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5.1i.2. Intuition, Misc (Intuition, Misc on PhilPapers)

Chudnoff, Elijah (2010). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.
Gendler, Tamar (2000). Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2009). Eliminativism and the challenge from folk belief. Noûs 43 (2):242-264.   (Google)
Sarch, Alexander (2010). Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy. Synthese 172 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy
Symons, John (2008). Intuition and philosophical methodology. Axiomathes 18 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part of a methodologically conservative stance towards philosophical investigation. I argue that methodological conservatism should be sharply distinguished from the process of evaluating individual propositions. Nevertheless, intuition is not always a reliable guide to truth and experimental philosophy can serve a vital ameliorative role in determining the scope and limits of our intuitive competence with respect to various areas of inquiry
Wright, Wayne (2002). Fodor's epistemic intuitions of analyticity. Sorites 14 (October):110-116.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Semantic holism has it that the semantic properties of an individual expression are determined by that expression