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5.1l. Moral Psychology (Moral Psychology on PhilPapers)

Andreou, Chrisoula (2007). Morality and psychology. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):46–55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character-based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.
Arpaly, Nomy (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency
Barry, Peter Brian (ms). Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.   (Google)
Blum, Lawrence (1994). Moral Development and Conceptions of Morality. In Lawrence Blum (ed.), Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Blum, Lawrence (2008). Review of Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).   (Google)
Brewer, Talbot (2002). The character of temptation: Towards a more plausible Kantian moral psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):103–130.   (Google | More links)
Bricke, John (1996). Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content
Brickhouse, Thomas C. (2010). Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Acknowledgements; 1. Apology of Socratic studies; 2. Motivational intellectualism; 3. The 'prudential paradox'; 4. Wrongdoing and damage to the soul; 5. Educating the appetites and passions; 6. Virtue intellectualism; 7. Socrates and his intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; Appendix: Is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?; Bibliography of works cited; Index of passages; General index.
Brännmark, Johan (2009). The constitution of agency: Essays on practical reason and moral psychology – by Christine M. Korsgaard. Theoria 75 (4):358-361.   (Google)
Carr, David & Davis, Andrew (1997). Can there be a moral psychology of democratic and civic education & understanding mathematics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 31 (2):355–364.   (Google | More links)
Carr, David (1988). The cardinal virtues and Plato's moral psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):186-200.   (Google | More links)
Chappell, Vere (1990). Locke's moral psychology. Journal of Philosophy 87 (10):524-525.   (Google | More links)
Cohen, Daniel (2003). Agency and responsibility: A common-sense moral psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):444 – 445.   (Google)
Abstract: Book Information Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology Jeanette Kennett New York Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 229 Hardback US$45 By Jeanette Kennett. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. viii + 229. Hardback:US$45
Cooper, Clara (1935). The Relation Between Morality and Intellect. [New York,Ams Press.   (Google)
Crittenden, Paul (1990). Learning to Be Moral: Philosophical Thoughts About Moral Development. Humanities Press International.   (Google)
Currie, Gregory (1995). The moral psychology of fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2):250 – 259.   (Google)
Davenport, John J. (2007). Review of R. Jay Wallace, Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).   (Google)
Deigh, John (ed.) (1992). Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This anthology focuses on emotions and motives that relate to our status as moral agents, our capacity for moral judgement, and the practices that help to define our social lives. Attachment, trust, respect, conscience, guilt, revenge, depravity, and forgiveness are among the topics discussed. Collectively, the thirteen essays in this collection represent a time-honored tradition in ethics: the effort to throw light on fundamental questions concerning the complexities of the human soul
Deigh, John (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The essays in this collection are concerned with the psychology of moral agency. They focus on moral feelings and moral motivation, and seek to understand the operations and origins of these phenomena as rooted in the natural desires and emotions of human beings. An important feature of the essays, and one that distinguishes the book from most philosophical work in moral psychology, is the attention to the writings of Freud. Many of the essays draw on Freud's ideas about conscience and morality, while several explore the depths and limits of Freud's theories. An underlying theme of the volume is a critique of influential rationalist accounts of moral agency. John Deigh shows that one can subject the principles of morality to rational inquiry without thereby holding that reason alone can originate action
Denis, Lara (2000). Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy. Kantian Review 4:48-73.   (Google)
Abstract: Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order to argue that his praise of extreme emotional self-control is not incompatible with, but rather complementary to, his praise of sympathy.
Doris, John M. & Murphy, Dominic (2007). From my Lai to abu ghraib: The moral psychology of atrocity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):25–55.   (Google | More links)
Doris, John & Stich, Stephen (online). Moral psychology: Empirical approaches. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Douglas, Charles (2009). End-of-life decisions and moral psychology: Killing, letting die, intention and foresight. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In contemplating any life and death moral dilemma, one is often struck by the possible importance of two distinctions; the distinction between killing and “letting die”, and the distinction between an intentional killing and an action aimed at some other outcome that causes death as a foreseen but unintended “side-effect”. Many feel intuitively that these distinctions are morally significant, but attempts to explain why this might be so have been unconvincing. In this paper, I explore the problem from an explicitly consequentialist point of view. I first review and endorse the arguments that the distinctions cannot be drawn with perfect clarity, and that they do not have the kind of fundamental significance required to defend an absolute prohibition on killing. I go on to argue that the distinctions are nonetheless important. A complete consequentialist account of morality must include a consideration of our need and ability to construct and follow rules; our instincts about these rules; and the consequences (to the agent and to others) that might follow if the agent breaks a good general rule, particularly if this involves acting contrary to moral instinct. With this perspective, I suggest that the distinctions between killing and letting die and between intending and foreseeing do have moral relevance, especially for those involved in the care of the sick and dying
Dunn, Robert (2004). Moral psychology and expressivism. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):178–198.   (Google | More links)
Dwyer, Susan, Moral psychology as cognitive science: Explananda and acquisition.   (Google)
Abstract: Depending on how one looks at it, we have been enjoying or suffering a significant empirical turn in moral psychology during this first decade of the 21st century. While philosophers have, from time to time, considered empirical matters with respect to morality, those who took an interest in actual (rather than ideal) moral agents were primarily concerned with whether particular moral theories were ‘too demanding’ for creatures like us (Flanagan, 1991; Williams, 1976; Wolf, 1982). Faithful adherence to Utilitarianism or Kantianism would appear to be inconsistent with other things we value, like personal integrity and flourishing, which depend upon pursuing individually determined projects and ways of life in rather single-minded ways. Maximizing the good is a full-time job, and the impartiality recommended by Kantian theory can get in the way of showing special care for those we know and love. All this is standard philosophical fare. However, more recently, philosophers and psychologists have begun to treat moral psychology as a legitimate branch of cognitive science. They inquire into the evolution of morality (e.g., Joyce, 2007; Nichols 2004), debate the human uniqueness of moral capacities (e.g., deWaal, 2006; Hauser, 2006), investigate the causal etiology of moral judgments (e.g., Haidt & Greene, 2002; Hauser et al., 2006; Prinz, 2006), attempt to map the neuroanatomy of moral reasoning (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Moll, et al., 2005), and consider what other affective and cognitive capacities are required by a creature who sees the world in moral terms. (See also Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). 1 In this essay, I discuss two issues whose interdependence and central importance for empirically informed moral psychology have not been fully grasped, or so I believe. First is what I call the Explananda Challenge. Let us assume that the primary question for moral psychology is this: How is it possible for human beings to be moral creatures? Deceptively simple, this question obscures a number of rather more difficult ones..
Flanagan, Owen J. (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Frey, William J. (forthcoming). Teaching virtue: Pedagogical implications of moral psychology. Science and Engineering Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral exemplar studies of computer and engineering professionals have led ethics teachers to expand their pedagogical aims beyond moral reasoning to include the skills of moral expertise. This paper frames this expanded moral curriculum in a psychologically informed virtue ethics. Moral psychology provides a description of character distributed across personality traits, integration of moral value into the self system, and moral skill sets. All of these elements play out on the stage of a social surround called a moral ecology. Expanding the practical and professional curriculum to cover the skills and competencies of moral expertise converts the classroom into a laboratory where students practice moral expertise under the guidance of their teachers. The good news is that this expanded pedagogical approach can be realized without revolutionizing existing methods of teaching ethics. What is required, instead, is a redeployment of existing pedagogical tools such as cases, professional codes, decision-making frameworks, and ethics tests. This essay begins with a summary of virtue ethics and informs this with recent research in moral psychology. After identifying pedagogical means for teaching ethics, it shows how these can be redeployed to meet a broader, skills based agenda. Finally, short module profiles offer concrete examples of the shape this redeployed pedagogical agenda would take in the practical and professional ethics classroom
Gert, Joshua & McKenna, Michael (2008). Review of Normativity and the will by R. Jay Wallace. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):559–563.   (Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , ed., moral psychology volume 2. the cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity , cambridge, mass.: Mit press, 2008, pp. XVIII + 585, us$30 (paper). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):525 – 528.   (Google)
Gill, Michael B. & Nichols, Shaun (2008). Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.   (Google)
Haidt, Jonathan, Moral psychology and the misunderstanding of religion.   (Google)
Abstract: Morality is one of those basic aspects of humanity, like sexuality and eating, that can’t fit into one or two academic fields. Morality is unique, however, in having a kind of spell that disguises it and protects its secrets. We all care about morality so passionately that it’s hard to look straight at it. We all look at the world through some kind of moral lens, and because most of the academic community uses the same lens, we validate each other’s visions and distortions. I think this problem is particularly acute in some of the new scientific writing about religion
Haidt, Jonathan, Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Here are our answers: 1) Moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop; these intuitions then enable and constrain the social construction of virtues and values, and 2) moral judgment is a product of quick and automatic intuitions that then give rise to slow, conscious moral reasoning. Our approach is therefore some kind of intuitionism. But there is more: moral reasoning done by an individual is usually devoted to finding reasons to support the individual’s intuitions, but moral reasons passed between people have a causal force. Moral discussion is a kind of distributed reasoning, and moral claims and justifications have important effects on individuals and societies. We believe that moral judgment is best understood as a social process, not as a private act of cognition. We therefore call our model the “Social Intuitionist Model.” Please don’t forget the social part of the model, or you will think that we think that morality is just blind instinct, no smarter than lust. You will accuse us of denying any causal role for moral reasoning or for culture, and you will feel that our theory is a threat to human dignity, to the possibility of moral change, or to the notion that philosophers have any useful role to play in our moral lives (see the debate between Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004, versus Haidt, 2004). Unfortunately, if our theory is correct, once you get angry at us, we will no longer be able to persuade you with the many good reasons we are planning on giving you below. So please, don’t forget the social part
Hekman, Susan J. (1995). Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Jacobs, Jonathan A. (2002). Dimensions of Moral Theory: An Introduction to Metaethics and Moral Psychology. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Jacobs, Jonathan A. (1995). Practical Realism and Moral Psychology. Georgetown University Press.   (Google)
Katsafanas, Paul (forthcoming). Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance. International Studies in Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Nietzsche frequently claims that agents are in some sense ignorant of their own actions. In this conference paper, I ask two questions: what exactly does Nietzsche mean by this claim, and how would the truth of this claim affect philosophical models of agency? I argue that Nietzsche's claim about self-ignorance is intended to draw attention to the fact that there are influences upon reflective episodes of choice that have three features. First, these influences are pervasive, occurring in every episode of choice. Second, these influences are normatively significant, in that their presence typically affects the outcome of deliberation. Third, these influences are difficult to detect, in that one needs to acquire a great deal of self-knowledge in order to begin to counteract their effects. I briefly sketch the way in which these claims follow from Nietzsche's philosophical psychology.
Katsafanas, Paul (forthcoming). Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology. In John Richardson & Ken Gemes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford.   (Google)
Abstract: Freud claimed that the concept of drive is "at once the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research." It is hard to think of a better proof of Freud's claim than the work of Nietzsche, which provides ample support for the idea that the drive concept is both tremendously important and terribly obscure. Although Nietzsche's accounts of agency and value everywhere appeal to drives, the concept has not been adequately explicated. I remedy this situation by providing an account of drives. I argue that Nietzschean drives are dispositions that generate evaluative orientations, in part by affecting perceptual saliences. In addition, I show that drive psychology has important implications for contemporary accounts of reflective agency. Contemporary philosophers often endorse a claim that has its origins in Locke and Kant: self-conscious agents are capable of reflecting on and thereby achieving a distance from their motives; therefore, these motives do not determine what the agent will do. Nietzsche's drive psychology shows that the inference in the preceding sentence is illegitimate. The drive psychology articulates a way in which motives can determine the agent's action by influencing the course of the agent's reflective deliberations. An agent who reflects on a motive and decides whether to act on it may, all the while, be surreptitiously guided by the very motive upon which he is reflecting. I show how this point complicates traditional models of the role of reflection in agency.
Kennett, Jeanette (2001). Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will, and compulsion have been the targets of much philosophical attack. Beginning with the problem of weakness of will, this volume builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency that highly regards the capacity for self-control. It addresses with clarity a range of important topics-such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness-making this work especially important to those interested in philosophy, psychology, law, and moral and legal responsibility in general
Knobe, Joshua & Leiter, Brian (2007). The case for Nietzschean moral psychology. In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract:      Contemporary moral psychology has been dominated by two broad traditions, one usually associated with Aristotle, the other with Kant. The broadly Aristotelian approach emphasizes the role of childhood upbringing in the development of good moral character, and the role of such character in ethical behavior. The broadly Kantian approach emphasizes the role of freely chosen conscious moral principles in ethical behavior. We review a growing body of experimental evidence that suggests that both of these approaches are predicated on an implausible view of human psychology. This evidence suggests that both childhood upbringing and conscious moral principles have extraordinarily little impact on people's moral behavior. This paper argues that moral psychology needs to take seriously a third approach, derived from Nietzsche. This approach emphasizes the role of heritable psychological and physiological traits in explaining behavior. In particular, it claims that differences in the degree to which different individuals behave morally can often be traced back to heritable differences between those individuals. We show that this third approach enjoys considerable empirical support - indeed that it is far better supported by the empirical data than are either the Aristotelian or Kantian traditions in moral psychology
Korsgaard, Christine M. (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kurtines, William M. & Gewirtz, Jacob L. (eds.) (1991). Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development. L. Erlbaum.   (Google)
Abstract: The publication of this unique three-volume set represents the culmination of years of work by a large number of scholars, researchers, and professionals in the field of moral development. The literature on moral behavior and development has grown to the point where it is no longer possible to capture the “state of the art” in a single volume. This comprehensive multi-volume Handbook marks an important transition because it provides evidence that the field has emerged as an area of scholarly activity in its own right. Spanning many professional domains, there is a striking variety of issues and topics surveyed: anthropology, biology, economics, education, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, social work, and more. By bringing together work on diverse topics, the editors have fostered a mutually-beneficial exchange not only between alternative approaches and perspectives, but also between “applied” and “pure” research interests. The Theory volume presents current and ongoing theoretical advances focusing on new developments or substantive refinements and revisions to existing theoretical frameworks. The Research volume summarizes and interprets the findings of specific, theory-driven, research programs; reviews research in areas that have generated substantial empirical findings; describes recent developments in research methodology/techniques; and reports research on new and emerging issues. The Application volume describes a diverse array of intervention projects — educational, clinical, organizational, and the like. Each chapter includes a summary report of results and findings, conceptual developments, and emerging issues or topics. Since the contributors to this publication are active theorists, researchers, and practitioners, it may serve to define directions that will shape the emerging literature in the field
Lapsley, Daniel K. (1996). Moral Psychology. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral functioning is a defining feature of human personhood and human social life. Moral Psychology provides an integrative and evaluative overview of the theoretical and empirical traditions that have attempted to make sense of moral cognition, prosocial behavior, and the development of virtuous character.This is the first book to integrate a comprehensive review of the psychological literatures with allied traditions in ethics. Moral rationality and decisionmaking; the development of the sense of fairness and justice, and of prosocial dispositions; as well as the notion of moral self and moral identity and their relation to issues of character and virtue are fully discussed in the rich contexts provided by psychological and philosophical paradigms. Lapsley emphasizes parenting and educational strategies for influencing moral behavior, reasoning, and character development, and charts a line of research for the “post-Kohlbergian era” in moral psychology.This book will be an invaluable text for advanced courses in moral psychology, as taught in departments of psychology, education, and philosophy. It will also prove to be a standard reference work for researchers and ethicists alike
Lear, Jonathan (2004). Psychoanalysis and the idea of a moral psychology: Memorial to Bernard Williams' philosophy. Inquiry 47 (5):515 – 522.   (Google | More links)
Lindemann, Hilde (2001). Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
London, Alex John (2000). Amenable to reason: Aristotle's rhetoric and the moral psychology of practical ethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: : An Aristotelian conception of practical ethics can be derived from the account of practical reasoning that Aristotle articulates in his Rhetoric and this has important implications for the way we understand the nature and limits of practical ethics. An important feature of this conception of practical ethics is its responsiveness to the complex ways in which agents form and maintain moral commitments, and this has important implications for the debate concerning methods of ethics in applied ethics. In particular, this feature enables us to understand casuistry, narrative, and principlism as mutually supportive modes of moral inquiry, rather than divergent and mutually exclusive methods of ethics. As a result, an Aristotelian conception of practical ethics clears the conceptual common ground upon which practical ethicists can forge a stable and realistic self-understanding
Lyons, William (2009). Conscience – an essay in moral psychology. Philosophy 84 (4):477-494.   (Google)
Machery, Edouard (forthcoming). The bleak implications of moral psychology. Neuroethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I focus on two claims made by Appiah in Experiments in Ethics: Doris’s and Harman’s criticism of virtue ethics fails, and moral psychology can be used to identify erroneous moral intuitions. I argue that both claims are erroneous
MacDonald, Scott (1991). Ultimate ends in practical reasoning: Aquinas's aristotelian moral psychology and Anscombe's fallacy. Philosophical Review 100 (1):31-66.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Wayne (ms). Conscience and confession in Rousseau's naturalistic moral psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: IN PLACE OF AN ABSTRACT: I here report on my work-in-progress addressing Rousseau’s naturalistic account of human agency. In the first half of these notes I attempt to throw light on the distinctive character of Rousseau’s philosophical naturalism. I compare Rousseau’s naturalism both to that of his own contemporaries and to some of our own (§1), but argue that Rousseauian naturalism is better understood as a development of ancient forms of ethical naturalism, particularly as mediated by Seneca (§2). I then turn to consider how Rousseau’s distinctive naturalistic commitments shape his treatment of the problem of self-consciousness, in particular with regard to the self-consciousness involved in action. I argue that Rousseau identifies two fundamental structures of self-consciousness essential to beings with natures like ours. The first is Rousseauian conscience, understood following the Stoics as a form of natural selfsentiment (§3); the second is associated with the distinctively human task of confession, understood as a form of self-judgment (§4)
Martin, Adrienne, Wanting to pull clouds: The moral psychology of hope 1. overview.   (Google)
Abstract: The extent of the approval with which Western culture views the attitude of hope can scarcely be exaggerated. Hope is seen as that which sustains us through wartime, death camps, slavery, natural disaster, extreme disease and disability—it is a light, a beacon, the last spark that fuels us when all else has failed. Hope is also seen as a moral and spiritual virtue—hoping for moral progress in this world, and salvation in the next, is at the heart of a meaningful human life. A positive view of hope infuses Western theology since Aquinas; utopian political philosophy, positive psychology, the self-help culture, the clinical research community, a wide range of activist groups, and a great deal of political rhetoric all maintain the affirmation of hope. The only qualm commonly expressed about hope is that it is sometimes “false:” that is, based on lies or misconceptions. False hope is bad because, first, it is bad to be deceived and, second, it may suck up resources better spent elsewhere. False hope, though, is not genuine hope, and genuine hope is an essential human good. My book Wanting to Pull Clouds will argue that the popular view of hope is vastly and dangerously oversimplified. Much more insidious than false hope is hope that is “genuine” and not based on lies or misconceptions, but that nevertheless bears important conceptual and empirical connections to passivity, inattention, excuse-making and wishful thinking. To be clear, this is not an anti-hope project. Rather, it examines the mechanisms that make hope desirable and virtuous, when it is these things; it becomes clear in the course of this examination that these very..
Merli, David (2009). Possessing moral concepts. Philosophia 37 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts
Nichols, Shaun (2005). Innateness and moral psychology. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although linguistic nativism has received the bulk of attention in contemporary innateness debates, moral nativism has perhaps an even deeper ancestry. If linguistic nativism is Cartesian, moral nativism is Platonic. Moral nativism has taken a backseat to linguistic nativism in contemporary discussions largely because Chomsky made a case for linguistic nativism characterized by unprecedented rigor. Hence it is not surprising that recent attempts to revive the thesis that we have innate moral knowledge have drawn on Chomsky’s framework. I’ll argue, however, that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The central argument in the Chomskian arsenal, of course, is the Poverty of the Stimulus (POS) argument. In section 1, I will set out the basic form of the POS argument and the conclusions about domain specificity and innate propositional knowledge that are supposed to follow. In section 2, I’ll distinguish 3 hypotheses about innateness and morality: rule nativism, moral principle nativism, and moral judgment nativism. In sections 3-5 I’ll then consider each of these hypotheses in turn. I’ll argue that while there is some reason to favor rule nativism, the arguments that moral principles and moral judgment derive from innate moral knowledge don’t work. The capacity for moral judgment is better explained by appeal to innate affective systems rather than innate moral knowledge. In the final section, I’ll suggest that the role of such affective mechanisms in structuring the mind complicates the standard picture about poverty of the stimulus arguments and nativism. For the affective mechanisms that influence cognitive structures can make contributions that are neither domain general nor domain specific
Nichols, Shaun, Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided by a plurality of moral rules2, and [3] prescriptive moral pluralism, which holds that moral judgment ought to be guided by a plurality of moral rules. In what follows, we will argue for all three positions. We will not present a comprehensive case for these positions nor address many of the arguments philosophers have developed against them. What we will try to show is that recent psychological work supports sentimentalist pluralism in both its descriptive and prescriptive forms
Flanagan Jr, Owen J. (1982). Virtue, sex, and gender: Some philosophical reflections on the moral psychology debate. Ethics 92 (3):499-512.   (Google | More links)
Penelhum, Terence (2009). Hume's moral psychology. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Pettit, Philip (1994). Consequentialism and moral psychology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1):1 – 17.   (Google)
Racine, Eric (2008). Enriching our views on clinical ethics: Results of a qualitative study of the moral psychology of healthcare ethics committee members. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   The contribution of healthcare ethics committee (HEC) members to HECs is fundamental. However, little is known about how HEC members view clinical ethics. We report results from a qualitative study of the moral psychology of HEC members. We found that contrary to the existing Kohlberg-based studies, HEC members hold a pragmatic non-expert view of clinical ethics based mainly on respect for persons and a commitment to the patient’s good. In general, HEC members hold deflationary views regarding moral theory. Ethical principles are not abstract foundations but the expression of moral commitments to patients that pre-exist awareness of moral theory. Emotions and proximity to patient sufferance fundamentally shape the views of HEC members on clinical ethics. Further work at the intersection of clinical ethics and qualitative research could bring to the foreground lay perspectives on moral problems that may differ from bioethics expert views
Radden, Jennifer (1985). Madness and Reason. G. Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
Ridge, Michael (1998). Humean Intentions. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178.   (Google)
Abstract: Many hold that the differences between intentions and desires are so significant that, not only can we not identify intentions with desires simpliciter, but that intentions are irreducible to any subclass of desires. My main aim is to explain why we should reject the irreducibility thesis in both forms, thereby defending the Humean view of action explanation.
Roberts, Rodney C. (2002). Toward a moral psychology of rectification: A reply to Thomas and Boxill. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):339–343.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Shelley Kapnek (2003). Raising a Mensch. Jewish Publication Society.   (Google)
Ryan, James A. (1998). Moral philosophy and moral psychology in mencius. Asian Philosophy 8 (1):47 – 64.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius' moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the 'virtue ethics' reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius' moral theory, in spite of Mencius' obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory
Saemi, Amir (2009). Intention and Permissibility. Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are two kinds of view in the literature concerning the relevance of intention to permissibility. While subjectivism assumes that an agent acts permissibly if he or she believes that the conduct is necessary for a moral purpose, for objectivism the de facto presence of an objective reason to justify one’s deeds is what matters. Recently, Scanlon and Hanser defend a moderate version of objectivism and subjectivism, respectively. Although I have a degree of sympathy toward both views, I will argue that the truth lies somewhere in between. The view that I suggest in this paper hopefully occupies a space between subjectivism and objectivism and can accommodate the intuitions that neither of those views cannot account for.
Segal, Jerome M. (2008). Agency, Illusion, and Well-Being: Essays in Moral Psychology and Philosophical Economics. Lexington Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Human agency -- Alienness : experiencing one's own incoherence -- Alienness, understanding, and self-deception -- God's project of self-deception -- Alienation and political agency -- How we fooled ourselves into believing in progress -- The monetary illusion -- The good life and economic activity -- Human activity : a molecular approach to action theory.
Singpurwalla, Rachel (2006). Reasoning with the irrational: Moral psychology in the protagoras. Ancient Philosophy 26 (2):243-258.   (Google)
Smith, Michael (2004). Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Over the last fifteen years, Michael Smith has written a series of seminal essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith's essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons, Williams and Korsgaard on internal and external reasons, the nature of self-control, weakness of will, compulsion, freedom, responsibility, the analysis of our rational capacities, moral realism, the dispositional theory of value, the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, the error theory, rationalist treatments of moral judgment, the practicality requirement on moral judgment and non-cognivist. This collection will be of interest to students in philosophy and psychology
Smith, Richard (2006). On diffidence: The moral psychology of self-belief. Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (1):51–62.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen; Kelly, Daniel; Haley, Kevin; Eng, Serena & Fessler, Daniel (2007). Harm. Affect & the moral / conventional distinction. Mind & Language 22 (2):117-131.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral/conventional task has been widely used to study the emergence of moral understanding in children and to explore the defi cits in moral understanding in clinical populations. Previous studies have indicated that moral transgressions, particularly those in which a victim is harmed, evoke a signature pattern of responses in the moral/conventional task: they are judged to be serious, generalizable and not authority dependent. Moreover, this signature pattern is held to be pan-cultural and to emerge early in development. However, almost all the evidence for these claims comes from studies using harmful transgressions of the sort that primary school children might commit in the schoolyard. In a study conducted on the Internet, we used a much wider range of harm transgressions, and found that they do not evoke the signature pattern of responses found in studies using only schoolyard transgressions. Paralleling other recent work, our study provides preliminary grounds for skepticism regarding many conclusions drawn from earlier research using the moral/conventional task.
Stich, Stephen (1993). Moral philosophy and mental representation. In R. Michod, L. Nadel & M. Hechter (eds.), The Origin of Values. Aldine de Gruyer.   (Google)
Abstract: Here is an overview of what is to come. In Sections I and II, I will sketch two of the projects frequently pursued by moral philosophers, and the methods typically invoked in those projects. I will argue that these projects presuppose (or at least suggest) a particular sort of account of the mental representation of human value systems, since the methods make sense only if we assume a certain kind of story about how the human mind stores information about values. The burden of my argument in Section III will be that while the jury is still out, there is some evidence suggesting that this account of mental representation is mistaken. If it is mistaken, it follows that two of the central methods of moral philosophy have to be substantially modified, or perhaps abandoned, and that the goals philosophers have sought to achieve with these methods may themselves be misguided. I fear that many of my philosophical colleagues will find this a quite radical suggestion. But if anything is clear in this area, it is that the methods we will be considering have not been conspicuously successful, though it certainly has not been for want of trying. So perhaps it is time for some radical, empirically informed rethinking of goals and methods in these parts of moral philosophy.
Stocker, Michael (1979). Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology. Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.   (Google | More links)
Straughan, Roger (1982). "I Ought to, But--": A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of Weakness of Will in Education. Distributed by Humanities Press.   (Google)
Superson, Anita (online). Feminist moral psychology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Thagard, Paul (2007). The moral psychology of conflicts of interest: Insights from affective neuroscience. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):367–380.   (Google | More links)
Thomas, R. Murray (1997). An Integrated Theory of Moral Development. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Thomas, Laurence (1983). Rationality and moral autonomy: An essay in moral psychology. Synthese 57 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Although there are many variations on the theme, so much is made of the good of moral autonomy that it is difficult not to suppose that there is everything to be said for being morally autonomous and nothing at all to be said for being morally nonautonomous. However, this view of moral autonomy cannot be made to square with the well-received fact that most people are morally nonautonomous — not, at any rate, unless one is prepared to maintain that most people are irrational in this respect. I am not. Thus, I reject what I take to be the prevailing view of moral autonomy. I argue that it is false that (1) moral autonomy is such that it is rational for every person to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous, but true that (2) moral autonomy is such that if anyone is morally autonomous, then it is rational for him to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous
Velleman, J. David (1992). The guise of the good. Noûs 26 (1):3-26.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent is conceived as being capable of intentional action—and hence as being an agent—only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent while ignoring those agents who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk. I hope for a moral psychology that has room for the whole motley crew. I shall begin by examining why some philosophers have thought that the attitudes motivating intentional actions involve judgments of value. I shall then argue that their conception of these attitudes is incorrect. Finally, I shall argue that practical reason should not be conceived as a faculty for pursuing value.
Vermeule, Blakey (2000). The Party of Humanity: Writing Moral Psychology in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the relationship between the self and society? Where do moral judgments come from? As Blakey Vermeule demonstrates in The Party of Humanity, such questions about sociability and moral philosophy were central to eighteenth-century writers and artists. Vermeule focuses on a group of aesthetically complicated moral texts: Alexander Pope's character sketches and Dunciad , Samuel Johnson's Life of Savage, and David Hume's self-consciously theatrical writings on pride and his autobiographical writings on religious melancholia. These writers and their characters confronted familiar social dilemmas--sexual desire, gender identity, family relations, cheating, ambition, status, rivalry, and shame--and responded by developing a practical ethics about their own behavior at the same time that they refined their moral judgments of others. The Party of Humanity frames its discussion about emotions, social conflict, and aesthetics within two broad theories: the emerging field of evolutionary psychology and Kantian moral philosophy. By studying how eighteenth-century Britons experienced the demands of their social identities, Vermeule argues, we can better understand the most salient problems facing moral philosophy today--the issue of self-interest and the question of how moral norms are shaped by social agendas
Vidarte, Vicente Sanfélix (1997). Mind and morality: An examination of Hume's moral psychology. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 12 (2):384-386.   (Google)
Viens, A. M. (2007). Addiction, responsibility and moral psychology. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):17 – 19.   (Google)
Vogler, Candace A. (2001). John Stuart Mill's Deliberative Landscape: An Essay in Moral Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book charts the fate of philosophical theory about what sorts of things are worth pursuing and why by watching its influence on the philosopher John Stuart Mill whose whole early education was predicated upon the truth of the theory. Drawing on the anti-instrumentalist strands of Millian thought, Vogler constructs a powerful objection to instrumentalism about practical rationality
Walker, Margaret Urban (2007). Moral psychology. In Linda Alcoff & Eva Feder Kittay (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Wallace, R. Jay (2005). Moral psychology. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Wallace, R. Jay (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason, and they articulate and defend a unified framework for thinking about those issues. The volume also features a helpful new introduction
Watson, Gary (2002). Review: Agency and responsibility: A common sense moral psychology. Mind 111 (444).   (Google)
Wilson, Richard W. & Schochet, Gordon J. (eds.) (1980). Moral Development and Politics. Praeger.   (Google)
Wolf, Susan (2007). Moral psychology and the unity of the virtues. Ratio 20 (2):145–167.   (Google | More links)
Wren, Thomas E. (1991). Caring About Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology. Mit Press.   (Google)
Young, Liane & Saxe, Rebecca (forthcoming). It's not just what you do, but what's on your mind: A review of Kwame Anthony Appiah's “experiments in ethics”. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the impact of science on philosophy? In “Experiments in Ethics”, Kwame Anthony Appiah addresses this question for morality and ethics. Appiah suggests that scientific results may undermine moral intuitions by undermining our confidence in the actual sources of our intuitions, or by invalidating our factual assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Appiah worries that scientific results showing situational causes on human behavior force us to abandon the intuition, formalized in virtue ethics, that what matters is “who you are on the inside”. In this review, we agree with Appiah that scientific results at once force and do not force us to abandon this intuition. We also propose that Appiah’s worry is due in part to an over-simplified conception of “internal causes”, shared widely among scientists and philosophers. By re-introducing the true richness of internal causes invoked in moral judgments, we hope to relax the tension between scientific results and moral intuitions. Ultimately, we propose that science can undermine and constrain but cannot affirm our commitment to specific moral intuitions

5.1l.1 Moral Emotion

Anderson, Elizabeth (2008). Emotions in Kant's later moral philosophy : Honour and the phenomenology of moral value. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.   (Google)
Antonaccio, Maria (2001). Picturing the soul: Moral psychology and the recovery of the emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch''s moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of emotions in ethics. In particular, it acknowledges the centrality of moral psychology to ethics and reclaims the notion of consciousness rather than the will as the primary mode of human moral being. At a second, more substantive level, the paper explores the relation between the emotions and consciousness. Specifically, it defends a cognitivist and reflexive theory of the emotions which affirms a strong relation between the emotions and our evaluative beliefs. On this view, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective value. In order to earn their cognitive status, however, the emotions must be tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up images of reality to serve its own purposes. Therefore, a theory of the Good must be part of the critical content of a reflexive theory of the emotions
Armstrong, David (2008). Be angry and sin not" : Philodemus versus the stoics on natural bites and natural emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Aureli, Filippo & Schaffner, Colleen M. (2001). Empathy as a special case of emotional mediation of social behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):23-24.   (Google)
Abstract: Empathy can be viewed as an intervening variable to explain complex webs of causation between multiple factors and the resulting responses. The mediating role of emotion, implicit in the concept of an intervening variable, can be at the basis of the flexibility of empathic responses. Knowledge of the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms is needed for empathy to be considered as a biologically functional intervening variable
Bell, Macalester (2005). A woman's scorn: Toward a feminist defense of contempt as a moral emotion. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. I argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male-dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. I begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the nature and moral significance of contempt, and argue that contempt can be morally and politically valuable for the same reasons that feminists have defended other negative emotions. I close by considering why feminists have been hesitant to defend contempt as a morally and politically important emotion
Ben-ze'ev, A. (1992). Emotional and moral evaluations. Metaphilosophy 23 (3):214-29.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1997). Emotions and morality. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (2).   (Google)
Berman, Douglas A. & Bibas, Stephanos (ms). Engaging capital emotions.   (Google)
Abstract:      The Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, is about to decide whether the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for child rape. Commentators are aghast, viewing this as a vengeful recrudescence of emotion clouding sober, rational criminal justice policy. To their minds, emotion is distracting. To ours, however, emotion is central to understand the death penalty. Descriptively, emotions help to explain many features of our death-penalty jurisprudence. Normatively, emotions are central to why we punish, and denying or squelching them risks prompting vigilantism and other unhealthy outlets for this normal human reaction. The emotional case for the death penalty for child rape may be even stronger than for adult murders, contrary to what newspaper editorials are suggesting. Finally, we suggest ways in which death-penalty abolitionists can stop pooh-poohing emotions' role and instead fight the death penalty on emotional terrain, particularly by harnessing the language of mercy and human fallibility
Berner, Knut (2001). Local anaesthesia, the increase of the evil through emotional impoverishment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Evil should be characterised as a specific constellation, which results from destructive connections between individual activities and systemic influences. The article shows some important aspects of the structure of evil and prefers the terms of wickedness and obscene coincidences to describe its own character. Therefore, also the division between rationality and affectivity appears as inadequate, because evil has on the one side an intrinsic attractiveness for individuals and is on the other side in modern societies more and more a product of a rationality, which is free from passion. Especially the emotional impoverishment is responsible for the increase of evil, which is demonstrated by two examples. Based on Paul Ricoeur, the evolution of malum can be developed by a short analyse of the relationship between Ethics and Emotions
Bett, Richard (2008). The stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):504–506.   (Google | More links)
Birkhead, Douglas (1997). Book review: The role of emotions in moral decisions: A book review by Douglas birkhead. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 12 (1):57 – 59.   (Google)
Blasi, Augusto (1999). Emotions and moral motivation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):1–19.   (Google | More links)
Bolender, John (2003). The genealogy of the moral modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources
Brady, Michael S. (2010). Virtue, emotion, and attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity
Brennan, Tad (2005). The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Tad Brennan explains how to live the Stoic life--and why we might want to. Stoicism has been one of the main currents of thought in Western civilization for two thousand years: Brennan offers a fascinating guide through the ethical ideas of the original Stoic philosophers, and shows how valuable these ideas remain today, both intellectually and in practice. He writes in a lively informal style which will bring Stoicism to life for readers who are new to ancient philosophy. The Stoic Life will also be of great interest to philosophers and classicists seeking a full understanding of the intellectual legacy of the Stoics
Bryant, Garry (1987). Ten-fifty P. I.: Emotion and the photographer's role. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 2 (2):32 – 39.   (Google)
Burrow, Sylvia (2009). Bodily limits to autonomy : Emotion, attitude, and self-defense. In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Butler, Brian E. (2002). The Necessity of Understanding Thumos, and the Misuse of Emotion in Modern Political Theory, The Review of Communication, Vol. The Review of Communication 2 (2).   (Google)
Carr, David (2002). Feelings in moral conflict and the hazards of emotional intelligence. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension
Cartwright, David (1987). Kant's view of the moral significance of kindhearted emotions and the moral insignificance of Kant's view. Journal of Value Inquiry 21 (4).   (Google)
Carr, David (2009). Virtue, mixed emotions and moral ambivalence. Philosophy 84 (1):31-46.   (Google)
Cassin, Chrystine E. (1968). Emotions and evaluations. Personalist 49:563-571.   (Google)
Charlton, William (2008). Emotional life in three dimensions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):291-300.   (Google)
Abstract: abstract  I first summarise Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion and place it against its historical background. Borrowing distinctions from Plato I then argue that the emotions discussed in Hiding From Humanity affect us primarily as social beings, not as individuals, and suggest modifying and educating them by social means
Clavien, Christine & Klein, Rebekka, Eager for fairness or for revenge? Altruism and emotion in neuroeconomics.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to understand the human capacity for altruism one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the relevance that recent findings in neu-roeconomics may have for the philosophical controversy between altruism and egoism, with par-ticular emphasis on the importance of emotion in understanding altruistic motivation. After briefly contextualising and sketching the philosophical controversy, we survey the results of three interesting studies that provide stimulating clues for the debate. We focus our attention particu-larly on the 2004 study in neuroeconomics by Dominique de Quervain, Urs Fischbacher and col-leagues, which contains an argument in favour of psychological egoism. On the basis of an emo-tional account of decision-making, we show that their analysis of the results – people seek fair-ness – may be questioned; we propose an alternative interpretation of the data – people seek re-venge. Unfortunately, our ‘emotion-directed’ interpretation renders this study far less relevant for the debate over the possibility of psychological altruism than previously expected
Coeckelbergh, Mark (forthcoming). Moral appearances: Emotions, robots, and human morality. Ethics and Information Technology.   (Google)
Abstract: Can we build ‘moral robots’? If morality depends on emotions, the answer seems negative. Current robots do not meet standard necessary conditions for having emotions: they lack consciousness, mental states, and feelings. Moreover, it is not even clear how we might ever establish whether robots satisfy these conditions. Thus, at most, robots could be programmed to follow rules, but it would seem that such ‘psychopathic’ robots would be dangerous since they would lack full moral agency. However, I will argue that in the future we might nevertheless be able to build quasi-moral robots that can learn to create the appearance of emotions and the appearance of being fully moral. I will also argue that this way of drawing robots into our social-moral world is less problematic than it might first seem, since human morality also relies on such appearances
Colombetti, Giovanna & Torrance, Steve (2009). Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):505-526.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007 ) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself
Connelly, Shane; Helton-Fauth, Whitney & Mumford, Michael D. (2004). A managerial in-basket study of the impact of trait emotions on ethical choice. Journal of Business Ethics 51 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship of various trait emotions to the ethical choices of 189 college students who completed a managerial decision-making task as part of an in-basket exercise in a laboratory setting. Prior research regarding emotion influences on ethical decision-making and linkages between emotions and cognition informed hypotheses about how different types of emotions impact ethical choices. Findings supported our expectations that positive and negative emotions classified as active would be more strongly related to interpersonally-directed ethical choices than to organizationally-directed ones, and that passive emotions would be less related to ethical choices than active emotions. Implications for ethical decision-making research and organizational practices are discussed
Cooper, John (ms). The emotional life of the wise by John M. Cooper.   (Google)
Abstract: The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature itself demands and indeed justifies—under certain circumstances at any rate—emotional attachments to or aversions from, and reactions to, some persons, things, and happenings, they introduced a theory of what came to be called eÈpãyeiai, good and acceptable ways of feeling or being affected. For short I will render these in English by “good feelings.”1 They divided these into three generic kinds, which they dubbed “joy” (xarã), “wish” (boÊlhsiw) and “caution” (eÈlãbeia). They ranged these alongside, and set them in sharp contrast to, three of the four highest genera into which they divided the normal human emotions: “pleasure” (≤donÆ), i.e., being pleased about something,2 “appetitive desire” (§piyuµ€a), and “fear” (fÒbow), respectively. The Stoics maintained that, though ordinary, familiar human emotions such as these last-named ones were always bad, the three sorts of “good feeling,” and their more specific variations (since these three are only the basic genera into which lots of other good ways of feeling will fall), were not merely free from the grounds of criticism on which ordinary emotions were rejected, and so were perfectly acceptable. The fully perfected human being (the “wise person”) would indeed regularly be subject to them
Coplan, Amy (2010). Feeling without thinking: Lessons from the ancients on emotion and virtue-acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue
D'arms, Justin (2004). Bennett Helm, emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001), pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.   (Google)
D'Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (1994). Expressivism, morality, and the emotions. Ethics 104 (4):739-763.   (Google | More links)
D'Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (2000). The moralistic fallacy: On the "appropriateness" of emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.   (Google | More links)
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (forthcoming). Is Shame a Social Emotion? In Anita Konzelman-Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans-Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Self Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several ways in which the social claim with regard to shame has been cashed out in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these claims are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion that shame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each claim in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory of shame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture of shame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of being apt to shed light on those cases where others seem to play no role in why we feel shame.
Teroni, Fabrice & Deonna, Julien A. (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.
Deshpande, Satish P. & Joseph, Jacob (2009). Impact of emotional intelligence, ethical climate, and behavior of Peers on ethical behavior of nurses. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This study examines factors impacting ethical behavior of 103 hospital nurses. The level of emotional intelligence and ethical behavior of peers had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Independence climate had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Other ethical climate types such as professional, caring, rules, instrumental, and efficiency did not impact ethical behavior of respondents. Implications of this study for researchers and practitioners are discussed
Dillon, Robin S. (1997). Self-respect: Moral, emotional, political. Ethics 107 (2):226-249.   (Google | More links)
Diorio, Joseph A. (1984). Do altruistic emotions have intrinsic value? Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1).   (Google)
Dunbar, W. Scott (2005). Emotional engagement in professional ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Recent results from two different studies show evidence of strong emotional engagement in moral dilemmas that require personal involvement or ethical problems that involve significant inter-personal issues. This empirical evidence for a connection between emotional engagement and moral or ethical choices is interesting because it is related to a fundamental survival mechanism rooted in human evolution. The results lead one to question when and how emotional engagement might occur in a professional ethical situation. However, the studies employed static dilemmas or problems that offered only two choices whose outcome was certain or nearly so, whereas actual problems in professional ethics are dynamic and typically involve considerable uncertainty. The circumstances of three example cases suggest that increasing personal involvement and uncertainty could have been perceived as changes, threats, or opportunities and could therefore have elicited an emotional response as a way to ensure the reputation, integrity or success of oneself or a group to which one belongs. Such emotional engagement is only suggested and more studies and experiments are required to better characterize the role of emotional engagement in professional ethics
Dunlop, Francis (1984). The education of the emotions. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):245–255.   (Google | More links)
Dyck, Arthur J. & Padilla, Carlos (2009). The empathic emotions and self-love in Bishop Joseph Butler and the neurosciences. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (4):577-612.   (Google)
Abstract: In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit—that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling."
Fernandez-Berrocal, Pablo & Extremera, Natalio (2005). About emotional intelligence and moral decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
Fine, Cordelia (2006). Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the 'automatization' of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows
Fjelstad, Per, Restraint and emotion in cicero's.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2008). Aristotle and theophrastus on the emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2002). Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics. Duckworth.   (Google)
Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Barry, Bruce & Long, D. Adam (2009). Lying and smiling: Informational and emotional deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4).   (Google)
Furtak, Rick Anthony (2003). Thoreau's emotional stoicism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (2).   (Google)
Gaudine, Alice & Thorne, Linda (2001). Emotion and ethical decision-making in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 31 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: While the influence of emotion on individuals'' ethical decisions has been identified by numerous researchers, little is known about how emotions influence individuals'' ethical decision process. Thus, it is not clear whether different emotions promote and/or discourage ethical decision-making in the workplace. To address this gap, this paper develops a model that illustrates how emotion affects the components of individuals'' ethical decision-making process. The model is developed by integrating research findings that consider the two dimensions of emotion, arousal and feeling state, into an applied cognitive-developmental perspective on the process of ethical decision-making. The model demonstrates that certain emotional states influence the individual''s propensity to identify ethical dilemmas, facilitate the formation of the individual''s prescriptive judgments at sophisticated levels of moral development, lead to ethical decision choices that are consistent with the individual''s prescriptive judgements, and promote the individual''s compliance with his or her ethical decision choices. In particular, the model suggests that individuals experiencing arousal and positive affect resolve ethical dilemmas in a manner consistent with more sophisticated cognitive moral structures. Implications for theory and practice are discussed
Gert, Joshua (2009). Colour, emotion and objectivity. Analysis 69 (4).   (Google)
Gintis, Herbert (2002). Altruism and emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):258-259.   (Google)
Abstract: If altruism requires self-control, people must consider altruistic acts as costly, the benefits of which will only be recouped in the future. By contrast, I shall present evidence that altruism is dictated by emotions: Altruists secure an immediate payoff from performing altruistic acts, so no element of self-control is present, and no future reward is required or expected
Goldie, Peter (2008). Thick concepts and emotion. In Daniel Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams. Routledge.   (Google)
Guyer, Paul (2008). Humean critics, imaginative fluency, and emotional responsiveness: A follow-up to Stephanie Ross. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: , Stephanie Ross argues that four of Hume's five criteria for qualified critics in "Of the Standard of Taste’, namely practise, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense, should be understood as conditions for improving the basic constituent of taste, namely delicacy of perception, in real critics whose judgments can be canonical or guiding for the rest of us, but that delicacy of perception needs to be supplemented by what she calls imaginative fluency and emotional responsiveness to provide a fuller conception of the basic constituents of taste. I support Ross's approach by showing that Hume's immediate successors in Scottish aesthetics Alexander Gerard and James Beattie understood his conception of the qualifications of good critics and supplemented his conception of the basic constituents of taste in precisely the same way that Ross does. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
Haidt, Jonathan, The emotional dog gets mistaken for a possum.   (Google)
Abstract: Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) critique the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), but the model that they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the “possum” model. They make three charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After I defend the honor of the social intuitionist model, I raise two areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning, and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. I present three clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity
Hartz, Glenn A. (1990). Desire and emotion in the virtue tradition. Philosophia 20 (1-2).   (Google)
Hauser, Marc; Young, Liane & Tranel, Daniel, Does emotion mediate the effect of an action's moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence.   (Google)
Abstract: Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution of intent to the actor, or the judgment that the actor acted intentionally. We test this hypothesis by presenting cases of morally bad and morally good action to seven individuals with deficits in emotional processing resulting from damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). If normal emotional processing is necessary for the observed asymmetry, then individuals with VMPC lesions should show no asymmetry. Our results provide no support for this hypothesis: like normal individuals, those with VMPC lesions showed the same asymmetry, tending to judge that an action was intentional when it was morally bad but not when it was morally good. Based on this finding, we suggest that normal emotional processing is not responsible for the observed asymmetry of intentional attributions and thus does not mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Helm, Bennett (2000). Emotional reason how to deliberate about value. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):1-22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Deliberation about personal, non-moral values involves elements of both invention and discovery. Thus, we invent our values by freely choosing them, where such distinctively human freedom is essential to our defining and taking responsibility for the kinds of persons we are; nonetheless, we also discover our values insofar as we can deliberate about them rationally and arrive at non-arbitrary decisions about what has value in our lives. Yet these notions of invention and discovery seem inconsistent with each other, and the possibility of deliberation about value therefore seems paradoxical. My aim is to argue that this apparent paradox is no paradox at all. I offer an account of what it is to value something largely in terms of emotions and desires. By examining the rational interconnections among emotions and evaluative judgments, I argue for an account both of how judgments can shape our emotions, thereby shaping our values in a way that makes intelligible the possibility of inventing our values, and of how our emotions can simultaneously rationally constrain correct deliberation, thereby making intelligible the possibility of discovering our values. The result is a rejection of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of value and deliberation about value
Helm, Bennett W. (1994). The Significance of Emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):319-331.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Henik, Erika (2008). Mad as hell or scared stiff? The effects of value conflict and emotions on potential whistle-blowers. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Existing whistle-blowing models rely on “cold” economic calculations and cost-benefit analyses to explain the judgments and actions of potential whistle-blowers. I argue that “hot” cognitions – value conflict and emotions – should be added to these models. I propose a model of the whistle-blowing decision process that highlights the reciprocal influence of “hot” and “cold” cognitions and advocate research that explores how value conflict and emotions inform reporting decisions. I draw on the cognitive appraisal approach to emotions and on the social-functional value pluralism model to generate propositions
Hobson, R. Peter (1993). The emotional origins of social understanding. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):227 – 249.   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co-ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of 'persons' who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism
Hookway, Christopher (2003). Affective states and epistemic immediacy. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):78-96.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks in ethics and epistemology, this expectation is not fulfilled. Of course, the vocabularies of evaluation are different: in ethics, we are concerned with issues of right and wrong, virtue and vice, moral obligation, and so on; and in epistemology, it is most commonly assumed that we are interested in whether states count as knowledge or as justified beliefs, with whether beliefs and strategies of belief formation are rational
Hurley, Elisa A. (2005). Apt affect: Moral concept mastery and the phenomenology of emotions. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002). Review: Emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation and the nature of value. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Hutchinson, Phil (2008). Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Experimental methods and conceptual confusion : philosophy, science, and what emotions really are -- To 'make our voices resonate' or 'to be silent'? : shame as fundamental ontology -- Emotion, cognition, and world -- Shame and world.
Ihara, Craig K. (1991). David Wong on emotions in mencius. Philosophy East and West 41 (1):45-53.   (Google | More links)
Im, Manyul (1999). Emotional control and virtue in the "mencius". Philosophy East and West 49 (1):1-27.   (Google | More links)
Kabasenche, William P. (2007). Emotions, memory suppression, and identity. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):33 – 34.   (Google)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2008). Reasons of the heart: Emotion, rationality, and the "wisdom of repugnance". Hastings Center Report 38 (4):pp. 36-45.   (Google)
Abstract: Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment
Kieran, Matthew (1998). Valuing emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth hegeman. Cambridge university press, 1996, pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 hb, £15.95 pb. Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.   (Google)
Kirchengast, Tyrone, Sentencing law and the 'emotional catharsis' of victim's rights in nsw homicide cases.   (Google)
Abstract: The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal ('NSWCCA') continues to endorse the principle that victim impact statements drafted by family members of homicide victims, while being received into sentencing proceedings, cannot influence the sentences of offenders. Family perspectives on the impact of the death of the primary victim are restricted out of the need to assess harm in terms of the immediate circumstances of the offence, maintaining respect for the equality of human life. Despite this limiting principle, the NSWCCA acknowledges that impact statements continue to be important, providing, as indicated by Sully J in R v FD; R v FD; R v JD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392 ('R v FD; R v FD; R v JD'), an 'emotional catharsis' for victims of crime. However, recent amendments to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) require that a court recognise the harm done to the victim and community. In the context of this amendment, the NSWCCA has suggested that the rule excluding family statements may now need to be revised to include the perspectives of family members as representing those of the community. This article explores this proposal in terms of the status of family statements in other jurisdictions where such statements are deemed relevant to sentence
Klein, Martha (2001). Valuing emotions. Michael Stocker Elizabeth hegeman. Mind 110 (439).   (Google)
Koons, Jeremy Randel (2001). Emotions and incommensurable moral concepts. Philosophy 76 (4):585-604.   (Google)
Abstract: Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2003). On the very idea of "negative emotions". Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.   (Google | More links)
Lacewing, Michael (2005). Emotional self-awareness and ethical deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lanteri, Alessandro; Chelini, Chiara & Rizzello, Salvatore (2008). An experimental investigation of emotions and reasoning in the trolley problem. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (‹lever’ and ‹stranger’) either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given
Maroney, Terry A., Emotional common sense as constitutional law.   (Google)
Abstract:      In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked post-abortion regret to justify a ban on a particular abortion procedure. The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident." That such observations could drive critical legal determinations was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously unidentified norm permeating constitutional jurisprudence: reliance on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about the emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal to its holder-but this appearance is misleading. This Article articulates and evaluates the Court's reliance on emotional common sense in constitutional law. It demonstrates that emotional common sense sometimes imports into law inaccurate accounts of the world. Justices of every ideological orientation invoke it in a manner that comports with their desired ends. Emotional common sense colors interpretation of evidence, manifests in selective perspective-taking, and shapes jurisprudential choices. Common-sense evaluation of the emotions also necessarily embodies underlying beliefs and values; enforcing them on others under the guise of simple truth silently forces a false consensus. Emotional common sense has a limited place in constitutional law. It may be cautiously embraced where an emotional phenomenon is relatively basic and universal. In all other cases the embrace should be withheld. Evaluating isolated instances in which the Court has looked beyond emotional common sense, the Article shows that a superior path exists
McCullagh, C. B. (1990). The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):44-58.   (Google | More links)
Morris, Michael K. (1992). Moral conflict and ordinary emotional experience. Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2).   (Google)
Parkinson, B. (2004). Unpicking reasonable emotions. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pelletier, Kathie L. & Bligh, Michelle C. (2008). The aftermath of organizational corruption: Employee attributions and emotional reactions. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (4).   (Google)
PhD, R. G. N. (2000). Emotion, moral perception, and nursing practice. Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):123–133.   (Google | More links)
Pizarro, David (2000). Nothing more than feelings? The role of emotions in moral judgment. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (4):355–375.   (Google | More links)
Pugmire, David (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? What distinguishes good feeling from (just) feeling good? Is there such a distinction at all? The answer to these questions becomes clearer if we realize that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It may be that good feeling depends on feeling truly if we are to be really moved, moved in the way that avoids the need for constant, fretful replenishment and reinforcement. To be sound, emotions may need to be capable of genuineness, depth, and other kinds of integrity. And that, in turn, may require certain virtues of mind, such as truthfulness, temperateness, and even courage, that are more familiar at the level of action. The governing aim of this book is to demonstrate that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions and the emotional life
Rietti, Sophie (2008). Emotional intelligence as educational goal: A case for caution. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):631-643.   (Google)
Abstract: Originally conceptualised as a set of capacities for understanding and managing emotions, emotional intelligence (EI) has become associated, mainly due to the work of Daniel Goleman, with life success skills, prosocial attitudes and moral and civic virtues. But EI, which may not in itself be teachable, need not lead to these outcomes, which may not necessarily converge. Also, what counts as life success, prosocial attitudes and moral and civic virtues can only be determined, if at all, by facing the value questions involved as value questions, not by conflating them with applied science
Roberts, Robert C. (1989). Aristotle on virtues and emotions. Philosophical Studies 56 (3).   (Google)
Roberts, Robert Campbell (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology
Schaller, Jean-Pierre (1968). Our Emotions and the Moral Act. Staten Island, N.Y.,Alba House.   (Google)
Sigler, M. (2000). The story of justice:Retribution, mercy, and the role of emotions in the capital sentencing process. Law and Philosophy 19 (3):339-367.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay examines Martha Nussbaum's prescription for tempering retribution with mercy in the capital sentencing process. Nussbaum observes that the operation of retribution in the ancient world resulted in harsh and indiscriminate punishment without regard to the particularities of the offender and his crime. In the interest of mercy, Nussbaum advocates the use of the novel as a model for a more compassionate sentencing process. An examination of Nussbaum's ``novel prescription'' reveals that the retribution that operates in the modern criminal law, and in the Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, already accommodates the values of justice –individuation, particularization, and proportionality – that are characteristic of the mercy tradition. Moreover, the rich narrative approach that Nussbaum favors is by no means congenial to merciful punishment. Because the particularistic detail of the novel form is not confined to the sympathetic portrayal of the defendant, the emotionalism that Nussbaum urges encompasses as well emotional details about the characteristics of the defendant's victim. Such victim impact evidence is consistent with the novel form, but is unlikely to promote merciful judgment. Instead, the details of victim impact evidence can be expected to exacerbate a sentencing authority's inclination to judge a capital defendant harshly. The novel thus provides a poor model for the capital sentencing process because it fosters the sort of unchecked emotionalism that undermines the rational decision making that the Supreme Court has sought to achieve

5.1l.1.1 Responsibility and Emotion

Blair, R. J. R. (2007). What emotional responding is to blame it might not be to responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.   (Google)
Teroni, Fabrice & Bruun, Otto (forthcoming). Shame, Guilt and Morality. The Journal Of Moral Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame, and the Social Argument to shame’s link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt has obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives.
Gardner, John (2009). The logic of excuses and the rationality of emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability of such excuses depends on what wrong one is trying to excuse. No excuse is available in respect of all wrongs. Some wrongs, indeed, are inexcusable. This throws up the interesting question of what makes a particular emotion apt to excuse a particular wrong. Why is fear, for example, more apt to excuse more serious wrongs than, say, pride or shame? This question leads naturally to another. Why are some emotions, such as lust, greed, and envy, apparently not apt to furnish any excuses at all? Can one not be overcome by them? Can they not drive one to wrongdoing as readily as fear and grief? Or is that not the point?
Roberts, Robert C. (1984). Solomon on the control of emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Schoeman, Ferdinand David (ed.) (1987). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are: what scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his character given genetic and environmental factors; does an account of responsiblity provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions; are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurrences over which we have no control; does responsibility for the consequences of our acts require that they were intended or simply expected; and how have a number of influential previous philosophers, including Aristotle, Maimonides, and Spinoza, approached these questions?
Schlossberger, Eugene (1986). Why we are responsible for our emotions. Mind 95 (377):37-56.   (Google | More links)
Scrutton, Anastasia (2009). Living like common people: Emotion, will, and divine passibility. Religious Studies 45 (4):373-393.   (Google)

5.1l.1.2 Moral Emotion, Misc

Ansell, Nicola & Van Blerk, Lorraine (2005). Joining the conspiracy? Negotiating ethics and emotions in researching (around) AIDS in southern Africa. Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (1):61 – 82.   (Google)
Abstract: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an emotive subject, particularly in southern Africa. Among those who have been directly affected by the disease, or who perceive themselves to be personally at risk, talking about AIDS inevitably arouses strong emotions - amongst them fear, distress, loss and anger. Conventionally, human geography research has avoided engagement with such emotions. Although the ideal of the detached observer has been roundly critiqued, the emphasis in methodological literature on 'doing no harm' has led even qualitative researchers to avoid difficult emotional encounters. Nonetheless, research is inevitably shaped by emotions, not least those of the researchers themselves. In this paper, we examine the role of emotions in the research process through our experiences of researching the lives of young AIDS migrants in Malawi and Lesotho. We explore how the context of the research gave rise to the production of particular emotions, and how, in response, we shaped the research, presenting a research agenda focused more on migration than AIDS. This example reveals a tension between universalised ethics expressed through ethical research guidelines that demand informed consent, and ethics of care, sensitive to emotional context. It also demonstrates how dualistic distinctions between reason and emotion, justice and care, global and local are unhelpful in interpreting the ethics of research practice
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Ciocchetti, Christopher (2009). Emotions, retribution, and punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.   (Google)
Abstract: I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires
Cohen, Taya R. (2010). Moral emotions and unethical bargaining: The differential effects of empathy and perspective taking in deterring deceitful negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents’ networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness predicted disapproval of false promises and misrepresentation. Empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the analysis. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (2008). Differentiating Shame from Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..   (Google)
Abstract: How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.
de Sousa, Ronald (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
Jacobson, Daniel (2008). Review of Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2005). Justice and desert-based emotions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53 – 68.   (Google)
Abstract: A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent
Nichols, Shaun, Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Prinz, Jesse, Is empathy necessary for morality?   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that empathy is a good thing, from a moral point of view. It is something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that’s true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is there little evidence for the claim that empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy might make us better people, but placing empathy at the center of our moral lives may be ill‐advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn’t centrally involve emotions. I think emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Prinz, 2007). It’s just that empathetic emotions are not ideally suited for these jobs. Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little more about the target of the attack. What is empathy? And what would it mean to say empathy is necessary for morality? With respect to the first question, much has been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathy as, “as an other‐oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person.” This is not the definition I will be using. Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic concern.” Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact, like a beautiful building that has into disrepair. Empathy, seems to connote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a find of feeling‐for an object and a feeling‐on‐behalf‐of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy, and I leave it as an open possibility that concern is highly important, if not necessary, for morality. Indeed, concern often seems to involve an element kind of moral anger, which I will argue is very important to morality. It is also important to distinguish empathy from sympathy. Suppose I feel outraged for someone who has been brainwashed into thinking she should follow a cult leader who is urging mass suicide. That would not necessarily qualify as empathy. As Darwall (1998: 261) points out, sympathy is a third‐person emotional response, whereas empathy involves putting oneself in another person’s shoes. But 1 Darwall’s definition is also somewhat problematic. He says, “Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings, whether one comes thereby to be concerned … or not.” This definition has two features, which I would like to avoid. First, the appeal to imagination seems overly intellectual. Imagination sounds like a kind of mental act that requires effort on the part of the imaginer. As Darwell recognizes, empathy in its simplest form empathy is just emotional contagion: catching the emotion that another person feels (Hatfield et al., 1994; Hoffman, 2000). It seems inflated to call contagion an imaginative act. Also, I want to resist Darwall’s application of “empathy” to cases where one has a feeling that someone should feel, but does not feel. The problem is that this tends to blur the distinction between empathy and sympathy. Suppose I encounter a member of a cult who is delighted by the cult leader’s nefarious plans. The cult member should by afraid, but is not. If I feel fear on the cult member’s behalf, that is not putting myself in the cult member’s shoes. As I will use the term, empathy requires a kind of emotional mimicry. I do not wish to imply that empathy is always an automatic process, in the way that emotional contagion is. Sometimes imagination is requires, and sometimes we experience emotions that we think someone would be experiencing, even if we have not seen direct evidence that the emotion is, in fact, being experienced. For example, one might feel empathetic hope for a marathon runner who is a few steps behind the runner is first place, or anxiety for the first place runner, and the second place runner catches up. We can experience these feelings even if the runners’ facial expressions reveal little more than muscular contortions associated with concentration and physical exertion. A situation can reveal a feeling. The core idea, as I will use the term, is that empathy is a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. And the “taking” here can be a matter of automatic contagion or the result of a complicated exercise of the imagination. I don’t think there is anything anachronistic about this notion of empathy. I think it has a long tradition in moral philosophy, even though the term “empathy” is only 100 years old. The British moralists, including David Hume and Adam Smith, used “sympathy” in way that is similar to the way I want to use “empathy.” Here is Smith (1759: II.i): “Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.” My question, in the pages that follow, is whether empathy so‐defined is necessary for morality. I should note again, in advance, that the empirical literature does not always distinguish between the constructs I have been discussing, but I do think that all the studies I discuss below can, by inference at least, shed some light on empathy as defined here. The suggestion that empathy is necessary for morality can be interpreted in at least three different ways. One might hold the view that empathy is necessary for making moral judgment. One might think empathy is necessary for moral development. And one might think empathy is necessary for motivating moral conduct. I think each of these conjectures is false. Empathy is not necessary for any of these things. We can have moral systems without empathy. Of course, it doesn’t follow directly that empathy should be eliminated from morality. One might think the modal question—Can there be morality without empathy?—and the related....
Pugmire, David (2002). Narcissism in emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion
Rodogno, Raffaele (2009). Shame, guilt, and punishment. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):429-464.   (Google)
Abstract: The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I␣contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state’s act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual
Ross, Steven L. (1984). Evaluating the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):309-326.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2005). What is emotional authenticity? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way
Starkey, Charles (2008). Emotion and full understanding. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding
Tiwald, Justin (2010). Dai Zhen on Sympathetic Concern. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37 (1):76-89.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that Dai Zhen’s account of sympathetic concern is distinguished from other accounts of sympathy (and empathy) by several features, the most important of which are the following: First, he sees the awareness of our similarities to others as a necessary condition for sympathy but not a constituent of it. Second, the relevant similarities are those that our grounded in our common status as living creatures, and not in our common powers of autonomy or other traits that are often taken to be distinguishing features of persons. Finally, Dai thinks that when we properly sympathize with others, we value their well-being in a way that mimics the way we value our own. This last feature helps to explain two important claims about the place of sympathy in moral action: that it necessarily requires perspective-taking (at least with respect to most other human beings), and that it provides indirect motives to be virtuous, which even imperfect moral agents can draw upon. In the course of making my argument, I identify salient differences between Dai’s variant of sympathy and some of its closest relatives, including Aristotelian pity and Buddhist compassion.


5.1l.2 Moral Education

Barrow, Robin (1975). Moral Philosophy for Education. Linnet Books.   (Google)
Booth, Wayne (1988). The Company We Keep. University of California Press.   (Google)
Carroll, Noël (2000). Art and ethical criticism: An overview of recent directions of research. Ethics 110 (2):350-387.   (Google | More links)
Carroll, Noël (2002). The wheel of virtue: Art, literature, and moral knowledge. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (1):3–26.   (Google | More links)
Carr, David & Steutel, J. W. (eds.) (1999). Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education
Depaul, Michael R. (1988). Argument and perception: The role of literature in moral inquiry. Journal of Philosophy 85 (10):552-565.   (Google | More links)
Haydon, Graham (2006). Education, Philosophy and the Ethical Environment. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The Foundations and Futures of Education series focuses on key emerging issues in education as well as continuing debates within the field. The series is inter-disciplinary, and includes historical, philosophical, sociological, psychological and comparative perspectives on three major themes: the purposes and nature of education; increasing interdisciplinary within the subject; and the theory-practice divide. Around the world there is concern about the climate of values in which young people are growing up. Liberal ideas about personal morality and the value of individual choice are spreading worldwide, but often meeting resistance from more traditional values. Everywhere people look to education to promote the right values and help stem the tide of values that are seen as threatening. But what is it that we should be expecting education to do? This book, written by a philosopher of education, casts new light on that question by seeing values education, not as a separate activity within schools, but as an aspect of education that both reflects the surrounding climate of values and can help to change it. Graham Haydon argues that all of us - whether as teachers, parents, students or citizens - share in a responsibility for the quality of that ethical environment. We must ensure that what happens in schools will: · enable young people to appreciate the diversity of our ethical environment · help them find their way through its complexities · contribute to developing a climate of values that is desirable for all. This book shows that values education is too demanding to be left to parents and too important to be entrusted to government initiatives. For teachers engaged in values education - including those teaching citizenship, personal and social education, or religious education - this book brings a fresh perspective to what they are doing, within a realistic view of their responsibilities. For students of education it shows that practical issues can be illuminated by insights from philosophy
Jacobson, Daniel (1996). Sir Philip Sidney's dilemma: On the ethical function of narrative art. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (4):327-336.   (Google | More links)
Maes, Hans (2004). Modesty, asymmetry, and hypocrisy. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4).   (Google)
Phenix, Philip Henry (1977). Education and the Common Good: A Moral Philosophy of the Curriculum. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Sprod, Tim (2001). Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education: The Community of Ethical Inquiry. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years there has been an increase in the number of calls for moral education to receive greater public attention. In our pluralist society, however, it is difficult to find agreement on what exactly moral education requires. Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education develops a detailed philosophical defence of the claim that teachers should engage students in ethical discussions to promote moral competence and strengthen moral character. Paying particular attention to the teacher's role, this book highlights the justification for, and methods of, creating a classroom community of ethical inquiry
Surprenant, Chris W. (2010). Kant's Moral Education: The Relevance of Catechistics. Journal of Moral Education 39 (2).   (Google)

5.1l.3 Altruism and Psychological Egoism

Ananth, Mahesh (2005). Psychological altruism vs. biological altruism: Narrowing the gap with the Baldwin effect. Acta Biotheoretica 53 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts of “organic selection”and “social heredity” to assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closelytethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to thelatter
Baier, Kurt (1990). Egoism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Batson, C. Daniel & Shaw, Laura L. (1991). Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives. Psychological Inquiry 2 (2):107-122.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychologists have long assumed that the motivation for all intentional action, including all action intended to benefit others, is egoistic. People benefit others because, ultimately, to do so benefits themselves. The empathy-altruism hypothesis challenges this assumption. It claims that empathic emotion evokes truly altruistic motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal ofbenefiting not the self but the person for whom empathy is felt. Logical and psychological distinctions between egoism and altruism are reviewed, providing a conceptualframeworkfor empirical tests for the existence of altruism. Results of empirical tests to date are summarized; these results provide impressive support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. We conclude that the popular and parsimonious explanation ofprosocial motivation in terms ofuniversal egoism must give way to a pluralistic explanation that includes altruism as well as egoism. Implications of such a pluralism are briefly noted, not only for our understanding ofprosocial motivation but also for our understanding of human nature and of the emotion-motivation link.
Batson, C. Daniel (1991). The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Are our efforts to help others ever driven solely by altruistic motivation, or is our ultimate goal always some form of self- benefit (egoistic motivation)? This volume reports the development of an empirically-testable theory of altruistic motivation and a series of experiments designed to test that theory. It sets the issue of egoism versus altruism in its larger historical and philosophical context, and brings diverse experiments into a single, integrated argument. Readers will find that this book provides a solid base of information from which questions surrounding the existence of altruistic motivation can be further investigated.
Batson, C. Daniel (2000). Unto Others: A service... and a Disservice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):207-210.   (Google)
Abstract: Sober and Wilson (1998) render a valuable service by bringing together discussions of evolutionary altruism and psychological altruism. They do a disservice by interpreting the results of experiments designed to test for the existence of psychological altruism as less conclusive than the data warrant. Sober and Wilson claim that new egoistic explanations can account for the existing experimental evidence, but they only offer explanations that have already been ruled out. Insofar as I know, no plausible egoistic explanation currently exists for the experimental evidence that feeling empathy for a person in need evokes altruistic motivation. Unless Sober and Wilson can provide a plausible egoistic explanation for the existing evidence, their ‘inconclusive’ conclusion should be corrected.
Broad, C. D. (1950). Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives. The Hibbert Journal 48:105-114.   (Google)
Abstract: Now it is plain that such consequences as these conflict sharply with common-sense notions of morality. If we had been obliged to accept Psychological Egoism, in any of its narrower forms, on its merits, we should have had to say: 'So much the worse for the common-sense notions of morality!' But, if I am right, the morality of common sense, with all its difficulties and incoherences, is immune at least to attacks from the basis of Psychological Egoism.
Brunero, John S. (2002). Evolution, altruism and "internal reward" explanations. Philosophical Forum 33 (4):413–424.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Internal rewards are the psychological benefits one receives by performing certain other-regarding actions. Internal rewards include such benefits as the avoidance of guilt, the avoidance of painful memories, and the attainment of warm, fuzzy feelings. Despite the limitations of social psychology, Sober and Wilson believe that evolutionary theory can show that it is more likely for benevolent other-regarding motivational mechanisms to have evolved, thereby supporting the altruist’s claim. Here, I will argue for two related theses. First, if internal reward explanations pose a problem for social psychology, then they also pose a problem for evolutionary theory. Second, there is no need to think that internal reward explanations pose a problem for altruists because these explanations either do not inform us about what our ultimate motives really are or they unreasonably define out of existence the possibility of altruism.
Campbell, John (1999). Can philosophical accounts of altruism accommodate experimental data on helping behaviour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers often discuss altruism, how it is to be understood, explained, justified, evaluated, etc. Few refer to any experimental data on helping behaviour. I will argue that some of these data seem at least initially to present a challenge to various philosophical accounts of altruism. Put very broadly, when one looks at various philosophical accounts of altruism in light of various data on helping behaviour, one might wonder whether many philosophical accounts fall prey to the 'fundamental attribution error', overestimating people's character and personal dispositions as the basis of their actions and underestimating the role of persons' situations and their construals of them in determining what they do.
Evans, E. Keri (1897). The idealist treatment of egoism and altruism. International Journal of Ethics 7 (4):486-492.   (Google | More links)
Feinberg, Joel (1978). Psychological Egoism. In Russ Shafer-Landau & Joel Feinberg (eds.), Reason and Responsibility. Wadsworth.   (Google)
Frankfurt, Harry (2001). The dear self. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-14.   (Google)
Abstract: Frankfurt argues that self-love is the purest and -- paradoxically, perhaps -- most disinterested form of love
Gert, Bernard (1967). Hobbes and Psychological Egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4):503-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Hobbes has served for both philosophers and political scientists as the paradigm case of someone who held an egoistic view of human nature. In this article I shall attempt to show that the almost unanimous view that Hobbes held psychological egoism is mistaken, and further that Hobbes's political theory does not demand an egoistic psychology, but on the contrary is incompatible with psychological egoism. I do not maintain that Hobbes was completely consistent; in fact, I shall show that there was a continuous development in Hobbes's works away from an egoistic psychology. But I do think that the main outlines of Hobbes's political theory, i.e., his account of the laws of nature, the right of nature, the obligations imposed by laws and covenants, and the rights and duties of citizen and sovereign, are essentially the same in The Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan. I thus hold that even in his earliest work, The Elements, the only one where a charge of egoism is justifiable, the political theory does not depend on egoism. But the first and most important point to be established is that Hobbes did not hold an egoistic psychology.
Gert, Bernard (1965). Hobbes, mechanism, and egoism. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):341-349.   (Google | More links)
Glasgow, W. D. (1978). Broad on psychological egoism. Ethics 88 (4):361-368.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In what follows, I shall first outline Broad's description of, and attitude to, psychological egoism. Then, I shall examine briefly the form which a defense against his criticisms might take. This raises the query whether such a defense is consistent with the doctrine's empirical character. It is suggested that the egoist could evade this difficulty by questioning an assumption which Broad (and others) make about psychological egoism. By abandoning this assumption, we can state the doctrine in a more adequate form-a form which emphasizes the point that men, although psychological egoists, are also rational beings, capable of acting on principle!
Hodges, Donald Clark (1961). Psychological egoism: A note on professor Lemos' discussion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):246-248.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his discussion of "Psychological Egoism" (PPR, June, 1960), Professor Lemos chooses to legislate it out of existence by means of a definition; so I choose to legislate it back into existence by a similar device. The pertinent question is whether definitions of psychological egoism are arbitrary or not.
Jamieson, Dale (2002). Sober and Wilson on psychological altruism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):702–710.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In their marvelous book, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Sober and Wilson identify two distinct problems of altruism.’ The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) “is to show how behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can evolve;” (17) group selection is the key to the solution of this problem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to determine whether people “have altruistic desires that are psychologically ultimate.” (201) After carefully considering the arguments of both psychologists and philosophers, Sober and Wilson render the verdict “not proven.” But just in the nick of time, evolutionary biology rides to the rescue; it succeeds where psychology and philosophy fail in vindicating our good nature. In this paper, I will discuss Sober and Wilson’s treatment of PA.
Krebs, Dennis (1982). Psychological approaches to altruism: An evaluation. Ethics 92 (3):447-458.   (Google | More links)
LaFollette, Hugh (1988). The truth in psychological egosim. In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason and Responsibility (7th Edition).   (Google)
Abstract: Mother Teresa spends her life caring for the poor and the infirm; J. Paul Getty, Jr., spends his life making investments and directing corporations. Although we might be unhappy doing what they do, we assume they are satisfied. Mother Teresa enjoys her work and would be miserable if she had to mastermind corporate takeovers. Getty would be wretched if he had to care for lepers or become a lawn chair salesman
Lemos, Ramon M. (1960). Psychological egoism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (4):540-546.   (Google | More links)
Lemos, John (2004). Psychological hedonism, evolutionary biology, and the experience machine. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):506-526.   (Google)
Abstract: In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their book, which is a defense of group selectionism, has received almost all of the attention of those people who have published reactions to the book. No one has published a detailed reaction to the argument of the latter half of the book. In this article, the author explains and critically discusses their evolutionary biological argument against psychological hedonism, concluding that in its current form it is not strong enough to support its conclusion. However, the author goes on to argue that despite recent criticisms of Robert Nozick’s experience-machine argument, it is still a good argument against psychological hedonism. In support of the latter point, the author responds to the objections of Sober and Wilson and to the more recent criticisms offered by Matthew Silverstein. Key Words: hedonism • psychological egoism • evolution • Robert Nozick • Elliott Sober
Lipkin, Robert J. (1987). Altruism and sympathy in Hume's ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):18 – 32.   (Google | More links)
May, Joshua (forthcoming). Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson’s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.
McAllister, W. K. (1953). Toward a re-examination of psychological hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (4):499-505.   (Google | More links)
McBride, Cillian & Seglow, Jonathan (2003). Introduction: Egoism, altruism and impartiality. Res Publica 9 (3):213-222.   (Google)
Abstract: The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’ interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality
McConnell, Terrance C. (1978). The argument from psychological egoism to ethical egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):41-47.   (Google)
McGilvary, Evander Bradley (1903). Altruism in Hume's treatise. Philosophical Review 12 (3):272-298.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine the position of the Treatise on this subject [of altruism]. The result, as the writer believes, will show that Hume admits the existence of an original altruism as fully in his earlier as in his later work.
McNeilly, F. S. (1966). Egoism in Hobbes. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (64):193-206.   (Google | More links)
Mees, Ulrich & Schmitt, Annette (2008). Goals of action and emotional reasons for action. A modern version of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):157–178.   (Google | More links)
Menon, Sangeetha (2007). Basics of Spiritual Altruism. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 39 (2):137-152.   (Google)
Abstract: The major discussions on altruism today, particularly in the area of sociobiology, give exclusive attention to altruism as an act that favors evolutionary or social benefits. That altruism is a phenomenon exhibited by a self is almost neglected. To understand altruism it is also important to look at the nature of 'self-space' that constitutes various levels of altruism. Self-space, as presented in the Indian philosophical literature, refers to a reified self-identity that would reflect ethical and spiritual concerns.
Merrylees, W. A. (1932). An examination of psychological hedonism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):92 – 108.   (Google | More links)
Mercer, Mark (2001). In defence of weak psychological egoism. Erkenntnis 55 (2):217-237.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Weak psychological egoism is the doctrine that anything an agent does intentionally, that agent does at least expecting thereby to realize one of her self-regarding ends. (Strong psychological egoism, by contrast, is the doctrine that agents act always intending thereby to realize a self-regarding end.) Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that include it as an organizing principle. These reasons have mainly to do with the idea that to understand the motivation behind an action, we need to understand the force of the consideration that motivates the agent, and the way to do this is to find a self-regarding end associated in the agent''s mind with acting on that consideration
Morillo, Carolyn R. (1990). The reward event and motivation. Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):169-186.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In philosophy, the textbook case for the discussion of human motivation is the examination (and almost always, the refutation) of psychological egoism. The arguments have become part of the folklore of our tribe, from their inclusion in countless introductory texts. [...] One of my central aims has been to define the issues empirically, so we do not just settle them by definition. Although I am inclined at present to put my bets on the reward-event theory, with its internalism, monism, and causal primacy of satisfaction, I think we are very far from knowing enough to settle these questions concerning motivation, human or otherwise. The winds of science will blow where they may. In the meantime, we can be a bit more circumspect about what we put in our tribal folklore.
Moseley, Alexander (online). Egoism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: In philosophy, egoism is the theory that one’s self is, or should be, the motivation and the goal of one’s own action. Egoism has two variants, descriptive or normative. The descriptive (or positive) variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human affairs. That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and they cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes that people should be so motivated, regardless of what presently motivates their behavior. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. The term “egoism” derives from “ego,” the Latin term for the English word “I”. “Egoism” should be distinguished from “egotism,” which means a psychological overvaluation of one’s own importance, or of one’s own activities.
Nagel, Thomas (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
Nichols, Shaun (2001). Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic motivation. Mind and Language 16 (4):425-455.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying altruistic motivation, one central question is the extent to which the capacity for altruism depends on the capacity for understanding other minds, or ‘mindreading’. Some theorists maintain that the capacity for altruism is independent of any capacity for mindreading; others maintain that the capacity for altruism depends on fairly sophisticated mindreading skills. I argue that none of the prevailing accounts is adequate. Rather, I argue that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a ‘Concern Mechanism’, which requires only a minimal capacity for mindreading
Overskeid, Geir (2002). Psychological hedonism and the nature of motivation: Bertrand Russell's anhedonic desires. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):77 – 93.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding the causes of behavior is one of philosophy's oldest challenges. In analyzing human desires, Bertrand Russell's position was clearly related to that of psychological hedonism. Still, though he seems to have held quite consistently that desires and emotions govern human behavior, he claimed that they do not necessarily do so by making us want to maximize pleasure. This claim is related to several being made in today's psychology and philosophy. I point out a string of facts and arguments indicating the weakness of this position, and briefly discuss the possibility of developing a set of assumptions regarding behavioral causation common to students of thinking and behavior
Perrett, Roy W. (1987). Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in buddhist ethics. Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1).   (Google)
Piddington, Ralph (1931). Psychological hedonism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):274 – 283.   (Google | More links)
Rosas, Alejandro (2002). Psychological and evolutionary evidence for altruism. Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):93-107.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Sober and Wilson have recently claimed that evolutionary theory can do what neither philosophy nor experimental psychology have been able to, namely, "break the deadlock" in the egoism vs. altruism debate with an argument based on the reliability of altruistic motivation. I analyze both their reliability argument and the experimental evidence of social psychology in favor of altruism in terms of the folk-psychological "laws" and inference patterns underlying them, and conclude that they both rely on the same patterns. I expose the confusions that have led Sober and Wilson to defend a reliability argument while rejecting the experimental evidence of social psychology.
Ruse, Michael (2000). Review of Sober and Wilson, Unto Others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Ethics 110 (2):443-445.   (Google)
Russell, Bruce (1982). On the relation between psychological and ethical egoism. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):91-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently Terrance McConnell has attempted to show that not only does psychological egoism lend no support to ethical egoism but is even incompatible with it. 1 McConneU's attempt has been vitiated by Paul Simpson's critique of the version of psychological egoism that McConnell offered) In this discussion I will consider McConnell's and Simpson's arguments and then offer a version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's objections. After showing that one version of ethical egoism is incompatible with that version of psychological egoism, I will consider other versions of ethical egoism in an attempt to find the best version of that moral doctrine. It will turn out that even the best version of ethical egoism is incompatible with the version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's criticisms. However, another version of psychological egoism will be offered that is compatible with all versions of ethical egoism and that is also not open to Simpson's objections. An argument will be offered, and then criticized, that seems to lend support to ethical egoism and that rests, in part, on this other version of psychological egoism.
Shaver, Robert (online). Egoism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be rational that it maximize one's self-interest.
Sharp, Frank Chapman (1923). Some problems in the psychology of egoism and altruism. Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):85-104.   (Google | More links)
Sisson, Edward O. (1910). Egoism, altruism, catholism. A note on ethical terminology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (6):158-161.   (Google | More links)
Slote, Michael Anthony (1964). An empirical basis for psychological egoism. Journal of Philosophy 61 (18):530-537.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the present paper I wish to argue that psychological egoism may well have a basis in the empirical facts of human psychology. Certain contemporary learning theorists, e.g., Hull and Skinner, have put forward behavioristic theories of the origin and functioning of human motives which posit a certain number of basically "selfish, " unlearned primary drives or motives (like hunger, thirst, sleep, elimination, and sex), explain all other, higher-order, drives or motives as derived genetically from the primary ones via certain "laws of reinforcement," and, further, deny the "functional autonomy" of those higher-order drives or motive. Now it is a hotly debated issue in contemporary Learning Theory whether any theory such as we have described briefly above could adequately explain adult human behavior. I shall, however, argue only that a theory of the above kind may well be true, and that from such a theory, fortified only by one additional psychological premise, the truth of egoism (non-altruism) logically follows. I hope to show, thereby, that the question of psychological egoism is still an open empirical issue, however fallacious be the philosophical arguments for it.
Sober, Elliott & Wilson, David Sloan (2000). Morality and ‘Unto Others': Response to commentary discussion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):257-268.   (Google)
Abstract: We address the following issues raised by the commentators of our target article and book: (1) the problem of multiple perspectives; (2) how to define group selection; (3) distinguishing between the concepts of altruism and organism; (4) genetic versus cultural group selection; (5) the dark side of group selection; (6) the relationship between psychological and evolutionary altruism; (7) the question of whether the psychological questions can be answered; (8) psychological experiments. We thank the contributors for their commentaries, which provide a diverse agenda for future study of evolution and morality. Our response will follow the organization of our book, distinguishing between evolutionary issues that concern fitness effects and psychological issues that concern motives.
Sober, Elliott & Wilson, David Sloan (2000). Summary of: ‘Unto Others. The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):185-206.   (Google)
Abstract: The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 1960s evolutionary biology. In Unto Others (1998), we argue to the contrary, that group selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We suggest, in addition, that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second part of Unto Others, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism -- do human beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being of others? We argue that previous psychological and philosophical work on this question has been inconclusive. We propose an evolutionary argument for the claim that human beings have altruistic ultimate motives.
Sober, Elliott & Wilson, David Sloan (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: No matter what we do, however kind or generous our deeds may seem, a hidden motive of selfishness lurks--or so science has claimed for years. This book, whose publication promises to be a major scientific event, tells us differently. In Unto Others philosopher Elliott Sober and biologist David Sloan Wilson demonstrate once and for all that unselfish behavior is in fact an important feature of both biological and human nature. Their book provides a panoramic view of altruism throughout the animal kingdom--from self-sacrificing parasites to insects that subsume themselves in the superorganism of a colony to the human capacity for selflessness--even as it explains the evolutionary sense of such behavior.
Stich, Stephen; Doris, John M. & Roedder, Erica (forthcoming). Altruism. In Moral Psychology Research Group (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We begin, in section 2, with a brief sketch of a cluster of assumptions about human desires, beliefs, actions, and motivation that are widely shared by historical and contemporary authors on both sides in the debate. With this as background, we’ll be able to offer a more sharply focused account of the debate. In section 3, our focus will be on links between evolutionary theory and the egoism/altruism debate. There is a substantial literature employing evolutionary theory on each side of the issue. However, it is our contention that neither camp has offered a convincing case. We are much more sanguine about recent research on altruism in social psychology, which will be our topic in section 4. Though we don’t think this work has resolved the debate, we will argue that it has made illuminating progress – progress that philosophers interested in the question cannot afford to ignore.
Stich, Stephen (2007). Evolution, altruism and cognitive architecture: A critique of Sober and Wilson's argument for psychological altruism. Biology and Philosophy 22 (2):267-281.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sober and Wilson have propose a cluster of arguments for the conclusion that “natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives” and thus that psychological altruism is true. I maintain that none of these arguments is convincing. However, the most powerful of their arguments raises deep issues about what egoists and altruists are claiming and about the assumptions they make concerning the cognitive architecture underlying human motivation.
Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw (1949). Psychological hedonism. Synthese 8 (1).   (Google)
Van Der Steen, Wim J. (1995). Egoism and altruism in ethics: Dispensing with spurious generality. Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1):31-44.   (Google)
Abstract: Is human behavior exclusively motivated by self-interest? Common sense indicates that we should flatly deny this, or so it seems to me. Yet the doctrine of universal self-interest, psychological egoism for short, has gained the support of many researchers in science. Common sense also seems to allow the rejection of ethical egoism, the doctrine that human behavior should be motivated exclusively by self-interest. It appears to be at variance with widely endorsed moralities. Yet it is a perennial subject of research in ethics. What stance should we take in the face of these discrepancies? Two views suggest themselves. Commonsensical views of egoism and altruism are flawed or research on the subject in science and ethics is misguided. Considering ethics I argue in this article that research is misguided to the extent that it is conducted at inappropriately high levels of generality. I argue that both ethical egoism and psychological egoism are mistaken.
Williams, Bernard A. O. (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 144 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A volume of philosophical studies, centred on problems of personal identity and extending to related topics in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy

5.1l.4 Ethics and Cognitive Science

Timmons, Mark (1997). Will cognitive science change ethics?: Review essay of Larry may, Marilyn Friedman & Andy Clark (eds) mind and morals: Essays on ethics and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):531 – 540.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contains an overview of the essays contained in the Mind and morals anthology plus a critical discussion of certain themes raised in many of these essays concerning the bearing of recent work in cognitive science on the traditional project of moral theory. Specifically, I argue for the following claims: (1) authors like Virginia Held, who appear to be antagonistic toward the methodological naturalism of Owen Flanagan, Andy Clark, Paul Churchland, and others, are really in fundamental agreement with the naturalists (at least once the naturalist view is suitably clarified); (2) the prototype theory of moral concepts that is inspired by recent work in cognitive science does not necessarily jeopardize the aim of systematization characteristic of traditional moral theory; (3) nor does it threaten certain widely accepted views about moral rationality that is part of traditional moral theorizing. Moreover, I speculate that (4) recent work in cognitive science can be expected to play a corroborative role in the justification of theories in ethics, but we should probably not expect this work to yield new insights and directions in ethics. Finally, (5) Fodor's recent critique of cognitive science makes clear the perils of methodological ethical naturalism

5.1l.4.1 Evolution of Morality

Adams, Zed (2007). The Evolution of Morality by Joyce, Richard. Ethics 117 (2).   (Google)
Alexander, J. McKenzie (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: It is certainly the case that morality governs the interactions that take place between individuals. But what if morality exists because of these interactions? This book argues for the claim that much of the behaviour we view as 'moral' exists because acting in that way benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible, given the socially structured nature of society. Drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, the theory of bounded rationality, and computational models of social networks, it shows both how moral behaviour can emerge in socially structured environments, and how it can persist even when it is not typically viewed as 'rational' from a traditional economic perspective. Since morality consists of much more than mere behaviour, this book also provides a theory of how moral principles and the moral sentiments play an indispensable role in effective choice, acting as 'fast and frugal heuristics' in social decision contexts
Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Marc (2005). Animal play and the evolution of morality: An ethological approach. Topoi 24 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   In this paper we argue that there is much to learn about “wild justice” and the evolutionary origins of morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living mammals. Because of its relatively wide distribution among the mammals, ethological investigation of play, informed by interdisciplinary cooperation, can provide a comparative perspective on the evolution of ethical behavior that is broader than is provided by the usual focus on primate sociality. Careful analysis of social play reveals rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. Because of its significance in development, play may provide a foundation of fairness for other forms of cooperation that are advantageous to group living. Questions about the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality are best answered by attention to the details of what animals do when they engage in social play – how they negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, and to develop trust. We consider questions such as why play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does “being fair” mean being more fit? Do individual variations in play influence an individual’s reproductive fitness? Can we use information about the foundations of moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? We conclude that there is likely to be strong selection for cooperative fair play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play, to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved
Braddock, Matthew C. (2009). Evolutionary psychology's moral implications. Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):531-540.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it give us reason to think that we may have to change our ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects
Broom, Donald M. (2003). The Evolution of Morality and Religion. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Donald Broom argues that morality and the central components of religion are of great value, and presents two central ideas. He asserts that morality has a biological foundation and has evolved as a consequence of natural selection, and that religions are essentially the structures supporting morality. Many philosophers and theologians write about morality and its origins without reference to biological processes such as evolution. Likewise, biologists discuss phenomena of importance to human morality and religion without taking account of the thoughts of others on these subjects
Gaus, Gerald (ms). Respect for persons and the evolution of morality.   (Google)
Abstract: Let me begin with a stylized contrast between two ways of thinking about morality. On the one hand, morality can be understood as the dictate of, or uncovered by, impartial reason. That which is (truly) moral must be capable of being verified by everyone’s reasoning from a suitably impartial perspective. If we are to respect the free and equal nature of each person, each must (in some sense) rationally validate the requirements of morality. If we take this view, the genuine requirements of morality are a matter of rational reflection and self-imposed law. For Kant it seemed to be a matter of reflection by a rational individual, testing the impartiality of his maxims. For Rousseau, who was an important influence on Kant, under the proper conditions collective deliberation could yield impartial rules of justice that are willed by all. From another point of view moralities are social facts with histories. The heroes of this tradition are Hume, Ferguson and, perhaps surprisingly given his “deductive” method, Hobbes. The moral codes — or if “code” implies too much systematization, moral “practices” — we have ended up with are, to some extent, a matter of chance. This is by no means to say that morality is entirely arbitrary, but it does contain a significant arbitrary element. The morality we have ended up with is path-dependent: only because our moral codes have started somewhere, and have changed in response to unanticipated events, can we explain why we ended up where we have, and different societies end up in different places. The proponents of each view typically seek to discredit the other. Those who conceive of morality as the demand of impartial reason often insist the evolutionists confuse “positive morality” (the moral code that people actually follow) with justified (or true) morality, which is revealed by impartial reason. The positive morality that has evolved is simply what people think is morality, not what really is morality..
Green, Keith (2005). Donald M. Broom the evolution of morality and religion: A biological perspective. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2004). Pp. XI+229. £50.00 (hbk), £18.95 (pbk). ISBN 0 521 82192 (hbk), 0 521 52924 7 (pbk). Religious Studies 41 (3):363-368.   (Google)
Grose, Jonathan (2009). The structural evolution of morality , Jason McKenzie Alexander. Cambridge university press, 2007, IX + 300 pages. Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):113-119.   (Google)
Joyce, Richard (ms). Preçis of the evolution of morality.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Evolution of Morality attempts to accomplish two tasks. The first is to clarify and provisionally advocate the thesis that human morality is a distinct adaptation wrought by biological natural selection. The second is to inquire whether this empirical thesis would, if true, have any metaethical implications
Kahane, Guy (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of certain evaluative beliefs to undermines their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I show that EDAs are merely instances of a familiar form of argument commonly used in both evaluative and non-evaluative contexts. It’s often overlooked, however, that EDAs presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with the parallel and more sweeping metaethical argument recently put forward by Joyce and Street. After examining several ways of responding to this global evolutionary argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.
Levy, Neil (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , ed., moral psychology, volume 1. the evolution of morality: Adaptations and innateness , cambridge, mass: The mit press, 2008, pp. XIX + 583, us$30.00/£17.95 (paper). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):523 – 525.   (Google)
Morgan, Gregory J. (2008). The evolution of morality. By Richard Joyce. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):685-690.   (Google)
Seth, James (1889). The evolution of morality. Mind 14 (53):27-49.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen (2008). Some questions about The evolution of morality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):228-236.   (Google | More links)
Tresan, Jon (2009). Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).   (Google)
Uchii, Soshichi, Darwin on the evolution of morality.   (Google)
Abstract: Darwin argued for the biological basis of morality in his Descent of Man (1871). Beginning with the thesis of the continuity of man and animals, he tried to explain the origin of the moral sense, or conscience, as understood as an ability to discern right and wrong, and to feel guilty if one realizes to have done wrong. His argument is that, in any animal with social instincts and sufficient intellectual powers, a moral sense would be developed. Although Darwin's argument had some missing links, I try to show that his argument can be consistently reconstructed, in view of the recent development of evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology. As I understand, Darwin's basic tenet is reductionism via evolutionary processes (natural selection, in particular): morality can be reduced to a combination of non-moral factors, each of which can be shared with other animals; you do not have to assume that morality is sui generis

5.1l.4.2 Neuroscience of Ethics

Blair, James; Marsh, A. A.; Finger, E.; Blair, K. S. & Luo, J. (2006). Neuro-cognitive systems involved in morality. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):13 – 27.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, we will consider the neuro-cognitive systems involved in mediating morality. Five main claims will be made. First, that there are multiple, partially separable neuro-cognitive architectures that mediate specific aspects of morality: social convention, care-based morality, disgust-based morality and fairness/justice. Second, that all aspects of morality, including social convention, involve affect. Third, that the neural system particularly important for social convention, given its role in mediating anger and responding to angry expressions, is ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Fourth, that the neural systems particularly important for care-based morality are the amygdala and medial orbital frontal cortex. Fifth, that while Theory of Mind is not a prerequisite for the development of affect-based 'automatic moral attitudes', it is critically involved in many aspects of moral reasoning
Brickner, Richard M. (1944). Man and his values considered neurologically. Journal of Philosophy 41 (9):225-243.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Stephanie L. & Brown, R. Michael (2005). Social bonds, motivational conflict, and altruism: Implications for neurobiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):351-352.   (Google)
Abstract: Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky (D&M-S) do not address how a reward system accommodates the motivational dilemmas associated with (a) the decision to approach versus avoid conspecifics, and (b) self versus other tradeoffs inherent in behaving altruistically toward bonded relationship partners. We provide an alternative evolutionary view that addresses motivational conflict, and discuss implications for the neurobiological study of affiliative bonds
Bunge, Silvia A. & Wallis, Jonathan D. (eds.) (2008). Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: euroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior brings together, for the first time, the experiments and theories that have created the new science of rules. Rules are central to human behavior, but until now the field of neuroscience lacked a synthetic approach to understanding them. How are rules learned, retrieved from memory, maintained in consciousness and implemented? How are they used to solve problems and select among actions and activities? How are the various levels of rules represented in the brain, ranging from simple conditional ones if a traffic light turns red, then stop to rules and strategies of such sophistication that they defy description? And how do brain regions interact to produce rule-guided behavior? These are among the most fundamental questions facing neuroscience, but until recently there was relatively little progress in answering them. It was difficult to probe brain mechanisms in humans, and expert opinion held that animals lacked the capacity for such high-level behavior. However, rapid progress in neuroimaging technology has allowed investigators to explore brain mechanisms in humans, while increasingly sophisticated behavioral methods have revealed that animals can and do use high-level rules to control their behavior. The resulting explosion of information has led to a new science of rules, but it has also produced a plethora of overlapping ideas and terminology and a field sorely in need of synthesis. In this book, Silvia Bunge and Jonathan Wallis bring together the worlds leading cognitive and systems neuroscientists to explain the most recent research on rule-guided behavior. Their work covers a wide range of disciplines and methods, including neuropsychology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, neurophysiology, electroencephalography, neuropharmacology, near-infrared spectroscopy, and transcranial magnetic stimulation. This unprecedented synthesis is a must-read for anyone interested in how complex behavior is controlled and organized by the brain
Camerer, Colin F. (2008). The potential of neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):369-379.   (Google)
Carter, C. S.; Bales, K. L. & Porges, S. W. (2005). Neuropeptides influence expression of and capacity to form social bonds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):353-354.   (Google)
Abstract: In the present commentary we expand on two concepts relevant to understanding affliliative bonding. Differences and similarities between the functions and actions of oxytocin and vasopressin are difficult to study but may be critical to an understanding of mechanisms for social bonding. What is termed here a “trait of affiliation” may reflect in part the capacity of these same peptides to program the developing nervous system
Carter, Adrian & Hall, Wayne (2007). The social implications of neurobiological explanations of resistible compulsions. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):15 – 17.   (Google)
Casebeer, William D. (2005). Neurobiology supports virtue theory on the role of heuristics in moral cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):547-548.   (Google)
Abstract: Sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. His case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning
Chauchard, Paul (1957). Intériorité et objectivation du subjectif en neurophysiologie. Acta Biotheoretica 12 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of inferiority, of subjectivity, of conscience, is not only a metaphysical or psychological problem; it is susceptible to objective scientific study at the neurophysiological level. This study must not stop, however, at an analysis of cerebral function but must also recognize that conscience results from the self-being of the individual at himself in certain structures of his brain and that a cerebral process is or is not conscious according to whether or not it is integrated into the structure of the whole. This is best developed in man by virtue of the cerebral complexity which makes possible the verbalization of one self. The spiritual always appears as a functional, nonlocalizable aspect of the whole of the aggregate individual
Churchland, Patricia S. (2008). Human dignity from a neurophilosophical perspective. In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics.   (Google)
Clavien, Christine & Klein, Rebekka, Eager for fairness or for revenge? Altruism and emotion in neuroeconomics.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to understand the human capacity for altruism one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the relevance that recent findings in neu-roeconomics may have for the philosophical controversy between altruism and egoism, with par-ticular emphasis on the importance of emotion in understanding altruistic motivation. After briefly contextualising and sketching the philosophical controversy, we survey the results of three interesting studies that provide stimulating clues for the debate. We focus our attention particu-larly on the 2004 study in neuroeconomics by Dominique de Quervain, Urs Fischbacher and col-leagues, which contains an argument in favour of psychological egoism. On the basis of an emo-tional account of decision-making, we show that their analysis of the results – people seek fair-ness – may be questioned; we propose an alternative interpretation of the data – people seek re-venge. Unfortunately, our ‘emotion-directed’ interpretation renders this study far less relevant for the debate over the possibility of psychological altruism than previously expected
de Aguirre, María Inés (2006). Neurobiological bases of aggression, violence, and cruelty. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):228-229.   (Google)
Abstract: Aggression, violence, and cruelty are symptoms of psychiatric illness. They reflect abnormalities in the regulation of the stress and emotion circuitries. The functioning of these circuitries depends upon the interaction between genetics and environment. Abuse and neglect during infancy, as well as maternal stress and poor quality of maternal care, are some of the causes that produce these types of abnormal behavior. Research on the neurobiological bases of emotion regulation will allow the detection of the population at risk
Gray, Jeremy R. & Braver, Todd S. (2002). Cognitive control in altruism and self-control: A social cognitive neuroscience perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):260-260.   (Google)
Abstract: The primrose path and prisoner's dilemma paradigms may require cognitive (executive) control: The active maintenance of context representations in lateral prefrontal cortex to provide top-down support for specific behaviors in the face of short delays or stronger response tendencies. This perspective suggests further tests of whether altruism is a type of self-control, including brain imaging, induced affect, and dual-task studies
Hardy-Vallee, Benoit (ms). Decision-making: A neuroeconomic perspective.   (Google)
Abstract: This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality
Hollingsworth, Andrea (2008). Implications of interpersonal neurobiology for a spirituality of compassion. Zygon 43 (4):837-860.   (Google)
Abstract: Interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB) is a burgeoning interdisciplinary field that focuses on ways in which relationships shape and transform the architecture and functioning of the human brain. IPNB points to four specific conditions that appear to encourage the emergence of empathy. Further, these conditions, when gathered together, may constitute the core components of a spirituality of compassion. Following definitions and a discussion of interdisciplinary method, this essay delineates IPNB's main tenets and demonstrates ways in which IPNB sheds light on important aspects of human empathy and compassion. Drawing on this analysis, it introduces the four conditions that encourage the emergence of empathy in individuals and groups and shows why they may be central elements of a spirituality of compassion. A case study, in which the Native American Ojibwe practice of the talking circle is described and assessed through the lens of the IPNB-derived spirituality of compassion, demonstrates the evaluative usefulness of this set of conditions
Shackel, Nicholas & Kahane, Guy (2008). Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias? Nature 452:E5.   (Google)
Kahane, Guy & Shackel, Nicholas (forthcoming). Methodological Problems in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this paper we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene’s neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature.
Kamm, F. M. (2009). Neuroscience and moral reasoning: A note on recent research. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):330-345.   (Google)
Klein, Colin (forthcoming). The dual track theory of moral decision-making: A critique of the neuroimaging evidence. Neuroethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are functionally specific: each is active in a wide variety of both cognitive and emotional tasks. I further argue that distinct activation across conditions is not strong evidence for dissociation. This undermines support for the dual-track hypothesis. I further argue that moral decision-making appears to activate a common network that underlies self-projection : the ability to imagine oneself from a variety of viewpoints in a variety of situations. I argue that the utilization of self-projection indicates a continuity between moral decision-making and other kinds of complex social deliberation. This may have normative consequences, but teasing them out will require careful attention to both empirical and philosophical concerns
Mackenzie, Catriona (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , ed., moral psychology, volume 3. the neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development , cambridge, ma: Mit press, 2008, pp. XIX + 569, us $30 (paperback). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):528 – 532.   (Google)
Morrow, David (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our moral judgments, as the Rawlsian model predicts. Thus, Hauser's tripartite division of possible models of moral psychology is inadequate. Drawing on research in cognitive neuroscience, clinical and behavioral psychology, and psychopathology, I sketch a new, developmental sentimentalist model of moral psychology. I call it a “Mencian” model, after the Confucian philosopher Mencius. On this model, moral judgments are caused by emotions, but because of the way emotions are mapped onto particular actions, moral judgments unconsciously reflect certain principled distinctions

5.1l.4.3 Psychology of Ethics

Clark, Andy, Word and action: Reconciling rules and know-how in moral cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in Cognitive Science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, many accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of the rule-and-principle based accounts favored by Kant, Mill and others. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason is an intrinsically complex achievement that cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition -- like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends on the subtle interplay and interaction between multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason
Duncker, Karl (1939). Ethical relativity? (An enquiry into the psychology of ethics.). Mind 48 (189):39-57.   (Google | More links)
Fromm, Erich (1947). Man for Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics. H. Holt.   (Google)
Abstract: In Man for Himself , Erich Fromm examines the confusion of modern women and men who, because they lack faith in any principle by which life ought to be guided, become the helpless prey forces both within and without. From the broad, interdisciplinary perspective that marks Fromm’s distinguished oeuvre, he shows that psychology cannot divorce itself from the problems of philosophy and ethics, and that human nature cannot be understood without understanding the values and moral conflicts that confront us all. He shows that an ethical system can be based on human nature rather than on revelations or traditions. As Fromm asserts, “If man is to have confidence in values, he must know himself and the capacity of his nature for goodness and productiveness.”
Shackel, Nicholas & Kahane, Guy (2008). Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias? Nature 452:E5.   (Google)
Kahane, Guy & Shackel, Nicholas (forthcoming). Methodological Problems in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this paper we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene’s neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature.
Morrow, David (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our moral judgments, as the Rawlsian model predicts. Thus, Hauser's tripartite division of possible models of moral psychology is inadequate. Drawing on research in cognitive neuroscience, clinical and behavioral psychology, and psychopathology, I sketch a new, developmental sentimentalist model of moral psychology. I call it a “Mencian” model, after the Confucian philosopher Mencius. On this model, moral judgments are caused by emotions, but because of the way emotions are mapped onto particular actions, moral judgments unconsciously reflect certain principled distinctions

5.1l.4.4 Ethics and Cognitive Science, Misc

Morrow, David (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our moral judgments, as the Rawlsian model predicts. Thus, Hauser's tripartite division of possible models of moral psychology is inadequate. Drawing on research in cognitive neuroscience, clinical and behavioral psychology, and psychopathology, I sketch a new, developmental sentimentalist model of moral psychology. I call it a “Mencian” model, after the Confucian philosopher Mencius. On this model, moral judgments are caused by emotions, but because of the way emotions are mapped onto particular actions, moral judgments unconsciously reflect certain principled distinctions
Van Leeuwen, Neil (2009). Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy. Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):107-132.   (Google)

5.1l.5 Moral Character

Badhwar, Neera Kapur (ed.) (1993). Friendship: A Philosophical Reader. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bailey, F. G. (1993). The Kingdom of Individuals: An Essay on Self-Respect and Social Obligation. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Balguy, John (1728). The Foundation of Moral Goodness. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Bauhn, Per (2003). The Value of Courage. Nordic Academic Press.   (Google)
Baxley, Anne Margaret (2005). The practical significance of taste in Kant's critique of judgment: Love of natural beauty as a mark of moral character. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):33–45.   (Google | More links)
Bell, Derrick A. (2002). Ethical Ambition: Living a Life of Meaning and Worth. Distributed by Holtzbrinck Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: From the New York Times bestselling author Derrick Bell, a profound meditation on achieving success with integrity. As one of the country's most influential law professors, Derrick Bell has spent a lifetime helping students struggling to maintain a sense of integrity in the face of an overwhelming pressure to succeed at any price. Frequently asked how he managed to be so extraordinarily successful while never giving up the fight for justice and equality, Bell decided to spend his seventieth year writing a book of insight and guidance. The result, Ethical Ambition , is a deeply affecting, uplifting, and brilliant series of meditations that not only challenges us to face some of the most difficult questions that life presents, but dares to offer some solutions. Using incidents from his own life, Bell also looks to literature, history, and other contemporary figures who have refused to compromise their beliefs. In chapters that explore passion, faith courage, inspiration, humility, and relationships, Ethical Ambition address the most fundamental issues of life
Blum, Lawrence A. (1980). Friendship, Altruism, and Morality. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Borgmann, Albert (2007). Science and virtue: An essay on the impact of the scientific mentality on moral character. Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):405-407.   (Google)
Bradley, Marshell Carl & Blosser, Philip (eds.) (1989). Of Friendship: Philosophic Selections on a Perennial Concern. Longwood Academic.   (Google)
Campbell, Archibald (1733). An Enquiry Into the Original of Moral Virtue. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is the third selection of major works on the Scottish Enlightenment and includes the same combination of hard-to-find and popular works as in the two previous collections. Contents: An Essay on the Natural Equality of Men [1793] William Lawrence Brown, New introduction by Dr. William Scott 308 pp An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue [1733] Archibald Campbell 586 pp The Philosophical Works [1765] William Dudgeon, New introduction by David Berman 300 pp Institutes of Moral Philosophy For the use of Students in the College of Edinburgh [1769] Adam Ferguson 340 pp A Comparative view of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World [1774] John Gregory 426 pp An Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq [1777] Samuel Jackson A Letter to Adam Smith, On the Life, Death and Philosophy of his friend David Hume Esq [1777] George Horne (Bishop of Norwich) 252 pp
Casey, John (1990). Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The study of the virtues has largely dropped out of modern philosophy, yet it was the predominant tradition in ethics fom the ancient Greeks until Kant. Traditionally the study of the virtues was also the study of what constituted a successful and happy life. Drawing on such diverse sources as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Shakespeare, Hume, Jane Austen, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre, Casey here argues that the classical virtues of courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and justice centrally define the good for humans, and that they are insufficiently acknowledged in modern moral philosophy. He suggests that values of success, worldliness, and pride are active parts of our moral thinking, and that the conflict between these and our equally important Christian inheritance leads to tensions and contradictions in our understanding of the moral life
Comte-Sponville, André (2002). A Short Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday Life. Heinemann.   (Google)
Comte-Sponville, André (2001). A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday Life. Metropolitan Books.   (Google)
Abstract: An utterly original exploration of the timeless human virtues and how they apply to the way we live now, from a bold and dynamic French writer. In this graceful, incisive book, writer-philosopher André Comte-Sponville reexamines the classic human virtues to help us under-stand "what we should do, who we should be, and how we should live." In the process, he gives us an entirely new perspective on the value, the relevance, and even the charm of the Western ethical tradition. Drawing on thinkers from Aristotle to Simone Weil, by way of Aquinas, Kant, Rilke, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Rawls, among others, Comte-Sponville elaborates on the qualities that constitute the essence and excellence of humankind. Starting with politeness -- almost a virtue -- and ing with love -- which transcs all morality -- A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues takes us on a tour of the eighteen essential virtues: fidelity, prudence, temperance, courage, justice, generosity, compassion, mercy, gratitude, humility, simplicity, tolerance, purity, gentleness, good faith, and even, surprisingly, humor.Sophisticated and lucid, full of wit and vivacity, this modestly titled yet immensely important work provides an indispensable guide to finding what is right and good in everyday life
Cottingham, John (1998). Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian, and Psychoanalytic Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Can philosophy enable us to lead better lives through a systematic understanding of our human nature? John Cottingham's thought-provoking study examines three major philosophical approaches to this problem. Starting with the attempts of Classical philosophers to cope with the recalcitrant forces of the passions, he moves on to examine the moral psychology of Descartes, and concludes by analyzing the insights of modern psychoanalytic theory into the human predicament. His study provides a fresh and challenging perspective on moral philosophy and psychology for students and specialists alike
Crisp, Roger (ed.) (1996). How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The last few years have seen a remarkable revival of interest in the virtues, which have regained their central role in moral philosophy. This thought-provoking new collection is a much-needed survey of virtue ethics and virtue theory. The specially commissioned articles by an international team of philosophers represent the state of the art in this subject and will set the agenda for future work in the area. The contributors--including Lawrence Blum, John Cottingham, Julia Driver, Rosalind Hursthouse, Terence Irwin, Susan Moller Okin, Onora O'Neill, Michael Slote, Michael Stocker, and David Wiggins--cover practical virtue ethics, ancient views of the virtues, impartiality and partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtue and the good life, the vices, emotions, politics, feminism, moral education, and community
Driver, Julia (2001). Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences
Durston, Diane (2006). Wabi Sabi: The Art of Everyday Life. Storey Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: With “slow living” as the newest incarnation of the simplicity movement, the search for fresh inspiration on ways to live a more authentic life is as pressing as ever. Turning to Eastern traditions, people are discovering the Japanese concept of wabi sabi. The perfect antidote to today’s frenzied, consumer-oriented culture, wabi sabi encourages slowing down, living modestly, and appreciating the natural and imperfect aspect of material culture. While defying definition, wabi sabi is best expressed in brief, evocative bites. In The Little Wabi Sabi Companion, Diane Durston, a noted writer on Japanese art and culture, presents a collection of reflections, along with classic poetry and verse from both Eastern and Western traditions, that capture the wabi sabi moment, and inspire readers to do the same. The subtle beauty of nature, the simplicity of a found object, the impermanence of an autumnal flower arrangement, the solitude of a single fisherman in his boat are all celebrated and reflected upon in this easily browseable book. The text is complemented by photography and calligraphy inspired by the wabi-sabi spirit. This collection of simple, yet profound insights in an irresistable, hold-in-the-hand package offers readers the opportunity for integrating moments of contemplation and meditation into their daily lives, and to discover the essence of wabi sabi
Felltham, Owen (1628). Resolves, a Duple Century. W. J. Johnson.   (Google)
Feldman, Steven P. (2004). The professional conscience: A psychoanalytic study of moral character in Tolstoy's the death of Ivan ilych. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Modern professional behavior all too often fails to meet high standards of moral conduct. An important reason for this unfortunate state of affairs is the expansive self interest of the individual professional. The individual''s natural desire for his/her own success and pleasure goes unchecked by internal moral constraints. In this essay, I investigate this phenomenon using the psychoanalytic concepts of the ego ideal and superego. These concepts are used to explore the internal psychological dynamics that contribute to moral decision-making. The contrasts between self interest and concern for others, selfishness and moral values, and moral conscience and social conformity are examined in Tolstoy''s study of the modern professional in The Death of Ivan Ilych. By reviewing Freud''s work on the moral conscience, particularly its complex inner structure and liabilities to dysfunction, and applying it to Tolstoy''s penetrating portrayal of Ivan Ilych''s personal and professional life, an understanding of the inner (emotional) foundation of moral character, its dependence on the past through the links between generations, and the need to integrate idealism with moral values is generated. Examples from Enron Corporation will be used throughout the paper to relate the analysis and discussion to contemporary business ethics problems
Frankfurt, Harry G. (2006). Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Harry G. Frankfurt begins his inquiry by asking, “What is it about human beings that makes it possible for us to take ourselves seriously?” Based on The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right delves into this provocative and original question. The author maintains that taking ourselves seriously presupposes an inward-directed, reflexive oversight that enables us to focus our attention directly upon ourselves, and “[it] means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right.” The essays delineate two features that have a critical role to play in this: our rationality, and our ability to love. Frankfurt incisively explores the roles of reason and of love in our active lives, and considers the relation between these two motivating forces of our actions. The argument is that the authority of practical reason is less fundamental than the authority of love. Love, as the author defines it, is a volitional matter, that is, it consists in what we are actually committed to caring about. Frankfurt adds that “The object of love can be almost anything—a life, a quality of experience, a person, a group, a moral ideal, a nonmoral ideal, a tradition, whatever.” However, these objects and ideals are difficult to comprehend and often in conflict with each other. Moral principles play an important supporting role in this process as they help us develop and elucidate a vision that inspires our love. The first section of the book consists of the two lectures, which are entitled “Taking Ourselves Seriously” and “Getting It Right.” The second section consists of comments in response by Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael E. Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen. The book includes a preface by Debra Satz
Friedman, Marilyn (1993). What Are Friends For?: Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Gini, Al (2008). Why It's Hard to Be Good. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethics means what? -- Narcissism: me, myself, and I -- Character, integrity, and conscience -- Its so easy to be a bystander -- Change, choice, and culture -- The media and morality -- Ethics and the workplace -- Leisure and play -- Leadership, money, power -- Sex (yes, sex) -- Death (ditto).
Hauerwas, Stanley (1994). Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Hill, Thomas E. (1991). Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This stimulating collection of essays in ethics eschews the simple exposition and refinement of abstract theories. Rather, the author focuses on everyday moral issues, often neglected by philosophers, and explores the deeper theoretical questions which they raise. Such issues are: Is it wrong to tell a lie to protect someone from a painful truth? Should one commit a lesser evil to prevent another from doing something worse? Can one be both autonomous and compassionate? Other topics discussed are servility, weakness of will, suicide, obligations to oneself, snobbery, and environmental concerns. A feature of the collection is the contrast of Kantian and utilitarian answers to these problems. The essays are crisply and lucidly written and will appeal to both teachers and students of philosophy
Johnson, Peter (1999). The Philosophy of Manners: A Study of the 'Little Virtues'. Thoemmes.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Philosophy of Manners Peter Johnson makes a compelling case for manners as a subject for investigation by modern moral philosophy. He examines manners as 'little virtues', explaining their distinctive conceptual characteristics and charting their intricate detail and relationships with each other. In demonstrating why manners are important to our mutual expectations, Johnson reveals a terrain which modern moral philosophy has left largely unmapped. Through a critical examination of the ethics of John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre, Johnson shows how the nature of manners constitutes a philosophical problem both for liberalism and its critics. Taking the recent revival of virtue ethics as its broad starting point, The Philosophy of Manners discusses the 'little virtues' as they are treated in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions of writing on ethics. Original features of the book include discussions of nameless virtues, the logical intricacy of the 'little virtues' which compose manners, and the nature of their orchestration by the more substantial virtues and moral concerns. The aim throughout is to give manners a philosophically defensible place in the moral life - a place which neither inflates nor understates their importance. --an examination of why manners are essential to moral literacy and an ethical society --the first work of its kind - no other ethical investigation concentrates on manners --relevant to the recent revival of interest in virtue ethics and any course in contemporary ethics --will provoke argument and disagreement
Jollimore, Troy A. (2001). Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Kieran, Matthew (2006). Art, morality and ethics: On the (im)moral character of art works and inter-relations to artistic value. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):129–143.   (Google | More links)
Kieran, Matthew (2010). Teaching & learning guide for: Art, morality and ethics: On the (im)moral character of art works and inter-relations to artistic value. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):426-431.   (Google)
Abstract: Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter-relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a distinguished philosophical history but as the Compass survey article suggests ('Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value.' Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43), it is only very recently that figures in the field have returned to it to develop more precisely what they take the relationships to be and why. Consensus is, unsurprisingly, lacking. The reinvigoration of the issues has led sophisticated formalists or autonomists to mount a more considered defence of the idea that aesthetic and literary values are indeed conceptually distinct from the justification or otherwise of the moral perspective or views endorsed in a work (Topic I). The challenges presented by such a defence are many but amongst them are appeals to critical practice (Lamarque and Olsen), scepticism about whether or not art really can give us bona fide knowledge (Stolnitz) and the recognition that truth often seems to be far removed from what it is we value in our appreciation of works (Lamarque). One way to motivate consideration of the relevance of a work's moral character to its artistic value concerns the phenomena of imaginative resistance. At least sometimes it would seem that, as Hume originally suggested, we either cannot or will not enter imaginatively into the perspective solicited by a work due to its morally problematic character (Topic II). In some cases, it would seem that as a matter of psychological fact, we cannot do so since it is impossible for us to imagine how it could be that a certain attitude or action is morally permissible or good (Walton). The question then is whether or not this is a function of morality in particular or constraints on imaginative possibility more generally and what else is involved. At other times, the phenomena seem to be driven by a moral reluctance to allow ourselves to enter into the dramatic perspective involved (Moran) or evaluation of the attitude expressed (Stokes). Nonetheless, it is far from obvious that this is so of all the attitudes or responses we judge to be morally problematic. After all, it looks like we can and indeed often do suspend or background particular cognitive and moral commitments in engaging with all sorts of works (Nichols and Weinberg). If the moral character of a work interacts with how we appreciate and evaluate them, then the pressing question is this: is there any systematic account of the relationship available to us? One way is to consider the relationship between our emotional responses to works and their moral character (Topic III). After all, art works often solicit various emotional responses from us to follow the work and make use of moral concepts in so doing (Carroll). Indeed, whether or not a work merits the sought for emotional responses often seems to be internally related to ethical considerations (Gaut). Yet, it is not obvious that we should apply our moral concepts or respond emotionally in our imaginative engagement with works as art as we should in real life (Kieran, Jacobson). A different route is via the thought that art can convey knowledge (Topic IV). There might be particular kinds of moral knowledge art distinctively suited to conveying (Nussbaum) or it may just be that art does so particularly effectively (Carroll, Gaut, Kieran). Either way where this can be tied to the artistic means and appreciation of a work it would seem that to cultivate moral understanding contributes to the value of a work and to betray misunderstanding is a defect. Without denying the relevance of the moral character of a work some authors have wanted to claim that sometimes the immoral aspect of a work can contribute to rather than lessen its artistic value (Topic V). One route is to claim that there is no systematic theoretical account of the relationship available and what the right thing to say is depends on the particular case involved (Jacobson). Another involves the claim that this is so when the defect connects up in an appropriate way to one of the values of art. Thus, it has been claimed, only where a work reveals something which adds to intelligibility, knowledge or understanding in virtue of its morally problematic aspect can this be so (Kieran). The latter position looks like it could in principle be held whilst nonetheless maintaining that the typical or standard relationship is as the moralists would have it. Yet perhaps allowing valence change for such reasons is less a mark of principled explanation and more a function of downright inconsistency or incoherence (Harold). The topics themselves and suggested readings given below follow the structure articulated above as further amplified in the Compass survey article. The design and structure given below can be easily compressed or expanded further. Author Recommends 1. Carroll, Noël. 'Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 126–60. This article develops the idea that engaging with narrative art calls on moral concepts and emotions and can thereby clarify our moral understanding. 2. Carroll, Noël. Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays . Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. Part IV consists of six distinct essays on questions concerning the inter-relations between art and morality including the essay cited above and the author's articulation and defence of moderate moralism. 3. Gaut, Berys. 'The Ethical Criticism of Art.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. 4. Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. This monograph provides the most exhaustive treatment of the issues and defends the claim that, where relevant, whenever a work is morally flawed it is of lesser value as art and wherever it is morally virtuous the work's value as art is enhanced. Chapters 7 and 8 defend concern ethical knowledge and chapter 10 is a development of the article cited above concerning emotional responses. Chapter 3 also gives a useful conceptual map of the issues and options in the debate. 5. Jacobson, Daniel. 'In Praise of Immoral Art.' Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. A wide ranging and extended treatment of relevant issues which objects to generalising moral treatments of our responses to art works and defends the idea that particular works can be better because of rather than despite their moral defects. 6. Kieran, Matthew. 'Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.' Art and Morality . Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. A general argument for immoralism is elaborated by outlining when, where and why a work's morally problematic character can contribute to its artistic value for principled reasons (through enhancing moral understanding). 7. Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art . London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. This chapter argues against both aestheticism and straightforward moralism about art, elaborating a defence of immoralism in relation to visual art whilst ranging over issues from pornographic art to the nature and demands of different genres in art. 8. Lamarque, Peter. 'Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. This article concisely outlines and defends a sophisticated aestheticism that denies the importance of truth to artistic value. 9. Stolnitz, Jerome. 'On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.' British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. This article articulates and defends the claim that no knowledge of any interesting or significant kind can be afforded by works appreciated and evaluated as art. 10. Walton, Kendall. 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 68 (1994): 27–51. This article builds on some comments from Hume to develop the idea that when engaging with fictions it seems impossible imaginatively to enter into radically deviant moral attitudes. Online Materials 'Aesthetics and Ethics: The State of the Art.' American Society of Aesthetics online (Jeffrey Dean): >. 'Art, Censorship and Morality' downloadable podcast of Nigel Warburton interviewing Matthew Kieran at Tate Britain (BBC/OU as part of the Ethics Bites series): >. 'Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value.' Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43 (Matthew Kieran): >. 'Ethical Criticism of Art.' Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ella Peek): >. 'Fascinating Fascism.' New York Review of Books Piece Discussing Leni Riefenstahl (Susan Sontag): >. 'The Beheading of St. John the Baptist (1450s), Giovanni de Paolo' (Tom Lubbock): >. Vladimir Nabokov and Lionel Trilling discuss Lolita (CBS): >. Sample Syllabus Topic I Autonomism/Aestheticism • Anderson, James C. and Jeffrey T. Dean. 'Moderate Autonomism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 38.2 (1998): 150–66. • Beardsley, Monroe. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism . New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. Chapter 12. • Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement.Trans. James Creed Meredith . Oxford: Oxford UP, 1952 [1790]. • Lamarque, Peter. 'Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. • ——. 'Tragedy and Moral Value.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.2 (1995): 239–49. • Lamarque, Peter and Stein Olsen. Truth, Fiction and Literature . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Chapter 10. • Stolnitz, Jerome. 'On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.' British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. Topic II Imaginative Capacities, Intelligibility and Resistance • Moran, Richard. 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination.' Philosophical Review 103.1 (1994): 75–106. • Nichols, Shaun. 'Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing'. Mind & Language 21.4 (2006): 459–74. • Stokes, Dustin. 'The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance'. British Journal of Aesthetics 46.4 (2006): 387–405. • Tanner, Michael. 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, II'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 51–66. • Walton, Kendall (1994). 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 27–51. • Weinberg, Jonathan. 'Configuring the Cognitive Imagination.' New Waves in Aesthetics . Eds. K. Stock and K. Thomson-Jones. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 203–23. Topic III Moralism and Emotions • Carroll, Noël. 'Moderate Moralism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 36.3 (1996): 223–37. • Carroll, Noël. 'Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.126–60. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapter 10. • ——. 'The Ethical Criticism of Art.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. • Hume, David. 'Of the Standard of Taste.' Selected Essays . Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993 [1757]. 133–53. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Emotions, Art and Immorality.' Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Emotions . Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 681–703. • Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art? . London: Penguin, 2004. Chapters 5 and 15. Topic IV Moralism and Knowledge • Aristotle. Poetics . Trans. M. Heath. London: Penguin, 1996 [367–322 BC]. • Carroll, Noël. 'The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.1 (2002): 3–26. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapters 7 and 8. • Gaut, Berys. 'Art and Cognition.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 115–26. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Art, Imagination and the Cultivation of Morals.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54.4 (1996): 337–51. • Nussbaum, Martha. 'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination.' Love's Knowledge . New York: Oxford UP, 1990. 148–68. • Plato. The Republic . Trans. D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974. Book 10. Topic V Immoralist Contextualism • Harold, James. 'Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48.1 (2008): 45–64. • Jacobson, Daniel. 'In Praise of Immoral Art.' Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. • ——. 'Ethical Criticism and the Vices of Moderation.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 342–55. • John, Eileen. 'Artistic Value and Moral Opportunism.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 331–41. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Forbidden Knowledge:The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.' Art and Morality . Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. • Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art . London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. • Patridge, Stephanie. 'Moral Vices as Artistic Virtues: Eugene Onegin and Alice.' Philosophia 36.2 (2008): 181–93. Focus Questions 1. What is the strongest argument for the claim that the moral character of a work is not relevant to its artistic value? Does artistic or literary criticism tend to concern itself with the truth or morality of works? If so, in what ways? If not, why do you think this is? 2. What different explanations might there be for difficulty with or resistance to imaginatively entering into attitudes you take to be immoral? How might this relate to the way our imaginings work as contrasted with belief? How might different literary or artistic treatments of the same subject matter make a difference? 3. How do narrative works draw on our moral concepts and responses? Can we suspend our normal moral commitments or application of moral concepts in responding emotionally to art works? Should we respond emotionally to art works as we ought to respond to real world events we witness? Why? Why not? 4. How, if at all, do art works convey moral understanding? How, if at all, is this related to the kinds of moral knowledge art works can teach or reveal to us? When, where and why might this be tied to the artistic value of a work? How can we tell where a work enhances our moral understanding as opposed to misleading or distorting it? 5. What art works do you value overall as art which commend or endorse moral values and attitudes that you do not? Is appreciation of them always marred or lessened by the morally dubious aspect? If not, what explains the differences in evaluation? What, if anything, might you learn by engaging with works which endorse moral attitudes or apply moral concepts different from those you take to be justified? How, if at all, might this connect up with what makes them valuable as art?
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Abstract: The basic relationship between people should be care, and the caring life is the highest which humans can live. Unfortunately, care that is not thoughtful slides into illegitimate intrusion on autonomy. Autonomy is a basic good, and we should not abridge it without good reason. On the other hand, it is not the only good. We must sometimes intervene in the lives of others to protect them from grave harms or provide them with important benefits. The reflective person, therefore, needs guidelines for caring. Some contemporary moralists condemn paternalism categorically. This work examines weaknesses in their arguments and proposes new guidelines for paternalism, which it calls "parentalism" to avoid the patriarchal connotations of the old term. Its antiparentalism is more moderate than standard antipaternalism based on an exaggerated respect for autonomy. The work explores implications for both the personal sphere of interactions between individuals, such as friends and family members, and the public sphere of institutions, legislation, and the professional practices
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Abstract: We often speak of a person's character--good or bad, strong or weak--and think of it as a guide to how that person will behave in a given situation. Oddly, however, philosophers writing about ethics have had virtually nothing to say about the role of character in ethical behavior. What is character? How does it relate to having a self, or to the process of moral decision? Are we responsible for our characters? Character answers these questions, and goes on to examine the place of character in ethical philosophy. Both the Kantian and utilitarian traditions, Kupperman argues, have largely ignored the ways in which decisions are integrated over time, and instead provide a "snapshot" model of moral decision. Kupperman demonstrates the deficiencies of a number of classic and contemporary ethical theories that do not take account of the idea of character, and offers his own character-based theory. Along the way he touches on such subjects as personal identity, the importance of happiness, moral education, and the definition of a valuable life
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Abstract: By the early 80s, kids were already trawling the message boards of the Internet for perverse kicks. Well before Star Ways Kid or "flash mobs," one of the first online fads was the "Purity Test," a series of questions to rate your moral purity, from the raunchy ("Ever had sex in your parents' bedroom?") to the absurd ("Ever snorted cocaine off the dashboard of a car doing 80 mph?").The tests would be printed out, brought to school, and pored over with friends in the back of the gym during recess. Then kids would modify the original with their own prurient additions before sending it along. Eventually, the tests became bloated thousand-question Franken-tests that took hours to complete.Doing the test with friends was like playing an endless, filthy, wildly enlightening game of "Did You Ever?"--and because it was a standardized test, you could compare your scores. Assuming everyone was being honest--which they weren't. The Purity Test will offer both a humorous history and analysis of the Purity Test as well as several versions of the test to take at home
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Abstract: Totemic unity as key to community in thought and action -- Myth : the emergence of diversity within unity -- The individual in the Greek polis -- The synthesis of personal uniqueness and social unity in Christian and Islamic thought -- Modern alienation of individuals and society -- Opening a new paradigm for civil society and social harmony : a contemporary metaphysics of freedom -- The diversified unity of a global whole.
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Abstract: This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not
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Abstract: abstract   As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement
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Abstract: Yves R. Simon (1903-1961) was one of this century’s greatest students of the virtue of practical wisdom. Simon’s interest in this virtue ranged from ultimate theoretical and foundational concerns, such as the relationship between practical knowledge and science, to the most concrete and immediate questions regarding the role of practical wisdom in personal and social decision-making. These concerns occupied Simon from his earliest published writing to the final notes and correspondence he was working on at the moment of his untimely death. Throughout his life, practical wisdom and its related philosophical ramifications emerge time and again at critical junctures, throwing into bold relief some of the deeper dimensions of questions as diverse as the nature of democracy, the concept of law, and the theory of work. Practical knowledge constitutes a unifying motif of Simon’s entire encyclopedic effort. This volume reconstructs what would have been Simon’s final sustained writing on practical knowledge. It includes reworking of some previously published material, especially the landmark 1961 essay, "Introduction to the Study of Practical Wisdom," possibly the best treatment of the concept of "command" in recent philosophical writing. But it also reproduces, in a form closely corresponding to Simon’s intention, material drawn from notes and schemata, concerning issues such as the relationship between moral science and wisdom, the nature of practical judgment, and the relationship between practical knowledge and Christian moral philosophy. Also included are previously unpublished letters to Jacques Maritain on the controversy surrounding the theoretical-practical and practico-practical syllogisms, as well as Maritain’s responses. The volume concludes with applications of Simon’s general theory to a critique of the concept of a social science and to the notion of Christian humanism. This volume will appeal to moral philosophers interested in a range of normative issues, as well as social scientists and readers concerned with the philosophical foundations of modern culture. Virtue moralist, in particular, will find in Simon one of the profoundest commentators on this tradition in normative ethics
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5.1l.5.1 Authenticity

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Anderson, Joel (1995). The persistence of authenticity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (1).   (Google)
Knobe, Joshua (2005). Ordinary ethical reasoning and the ideal of 'being yourself'. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):327 – 340.   (Google)
Abstract: The psychological study of ethical reasoning tends to concentrate on a few specific issues, with the bulk of the research going to the study of people's attitudes toward moral rules or the welfare of others. But people's ethical reasoning is also shaped by a wide range of other concerns. Here I focus on the importance that people attach to the ideal of being yourself. It is shown that certain experimental results - results that seemed anomalous and inexplicable to researchers who focused on moral rules and concern for the welfare of others - can be explained quite elegantly as the product of people's attachment to the ideal of 'being yourself'. The success of this explanation then points to the need for a more general inquiry into the role that the ideal of 'being yourself ' plays in people's ethical reasoning

5.1l.5.2 Personality

Bannister, D. (ed.) (1977). New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. Academic Press.   (Google)
Butt, Trevor (2003). Understanding People. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding People provides an overview and critique of current psychological assumptions about people and what differentiates them, and replaces them with a set of ideas taken from social constructionism. It begins with an examination of contemporary theories, then explores the critique of the social constructionists, before laying out the basis of an understanding of human action and behavior, drawing on phenomenology and personal construct theory. Using everyday experience to illustrate the issues in personality theory (Is behavior situation-specific? Why do we have a sense of self? Is there an unconscious?), this book will breathe life into an area of psychology that is so often arid, and, in the eyes of students, divorced from their world
Davis, Kathy (ed.) (1997). Embodied Practices: Feminist Perspectives on the Body. Sage.   (Google)
Abstract: This book focuses on the significance of the body in contemporary feminist scholarship. Whether the body is treated as biological bedrock or subversive metaphor, it is implicated in the cultural and historical construction of sexual difference as well as asymmetrical power relations. The contributors to this volume examine the role of the body as socially shaped and historically colonized territory and as the focus of individual womenÆs struggles for autonomy and self-determination. They also analyze its centrality to the feminist critique of male-stream science as dualistic, distanced, and decontextualized. While the body has become a "hot item" in contemporary social theory and research, the renewed interest has received a mixed reaction from feminists. The body may be back, but the "new" body theory often proves to be just as disembodied as it ever was. The body revival seems to be less an attempt to re-embody masculinist science than just another expression of the same condition that evoked the feminist critique in the first place: a flight from femininity and everything that is associated with it in Western culture. Drawing on insights from contemporary feminist theories of gender and power, this book offers a timely critical appraisal of the recent "body revival." Embodied Practices not only sets an agenda for research about the body, but for an embodied perspective on the body as well. It will be a valuable and thought-provoking resource for students of womenÆs studies, social theory, cultural studies, and medical sociology
Lamiell, James T. (1987). The Psychology of Personality: An Epistemological Inquiry. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Maze, J. R. (1983). The Meaning of Behaviour. G. Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
[Price-Williams, Douglass Richard] [from old catalog] (1974). [The Philosophy of Science and the Study of Personality. New York,J. Norton Publishers.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1981). A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory. Krieger Pub. Co..   (Google)
Shotter, John (1984). Social Accountability and Selfhood. B. Blackwell.   (Google)
Sullivan, Karen (2003). Finding the Inner You: How Well Do You Know Yourself? Barrons Educational Series.   (Google)
Abstract: A key to happiness lies in each person’s ability to know himself or herself. The consequences of going through life without self-knowledge are frequently self-obsession, false priorities, and unwarranted fears. This book explains the enlightening process of self-discovery and shows how it leads to self-sufficiency. The author offers guidance with inspiring true-life stories and practical advice that readers can apply to their own lives. Here is instruction on techniques for engaging in periods of solitude, with emphasis on making such times enjoyable and spiritually enriching experiences. The author also discusses the relationships between solitude and human emotions, solitude and intelligence, methods of effective communication with others, and ways to create a state of mind that is based on self-sufficiency. Making solitude a source of spiritual enrichment entails creating a balance between the normal need for human relationships and the awareness of one’s self as an independent being. That balance invariably produces a sense of happiness and personal fulfillment
Tiemersma, Douwe (1989). Body Schema and Body Image: An Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Study. Amsterdam ;Swets & Zeitlinger.   (Google)
Wilson, Timothy D. (2002). Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 331 | Google | More links)

5.1l.5.3 Integrity

Adler, Nancy J. & Bird, Frederick B. (1988). International dimensions of executive integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Aitken, Stuart C. (2001). Fielding diversity and moral integrity. Ethics, Place and Environment 4 (2):125 – 129.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper outlines some of the moral issues I faced when working in the field with homeless children and children with cerebral palsy. Bill Bunge argues that the 'immediacy' of fieldwork requires that we divest ourselves of theoretical and philosophical pretensions to attend the urgency of our participants' context. I use personal examples of powerful and contradictory experiences from working with young people in the field to highlight the importance of a moral integrity that recognizes vulnerability and the needs of the moment
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1946). Theory and the integrity of experience. Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):379-382.   (Google | More links)
Allen, Charles Lawrence (2007). Why Good People Make Bad Choices: How You Can Develop Peace of Mind Through Integrity. Loving Healing Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The agenda -- The instinctual management of feeling -- The instinctual management of life -- Behind the scenes of choice -- Anger -- Going beyond ego -- Belief system components -- Conscious values -- Conscious morals -- Conscious expectations and self-image -- The conscious management of feelings -- Managing 'mad' -- Managing 'sad' -- Managing 'bad' -- Managing 'fear' -- Managing 'glad' -- Integrity : one choice at a time -- Nature meets nurture : the peace of mind perspective is born.
Anderson, Melissa S. (2007). Collective openness and other recommendations for the promotion of research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4).   (Google)
Anderson, Melissa S. & Shultz, Joseph B. (2003). The role of scientific associations in promoting research integrity and deterring research misconduct. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The nature of scientific societies’ relationships with their members limits their ability to promote research integrity. They must therefore leverage their strengths as professional organizations to integrate ethical considerations into their ongoing support of their academic disciplines. This paper suggests five strategies for doing so
Argyris, Chris & Schön, Donald A. (1988). Reciprocal integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Ashford, Elizabeth (2000). Utilitarianism, integrity, and partiality. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):421-439.   (Google | More links)
Atkinson, Timothy N. (2008). Using creative writing techniques to enhance the case study method in research integrity and ethics courses. Journal of Academic Ethics 6 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The following article explores the use of creative writing techniques to teach research ethics, breathe life into case study preparation, and train students to think of their settings as complex organizational environments with multiple actors and stakeholders
Babbitt, Susan E. (1996). Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people
Bauer, Keith (2004). Cybermedicine and the moral integrity of the physician–patient relationship. Ethics and Information Technology 6 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Some critiques of cybermedicine claim that it is problematic because it fails to create physician–patient relationships. But, electronically mediated encounters do create such relationships. The issue is the nature and quality of those relationships and whether they are conducive to good patient care and meet the ethical ideals and standards of medicine. In this paper, I argue that effective communication and compassion are, in most cases, necessary for the establishment of trusting and morally appropriate physician–patient relationships. The creation of these relationships requires patients and physicians to take psychological and emotional risks and to make commitments to each other. The problem is that by altering the form and content of verbal and non-verbal behaviors and by limiting the kinds of interactions that can take place, cybermedicine makes risk-free interactions easier and more commonplace and retards the development of physician compassion and patient trust. In doing so, cybermedicine encourages morally inappropriate physician–patient relationships. I argue that Merleau-Ponty''s notion of embodiment and Kierkegaard''s criticisms of disinterested reflection help us to understand how cybermedicine can undermine patient health and well being and why it should be seen as a possible threat to the moral integrity of physician–patient relationships
Bayne, Tim & Levy, Neil (2005). Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had been transformed for the better by the operation [1]. A second patient was also reported as having been satisfied with his amputation [2]
Baylis, Françoise (2007). Of courage, honor, and integrity. In Lisa A. Eckenwiler & Felicia Cohn (eds.), The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral Landscape. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Beitz, Charles R. (1980). Nonintervention and communal integrity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (4):385-391.   (Google | More links)
Bernasek, Anna (2010). The Economics of Integrity: From Dairy Farmers to Toyota, How Wealth is Built on Trust and What That Means for Our Future. Harperstudio.   (Google)
Besser-Jones, Lorraine (2008). Personal Integrity, Moraity, and Psychological Well-Being. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):361-383.   (Google)
Bigelow, John & Pargetter, Robert (2007). Integrity and Autonomy. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):39-49.   (Google)
Bird, Stephanie J. (2006). Research ethics, research integrity and the responsible conduct of research. Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (3).   (Google)
Bivins, Thomas (2007). Loyalty, utility, and integrity in casablanca: The use of film in explicating philosophical disputes concerning utilitarianism. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22 (2 & 3):132 – 150.   (Google)
Abstract: Can concepts such as loyalty and integrity remain intrinsically valuable personal traits even as we devote ourselves to that which requires the loyalty in the first place (the greater good)? Does utilitarian deliberation rest on too extreme a notion of impartiality - one that focuses exclusively on the consequences of actions, leaving people, in the words of Bernard Williams, "mere faceless numbers"? Using the film Casablanca as an extended analogy, this article attempts to reconcile the concept of loyalty to a cause, as described by Josiah Royce, with Williams's argument that personal integrity can remain part of even utilitarian thought processes
Bowie, Norman E. (2010). Organizational integrity and moral climates. In George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Brady, Emily (2002). Aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity in environmental conservation. Environmental Ethics 24 (1):75-91.   (Google)
Abstract: Aesthetics plays an important role in environmental conservation. In this paper, I pin down two key concepts for understanding this role, aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity. Aesthetic character describes the particularity of an environment based on its aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities. In the first part, I give an account of aesthetic character through a discussion of its subjective and objective bases, and I argue for an awareness of the dynamic nature of this character. In the second part, I consider aesthetic character in a conservation context. I develop the diachronic concept of aesthetic integrity to guide decisions about how to manage change to aesthetic character. My argument is illustrated with a case study of the proposal for a superquarry on the remote isle of Harris in Scotland
Brazier, Frances; Oskamp, Anja; Prins, Corien; Schellekens, Maurice & Wijngaards, Niek (2004). Law-abiding and integrity on the internet: A case for agents. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Software agents extend the current, information-based Internet to include autonomous mobile processing. In most countries such processes, i.e., software agents are, however, without an explicit legal status. Many of the legal implications of their actions (e.g., gathering information, negotiating terms, performing transactions) are not well understood. One important characteristic of mobile software agents is that they roam the Internet: they often run on agent platforms of others. There often is no pre-existing relation between the owner of a running agents process and the owner of the agent platform on which an agent process runs. When conflicts arise, the position of the agent platform administrator is not clear: is he or she allowed to slow down the process or possibly remove it from the system? Can the interests of the user of the agent be protected? This article explores legal and technical perspectives in protecting the integrity and availability of software agents and agent platforms
Bratton, Susan Power (1993). Loving nature: Ecological integrity and Christian responsibility. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):93-96.   (Google)
Brenkert, George G. (2010). Whistle-blowing, moral integrity, and organizational ethics. In George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Brown, Marvin T. (2006). Corporate integrity and public interest: A relational approach to business ethics and leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper approaches the question of corporate integrity and leadership from a civic perspective, which means that corporations are seen as members of civil society, corporate members are seen as citizens, and corporate decisions are guided by civic norms. Corporate integrity, from this perspective, requires that the communication patterns that constitute interpersonal relationships at work exhibit the civic norm of reciprocity and acknowledge the need for security and the right to participate. Since leaders are members of corporate relationships, their integrity will be determined by the integrity of these interpersonal relationships, and by their efforts to improve them
Brody, Howard & Night, Susan S. (2007). The pharmacist's personal and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (6):16 – 17.   (Google)
Byrne, Edmund F. (2002). Business ethics: A helpful hybrid in search of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 37 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: What sort of connection is there between business ethics and philosophy? The answer given here: a weak one, but it may be getting stronger. Comparatively few business ethics articles are structurally dependent on mainstream academic philosophy or on such sub-specialities thereof as normative ethics, moral theory, and social and political philosophy. Examining articles recently published in the Journal of Business Ethics that declare some dependence, the author finds that such declarations often constitute only a pro forma gesture which could be omitted without detriment to the paper's content and conclusions. He also finds, however, that some authors do draw on solid philosophical work in ways that are establishing ever more meaningful interconnections between business ethics and academic philosophy. These cross-disciplinary studies, he concludes, are ground-breaking and invite creative imitation
Caelleigh, Addeane S. (2003). Roles for scientific societies in promoting integrity in publication ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Scientific societies can have a powerful influence on the professional lives of scientists. Using this influence, they have a responsibility to make long-term commitments and investments in promoting integrity in publication, just as in other areas of research ethics. Concepts that can inform the thinking and activities of scientific societies with regard to publication ethics are: the “hidden curriculum” (the message of actions rather than formal statements), a fresh look at the components of acting with integrity, deviancy as a normally occurring phenomenon in human society, and the scientific community as an actual community. A society’s first step is to decide what values it will promote, within the framework of present-day standards of good conduct of science and given the society’s history and traditions. The society then must create educational programs that serve members across their careers. Scientific societies must take seriously the implications of the problem; set policies and standards for publication ethics for their members; educate about and enforce the standards; bring the issues before the members early and often; and maintain continuing dialogue with editors
Caldwell, Cam (2010). A ten-step model for academic integrity: A positive approach for business schools. Journal of Business Ethics 92 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of academic dishonesty in Business Schools has risen to the level of a crisis according to some authors, with the incidence of reports on student cheating rising to more than half of all the business students. In this article we introduce the problem of academic integrity as a holistic issue that requires creating a␣cultural change involving students, faculty, and administrators in an integrated process. Integrating the extensive literature from other scholars, we offer a ten-step model which can create a positive culture for academic integrity. The successful implementation of a well-crafted academic integrity program can have a positive impact on business schools and improve the reputation of tomorrow’s business leaders
Calnan, Alan (ms). Duty and integrity in tort law.   (Google)
Abstract:      The tort concept of duty lacks integrity in virtually every popular sense of that term. It is at once incomplete, unharmonious and unbeholden to any ethical principle or moral standard. Although these problems are interrelated, each corrupts tort jurisprudence in its own unique way. The incompleteness problem is particularly acute in theories of intentional tort and strict liability, where it is either selectively invoked or completely ignored. While duty holds a more prominent place in negligence, it has been fragmented into myriad specialized obligations which remain mostly in disarray. Such disunity, in turn, has fostered an even greater problem of disharmony, Tort scholars disagree about what duty is and what it is supposed to do. At one extreme, deontologists see duty as a strict moral obligation that judges must adopt and implement in accordance with natural law. At the other extreme, realists view duty merely as a terminological faýade for a judge's unfettered policy decision that liability should or should not exist. Between these opposed camps lie the pragmatists, who conceive of duties as useful guiding principles, but readily recognize a judge's authority to create new rules whenever social circumstances so require. Beneath even this collective dissonance lurks the third integrity issue: the moral problem of principle. Besides the deontological view, which grounds duty in exceedingly strong moral principles, each of the remaining camps fail to give principle its due. Because the realists and pragmatists refuse to commit to any specific set of principles - most especially, liberal-moral principles rooted in American history, law, culture and values - their approaches necessarily lack a unifying standard, and so seem doomed to unpredictability, inconsistency and incoherence. These problems, however, are not intractable. In fact, significant guidance can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of "law as integrity" provides a methodology for judicial lawmaking and interpretation. Under this theory, judges deciding hard cases must seek to promote liberal values of equality, liberty and due process by interpreting the law in a way that not only squares with past precedent, but also reconciles and strengthens the law's core principles and integrates them into a larger, cohesive framework. Because tort law is largely judge-made, and the "law" part of torts consists primarily of its scheme of duties, Dworkin's approach seems naturally fitted to the law's current duty conundrum. Still, that fit may not be perfect. While Dworkin views history as mostly irrelevant to modern legal interpretation, the history of tort law may well tell us something quite profound about the law's core principles, their connection to the law's present value system and their role in shaping that system's cultural identity. For these reasons, I shall offer a modified Dworkinian theory of tort duty that not only fits and justifies the law's present values, doctrines and structures, but also respects and promotes its historical tradition. Part I begins by briefly examining the role of duty in a liberal state. It then explores common law duties in particular, revealing their developmental patterns and exposing their integrity problems. Part II reviews Dworkin's approach to these problems, explaining his theory of "law as integrity" and highlighting some of the problems in his approach. In Part III, the focus shifts to the concept of duty in tort law. After tracing the historical development of duty in torts, it examines the duty concepts in tort's three modern theories of liability. It finds great integrity in intentional torts, a lost integrity in strict liability and the promise of integrity in negligence. The remainder of the article seeks to fulfill this promise. In Part IV, I examine the history or vertical integrity of negligence's duty concept, exposing several flaws in the modern view. Then, picking up on Dworkin's approach, I explore the horizontal integrity of this concept, identifying in Part V duty's substantive bases and conceptual limits, proposing in Part VI a structured, interpretive analysis, and illustrating in Part VII the application of that analysis in a difficult duty case. Part VIII culminates the discussion by offering a general methodology for handling all negligence duty issues. To put this new metatheory in perspective, the Conclusion highlights its significant features and addresses some of its likely criticisms
Cameron, Scott W.; Fletcher, Galen L. & Wise, Jane H. (eds.) (2009). Life in the Law: Service & Integrity. J. Reuben Clark Law Society, Brigham Young University Law School.   (Google)
Carle, Susan, Structure and integrity.   (Google)
Abstract:      In this Review Essay of David Luban's Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, I argue that although Professor Luban has not had much to say until now about "structural" concerns - namely, how lawyers' locations within institutions that organize access to power shape or should shape those lawyers' conduct - in his most recent work, another approach slips in as a supplement to his individualist framework. In this emerging supplement, structural concerns become increasingly important. Although individual integrity continues to matter most in Professor Luban's world view, it increasingly matters in the context of structural relations in which lawyers' ethical duties to particular clients vary. Individual clients facing powerful institutional adversaries deserve client-centered representation, but lawyers representing impersonal and powerful institutions have different ethical responsibilities. In general, Professor Luban approves most of lawyers' work involving the protection of the less powerful against those who would exercise power to cause others great harm. I discuss several important implications of this shift in perspective, focusing especially on tough questions that arise in thinking about lawyers' ethics in the face of chronic conditions of institutional injustice. Combined with a structuralist supplement, the analysis in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity points to key questions about how to design institutional mechanisms that protect and respond constructively to dissent. Legal Ethics and Human Dignity also compels us to think about these questions in the context of government lawyering, where questions of lawyers' ethical conduct within institutional constraints have become especially pressing today
Carr, Spencer (1976). The integrity of a utilitarian. Ethics 86 (3):241-246.   (Google | More links)
Chappell, Timothy (2007). Integrity and demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
Chalk, Rosemary (1999). Integrity in science: Moving into the new millennium. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Chan, Ho Mun & Pang, Sam (2007). Long-term care: Dignity, autonomy, family integrity, and social sustainability: The Hong Kong experience. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (5):401 – 424.   (Google)
Abstract: This article reveals the outcome of a study on the perceptions of elders, family members, and healthcare professionals and administration providing care in a range of different long-term care facilities in Hong Kong with primary focus on the concepts of autonomy and dignity of elders, quality and location of care, decision making, and financing of long term care. It was found that aging in place and family care were considered the best approaches to long term care insofar as procuring and balancing the values of dignity, autonomy, family integrity and social sustainability were concerned. An elder having the final say was generally accepted. The results also initiated the importance of sharing of financial responsibility among elders, children and government albeit the emphasis was placed on individuals. Furthermore, dignity of elders was not considered purely a synonym of autonomy, but it had also to do with respect, family and social connections
Cohen, Andrew (1996). The Challenge of Enlightenment: A Voyage Into the Multidimensional Integrity of Nonduality: A Talk. Moksha Press.   (Google)
Conteh-Morgan, Earl (2000). State integrity and democratization: Issues, values, and paradoxes in african development. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (4):488–496.   (Google | More links)
Corlett, J. Angelo (forthcoming). Moral integrity and academic research. Journal of Academic Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper focuses on some moral issues in academic journal publishing, from the standpoints of Publishers, editors, referees and authors
Cossette, Pierre (2004). Research integrity: An exploratory survey of administrative science faculties. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This research focuses on the perceptions of research integrity held by administrative science faculty members in French-language universities in Québec. More specifically, the survey was conducted to isolate and analyse the opinions of the target group concerning the seriousness and frequency of various types of conduct generally associated with a lack of integrity among researchers, peer reviewers and editors (or other assessment supervisors), the causes attributed to research misconduct, and the solutions proposed. Its main interest is to encourage researchers to reflect on the standards they would like to see introduced, based on their own statements concerning what they think and do about research integrity. Each of the 699 faculty members surveyed received a 91-item questionnaire by mail, and 136 completed and returned it. The results show, among other things, that the respondents did not take the question of research integrity lightly; in almost all cases, they considered the types of conduct studied to be at least moderately reprehensible and often very reprehensible. In addition, the same types of conduct were considered to be, or almost to be, moderately frequent. Causes were closely linked to the achievement of professional success. Solutions related to the promotion of publication quality instead of quantity and to the inclusion of at least one full session on research integrity in advanced programs were very clearly favoured. However, in all cases, the consensus did not appear to be very strong. The limits of the results are discussed, along with the recommendations and research possibilities to which they lead
Cottingham, John (2010). Integrity and fragmentation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):2-14.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The virtue of integrity does not appear explicitly in either the Aristotelian or the Judaeo-Christian list of virtues, but elements of both ethical systems implicitly acknowledge the importance of a unified and integrated life. This paper argues that integrity is indispensible for a good human life; the fragmented or compartmentalized life is always subject to instability, in so far as unresolved psychological conflicts and tensions may threaten to derail our ethical plans and projects. Achieving a stable and integrated life requires self-awareness; and (drawing on insights from the psychoanalytic tradition) it is suggested that self-awareness is not a simple matter, but requires a complex process of self-discovery. The paper's final section argues that although vitally necessary for the good life, integrity cannot be sufficient. Against the view of influential writers such as Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt, our commitment to our chosen projects, however authentic and integrated, cannot in itself give our lives meaning and value. The good and meaningful life cannot be a matter of authenticity alone, but requires us, whether we like it or not, to bring our projects into line with enduring objective values that we did not create, and which we cannot alter
Cowton, C. J. (2002). Integrity, responsibility and affinity: Three aspects of ethics in banking. Business Ethics 11 (4):393–400.   (Google | More links)
Cox, Damian (online). Integrity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Cox, Damian (2005). Integrity, commitment, and indirect consequentialism. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1).   (Google)
Cox, Damian; LaCaze, Marguerite & Levine, M. P. (1999). Should we strive for integrity? Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (4).   (Google)
Crowe, Jonathan, Dworkin on the value of integrity.   (Google)
Abstract:      This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin's arguments on the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. I defend an alternative theory of the value of integrity, according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this instrumental-value theory explains the value of integrity more satisfactorily than Dworkin's inherent-value account. The article concludes with a discussion of Dworkin's 'one right answer thesis'. Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong version of Dworkin's thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative deliberation generally
Culbert, Samuel A. & McDonough, John J. (1988). Organizational alignments, schisms, and high-integrity managerial behavior. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Dahlberg, John E. & Davidian, Nancy M. (forthcoming). Scientific forensics: How the office of research integrity can assist institutional investigations of research misconduct during oversight review. Science and Engineering Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The Division of Investigative Oversight within the U.S. Office of Research Integrity (ORI) is responsible for conducting oversight review of institutional inquiries and investigations of possible research misconduct. It is also responsible for determining whether Public Health Service findings of research misconduct are warranted. Although ORI findings rely primarily on the scope and quality of the institution’s analyses and determinations, ORI often has been able to strengthen the original findings by employing a variety of analytical methods, often computer based. Although ORI does not conduct inquiries or investigations, it has broad authority to provide assistance to institutions at all stages of their reviews of allegations. This assistance can range from providing advice on best practices, to legal assistance, to suggestions for how best to investigate specific allegations. When asked, ORI can also conduct certain forensic analyses, such as a statistical examination of questioned digits or a simple examination of a questioned figure in Photoshop. ORI will not provide opinions or render judgment on such analyses while the institution is still conducting its investigation. Such analyses can be done without knowing much else about the case
Davis, Anne L. & Rothstein, Hannah R. (2006). The effects of the perceived behavioral integrity of managers on employee attitudes: A meta-analysis. Journal of Business Ethics 67 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Perceived behavioral integrity involves the employee’s perception of the alignment of the manager’s words and deeds. This meta-analysis examined the relationship between perceived behavioral integrity of managers and the employee attitudes of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with the leader and affect toward the organization. Results indicate a strong positive relationship overall (average r = 0.48, p<0.01). With only 12 studies included, exploration of moderators was limited, but preliminary analysis suggested that the gender of the employees and the number of levels between the employee and the manager are potential moderators of the relationship. In the current sample of studies, country where the research was conducted did not seem to have any moderating effects. In addition to suggesting further investigation of potential moderators, we call for research that examines the relationship between behavioral integrity and outcomes that include individual behavior and organizational performance
De Bakker, Erik (2007). Integrity and cynicism: Possibilities and constraints of moral communication. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Paying thorough attention to cynical action and integrity could result in a less naive approach to ethics and moral communication. This article discusses the issues of integrity and cynicism on a theoretical and on a more practical level. The first part confronts Habermas’s approach of communicative action with Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason. In the second part, the focus will be on the constraints and possibilities of moral communication within a business context. Discussing the corporate integrity approach of Kaptein and Wempe will provide this focus. Their approach can be considered as a valuable contribution to the question of how to deal with (dilemmas of) conflicting interests, open discussion, fairness, and strategic decision-making in the context of stakeholder dialog. However, it is concluded that Kaptein and Wempe seem to overstretch the concept of corporate integrity by their inclination to make it an all-purpose remedy for corporate dilemmas
Dekkers, Wim (2009). Routine (non-religious) neonatal circumcision and bodily integrity: A transatlantic dialogue. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (2):pp. 125-146.   (Google)
De Maria, William (2006). Brother secret, sister silence: Sibling conspiracies against managerial integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 65 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I offer a new cartography of ethical resistance. I argue that there is an uncharted interaction between managerial secrecy and organizational silence, which may exponentially increase the incidence of corruption in ways not yet understood. Current methods used to raise levels of moral conduct in business and government practice appear blind to this powerful duo. Extensive literature reviews of secrecy and silence scholarships form the background for an early stage conceptual layout of the co-production of secrecy and silence
de Sousa, Ronald (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
De Vries, Rob (2006). Genetic engineering and the integrity of animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Genetic engineering evokes a number of objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. The concept of animal integrity is often invoked to articulate these kind of objections. Moreover, in reaction to the advent of genetic engineering, the concept has been extended from the level of the individual animal to the level of the genome and of the species. However, the concept of animal integrity was not developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the assumption that the concept of integrity, including its extensions to the level of the genome and the species, is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed at the genetic engineering of animals
Deval, Bill & Sessions, George (1984). The development of nature resources and the integrity of nature. Environmental Ethics 6 (4):293-322.   (Google)
Abstract: During the twentieth century, John Muir’s ideas of “righteous management” were eclipsed by Gifford Pinchot’s anthropocentric scientific management ideas conceming the conservation and development of Nature as a human resource. Ecology as a subversive science, however, has now undercut the foundations of this resource conservation and development ideology. Using the philosophical principles of deepecology, we explore a contemporary version of Muir’s “righteous management” by developing the ideas of holistic management and ecosystem rehabilitation
Dobos, Ned (2010). A state to call their own: Insurrection, intervention, and the communal integrity thesis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):26-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Many reasons have been given as to why humanitarian intervention might not be justified even where rebellion with similar aims would be a morally legitimate option. One of them is that intervention involves the imposition of alien values on the target society. Michael Walzer formulates this objection in terms of a people's right to a state that 'expresses their inherited culture' and that they can truly 'call their own'. I argue that this right can plausibly be said to extend sovereignty to at least some illiberal governments, and therefore to impose at least some moral constraints on humanitarian intervention. The problem for Walzer is that this right cannot form the basis of a constraint that applies to foreign intervention exclusively. Once the details of Walzer's argument are teased out, it becomes apparent that civil war and revolution must be equally restricted by this right. Hence a people's prerogative to be governed in accordance with familiar traditions cannot coherently be invoked to show that intervention is impermissible in cases where insurrection is taken to be justified
Dresser, Rebecca (2001). Cosmetic reproductive services and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 1 (1):11 – 12.   (Google)
Dudzinski, Denise M. (2004). Integrity in the relationship between medical ethics and professionalism. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (2):26 – 27.   (Google)
Dudzinski, Denise M. (2004). Integrity: Principled coherence, virtue, or both? Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3).   (Google)
Dunne, Joseph & Hogan, Pádraig (eds.) (2004). Education and Practice: Upholding the Integrity of Teaching and Learning. Blackwell.   (Google)
Easton, Susan (1995). Taking women's rights seriously: Integrity and the “right” to consume pornography. Res Publica 1 (2).   (Google)
Eyal, Nir (2009). Is the body special? Review of Cécile Fabre, whose body is it anyway? Justice and the integrity of the person. Utilitas 21 (2):233-245.   (Google)
Fadel, Petrina (2003). Respect for bodily integrity: A catholic perspective on circumcision in catholic hospitals. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (2):23 – 25.   (Google)
Fleischacker, Samuel (1992). Integrity and Moral Relativism. E.J. Brill.   (Google)
Frankel, Mark S. & Bird, Stephanie J. (2003). The role of scientific societies in promoting research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Friedman, Marilyn A. (1985). Moral integrity and the deferential wife. Philosophical Studies 47 (1).   (Google)
Geller, Lisa N. (2002). Exploring the role of the research integrity officer. Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (4).   (Google)
Gheaus, Anca (2006). Review of Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (12).   (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (3):215-33.   (Google)
Godlovitch, Stan (1993). The integrity of musical performance. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (4):573-587.   (Google | More links)
Goodstein, Jerry & Potter, RobertLyman (1999). Beyond financial incentives: Organizational ethics and organizational integrity. HEC Forum 11 (4).   (Google)
Gorski, A. (1996). Scientific integrity: Review of the symposium held in warsaw, Poland, 23 november 1995. Science and Engineering Ethics 2 (4).   (Google)
Gosling, Mark & Huang, Heh Jason (forthcoming). The fit between integrity and integrative social contracts theory. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of integrity appears in many arguments and theories in business ethics and organizational behavior where it plays multiple roles. It has been shown to have desirable organizational outcomes and is held as important by the academic and practitioner alike. Yet despite its prominence there are a variety of approaches to defining and conceptualizing it and little existent theory to explain its nature. We offer integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) as a framework that can anchor integrity in ethical theory and also encompass aspects of integrity such as wholeness, consistency, and authenticity. In addition we show how ISCT can resolve some of the challenges to definitions of integrity that have been raised in the literature and hence we provide some suggestions for future academic research and suggestions for the practitioner
Gowans, Christopher W. (1984). Integrity in the corporation: The plight of corporate product advocates. Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The integrity of corporate product advocates (advertisers and salespersons) is questionable for the same reason the integrity of lawyers is questionable. In both cases the requirements of a professional role inevitably lead to forms of deception. However, the integrity of lawyers has been taken to be a more serious issue than the integrity of product advocates. I consider why this is so, and I conclude that we should pay more attention to the integrity issue in the corporate case. In addition, I consider a parallel set of arguments that purport to justify a lack of integrity among product advocates and lawyers respectively. According to these arguments, a great social good is obtained from the institutions, corporate and legal, of which these persons are essential participants. Against these arguments, I emphasize the overriding importance of integrity, both within institutions and in society at large
Graham, Jody L. (2001). Does integrity require moral goodness? Ratio 14 (3):234–251.   (Google | More links)
Grant, Ruth Weissbourd (1997). Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Questioning the usual judgements of political ethics, Ruth W. Grant argues that hypocrisy can actually be constructive while strictly principled behavior can be destructive. Hypocrisy and Integrity offers a new conceptual framework that clarifies the differences between idealism and fanaticism while it uncovers the moral limits of compromise. "Exciting and provocative. . . . Grant's work is to be highly recommended, offering a fresh reading of Rousseau and Machiavelli as well as presenting a penetrating analysis of hypocrisy and integrity."--Ronald J. Terchek, American Political Science Review "A great refreshment. . . . With liberalism's best interests at heart, Grant seeks to make available a better understanding of the limits of reason in politics."--Peter Berkowitz, New Republic
Grant, Ruth W. (1994). Integrity and politics: An alternative reading of Rousseau. Political Theory 22 (3):414-443.   (Google | More links)
Grinin, Leonid & Korotayev, Andrey (2009). Social macroevolution: Growth of the world system integrity and a system of phase transitions. World Futures 65 (7):477 – 506.   (Google)
Abstract: There are very significant conceptual links between theories of social macroevolution and theories of the World System development. It is shown that the growth of the World System complexity and integrity can be traced through a system of phase transitions of macroevolution. The first set of phase transition is connected with the agrarian, industrial, and information-scientific revolutions (that are interpreted as changes of “production principles”). The second set consists of phase transitions within one production principle. These phase transitions are analyzed on the basis of the World System urbanization dynamics, but they can be traced with respect to the other (cultural, economic, technological, demographic, political, etc.) dimensions of the World System development
Guerrette, Richard H. (1986). Environmental integrity and corporate responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 5 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Environmental disasters like Bhopal have a way of calling attention to environmental and corporate ethical issues. This paper discusses these issues in terms of a livable environment as an inalienable right and of corporate responsibility as an philosophical and social psychological disposition that enables corporations to respect that right. The corporate conscience is compared to the individual conscience and analyzed according to the moral development theories of Lawrence Kohlberg. Its moral development is recognized as problematic from the cited performance records of some leading multinational corporations and from the anti-environmental lobbying efforts of the chemical industry itself. Outreach programs in environmental health associated with research projects in corporate ethics are suggested to develop the corporate conscience for preserving environmental integrity through corporate responsibility
Guinn, David E. (2000). Corporate compliance and integrity programs: The uneasy alliance between law and ethics. HEC Forum 12 (4).   (Google)
Gutmann, James (1945). Integrity as a standard of valuation. Journal of Philosophy 42 (8):210-216.   (Google | More links)
Gyorfi, Tamas (ms). The arbitration conception of authority, law as integrity and normative positivism.   (Google)
Abstract:      In the first part of my essay I will argue that there is a strong relationship between our view of authority and the desirability of preemptive reasons. More specifically, we have strong reasons to regard legal norms as preemptive reasons only if we accept the service conception of authority. I suggest, however, that an alternative account of authority - which I shall call the arbitrator model - gives us a better account of what legal authority demands and how it works. In the second part of my essay I suggest that we should recast the debate between Dworkinian law as integrity and normative positivism as a debate between two different attempts to put flesh on the bones of the arbitrator model of authority
Haack, Susan (ms). The ideal of intellectual integrity, in life and literature.   (Google)
Abstract:      A philosophical exploration of the ideal of intellectual integrity drawing on Samuel Butler's semi-autobiographical Bildungsroaman, The Way of All Flesh; and relating this to C.S. Peirce's idea of the scientific attitude and Percy Bridgman's reflections on the conditions needed for this ideal to flourish
Haack, Susan (ms). The integrity of science: What it means, why it matters.   (Google)
Abstract:      The many meanings of integrity are distinguished. This paper focuses specifically on how the concept of integrity in the sense of firm adherence to values applies to science qua institution. The most relevant values - the epistemological values of evidence-sharing and respect for evidence - are articulated, and shown to be rooted in the character of the scientific enterprise. This paves the way for an exploration of the circumstances that presently threaten to erode commitment to these core values: an exploration illustrated by the disturbing saga of the arthritis drugs Vioxx and Celebrex. The paper concludes with an articulation of why the erosion of scientific integrity should concern us
Hagenmeyer, Ulrich (2007). Integrity in management consulting: A contradiction in terms? Business Ethics 16 (2):107–113.   (Google | More links)
Halfon, Mark S. (1989). Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry. Temple University Press.   (Google)
Hansson, Mats G. (2000). Protecting research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:  It is not contoversial to state that acts of fraud do not belong in the academic world. What is debated is the best way to minimise the risk of fraudulent behaviour. Broadly speaking there are two different approaches to this problem. They differ with regard to whether the main focus is on internal or external control. In this article I argue that the main emphasis should be on internal structures in order to achieve the desired end. Only when the internal structures are in place is it meaningful to adopt external, supportive means to the same end. Invitation to the academic project as such, education and training in research ethics and good research practice, the implementation of good documentation procedures and the implementation of a procedure for investigation of suspicions of fraud which is characterised by efficiency, impartiality and competence are the four primary ingredients in the cure. The first three are suggested to build up the necessary foundation before a structure of investigation procedures are established
Harris, Jared & Souder, David (2004). Bad apples or bad bushel?: Ethics, efficiency, and capital market integrity. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 23 (1/2):201-222.   (Google)
Harris, George W. (1989). Integrity and agent centered restrictions. Noûs 23 (4):437-456.   (Google | More links)
Harcourt, Edward (1998). Integrity, practical deliberation and utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):189-198.   (Google | More links)
Harris, John (1974). Williams on negative responsibility and integrity. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (96):265-273.   (Google | More links)
Hershovitz, Scott (2006). Integrity and stare decisis. In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Holton, Gerald (2005). Candor and integrity in science. Synthese 145 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   In the pursuit of researches and in the reporting of their results, the individual scientist as well as the community of fellow professionals rely implicitly on the researcher embracing the habit of truthfulness, a main pillar of the ethos of science. Failure to adhere to the twin imperatives of candor and integrity will be adjudged intolerable and, by virtue of science’s self-policing mechanisms, rendered the exception to the rule. Yet both as philosophical concepts and in practice, candor and integrity are complex, difficult to define clearly, and difficult to convey easily to those entering on scientific careers. Therefore it is useful to present operational examples of two major scientists who exemplified devotion to candor and integrity in scientific research
Holleman, Warren & Chappell, Cynthia (1993). Should academic ethics committees be available to review lapses in scientific integrity? No. HEC Forum 5 (1).   (Google)
Honneth, Axel (1992). Integrity and disrespect: Principles of a conception of morality based on the theory of recognition. Political Theory 20 (2):187-201.   (Google | More links)
Hundleby, Catherine (2002). The open end: Social naturalism, feminist values and the integrity of epistemology. Social Epistemology 16 (3):251 – 265.   (Google)
Iltis, Ana Smith (2001). Organizational ethics and institutional integrity. HEC Forum 13 (4).   (Google)
Iltis, Ana Smith (2005). Values based decision making: Organizational mission and integrity. HEC Forum 17 (1).   (Google)
Iseda, Tetsuji (2008). How should we Foster the professional integrity of engineers in japan? A pride-based approach. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  I discuss the predicament that engineering-ethics education in Japan now faces and propose a solution to this. The predicament is professional motivation, i.e., the problem of how to motivate engineering students to maintain their professional integrity. The special professional responsibilities of engineers are often explained either as an implicit social contract between the profession and society (the “social-contract” view), or as requirements for membership in the profession (the “membership-requirement” view). However, there are empirical data that suggest that such views will not do in Japan, and this is the predicament that confronts us. In this country, the profession of engineering did not exist 10 years ago and is still quite underdeveloped. Engineers in this country do not have privileges, high income, or high social status. Under such conditions, neither the social-contract view nor the membership-requirement view is convincing. As an alternative approach that might work in Japan, I propose a pride-based view. The notion of pride has been analyzed in the virtue-ethics literature, but the full potential of this notion has not been explored. Unlike other kinds of pride, professional pride can directly benefit the general public by motivating engineers to do excellent work even without social rewards, since being proud of themselves is already a reward. My proposal is to foster a particular kind of professional pride associated with the importance of professional services in society, as the motivational basis for professional integrity. There is evidence to suggest that this model works
Iutcovich, Joyce M.; Kennedy, John M. & Levine, Felice J. (2003). Establishing an ethical climate in support of research integrity: Efforts and activities of the american sociological association. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The article provides an overview of the recent efforts and activities of the American Sociological Association (ASA) to keep its Code of Ethics visible and relevant to its membership. The development process and challenges associated with the most recent revision of the ASA’s code are reviewed, the current education and support activities are described, and other strategies for taking a proactive and leadership role in establishing an ethical climate are proposed. In conclusion, while the ASA has made significant progress in this area, it recognizes that a lot of work remains
Iverson, Margot; Frankel, Mark S. & Siang, Sanyin (2003). Scientific societies and research integrity: What are they doing and how well are they doing it? Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Scientific societies can play an important role in promoting ethical research practices among their members, and over the past two decades several studies have addressed how societies perform this role. This survey continues this research by examining current efforts by scientific societies to promote research integrity among their members. The data indicate that although many of the societies are working to promote research integrity through ethics codes and activities, they lack rigorous assessment methods to determine the effectiveness of their efforts
Jensen, Henning (1989). Kant and moral integrity. Philosophical Studies 57 (2).   (Google)
Johns, Beverley H. (2008). Ethical Dilemmas in Education: Standing Up for Honesty and Integrity. Rowman & Littlefield Education.   (Google)
Kaptein, Muel (2002). The Balanced Company: A Theory of Corporate Integrity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book contains a cohesive overview of the most important theories and insights in the field of business ethics. At the same time, it further tailors these theories to the situation in which organizations function, presenting criteria that can be used to measure, assess, improve and report on corporate integrity
Kerr, Donna H. (1984). Barriers to Integrity: Modern Modes of Knowledge Utilization. Westview Press.   (Google)
Kerr, Steven (1988). Integrity in effective leadership. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Kisamore, Jennifer L.; Stone, Thomas H. & Jawahar, I. M. (2007). Academic integrity: The relationship between individual and situational factors on misconduct contemplations. Journal of Business Ethics 75 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent, well-publicized scandals, involving unethical conduct have rekindled interest in academic misconduct. Prior studies of academic misconduct have focussed exclusively on situational factors (e.g., integrity culture, honor codes), demographic variables or personality constructs. We contend that it is important to also examine how␣these classes of variables interact to influence perceptions of and intentions relating to academic misconduct. In a sample of 217 business students, we examined how integrity culture interacts with Prudence and Adjustment to explain variance in estimated frequency of cheating, suspicions of cheating, considering cheating and reporting cheating. Age, integrity culture, and personality variables were significantly related to different criteria. Overall, personality variables explained the most unique variance in academic misconduct, and Adjustment interacted with integrity culture, such that integrity culture had more influence on intentions to cheat for less well-adjusted individuals. Implications for practice are discussed and future research directions are offered
Klockars, Carl B. (2006). Enhancing Police Integrity. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we enhance police integrity? The authors surveyed over 3000 police officers from 30 U.S. police departments on how they would respond to typical scenarios where integrity is challenged. They studied three police agencies which scored highly on the integrity scale: Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and St. Petersburg, Florida. The authors conclude that enhancing police integrity goes well beyond culling out "bad apple" police officers. Police administrators should focus on four aspects: organizational rulemaking; detecting, investigating and disciplining rule violations; circumscribing the informal "code of silence" that prohibits police from reporting the misconduct of their colleagues; and understanding the influence of public expectations and agency history
Koehn, Daryl (2005). Integrity as a business asset. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3).   (Google)
Abstract: . In this post-Enron era, we have heard much talk about the need for integrity. Today’s employees perceive it as being in short supply. A recent survey by the Walker Consulting Firm found that less than half of workers polled thought their senior leaders were people of high integrity. To combat the perceived lack of corporate integrity, companies are stressing their probity. This stress is problematic because executives tend to instrumentalize the value of integrity. This paper argues that integrity needs to be better defined because the current mode of talking about the subject is misleading. The paper considers three traditions’ understanding of the idea of integrity, argues that integrity is intrinsically valuable, and concludes with some reflections on the way in which integrity, properly understood, functions as a business asset
Kolb, David A. (1988). Integrity, advanced professional development, and learning. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Korsgaard, Christine M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity -- Kant on the hypothetical imperative -- Against particularistic willing -- Deciding and predicting -- Autonomy and efficacy -- The function of action -- The possibility of agency -- Non-rational action -- Action -- Attribution -- The psychology of action -- Expulsion from the garden : the transition to humanity -- Instinct, emotion, intelligence, and reason -- The parts of the soul -- Inside or outside -- Pull yourself together -- The constitutional model -- Models of the soul -- The city and the soul -- Platonic virtues -- Justice : substantive, procedural, and platonic -- Kant and the constitutional model -- Defective action -- The problem of bad action -- Being governed by the wrong law -- Or five bad constitutions -- Conceptions of evil -- Degrees of action -- Integrity and interaction -- Deciding to be bad -- The ordinary cases -- Dealing with the disunified -- Kant's theory of interaction -- My reasons -- Deciding to treat someone as an end in himself -- Interacting with yourself -- How to be a person -- What's left of me?
Kornhauser, Lewis A. & Sager, Lawrence G. (2004). The many as one: Integrity and group choice in paradoxical cases. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3):249–276.   (Google | More links)
Kroon, Frederick (2008). Fear and integrity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):pp. 31-49.   (Google)
Kuczewski, Mark (2001). Is informed consent enough? Monetary incentives for research participation and the integrity of biomedicine. American Journal of Bioethics 1 (2):49 – 51.   (Google)
Kwall, Roberta Rosenthal, The soul of creativity: Should intellectual property law protect the integrity of a creator's work - international norms.   (Google)
Abstract:      This Chapter explores in general terms the treatment accorded authors in foreign jurisdictions. In contrast to the United States, many countries maintain authors' rights protections that enable authors to safeguard the integrity of their texts far more readily than authors in this country. Thus, the United States is out of step with global norms by not recognizing more substantial authors' rights. Moreover, the Internet environment makes the United States' deficiency particularly problematic because violations of textual integrity can occur with unprecedented ease, and the results can be disseminated to countless recipients with the mere press of a key. Yet, these differences cannot be so easily remedied because certain cultural and legal differences preclude the wholesale adoption of another country's approach absent careful consideration of its fit into our existing legal framework
Larson, Gerald James (1999). On the integrity of the yoga darśana: A review. International Journal of Hindu Studies 3 (2).   (Google)
LeClair, Debbie Thorne (1998). Integrity Management: A Guide to Managing Legal and Ethical Issues in the Workplace. University of Tampa Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Managing integrity -- Identifying ethical and legal issues in the workplace -- Understanding decision making in the workplace -- Managing organizational culture for integrity -- Increasing legal pressure for ethical compliance -- Developing an effective organizational integrity program -- Implementing ethics and legal compliance training -- Managing integrity in a global economy -- Creating the good citizen organization -- Benefiting from best practices.
Levine, Felice J. & Iutcovich, Joyce M. (2003). Challenges in studying the effects of scientific societies on research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Beyond impressionistic observations, little is known about the role and influence of scientific societies on research conduct. Acknowledging that the influence of scientific societies is not easily disentangled from other factors that shape norms and practices, this article addresses how best to study the promotion of research integrity generally as well as the role and impact of scientific societies as part of that process. In setting forth the parameters of a research agenda, the article addresses four issues: (1) how to conceptualize research on scientific societies and research integrity; (2) challenges and complexities in undertaking basic research; (3) strategies for undertaking basic research that is attentive to individual, situational, organizational, and environmental levels of analysis; and (4) the need for evaluation research as integral to programmatic change and to assessment of the impact of activities by scientific societies
Lichtenstein, Scott; Higgins, Les & Pat Dade, (2008). Engaging the board: Integrity, values and the board agenda. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 4 (1):79-98.   (Google)
Abstract: Directors rate integrity as having the greatest impact on successful Board performance. Yet, no shared meaning exists about what integrity means because it is dependent on one's personal values. This paper builds on research into integrity and top teams by investigating how integrity varies by director's personal values and implications for the Board agenda. It will explore how executives' and directors' definitions of integrity are based on their values, beliefs and underlying needs. Data from UK society was collected from 500 UK adults, aged 18 and over. Results of the research found that definitions of integrity vary by ones value system. Implications include that what director's mean by integrity differs substantially from other employees with different values. Recommendations include re-focusing the Board agenda on issues that resonate with the director's personal values. A passionate Board requires integrity plus action; action without integrity equals indifference
Linker, Maureen (1999). Review essay: A coherentist epistemology with integrity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Linda Alcoff, Real Knowing (reviewed by Maureen Linker)
Lomax, Karen J. & Garthwaite, Thomas L. (1997). Vha's mission: Institutional integrity, non-abandonment and VHA special emphasis programs. HEC Forum 9 (2).   (Google)
Lucas, Gale M. & Friedrich, James (2005). Individual differences in workplace deviance and integrity as predictors of academic dishonesty. Ethics and Behavior 15 (1):15 – 35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meta-analytic findings have suggested that individual differences are relatively weaker predictors of academic dishonesty than are situational factors. A robust literature on deviance correlates and workplace integrity testing, however, demonstrates that individual difference variables can be relatively strong predictors of a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). To the extent that academic cheating represents a kind of counterproductive behavior in the work role of "student", employment-type integrity measures should be strong predictors of academic dishonesty. Our results with a college student sample showed that integrity test scores were moderate to strong correlates of self-reported academic cheating and that these relationships persisted even after controlling for a variety of measurement concerns such as item format similarity, concurrent assessment, and socially desirable responding. Implications for institutional honor codes and the broader relations between educational and workplace dishonesty are discussed
Maak, Thomas (2008). Undivided corporate responsibility: Towards a theory of corporate integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In the years since Enron corporate social responsibility, or “CSR,” has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in both research and business practice. CSR is used as an umbrella term to describe much of what is done in terms of ethics-related activities in firms around the globe to such an extent that some consider it a “tortured concept” (Godfrey and Hatch 2007, Journal of Business Ethics 70, 87–98). Addressing this skepticism, I argue in this article that the focus on CSR is indeed problematic for three main reasons: (1) the term carries a lot of historical baggage – baggage that is not necessarily conducive to the clarity of the concept; (2) it is the object of increasing ethical instrumentalism; and (3) given the multiple ethical challenges that corporations face, and given the fact that the “social” responsibilities of business are but one set of corporate responsibilities, a suitable term would have to be more inclusive and integrative. I therefore suggests moving instead toward a sound definition of corporate integrity and aim in this article to develop a working definition by fleshing out “7 Cs” of integrity: commitment, conduct, content, context, consistency, coherence, and continuity. I then discuss how these 7 Cs impact our understanding of CSR or, more broadly, corporate responsibility in general
Macklin, Ruth (1996). Disagreement, consensus, and moral integrity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments experienced some disagreements among its members in the course of its work. An epistemological controversy over the nature and degree of evidence required to draw ethical conclusions pervaded the committee's deliberations. Other disagreements involved the proper role of a governmental advisory committee and the question of when it is appropriate to notify people that they were unknowing subjects of radiation experiments. In the end, the Committee was able to reach consensus on almost all of its findings and recommendations through a process that preserved the integrity of its members
Maccoby, Michael (1988). Integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
MacIver, Robert M. (ed.) (1972). Integrity and Compromise. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.   (Google)
MacCallum Jr, Gerald C. (1971). Reform, violence, and personal integrity. Inquiry 14 (1-4):301 – 314.   (Google)
Macfarlane, Bruce (2004). Teaching with Integrity: The Ethics of Higher Education Practice. Routledgefalmer.   (Google)
Abstract: While many books focus on the broader socially ethical topics of widening participation and promoting equal opportunities, this unique book concentrates specifically on the lecturer's professional responsibilities. Bruce Macfarlane analyzes the pros and cons of prescriptive professional codes of practice employed by many universities and proposes the active development of professional virtues over bureaucratic recommendations. The material is presented in a scholarly yet accessible style and case examples are used throughout to encourage a practical, reflective approach
Madry, Alan (2005). Global concepts, local rules, practices of adjudication and Ronald dworkin’s law as integrity. Law and Philosophy 24 (3):211-238.   (Google | More links)
Magill, Gerard & Prybil, Lawrence (2004). Stewardship and integrity in health care: A role for organizational ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Media reporting of recent business scandals, ranging from systemic accounting fraud to individual executive greed, has shed new light on the urgent need for organizational ethics in corporate America. The essay argues that organizational ethics can foster virtuous organizations by developing their sense of stewardship and integrity. This approach can inspire the ethical decision-making processes and standards of conduct for personnel throughout the organization. Another crucial role for organizational ethics is to regain lost trust and to recover the confidence of our communities, whether we are discussing the business community or the health care community. Corporate America and organizations in health care need to win back the respect of skeptical customers, disheartened patients, and distrusting communities. But this task can be accomplished properly only when organizations and their business practices have a renewed commitment to ethics. The essay discusses how organizational ethics can permeate the entire organization in order to instill trust and confidence among its constituencies. Although the focus of the essay is upon the role of organizational ethics in health care, the argument also applies to the renewal of business practices in corporations across the nation
Martin, Daniel E.; Rao, Asha & Sloan, Lloyd R. (2009). Plagiarism, integrity, and workplace deviance: A criterion study. Ethics and Behavior 19 (1):36 – 50.   (Google)
Abstract: Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime
Markovits, Daniel (2008). The architecture of integrity stories and self-conceptions. In Daniel Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams. Routledge.   (Google)
Mason, Mark (2001). The ethics of integrity: Educational values beyond postmodern ethics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (1):47–69.   (Google | More links)
McCann, Jack & Holt, Roger (2009). Ethical leadership and organizations: An analysis of leadership in the manufacturing industry based on the perceived leadership integrity scale. Journal of Business Ethics 87 (2).   (Google)
McCullough, Laurence B. (2002). Power, integrity, and trust in the managed practice of medicine: Lessons from the history of medical ethics. Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):180-211.   (Google)
McFall, Lynne (1987). Integrity. Ethics 98 (1):5-20.   (Google | More links)
McLeod, Carolyn (2004). Integrity and self-protection. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):216–232.   (Google | More links)
Mentkowski, Marcia (1988). Paths to integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Miller, Franklin G. & Brody, Howard (2005). Enhancement technologies and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):15 – 17.   (Google)
Miller, Alexander (1997). Lenin's anticipation of Bernard Williams's integrity objection to utilitarianism. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4).   (Google)
Mitcham, Carl (2003). Co-responsibility for research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  To enlarge the discussion of scientific responsibility for research integrity, this paper offers two historico-philosophical observations. First, in the broad history of ideas, modern ethics replaces social role responsibility with appeals to abstract principles; by contrast, discussions within the scientific community of responsibility for research integrity constitute a rediscovery of the continuing vitality of role responsibility. This is a rediscovery from which philosophy itself may benefit. Second, within the context of scientists’ concerns, the idea of role responsibility has undergone significant evolution from “collective responsibility” to the notion of responsibility resting with a “trans-scientific community.” Further challenges nevertheless remain in order to relate scientific role responsibility for scientific integrity to the relationship between science and society. To promote a notion of integrity not just in science but in the science-society relationship, it may be useful to think in terms of a “co-responsibility” for scientific integrity
Miya, Pamela A. & Pinch, Winifred J. (1993). Should academic ethics committees be available to review lapses in scientific integrity? Yes. HEC Forum 5 (1).   (Google)
Moland, Lydia L. (2006). Moral integrity and regret in nursing. In Sioban Nelson & Suzanne Gordon (eds.), The Complexities of Care: Nursing Reconsidered. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Montefiore, Alan & Vines, David (eds.) (1999). Integrity in the Public and Private Domains. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Integrity is one of the most hotly debated topics in applied philosophy today. In this new work, men and women of varied practical and theoretical experience engage in rigorous debate in an effort to better understand the specific demands of integrity in their respective professions
Morito, Bruce (1999). Examining ecosystem integrity. Environmental Ethics 21 (1):59-73.   (Google)
Abstract: Attempts to come to grip with what appears to be the autonomy of nature have developed into several schools of thought. Among the most influential of these schools is the ecosystem integrity approach to environmental ethics, management and policy. The philosophical arm of the approach has been spearheaded by Laura Westra and her work in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics. The emphasis that this school places on pristine wilderness to model ecosystem integrity and the arguments Westra devises to justify the application of what she calls the “principle of integrity,” although clear in its goal and object of inquiry, could very well retrench dualistic thinking of the sort that environmental thinkers have been trying to undermine. More importantly, I argue that Westra misses an important implication for the way in which ecosystem integrity could be used to help develop an ethic not so confined by problems of justification in attaching values to facts and descriptions to prescriptions
Morrison, Allen (2001). Integrity and global leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 31 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses the role of integrity in global leadership. It reviews the philosophy of ethics and suggests that both contractarianism and pluralism are particularly helpful in understanding ethics from a global leadership perspective. It also reviews the challenges to integrity that come through interactions that are both external and internal to the company. Finally, the paper provides helpful suggestions on how global leaders can define appropriate ethical standards for themselves and their organizations
Morton, I. W. (1900). Is commercial integrity increasing? International Journal of Ethics 11 (1):47-59.   (Google | More links)
Mumford, Michael D.; Murphy, Stephen T.; Connelly, Shane; Hill, Jason H.; Antes, Alison L.; Brown, Ryan P. & Devenport, Lynn D. (2007). Environmental influences on ethical decision making: Climate and environmental predictors of research integrity. Ethics and Behavior 17 (4):337 – 366.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that early career experiences influence ethical behavior. One way early career experiences might operate is to influence the decisions people make when presented with problems that raise ethical concerns. To test this proposition, 102 first-year doctoral students were asked to complete a series of measures examining ethical decision making along with a series of measures examining environmental experiences and climate perceptions. Factoring of the environmental measure yielded five dimensions: professional leadership, poor coping, lack of rewards, limited competitive pressure, and poor career direction. Factoring of the climate inventory yielded four dimensions: equity, interpersonal conflict, occupational engagement, and work commitment. When these dimensions were used to predict performance on the ethical decision-making task, it was found that the environmental dimensions were better predictors than the climate dimensions. The implications of these findings for research on ethical conduct are discussed
Murray, David J. & Kucia, Marek (1995). Business integrity in transitional economies: Central & eastern europe. Business Ethics 4 (2):76–82.   (Google | More links)
Murray, Thomas H. & Johnston, Josephine (eds.) (2010). Trust and Integrity in Biomedical Research: The Case of Financial Conflicts of Interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Musschenga, Albert W. (2001). Education for moral integrity. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (2):219–235.   (Google | More links)
, Unknown, Why moral theory is boring and corrupt.   (Google)
Abstract: Contemporary academic moral theory is a territory partitioned between a number of highly professionalised and (on the face of it) fiercely opposed schools of thought—consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, contractualism, natural law theory, sentimentalism and others. Not every academic ethicist is aligned with any of these schools, but most are, and all face insistent pressure to become aligned. (For example, appointing committees for ethics jobs often ask “What sort of ethicist are you?”, and tend, both intentionally and unintentionally, to penalise complex or unusual answers.)
Noggle, Robert (1999). Integrity, the self, and desire-based accounts of the good. Philosophical Studies 96 (3).   (Google)
Novitz, David (1990). The integrity of aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (1):9-20.   (Google | More links)
O'Dea, Jane (1997). Integrity and the feminist teacher. Journal of Philosophy of Education 31 (2):267–282.   (Google | More links)
Ortiz, Gavrell & Elizabeth, Sara (2004). Beyond welfare: Animal integrity, animal dignity, and genetic engineering. Ethics and the Environment 9 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : Bernard Rollin argues that it is permissible to change an animal's telos through genetic engineering, if it doesn't harm the animal's welfare. Recent attempts to undermine his argument rely either on the claim that diminishing certain capacities always harms an animal's welfare or on the claim that it always violates an animal's integrity. I argue that these fail. However, respect for animal dignity provides a defeasible reason not to engineer an animal in a way that inhibits the development of those functions that a member of its species can normally perform, even if the modification would improve the animal's welfare
Pagon, Milan (ed.) (2000). Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Ethics, Integrity, and Human Rights. College of Police and Security Studies.   (Google)
Parry, Ken W. & Proctor-Thomson, Sarah B. (2002). Perceived integrity of transformational leaders in organisational settings. Journal of Business Ethics 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The ethical nature of transformational leadership has been hotly debated. This debate is demonstrated in the range of descriptors that have been used to label transformational leaders including narcissistic, manipulative, and self-centred, but also ethical, just and effective. Therefore, the purpose of the present research was to address this issue directly by assessing the statistical relationship between perceived leader integrity and transformational leadership using the Perceived Leader Integrity Scale (PLIS) and the Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). In a national sample of 1354 managers a moderate to strong positive relationship was found between perceived integrity and the demonstration of transformational leadership behaviours. A similar relationship was found between perceived integrity and developmental exchange leadership. A systematic leniency bias was identified when respondents rated subordinates vis-à-vis peer ratings. In support of previous findings, perceived integrity was also found to correlate positively with leader and organisational effectiveness measures
Pascal, Chris B. (1999). The history and future of the office of research integrity: Scientific misconduct and beyond. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This paper looks at the issues and controversies that led to creation of the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) and that dominated its agenda in the early years. The successes and failures of ORI are described and new problems identified. This paper then looks ahead to the future, considering what issues will dominate ORI’s agenda and affect the research institutions, individual scientists, and the scientific community in the next several years
Pascalev, Assya (2003). You are what you eat: Genetically modified foods, integrity, and society. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 16 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: Thus far, the moral debateconcerning genetically modified foods (GMF) hasfocused on extrinsic consequentialist questionsabout the health effects, environmental impacts,and economic benefits of such foods. Thisextrinsic approach to the morality of GMF isdependent on unsubstantiated empirical claimsand fails to account for the intrinsic moralvalue of food and food choice and theirconnection to the agent's concept of the goodlife. I develop a set of objections to GMFgrounded in the concept of integrity andmaintain that food and food choice can beintimately connected to the agent's personalintegrity. I argue that due to the constitutionof GMF and the manner in which they areproduced, such foods are incompatible with thefundamental values and integrity of certainindividual moral agents or groups. I identifythree types of integrity that are threatened byGMF: religious, consumer, and integrity basedon certain other moral or metaphysical grounds.I maintain that these types of integrity aresufficiently important to provide justificationfor political and societal actions to protectthe interests of those affected. I conclude byproposing specific steps for handling GMFconsistent with the moral principles ofinformed consent, non-maleficence, and respectfor the integrity of all members of society.They include mandatory labeling of GMF, theimplementation of a system for control andregulations concerning such foods, andguaranteed provision of conventional foods
Petrick, Joseph A. & Quinn, John F. (2001). The challenge of leadership accountability for integrity capacity as a strategic asset. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: The authors identify the challenge of holding contemporary business leaders accountable for enhancing the intangible strategic asset of integrity capacity in organizations. After defining integrity capacity and framing it as part of a strategic resource model of sustainable global competitive advantage, the stakeholder costs of integrity capacity neglect are delineated. To address this neglect issue, the authors focus on the cultivation of judgment integrity to handle behavioral, moral and hypothesized economic complexities as key dimensions of integrity capacity. Finally, the authors recommend two leadership practices to build competence in business leaders to enhance integrity capacity as an organizational strategic asset
Petrick, Joseph A. & Quinn, John F. (2000). The integrity capacity construct and moral progress in business. Journal of Business Ethics 23 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The authors propose the integrity capacity construct with its four dimensions (process, judgment, development and system dimensions) as a framework for analyzing and resolving behavioral, moral and legal complexity in business ethics' issues at the individual and collective levels. They claim that moral progress in business comes about through the increase in stakeholders who regularly handle moral complexity by demonstrating process, judgment, developmental and system integrity capacity domestically and globally
PhD, Florence Myrick RN (2004). Pedagogical integrity in the knowledge economy. Nursing Philosophy 5 (1):23–29.   (Google | More links)
Pimple, Kenneth D. (1999). Commentary on “the history and future of the office of research integrity: Scientific misconduct and beyond” (c. pascal). Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Pitman, Michael M. (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.   (Google | More links)
Poff, Deborah C. (2004). Challenges to integrity in university administration: Bad faith and loyal agency. Journal of Academic Ethics 2 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses a small but important subset of the challenges to ethical behaviour that face senior university administrators in their daily work, namely, errors in moral judgment which arise from over-identification and loyalty to the institution. The domain and precipitating factors are not unique to universities but may be more intensely experienced due to two features of the traditional public and private not-for-profit university that are unique. These features include the historical nature and purpose of a university and the role of the university professor in the production and dissemination of knowledge
Postema, Gerald J. (2004). Integrity : Justice in workclothes. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Prottas, David J. (2008). Perceived behavioral integrity: Relationships with employee attitudes, well-being, and absenteeism. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Relationships between the behavioral integrity of managers as perceived by employees and employee attitudes (job satisfaction and life satisfaction), well-being (stress and health), and behaviors (absenteeism) were tested using data from the 2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce (n = 2,820). Using multivariate and univariate analysis, perceived behavioral integrity (PBI) was positively related to job and life satisfaction and negatively related to stress, poor health, and absenteeism. The effect size for the relationship with job satisfaction was medium-to-large while the effect sizes with respect to the other variables were small-to-medium. There was no support for the hypotheses that women would perceive lower levels of behavioral integrity and that the strength of the relationships between PBI and the outcomes variables would be stronger among women than among men
Pugmire, David (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? What distinguishes good feeling from (just) feeling good? Is there such a distinction at all? The answer to these questions becomes clearer if we realize that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It may be that good feeling depends on feeling truly if we are to be really moved, moved in the way that avoids the need for constant, fretful replenishment and reinforcement. To be sound, emotions may need to be capable of genuineness, depth, and other kinds of integrity. And that, in turn, may require certain virtues of mind, such as truthfulness, temperateness, and even courage, that are more familiar at the level of action. The governing aim of this book is to demonstrate that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions and the emotional life
Rajczi, Alex (2009). Consequentialism, integrity, and ordinary morality. Utilitas 21 (3):377-392.   (Google)
Ramsay, Hayden (1997). Beyond Virtue: Integrity and Morality. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Virtue ethics or natural law? Most contemporary accounts treat these as rival approaches. This book argues both are necessary since virtue is commitment to objective human goods. It also argues integrity is planning one's life by commitment to reasonableness, rejects traditional natural law and virtue ethics for more deontological accounts of the human good and virtue, and explains human personhood accordingly. Part 2 then analyses Aquinas's accounts of emotion, the body and happiness in terms of integrity
Raz, Joseph (2004). Speaking with one voice : On Dworkinian integrity and coherence. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Ridge, Michael, Agent-neutral consequentialism from the inside-out: Concern for integrity without self-indulgence.   (Google)
Abstract: Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses
RN, M. A. (2004). Integrity and moral residue: Nurses as participants in a moral community. Nursing Philosophy 5 (2):127–134.   (Google | More links)
Rollin, Bernard E. (2003). Ethics and species integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):15 – 17.   (Google)
Rossouw, Deon (2008). Practising applied ethics with philosophical integrity: The case of business ethics. Business Ethics 17 (2):161–170.   (Google | More links)
Rosenstein, Leon (1976). The ontological integrity of the art object from the ludic viewpoint. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (3):323-336.   (Google | More links)
Russell, Barbara (forthcoming). Reflections on 'autistic integrity'. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Autism, particularly its moderate to severe forms, has prompted considerable scientific study and clinical involvement because the associated behaviours imply disconnections with valued features of a 'good' life, such as close relationships, enjoyment, and adaptability. Proposed causes of autism involve potent philosophical concepts including consciousness, identity, mind, and relationality. The concept of autistic integrity is used by Barnbaum in The Ethics of Autism: Among Them, But Not of Them to help provide moral justification to stop efforts to cure adults with autism, especially if the cause is presumed to be a lack of a theory of mind. 1 This article has two goals: (1) to apply four familiar definitions or characterizations of integrity to the case of moderate to severe autism, and (2) to examine whether autistic integrity does provide the moral justification Barnbaum seeks
Ryan, Christopher James (2009). Out on a limb: The ethical management of body integrity identity disorder. Neuroethics 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration of other treatment options
Ryan, Christopher James (2009). The ethical management of body integrity identity disorder: Reply to pies. Neuroethics 2 (3).   (Google)
Sabine, M. (2009). Body integrity identity disorder (biid)—is the amputation of healthy Limbs ethically justified? American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):36 – 43.   (Google)
Abstract: The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in analogy to the desire of transsexuals for surgical sex reassignment. Medical ethicists discuss the controversy about elective amputations of healthy limbs: on the one hand the principle of autonomy is used to deduce the right for body modifications; on the other hand the autonomy of BIID patients is doubted. Neurological results suggest that BIID is a brain disorder producing a disruption of the body image, for which parallels for stroke patients are known. If BIID were a neuropsychological disturbance, which includes missing insight into the illness and a specific lack of autonomy, then amputations would be contraindicated and must be evaluated as bodily injuries of mentally disordered patients. Instead of only curing the symptom, a causal therapy should be developed to integrate the alien limb into the body image
Sales, Bruce D. & Shuman, Daniel W. (1993). Guest editorial: Reclaiming the integrity of science in expert witnessing. Ethics and Behavior 3 (3 & 4):223 – 229.   (Google)
Abstract: Explores the impact of expert witnessing on the integrity of forensic scientific information. Complaints on the behavior of expert witnesses; Factors stimulating the susceptibility of experts to abandon their scientific integrity; Implications of the reliance of expert witnesses on ethics codes
Schilbrack, Kevin (2003). Thomas P. Kasulis, intimacy or integrity: Philosophy and cultural difference. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (1).   (Google)
Self, Donnie J. (1995). Moral integrity and values in medicine: Inaugurating a new section. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 16 (3).   (Google)
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine (2004). Preserving integrity against colonization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Genuine reconciliation between first- and third-person methodologies and knowledge requires respect for both phenomenological and scientific epistemologies. Recent pragmatic, theoretical, and verbal attempts at reconciliation by cognitive scientists compromise phenomenological method and knowledge. The basic question is thus: how do we begin reconciling first- and third-person epistemologies? Because life is the unifying concept across phenomenological and cognitive disciplines, a concept consistently if differentially exemplified in and by the phenomenon of movement, conceptual complementarities anchored in the animate properly provide the foundation for reconciliation. Research by people in neuroscience and in dynamic systems theory substantiate this thesis, providing fundamental examples of conceptual complementarity between phenomenology and science
Silverman, Henry J. (2000). Organizational ethics in healthcare organizations: Proactively managing the ethical climate to ensure organizational integrity. HEC Forum 12 (3).   (Google)
Smith, Dale (2006). The many faces of political integrity. In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (1999). A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Is business ethics a contradiction in terms? Absolutely not, says Robert Solomon. In fact, he maintains that sound ethics is a necessary precondition of any long-term business enterprise, and that excellence in business must exist on the foundation of values that most of us hold dear. Drawing on twenty years of experience consulting with major corporations on ethics, Solomon clarifies the difficult ethical choices all people in business are faced with from time to time. He takes an "Aristotelian" approach to ethical questions, reminding readers that a corporation--like an individual--is embedded in a community, and that corporate values such as fairness and honesty are meaningless until transformed into action. Values--coupled with action--become virtues, and virtues make possible any good business corporate relationship. Without a base of shared values, trust and mutual benefits, today's national and international business world will fall apart. In keeping with his conviction that virtue and profit must thrive together, Solomon both examines the ways in which deficient values actually destroy businesses, and debunks the pervasive myths that encourage unethical business practices. Complete with a working catalog of virtues designed to illustrate the importance of integrity in any business situation, this compelling handbook contains a goldmine of wisdom for either the small business manager or the corporate executive struggling with ethical issues
Solomon, Robert C. (1992). Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The Greek philosopher Aristotle, writing over two thousand years before Wall Street, called people who engaged in activities which did not contribute to society "parasites." In his latest work, renowned scholar Robert C. Solomon asserts that though capitalism may require capital, but it does not require, much less should it be defined by the parasites it inevitably attracts. Capitalism has succeeded not with brute strength or because it has made people rich, but because it has produced responsible citizens and--however unevenly--prosperous communities. It cannot tolerate a conception of business that focuses solely on income and vulgarity while ignoring traditional virtues of responsibility, community, and integrity. Many feel that there is too much lip-service and not enough understanding of the importance of cooperation and integrity in corporate life. This book rejects the myths and metaphors of war-like competition that cloud business thinking and develops an "Aristotelean" theory of business. The author's approach emphasizes several core concepts: the corporation as community, the search for excellence, the importance of integrity and sound judgment, as well as a more cooperative and humane vision of business. Solomon stresses the virtues of honesty, trust, fairness, and compassion in the competitive business world, and confronts the problem of "moral mazes" and what he posits as its solution--moral courage
Spier, Raymond E. (2007). Some thoughts on the 2007 world conference on research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4).   (Google)
Srivastva, Suresh (ed.) (1988). Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: Shows that executive integrity is not merely a moral trait but a dynamic process of making empathetic, responsible, and sound decisions. Describes key features of executive integrity including effective social interaction, open dialogue, and responsive leadershipand explains how integrity can be developed and practiced in today's organizations
Srivastva, Suresh & Barrett, Frank J. (1988). Foundations for executive integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Steneck, Nicholas H. (2002). Institutional and individual responsibilities for integrity in research. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (4):51 – 53.   (Google)
Stearns, S. A. (2001). The student-instructor relationship's effect on academic integrity. Ethics and Behavior 11 (3):275 – 285.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this study, I surveyed students' evaluative perceptions of instructor behavior and their possible influence on academic dishonesty. Slightly over 20% of 1,369 student respondents admitted to academic dishonesty in at least 1 class during 1 term at college. Students who admitted to acts of academic dishonesty had lower overall evaluations of instructor behavior than students who reported not committing academic dishonesty. Implications for student learning and the enhancement of academic integrity in the classroom are discussed
student, Bryan Donnelly Doctoral (2008). Work and integrity: The crisis and promise of professionalism in America. World Futures 64 (3):222 – 225.   (Google)
Thomas, Alan (ms). Consequentialism, integrity and demandingness.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I will develop the argument that a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons is the only approach that can sustain a non-alienated relation to one’s character and ethical commitments. [Thomas, 2005] As a corollary of this claim, I will argue that moral reasons must be understood as reasonably partial. A view of this kind can, nevertheless, recognise the existence of general and positive obligations to humanity. Doing so does not undermine the view by leading to a highly demanding view of morality. Indeed, it offers a defence against the view that an analogy between obligations of immediate rescue to particular individuals and general and positive obligations to humanity leads to the conclusion that morality is highly demanding. The plan of this paper is as follows. The first section sets out the main elements of a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons. The second applies it to the test case of an argument that claims that one way in which one seeks to lead a non-alienated ethical life, a life of integrity, is incompatible with the requirements of consequentialism given certain very general facts about the moral state of the world. [Ashford, 2000] My..
Tichy, Noel M. & McGill, Andrew R. (eds.) (2003). The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead with Unyielding Integrity. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: The Enron debacle, the demise of Arthur Andersen, questionable practices at Tyco, Qwest, WorldCom, and a seemingly endless list of others have pushed public regard for business and business leaders to new lows. The need for smart leaders with vision and integrity has never been greater. Things need to change-- and it will not be easy. We can take a first step toward producing better business leaders by changing some of our own ideas about what it means to "win." Noel M. Tichy and Andrew R. McGill have brought together a stellar group of contributors from a variety of perspectives-- including General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, and renowned management gurus Robert Quinn and C. K. Prahalad, among others-- to offer insights that will help build better leaders, communities, and organizations. They show how to present a "Teachable Point of View" about business ethics that will help all leaders within an organization: Internalize core values Build a values-based culture across the organization Become engaged to teach the same values lessons to their staff Take action and raise the ethical bar Successful business leaders must be able to articulate their own unique Teachable Point of View on business ethics and drive it through their organization to ensure that everyone knows the ethical line and is neither shy nor silent if others risk crossing it
Trianosky, Gregory W. (1986). Moral integrity and moral psychology: A refutation of two accounts of the conflict between utilitarianism and integrity. Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (4).   (Google)
Van Bueren, Edith T. Lammerts & Struik, Paul C. (2005). Integrity and rights of plants: Ethical notions in organic plant breeding and propagation. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: In addition to obviating the use of synthetic agrochemicals and emphasizing farming in accordance with agro-ecological guidelines, organic farming acknowledges the integrity of plants as an essential element of its natural approaches to crop production. For cultivated plants, integrity refers to their inherent nature, wholeness, completeness, species-specific characteristics, and their being in balance with their (organically farmed) environment, while accomplishing their “natural aim.” We argue that this integrity of plants has ethical value, distinguishing integrity of life, plant-typic integrity, genotypic integrity, and phenotypic integrity. We have developed qualitative criteria to ethically evaluate existing practices and have applied these criteria to assess whether current plant breeding and propagation techniques violate the integrity of crop plants. This process has resulted in a design of a holistic, scientific approach of organic plant breeding and seed production. Our evaluation has met considerable criticism from mainstream (crop) scientists. We respond to the following questions: (1). Can ethics be incorporated into objective crop sciences? (2). What is the nature of the intrinsic value of plants in organic farming? We argue that criteria to take integrity into account can only be assessed from a holistic perspective and we show that a holistic approach is needed to design such ethical notions in a consistent way. The ethical notions have been further elaborated by formulating human responsibility and respect towards crop plants. Responsibility and respect can only be shown by providing crop plants the right to be nurtured and to express natural behavior at all levels of integrity
van Willigenburg, Theo (2000). Moral compromises, moral integrity and the indeterminacy of value rankings. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs
Verhezen, Peter (forthcoming). Giving voice in a culture of silence. From a culture of compliance to a culture of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Wamala, Edward (2008). Status to contract society: Africa's integrity crisis. Journal of Global Ethics 4 (3):195 – 205.   (Google)
Waters, James A. (1988). Integrity management. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Watson, Charles E. (1991). Managing with Integrity: Insights From America's Ceos. Praeger.   (Google)
Weber, James & Green, Sharon (1991). Principled moral reasoning: Is it a viable approach to promote ethical integrity? Journal of Business Ethics 10 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: In response to recent recommendations for the teaching of principled moral reasoning in business school curricula, this paper assesses the viability of such an approach. The results indicate that, while business students' level of moral reasoning in this sample are like most 18- to 21-year-olds, they may be incapable of grasping the concepts embodied in principled moral reasoning. Implications of these findings are discussed
Westra, Laura (2000). Living in integrity: A global ethic to restore a fragmented earth. Environmental Ethics 22 (1):101-103.   (Google)
Westra, Laura (1997). Post-normal science, the precautionary principle and the ethics of integrity. Foundations of Science 2 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Present laws and regulations even in democratic countries are not sufficient to prevent the grave environmental threats we face. Further, even environmental ethics, when they remain anthropocentric cannot propose a better approach. I argue that, taking in considerations the precautionary principle, and adopting the perspective of post-normal science, the ethics of integrity suggest a better way to reduce ecological threats and promote the human good globally
Whitley, Bernard E. & Keith-Spiegel, Patricia (2001). Academic integrity as an institutional issue. Ethics and Behavior 11 (3):325 – 342.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Academic dishonesty among students is not confined to the dynamics of the classrooms in which it occurs. The institution has a major role in fostering academic integrity. Ways that institutions can have a significant impact on attitudes toward and knowledge about academic integrity as well as reducing the incidence of academic dishonesty are described. These include the content of an effective academic honesty policy, campus-wide programs designed to foster integrity, and the development of a campus-wide ethos that encourages integrity
Whicher, Ian (1999). On the integrity of the yoga darśana: A response to Larson's review. International Journal of Hindu Studies 3 (2).   (Google)
White, Darin W. & Lean, Emily (2008). The impact of perceived leader integrity on subordinates in a work team environment. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Over the last decade, the increased use of work teams within organizations has been one of the most influential and far-reaching trends to shape the business world. At the same time, corporations have continued to struggle with increased unethical employee behavior. Very little research has been conducted that specifically examines the developmental aspects of employee ethical decision-making in a team environment. This study examines the impact of a team leader’s perceived integrity on his or her subordinates’ behavior. The results, which came from a survey of 245 MBA students functioning for 2 years in a work team environment, indicate an interaction between leader integrity and team member ethical intentions
Wijsbek, Henri (forthcoming). 'To thine own self be true': On the loss of integrity as a kind of suffering. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the requirements in the Dutch regulation for euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the doctor must be satisfied 'that the patient's suffering is unbearable, and that there is no prospect of improvement.' In the notorious Chabot case, a psychiatrist assisted a 50 year old woman in suicide, although she did not suffer from any somatic disease, nor strictly speaking from any psychiatric condition. In Seduced by Death, Herbert Hendin concluded that apparently the Dutch regulation now allows physicians to assist anyone in suicide simply because he or she is unhappy. In this paper, I reject Hendin's conclusion and in particular his description of Mrs Boomsma as someone who was 'simply unhappy.' After a detailed narration of her lifestory, I turn to the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt's account of volitional incapacity and love for a more accurate characterization of her suffering. Having been through what she had, she could only go on living as another person than the one she had been when she was a happy mother. That would have violated her integrity, and that she could not bring herself to do
Williams, Bernard (1988). Consequentialism and integrity. In Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Wildes, Kevin Wm (1997). Institutional identity, integrity, and conscience. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Bioethics has focused on the areas of individual ethical choices--patient care--or public policy and law. There are, however, important arenas for ethical choices that have been overlooked. Health care is populated with intermediate arenas such as hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, and health care systems. This essay argues that bioethics needs to develop a language and concepts for institutional ethics. A first step in this direction is to think about institutional conscience
Winch, Peter (1968). Moral Integrity: Inaugural Lecture in the Chair of Philosophy Delivered at King's College, London, 9 May 1968. Oxford, Blackwell.   (Google)
Wolfe, Donald M. (1988). Is there integrity in the bottom line. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Youngner, J. S. (2003). Promoting research integrity at the american society for microbiology. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The American Society for Microbiology addresses issues of research integrity in several ways. There is a Code of Ethics for Society members and an Ethics Committee, a Publications Board has editorial oversight of ethical issues involved in Society journals and other publications, and the Public and Scientific Affairs Board is involved in ethical issues and scientific policies at the national level. In addition, the Society uses meetings and publications to inform and educate members about research integrity
Zeng, Weiqin & Resnik, David (forthcoming). Research integrity in china: Problems and prospects. Developing World Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: In little more than 30 years, China has recovered from the intellectual stagnation brought about by the Cultural Revolution to become a global leader in science and technology. Like other leading countries in science and technology, China has encountered some ethical problems related to the conduct of research. China's leaders have taken some steps to respond to these problems, such as developing ethics policies and establishing oversight committees. To keep moving forward, China needs to continue to take effective action to promote research integrity. Some of the challenges China faces include additional policy development, promoting education in responsible conduct of research, protecting whistle-blowers, and cultivating an ethical research environment

5.1l.5.4 Moral Sainthood

5.1l.5.5 Skepticism about Character

Alfano, Mark (forthcoming). Virtues, intelligences, and situations. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.   (Google)
Alzola, Miguel (2008). Character and environment: The status of virtues in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Using evidence from experimental psychology, some social psychologists, moral philosophers and organizational scholars claim that character traits do not exist and, hence, that the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics is empirically inadequate and should dispose of the notion of character to accommodate the empirical evidence. In this paper, I systematically address the debate between dispositionalists and situationists about the existence, status and properties of character traits and their manifestations in human behavior, with the ultimate goal of responding to the question whether virtue ethicists need to abandon the very enterprise of building a character-based moral theory in business ethics and organizational behavior. In the course of this paper, I shall defend the claim that the situationist argument relies on a misinterpretation of the experimental evidence
Appiah, Anthony (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Appiah explores how the new empirical moral psychology relates to philosophical ethics. He elaborates a vision of naturalism that resists both temptations and traces an intellectual genealogy of the burgeoning discipline of 'experimental philosophy'.
Athanassoulis, Nafsika (2000). A response to Harman: Virtue ethics and character traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):215–221.   (Google)
Badhwar, Neera K. (forthcoming). The Milgram experiments, learned helplessness, and character traits. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects
Besser-jones, Lorraine (2008). Social psychology, moral character, and moral fallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):310–332.   (Google | More links)
Doris, John M. (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character that date back to Aristotle. John Doris draws on behavioral science, especially social psychology, to argue that we misattribute the causes of behavior to personality traits and other fixed aspects of character rather than to the situational context. More often than not it is the situation not the nature of the personality that really counts. The author elaborates the philosophical consequences of this research for a whole array of ethical theories and shows that, once rid of the misleading conception of motivation, moral psychology can support more robust ethical theories and more humane ethical practices
Doris, John M. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Noûs 32 (4):504-530.   (Google | More links)
Fleming, Diana (2006). The character of virtue: Answering the situationist challenge to virtue ethics. Ratio 19 (1):24–42.   (Google | More links)
Goldman, Alvin I. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103 (2):337-360.   (Google | More links)
Harman, Gilbert (forthcoming). Skepticism about character traits. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people’s conceptions of personality and character rather than on the accuracy of these conceptions). Similarly, the political theorist R. Hardin has argued for situational explanations of bloody social disputes in the former Yugoslavia and in Africa, rather than explanations in terms of ethnic hatred for example. A version of virtue ethics might identify virtues as characteristics of acts rather than character traits, as traits consisting in actual regularities in behavior, or as robust dispositions that would manifest themselves also in counterfactual situations
Harman, Gilbert (2000). The nonexistence of character traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):223–226.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (2003). Three trends in moral and political philosophy. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3).   (Google)
Hennig, Boris (2008). Tugenden und absichten. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1):165-182.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychological experiments show that human behavior is often determined by features of the situation rather than general and persistent character traits of the agent. Therefore, it may seem naive to suppose that someone with a virtuous character will in general act virtuously. This is at least true if a character trait is taken to be a persistent characteristic or property that reliably causes certain behavior. On the basis of the conception of agency developed by Anscombe in Intention, I will argue against the assumption that virtues are such persistent traits. Rather, I will suggest that virtues stand in a conceptual relation to ways of acting in kinds of contexts in the same way in which intentions are not causes of actions but stand in a conceptual relation to them.
Hurka, Thomas (2006). Virtuous act, virtuous dispositions. Analysis 66 (289):69–76.   (Google | More links)
Hutton, Eric L. (2006). Character, situationism, and early confucian thought. Philosophical Studies 127 (1).   (Google)
Kamtekar, Rachana (2004). Situationism and virtue ethics on the content of our character. Ethics 114 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Situationist social psychologists tell us that information about people’s distinctive character traits, opinions, attitudes, values, or past behavior is not as useful for determining what they will do as is information about the details of their situations.1 One would expect, they say, that the possessor of a given character trait (such as helpfulness) would behave consistently (helpfully) across situations that are similar in calling for the relevant (helping) behavior, but under experimental conditions, people’s behavior is not found to be cross-situationally consistent (the likelihood that a person who has behaved helpfully on one occasion will behave helpfully on the next is hardly above chance).2 Instead, across a range of situations, the person’s behavior tends to converge on the behavioral norm for those situations. So situationists reason that people’s situations, rather than their characters, are the explanatorily powerful factors in determining why different people behave differently. They add that if behavior does not covary with character traits, then ordinary people, “folk psychologists” who try to explain and predict..
Kupperman, Joel J. (2001). The indispensability of character. Philosophy 76 (2):239-250.   (Google)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman has argued that it does not make sense to ascribe character traits to people. The notion of morally virtuous character becomes particularly suspect. How plausible this is depends on how broad character traits would have to be. Views of character as entirely invariant behavioural tendencies offer a soft target. This paper explores a view that is a less easy target: character traits as specific to kinds of situation, and as involving probabilities or real possibilities. Such ascriptions are not undermined by Harman's arguments, and it remains plausible that the agent's character often is indispensable in explanation of behaviour. Character is indispensable also as processes of control that impose reliability where it really matters
Kupperman, Joel J. (forthcoming). Virtue in virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001 ). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures
Merritt, Maria (2000). Virtue ethics and situationist personality psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems
Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics 7 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the line of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to briefly sketching a positive account of character trait possession
Miller, Christian (forthcoming). Social psychology, mood, and helping: Mixed results for virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and then examine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencing compassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim that many people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping traits fall well short of exhibiting certain central features of compassion
Montmarquet, James (2003). Moral character and social science research. Philosophy 78 (3):355-368.   (Google)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman and John Doris (among others) have maintained that experimental studies of human behaviour give good grounds for denying the very existence of moral character. This research, according to Harman and Doris, shows human behaviour to be dependent not on character but mainly on one's ‘situation.’ My paper develops a number of criticisms of this view, among them that social science experiments are ill-suited to study character, insofar as they do not estimate the role of character in continuously shaping the direction of one's life—including what situations one is apt to get into in the first place
Nelkin, Dana K. (2005). Freedom, responsibility and the challenge of situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
Prinz, Jesse (forthcoming). The normativity challenge: Cultural psychology provides the real threat to virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are virtuous, and our ideals of what qualifies as well-being. If virtues and well-being are culturally constructed ideals, then the standard strategy for grounding the normativity of virtue ethics in human nature is undermined
Russell, Daniel C. (2009). Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Practical intelligence and the virtues : an aristotelian approach -- Deliberation -- Phronesis -- The phronesis controversy -- Phronesis, virtue, and right action -- Right action for virtue ethics -- Right action and serious practical concerns -- Two constraints on right action -- Must virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Can virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Right action and virtuous motives -- The structure of agent-based virtue ethics -- Virtuous acts and virtuous motivations -- Why virtues are virtues -- Reasons for virtue -- Right action and 'the virtuous person' -- Doing without 'the virtuous person' -- 'Virtuous enough' -- Ideals and aspirations -- Virtues, persons, and 'the virtuous person' -- Representing 'the virtuous person' -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem : an introduction -- Enumeration and overall virtuous actions -- Enumeration and overall virtuous persons -- Enumeration and naturalism -- Individuating the virtues -- From individuation to enumeration -- 'The same reasons' -- Reasons, individuation, and cardinality -- Implications for hard virtue ethics -- Magnificence, generosity, and subordination -- Magnificence as a virtue -- Subordination, specialization, and cardinality -- Alternatives to the subordination view -- Situations, dispositions, and virtues -- Situations and broad-based dispositions -- Situationism and dispositionism -- Situationism and personality -- Idiographic predictions of consistency -- Situations and dispositions : examining the evidence -- How to test broad-based dispositions for cross-situational consistency -- Putting dispositions to the test : four representative experiments -- Interpreting the findings -- From situationism to virtue theory -- Situationism : from empirical to philosophical psychology -- Situationism and virtue theory : normative adequacy -- From common sense to virtue theory? -- Out-sourcing the empirical work? -- A cognitive-affective approach to the virtues -- Defending hard virtue theory -- Phronesis and the unity of the virtues -- The unity of which virtues? -- Attributive and model theses -- Responsibility for character -- Depth, self-construction, and responsibility -- On responsibility and ultimate responsibility for character -- What is critical distance? -- From critical distance to responsibility -- Objections to the critical distance view.
Sabini, John & Silver, Maury (2005). Lack of character? Situationism critiqued. Ethics 115 (3).   (Google)
Snow, Nancy E. (2010). Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- In search of global traits -- Habitual virtuous actions and automaticity -- Social intelligence and why it matters -- Virtue as social intelligence -- Philosophical situationism revisited -- Conclusion.
Solomon, Robert C. (2005). What's character got to do with it? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):648–655.   (Google | More links)
Sosa, Ernest (online). A defense of virtue theory against situationist objections.   (Google)
Sreenivasan, Gopal (2008). Character and consistency: Still more errors. Mind 117 (467).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper continues a debate among philosophers concerning the implications of situationist experiments in social psychology for the theory of virtue. In a previous paper (2002), I argued among other things that the sort of character trait problematized by Hartshorne and May's (1928) famous study of honesty is not the right sort to trouble the theory of virtue. Webber (2006) criticizes my argument, alleging that it founders on an ambiguity in "cross-situational consistency" and that Milgram's (1974) obedience experiment is immune to the objections I levelled against Hartshorne and May. Here I respond to his criticisms. The most important error in Webber's argument is that it overlooks a distinction between "one time performance" experiments and "iterated trial" experiments. I explain why the former cannot begin to trouble the theory of virtue. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
Sreenivasan, Gopal (forthcoming). Disunity of virtue. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed
Sreenivasan, Gopal (2002). Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution. Mind 111 (441).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory—specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute this conclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data—the data themselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone's character trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject's own construal of the situation. Second, they include behaviour that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third, they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given these inadequacies in situationism's operationalized conception of a ‘character trait’, I argue that situationism does not really address the proposition that people have ‘character traits’, properly understood. A fortiori, the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimental evidence in favour of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism
Upton, Candace L. (2005). A contextual account of character traits. Philosophical Studies 122 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Character traits have several vital functions. They should enable us to assess others morally, inform us of others’ behavioral tendencies, and accurately explain and predict others’ behavior. But traits of character, as they have traditionally been understood, cannot adequately serve these purposes. For character traits are traditionally thought to be context-insensitive. The Contextual Account of Character Traits, which I here develop and defend, posits traits that are context-sensitive. Context-sensitive character traits are more receptive to the complexity of human psychology and behavior and, hence, they not only adequately, but excellently, satisfy their theoretic and pragmatic functions
Upton, Candace L. (2009). Situational Traits of Character: Dispositional Foundations and Implications for Moral Psychology and Friendship. Lexington Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Global traits of character -- Traits as dispositions -- Situational traits of character -- Situational traits and social psychology -- Situational traits and the friendly consequentialist.
Upton, Candace L. (forthcoming). The structure of character. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations
Upton, Candace L. (forthcoming). Virtue ethics and moral psychology: The situationism debate. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Vranas, Peter B. M. (forthcoming). Against moral character evaluations: The undetectability of virtue and vice. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend the epistemic thesis that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. (1) Because most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations), one’s prior probability that any given person is fragmented should be high. (2) Because one’s information about specific people does not reliably distinguish those who are fragmented from those who are not, one’s posterior probability that any given person is fragmented should be close to one’s prior—and thus should also be high. (3) Because being fragmented entails being indeterminate (neither good nor bad nor intermediate), one’s posterior probability that any given person is indeterminate should also be high—and the epistemic thesis follows. (1) and (3) rely on previous work; here I support (2) by using a mathematical result together with empirical evidence from personality psychology
Vranas, Peter B. M. (2005). The indeterminacy paradox: Character evaluations and human psychology. Noûs 39 (1):1–42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) fragmentation entails indeterminacy. I support (1) by examining psychological experiments in which most participants behave deplorably (e.g., by maltreating “prisoners” in a simulated prison) or admirably (e.g., by intervening in a simulated theft). I support (2) by arguing that, according to certain plausible conceptions, character evaluations presuppose behavioral consistency (lack of fragmentation). Possible reactions to the paradox include: (a) denying that the experiments are relevant to character; (b) upholding conceptions according to which character evaluations do not presuppose consistency; (c) granting that most people are indeterminate and explaining why it appears otherwise. I defend (c) against (a) and (b)
Webber, Jonathan (2007). Character, common-sense, and expertise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people’s behaviour, difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations between them must be based on more objective data
Webber, Jonathan (2006). Character, consistency, and classification. Mind 115 (459).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: John Doris has recently argued that since we do not possess character traits as traditionally conceived, virtue ethics is rooted in a false empirical presupposition. Gopal Sreenivasan has claimed, in a paper in Mind, that Doris has not provided suitable evidence for his empirical claim. But the experiment Sreenivasan focuses on is not one that Doris employs, and neither is it relevantly similar in structure. The confusion arises because both authors use the phrase ‘cross-situational consistency’ to describe the aspect of character traits that they are concerned with, but neither defines this phrase, and it is ambiguous: Doris uses it in one sense, Sreenivasan in another. Partly for this reason, the objections Sreenivasan raises fail to block the argument Doris provides. In particular, the most reliable data Doris employs, Milgram’s famous study of authority, is entirely immune to Sreenivasan’s objections. Sreenivasan has not shown, therefore, that Doris provides unsuitable evidence for his claim
Webber, Jonathan (2007). Character, global and local. Utilitas 19 (4):430-434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An individual’s behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational feature, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features. The data cited by these philosophers supports their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We should not adopt the former conception, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not revise our understanding of character in this way
Webber, Jonathan (2006). Virtue, character and situation. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have recently argued that traditional discussions of virtue and character presuppose an account of behaviour that experimental psychology has shown to be false. Behaviour does not issue from global traits such as prudence, temperance, courage or fairness, they claim, but from local traits such as sailing-in-rough-weather-with-friends-courage and office-party-temperance. The data employed provides evidence for this view only if we understand it in the light of a behaviourist construal of traits in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the light of the more traditional construal in terms of inner events such as inclinations. More recent experiments have shown this traditional conception to have greater explanatory and predictive power than its behaviourist rival. So we should retain the traditional conception, and hence reject the proposed alteration to our understanding of behaviour. This discussion has further implications for future philosophical investigations of character and virtue. Key Words: character traits • situationism • social psychology • virtue ethics
Wielenberg, Erik J. (2006). Saving character. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In his recent book Lack of Character, Jon Doris argues that people typically lack character (understood in a particular way). Such a claim, if correct, would have devastating implications for moral philosophy and for various human moral projects (e.g. character development). I seek to defend character against Doris's challenging attack. To accomplish this, I draw on Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant to identify some of the central components of virtuous character. Next, I examine in detail some of the central experiments in social psychology upon which Doris's argument is based. I argue that, properly understood, such experiments reveal differences in the characters of their subjects, not that their subjects lack character altogether. I conclude with some reflections on the significance of such experiments and the importance of character
Winter, Michael & Tauer, John (2006). Virtue theory and social psychology. Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (1).   (Google)

5.1l.5.6 Virtues and Vices

Aristotle, , Virtues and vices.   (Google | More links)
Aristotle, , Virtues and vices (greek and english).   (Google)
Maes, Hans (2001). Bescheidenheid en asymmetrie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93 (2).   (Google)
Denis, Lara (2006). Kant's Conception of Virtue. In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I explicate Kant’s theory of virtue and situate it within the context of theories of virtue before Kant (such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hume) and after Kant (such as Schiller and Schopenhauer). I explore Kant’s notions of virtue as a disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law, as moral strength in non-holy wills, as the moral disposition in conflict, and as moral self-constraint based on inner freedom. I distinguish between Kant’s notions of virtue and of the good will. I discuss Kant’s duties of virtue (and so particular virtues and vices), the relationships between virtue and happiness and virtue and the emotions, and Kant’s criticisms of his predecessors’ views of virtue. I close with a discussion of Kant and contemporary virtue ethics. Although the paper reflects my own interpretation of Kant, it strives less to argue for a particular thesis about Kant on virtue than to illuminate important aspects of Kant’s theory of virtue.
Denis, Lara (2006). Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent. In Raja Halwani (ed.), Sex and Ethics: Essays in Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good Life. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores how a virtuous Kantian agent would regard and express her sexuality. I argue both that Kant has a rich account of virtue, and that a virtuous Kantian agent should view her sexuality as a good thing–as an important aspect of her animal nature. On my view, the virtuous agent does not seek to suppress her sexuality, but rather to find modes and contexts for its expression that allow the agent to maintain her self-respect and to avoid degrading others. The paper begins by considering reasons, grounded in Kant’s texts, why one might reasonably think that Kant has a pejorative view of sexuality, and only the thinnest account of virtue, to offer. I then aim to correct this picture by more carefully and fully exploring Kant’s work, putting his apparently negative comments about sex, and apparently narrow account of virtue, in their proper context. I also dispute—based on Kant’s own principles—some of Kant’s claims about homosexual sex and masturbation as violations of duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Finally, I conclude the paper with an account of the virtuous Kantian agent’s proper attitude toward her sexuality.
Duff, R. A. (2006). The virtues and vices of virtue jurisprudence. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Foot, Philippa (1978). Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice
Green, Rosalie B. (1968). Virtues and vices in the chapter house vestibule in Salisbury. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 31:148-158.   (Google | More links)
Kawall, Jason (2006). On Complacency. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):343-55.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.
Margulies, Peter, The detainees' dilemma: The virtues and vices of mobilization strategies for human rights in the war on terror.   (Google)
Abstract:      The war on terror's excesses have tested both lawyers and the legal system. However, commentary on that test has not been comprehensive. Commentators have studied the courts' response to the detention and trial of suspected terrorists and the role of government lawyers such as John Yoo who offered advice authorizing government policies. In contrast, most commentators have ignored the war on terror's role as a catalyst for the creativity of human rights lawyers. The war on terror's restrictions on access to courts have produced innovations among detainee advocates familiar to those who have played the game of "whack-a-mole." Driven by Bush administration measures that made conventional advocacy difficult, lawyers for detainees have developed an alternative approach to lawyering that I call crossover advocacy. For crossover advocates, lawyering advocacy outside of court is often the main event. Crossover advocacy includes work with the media, foreign governments, and international forums, as well as scholarship by academic lawyers working for detainees and damage suits that drive mobilization campaigns independent of judicial outcomes. In the fluid world of "law in action," crossover advocacy has played a more significant role than the elite briefing and argument that inspires Supreme Court opinions. As in any legal regime trying to tamp down forces that keep reappearing from another direction, crossover effects in the war on terror yield both benefits and risks. Crossover advocates can amplify the voices of detainees and enhance the integrity and transparency of legal regimes in the war on terror. However, advocates are also susceptible to pervasive cognitive flaws such intertemporal and self-serving bias that generate three classes of adverse crossover effects. First, asymmetries in accountability between traditional judicial forums and crossover venues promote reckless advocacy, generate opportunity costs for clients, and encourage an echo chamber dynamic in which preaching to the converted prevails. Second, role conflicts in crossover advocacy undermine deliberation and candor. For example, the legal complaint drafted by lawyers at Yale Law School for a lawsuit against John Yoo may initially prompt the response that turnabout is fair play. However, the complaint's amorphous inconsistency fails as payback for Yoo's infamous legal advice. Crossover advocacy can also produce boomerang and backlash effects that injure the public interest. Deliberation about the virtues and costs of crossover advocacy requires a mobilization metric. The metric proposed here considers the innocence of the detainee, the fairness of procedures in place, and the gravity of the harm that can befall the client as indicia of a case's mobilization potential. An advocate should weigh that potential against the opportunity costs of crossover advocacy, including the neglect of traditional tactics such as the client's cooperation with the government. The advocate should also consider the prospect that the government will respond to pressure with measures that reduce the lawyer's leverage, such as extraordinary rendition. The mobilization metric will not vanquish all of the challenges faced by advocates who seek to represent detainees in the face of onerous government restrictions. Nevertheless, working through the metric will correct for cognitive flaws and clarify tactical choices. Resort to the metric will ensure that clients and the public derive the maximum benefit from mobilization strategies
McNamee, M. J. (2008). Sports, Virtues and Vices: Morality Plays. Routledge.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1981). Choice and virtue in the. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (4):405-423.   (Google)
Abstract: COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x 163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference?
Pring, Richard (2001). The virtues and vices of an educational researcher. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (3):407–421.   (Google | More links)
Schofer, Jonathan Wyn (2008). Virtues and vices of relativism. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (4):709-715.   (Google)
Abstract: comment ▪  Subject: "Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison" Aaron Stalnaker Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September 2008) ▪  From: Jonathan Wyn Schofer Harvard Divinity School 45 Francis Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138
Dent, N. J. H. (1984). The Moral Psychology of the Virtues. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Tuve, Rosemond (1963). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 26 (3/4):264-303.   (Google | More links)
Tuve, Rosemond (1964). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (3/4):42-72.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, James D. (1978). Virtues and Vices. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Wertheimer, Roger (ed.) (2010). Empowering Our Military Conscience. Ashgate.   (Google)
Abstract: TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface, Roger Wertheimer; Introduction-A Great Awakening, Roger Wertheimer; Part I. Jus ad Bellum: (1) The Triumph of the Just War Tradition, and the Dangers of Success, Michael Walzer; (2) Methodological Anarchy: Arguing About Preventive War, George R. Lucas, Jr.; (3) Crossing Borders to Fight Injustice: The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, Richard Miller; Part II. Jus in Bello: (4) The Proper Role of Intention in Military Decision-Making, Thomas Scanlon; (5) Ethics for Calamities: How Strict is the Moral Rule Against Targeting Noncombatants?, Jeffrey Reiman; (6) Invincible Ignorance, Moral Equality, and Professional Obligation, Richard Schoonhoven; Part III. Jus ante Bellum (7) The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism, Roger Wertheimer; (8) The Morality of Military Ethics Education, Roger Wertheimer
Wertheimer, Roger (2010). The Morality of Military Ethics Education. In Roger Wertheimer (ed.), Empowering Our Military Conscience.   (Google)
Abstract: Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) must transmit and promote military professionalism, so it must continuously

5.1l.5.7 Moral Character, Misc

Denis, Lara (2008). Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper situates abortion in the context of women’s duties to themselves. I argue that Kant’s fundamental moral requirement (found in the formula of humanity) to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kant’s view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women’s agency and moral character without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required. I first sketch Kant’s account to duties to oneself, highlighting duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Next, I discuss pregnancy and the challenges it poses to women’s self-preservation, development, and efficacy as rational human agents. I then give my main argument: that abortion is morally problematic because it is antagonistic to an important subset of morally useful emotions that we have self-regarding duties to protect and cultivate. I argue that self-regarding moral considerations ground a rebuttable deliberative presumption against maxims of abortion for inclination-based ends. Finally, I consider three objections to this account of abortion: that it rests on implausible assumptions about the effects of abortion on women’s morally useful sentiments; that it portrays the virtuous agent’s reasoning about abortion as objectionably self-regarding; and that it fails adequately to recognize the moral significance of the fetus as a potential rational being.
Hardwig, John (1983). Action from duty but not in accord with duty. Ethics 93 (2):283-290.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In thc Foundations, Kant draws a distinction bctwccn action which is in accord with duty and action which is done from the motive of duty. This is 21 famous distinction, of course, and thcrc arc many interesting issues concerning it and its implications for ethical thcory. In this paper, I wish t0 focus on just 0nc noteworthy feature of K2mt’s usc of this distinction. Likc any distinction bctwccn logical compatiblcs, this 0nc yields four logically possible classes of action: (1) actions which are both in accord with duty and from duty; (2) actions which arc neither from duty nor in accord with duty; (3) actions which are in accord with duty but not from duty; and (4) actions which are from duty but not in accord with duty. What intcrcsts mc about these four possibilities is that, to thc best of my knowledge, Kant never considers or even mentions the last 0f these possibilities: action from duty but not in accord with duty. This is perhaps surprising in a philosopher with Kant’s intcrcst in logic and passion for thoroughness. Onc would have thought that hc would mention this logical possibility, cvcn if only in order to discount it as not really possible. Beginning with the idea that there arc cases of action from duty but not in accord with duty, I argue in this paper that Kant could not have admitted that thcrc can be actions of this kind, for their cxistcncc un-
Jauss, Steven A. (2008). What's wrong with moralism? Edited by C. A. J. Coady. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):251–256.   (Google | More links)
LaFollette, Hugh (2005). Living on a slippery slope. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their most common usage, it would be prudent to avoid them in moral and political debate. They are often fallacious and have often been used for ill. They are normally used to defend the moral status quo. Even when they are cogent, we can always find an alternate way to capture their insights. Finally, by accepting that the moral roads on which we travel are slippery, we become better able to successfully navigate them
O’Hagan, Emer (2009). Moral self-knowledge in Kantian ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics
Perrett, Roy W. (2002). Evil and Human Nature. The Monist 85:304-19.   (Google)
Ware, Owen (2009). The duty of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self-deception (§2). Finding none of Kant's solutions to the problem of self-deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self-knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3)

5.1l.6 Moral States and Processes

5.1l.6.1 Moral Imagination

Bernauer, James & Mahon, Michael (2006). Michel Foucault's ethical imagination. In Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Collier, Jane (forthcoming). The art of moral imagination: Ethics in the practice of architecture. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses questions of ethics in the professional practice of architecture. It begins by discussing possible relationships between ethics and aesthetics. It then theorises ethics within concepts of ‘practice’, and argues for the importance of the context in architecture where narrative can be used to learn and to integrate past and present experience. Narrative reflection also takes in the future, and in the case of architecture there is a positive but not yet well accepted move (particularly within the ‘academy’) to realise the imperative nature of architecture’s responsibility with respect of global sustainability. Architects, more perhaps than other professions, use the faculty of imagination in their work, and this paper therefore maintains that architects as artists are uniquely qualified to exercise ‘moral imagination’ when it comes to situations where moral deliberation is needed. Pragmatism has given a new impetus to the importance of imagination in moral reflection, and I focus on John Dewey’s categories of ‘empathy’ and ‘dramatic rehearsal’ as descriptors of moral imagination as applied in situations. I argue in conclusion firstly that empathy between end-users and architects is an essential but not always realised part of morality in architecture, and secondly that ‘dramatic rehearsal’, when extended more widely that a given situation, may lead architects to question the social, political and ecological contexts of their work and thus motivate them to prioritise the ‘ethical’ in all the choices they make
De Vries, Raymond (2005). Framing neuroethics: A sociological assessment of the neuroethical imagination. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):25 – 27.   (Google)
Gedge, Elisabeth Boetzkes (2004). Collective moral imagination: Making decisions for persons with dementia. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (4):435 – 450.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Much debate concerning 'precedent autonomy' - that is, the authority of former, competent selves to govern the welfare of later, non-competent selves - has assumed a radical discontinuity between selves, and has overlooked the 'bridging' role of intimate proxy decision-makers. I consider a recent proposal by Lynn et al. (1999) that presents a provocative alternative, foregrounding an imagined dialogue between the formerly competent patient and her/his trusted others. I consider what standards must be met for such dialogues to have moral force, appealing to narrative and feminist ethics. I then critique the dualistic construction of selves implicit in much of the advance directive literature, noting the continuities of dependence, character, and body, as well as the social dimension of the construction of selves
Gorman, Michael E. (2005). Heuristics, moral imagination, and the future of technology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):551-551.   (Google)
Abstract: Successful application of heuristics depends on how a problem is represented, mentally. Moral imagination is a good technique for reflecting on, and sharing, mental representations of ethical dilemmas, including those involving emerging technologies. Future research on moral heuristics should use more ecologically valid problems and combine quantitative and qualitative methods
Heydt, Colin (2006). Narrative, imagination, and the religion of humanity in mill's ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper shows how the ethical benefits of Mill's Religion of HumanityÑa life imbued with purpose, an improved regard for others, and greater happiness for oneself from the pleasures of fellow-feelingÑare to be actualized through the imagination's creation of compelling narratives about humanity. Understanding the ethical importance of the Religion of Humanity therefore implies understanding the central role of imagination in Millian ethical life. This investigation serves to articulate a feature of Mill's utilitarianism that differentiates it from Bentham's, namely his commitment to the importance of a religious sensibility in the moral agent. It also raises the broader philosophical issue of what narratives a psychologically tenable humanist world-view requires
Johnson, Mark (1985). Imagination in moral judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (2):265-280.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, Mark (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Using path-breaking discoveries of cognitive science, Mark Johnson argues that humans are fundamentally imaginative moral animals, challenging the view that morality is simply a system of universal laws dictated by reason. According to the Western moral tradition, we make ethical decisions by applying universal laws to concrete situations. But Johnson shows how research in cognitive science undermines this view and reveals that imagination has an essential role in ethical deliberation. Expanding his innovative studies of human reason in Metaphors We Live By and The Body in the Mind, Johnson provides the tools for more practical, realistic, and constructive moral reflection
Kekes, John (2006). The Enlargement of Life: Moral Imagination at Work. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Mackenzie, Catriona & Scully, Jackie Leach (2007). Moral imagination, disability and embodiment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):335–351.   (Google | More links)
Magill, Gerard (1992). Theology in business ethics: Appealing to the religious imagination. Journal of Business Ethics 11 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: By appealing to the religious imagination Theology can make a distinctive contribution to business ethics. In the first part of the essay I examine what is entailed by appealing to the imagination to reason in ethics: through converging arguments the imagination enables us rationally to interpret reality and to infer obligations. In the following sections I consider the relevance of the religious imagination for business ethics. In the second part I explain the imagination''s use of religious metaphor to establish its theological distinctiveness in ethical inquiry. Then in the final part I illustrate Theology''s contribution to business ethics by studying the imagination''s use of religious metaphor with regard to profit and to third world debt
Malloy, David (2000). Patricia H. Werhane, moral imagination and management decision making. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4).   (Google)
Michael, E. Gorman; Patricia, H. Werhane & Nathan Swami, (2009). Moral imagination, trading zones, and the role of the ethicist in nanotechnology. Nanoethics 3 (3):185-195.   (Google)
Abstract: The societal and ethical impacts of emerging technological and business systems cannot entirely be foreseen; therefore, management of these innovations will require at least some ethicists to work closely with researchers. This is particularly critical in the development of new systems because the maximum degrees of freedom for changing technological direction occurs at or just after the point of breakthrough; that is also the point where the long-term implications are hardest to visualize. Recent work on shared expertise in Science & Technology Studies (STS) can help create productive collaborations among scientists, engineers, ethicists and other stakeholders as these new systems are designed and implemented. But collaboration across these disciplines will be successful only if scientists, engineers, and ethicists can communicate meaningfully with each other. The establishment of a trading zone coupled with moral imagination present one method for such collaborative communication
Moberg, Dennis & Caldwell, David F. (2007). An exploratory investigation of the effect of ethical culture in activating moral imagination. Journal of Business Ethics 73 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Moral imagination is a process that involves a thorough consideration of the ethical elements of a decision. We sought to explore what might distinguish moral imagination from other ethical approaches within a complex business simulation. Using a three-component model of moral imagination, we sought to discover whether organization cultures with a salient ethics theme activate moral imagination. Finding an effect, we sought an answer to whether some individuals were more prone to being influenced in this way by ethical cultures. We found that employees with strong moral identities are less influenced by such cultures than employees whose sense of self is not defined in moral terms
Nordgren, Anders (1998). Ethics and imagination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases
Stohr, Karen (2006). Practical wisdom and moral imagination in Sense and Sensibility. Philosophy and Literature 30 (2).   (Google)
Werhane, Patricia H. (2002). Moral imagination and systems thinking. Journal of Business Ethics 38 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Taking the lead from Susan Wolf's and Linda Emanuel's work on systems thinking, and developing ideas from Moberg's, Seabright's and my work on mental models and moral imagination, in this paper I shall argue that what is often missing in management decision-making is a systems approach. Systems thinking requires conceiving of management dilemmas as arising from within a system with interdependent elements, subsystems, and networks of relationships and patterns of interaction. Taking a systems approach and coupling it with moral imagination, now engaged on the organizational and systemic as well as individual levels of decision-making, I shall conclude, is a methodology that encourages managers and companies to think more imaginatively and to engage in integrating moral decision-making into ordinary business decisions. More importantly this sort of thinking is a means to circumvent what often appear to be intractable problems created by systemic constraints for which no individual appears to be responsible

5.1l.6.10 Moral States and Processes, Misc

5.1l.6.11 Courage

Balot, Ryan K. (2008). Socratic courage and athenian democracy. Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):49-69.   (Google)
Barash, Carol Isaacson (1996). Review essay : Ruth Hubbard, profitable promises: Essays on women, science and health (monroe, me, common courage press, 1995). Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (3).   (Google)
Bauhn, Per (2003). The Value of Courage. Nordic Academic Press.   (Google)
Baylis, Françoise (2007). Of courage, honor, and integrity. In Lisa A. Eckenwiler & Felicia Cohn (eds.), The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral Landscape. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Benson, Hugh H. (1994). On manly courage: A study of Plato's laches. Ancient Philosophy 14 (2):383-386.   (Google)
Bonevac, Daniel (ms). Laches, or courage.   (Google)
Abstract: Lys. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young
Chen, Lisheng (2010). Courage in the analects : A genealogical survey of the confucian virtue of courage. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The different meanings of “courage” in The Analects were expressed in Confucius’ remark on Zilu’s bravery. The typological analysis of courage in Mencius and Xunzi focused on the shaping of the personalities of brave persons. “Great courage” and “superior courage”, as the virtues of “great men” or “ shi junzi 士君子 (intellectuals with noble characters)”, exhibit not only the uprightness of the “internal sagacity”, but also the rich implications of the “external kingship”. The prototype of these brave persons could be said to be between Zengzi’s courage and King Wen’s courage. The discussion entered a new stage of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, when admiration for “Yanzi’s great valor” became the key of various arguments. The order of “the three cardinal virtues” was also discussed because it concerned the relationship between “finished virtue” and “novice virtue”; hence, the virtue of courage became internalized as an essence of the internal virtuous life. At the turn of the 20 th century, when China was trembling under the threat of foreign powers, intellectuals remodeled the tradition of courage by redefining “Confucius’ great valor”, as Liang Qichao did in representative fashion in his book Chinese Bushido . Hu Shi’s Lun Ru 论儒 (On Ru ) was no more than a repetition of Liang’s opinion. In the theoretical structures of the modern Confucians, courage is hardly given a place. As one of the three cardinal virtues, bravery is but a concept. In a contemporary society where heroes and sages exist only in history books, do we need to talk about courage? How should it be discussed? These are questions which deserve our consideration
Daly, Mary (2006). Amazon Grace: Re-Calling the Courage to Sin Big. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: In her signature style, revolutionary Mary Daly takes you on a Quantum leap into a joyous future of victory for women. Daly, the groundbreaking author of such classics as Beyond God the Father and The Church and the Second Sex , explores the visions of Matilda Joslyn Gage, the great nineteenth-century philosopher, and reveals that her insights are stunningly helpful to twenty-first-century Voyagers seeking to overcome the fascism and life-hating fundamentalism that has infused current power structures. Daly shows us once again that Wild, Wise Women can learn to take charge of the current destructive patriarchal forces and use this as an Outlandish opportunity for change
Devereux, Daniel (1977). Courage and wisdom in Plato's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (2).   (Google)
Roger Duncan, (1978). Courage in Plato's protagoras. Phronesis 23 (3):216-228.   (Google)
Funk, Rainer (1982). Erich Fromm: The Courage to Be Human. Continuum.   (Google)
Hamilton, Alastair (2007). Obedient heretics: Mennonite identitities in Lutheran Hamburg and altona during the confessional age. By Michael D. driedger and 'Elisabeth's manly courage': Testimonials and songs of martyred anabaptist women in the low countries. Edited and translated by hermina Joldersma and Louis grijp. Heythrop Journal 48 (3):480–481.   (Google | More links)
Harris, Howard (2001). Content analysis of secondary data: A study of courage in managerial decision making. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Empirical studies in business ethics often rely on self-reported data, but this reliance is open to criticism. Responses to questionnaires and interviews may be influenced by the subject''s view of what the researcher might want to hear, by a reluctance to talk about sensitive ethical issues, and by imperfect recall. This paper reviews the extent to which published research in business ethics relies on interviews and questionnaires, and then explores the possibilities of using secondary data, such as company documents and newspaper reports, as a source for empirical studies in applied ethics. A specific example is then discussed, describing the source material, the method, the development of the research questions, and the way in which reliability and validity were established. In the example, content analysis was used to examine the extent to which the executive virtue of courage was observed or called for in items published in four international daily newspapers, and to explore the meaning which was attributed to "courage" in the papers
Harris, Howard (2003). Enhancing the independence of supervisory agencies: The development of courage. Business Ethics 12 (4):369–377.   (Google | More links)
Harle, Tim (2005). Serenity, courage and wisdom: Changing competencies for leadership. Business Ethics 14 (4):348–358.   (Google | More links)
Hobbs, Angela (2000). Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Plato's thinking on courage, manliness and heroism is both profound and central to his work, but these areas of his thought remain underexplored. This book examines his developing critique of the notions and embodiments of manliness prevalent in his culture (particularly those in Homer), and his attempt to redefine such notions in accordance with his ethical, psychological and metaphysical principles. It further seeks to locate the discussion within the framework of Plato's general approach to ethics
Im, Manyul (2004). Moral knowledge and self control in mengzi: Rectitude, courage, and qi. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):59 – 77.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind (xin). Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature (ren xing) as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of 'internal' justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi
Ives, Jonathan (2008). Does a belief in God lead to moral cowardice?: The difference between courage of moral conviction and acquisition. Think 7 (20):57-68.   (Google)
Leslie, E. Sekerka; Richard, P. Bagozzi & Richard Charnigo, (2009). Facing ethical challenges in the workplace: Conceptualizing and measuring professional moral courage. Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4).   (Google)
Mahoney, Jack (1998). Editorial adieu: Cultivating moral courage in business. Business Ethics 7 (4):187–192.   (Google | More links)
Müller, Jörn (2008). In war and peace : The virtue of courage in the writings of Albert the great and Thomas Aquinas. In István Pieter Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200 -1500. Brill.   (Google)
Mumbach, Mary (2010). The courage of reason and the scandal of education. In Bainard Cowan (ed.), Gained Horizons: Regensburg and the Enlargement of Reason. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Norris, Christopher (2001). 'Courage not under fire': Realism, anti-realism, and the epistemological virtues. Inquiry 44 (3):269 – 290.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article offers a critical perspective on two lines of thought in recent epistemology and philosophy of science, namely Michael Dummett?s anti-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and knowledge and Bas van Fraassen?s influential programme of ?constructive empiricism?. While not denying the salient differences between them (the one a metaphysical doctrine premised on logicolinguistic considerations, the other a thesis primarily concerned with the scope and limits of empirical inquiry) it shows how they converge on a sceptical outlook concerning the realist claim that truth might always transcend the restrictions of some given (or indeed some future best-possible) state of knowledge. The author puts the case that such sceptical arguments, if followed through consistently, must involve giving up all claim to account for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge. He also takes issue with Dummett?s idea of truth as nothing more than a matter of ?warranted assertibility? and with van Fraassen?s likewise verificationist conception of empirical warrant as the most we can have by way of epistemic justification. Thus it is wrong to suppose that the realist is merely indulging in a display of ?courage not under fire? when she assumes ontological commitments in excess of the observational data. This disavowal of realism in favour of a theory which ?saves the (empirical) appearances? has a less-than-distinguished prehistory in the range of compromise strategies adopted by upholders of a dominant metaphysics or world-view, starting out with the orthodox Catholic attempt to defuse the implications of the heliocentric hypothesis advanced by Copernicus and Galileo. Such theological motives are nowadays not so prominent although ? it is suggested fithey do emerge at certain points in Dummett?s writing. More constructively, this article presents a case for objectivism with regard to scientific truth and also for inference to the best causal explanation on both the micro- and the macrophysical scale as the only approach with an adequate claim to make sense of the history of advancements in scientific knowledge to date
O'Connell, Robert J. (1997). William James on the Courage to Believe. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: William James’ celebrated lecture on “The Will to Believe” has kindled spirited controversy since the day it was delivered. In this lively reappraisal of that controversy, Father O’Connell contributes some fresh contentions: that James’ argument should be viewed against his indebtedness to Pascal and Renouvier; that it works primarily to validate our “over-beliefs” ; and most surprising perhaps, that James envisages our “passional nature” as intervening, not after, but before and throughout, our intellectual weighing of the evidence for belief
Penner, Terry (1992). What laches and nicias miss-and whether socrates thinks courage merely a part of virtue. Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):1-27.   (Google)
Pfau, Michael (2007). Who's afraid of fear appeals? Contingency, courage and deliberation in rhetorical theory and practice. Philosophy and Rhetoric 40 (2).   (Google)
Putman, Daniel (2001). The emotions of courage. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):463–470.   (Google | More links)
Pybus, Elizabeth (1991). Human Goodness: Generosity and Courage. Harvester Wheatsheaf.   (Google)
Rabieh, Linda R. (2006). Plato and the Virtue of Courage. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Plato and the Virtue of Courage canvasses contemporary discussions of courage and offers a new and controversial account of Plato's treatment of the concept. Linda R. Rabieh examines Plato's two main thematic discussions of courage, in the Laches and the Republic, and discovers that the two dialogues together yield a coherent, unified treatment of courage that explores a variety of vexing questions: Can courage be separated from justice, so that one can act courageously while advancing an unjust cause? Can courage be legitimately called a virtue? What role does wisdom play in courage? What role does courage play in wisdom? Based on Plato's presentation, Rabieh argues that a refined version of traditional heroic courage, notwithstanding certain excesses to which it is prone, is worth honoring and cultivating for several reasons. Chief among these is that, by facilitating the pursuit of wisdom, such courage can provide a crucial foundation for the courage most deserving of the name
Sacksteder, William (1958). A senator looks at courage. Ethics 68 (2):137-139.   (Google | More links)
Sekerka, Leslie E.; Bagozzi, Richard P. & Charnigo, Richard (forthcoming). Facing ethical challenges in the workplace: Conceptualizing and measuring professional moral courage. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Sekerka, Leslie E. & Bagozzi, Richard P. (2007). Moral courage in the workplace: Moving to and from the desire and decision to act. Business Ethics 16 (2):132–149.   (Google | More links)
Sekerka, Leslie & Zolin, Roxanne (2005). Professional courage in the military: Regulation fit and establishing moral intent. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 24 (4):27-50.   (Google)
Stout, Robert (1923). The need of courage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):77 – 83.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A brave man leaveth not the battle, He who flieth from it is no true warrior, In the field of this body a great war is toward Against Passion, Hunger, Pride and Greed, It is for the Kingdom of Truth, of Contentment and of Purity that this battle is raging: And the sword that ringeth most loudly is the sword Of His name. —KABIR, Hindu Poet
Tillich, Paul (2000). The Courage to Be. Yale University Press.   (Google)
Walton, Douglas N. (1990). Courage, relativism and practical reasoning. Philosophia 20 (1-2).   (Google)
Waterfield, Robin (2007). Plato and the virtue of courage. By Linda R. rabieh. Heythrop Journal 48 (6):992–993.   (Google | More links)
Weiss, Roslyn (1985). Courage, confidence, and wisdom in the protagoras. Ancient Philosophy 5 (1):11-24.   (Google)
Woodruff, Paul (2007). Socrates and political courage. Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):289-302.   (Google)
Yuen, Shirley (2005). Three Virtues of Effective Parenting: Lessons From Confucius on the Power of Benevolence, Wisdom, and Courage. Tuttle Pub..   (Google)

5.1l.6.12 Hypocrisy

Aikin, Scott F. (ms). Tu quoque arguments and the siginificance of hypocrisy.   (Google)
Abstract:      Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent's proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will term tu quoque judo
Aikin, Scott F. (ms). What is the significance of al Gore's purported hypocrisy?   (Google)
Abstract:      This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case
Bailey, Cathryn (2007). "Africa begins at the pyrenees": Moral outrage, hypocrisy, and the spanish bullfight. Ethics and the Environment 12 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : The long history of criticism directed at bullfighting usually suggests that there is something especially morally noxious about it. I analyze the claims that bullfighting is distinctively immoral, comparing it to more widely accepted practices such as the slaughtering of animals for food. I conclude that, while bullfighting is horrific, the emphasis on it as especially "uncivilized" may serve to disguise the similarities that it has with other practices that also depend on animal suffering. I conclude that, for many, the hypocritical maintenance of a self-image as "civilized," despite great moral crimes committed against animals, seems to be facilitated by a focus on this especially dramatic example of animal cruelty
Batson, C. Daniel; Collins, Elizabeth & Powell, Adam A. (2006). Doing business after the fall: The virtue of moral hypocrisy. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Moral hypocrisy is motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral. In business, moral hypocrisy allows one to engender trust, solve the commitment problem, and still relentlessly pursue personal gain. Indicating the power of this motive, research has provided clear and consistent evidence that, given the opportunity, many people act to appear fair (e.g., they flip a coin to distribute resources between themselves and another person) without actually being fair (they accept the flip only if it favors themselves). New evidence also indicates the power of moral hypocrisy in a situation more obviously relevant to business, resource allocation when one party has information about relative resource value that the other does not. Characteristics of modern business situations likely to encourage moral hypocrisy are outlined. We conclude that moral hypocrisy is not only a pragmatic virtue in modern business but is also fast becoming a prescriptive one
Bouwsma, William J. (1987). Calvin and the dilemma of hypocrisy. In Peter De Klerk (ed.), Calvin and Christian Ethics: Papers and Responses Presented at the Fifth Colloquium on Calvin & Calvin Studies Sponsored by the Calvin Studies Society Held at the Calvin Theological Seminary, Grand Rapids, Michigan, on May 8 and 9, 1985. Calvin Studies Society.   (Google)
Foote, Dorothy (2001). The question of ethical hypocrisy in human resource management in the U.k. And irish charity sectors. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Whilst there is a growing volume of literature exploring the ethical implications of organisational change for HRM and the ethical aspects of certain HRM activities, there have been few published U.K. studies of how HR managers actually behave when faced with ethical dilemmas in their work. This paper seeks to enhance the foundations of such knowledge through an examination of the influence of organisational values on the ethical behaviour of Human Resource Managers within a sample of charities in the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland. A qualitative research design is adopted utilising semi-structured interviews. Findings highlight ethical inconsistency in people management in the charity sector arising from the clear application of strong and explicit organisational values to external client groups but their limited influence on people management strategies and practices within the organisation. Many of the ethical issues faced by HRM professionals in both countries arise from this inconsistency. In their handling of ethical dilemmas, the HRM professionals exhibit a combination of a care ethic and a concern for justice but it is also clear that in situations of management intransigence, a desire to be conscience driven often gives way to a contingent approach. Whilst respondents considered it inappropriate for the HRM function to be the conscience of the organisation, it is seen to have a key role in providing management with advice on ethical action. However, the ability of HRM to influence ethical behaviour is highly dependent on the status of the function within the organisation
Friedman, R. Z. (1986). Hypocrisy and the highest good: Hegel on Kant's transition from morality to religion. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (4).   (Google)
Ginzburg, Benjamin (1922). Hypocrisy as a pathological symptom. International Journal of Ethics 32 (2):160-166.   (Google | More links)
Grant, Ruth Weissbourd (1997). Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Questioning the usual judgements of political ethics, Ruth W. Grant argues that hypocrisy can actually be constructive while strictly principled behavior can be destructive. Hypocrisy and Integrity offers a new conceptual framework that clarifies the differences between idealism and fanaticism while it uncovers the moral limits of compromise. "Exciting and provocative. . . . Grant's work is to be highly recommended, offering a fresh reading of Rousseau and Machiavelli as well as presenting a penetrating analysis of hypocrisy and integrity."--Ronald J. Terchek, American Political Science Review "A great refreshment. . . . With liberalism's best interests at heart, Grant seeks to make available a better understanding of the limits of reason in politics."--Peter Berkowitz, New Republic
Maes, Hans (2004). Modesty, asymmetry, and hypocrisy. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4).   (Google)
Mckinnon, Christine (forthcoming). Hypocrisy, cheating, and character possession. Journal of Value Inquiry.   (Google)
McKinnon, Christine (2006). Hypocrisy: Ethical lnvestigations. Dialogue 45 (2):395-398.   (Google)
Naso, Ronald C. (2010). Hypocrisy Unmasked: Dissociation, Shame, and the Ethics of Inauthenticity. Jason Aronson.   (Google)
Abstract: The paradox of hypocrisy -- The call of conscience -- Perversion and moral reckoning -- Compromises of integrity -- Beneath the mask -- Youthful indiscretions -- Dissociation as self-deception -- Multiplicity and moral ambiguity.
Palmer, Erin Louise, U.s. Hypocrisy in the treatment of non-state actors in the war on terror.   (Google)
Abstract:      This article begins by discussing various classifications of individuals under international humanitarian law, such as combatants, civilians, and mercenaries, in an attempt to determine which classification is appropriate for non-state actors involved in the "war on terror." Part II of this article details the classification of members of Al-Qaeda under international humanitarian law. The classification of certain individuals as "enemy combatants" is evidence of the limitations of the traditional law of war paradigm. The United States has relied on the ambiguous rights and responsibilities of non-states actors under international humanitarian law to argue that "enemy combatants" do not fall within the scope of the Geneva Conventions. Part III of this article analyzes the classification of employees of PMCs under international humanitarian law and concludes that employees of PMCs are non-state actors engaged in armed combat. Part IV of this article details methods of holding employees of PMCs accountable under U.S. law for human rights violations and Part V analyzes the difficulties in ensuring liability. Although laws exist in the United States to prosecute employees of PMCs, the United States has failed to prosecute any of these individuals, implying that the government is contracting legal services to shield its own illegal actions. This article concludes that the United States' treatment of members of Al-Qaeda in comparison to the United States' treatment of employees of PMCs is hypocritical. By claiming that members of Al-Qaeda are non-state actors who are not entitled to the protections of the laws of war, the U.S. government can engage in questionable interrogation practices that are otherwise prohibited. Meanwhile, the United States contracts private companies, which are also non-state actors, to conduct its sometimes-illegal military activities abroad because these companies distance the United States from direct liability. Additionally, the United States fails to prosecute these individuals based on various legal loopholes and a lack of willpower, implying that such prosecutions would reveal U.S. involvement in illegal action
Statman, Daniel (1997). Hypocrisy and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby not only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our attitude toward hypocrites
Tierney, James Fallows, Sovereign power, human rights and hypocrisy costs.   (Google)
Tooley, James (2007). From Adam swift to Adam Smith: How the ‘invisible hand’ overcomes middle class hypocrisy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (4):727–741.   (Google | More links)
Tsipko, A. S. (1993). Intellectual hypocrisy of the “orthodoxes” or a long way to common sense. Studies in East European Thought 45 (1-2).   (Google)
Watson, George W. & Sheikh, Farooq (2008). Normative self-interest or moral hypocrisy?: The importance of context. Journal of Business Ethics 77 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: We re-examine the construct of Moral Hypocrisy from the perspective of normative self-interest. Arguing that some degree of self-interest is culturally acceptable and indeed expected, we postulate that a pattern of behavior is more indicative of moral hypocrisy than a single action. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that a significant majority of subjects (N = 136) exhibited fair behavior, and that ideals of caring and fairness, when measured in context of the scenario, were predictive of those behaviors. Moreover, measures of Individualism/Collectivism appear more predictive of self-interested behavior than out-of-context responses to moral ideals. Implications for research and practice are discussed

5.1l.6.13 Cruelty

5.1l.6.14 Hope

Andersson, Lynne M.; Giacalone, Robert A. & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2007). On the relationship of hope and gratitude to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 70 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   A longitudinal study of 308 white-collar U.S. employees revealed that feelings of hope and gratitude increase concern for corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, employees with stronger hope and gratitude were found to have a greater sense of responsibility toward employee and societal issues; interestingly, employee hope and gratitude did not affect sense of responsibility toward economic and safety/quality issues. These findings offer an extension of research by Giacalone, Paul, and Jurkiewicz (2005, Journal of Business Ethics, 58, 295-305)
Augustine, , Handbook on faith hope and love (outler translation).   (Google)
Baelz, Peter R. (1974). The Forgotten Dream: Experience, Hope and God. Mowbrays.   (Google)
Bell, Catharine D. (2009). John Dewey and the philosophy and practice of hope. Education and Culture 25 (1):pp. 66-70.   (Google)
Benz, Ernst (1966). Evolution and Christian Hope. Garden City, N.Y.,Doubleday.   (Google)
Benjamin, Andrew E. (1997). Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Present Hope is a compelling exploration of how we think philosophically about the present. Andrew Benjamin considers examples in philosophy, architecture and poetry to illustrate crucial themes of loss, memory, tragedy, hope and modernity. The book uses the work of Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger to illustrate the ways the notion of hope was weaved into their philosophies. Andrew Benjamin maintains that hope is a vital part of the present, rather than an expression only of the future. Present Hope shows how Judaism and philosophy interact; how the Holocaust provides an important link between modernity and the present. Benjamin's writings on the significance of the Jewish Museum in Berlin and the poetry of Paul Celan unite toward understanding the present
Beste, Jennifer (2005). Instilling hope and respecting patient autonomy: Reconciling apparently conflicting duties. Bioethics 19 (3):215–231.   (Google | More links)
Bloechl, Jeffrey; Smith, David L. & Martino, Daniel J. (eds.) (2004). The Phenomenology of Hope: The Twenty-First Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center: Lectures. Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University-Gumberg Library.   (Google)
Bloch, Ernst (1986). The Principle of Hope. Mit Press.   (Google)
Bovens, Luc (1999). The value of hope. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):667-681.   (Google | More links)
Browne, Craig (2005). Hope, critique, and utopia. Critical Horizons 6 (1):63-86.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper assesses the extent to which the category of hope assists in preserving and redefining the vestiges of utopian thought in critical social theory. Hope has never had a systematic position among the categories of critical social theory, although it has sometimes acquired considerable prominence. It will be argued that the current philosophical and everyday interest in social hope can be traced to the limited capacity of liberal conceptions of freedom to articulate a vision of social transformation apposite to contemporary suffering and indignity. The background to these experiences is the structural changes associated with the injustices of globalisation, the mobilisation of the capitalist imaginary and the uncertainties of the risk society. The category of hope could assist in sustaining the utopianism of critical theory through conjoining normative principles with a temporal orientation. Yet, the paradoxes of the current phase of capitalist modernisation have further denuded notions of progress. Since the theological background to the category of hope constitutes a major limitation, the utopian orientation of critique is clarified in relation to the antinomies of the turn to social hope and the potential of Habermas' discourse theory of democracy, law and morality. Despite Castoriadis' profound critique of the category of hope, its present usage in social analyses will be seen to have affinities with Honneth's conception of the struggle for recognition
Calian, Carnegie Samuel (1969). Berdyaev's Philosophy of Hope. Leiden, E. J. Brill.   (Google)
Carr, Steven A. (1990). Celebrate Life: Hope for a Culture Preoccupied with Death. Wolgemuth & Hyatt.   (Google)
Cobb, Henry V. (1941). Hope, fate, and freedom: A soliloquy. Ethics 52 (1):1-16.   (Google | More links)
Cooley, Aaron (2007). Democratic hope: Pragmatism and the politics of truth (review). Education and Culture 23 (2):pp. 76-79.   (Google)
Cooper, Steven H. (2000). Objects of Hope: Exploring Possibility and Limit in Psychoanalysis. Analytic Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Objects of Hope brings ranging scholarship and refreshing candor to bear on the knotty issue of what can and cannot be achieved in the course of psychoanalytic therapy. It will be valued not only as an exemplary exercise in comparative psychoanaly
Cousins, Norman (1974). The Celebration of Life: A Dialogue on Hope, Spirit, and the Immortality of the Soul. Bantam Books.   (Google)
Dauenhauer, Bernard P. (1986). The Politics of Hope. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Day, J. P. (1998). More about hope and fear. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1).   (Google)
Day, J. P. (1970). The anatomy of hope and fear. Mind 79 (315):369-384.   (Google | More links)
Dembski, William (ms). What can we reasonably hope for?   (Google)
Abstract: In a memorable scene from the movie The Graduate , Dustin Hoffman’s parents throw him a party to celebrate his graduation from college. The parents’ friends are all there congratulating him and offering advice. What should Hoffman do with his life? One particularly solicitous guest is eager to set him straight. He takes Hoffman aside and utters a single word-- plastics!
Dooley, Mark (2001). The civic religion of social hope: A reply to Simon Critchley. Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This article attempts to respond to Simon Critchley's claim in a recent debate with Richard Rorty, that the latter, by not fully recognizing its indebtedness to Levinas, misunderstands the political import of the work of Jacques Derrida. I maintain, pace Critchley, that trying to push the Derrida-Levinas connection too far will not only further compound Rorty's view of Derrida as a thinker devoid of political efficacy, but that it will moreover serve to obscure the significant differences which exist between Levinas and Derrida - differences which cannot be overlooked in any serious discussion of the two thinkers in question. In the second half, I try to convince Critchley that what separates Derrida from Levinas is precisely what hooks him up with Rorty at a political level. Both, I argue, are committed to a civic religion of social hope. In so doing, I try to convince Rorty that his caricature of Derrida as a private writer without political consequence, ought now to be seriously reconsidered. Key Words: community • Critchley • democracy • Derrida • ethics • justice • law • Levinas • politics • religion • Rorty • sentiment • singularity • social hope
Downie, R. S. (1963). Hope. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (2):248-251.   (Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2009). Comments on Jonathan Lear's radical hope (harvard: 2006). Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Duncan, Stewart (ms). Hope, fantasy, and commitment1 Adrienne M. Martin adrm@sas.upenn.Edu.   (Google)
Abstract: The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for S is no more and no less than to desire S while believing S is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature or function of hope: that hope helps one resist the temptation to despair;2 that hope engages the sophisticated capacities of human agency, such as planning;3 or that hope involves the imagination in ways desire need not.4 Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope, and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting
Feldman, Fred (2002). The good life: A defense of attitudinal hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The students and colleagues of Roderick Chisholm admired and respected Chisholm. Many were filled not only with admiration, but with affection and gratitude for Chisholm throughout the time we knew him. Even now that he is dead, we continue to wish him well. Under the circumstances, many of us probably think that that wish amounts to no more than this: we hope that things went well for him when he lived; we hope that he had a good life
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1968). Dialectical theology and hope, I. Heythrop Journal 9 (2):143–163.   (Google | More links)
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1968). Dialectical theology and hope, II. Heythrop Journal 9 (4):384–399.   (Google | More links)
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1969). Dialectical theology and hope, III. Heythrop Journal 10 (1):26–42.   (Google | More links)
Fromm, Erich (1968). The Revolution of Hope. New York, Harper & Row.   (Google)
Gedney, Mark D. (2006). The hope of remembering. Research in Phenomenology 36 (1):317-327.   (Google)
Gelven, Michael (2001). Judging Hope: A Reach to the True and the False. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Geoghegan, Vincent (2008). Pandora's box: Reflections on a myth. Critical Horizons 9 (1):24-41.   (Google)
Abstract: The article seeks to consider the relationship between hope and utopianism by looking at the ancient Greek myth of Pandora's Box, with its enigmatic figure of hope. It begins by considering Hesiod's influential formulation of the myth, before examining a range of modern interpretations in which diverse conceptions of hope are to be found. Using the work of Spinoza, Hume and Day an alternative conception of hope is proposed that conjoins hope with fear. This is followed by an exploration of the utopian, using this time another figure associated with the myth, Prometheus. An attempt is then made to differentiate the frequently conflated concepts of hope and the utopian. Finally, in the spirit of recent post-secularism, the two concepts are brought to bear on the nature of religion
Geras, Norman (2008). Social hope and state lawlessness. Critical Horizons 9 (1):90-98.   (Google)
Abstract: Hope is a precious resource. But, deluded, not based on a sober appraisal of the relevant realities, hope can also be lethal. One kind of hope is utopian hope. It does not exhaust what social hope is, or should be, about. The hope of remedying the most terrible injustices makes an urgent call on our attention. The world has travelled some way from the time when tyrannical governments could act with impunity in dealing with those under their jurisdiction. But it has not travelled far enough. There remain a number of deficits in the system of international law: "thresholds of inhumanity"
Giacalone, Robert A.; Paul, Karen & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2005). A preliminary investigation into the role of positive psychology in consumer sensitivity to corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Research on positive psychology demonstrates that specific individual dispositions are associated with more desirable outcomes. The relationship of positive psychological constructs, however, has not been applied to the areas of business ethics and social responsibility. Using four constructs in two independent studies (hope and gratitude in Study 1, spirituality and generativity in Study 2), the relationship of these constructs to sensitivity to corporate social performance (CSCSP) were assessed. Results indicate that all four constructs significantly predicted CSCSP, though only hope and gratitude interacted to impact CSCSP. Discussion focuses upon these findings, limitations of the study, and future avenues for research
Godfrey, Joseph J. (1987). A Philosophy of Human Hope. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Gravlee, G. Scott (2000). Aristotle on hope. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4).   (Google)
Grady, J. E. (1970). Marcel: Hope and ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1).   (Google)
Halpin, David (2003). Hope and Education: The Role of the Utopian Imagination. Routledgefalmer.   (Google)
Abstract: In this uplifting book, David Halpin suggests ways of putting the hope back into education, exploring the value of and need for utopian thinking in discussions of the purpose of education and school policy
Huskey, Rebecca Kathleen (2010). Paul Ricoeur on Hope: Expecting the Good. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Defining hope for Ricoeur -- Hope as a capacity of expectation for the powers of thinking, doing, and feeling : fallible man -- The contribution of time and narrative to hope -- Hope is active, working towards a future good for self and others -- Oneself as another and conditions for the possibility of hope -- Ricoeur's symbolism of evil as an outline for the symbolism of good and the conditions for the possibility of hope -- Religion, atheism, hope -- The worlds of Ricoeur's texts.
Insole, Christopher (2008). The irreducible importance of religious hope in Kant's conception of the highest good. Philosophy 83 (3):333-351.   (Google)
Kabumba, Ijuka (2001). On Hope, and Other Essays. Nyonyi Pub. Co. Ltd..   (Google)
Kemp-Pritchard, Ilona (1981). Peirce on philosophical hope and logical sentiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (1):75-90.   (Google | More links)
Kleingeld, Pauline (1995). What Do the Virtuous Hope For?: Re-reading Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good. In Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995. Marquette University Press.   (Google)
Küng, Hans (2009). Afterword: A vision of hope : Religious peace and a global ethic. In Hans Küng (ed.), How to Do Good & Avoid Evil: A Global Ethic From the Sources of Judaism. Skylight Paths Pub..   (Google)
Koopman, Colin (2006). Pragmatism as a philosophy of hope: Emerson, James, Dewey, Rorty. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (2).   (Google)
Koopman, Colin (2009). Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: What pragmatism does -- Transitionalism, meliorism, and cultural criticism -- Transitionalism in the pragmatist tradition -- Three waves of pragmatism -- Knowledge as transitioning -- Ethics as perfecting -- Politics as progressing -- Critical inquiry as genealogical pragmatism.
Lalami, Laila (2005). Hope & Other Dangerous Pursuits; Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill.   (Google)
Langford, Thomas A. (1968). Intellect and Hope. Durham, N.C.,Published for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics by the Duke University Press.   (Google)
Lash, Nicholas (1981). A Matter of Hope: A Theologian's Reflections on the Thought of Karl Marx. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Lear, Jonathan (2006). Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: After this, nothing happened -- Ethics at the horizon -- Critique of abysmal reasoning.
Levitas, Ruth (2004). Hope and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 38 (2):269–273.   (Google | More links)
Liebman, Joshua Loth (1966). Hope for Man. New York, Simon and Schuster.   (Google)
Lynch, William F. (1974). Images of Hope. Notre Dame [Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Lynch, William F. (1965). Images of Hope. Baltimore, Helicon.   (Google)
Magee, Bryan (2002). What I believe. Philosophy 77 (3):407-419.   (Google)
Abstract: The ultimate survival or annihilation of each one of us is in question. Will my death be the end of me completely, or shall I survive it in some way? No one knows the answers to these questions, and many philosophers since Kant have contended that the answers are inherently unknowable. If this is so, the supreme challenge that faces us is to live in a way that permanently acknowledges and confronts this ignorance, not seeking to finesse it by pretending to ourselves that we really do know, or by embracing a faith, or by evading thinking about it. This, easy to say, is very hard to do
Marett, R. R. (1932). Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion. New York,B. Blom.   (Google)
Abstract: All rights reserved no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to...
Martin, Adrienne M., Hopes and dreams.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a commonplace in both the popular imagination and the philosophical literature that hope has a special kind of motivational force. This commonplace underwrites the conviction that hope alone is capable of bolstering us in despairinducing circumstances, as well as the strategy of appealing to hope in the political realm. In section 1, I argue that, to the contrary, hope’s motivational essence is not special or unique—it is simply that of an endorsed desire. The commonplace is not entirely mistaken, however, because standard ways of expressing hope do have motivational influence that is different in kind from that of desire. In sections 2 through 4, I examine one of these ways of expressing hope, fantasizing, and argue that fantasies can present us with reasons to modify our goals and projects in multiple ways
Martin, Adrienne (2008). Hope and exploitation. Hastings Center Report 38 (5):49--55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we encourage patients to be hopeful without exploiting their hope? A medical researcher or a pharmaceutical company can take unfair advantage of someone's hope by much subtler means than simply giving misinformation. Hope shapes deliberation, and therefore can make deliberation better or worse, by the deliberator's own standards of deliberation
Martin, Adrienne, Hope, fantasy, and commitment1 Adrienne M. Martin adrm@sas.upenn.Edu.   (Google)
Abstract: The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for S is no more and no less than to desire S while believing S is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature or function of hope: that hope helps one resist the temptation to despair;2 that hope engages the sophisticated capacities of human agency, such as planning;3 or that hope involves the imagination in ways desire need not.4 Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope, and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting
Martin, Adrienne (ms). Hope must be a minefield.   (Google)
Abstract: Hesiod wrote of Pandora: Ere this the tribes of men lived on earth remote and free from ills and hard toil and heavy sickness. But the woman took off the great lid of the cask with her hands and scattered all these and her thought caused sorrow and mischief to men. Only Hope remained there in an unbreakable home under the lid of the great cask, and did not fly out; for ere that, the lid of the cask stopped her. But the rest, countless plagues, wander amongst men; for earth is full of evils and the sea is full. Of themselves diseases come upon men continually by day and by night, bringing mischief to mortals silently. (Works and Days) Hope enters the scene in company of disease, and it is unclear from Hesiod’s account whether hope is just one of many evils, or something added in a moment of mercy to help us endure “ills and hard toil and heavy labor.” I offer an account of hope grounded in an examination of how it functions in the medical care and research settings. I argue that hope is a stance taken toward our desires and aims in light of uncertainty and limited control. As such, it is deeply connected to well-functioning human agency and a key factor in our ability to endure hardship and to work our way in a world we have limited ability to shape. Yet I also argue that hope is not without hazard. Hope makes us vulnerable to harms from within in the form of attentional deficits and from without in the form of exploitation by those perceived to control the object of hope. In short, hope is a good, but a good with dangers. I conclude by addressing how medical professionals can take both of these aspects into account when responding to hopeful patients and research subjects
Marcel, Gabriel (2009). Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Martin, Wayne (2009). Ought but cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):103-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I assess a series of arguments intended to show that 'ought' implies 'can'. Two are rooted in uses of 'ought' in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources of deontic logic. I show that, in each case, the arguments leave scope for forms of infinite moral consciousness—forms of moral consciousness in which a moral obligation retains its authority even in the face of the conviction that the obligation is impossible to fulfil. In this respect the paper sides with Martin Luther against Erasmus and Kant
Martin, Adrienne, The intricacies of hope.   (Google)
Abstract: Many people believe hope’s most important function is to bolster us in despairinducing circumstances. A related but less dramatic view is that instilling or reinforcing hope for a state of affairs is a good way to get people to act to promote that state of affairs. I propose that we conceive of hope as, most paradigmatically, the expression of desire in imagination. I then trace through the implications of this conception for, first, how hope influences motivation and, second, what forms of hope are rational
Mason, Gail (2006). Fear and hope: Author’s response. Hypatia 21 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: : This response seeks to pick up on the key questions and concerns raised by Nancy C. M. Hartsock and Karen Houle in their critiques of The Spectacle of Violence. I mold my response around two emotions that are never far from the question of violence: fear and hope. Is it fear of ambiguity that stops us from delicately blending the experiential with the discursive, the nodal with the circular, the corporeal with the epistemic, or the oppressive with the constitutive? If so, we can only hope that the power of such ambivalence lies in its ability to unsettle these treasured lines of force
McGeer, Victoria (2008). Trust, hope and empowerment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):237 – 254.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and social scientists have focussed a great deal of attention on our human capacity to trust, but relatively little on the capacity to hope. This is a significant oversight, as hope and trust are importantly interconnected. This paper argues that, even though trust can and does feed our hopes, it is our empowering capacity to hope that significantly underwrites—and makes rational—our capacity to trust
Meisenhelder, Thomas (1982). Hope: A phenomenological prelude to critical social theory. Human Studies 5 (1).   (Google)
Meirav, Ariel (2009).