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5.1k. Mental Actions (Mental Actions on PhilPapers)

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Aquila, Richard E. (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2004). Acceptance and deciding to believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):173-190.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2005). Can faith be a doxastic venture? Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture that involves pragmatically assuming that God exists
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Doxastic decisions and controlling belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1).   (Google | More links)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2005). How (not) to think about mental action. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2007). Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions from Mental Birth Control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-66.   (Google)
Chakrabarti, Chandana (1975). James and the identity theory. Behaviorism 3:152-155.   (Google)
Dubucs, Jacques P. & Miśkiewicz, Wioletta (forthcoming). Logic, Act and Product. In Giuseppe Primiero (ed.), Knowledge and Judgment. Springer Verlag.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Logic and psychology overlap in judgment, inference and proof. The problems raised by this commonality are notoriously difficult, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view. Sundholm has for a long time addressed these issues. His beautiful piece of work [A Century of Inference: 1837-1936] begins by summarizing the main difficulty in the usual provocative manner of the author: one can start, he says, by the act of knowledge to go to the object, as the Idealist does; one can also start by the object to go to the act, in the Realist mood; never the two shall meet. He is himself inclined to accept the first perspective as the right one and he has eventually developed an original version of antirealism which starts, not from considerations about the publicity of meaning, in the manner of Dummett, but from an epistemic standpoint, trying to search in a non-Fregean tradition of analysis of judgement and cognate notions a way of founding constructivist semantics. The present paper ploughes the same field. We concentrate on the significance, for Sundholm’s program, of the perspective that has been opened by Twardowski in his important essay on acts and products (1912.
Ducasse, Curt J. (1936). Introspection, mental acts, and sensa. Mind 45 (178):181-192.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ewing, Alfred C. (1948). Mental acts. Mind 57 (April):201-220.   (Google | More links)
Gallie, W. B. (1948). Dr Ewing on mental acts. Mind 57 (October):480-487.   (Google | More links)
Gallie, W. B. (1947). Does psychology study mental acts or dispositions, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 134:134-153.   (Google)
Geach, Peter (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Geach, Peter T. (1957). Mental Acts: Their Content And Their Objects. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 102 | Google)
Gibbs, Raymond W. (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book explores how people's subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for human cognition and language. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical and cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, but seek out the gross and detailed ways that language and thought are inextricably shaped by embodied action. Embodiment and Cognitive Science describes the abundance of empirical evidence from many disciplines, including work on perception, concepts, imagery and reasoning, language and communication, cognitive development, and emotions and consciousness, that support the idea that the mind is embodied
Hieronymi, Pamela (online). Mental agency.   (Google)
Abstract: What sort of agency do we exercise with respect to our own psychology? Of the wide array of things that might fill our minds—sensations, perceptions, thoughts, impressions, imaginings, rememberings, moods, emotions, beliefs, intentions—some of them, surely, are in our control, while others clearly are not, and many seem to occupy a difficult middle ground. How do we control those that are in our control?
Hunter, David (2003). Is thinking an action? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):133-148.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it
Loveday, T. (1901). Theories of mental activity. Mind 10 (40):455-478.   (Google | More links)
Mace, C. A. (1947). Does psychology study mental acts or dispositions, part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 164:164-174.   (Google)
Matthews, Gareth B. & Cohen, S. Marc (1967). Wants and lacks. Journal of Philosophy 64 (14):455-456.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Anthony Kenny says it is impossible to want what one already has and knows one has. We present a counter-example and then suggest that Kenny may have been misled by the fact that wanting expresses itself in goal-directed behavior. From the truism that one's behavior cannot be directed toward a goal that one knows one has already attained, Kenny may have been led to suppose that behavior directed toward an as yet unattained goal cannot express one's desire for what one has and knows one has.
Mele, Alfred R. (1997). Agency and mental action. Philosophical Perspectives 11:231-249.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects’ awareness of their own mental actions is a species of the same genus that also includes the distinctive awareness of bodily actions. More specifically, I claim
Peacocke, Christopher (2007). Mental action and self-awareness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (2008). Mental action and self-awareness. In Lucy F. O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
Peacocke, Christopher (ms). Mental action and self-awareness (II): Epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
Proust, Joëlle (2001). A plea for mental acts. Synthese 129 (1):105-128.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalready know how to act in order to reach somepredefined result? A crucial element in the solutionof these puzzles consists in making explicit thecontingency between mental acts and mentaloperations, parallel to the contingency betweenphysical acts and bodily movements. The paper finallydiscusses the kind of reflexivity at stake in mentalacts; it is shown that the capacity to refer tooneself is not a necessary condition of the successfulexecution of mental acts
Soteriou, Matthew (2005). Mental action and the epistemology of mind. Noûs 39 (1):83-105.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Sprott, W. J. H. (1947). Does psychology study mental acts or dispositions, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 154:154-163.   (Google)
Taylor, Richard W. (1963). The stream of thoughts versus mental acts. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):311-321.   (Google | More links)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2009). Rationality and compulsion: Applying action theory to psychiatry – by Lennart Nordenfelt. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):415-418.   (Google)
Wright, J. N. (1944). Mental activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.   (Google)