis of the historical and political (rather than existential) meaning of death with respect to larger philosophical currents
Hertzberg, Lars (1991). Imagination and the sense of identity. In Human Beings. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Himmelfarb, Gertrude (2006). The Moral Imagination: From Edmund Burke to Lionel Trilling. Ivan R. Dee.   (Google)
Abstract: Edmund Burke : apologist for Judaism? -- George Eliot : the wisdom of Dorothea -- Jane Austen : the education of Emma -- Charles Dickens : "a low writer" -- Benjamin Disraeli : the Tory imagination -- John Stuart Mill : the other Mill -- Walter Bagehot : "a divided nature" -- John Buchan : an untimely appreciation -- The Knoxes : a God-haunted family -- Michael Oakeshott : the conservative disposition -- Winston Churchill : "quite simply, a great man" -- Lionel Trilling : the moral imagination.
Hoff, J. H. van't (1967). Imagination in Science. [New York]Springer-Verlag New York.   (Google)
Hohler, T. P. (1982). Imagination and Reflection: Intersubjectivity: Fichte's Grundlage of 1794. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Boston.   (Google)
Holton, Gerald James (1978). The Scientific Imagination: With a New Introduction. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Holton, Gerald James (1978). The Scientific Imagination: Case Studies. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hume, Robert D. (1970). Kant and coleridge on imagination. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (4):485-496.   (Google | More links)
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2009). Dreaming and imagination. Mind and Language 24 (1):103-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Penultimate draft; please refer to published version. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that contrary to an orthodox view, dreams do not typically involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experience while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. Rather, on my view, dreams involve mental imagery and propositional imagination. I defend the imagination model of dreaming from some objections
Ichikawa, Jonathan (online). Inference in imagination and counterfactual conditionals.   (Google)
Abstract: I propose an explanation for reasoning about counterfactual conditionals. We reason properly to a counterfactual if A, C, when we imagine A along with cotenable background conditions, then properly infer C. Proper inference in my sense is just the same sort of inference that is proper in cases of theoretical reasoning with beliefs. (Roughly: a proper inference is warrant-transferring from belief in A and the background conditions to C.) Cotenability for counterfactuals is explained by reference to our abilities to attribute beliefs to others, given sincere testimony. (Roughly: p is cotenable with A just in case it would be reasonable to attribute the belief that p to a person who sincerely asserted A, in the conversational context.) I close with a proposal for the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. To assert the counterfactual is merely to claim that (the conditions are such that) there is an available inference from the antecedent, with the cotenable conditions, to the consequent
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2008). Skepticism and the imagination model of dreaming. The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Penultimate draft; please refer to published version -- especially important in this case, as the official version has been Britishized; even the title's second letter is not the same. Abstract. Ernest Sosa has argued that the solution to dream skepticism lies in an understanding of dreams as imaginative experiences – when we dream, on this suggestion, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Sosa rebuts skepticism thus: dreams don’t cause false beliefs, so my beliefs cannot be false, having been caused by dreams. I argue that, even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dreaming, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imagination model, I suggest, is to recharacterize the way we think about dream skepticism: the skeptical threat is not, after all, that we have false beliefs. So even though dreams don’t involve false beliefs, they still pose a skeptical threat, which I elaborate
Jansen, Julia (2006). Review of Brian Elliott, Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).   (Google)
Johnson, Mark L. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2049 | Google)
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Abstract: Interest in imagination dates back to Plato and Aristotle, but full-length works have been devoted to it only relatively recently by Sartre, McKellar, Furlong, Casey, Johnson, Warnock, Brann, and others. Despite their length and variety, however, these current theories take overly narrow views of this complex phenomenon. (1) Their definitions of “imagination” neglect the multiplicity of its meanings and tend to focus narrowly on the power of imaging alone (which produces images and imagery). But imagination in the fullest, most encompassing sense centers instead on creativity, which involves both imaging and reasoning powers. (2) Current accounts of the operations of imagination narrowly construe it in fixed, immutable terms. But it’s instead a dynamic, evolving synergy of its psychological roots (images and symbols) and sociobiological roots (cultures and instincts). This synergy has transformed the roles of images and symbols in imagination (as Vygotsky, Goody, etc. note). For example, in the shift from mytheopic to scientific imagination, literacy and formal education fostered abstract symbolic thinking (reason), which differs from mytheopic thinking based on richly concrete associations (imagery). The result was “more than cool reason”, but experimental studies (by Perkins, Clement, etc.) show that it’s also more than just dreamy imagery. It’s a dynamic synergy of the two that has transformed both. (3) Current evaluations of imagination’s potentials are also narrow. They tend to focus on its role in mental life while ignoring social and political life. Also, they tend to follow romantic and existentialist customs of extolling imagination’s virtues without soberly critiquing its limitations. Again, they ignore the synergy of psychological, sociological and biological forces that shape mental and social evolution, and promote and constrain imagination in complex ways. For example, Sartre surreally asks us to choose our own nature with an imagination emancipated from institutional and instinctual strictures. Yet making intelligible choices depends on these strictures. (4) In conclusion, current theories define imagination narrowly in terms of imaging, they describe its operations in fixed and immutable terms, and they evaluate its potentials without examining the full interplay of forces shaping it. These shortcomings are remedied by a broader perspective that defines imagination more adequately and comprehensively, and that recognizes it’s complex roots, dynamic operations, and evolving potentials.
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Abstract: Modelling became one of the primary tools of mathematical economic research in the twentieth century, but when we look at examples of how nonanalogical models were first built in economics, both the process of making representations and aspects of the representing relation remain opaque. Like early astronomers, economists have to imagine how the hidden parts of their world are arranged and to make images, that is, create models, to represent how they work. The case of the Edgeworth Box, a model widely used for theoretical work in twentieth-century economics, provides a good example to explore the process of making mathematical representations of the economy. It shows how, in making these new representations, conceptual elements were developed which could not have been represented in the older verbal forms of economics
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Abstract: Stephen Mulhall offers a new way of interpreting one of the most famous and contested texts in modern philosophy: remarks on "private language" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He sheds new light on a central controversy concerning Wittgenstein's early work by showing its relevance to a proper understanding of the later work
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