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5.1l.1.1. Responsibility and Emotion (Responsibility and Emotion on PhilPapers)

Blair, R. J. R. (2007). What emotional responding is to blame it might not be to responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.   (Google)
Teroni, Fabrice & Bruun, Otto (forthcoming). Shame, Guilt and Morality. The Journal Of Moral Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame, and the Social Argument to shame’s link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt has obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives.
Gardner, John (2009). The logic of excuses and the rationality of emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability of such excuses depends on what wrong one is trying to excuse. No excuse is available in respect of all wrongs. Some wrongs, indeed, are inexcusable. This throws up the interesting question of what makes a particular emotion apt to excuse a particular wrong. Why is fear, for example, more apt to excuse more serious wrongs than, say, pride or shame? This question leads naturally to another. Why are some emotions, such as lust, greed, and envy, apparently not apt to furnish any excuses at all? Can one not be overcome by them? Can they not drive one to wrongdoing as readily as fear and grief? Or is that not the point?
Roberts, Robert C. (1984). Solomon on the control of emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Schoeman, Ferdinand David (ed.) (1987). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are: what scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his character given genetic and environmental factors; does an account of responsiblity provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions; are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurrences over which we have no control; does responsibility for the consequences of our acts require that they were intended or simply expected; and how have a number of influential previous philosophers, including Aristotle, Maimonides, and Spinoza, approached these questions?
Schlossberger, Eugene (1986). Why we are responsible for our emotions. Mind 95 (377):37-56.   (Google | More links)
Scrutton, Anastasia (2009). Living like common people: Emotion, will, and divine passibility. Religious Studies 45 (4):373-393.   (Google)