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5.1l.1. Moral Emotion (Moral Emotion on PhilPapers)

Anderson, Elizabeth (2008). Emotions in Kant's later moral philosophy : Honour and the phenomenology of moral value. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.   (Google)
Antonaccio, Maria (2001). Picturing the soul: Moral psychology and the recovery of the emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch''s moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of emotions in ethics. In particular, it acknowledges the centrality of moral psychology to ethics and reclaims the notion of consciousness rather than the will as the primary mode of human moral being. At a second, more substantive level, the paper explores the relation between the emotions and consciousness. Specifically, it defends a cognitivist and reflexive theory of the emotions which affirms a strong relation between the emotions and our evaluative beliefs. On this view, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective value. In order to earn their cognitive status, however, the emotions must be tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up images of reality to serve its own purposes. Therefore, a theory of the Good must be part of the critical content of a reflexive theory of the emotions
Armstrong, David (2008). Be angry and sin not" : Philodemus versus the stoics on natural bites and natural emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Aureli, Filippo & Schaffner, Colleen M. (2001). Empathy as a special case of emotional mediation of social behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):23-24.   (Google)
Abstract: Empathy can be viewed as an intervening variable to explain complex webs of causation between multiple factors and the resulting responses. The mediating role of emotion, implicit in the concept of an intervening variable, can be at the basis of the flexibility of empathic responses. Knowledge of the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms is needed for empathy to be considered as a biologically functional intervening variable
Bell, Macalester (2005). A woman's scorn: Toward a feminist defense of contempt as a moral emotion. Hypatia 20 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. I argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male-dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. I begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the nature and moral significance of contempt, and argue that contempt can be morally and politically valuable for the same reasons that feminists have defended other negative emotions. I close by considering why feminists have been hesitant to defend contempt as a morally and politically important emotion
Ben-ze'ev, A. (1992). Emotional and moral evaluations. Metaphilosophy 23 (3):214-29.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1997). Emotions and morality. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (2).   (Google)
Berman, Douglas A. & Bibas, Stephanos (ms). Engaging capital emotions.   (Google)
Abstract:      The Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, is about to decide whether the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for child rape. Commentators are aghast, viewing this as a vengeful recrudescence of emotion clouding sober, rational criminal justice policy. To their minds, emotion is distracting. To ours, however, emotion is central to understand the death penalty. Descriptively, emotions help to explain many features of our death-penalty jurisprudence. Normatively, emotions are central to why we punish, and denying or squelching them risks prompting vigilantism and other unhealthy outlets for this normal human reaction. The emotional case for the death penalty for child rape may be even stronger than for adult murders, contrary to what newspaper editorials are suggesting. Finally, we suggest ways in which death-penalty abolitionists can stop pooh-poohing emotions' role and instead fight the death penalty on emotional terrain, particularly by harnessing the language of mercy and human fallibility
Berner, Knut (2001). Local anaesthesia, the increase of the evil through emotional impoverishment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Evil should be characterised as a specific constellation, which results from destructive connections between individual activities and systemic influences. The article shows some important aspects of the structure of evil and prefers the terms of wickedness and obscene coincidences to describe its own character. Therefore, also the division between rationality and affectivity appears as inadequate, because evil has on the one side an intrinsic attractiveness for individuals and is on the other side in modern societies more and more a product of a rationality, which is free from passion. Especially the emotional impoverishment is responsible for the increase of evil, which is demonstrated by two examples. Based on Paul Ricoeur, the evolution of malum can be developed by a short analyse of the relationship between Ethics and Emotions
Bett, Richard (2008). The stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):504–506.   (Google | More links)
Birkhead, Douglas (1997). Book review: The role of emotions in moral decisions: A book review by Douglas birkhead. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 12 (1):57 – 59.   (Google)
Blasi, Augusto (1999). Emotions and moral motivation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):1–19.   (Google | More links)
Bolender, John (2003). The genealogy of the moral modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources
Brady, Michael S. (2010). Virtue, emotion, and attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity
Brennan, Tad (2005). The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Tad Brennan explains how to live the Stoic life--and why we might want to. Stoicism has been one of the main currents of thought in Western civilization for two thousand years: Brennan offers a fascinating guide through the ethical ideas of the original Stoic philosophers, and shows how valuable these ideas remain today, both intellectually and in practice. He writes in a lively informal style which will bring Stoicism to life for readers who are new to ancient philosophy. The Stoic Life will also be of great interest to philosophers and classicists seeking a full understanding of the intellectual legacy of the Stoics
Bryant, Garry (1987). Ten-fifty P. I.: Emotion and the photographer's role. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 2 (2):32 – 39.   (Google)
Burrow, Sylvia (2009). Bodily limits to autonomy : Emotion, attitude, and self-defense. In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Butler, Brian E. (2002). The Necessity of Understanding Thumos, and the Misuse of Emotion in Modern Political Theory, The Review of Communication, Vol. The Review of Communication 2 (2).   (Google)
Carr, David (2002). Feelings in moral conflict and the hazards of emotional intelligence. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension
Cartwright, David (1987). Kant's view of the moral significance of kindhearted emotions and the moral insignificance of Kant's view. Journal of Value Inquiry 21 (4).   (Google)
Carr, David (2009). Virtue, mixed emotions and moral ambivalence. Philosophy 84 (1):31-46.   (Google)
Cassin, Chrystine E. (1968). Emotions and evaluations. Personalist 49:563-571.   (Google)
Charlton, William (2008). Emotional life in three dimensions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):291-300.   (Google)
Abstract: abstract  I first summarise Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion and place it against its historical background. Borrowing distinctions from Plato I then argue that the emotions discussed in Hiding From Humanity affect us primarily as social beings, not as individuals, and suggest modifying and educating them by social means
Clavien, Christine & Klein, Rebekka, Eager for fairness or for revenge? Altruism and emotion in neuroeconomics.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to understand the human capacity for altruism one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the relevance that recent findings in neu-roeconomics may have for the philosophical controversy between altruism and egoism, with par-ticular emphasis on the importance of emotion in understanding altruistic motivation. After briefly contextualising and sketching the philosophical controversy, we survey the results of three interesting studies that provide stimulating clues for the debate. We focus our attention particu-larly on the 2004 study in neuroeconomics by Dominique de Quervain, Urs Fischbacher and col-leagues, which contains an argument in favour of psychological egoism. On the basis of an emo-tional account of decision-making, we show that their analysis of the results – people seek fair-ness – may be questioned; we propose an alternative interpretation of the data – people seek re-venge. Unfortunately, our ‘emotion-directed’ interpretation renders this study far less relevant for the debate over the possibility of psychological altruism than previously expected
Coeckelbergh, Mark (forthcoming). Moral appearances: Emotions, robots, and human morality. Ethics and Information Technology.   (Google)
Abstract: Can we build ‘moral robots’? If morality depends on emotions, the answer seems negative. Current robots do not meet standard necessary conditions for having emotions: they lack consciousness, mental states, and feelings. Moreover, it is not even clear how we might ever establish whether robots satisfy these conditions. Thus, at most, robots could be programmed to follow rules, but it would seem that such ‘psychopathic’ robots would be dangerous since they would lack full moral agency. However, I will argue that in the future we might nevertheless be able to build quasi-moral robots that can learn to create the appearance of emotions and the appearance of being fully moral. I will also argue that this way of drawing robots into our social-moral world is less problematic than it might first seem, since human morality also relies on such appearances
Colombetti, Giovanna & Torrance, Steve (2009). Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):505-526.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007 ) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself
Connelly, Shane; Helton-Fauth, Whitney & Mumford, Michael D. (2004). A managerial in-basket study of the impact of trait emotions on ethical choice. Journal of Business Ethics 51 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship of various trait emotions to the ethical choices of 189 college students who completed a managerial decision-making task as part of an in-basket exercise in a laboratory setting. Prior research regarding emotion influences on ethical decision-making and linkages between emotions and cognition informed hypotheses about how different types of emotions impact ethical choices. Findings supported our expectations that positive and negative emotions classified as active would be more strongly related to interpersonally-directed ethical choices than to organizationally-directed ones, and that passive emotions would be less related to ethical choices than active emotions. Implications for ethical decision-making research and organizational practices are discussed
Cooper, John (ms). The emotional life of the wise by John M. Cooper.   (Google)
Abstract: The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature itself demands and indeed justifies—under certain circumstances at any rate—emotional attachments to or aversions from, and reactions to, some persons, things, and happenings, they introduced a theory of what came to be called eÈpãyeiai, good and acceptable ways of feeling or being affected. For short I will render these in English by “good feelings.”1 They divided these into three generic kinds, which they dubbed “joy” (xarã), “wish” (boÊlhsiw) and “caution” (eÈlãbeia). They ranged these alongside, and set them in sharp contrast to, three of the four highest genera into which they divided the normal human emotions: “pleasure” (≤donÆ), i.e., being pleased about something,2 “appetitive desire” (§piyuµ€a), and “fear” (fÒbow), respectively. The Stoics maintained that, though ordinary, familiar human emotions such as these last-named ones were always bad, the three sorts of “good feeling,” and their more specific variations (since these three are only the basic genera into which lots of other good ways of feeling will fall), were not merely free from the grounds of criticism on which ordinary emotions were rejected, and so were perfectly acceptable. The fully perfected human being (the “wise person”) would indeed regularly be subject to them
Coplan, Amy (2010). Feeling without thinking: Lessons from the ancients on emotion and virtue-acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue
D'arms, Justin (2004). Bennett Helm, emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001), pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.   (Google)
D'Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (1994). Expressivism, morality, and the emotions. Ethics 104 (4):739-763.   (Google | More links)
D'Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (2000). The moralistic fallacy: On the "appropriateness" of emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.   (Google | More links)
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (forthcoming). Is Shame a Social Emotion? In Anita Konzelman-Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans-Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Self Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several ways in which the social claim with regard to shame has been cashed out in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these claims are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion that shame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each claim in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory of shame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture of shame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of being apt to shed light on those cases where others seem to play no role in why we feel shame.
Teroni, Fabrice & Deonna, Julien A. (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.
Deshpande, Satish P. & Joseph, Jacob (2009). Impact of emotional intelligence, ethical climate, and behavior of Peers on ethical behavior of nurses. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This study examines factors impacting ethical behavior of 103 hospital nurses. The level of emotional intelligence and ethical behavior of peers had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Independence climate had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Other ethical climate types such as professional, caring, rules, instrumental, and efficiency did not impact ethical behavior of respondents. Implications of this study for researchers and practitioners are discussed
Dillon, Robin S. (1997). Self-respect: Moral, emotional, political. Ethics 107 (2):226-249.   (Google | More links)
Diorio, Joseph A. (1984). Do altruistic emotions have intrinsic value? Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1).   (Google)
Dunbar, W. Scott (2005). Emotional engagement in professional ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Recent results from two different studies show evidence of strong emotional engagement in moral dilemmas that require personal involvement or ethical problems that involve significant inter-personal issues. This empirical evidence for a connection between emotional engagement and moral or ethical choices is interesting because it is related to a fundamental survival mechanism rooted in human evolution. The results lead one to question when and how emotional engagement might occur in a professional ethical situation. However, the studies employed static dilemmas or problems that offered only two choices whose outcome was certain or nearly so, whereas actual problems in professional ethics are dynamic and typically involve considerable uncertainty. The circumstances of three example cases suggest that increasing personal involvement and uncertainty could have been perceived as changes, threats, or opportunities and could therefore have elicited an emotional response as a way to ensure the reputation, integrity or success of oneself or a group to which one belongs. Such emotional engagement is only suggested and more studies and experiments are required to better characterize the role of emotional engagement in professional ethics
Dunlop, Francis (1984). The education of the emotions. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):245–255.   (Google | More links)
Dyck, Arthur J. & Padilla, Carlos (2009). The empathic emotions and self-love in Bishop Joseph Butler and the neurosciences. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (4):577-612.   (Google)
Abstract: In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit—that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling."
Fernandez-Berrocal, Pablo & Extremera, Natalio (2005). About emotional intelligence and moral decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
Fine, Cordelia (2006). Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the 'automatization' of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning than the SIM allows
Fjelstad, Per, Restraint and emotion in cicero's.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2008). Aristotle and theophrastus on the emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Fortenbaugh, William W. (2002). Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics. Duckworth.   (Google)
Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Barry, Bruce & Long, D. Adam (2009). Lying and smiling: Informational and emotional deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4).   (Google)
Furtak, Rick Anthony (2003). Thoreau's emotional stoicism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (2).   (Google)
Gaudine, Alice & Thorne, Linda (2001). Emotion and ethical decision-making in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 31 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: While the influence of emotion on individuals'' ethical decisions has been identified by numerous researchers, little is known about how emotions influence individuals'' ethical decision process. Thus, it is not clear whether different emotions promote and/or discourage ethical decision-making in the workplace. To address this gap, this paper develops a model that illustrates how emotion affects the components of individuals'' ethical decision-making process. The model is developed by integrating research findings that consider the two dimensions of emotion, arousal and feeling state, into an applied cognitive-developmental perspective on the process of ethical decision-making. The model demonstrates that certain emotional states influence the individual''s propensity to identify ethical dilemmas, facilitate the formation of the individual''s prescriptive judgments at sophisticated levels of moral development, lead to ethical decision choices that are consistent with the individual''s prescriptive judgements, and promote the individual''s compliance with his or her ethical decision choices. In particular, the model suggests that individuals experiencing arousal and positive affect resolve ethical dilemmas in a manner consistent with more sophisticated cognitive moral structures. Implications for theory and practice are discussed
Gert, Joshua (2009). Colour, emotion and objectivity. Analysis 69 (4).   (Google)
Gintis, Herbert (2002). Altruism and emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):258-259.   (Google)
Abstract: If altruism requires self-control, people must consider altruistic acts as costly, the benefits of which will only be recouped in the future. By contrast, I shall present evidence that altruism is dictated by emotions: Altruists secure an immediate payoff from performing altruistic acts, so no element of self-control is present, and no future reward is required or expected
Goldie, Peter (2008). Thick concepts and emotion. In Daniel Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams. Routledge.   (Google)
Guyer, Paul (2008). Humean critics, imaginative fluency, and emotional responsiveness: A follow-up to Stephanie Ross. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: , Stephanie Ross argues that four of Hume's five criteria for qualified critics in "Of the Standard of Taste’, namely practise, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense, should be understood as conditions for improving the basic constituent of taste, namely delicacy of perception, in real critics whose judgments can be canonical or guiding for the rest of us, but that delicacy of perception needs to be supplemented by what she calls imaginative fluency and emotional responsiveness to provide a fuller conception of the basic constituents of taste. I support Ross's approach by showing that Hume's immediate successors in Scottish aesthetics Alexander Gerard and James Beattie understood his conception of the qualifications of good critics and supplemented his conception of the basic constituents of taste in precisely the same way that Ross does. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
Haidt, Jonathan, The emotional dog gets mistaken for a possum.   (Google)
Abstract: Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) critique the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), but the model that they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the “possum” model. They make three charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After I defend the honor of the social intuitionist model, I raise two areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning, and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. I present three clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity
Hartz, Glenn A. (1990). Desire and emotion in the virtue tradition. Philosophia 20 (1-2).   (Google)
Hauser, Marc; Young, Liane & Tranel, Daniel, Does emotion mediate the effect of an action's moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence.   (Google)
Abstract: Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution of intent to the actor, or the judgment that the actor acted intentionally. We test this hypothesis by presenting cases of morally bad and morally good action to seven individuals with deficits in emotional processing resulting from damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). If normal emotional processing is necessary for the observed asymmetry, then individuals with VMPC lesions should show no asymmetry. Our results provide no support for this hypothesis: like normal individuals, those with VMPC lesions showed the same asymmetry, tending to judge that an action was intentional when it was morally bad but not when it was morally good. Based on this finding, we suggest that normal emotional processing is not responsible for the observed asymmetry of intentional attributions and thus does not mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotions and practical reason: Rethinking evaluation and motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will
Helm, Bennett W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Helm, Bennett (2000). Emotional reason how to deliberate about value. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):1-22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Deliberation about personal, non-moral values involves elements of both invention and discovery. Thus, we invent our values by freely choosing them, where such distinctively human freedom is essential to our defining and taking responsibility for the kinds of persons we are; nonetheless, we also discover our values insofar as we can deliberate about them rationally and arrive at non-arbitrary decisions about what has value in our lives. Yet these notions of invention and discovery seem inconsistent with each other, and the possibility of deliberation about value therefore seems paradoxical. My aim is to argue that this apparent paradox is no paradox at all. I offer an account of what it is to value something largely in terms of emotions and desires. By examining the rational interconnections among emotions and evaluative judgments, I argue for an account both of how judgments can shape our emotions, thereby shaping our values in a way that makes intelligible the possibility of inventing our values, and of how our emotions can simultaneously rationally constrain correct deliberation, thereby making intelligible the possibility of discovering our values. The result is a rejection of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of value and deliberation about value
Helm, Bennett W. (1994). The Significance of Emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):319-331.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Henik, Erika (2008). Mad as hell or scared stiff? The effects of value conflict and emotions on potential whistle-blowers. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Existing whistle-blowing models rely on “cold” economic calculations and cost-benefit analyses to explain the judgments and actions of potential whistle-blowers. I argue that “hot” cognitions – value conflict and emotions – should be added to these models. I propose a model of the whistle-blowing decision process that highlights the reciprocal influence of “hot” and “cold” cognitions and advocate research that explores how value conflict and emotions inform reporting decisions. I draw on the cognitive appraisal approach to emotions and on the social-functional value pluralism model to generate propositions
Hobson, R. Peter (1993). The emotional origins of social understanding. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):227 – 249.   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co-ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of 'persons' who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism
Hookway, Christopher (2003). Affective states and epistemic immediacy. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):78-96.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks in ethics and epistemology, this expectation is not fulfilled. Of course, the vocabularies of evaluation are different: in ethics, we are concerned with issues of right and wrong, virtue and vice, moral obligation, and so on; and in epistemology, it is most commonly assumed that we are interested in whether states count as knowledge or as justified beliefs, with whether beliefs and strategies of belief formation are rational
Hurley, Elisa A. (2005). Apt affect: Moral concept mastery and the phenomenology of emotions. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002). Review: Emotional reason: Deliberation, motivation and the nature of value. Mind 111 (442).   (Google)
Hutchinson, Phil (2008). Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Experimental methods and conceptual confusion : philosophy, science, and what emotions really are -- To 'make our voices resonate' or 'to be silent'? : shame as fundamental ontology -- Emotion, cognition, and world -- Shame and world.
Ihara, Craig K. (1991). David Wong on emotions in mencius. Philosophy East and West 41 (1):45-53.   (Google | More links)
Im, Manyul (1999). Emotional control and virtue in the "mencius". Philosophy East and West 49 (1):1-27.   (Google | More links)
Kabasenche, William P. (2007). Emotions, memory suppression, and identity. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):33 – 34.   (Google)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2008). Reasons of the heart: Emotion, rationality, and the "wisdom of repugnance". Hastings Center Report 38 (4):pp. 36-45.   (Google)
Abstract: Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment
Kieran, Matthew (1998). Valuing emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth hegeman. Cambridge university press, 1996, pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 hb, £15.95 pb. Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.   (Google)
Kirchengast, Tyrone, Sentencing law and the 'emotional catharsis' of victim's rights in nsw homicide cases.   (Google)
Abstract: The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal ('NSWCCA') continues to endorse the principle that victim impact statements drafted by family members of homicide victims, while being received into sentencing proceedings, cannot influence the sentences of offenders. Family perspectives on the impact of the death of the primary victim are restricted out of the need to assess harm in terms of the immediate circumstances of the offence, maintaining respect for the equality of human life. Despite this limiting principle, the NSWCCA acknowledges that impact statements continue to be important, providing, as indicated by Sully J in R v FD; R v FD; R v JD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392 ('R v FD; R v FD; R v JD'), an 'emotional catharsis' for victims of crime. However, recent amendments to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) require that a court recognise the harm done to the victim and community. In the context of this amendment, the NSWCCA has suggested that the rule excluding family statements may now need to be revised to include the perspectives of family members as representing those of the community. This article explores this proposal in terms of the status of family statements in other jurisdictions where such statements are deemed relevant to sentence
Klein, Martha (2001). Valuing emotions. Michael Stocker Elizabeth hegeman. Mind 110 (439).   (Google)
Koons, Jeremy Randel (2001). Emotions and incommensurable moral concepts. Philosophy 76 (4):585-604.   (Google)
Abstract: Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2003). On the very idea of "negative emotions". Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.   (Google | More links)
Lacewing, Michael (2005). Emotional self-awareness and ethical deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lanteri, Alessandro; Chelini, Chiara & Rizzello, Salvatore (2008). An experimental investigation of emotions and reasoning in the trolley problem. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (‹lever’ and ‹stranger’) either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given
Maroney, Terry A., Emotional common sense as constitutional law.   (Google)
Abstract:      In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked post-abortion regret to justify a ban on a particular abortion procedure. The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident." That such observations could drive critical legal determinations was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously unidentified norm permeating constitutional jurisprudence: reliance on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about the emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal to its holder-but this appearance is misleading. This Article articulates and evaluates the Court's reliance on emotional common sense in constitutional law. It demonstrates that emotional common sense sometimes imports into law inaccurate accounts of the world. Justices of every ideological orientation invoke it in a manner that comports with their desired ends. Emotional common sense colors interpretation of evidence, manifests in selective perspective-taking, and shapes jurisprudential choices. Common-sense evaluation of the emotions also necessarily embodies underlying beliefs and values; enforcing them on others under the guise of simple truth silently forces a false consensus. Emotional common sense has a limited place in constitutional law. It may be cautiously embraced where an emotional phenomenon is relatively basic and universal. In all other cases the embrace should be withheld. Evaluating isolated instances in which the Court has looked beyond emotional common sense, the Article shows that a superior path exists
McCullagh, C. B. (1990). The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):44-58.   (Google | More links)
Morris, Michael K. (1992). Moral conflict and ordinary emotional experience. Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2).   (Google)
Parkinson, B. (2004). Unpicking reasonable emotions. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pelletier, Kathie L. & Bligh, Michelle C. (2008). The aftermath of organizational corruption: Employee attributions and emotional reactions. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (4).   (Google)
PhD, R. G. N. (2000). Emotion, moral perception, and nursing practice. Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):123–133.   (Google | More links)
Pizarro, David (2000). Nothing more than feelings? The role of emotions in moral judgment. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (4):355–375.   (Google | More links)
Pugmire, David (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? What distinguishes good feeling from (just) feeling good? Is there such a distinction at all? The answer to these questions becomes clearer if we realize that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It may be that good feeling depends on feeling truly if we are to be really moved, moved in the way that avoids the need for constant, fretful replenishment and reinforcement. To be sound, emotions may need to be capable of genuineness, depth, and other kinds of integrity. And that, in turn, may require certain virtues of mind, such as truthfulness, temperateness, and even courage, that are more familiar at the level of action. The governing aim of this book is to demonstrate that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions and the emotional life
Rietti, Sophie (2008). Emotional intelligence as educational goal: A case for caution. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):631-643.   (Google)
Abstract: Originally conceptualised as a set of capacities for understanding and managing emotions, emotional intelligence (EI) has become associated, mainly due to the work of Daniel Goleman, with life success skills, prosocial attitudes and moral and civic virtues. But EI, which may not in itself be teachable, need not lead to these outcomes, which may not necessarily converge. Also, what counts as life success, prosocial attitudes and moral and civic virtues can only be determined, if at all, by facing the value questions involved as value questions, not by conflating them with applied science
Roberts, Robert C. (1989). Aristotle on virtues and emotions. Philosophical Studies 56 (3).   (Google)
Roberts, Robert Campbell (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology
Schaller, Jean-Pierre (1968). Our Emotions and the Moral Act. Staten Island, N.Y.,Alba House.   (Google)
Sigler, M. (2000). The story of justice:Retribution, mercy, and the role of emotions in the capital sentencing process. Law and Philosophy 19 (3):339-367.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay examines Martha Nussbaum's prescription for tempering retribution with mercy in the capital sentencing process. Nussbaum observes that the operation of retribution in the ancient world resulted in harsh and indiscriminate punishment without regard to the particularities of the offender and his crime. In the interest of mercy, Nussbaum advocates the use of the novel as a model for a more compassionate sentencing process. An examination of Nussbaum's ``novel prescription'' reveals that the retribution that operates in the modern criminal law, and in the Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, already accommodates the values of justice –individuation, particularization, and proportionality – that are characteristic of the mercy tradition. Moreover, the rich narrative approach that Nussbaum favors is by no means congenial to merciful punishment. Because the particularistic detail of the novel form is not confined to the sympathetic portrayal of the defendant, the emotionalism that Nussbaum urges encompasses as well emotional details about the characteristics of the defendant's victim. Such victim impact evidence is consistent with the novel form, but is unlikely to promote merciful judgment. Instead, the details of victim impact evidence can be expected to exacerbate a sentencing authority's inclination to judge a capital defendant harshly. The novel thus provides a poor model for the capital sentencing process because it fosters the sort of unchecked emotionalism that undermines the rational decision making that the Supreme Court has sought to achieve

5.1l.1.1 Responsibility and Emotion

Blair, R. J. R. (2007). What emotional responding is to blame it might not be to responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.   (Google)
Teroni, Fabrice & Bruun, Otto (forthcoming). Shame, Guilt and Morality. The Journal Of Moral Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame, and the Social Argument to shame’s link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt has obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives.
Gardner, John (2009). The logic of excuses and the rationality of emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability of such excuses depends on what wrong one is trying to excuse. No excuse is available in respect of all wrongs. Some wrongs, indeed, are inexcusable. This throws up the interesting question of what makes a particular emotion apt to excuse a particular wrong. Why is fear, for example, more apt to excuse more serious wrongs than, say, pride or shame? This question leads naturally to another. Why are some emotions, such as lust, greed, and envy, apparently not apt to furnish any excuses at all? Can one not be overcome by them? Can they not drive one to wrongdoing as readily as fear and grief? Or is that not the point?
Roberts, Robert C. (1984). Solomon on the control of emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Schoeman, Ferdinand David (ed.) (1987). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are: what scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his character given genetic and environmental factors; does an account of responsiblity provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions; are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurrences over which we have no control; does responsibility for the consequences of our acts require that they were intended or simply expected; and how have a number of influential previous philosophers, including Aristotle, Maimonides, and Spinoza, approached these questions?
Schlossberger, Eugene (1986). Why we are responsible for our emotions. Mind 95 (377):37-56.   (Google | More links)
Scrutton, Anastasia (2009). Living like common people: Emotion, will, and divine passibility. Religious Studies 45 (4):373-393.   (Google)

5.1l.1.2 Moral Emotion, Misc

Ansell, Nicola & Van Blerk, Lorraine (2005). Joining the conspiracy? Negotiating ethics and emotions in researching (around) AIDS in southern Africa. Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (1):61 – 82.   (Google)
Abstract: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an emotive subject, particularly in southern Africa. Among those who have been directly affected by the disease, or who perceive themselves to be personally at risk, talking about AIDS inevitably arouses strong emotions - amongst them fear, distress, loss and anger. Conventionally, human geography research has avoided engagement with such emotions. Although the ideal of the detached observer has been roundly critiqued, the emphasis in methodological literature on 'doing no harm' has led even qualitative researchers to avoid difficult emotional encounters. Nonetheless, research is inevitably shaped by emotions, not least those of the researchers themselves. In this paper, we examine the role of emotions in the research process through our experiences of researching the lives of young AIDS migrants in Malawi and Lesotho. We explore how the context of the research gave rise to the production of particular emotions, and how, in response, we shaped the research, presenting a research agenda focused more on migration than AIDS. This example reveals a tension between universalised ethics expressed through ethical research guidelines that demand informed consent, and ethics of care, sensitive to emotional context. It also demonstrates how dualistic distinctions between reason and emotion, justice and care, global and local are unhelpful in interpreting the ethics of research practice
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Ciocchetti, Christopher (2009). Emotions, retribution, and punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.   (Google)
Abstract: I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires
Cohen, Taya R. (2010). Moral emotions and unethical bargaining: The differential effects of empathy and perspective taking in deterring deceitful negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents’ networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness predicted disapproval of false promises and misrepresentation. Empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the analysis. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy
Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice (2008). Differentiating Shame from Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..   (Google)
Abstract: How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.
de Sousa, Ronald (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
Jacobson, Daniel (2008). Review of Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2005). Justice and desert-based emotions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53 – 68.   (Google)
Abstract: A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent
Nichols, Shaun, Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Prinz, Jesse, Is empathy necessary for morality?   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that empathy is a good thing, from a moral point of view. It is something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that’s true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is there little evidence for the claim that empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy might make us better people, but placing empathy at the center of our moral lives may be ill‐advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn’t centrally involve emotions. I think emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Prinz, 2007). It’s just that empathetic emotions are not ideally suited for these jobs. Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little more about the target of the attack. What is empathy? And what would it mean to say empathy is necessary for morality? With respect to the first question, much has been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathy as, “as an other‐oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person.” This is not the definition I will be using. Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic concern.” Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact, like a beautiful building that has into disrepair. Empathy, seems to connote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a find of feeling‐for an object and a feeling‐on‐behalf‐of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy, and I leave it as an open possibility that concern is highly important, if not necessary, for morality. Indeed, concern often seems to involve an element kind of moral anger, which I will argue is very important to morality. It is also important to distinguish empathy from sympathy. Suppose I feel outraged for someone who has been brainwashed into thinking she should follow a cult leader who is urging mass suicide. That would not necessarily qualify as empathy. As Darwall (1998: 261) points out, sympathy is a third‐person emotional response, whereas empathy involves putting oneself in another person’s shoes. But 1 Darwall’s definition is also somewhat problematic. He says, “Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings, whether one comes thereby to be concerned … or not.” This definition has two features, which I would like to avoid. First, the appeal to imagination seems overly intellectual. Imagination sounds like a kind of mental act that requires effort on the part of the imaginer. As Darwell recognizes, empathy in its simplest form empathy is just emotional contagion: catching the emotion that another person feels (Hatfield et al., 1994; Hoffman, 2000). It seems inflated to call contagion an imaginative act. Also, I want to resist Darwall’s application of “empathy” to cases where one has a feeling that someone should feel, but does not feel. The problem is that this tends to blur the distinction between empathy and sympathy. Suppose I encounter a member of a cult who is delighted by the cult leader’s nefarious plans. The cult member should by afraid, but is not. If I feel fear on the cult member’s behalf, that is not putting myself in the cult member’s shoes. As I will use the term, empathy requires a kind of emotional mimicry. I do not wish to imply that empathy is always an automatic process, in the way that emotional contagion is. Sometimes imagination is requires, and sometimes we experience emotions that we think someone would be experiencing, even if we have not seen direct evidence that the emotion is, in fact, being experienced. For example, one might feel empathetic hope for a marathon runner who is a few steps behind the runner is first place, or anxiety for the first place runner, and the second place runner catches up. We can experience these feelings even if the runners’ facial expressions reveal little more than muscular contortions associated with concentration and physical exertion. A situation can reveal a feeling. The core idea, as I will use the term, is that empathy is a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. And the “taking” here can be a matter of automatic contagion or the result of a complicated exercise of the imagination. I don’t think there is anything anachronistic about this notion of empathy. I think it has a long tradition in moral philosophy, even though the term “empathy” is only 100 years old. The British moralists, including David Hume and Adam Smith, used “sympathy” in way that is similar to the way I want to use “empathy.” Here is Smith (1759: II.i): “Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.” My question, in the pages that follow, is whether empathy so‐defined is necessary for morality. I should note again, in advance, that the empirical literature does not always distinguish between the constructs I have been discussing, but I do think that all the studies I discuss below can, by inference at least, shed some light on empathy as defined here. The suggestion that empathy is necessary for morality can be interpreted in at least three different ways. One might hold the view that empathy is necessary for making moral judgment. One might think empathy is necessary for moral development. And one might think empathy is necessary for motivating moral conduct. I think each of these conjectures is false. Empathy is not necessary for any of these things. We can have moral systems without empathy. Of course, it doesn’t follow directly that empathy should be eliminated from morality. One might think the modal question—Can there be morality without empathy?—and the related....
Pugmire, David (2002). Narcissism in emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion
Rodogno, Raffaele (2009). Shame, guilt, and punishment. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):429-464.   (Google)
Abstract: The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I␣contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state’s act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual
Ross, Steven L. (1984). Evaluating the emotions. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):309-326.   (Google | More links)
Salmela, Mikko (2005). What is emotional authenticity? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C. (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory
Solomon, Robert C. (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. Emotions have recently become a highly fashionable area of research in the sciences, with brain imaging uncovering valuable clues as to how we experience our feelings. But while Solomon provides a guide to this cutting-edge research, as well as to what others--philosophers and psychologists--have said on the subject, he also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. He shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense--rather, they are judgements we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion--they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well. Solomon highlights some of the dramatic ways that emotions fit into our ethics and our sense of the good life, how we can make our emotional lives more coherent with our values and be more "true to our feelings" and cultivate emotional integrity. The story of our lives is the story of our passions. We fall in love, we are gripped by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, we fear death and grieve for others, we humble ourselves in envy, jealousy, and resentment. In this remarkable book, Robert Solomon shares his fascination with the emotions and illuminates our passions in an exciting new way
Starkey, Charles (2008). Emotion and full understanding. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding
Tiwald, Justin (2010). Dai Zhen on Sympathetic Concern. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37 (1):76-89.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that Dai Zhen’s account of sympathetic concern is distinguished from other accounts of sympathy (and empathy) by several features, the most important of which are the following: First, he sees the awareness of our similarities to others as a necessary condition for sympathy but not a constituent of it. Second, the relevant similarities are those that our grounded in our common status as living creatures, and not in our common powers of autonomy or other traits that are often taken to be distinguishing features of persons. Finally, Dai thinks that when we properly sympathize with others, we value their well-being in a way that mimics the way we value our own. This last feature helps to explain two important claims about the place of sympathy in moral action: that it necessarily requires perspective-taking (at least with respect to most other human beings), and that it provides indirect motives to be virtuous, which even imperfect moral agents can draw upon. In the course of making my argument, I identify salient differences between Dai’s variant of sympathy and some of its closest relatives, including Aristotelian pity and Buddhist compassion.

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