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5.1l.5. Moral Character (Moral Character on PhilPapers)

Badhwar, Neera Kapur (ed.) (1993). Friendship: A Philosophical Reader. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bailey, F. G. (1993). The Kingdom of Individuals: An Essay on Self-Respect and Social Obligation. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Balguy, John (1728). The Foundation of Moral Goodness. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Bauhn, Per (2003). The Value of Courage. Nordic Academic Press.   (Google)
Baxley, Anne Margaret (2005). The practical significance of taste in Kant's critique of judgment: Love of natural beauty as a mark of moral character. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):33–45.   (Google | More links)
Bell, Derrick A. (2002). Ethical Ambition: Living a Life of Meaning and Worth. Distributed by Holtzbrinck Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: From the New York Times bestselling author Derrick Bell, a profound meditation on achieving success with integrity. As one of the country's most influential law professors, Derrick Bell has spent a lifetime helping students struggling to maintain a sense of integrity in the face of an overwhelming pressure to succeed at any price. Frequently asked how he managed to be so extraordinarily successful while never giving up the fight for justice and equality, Bell decided to spend his seventieth year writing a book of insight and guidance. The result, Ethical Ambition , is a deeply affecting, uplifting, and brilliant series of meditations that not only challenges us to face some of the most difficult questions that life presents, but dares to offer some solutions. Using incidents from his own life, Bell also looks to literature, history, and other contemporary figures who have refused to compromise their beliefs. In chapters that explore passion, faith courage, inspiration, humility, and relationships, Ethical Ambition address the most fundamental issues of life
Blum, Lawrence A. (1980). Friendship, Altruism, and Morality. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Borgmann, Albert (2007). Science and virtue: An essay on the impact of the scientific mentality on moral character. Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):405-407.   (Google)
Bradley, Marshell Carl & Blosser, Philip (eds.) (1989). Of Friendship: Philosophic Selections on a Perennial Concern. Longwood Academic.   (Google)
Campbell, Archibald (1733). An Enquiry Into the Original of Moral Virtue. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is the third selection of major works on the Scottish Enlightenment and includes the same combination of hard-to-find and popular works as in the two previous collections. Contents: An Essay on the Natural Equality of Men [1793] William Lawrence Brown, New introduction by Dr. William Scott 308 pp An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue [1733] Archibald Campbell 586 pp The Philosophical Works [1765] William Dudgeon, New introduction by David Berman 300 pp Institutes of Moral Philosophy For the use of Students in the College of Edinburgh [1769] Adam Ferguson 340 pp A Comparative view of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World [1774] John Gregory 426 pp An Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq [1777] Samuel Jackson A Letter to Adam Smith, On the Life, Death and Philosophy of his friend David Hume Esq [1777] George Horne (Bishop of Norwich) 252 pp
Casey, John (1990). Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The study of the virtues has largely dropped out of modern philosophy, yet it was the predominant tradition in ethics fom the ancient Greeks until Kant. Traditionally the study of the virtues was also the study of what constituted a successful and happy life. Drawing on such diverse sources as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Shakespeare, Hume, Jane Austen, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre, Casey here argues that the classical virtues of courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and justice centrally define the good for humans, and that they are insufficiently acknowledged in modern moral philosophy. He suggests that values of success, worldliness, and pride are active parts of our moral thinking, and that the conflict between these and our equally important Christian inheritance leads to tensions and contradictions in our understanding of the moral life
Comte-Sponville, André (2002). A Short Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday Life. Heinemann.   (Google)
Comte-Sponville, André (2001). A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday Life. Metropolitan Books.   (Google)
Abstract: An utterly original exploration of the timeless human virtues and how they apply to the way we live now, from a bold and dynamic French writer. In this graceful, incisive book, writer-philosopher André Comte-Sponville reexamines the classic human virtues to help us under-stand "what we should do, who we should be, and how we should live." In the process, he gives us an entirely new perspective on the value, the relevance, and even the charm of the Western ethical tradition. Drawing on thinkers from Aristotle to Simone Weil, by way of Aquinas, Kant, Rilke, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Rawls, among others, Comte-Sponville elaborates on the qualities that constitute the essence and excellence of humankind. Starting with politeness -- almost a virtue -- and ing with love -- which transcs all morality -- A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues takes us on a tour of the eighteen essential virtues: fidelity, prudence, temperance, courage, justice, generosity, compassion, mercy, gratitude, humility, simplicity, tolerance, purity, gentleness, good faith, and even, surprisingly, humor.Sophisticated and lucid, full of wit and vivacity, this modestly titled yet immensely important work provides an indispensable guide to finding what is right and good in everyday life
Cottingham, John (1998). Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian, and Psychoanalytic Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Can philosophy enable us to lead better lives through a systematic understanding of our human nature? John Cottingham's thought-provoking study examines three major philosophical approaches to this problem. Starting with the attempts of Classical philosophers to cope with the recalcitrant forces of the passions, he moves on to examine the moral psychology of Descartes, and concludes by analyzing the insights of modern psychoanalytic theory into the human predicament. His study provides a fresh and challenging perspective on moral philosophy and psychology for students and specialists alike
Crisp, Roger (ed.) (1996). How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The last few years have seen a remarkable revival of interest in the virtues, which have regained their central role in moral philosophy. This thought-provoking new collection is a much-needed survey of virtue ethics and virtue theory. The specially commissioned articles by an international team of philosophers represent the state of the art in this subject and will set the agenda for future work in the area. The contributors--including Lawrence Blum, John Cottingham, Julia Driver, Rosalind Hursthouse, Terence Irwin, Susan Moller Okin, Onora O'Neill, Michael Slote, Michael Stocker, and David Wiggins--cover practical virtue ethics, ancient views of the virtues, impartiality and partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtue and the good life, the vices, emotions, politics, feminism, moral education, and community
Driver, Julia (2001). Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences
Durston, Diane (2006). Wabi Sabi: The Art of Everyday Life. Storey Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: With “slow living” as the newest incarnation of the simplicity movement, the search for fresh inspiration on ways to live a more authentic life is as pressing as ever. Turning to Eastern traditions, people are discovering the Japanese concept of wabi sabi. The perfect antidote to today’s frenzied, consumer-oriented culture, wabi sabi encourages slowing down, living modestly, and appreciating the natural and imperfect aspect of material culture. While defying definition, wabi sabi is best expressed in brief, evocative bites. In The Little Wabi Sabi Companion, Diane Durston, a noted writer on Japanese art and culture, presents a collection of reflections, along with classic poetry and verse from both Eastern and Western traditions, that capture the wabi sabi moment, and inspire readers to do the same. The subtle beauty of nature, the simplicity of a found object, the impermanence of an autumnal flower arrangement, the solitude of a single fisherman in his boat are all celebrated and reflected upon in this easily browseable book. The text is complemented by photography and calligraphy inspired by the wabi-sabi spirit. This collection of simple, yet profound insights in an irresistable, hold-in-the-hand package offers readers the opportunity for integrating moments of contemplation and meditation into their daily lives, and to discover the essence of wabi sabi
Felltham, Owen (1628). Resolves, a Duple Century. W. J. Johnson.   (Google)
Feldman, Steven P. (2004). The professional conscience: A psychoanalytic study of moral character in Tolstoy's the death of Ivan ilych. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Modern professional behavior all too often fails to meet high standards of moral conduct. An important reason for this unfortunate state of affairs is the expansive self interest of the individual professional. The individual''s natural desire for his/her own success and pleasure goes unchecked by internal moral constraints. In this essay, I investigate this phenomenon using the psychoanalytic concepts of the ego ideal and superego. These concepts are used to explore the internal psychological dynamics that contribute to moral decision-making. The contrasts between self interest and concern for others, selfishness and moral values, and moral conscience and social conformity are examined in Tolstoy''s study of the modern professional in The Death of Ivan Ilych. By reviewing Freud''s work on the moral conscience, particularly its complex inner structure and liabilities to dysfunction, and applying it to Tolstoy''s penetrating portrayal of Ivan Ilych''s personal and professional life, an understanding of the inner (emotional) foundation of moral character, its dependence on the past through the links between generations, and the need to integrate idealism with moral values is generated. Examples from Enron Corporation will be used throughout the paper to relate the analysis and discussion to contemporary business ethics problems
Frankfurt, Harry G. (2006). Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Harry G. Frankfurt begins his inquiry by asking, “What is it about human beings that makes it possible for us to take ourselves seriously?” Based on The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right delves into this provocative and original question. The author maintains that taking ourselves seriously presupposes an inward-directed, reflexive oversight that enables us to focus our attention directly upon ourselves, and “[it] means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right.” The essays delineate two features that have a critical role to play in this: our rationality, and our ability to love. Frankfurt incisively explores the roles of reason and of love in our active lives, and considers the relation between these two motivating forces of our actions. The argument is that the authority of practical reason is less fundamental than the authority of love. Love, as the author defines it, is a volitional matter, that is, it consists in what we are actually committed to caring about. Frankfurt adds that “The object of love can be almost anything—a life, a quality of experience, a person, a group, a moral ideal, a nonmoral ideal, a tradition, whatever.” However, these objects and ideals are difficult to comprehend and often in conflict with each other. Moral principles play an important supporting role in this process as they help us develop and elucidate a vision that inspires our love. The first section of the book consists of the two lectures, which are entitled “Taking Ourselves Seriously” and “Getting It Right.” The second section consists of comments in response by Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael E. Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen. The book includes a preface by Debra Satz
Friedman, Marilyn (1993). What Are Friends For?: Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Gini, Al (2008). Why It's Hard to Be Good. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethics means what? -- Narcissism: me, myself, and I -- Character, integrity, and conscience -- Its so easy to be a bystander -- Change, choice, and culture -- The media and morality -- Ethics and the workplace -- Leisure and play -- Leadership, money, power -- Sex (yes, sex) -- Death (ditto).
Hauerwas, Stanley (1994). Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Hill, Thomas E. (1991). Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This stimulating collection of essays in ethics eschews the simple exposition and refinement of abstract theories. Rather, the author focuses on everyday moral issues, often neglected by philosophers, and explores the deeper theoretical questions which they raise. Such issues are: Is it wrong to tell a lie to protect someone from a painful truth? Should one commit a lesser evil to prevent another from doing something worse? Can one be both autonomous and compassionate? Other topics discussed are servility, weakness of will, suicide, obligations to oneself, snobbery, and environmental concerns. A feature of the collection is the contrast of Kantian and utilitarian answers to these problems. The essays are crisply and lucidly written and will appeal to both teachers and students of philosophy
Johnson, Peter (1999). The Philosophy of Manners: A Study of the 'Little Virtues'. Thoemmes.   (Google)
Abstract: In The Philosophy of Manners Peter Johnson makes a compelling case for manners as a subject for investigation by modern moral philosophy. He examines manners as 'little virtues', explaining their distinctive conceptual characteristics and charting their intricate detail and relationships with each other. In demonstrating why manners are important to our mutual expectations, Johnson reveals a terrain which modern moral philosophy has left largely unmapped. Through a critical examination of the ethics of John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre, Johnson shows how the nature of manners constitutes a philosophical problem both for liberalism and its critics. Taking the recent revival of virtue ethics as its broad starting point, The Philosophy of Manners discusses the 'little virtues' as they are treated in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions of writing on ethics. Original features of the book include discussions of nameless virtues, the logical intricacy of the 'little virtues' which compose manners, and the nature of their orchestration by the more substantial virtues and moral concerns. The aim throughout is to give manners a philosophically defensible place in the moral life - a place which neither inflates nor understates their importance. --an examination of why manners are essential to moral literacy and an ethical society --the first work of its kind - no other ethical investigation concentrates on manners --relevant to the recent revival of interest in virtue ethics and any course in contemporary ethics --will provoke argument and disagreement
Jollimore, Troy A. (2001). Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality. Garland Pub..   (Google)
Kieran, Matthew (2006). Art, morality and ethics: On the (im)moral character of art works and inter-relations to artistic value. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):129–143.   (Google | More links)
Kieran, Matthew (2010). Teaching & learning guide for: Art, morality and ethics: On the (im)moral character of art works and inter-relations to artistic value. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):426-431.   (Google)
Abstract: Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter-relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a distinguished philosophical history but as the Compass survey article suggests ('Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value.' Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43), it is only very recently that figures in the field have returned to it to develop more precisely what they take the relationships to be and why. Consensus is, unsurprisingly, lacking. The reinvigoration of the issues has led sophisticated formalists or autonomists to mount a more considered defence of the idea that aesthetic and literary values are indeed conceptually distinct from the justification or otherwise of the moral perspective or views endorsed in a work (Topic I). The challenges presented by such a defence are many but amongst them are appeals to critical practice (Lamarque and Olsen), scepticism about whether or not art really can give us bona fide knowledge (Stolnitz) and the recognition that truth often seems to be far removed from what it is we value in our appreciation of works (Lamarque). One way to motivate consideration of the relevance of a work's moral character to its artistic value concerns the phenomena of imaginative resistance. At least sometimes it would seem that, as Hume originally suggested, we either cannot or will not enter imaginatively into the perspective solicited by a work due to its morally problematic character (Topic II). In some cases, it would seem that as a matter of psychological fact, we cannot do so since it is impossible for us to imagine how it could be that a certain attitude or action is morally permissible or good (Walton). The question then is whether or not this is a function of morality in particular or constraints on imaginative possibility more generally and what else is involved. At other times, the phenomena seem to be driven by a moral reluctance to allow ourselves to enter into the dramatic perspective involved (Moran) or evaluation of the attitude expressed (Stokes). Nonetheless, it is far from obvious that this is so of all the attitudes or responses we judge to be morally problematic. After all, it looks like we can and indeed often do suspend or background particular cognitive and moral commitments in engaging with all sorts of works (Nichols and Weinberg). If the moral character of a work interacts with how we appreciate and evaluate them, then the pressing question is this: is there any systematic account of the relationship available to us? One way is to consider the relationship between our emotional responses to works and their moral character (Topic III). After all, art works often solicit various emotional responses from us to follow the work and make use of moral concepts in so doing (Carroll). Indeed, whether or not a work merits the sought for emotional responses often seems to be internally related to ethical considerations (Gaut). Yet, it is not obvious that we should apply our moral concepts or respond emotionally in our imaginative engagement with works as art as we should in real life (Kieran, Jacobson). A different route is via the thought that art can convey knowledge (Topic IV). There might be particular kinds of moral knowledge art distinctively suited to conveying (Nussbaum) or it may just be that art does so particularly effectively (Carroll, Gaut, Kieran). Either way where this can be tied to the artistic means and appreciation of a work it would seem that to cultivate moral understanding contributes to the value of a work and to betray misunderstanding is a defect. Without denying the relevance of the moral character of a work some authors have wanted to claim that sometimes the immoral aspect of a work can contribute to rather than lessen its artistic value (Topic V). One route is to claim that there is no systematic theoretical account of the relationship available and what the right thing to say is depends on the particular case involved (Jacobson). Another involves the claim that this is so when the defect connects up in an appropriate way to one of the values of art. Thus, it has been claimed, only where a work reveals something which adds to intelligibility, knowledge or understanding in virtue of its morally problematic aspect can this be so (Kieran). The latter position looks like it could in principle be held whilst nonetheless maintaining that the typical or standard relationship is as the moralists would have it. Yet perhaps allowing valence change for such reasons is less a mark of principled explanation and more a function of downright inconsistency or incoherence (Harold). The topics themselves and suggested readings given below follow the structure articulated above as further amplified in the Compass survey article. The design and structure given below can be easily compressed or expanded further. Author Recommends 1. Carroll, Noël. 'Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 126–60. This article develops the idea that engaging with narrative art calls on moral concepts and emotions and can thereby clarify our moral understanding. 2. Carroll, Noël. Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays . Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. Part IV consists of six distinct essays on questions concerning the inter-relations between art and morality including the essay cited above and the author's articulation and defence of moderate moralism. 3. Gaut, Berys. 'The Ethical Criticism of Art.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. 4. Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. This monograph provides the most exhaustive treatment of the issues and defends the claim that, where relevant, whenever a work is morally flawed it is of lesser value as art and wherever it is morally virtuous the work's value as art is enhanced. Chapters 7 and 8 defend concern ethical knowledge and chapter 10 is a development of the article cited above concerning emotional responses. Chapter 3 also gives a useful conceptual map of the issues and options in the debate. 5. Jacobson, Daniel. 'In Praise of Immoral Art.' Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. A wide ranging and extended treatment of relevant issues which objects to generalising moral treatments of our responses to art works and defends the idea that particular works can be better because of rather than despite their moral defects. 6. Kieran, Matthew. 'Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.' Art and Morality . Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. A general argument for immoralism is elaborated by outlining when, where and why a work's morally problematic character can contribute to its artistic value for principled reasons (through enhancing moral understanding). 7. Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art . London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. This chapter argues against both aestheticism and straightforward moralism about art, elaborating a defence of immoralism in relation to visual art whilst ranging over issues from pornographic art to the nature and demands of different genres in art. 8. Lamarque, Peter. 'Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. This article concisely outlines and defends a sophisticated aestheticism that denies the importance of truth to artistic value. 9. Stolnitz, Jerome. 'On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.' British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. This article articulates and defends the claim that no knowledge of any interesting or significant kind can be afforded by works appreciated and evaluated as art. 10. Walton, Kendall. 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 68 (1994): 27–51. This article builds on some comments from Hume to develop the idea that when engaging with fictions it seems impossible imaginatively to enter into radically deviant moral attitudes. Online Materials 'Aesthetics and Ethics: The State of the Art.' American Society of Aesthetics online (Jeffrey Dean): >. 'Art, Censorship and Morality' downloadable podcast of Nigel Warburton interviewing Matthew Kieran at Tate Britain (BBC/OU as part of the Ethics Bites series): >. 'Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value.' Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43 (Matthew Kieran): >. 'Ethical Criticism of Art.' Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ella Peek): >. 'Fascinating Fascism.' New York Review of Books Piece Discussing Leni Riefenstahl (Susan Sontag): >. 'The Beheading of St. John the Baptist (1450s), Giovanni de Paolo' (Tom Lubbock): >. Vladimir Nabokov and Lionel Trilling discuss Lolita (CBS): >. Sample Syllabus Topic I Autonomism/Aestheticism • Anderson, James C. and Jeffrey T. Dean. 'Moderate Autonomism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 38.2 (1998): 150–66. • Beardsley, Monroe. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism . New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. Chapter 12. • Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement.Trans. James Creed Meredith . Oxford: Oxford UP, 1952 [1790]. • Lamarque, Peter. 'Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. • ——. 'Tragedy and Moral Value.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.2 (1995): 239–49. • Lamarque, Peter and Stein Olsen. Truth, Fiction and Literature . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Chapter 10. • Stolnitz, Jerome. 'On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.' British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. Topic II Imaginative Capacities, Intelligibility and Resistance • Moran, Richard. 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination.' Philosophical Review 103.1 (1994): 75–106. • Nichols, Shaun. 'Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing'. Mind & Language 21.4 (2006): 459–74. • Stokes, Dustin. 'The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance'. British Journal of Aesthetics 46.4 (2006): 387–405. • Tanner, Michael. 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, II'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 51–66. • Walton, Kendall (1994). 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 27–51. • Weinberg, Jonathan. 'Configuring the Cognitive Imagination.' New Waves in Aesthetics . Eds. K. Stock and K. Thomson-Jones. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 203–23. Topic III Moralism and Emotions • Carroll, Noël. 'Moderate Moralism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 36.3 (1996): 223–37. • Carroll, Noël. 'Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.126–60. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapter 10. • ——. 'The Ethical Criticism of Art.' Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection . Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. • Hume, David. 'Of the Standard of Taste.' Selected Essays . Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993 [1757]. 133–53. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Emotions, Art and Immorality.' Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Emotions . Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 681–703. • Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art? . London: Penguin, 2004. Chapters 5 and 15. Topic IV Moralism and Knowledge • Aristotle. Poetics . Trans. M. Heath. London: Penguin, 1996 [367–322 BC]. • Carroll, Noël. 'The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.1 (2002): 3–26. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapters 7 and 8. • Gaut, Berys. 'Art and Cognition.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 115–26. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Art, Imagination and the Cultivation of Morals.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54.4 (1996): 337–51. • Nussbaum, Martha. 'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination.' Love's Knowledge . New York: Oxford UP, 1990. 148–68. • Plato. The Republic . Trans. D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974. Book 10. Topic V Immoralist Contextualism • Harold, James. 'Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48.1 (2008): 45–64. • Jacobson, Daniel. 'In Praise of Immoral Art.' Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. • ——. 'Ethical Criticism and the Vices of Moderation.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 342–55. • John, Eileen. 'Artistic Value and Moral Opportunism.' Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art . Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 331–41. • Kieran, Matthew. 'Forbidden Knowledge:The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.' Art and Morality . Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. • Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art . London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. • Patridge, Stephanie. 'Moral Vices as Artistic Virtues: Eugene Onegin and Alice.' Philosophia 36.2 (2008): 181–93. Focus Questions 1. What is the strongest argument for the claim that the moral character of a work is not relevant to its artistic value? Does artistic or literary criticism tend to concern itself with the truth or morality of works? If so, in what ways? If not, why do you think this is? 2. What different explanations might there be for difficulty with or resistance to imaginatively entering into attitudes you take to be immoral? How might this relate to the way our imaginings work as contrasted with belief? How might different literary or artistic treatments of the same subject matter make a difference? 3. How do narrative works draw on our moral concepts and responses? Can we suspend our normal moral commitments or application of moral concepts in responding emotionally to art works? Should we respond emotionally to art works as we ought to respond to real world events we witness? Why? Why not? 4. How, if at all, do art works convey moral understanding? How, if at all, is this related to the kinds of moral knowledge art works can teach or reveal to us? When, where and why might this be tied to the artistic value of a work? How can we tell where a work enhances our moral understanding as opposed to misleading or distorting it? 5. What art works do you value overall as art which commend or endorse moral values and attitudes that you do not? Is appreciation of them always marred or lessened by the morally dubious aspect? If not, what explains the differences in evaluation? What, if anything, might you learn by engaging with works which endorse moral attitudes or apply moral concepts different from those you take to be justified? How, if at all, might this connect up with what makes them valuable as art?
Kultgen, John H. (1995). Autonomy and Intervention: Parentalism in the Caring Life. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The basic relationship between people should be care, and the caring life is the highest which humans can live. Unfortunately, care that is not thoughtful slides into illegitimate intrusion on autonomy. Autonomy is a basic good, and we should not abridge it without good reason. On the other hand, it is not the only good. We must sometimes intervene in the lives of others to protect them from grave harms or provide them with important benefits. The reflective person, therefore, needs guidelines for caring. Some contemporary moralists condemn paternalism categorically. This work examines weaknesses in their arguments and proposes new guidelines for paternalism, which it calls "parentalism" to avoid the patriarchal connotations of the old term. Its antiparentalism is more moderate than standard antipaternalism based on an exaggerated respect for autonomy. The work explores implications for both the personal sphere of interactions between individuals, such as friends and family members, and the public sphere of institutions, legislation, and the professional practices
Kupperman, Joel (1991). Character. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We often speak of a person's character--good or bad, strong or weak--and think of it as a guide to how that person will behave in a given situation. Oddly, however, philosophers writing about ethics have had virtually nothing to say about the role of character in ethical behavior. What is character? How does it relate to having a self, or to the process of moral decision? Are we responsible for our characters? Character answers these questions, and goes on to examine the place of character in ethical philosophy. Both the Kantian and utilitarian traditions, Kupperman argues, have largely ignored the ways in which decisions are integrated over time, and instead provide a "snapshot" model of moral decision. Kupperman demonstrates the deficiencies of a number of classic and contemporary ethical theories that do not take account of the idea of character, and offers his own character-based theory. Along the way he touches on such subjects as personal identity, the importance of happiness, moral education, and the definition of a valuable life
Kusch, Martin (2008). Science and virtue: An essay on the impact of the scientific mentality on moral character. By Louis Caruana. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):701–702.   (Google | More links)
Law, William (1725). Remarks Upon a Late Book, Entitled, the Fable of the Bees. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Leaman, Oliver (ed.) (1995). Friendship East and West: Philosophical Perspectives. Curzon.   (Google)
Linder, Joselin (2009). The Purity Test: Your Filth and Depravity Cheerfully Exposed by 2,000 Nosy Questions. St. Martin's Griffin.   (Google)
Abstract: By the early 80s, kids were already trawling the message boards of the Internet for perverse kicks. Well before Star Ways Kid or "flash mobs," one of the first online fads was the "Purity Test," a series of questions to rate your moral purity, from the raunchy ("Ever had sex in your parents' bedroom?") to the absurd ("Ever snorted cocaine off the dashboard of a car doing 80 mph?").The tests would be printed out, brought to school, and pored over with friends in the back of the gym during recess. Then kids would modify the original with their own prurient additions before sending it along. Eventually, the tests became bloated thousand-question Franken-tests that took hours to complete.Doing the test with friends was like playing an endless, filthy, wildly enlightening game of "Did You Ever?"--and because it was a standardized test, you could compare your scores. Assuming everyone was being honest--which they weren't. The Purity Test will offer both a humorous history and analysis of the Purity Test as well as several versions of the test to take at home
Mandeville, Bernard (1924). The Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits. Liberty Classics.   (Google)
Mandeville, Bernard (1714). The Fable of the Bees. Harmondsworth,Penguin.   (Google)
Mazlish, Bruce (2009). The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: The result of a lifetime of research and contemplation on global phenomena, this book explores the idea of humanity in the modern age of globalization. Tracking the idea in the historical, philosophical, legal, and political realms, this is a concise and illuminating look at a concept that has defined the twentieth century
McLean, George F. (2008). Unity and Harmony, Compassion and Love in Global Times. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Totemic unity as key to community in thought and action -- Myth : the emergence of diversity within unity -- The individual in the Greek polis -- The synthesis of personal uniqueness and social unity in Christian and Islamic thought -- Modern alienation of individuals and society -- Opening a new paradigm for civil society and social harmony : a contemporary metaphysics of freedom -- The diversified unity of a global whole.
Meir, Israel (2004). Day by Day: Readings for the Soul From the Chofetz Chaim: Collected From His Writings: Appeared in Hebrew as "Kli Yakar Sifsei Daʻas". Distributed by Feldheim.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 156 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not
Oates, Wayne Edward (1974). Life's Detours. [Nashville]the Upper Room.   (Google)
Persson, Ingmar & Savulescu, Julian (2008). The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.   (Google)
Abstract: abstract   As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement
Randolph, Jeanne (2007). Ethics of Luxury: Materialism and Imagination. Yyz Books.   (Google)
Richards, Norvin (1984). Double effect and moral character. Mind 93 (371):381-397.   (Google | More links)
Royce, Josiah (1924). The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York,Hafner Pub. Co..   (Google)
Abstract: Josiah Royce was born in California where he began his teaching career.
Schwartz, Daniel (2007). Aquinas on Friendship. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Simon, Yves René Marie (1991). Practical Knowledge. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Yves R. Simon (1903-1961) was one of this century’s greatest students of the virtue of practical wisdom. Simon’s interest in this virtue ranged from ultimate theoretical and foundational concerns, such as the relationship between practical knowledge and science, to the most concrete and immediate questions regarding the role of practical wisdom in personal and social decision-making. These concerns occupied Simon from his earliest published writing to the final notes and correspondence he was working on at the moment of his untimely death. Throughout his life, practical wisdom and its related philosophical ramifications emerge time and again at critical junctures, throwing into bold relief some of the deeper dimensions of questions as diverse as the nature of democracy, the concept of law, and the theory of work. Practical knowledge constitutes a unifying motif of Simon’s entire encyclopedic effort. This volume reconstructs what would have been Simon’s final sustained writing on practical knowledge. It includes reworking of some previously published material, especially the landmark 1961 essay, "Introduction to the Study of Practical Wisdom," possibly the best treatment of the concept of "command" in recent philosophical writing. But it also reproduces, in a form closely corresponding to Simon’s intention, material drawn from notes and schemata, concerning issues such as the relationship between moral science and wisdom, the nature of practical judgment, and the relationship between practical knowledge and Christian moral philosophy. Also included are previously unpublished letters to Jacques Maritain on the controversy surrounding the theoretical-practical and practico-practical syllogisms, as well as Maritain’s responses. The volume concludes with applications of Simon’s general theory to a critique of the concept of a social science and to the notion of Christian humanism. This volume will appeal to moral philosophers interested in a range of normative issues, as well as social scientists and readers concerned with the philosophical foundations of modern culture. Virtue moralist, in particular, will find in Simon one of the profoundest commentators on this tradition in normative ethics
Slote, Michael A. (2001). Morals From Motives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Morals from Motives develops a virtue ethics inspired more by Hume and Hutcheson's moral sentimentalism than by recently-influential Aristotelianism. It argues that a reconfigured and expanded "morality of caring" can offer a general account of right and wrong action as well as social justice. Expanding the frontiers of ethics, it goes on to show how a motive-based "pure" virtue theory can also help us to understand the nature of human well-being and practical reason
Sugarman, Richard Ira (1976). Rancor Against Time: The Phenomenology of Ressentiment. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Taylor, Gabriele (2006). Deadly Vices. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the "ordinary" vices traditionally seen as "death to the soul": sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. In the course of a richly detailed discussion of individual and interrelated vices, which complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, she shows why these "deadly sins" are correctly so named and grouped together
Taylor, Craig (2002). Sympathy: A Philosophical Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends
Thomas, Laurence (1989). Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character. Temple University Press.   (Google)
Tillich, Paul (2000). The Courage to Be. Yale University Press.   (Google)
Timpe, Kevin (online). Moral character. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: At the heart of one major approach to ethics—an approach counting among its proponents Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas—is the conviction that ethics is fundamentally related to what kind of persons we are. Many of Plato’s dialogues, for example, focus on what kind of persons we ought to be and begin with examinations of particular virtues: What is the nature of justice? Republic) What is the nature of piety? Euthyphro) What is the nature of temperance? Charmides) What is the nature of courage? Laches) On the assumption that what kind of person one is is constituted by one’s character, the link between moral character and virtue is clear. We can think of one’s moral character as primarily a function of whether she has or lacks various moral virtues and vices. The virtues and vices that comprise one’s moral character are typically understood as dispositions to behave in certain ways in certain sorts of circumstances. For instance, an honest person is disposed to telling the truth when asked. These dispositions are typically understood as relatively stable and long-term. Further, they are also typically understood to be robust, that is, consistent across a wide-spectrum of conditions. We are unlikely, for example, to think that an individual who tells the truth to her friends but consistently lies to her parents and teachers possesses the virtue of honesty. Moral character, like most issues in moral psychology, stands at the intersection of issues in both normative ethics and empirical psychology. This suggests that there are conceivably two general approaches one could take when elucidating the nature of moral character. One could approach moral character primarily by focusing on standards set by normative ethics ; whether people can or do live up to these standards is irrelevant. Alternatively, one could approach moral character under the guideline that normative ethics ought to be constrained by psychology. On this second approach, it’s not that the normative/descriptive distinction disappears; instead, it is just that a theory of moral character ought to be appropriately constrained by what social psychology tells us moral agents are in fact like..
Trilling, Lionel (1974). Sincerity and Authenticity. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   (Google)
Unknown, Unknown (online). Moral character. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Westberg, Daniel (1994). Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is a study of the role of intellect in human action as described by Thomas Aquinas. One of its primary aims is to compare the interpretation of Aristotle by Aquinas with the lines of interpretation offered in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. The book seeks to clarify the problems involved in the appropriation of Aristotle's theory by a Christian theologian, including such topics as the practical syllogism and the problems of akrasia. Westberg argues that Aquinas was much closer to Aristotle than is often recognized, and he puts forward important new interpretations of the relation of intellect and will in the stages of intention, deliberation, decision, and execution. In the concluding section of the book, he shows how this new interpretation yields fruitful insights on a range of theological topics, including sin, law, love, and the moral virtues
Wielenberg, Erik (2002). Pleasure, pain, and moral character and development. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):282-299.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, James Q. (1995). On Character: Essays. Aei Press.   (Google)
Yu, Jiyuan (2007). The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Eudaimonia, Dao, and virtue -- Humanity : Xing and Ergon -- Virtue, mean, and disposition -- Habituation and ritualization -- Practical wisdom and appropriateness -- The highest good and the external goods -- The practical and the contemplative.

5.1l.5.1 Authenticity

Anderson, Joel (2003). Autonomy and the authority of personal commitments: From internal coherence to social normativity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I sketch a view that focuses on intersubjective constraints of intelligibility built into social practices and on the pragmatics of how those norms are contested in an ongoing fashion
Anderson, Joel (1995). The persistence of authenticity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (1).   (Google)
Knobe, Joshua (2005). Ordinary ethical reasoning and the ideal of 'being yourself'. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):327 – 340.   (Google)
Abstract: The psychological study of ethical reasoning tends to concentrate on a few specific issues, with the bulk of the research going to the study of people's attitudes toward moral rules or the welfare of others. But people's ethical reasoning is also shaped by a wide range of other concerns. Here I focus on the importance that people attach to the ideal of being yourself. It is shown that certain experimental results - results that seemed anomalous and inexplicable to researchers who focused on moral rules and concern for the welfare of others - can be explained quite elegantly as the product of people's attachment to the ideal of 'being yourself'. The success of this explanation then points to the need for a more general inquiry into the role that the ideal of 'being yourself ' plays in people's ethical reasoning

5.1l.5.2 Personality

Bannister, D. (ed.) (1977). New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. Academic Press.   (Google)
Butt, Trevor (2003). Understanding People. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding People provides an overview and critique of current psychological assumptions about people and what differentiates them, and replaces them with a set of ideas taken from social constructionism. It begins with an examination of contemporary theories, then explores the critique of the social constructionists, before laying out the basis of an understanding of human action and behavior, drawing on phenomenology and personal construct theory. Using everyday experience to illustrate the issues in personality theory (Is behavior situation-specific? Why do we have a sense of self? Is there an unconscious?), this book will breathe life into an area of psychology that is so often arid, and, in the eyes of students, divorced from their world
Davis, Kathy (ed.) (1997). Embodied Practices: Feminist Perspectives on the Body. Sage.   (Google)
Abstract: This book focuses on the significance of the body in contemporary feminist scholarship. Whether the body is treated as biological bedrock or subversive metaphor, it is implicated in the cultural and historical construction of sexual difference as well as asymmetrical power relations. The contributors to this volume examine the role of the body as socially shaped and historically colonized territory and as the focus of individual womenÆs struggles for autonomy and self-determination. They also analyze its centrality to the feminist critique of male-stream science as dualistic, distanced, and decontextualized. While the body has become a "hot item" in contemporary social theory and research, the renewed interest has received a mixed reaction from feminists. The body may be back, but the "new" body theory often proves to be just as disembodied as it ever was. The body revival seems to be less an attempt to re-embody masculinist science than just another expression of the same condition that evoked the feminist critique in the first place: a flight from femininity and everything that is associated with it in Western culture. Drawing on insights from contemporary feminist theories of gender and power, this book offers a timely critical appraisal of the recent "body revival." Embodied Practices not only sets an agenda for research about the body, but for an embodied perspective on the body as well. It will be a valuable and thought-provoking resource for students of womenÆs studies, social theory, cultural studies, and medical sociology
Lamiell, James T. (1987). The Psychology of Personality: An Epistemological Inquiry. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Maze, J. R. (1983). The Meaning of Behaviour. G. Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
[Price-Williams, Douglass Richard] [from old catalog] (1974). [The Philosophy of Science and the Study of Personality. New York,J. Norton Publishers.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1981). A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory. Krieger Pub. Co..   (Google)
Shotter, John (1984). Social Accountability and Selfhood. B. Blackwell.   (Google)
Sullivan, Karen (2003). Finding the Inner You: How Well Do You Know Yourself? Barrons Educational Series.   (Google)
Abstract: A key to happiness lies in each person’s ability to know himself or herself. The consequences of going through life without self-knowledge are frequently self-obsession, false priorities, and unwarranted fears. This book explains the enlightening process of self-discovery and shows how it leads to self-sufficiency. The author offers guidance with inspiring true-life stories and practical advice that readers can apply to their own lives. Here is instruction on techniques for engaging in periods of solitude, with emphasis on making such times enjoyable and spiritually enriching experiences. The author also discusses the relationships between solitude and human emotions, solitude and intelligence, methods of effective communication with others, and ways to create a state of mind that is based on self-sufficiency. Making solitude a source of spiritual enrichment entails creating a balance between the normal need for human relationships and the awareness of one’s self as an independent being. That balance invariably produces a sense of happiness and personal fulfillment
Tiemersma, Douwe (1989). Body Schema and Body Image: An Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Study. Amsterdam ;Swets & Zeitlinger.   (Google)
Wilson, Timothy D. (2002). Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 331 | Google | More links)

5.1l.5.3 Integrity

Adler, Nancy J. & Bird, Frederick B. (1988). International dimensions of executive integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Aitken, Stuart C. (2001). Fielding diversity and moral integrity. Ethics, Place and Environment 4 (2):125 – 129.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper outlines some of the moral issues I faced when working in the field with homeless children and children with cerebral palsy. Bill Bunge argues that the 'immediacy' of fieldwork requires that we divest ourselves of theoretical and philosophical pretensions to attend the urgency of our participants' context. I use personal examples of powerful and contradictory experiences from working with young people in the field to highlight the importance of a moral integrity that recognizes vulnerability and the needs of the moment
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1946). Theory and the integrity of experience. Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):379-382.   (Google | More links)
Allen, Charles Lawrence (2007). Why Good People Make Bad Choices: How You Can Develop Peace of Mind Through Integrity. Loving Healing Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The agenda -- The instinctual management of feeling -- The instinctual management of life -- Behind the scenes of choice -- Anger -- Going beyond ego -- Belief system components -- Conscious values -- Conscious morals -- Conscious expectations and self-image -- The conscious management of feelings -- Managing 'mad' -- Managing 'sad' -- Managing 'bad' -- Managing 'fear' -- Managing 'glad' -- Integrity : one choice at a time -- Nature meets nurture : the peace of mind perspective is born.
Anderson, Melissa S. (2007). Collective openness and other recommendations for the promotion of research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4).   (Google)
Anderson, Melissa S. & Shultz, Joseph B. (2003). The role of scientific associations in promoting research integrity and deterring research misconduct. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The nature of scientific societies’ relationships with their members limits their ability to promote research integrity. They must therefore leverage their strengths as professional organizations to integrate ethical considerations into their ongoing support of their academic disciplines. This paper suggests five strategies for doing so
Argyris, Chris & Schön, Donald A. (1988). Reciprocal integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Ashford, Elizabeth (2000). Utilitarianism, integrity, and partiality. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):421-439.   (Google | More links)
Atkinson, Timothy N. (2008). Using creative writing techniques to enhance the case study method in research integrity and ethics courses. Journal of Academic Ethics 6 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The following article explores the use of creative writing techniques to teach research ethics, breathe life into case study preparation, and train students to think of their settings as complex organizational environments with multiple actors and stakeholders
Babbitt, Susan E. (1996). Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people
Bauer, Keith (2004). Cybermedicine and the moral integrity of the physician–patient relationship. Ethics and Information Technology 6 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Some critiques of cybermedicine claim that it is problematic because it fails to create physician–patient relationships. But, electronically mediated encounters do create such relationships. The issue is the nature and quality of those relationships and whether they are conducive to good patient care and meet the ethical ideals and standards of medicine. In this paper, I argue that effective communication and compassion are, in most cases, necessary for the establishment of trusting and morally appropriate physician–patient relationships. The creation of these relationships requires patients and physicians to take psychological and emotional risks and to make commitments to each other. The problem is that by altering the form and content of verbal and non-verbal behaviors and by limiting the kinds of interactions that can take place, cybermedicine makes risk-free interactions easier and more commonplace and retards the development of physician compassion and patient trust. In doing so, cybermedicine encourages morally inappropriate physician–patient relationships. I argue that Merleau-Ponty''s notion of embodiment and Kierkegaard''s criticisms of disinterested reflection help us to understand how cybermedicine can undermine patient health and well being and why it should be seen as a possible threat to the moral integrity of physician–patient relationships
Bayne, Tim & Levy, Neil (2005). Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had been transformed for the better by the operation [1]. A second patient was also reported as having been satisfied with his amputation [2]
Baylis, Françoise (2007). Of courage, honor, and integrity. In Lisa A. Eckenwiler & Felicia Cohn (eds.), The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral Landscape. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Beitz, Charles R. (1980). Nonintervention and communal integrity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (4):385-391.   (Google | More links)
Bernasek, Anna (2010). The Economics of Integrity: From Dairy Farmers to Toyota, How Wealth is Built on Trust and What That Means for Our Future. Harperstudio.   (Google)
Besser-Jones, Lorraine (2008). Personal Integrity, Moraity, and Psychological Well-Being. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):361-383.   (Google)
Bigelow, John & Pargetter, Robert (2007). Integrity and Autonomy. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):39-49.   (Google)
Bird, Stephanie J. (2006). Research ethics, research integrity and the responsible conduct of research. Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (3).   (Google)
Bivins, Thomas (2007). Loyalty, utility, and integrity in casablanca: The use of film in explicating philosophical disputes concerning utilitarianism. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22 (2 & 3):132 – 150.   (Google)
Abstract: Can concepts such as loyalty and integrity remain intrinsically valuable personal traits even as we devote ourselves to that which requires the loyalty in the first place (the greater good)? Does utilitarian deliberation rest on too extreme a notion of impartiality - one that focuses exclusively on the consequences of actions, leaving people, in the words of Bernard Williams, "mere faceless numbers"? Using the film Casablanca as an extended analogy, this article attempts to reconcile the concept of loyalty to a cause, as described by Josiah Royce, with Williams's argument that personal integrity can remain part of even utilitarian thought processes
Bowie, Norman E. (2010). Organizational integrity and moral climates. In George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Brady, Emily (2002). Aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity in environmental conservation. Environmental Ethics 24 (1):75-91.   (Google)
Abstract: Aesthetics plays an important role in environmental conservation. In this paper, I pin down two key concepts for understanding this role, aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity. Aesthetic character describes the particularity of an environment based on its aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities. In the first part, I give an account of aesthetic character through a discussion of its subjective and objective bases, and I argue for an awareness of the dynamic nature of this character. In the second part, I consider aesthetic character in a conservation context. I develop the diachronic concept of aesthetic integrity to guide decisions about how to manage change to aesthetic character. My argument is illustrated with a case study of the proposal for a superquarry on the remote isle of Harris in Scotland
Brazier, Frances; Oskamp, Anja; Prins, Corien; Schellekens, Maurice & Wijngaards, Niek (2004). Law-abiding and integrity on the internet: A case for agents. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Software agents extend the current, information-based Internet to include autonomous mobile processing. In most countries such processes, i.e., software agents are, however, without an explicit legal status. Many of the legal implications of their actions (e.g., gathering information, negotiating terms, performing transactions) are not well understood. One important characteristic of mobile software agents is that they roam the Internet: they often run on agent platforms of others. There often is no pre-existing relation between the owner of a running agents process and the owner of the agent platform on which an agent process runs. When conflicts arise, the position of the agent platform administrator is not clear: is he or she allowed to slow down the process or possibly remove it from the system? Can the interests of the user of the agent be protected? This article explores legal and technical perspectives in protecting the integrity and availability of software agents and agent platforms
Bratton, Susan Power (1993). Loving nature: Ecological integrity and Christian responsibility. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):93-96.   (Google)
Brenkert, George G. (2010). Whistle-blowing, moral integrity, and organizational ethics. In George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Brown, Marvin T. (2006). Corporate integrity and public interest: A relational approach to business ethics and leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper approaches the question of corporate integrity and leadership from a civic perspective, which means that corporations are seen as members of civil society, corporate members are seen as citizens, and corporate decisions are guided by civic norms. Corporate integrity, from this perspective, requires that the communication patterns that constitute interpersonal relationships at work exhibit the civic norm of reciprocity and acknowledge the need for security and the right to participate. Since leaders are members of corporate relationships, their integrity will be determined by the integrity of these interpersonal relationships, and by their efforts to improve them
Brody, Howard & Night, Susan S. (2007). The pharmacist's personal and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (6):16 – 17.   (Google)
Byrne, Edmund F. (2002). Business ethics: A helpful hybrid in search of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 37 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: What sort of connection is there between business ethics and philosophy? The answer given here: a weak one, but it may be getting stronger. Comparatively few business ethics articles are structurally dependent on mainstream academic philosophy or on such sub-specialities thereof as normative ethics, moral theory, and social and political philosophy. Examining articles recently published in the Journal of Business Ethics that declare some dependence, the author finds that such declarations often constitute only a pro forma gesture which could be omitted without detriment to the paper's content and conclusions. He also finds, however, that some authors do draw on solid philosophical work in ways that are establishing ever more meaningful interconnections between business ethics and academic philosophy. These cross-disciplinary studies, he concludes, are ground-breaking and invite creative imitation
Caelleigh, Addeane S. (2003). Roles for scientific societies in promoting integrity in publication ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Scientific societies can have a powerful influence on the professional lives of scientists. Using this influence, they have a responsibility to make long-term commitments and investments in promoting integrity in publication, just as in other areas of research ethics. Concepts that can inform the thinking and activities of scientific societies with regard to publication ethics are: the “hidden curriculum” (the message of actions rather than formal statements), a fresh look at the components of acting with integrity, deviancy as a normally occurring phenomenon in human society, and the scientific community as an actual community. A society’s first step is to decide what values it will promote, within the framework of present-day standards of good conduct of science and given the society’s history and traditions. The society then must create educational programs that serve members across their careers. Scientific societies must take seriously the implications of the problem; set policies and standards for publication ethics for their members; educate about and enforce the standards; bring the issues before the members early and often; and maintain continuing dialogue with editors
Caldwell, Cam (2010). A ten-step model for academic integrity: A positive approach for business schools. Journal of Business Ethics 92 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of academic dishonesty in Business Schools has risen to the level of a crisis according to some authors, with the incidence of reports on student cheating rising to more than half of all the business students. In this article we introduce the problem of academic integrity as a holistic issue that requires creating a␣cultural change involving students, faculty, and administrators in an integrated process. Integrating the extensive literature from other scholars, we offer a ten-step model which can create a positive culture for academic integrity. The successful implementation of a well-crafted academic integrity program can have a positive impact on business schools and improve the reputation of tomorrow’s business leaders
Calnan, Alan (ms). Duty and integrity in tort law.   (Google)
Abstract:      The tort concept of duty lacks integrity in virtually every popular sense of that term. It is at once incomplete, unharmonious and unbeholden to any ethical principle or moral standard. Although these problems are interrelated, each corrupts tort jurisprudence in its own unique way. The incompleteness problem is particularly acute in theories of intentional tort and strict liability, where it is either selectively invoked or completely ignored. While duty holds a more prominent place in negligence, it has been fragmented into myriad specialized obligations which remain mostly in disarray. Such disunity, in turn, has fostered an even greater problem of disharmony, Tort scholars disagree about what duty is and what it is supposed to do. At one extreme, deontologists see duty as a strict moral obligation that judges must adopt and implement in accordance with natural law. At the other extreme, realists view duty merely as a terminological faýade for a judge's unfettered policy decision that liability should or should not exist. Between these opposed camps lie the pragmatists, who conceive of duties as useful guiding principles, but readily recognize a judge's authority to create new rules whenever social circumstances so require. Beneath even this collective dissonance lurks the third integrity issue: the moral problem of principle. Besides the deontological view, which grounds duty in exceedingly strong moral principles, each of the remaining camps fail to give principle its due. Because the realists and pragmatists refuse to commit to any specific set of principles - most especially, liberal-moral principles rooted in American history, law, culture and values - their approaches necessarily lack a unifying standard, and so seem doomed to unpredictability, inconsistency and incoherence. These problems, however, are not intractable. In fact, significant guidance can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of "law as integrity" provides a methodology for judicial lawmaking and interpretation. Under this theory, judges deciding hard cases must seek to promote liberal values of equality, liberty and due process by interpreting the law in a way that not only squares with past precedent, but also reconciles and strengthens the law's core principles and integrates them into a larger, cohesive framework. Because tort law is largely judge-made, and the "law" part of torts consists primarily of its scheme of duties, Dworkin's approach seems naturally fitted to the law's current duty conundrum. Still, that fit may not be perfect. While Dworkin views history as mostly irrelevant to modern legal interpretation, the history of tort law may well tell us something quite profound about the law's core principles, their connection to the law's present value system and their role in shaping that system's cultural identity. For these reasons, I shall offer a modified Dworkinian theory of tort duty that not only fits and justifies the law's present values, doctrines and structures, but also respects and promotes its historical tradition. Part I begins by briefly examining the role of duty in a liberal state. It then explores common law duties in particular, revealing their developmental patterns and exposing their integrity problems. Part II reviews Dworkin's approach to these problems, explaining his theory of "law as integrity" and highlighting some of the problems in his approach. In Part III, the focus shifts to the concept of duty in tort law. After tracing the historical development of duty in torts, it examines the duty concepts in tort's three modern theories of liability. It finds great integrity in intentional torts, a lost integrity in strict liability and the promise of integrity in negligence. The remainder of the article seeks to fulfill this promise. In Part IV, I examine the history or vertical integrity of negligence's duty concept, exposing several flaws in the modern view. Then, picking up on Dworkin's approach, I explore the horizontal integrity of this concept, identifying in Part V duty's substantive bases and conceptual limits, proposing in Part VI a structured, interpretive analysis, and illustrating in Part VII the application of that analysis in a difficult duty case. Part VIII culminates the discussion by offering a general methodology for handling all negligence duty issues. To put this new metatheory in perspective, the Conclusion highlights its significant features and addresses some of its likely criticisms
Cameron, Scott W.; Fletcher, Galen L. & Wise, Jane H. (eds.) (2009). Life in the Law: Service & Integrity. J. Reuben Clark Law Society, Brigham Young University Law School.   (Google)
Carle, Susan, Structure and integrity.   (Google)
Abstract:      In this Review Essay of David Luban's Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, I argue that although Professor Luban has not had much to say until now about "structural" concerns - namely, how lawyers' locations within institutions that organize access to power shape or should shape those lawyers' conduct - in his most recent work, another approach slips in as a supplement to his individualist framework. In this emerging supplement, structural concerns become increasingly important. Although individual integrity continues to matter most in Professor Luban's world view, it increasingly matters in the context of structural relations in which lawyers' ethical duties to particular clients vary. Individual clients facing powerful institutional adversaries deserve client-centered representation, but lawyers representing impersonal and powerful institutions have different ethical responsibilities. In general, Professor Luban approves most of lawyers' work involving the protection of the less powerful against those who would exercise power to cause others great harm. I discuss several important implications of this shift in perspective, focusing especially on tough questions that arise in thinking about lawyers' ethics in the face of chronic conditions of institutional injustice. Combined with a structuralist supplement, the analysis in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity points to key questions about how to design institutional mechanisms that protect and respond constructively to dissent. Legal Ethics and Human Dignity also compels us to think about these questions in the context of government lawyering, where questions of lawyers' ethical conduct within institutional constraints have become especially pressing today
Carr, Spencer (1976). The integrity of a utilitarian. Ethics 86 (3):241-246.   (Google | More links)
Chappell, Timothy (2007). Integrity and demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
Chalk, Rosemary (1999). Integrity in science: Moving into the new millennium. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Chan, Ho Mun & Pang, Sam (2007). Long-term care: Dignity, autonomy, family integrity, and social sustainability: The Hong Kong experience. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (5):401 – 424.   (Google)
Abstract: This article reveals the outcome of a study on the perceptions of elders, family members, and healthcare professionals and administration providing care in a range of different long-term care facilities in Hong Kong with primary focus on the concepts of autonomy and dignity of elders, quality and location of care, decision making, and financing of long term care. It was found that aging in place and family care were considered the best approaches to long term care insofar as procuring and balancing the values of dignity, autonomy, family integrity and social sustainability were concerned. An elder having the final say was generally accepted. The results also initiated the importance of sharing of financial responsibility among elders, children and government albeit the emphasis was placed on individuals. Furthermore, dignity of elders was not considered purely a synonym of autonomy, but it had also to do with respect, family and social connections
Cohen, Andrew (1996). The Challenge of Enlightenment: A Voyage Into the Multidimensional Integrity of Nonduality: A Talk. Moksha Press.   (Google)
Conteh-Morgan, Earl (2000). State integrity and democratization: Issues, values, and paradoxes in african development. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (4):488–496.   (Google | More links)
Corlett, J. Angelo (forthcoming). Moral integrity and academic research. Journal of Academic Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper focuses on some moral issues in academic journal publishing, from the standpoints of Publishers, editors, referees and authors
Cossette, Pierre (2004). Research integrity: An exploratory survey of administrative science faculties. Journal of Business Ethics 49 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This research focuses on the perceptions of research integrity held by administrative science faculty members in French-language universities in Québec. More specifically, the survey was conducted to isolate and analyse the opinions of the target group concerning the seriousness and frequency of various types of conduct generally associated with a lack of integrity among researchers, peer reviewers and editors (or other assessment supervisors), the causes attributed to research misconduct, and the solutions proposed. Its main interest is to encourage researchers to reflect on the standards they would like to see introduced, based on their own statements concerning what they think and do about research integrity. Each of the 699 faculty members surveyed received a 91-item questionnaire by mail, and 136 completed and returned it. The results show, among other things, that the respondents did not take the question of research integrity lightly; in almost all cases, they considered the types of conduct studied to be at least moderately reprehensible and often very reprehensible. In addition, the same types of conduct were considered to be, or almost to be, moderately frequent. Causes were closely linked to the achievement of professional success. Solutions related to the promotion of publication quality instead of quantity and to the inclusion of at least one full session on research integrity in advanced programs were very clearly favoured. However, in all cases, the consensus did not appear to be very strong. The limits of the results are discussed, along with the recommendations and research possibilities to which they lead
Cottingham, John (2010). Integrity and fragmentation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):2-14.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The virtue of integrity does not appear explicitly in either the Aristotelian or the Judaeo-Christian list of virtues, but elements of both ethical systems implicitly acknowledge the importance of a unified and integrated life. This paper argues that integrity is indispensible for a good human life; the fragmented or compartmentalized life is always subject to instability, in so far as unresolved psychological conflicts and tensions may threaten to derail our ethical plans and projects. Achieving a stable and integrated life requires self-awareness; and (drawing on insights from the psychoanalytic tradition) it is suggested that self-awareness is not a simple matter, but requires a complex process of self-discovery. The paper's final section argues that although vitally necessary for the good life, integrity cannot be sufficient. Against the view of influential writers such as Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt, our commitment to our chosen projects, however authentic and integrated, cannot in itself give our lives meaning and value. The good and meaningful life cannot be a matter of authenticity alone, but requires us, whether we like it or not, to bring our projects into line with enduring objective values that we did not create, and which we cannot alter
Cowton, C. J. (2002). Integrity, responsibility and affinity: Three aspects of ethics in banking. Business Ethics 11 (4):393–400.   (Google | More links)
Cox, Damian (online). Integrity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Cox, Damian (2005). Integrity, commitment, and indirect consequentialism. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1).   (Google)
Cox, Damian; LaCaze, Marguerite & Levine, M. P. (1999). Should we strive for integrity? Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (4).   (Google)
Crowe, Jonathan, Dworkin on the value of integrity.   (Google)
Abstract:      This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin's arguments on the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. I defend an alternative theory of the value of integrity, according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this instrumental-value theory explains the value of integrity more satisfactorily than Dworkin's inherent-value account. The article concludes with a discussion of Dworkin's 'one right answer thesis'. Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong version of Dworkin's thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative deliberation generally
Culbert, Samuel A. & McDonough, John J. (1988). Organizational alignments, schisms, and high-integrity managerial behavior. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Dahlberg, John E. & Davidian, Nancy M. (forthcoming). Scientific forensics: How the office of research integrity can assist institutional investigations of research misconduct during oversight review. Science and Engineering Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The Division of Investigative Oversight within the U.S. Office of Research Integrity (ORI) is responsible for conducting oversight review of institutional inquiries and investigations of possible research misconduct. It is also responsible for determining whether Public Health Service findings of research misconduct are warranted. Although ORI findings rely primarily on the scope and quality of the institution’s analyses and determinations, ORI often has been able to strengthen the original findings by employing a variety of analytical methods, often computer based. Although ORI does not conduct inquiries or investigations, it has broad authority to provide assistance to institutions at all stages of their reviews of allegations. This assistance can range from providing advice on best practices, to legal assistance, to suggestions for how best to investigate specific allegations. When asked, ORI can also conduct certain forensic analyses, such as a statistical examination of questioned digits or a simple examination of a questioned figure in Photoshop. ORI will not provide opinions or render judgment on such analyses while the institution is still conducting its investigation. Such analyses can be done without knowing much else about the case
Davis, Anne L. & Rothstein, Hannah R. (2006). The effects of the perceived behavioral integrity of managers on employee attitudes: A meta-analysis. Journal of Business Ethics 67 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Perceived behavioral integrity involves the employee’s perception of the alignment of the manager’s words and deeds. This meta-analysis examined the relationship between perceived behavioral integrity of managers and the employee attitudes of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with the leader and affect toward the organization. Results indicate a strong positive relationship overall (average r = 0.48, p<0.01). With only 12 studies included, exploration of moderators was limited, but preliminary analysis suggested that the gender of the employees and the number of levels between the employee and the manager are potential moderators of the relationship. In the current sample of studies, country where the research was conducted did not seem to have any moderating effects. In addition to suggesting further investigation of potential moderators, we call for research that examines the relationship between behavioral integrity and outcomes that include individual behavior and organizational performance
De Bakker, Erik (2007). Integrity and cynicism: Possibilities and constraints of moral communication. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Paying thorough attention to cynical action and integrity could result in a less naive approach to ethics and moral communication. This article discusses the issues of integrity and cynicism on a theoretical and on a more practical level. The first part confronts Habermas’s approach of communicative action with Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason. In the second part, the focus will be on the constraints and possibilities of moral communication within a business context. Discussing the corporate integrity approach of Kaptein and Wempe will provide this focus. Their approach can be considered as a valuable contribution to the question of how to deal with (dilemmas of) conflicting interests, open discussion, fairness, and strategic decision-making in the context of stakeholder dialog. However, it is concluded that Kaptein and Wempe seem to overstretch the concept of corporate integrity by their inclination to make it an all-purpose remedy for corporate dilemmas
Dekkers, Wim (2009). Routine (non-religious) neonatal circumcision and bodily integrity: A transatlantic dialogue. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (2):pp. 125-146.   (Google)
De Maria, William (2006). Brother secret, sister silence: Sibling conspiracies against managerial integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 65 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I offer a new cartography of ethical resistance. I argue that there is an uncharted interaction between managerial secrecy and organizational silence, which may exponentially increase the incidence of corruption in ways not yet understood. Current methods used to raise levels of moral conduct in business and government practice appear blind to this powerful duo. Extensive literature reviews of secrecy and silence scholarships form the background for an early stage conceptual layout of the co-production of secrecy and silence
de Sousa, Ronald (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
De Vries, Rob (2006). Genetic engineering and the integrity of animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Genetic engineering evokes a number of objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. The concept of animal integrity is often invoked to articulate these kind of objections. Moreover, in reaction to the advent of genetic engineering, the concept has been extended from the level of the individual animal to the level of the genome and of the species. However, the concept of animal integrity was not developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the assumption that the concept of integrity, including its extensions to the level of the genome and the species, is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed at the genetic engineering of animals
Deval, Bill & Sessions, George (1984). The development of nature resources and the integrity of nature. Environmental Ethics 6 (4):293-322.   (Google)
Abstract: During the twentieth century, John Muir’s ideas of “righteous management” were eclipsed by Gifford Pinchot’s anthropocentric scientific management ideas conceming the conservation and development of Nature as a human resource. Ecology as a subversive science, however, has now undercut the foundations of this resource conservation and development ideology. Using the philosophical principles of deepecology, we explore a contemporary version of Muir’s “righteous management” by developing the ideas of holistic management and ecosystem rehabilitation
Dobos, Ned (2010). A state to call their own: Insurrection, intervention, and the communal integrity thesis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):26-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Many reasons have been given as to why humanitarian intervention might not be justified even where rebellion with similar aims would be a morally legitimate option. One of them is that intervention involves the imposition of alien values on the target society. Michael Walzer formulates this objection in terms of a people's right to a state that 'expresses their inherited culture' and that they can truly 'call their own'. I argue that this right can plausibly be said to extend sovereignty to at least some illiberal governments, and therefore to impose at least some moral constraints on humanitarian intervention. The problem for Walzer is that this right cannot form the basis of a constraint that applies to foreign intervention exclusively. Once the details of Walzer's argument are teased out, it becomes apparent that civil war and revolution must be equally restricted by this right. Hence a people's prerogative to be governed in accordance with familiar traditions cannot coherently be invoked to show that intervention is impermissible in cases where insurrection is taken to be justified
Dresser, Rebecca (2001). Cosmetic reproductive services and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 1 (1):11 – 12.   (Google)
Dudzinski, Denise M. (2004). Integrity in the relationship between medical ethics and professionalism. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (2):26 – 27.   (Google)
Dudzinski, Denise M. (2004). Integrity: Principled coherence, virtue, or both? Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3).   (Google)
Dunne, Joseph & Hogan, Pádraig (eds.) (2004). Education and Practice: Upholding the Integrity of Teaching and Learning. Blackwell.   (Google)
Easton, Susan (1995). Taking women's rights seriously: Integrity and the “right” to consume pornography. Res Publica 1 (2).   (Google)
Eyal, Nir (2009). Is the body special? Review of Cécile Fabre, whose body is it anyway? Justice and the integrity of the person. Utilitas 21 (2):233-245.   (Google)
Fadel, Petrina (2003). Respect for bodily integrity: A catholic perspective on circumcision in catholic hospitals. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (2):23 – 25.   (Google)
Fleischacker, Samuel (1992). Integrity and Moral Relativism. E.J. Brill.   (Google)
Frankel, Mark S. & Bird, Stephanie J. (2003). The role of scientific societies in promoting research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Friedman, Marilyn A. (1985). Moral integrity and the deferential wife. Philosophical Studies 47 (1).   (Google)
Geller, Lisa N. (2002). Exploring the role of the research integrity officer. Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (4).   (Google)
Gheaus, Anca (2006). Review of Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (12).   (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (3):215-33.   (Google)
Godlovitch, Stan (1993). The integrity of musical performance. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (4):573-587.   (Google | More links)
Goodstein, Jerry & Potter, RobertLyman (1999). Beyond financial incentives: Organizational ethics and organizational integrity. HEC Forum 11 (4).   (Google)
Gorski, A. (1996). Scientific integrity: Review of the symposium held in warsaw, Poland, 23 november 1995. Science and Engineering Ethics 2 (4).   (Google)
Gosling, Mark & Huang, Heh Jason (forthcoming). The fit between integrity and integrative social contracts theory. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of integrity appears in many arguments and theories in business ethics and organizational behavior where it plays multiple roles. It has been shown to have desirable organizational outcomes and is held as important by the academic and practitioner alike. Yet despite its prominence there are a variety of approaches to defining and conceptualizing it and little existent theory to explain its nature. We offer integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) as a framework that can anchor integrity in ethical theory and also encompass aspects of integrity such as wholeness, consistency, and authenticity. In addition we show how ISCT can resolve some of the challenges to definitions of integrity that have been raised in the literature and hence we provide some suggestions for future academic research and suggestions for the practitioner
Gowans, Christopher W. (1984). Integrity in the corporation: The plight of corporate product advocates. Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The integrity of corporate product advocates (advertisers and salespersons) is questionable for the same reason the integrity of lawyers is questionable. In both cases the requirements of a professional role inevitably lead to forms of deception. However, the integrity of lawyers has been taken to be a more serious issue than the integrity of product advocates. I consider why this is so, and I conclude that we should pay more attention to the integrity issue in the corporate case. In addition, I consider a parallel set of arguments that purport to justify a lack of integrity among product advocates and lawyers respectively. According to these arguments, a great social good is obtained from the institutions, corporate and legal, of which these persons are essential participants. Against these arguments, I emphasize the overriding importance of integrity, both within institutions and in society at large
Graham, Jody L. (2001). Does integrity require moral goodness? Ratio 14 (3):234–251.   (Google | More links)
Grant, Ruth Weissbourd (1997). Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Questioning the usual judgements of political ethics, Ruth W. Grant argues that hypocrisy can actually be constructive while strictly principled behavior can be destructive. Hypocrisy and Integrity offers a new conceptual framework that clarifies the differences between idealism and fanaticism while it uncovers the moral limits of compromise. "Exciting and provocative. . . . Grant's work is to be highly recommended, offering a fresh reading of Rousseau and Machiavelli as well as presenting a penetrating analysis of hypocrisy and integrity."--Ronald J. Terchek, American Political Science Review "A great refreshment. . . . With liberalism's best interests at heart, Grant seeks to make available a better understanding of the limits of reason in politics."--Peter Berkowitz, New Republic
Grant, Ruth W. (1994). Integrity and politics: An alternative reading of Rousseau. Political Theory 22 (3):414-443.   (Google | More links)
Grinin, Leonid & Korotayev, Andrey (2009). Social macroevolution: Growth of the world system integrity and a system of phase transitions. World Futures 65 (7):477 – 506.   (Google)
Abstract: There are very significant conceptual links between theories of social macroevolution and theories of the World System development. It is shown that the growth of the World System complexity and integrity can be traced through a system of phase transitions of macroevolution. The first set of phase transition is connected with the agrarian, industrial, and information-scientific revolutions (that are interpreted as changes of “production principles”). The second set consists of phase transitions within one production principle. These phase transitions are analyzed on the basis of the World System urbanization dynamics, but they can be traced with respect to the other (cultural, economic, technological, demographic, political, etc.) dimensions of the World System development
Guerrette, Richard H. (1986). Environmental integrity and corporate responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 5 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Environmental disasters like Bhopal have a way of calling attention to environmental and corporate ethical issues. This paper discusses these issues in terms of a livable environment as an inalienable right and of corporate responsibility as an philosophical and social psychological disposition that enables corporations to respect that right. The corporate conscience is compared to the individual conscience and analyzed according to the moral development theories of Lawrence Kohlberg. Its moral development is recognized as problematic from the cited performance records of some leading multinational corporations and from the anti-environmental lobbying efforts of the chemical industry itself. Outreach programs in environmental health associated with research projects in corporate ethics are suggested to develop the corporate conscience for preserving environmental integrity through corporate responsibility
Guinn, David E. (2000). Corporate compliance and integrity programs: The uneasy alliance between law and ethics. HEC Forum 12 (4).   (Google)
Gutmann, James (1945). Integrity as a standard of valuation. Journal of Philosophy 42 (8):210-216.   (Google | More links)
Gyorfi, Tamas (ms). The arbitration conception of authority, law as integrity and normative positivism.   (Google)
Abstract:      In the first part of my essay I will argue that there is a strong relationship between our view of authority and the desirability of preemptive reasons. More specifically, we have strong reasons to regard legal norms as preemptive reasons only if we accept the service conception of authority. I suggest, however, that an alternative account of authority - which I shall call the arbitrator model - gives us a better account of what legal authority demands and how it works. In the second part of my essay I suggest that we should recast the debate between Dworkinian law as integrity and normative positivism as a debate between two different attempts to put flesh on the bones of the arbitrator model of authority
Haack, Susan (ms). The ideal of intellectual integrity, in life and literature.   (Google)
Abstract:      A philosophical exploration of the ideal of intellectual integrity drawing on Samuel Butler's semi-autobiographical Bildungsroaman, The Way of All Flesh; and relating this to C.S. Peirce's idea of the scientific attitude and Percy Bridgman's reflections on the conditions needed for this ideal to flourish
Haack, Susan (ms). The integrity of science: What it means, why it matters.   (Google)
Abstract:      The many meanings of integrity are distinguished. This paper focuses specifically on how the concept of integrity in the sense of firm adherence to values applies to science qua institution. The most relevant values - the epistemological values of evidence-sharing and respect for evidence - are articulated, and shown to be rooted in the character of the scientific enterprise. This paves the way for an exploration of the circumstances that presently threaten to erode commitment to these core values: an exploration illustrated by the disturbing saga of the arthritis drugs Vioxx and Celebrex. The paper concludes with an articulation of why the erosion of scientific integrity should concern us
Hagenmeyer, Ulrich (2007). Integrity in management consulting: A contradiction in terms? Business Ethics 16 (2):107–113.   (Google | More links)
Halfon, Mark S. (1989). Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry. Temple University Press.   (Google)
Hansson, Mats G. (2000). Protecting research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:  It is not contoversial to state that acts of fraud do not belong in the academic world. What is debated is the best way to minimise the risk of fraudulent behaviour. Broadly speaking there are two different approaches to this problem. They differ with regard to whether the main focus is on internal or external control. In this article I argue that the main emphasis should be on internal structures in order to achieve the desired end. Only when the internal structures are in place is it meaningful to adopt external, supportive means to the same end. Invitation to the academic project as such, education and training in research ethics and good research practice, the implementation of good documentation procedures and the implementation of a procedure for investigation of suspicions of fraud which is characterised by efficiency, impartiality and competence are the four primary ingredients in the cure. The first three are suggested to build up the necessary foundation before a structure of investigation procedures are established
Harris, Jared & Souder, David (2004). Bad apples or bad bushel?: Ethics, efficiency, and capital market integrity. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 23 (1/2):201-222.   (Google)
Harris, George W. (1989). Integrity and agent centered restrictions. Noûs 23 (4):437-456.   (Google | More links)
Harcourt, Edward (1998). Integrity, practical deliberation and utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):189-198.   (Google | More links)
Harris, John (1974). Williams on negative responsibility and integrity. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (96):265-273.   (Google | More links)
Hershovitz, Scott (2006). Integrity and stare decisis. In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Holton, Gerald (2005). Candor and integrity in science. Synthese 145 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   In the pursuit of researches and in the reporting of their results, the individual scientist as well as the community of fellow professionals rely implicitly on the researcher embracing the habit of truthfulness, a main pillar of the ethos of science. Failure to adhere to the twin imperatives of candor and integrity will be adjudged intolerable and, by virtue of science’s self-policing mechanisms, rendered the exception to the rule. Yet both as philosophical concepts and in practice, candor and integrity are complex, difficult to define clearly, and difficult to convey easily to those entering on scientific careers. Therefore it is useful to present operational examples of two major scientists who exemplified devotion to candor and integrity in scientific research
Holleman, Warren & Chappell, Cynthia (1993). Should academic ethics committees be available to review lapses in scientific integrity? No. HEC Forum 5 (1).   (Google)
Honneth, Axel (1992). Integrity and disrespect: Principles of a conception of morality based on the theory of recognition. Political Theory 20 (2):187-201.   (Google | More links)
Hundleby, Catherine (2002). The open end: Social naturalism, feminist values and the integrity of epistemology. Social Epistemology 16 (3):251 – 265.   (Google)
Iltis, Ana Smith (2001). Organizational ethics and institutional integrity. HEC Forum 13 (4).   (Google)
Iltis, Ana Smith (2005). Values based decision making: Organizational mission and integrity. HEC Forum 17 (1).   (Google)
Iseda, Tetsuji (2008). How should we Foster the professional integrity of engineers in japan? A pride-based approach. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  I discuss the predicament that engineering-ethics education in Japan now faces and propose a solution to this. The predicament is professional motivation, i.e., the problem of how to motivate engineering students to maintain their professional integrity. The special professional responsibilities of engineers are often explained either as an implicit social contract between the profession and society (the “social-contract” view), or as requirements for membership in the profession (the “membership-requirement” view). However, there are empirical data that suggest that such views will not do in Japan, and this is the predicament that confronts us. In this country, the profession of engineering did not exist 10 years ago and is still quite underdeveloped. Engineers in this country do not have privileges, high income, or high social status. Under such conditions, neither the social-contract view nor the membership-requirement view is convincing. As an alternative approach that might work in Japan, I propose a pride-based view. The notion of pride has been analyzed in the virtue-ethics literature, but the full potential of this notion has not been explored. Unlike other kinds of pride, professional pride can directly benefit the general public by motivating engineers to do excellent work even without social rewards, since being proud of themselves is already a reward. My proposal is to foster a particular kind of professional pride associated with the importance of professional services in society, as the motivational basis for professional integrity. There is evidence to suggest that this model works
Iutcovich, Joyce M.; Kennedy, John M. & Levine, Felice J. (2003). Establishing an ethical climate in support of research integrity: Efforts and activities of the american sociological association. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The article provides an overview of the recent efforts and activities of the American Sociological Association (ASA) to keep its Code of Ethics visible and relevant to its membership. The development process and challenges associated with the most recent revision of the ASA’s code are reviewed, the current education and support activities are described, and other strategies for taking a proactive and leadership role in establishing an ethical climate are proposed. In conclusion, while the ASA has made significant progress in this area, it recognizes that a lot of work remains
Iverson, Margot; Frankel, Mark S. & Siang, Sanyin (2003). Scientific societies and research integrity: What are they doing and how well are they doing it? Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Scientific societies can play an important role in promoting ethical research practices among their members, and over the past two decades several studies have addressed how societies perform this role. This survey continues this research by examining current efforts by scientific societies to promote research integrity among their members. The data indicate that although many of the societies are working to promote research integrity through ethics codes and activities, they lack rigorous assessment methods to determine the effectiveness of their efforts
Jensen, Henning (1989). Kant and moral integrity. Philosophical Studies 57 (2).   (Google)
Johns, Beverley H. (2008). Ethical Dilemmas in Education: Standing Up for Honesty and Integrity. Rowman & Littlefield Education.   (Google)
Kaptein, Muel (2002). The Balanced Company: A Theory of Corporate Integrity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book contains a cohesive overview of the most important theories and insights in the field of business ethics. At the same time, it further tailors these theories to the situation in which organizations function, presenting criteria that can be used to measure, assess, improve and report on corporate integrity
Kerr, Donna H. (1984). Barriers to Integrity: Modern Modes of Knowledge Utilization. Westview Press.   (Google)
Kerr, Steven (1988). Integrity in effective leadership. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Kisamore, Jennifer L.; Stone, Thomas H. & Jawahar, I. M. (2007). Academic integrity: The relationship between individual and situational factors on misconduct contemplations. Journal of Business Ethics 75 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent, well-publicized scandals, involving unethical conduct have rekindled interest in academic misconduct. Prior studies of academic misconduct have focussed exclusively on situational factors (e.g., integrity culture, honor codes), demographic variables or personality constructs. We contend that it is important to also examine how␣these classes of variables interact to influence perceptions of and intentions relating to academic misconduct. In a sample of 217 business students, we examined how integrity culture interacts with Prudence and Adjustment to explain variance in estimated frequency of cheating, suspicions of cheating, considering cheating and reporting cheating. Age, integrity culture, and personality variables were significantly related to different criteria. Overall, personality variables explained the most unique variance in academic misconduct, and Adjustment interacted with integrity culture, such that integrity culture had more influence on intentions to cheat for less well-adjusted individuals. Implications for practice are discussed and future research directions are offered
Klockars, Carl B. (2006). Enhancing Police Integrity. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: How can we enhance police integrity? The authors surveyed over 3000 police officers from 30 U.S. police departments on how they would respond to typical scenarios where integrity is challenged. They studied three police agencies which scored highly on the integrity scale: Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and St. Petersburg, Florida. The authors conclude that enhancing police integrity goes well beyond culling out "bad apple" police officers. Police administrators should focus on four aspects: organizational rulemaking; detecting, investigating and disciplining rule violations; circumscribing the informal "code of silence" that prohibits police from reporting the misconduct of their colleagues; and understanding the influence of public expectations and agency history
Koehn, Daryl (2005). Integrity as a business asset. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3).   (Google)
Abstract: . In this post-Enron era, we have heard much talk about the need for integrity. Today’s employees perceive it as being in short supply. A recent survey by the Walker Consulting Firm found that less than half of workers polled thought their senior leaders were people of high integrity. To combat the perceived lack of corporate integrity, companies are stressing their probity. This stress is problematic because executives tend to instrumentalize the value of integrity. This paper argues that integrity needs to be better defined because the current mode of talking about the subject is misleading. The paper considers three traditions’ understanding of the idea of integrity, argues that integrity is intrinsically valuable, and concludes with some reflections on the way in which integrity, properly understood, functions as a business asset
Kolb, David A. (1988). Integrity, advanced professional development, and learning. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Korsgaard, Christine M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity -- Kant on the hypothetical imperative -- Against particularistic willing -- Deciding and predicting -- Autonomy and efficacy -- The function of action -- The possibility of agency -- Non-rational action -- Action -- Attribution -- The psychology of action -- Expulsion from the garden : the transition to humanity -- Instinct, emotion, intelligence, and reason -- The parts of the soul -- Inside or outside -- Pull yourself together -- The constitutional model -- Models of the soul -- The city and the soul -- Platonic virtues -- Justice : substantive, procedural, and platonic -- Kant and the constitutional model -- Defective action -- The problem of bad action -- Being governed by the wrong law -- Or five bad constitutions -- Conceptions of evil -- Degrees of action -- Integrity and interaction -- Deciding to be bad -- The ordinary cases -- Dealing with the disunified -- Kant's theory of interaction -- My reasons -- Deciding to treat someone as an end in himself -- Interacting with yourself -- How to be a person -- What's left of me?
Kornhauser, Lewis A. & Sager, Lawrence G. (2004). The many as one: Integrity and group choice in paradoxical cases. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3):249–276.   (Google | More links)
Kroon, Frederick (2008). Fear and integrity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):pp. 31-49.   (Google)
Kuczewski, Mark (2001). Is informed consent enough? Monetary incentives for research participation and the integrity of biomedicine. American Journal of Bioethics 1 (2):49 – 51.   (Google)
Kwall, Roberta Rosenthal, The soul of creativity: Should intellectual property law protect the integrity of a creator's work - international norms.   (Google)
Abstract:      This Chapter explores in general terms the treatment accorded authors in foreign jurisdictions. In contrast to the United States, many countries maintain authors' rights protections that enable authors to safeguard the integrity of their texts far more readily than authors in this country. Thus, the United States is out of step with global norms by not recognizing more substantial authors' rights. Moreover, the Internet environment makes the United States' deficiency particularly problematic because violations of textual integrity can occur with unprecedented ease, and the results can be disseminated to countless recipients with the mere press of a key. Yet, these differences cannot be so easily remedied because certain cultural and legal differences preclude the wholesale adoption of another country's approach absent careful consideration of its fit into our existing legal framework
Larson, Gerald James (1999). On the integrity of the yoga darśana: A review. International Journal of Hindu Studies 3 (2).   (Google)
LeClair, Debbie Thorne (1998). Integrity Management: A Guide to Managing Legal and Ethical Issues in the Workplace. University of Tampa Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Managing integrity -- Identifying ethical and legal issues in the workplace -- Understanding decision making in the workplace -- Managing organizational culture for integrity -- Increasing legal pressure for ethical compliance -- Developing an effective organizational integrity program -- Implementing ethics and legal compliance training -- Managing integrity in a global economy -- Creating the good citizen organization -- Benefiting from best practices.
Levine, Felice J. & Iutcovich, Joyce M. (2003). Challenges in studying the effects of scientific societies on research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Beyond impressionistic observations, little is known about the role and influence of scientific societies on research conduct. Acknowledging that the influence of scientific societies is not easily disentangled from other factors that shape norms and practices, this article addresses how best to study the promotion of research integrity generally as well as the role and impact of scientific societies as part of that process. In setting forth the parameters of a research agenda, the article addresses four issues: (1) how to conceptualize research on scientific societies and research integrity; (2) challenges and complexities in undertaking basic research; (3) strategies for undertaking basic research that is attentive to individual, situational, organizational, and environmental levels of analysis; and (4) the need for evaluation research as integral to programmatic change and to assessment of the impact of activities by scientific societies
Lichtenstein, Scott; Higgins, Les & Pat Dade, (2008). Engaging the board: Integrity, values and the board agenda. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 4 (1):79-98.   (Google)
Abstract: Directors rate integrity as having the greatest impact on successful Board performance. Yet, no shared meaning exists about what integrity means because it is dependent on one's personal values. This paper builds on research into integrity and top teams by investigating how integrity varies by director's personal values and implications for the Board agenda. It will explore how executives' and directors' definitions of integrity are based on their values, beliefs and underlying needs. Data from UK society was collected from 500 UK adults, aged 18 and over. Results of the research found that definitions of integrity vary by ones value system. Implications include that what director's mean by integrity differs substantially from other employees with different values. Recommendations include re-focusing the Board agenda on issues that resonate with the director's personal values. A passionate Board requires integrity plus action; action without integrity equals indifference
Linker, Maureen (1999). Review essay: A coherentist epistemology with integrity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Linda Alcoff, Real Knowing (reviewed by Maureen Linker)
Lomax, Karen J. & Garthwaite, Thomas L. (1997). Vha's mission: Institutional integrity, non-abandonment and VHA special emphasis programs. HEC Forum 9 (2).   (Google)
Lucas, Gale M. & Friedrich, James (2005). Individual differences in workplace deviance and integrity as predictors of academic dishonesty. Ethics and Behavior 15 (1):15 – 35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meta-analytic findings have suggested that individual differences are relatively weaker predictors of academic dishonesty than are situational factors. A robust literature on deviance correlates and workplace integrity testing, however, demonstrates that individual difference variables can be relatively strong predictors of a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). To the extent that academic cheating represents a kind of counterproductive behavior in the work role of "student", employment-type integrity measures should be strong predictors of academic dishonesty. Our results with a college student sample showed that integrity test scores were moderate to strong correlates of self-reported academic cheating and that these relationships persisted even after controlling for a variety of measurement concerns such as item format similarity, concurrent assessment, and socially desirable responding. Implications for institutional honor codes and the broader relations between educational and workplace dishonesty are discussed
Maak, Thomas (2008). Undivided corporate responsibility: Towards a theory of corporate integrity. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In the years since Enron corporate social responsibility, or “CSR,” has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in both research and business practice. CSR is used as an umbrella term to describe much of what is done in terms of ethics-related activities in firms around the globe to such an extent that some consider it a “tortured concept” (Godfrey and Hatch 2007, Journal of Business Ethics 70, 87–98). Addressing this skepticism, I argue in this article that the focus on CSR is indeed problematic for three main reasons: (1) the term carries a lot of historical baggage – baggage that is not necessarily conducive to the clarity of the concept; (2) it is the object of increasing ethical instrumentalism; and (3) given the multiple ethical challenges that corporations face, and given the fact that the “social” responsibilities of business are but one set of corporate responsibilities, a suitable term would have to be more inclusive and integrative. I therefore suggests moving instead toward a sound definition of corporate integrity and aim in this article to develop a working definition by fleshing out “7 Cs” of integrity: commitment, conduct, content, context, consistency, coherence, and continuity. I then discuss how these 7 Cs impact our understanding of CSR or, more broadly, corporate responsibility in general
Macklin, Ruth (1996). Disagreement, consensus, and moral integrity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments experienced some disagreements among its members in the course of its work. An epistemological controversy over the nature and degree of evidence required to draw ethical conclusions pervaded the committee's deliberations. Other disagreements involved the proper role of a governmental advisory committee and the question of when it is appropriate to notify people that they were unknowing subjects of radiation experiments. In the end, the Committee was able to reach consensus on almost all of its findings and recommendations through a process that preserved the integrity of its members
Maccoby, Michael (1988). Integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
MacIver, Robert M. (ed.) (1972). Integrity and Compromise. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.   (Google)
MacCallum Jr, Gerald C. (1971). Reform, violence, and personal integrity. Inquiry 14 (1-4):301 – 314.   (Google)
Macfarlane, Bruce (2004). Teaching with Integrity: The Ethics of Higher Education Practice. Routledgefalmer.   (Google)
Abstract: While many books focus on the broader socially ethical topics of widening participation and promoting equal opportunities, this unique book concentrates specifically on the lecturer's professional responsibilities. Bruce Macfarlane analyzes the pros and cons of prescriptive professional codes of practice employed by many universities and proposes the active development of professional virtues over bureaucratic recommendations. The material is presented in a scholarly yet accessible style and case examples are used throughout to encourage a practical, reflective approach
Madry, Alan (2005). Global concepts, local rules, practices of adjudication and Ronald dworkin’s law as integrity. Law and Philosophy 24 (3):211-238.   (Google | More links)
Magill, Gerard & Prybil, Lawrence (2004). Stewardship and integrity in health care: A role for organizational ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Media reporting of recent business scandals, ranging from systemic accounting fraud to individual executive greed, has shed new light on the urgent need for organizational ethics in corporate America. The essay argues that organizational ethics can foster virtuous organizations by developing their sense of stewardship and integrity. This approach can inspire the ethical decision-making processes and standards of conduct for personnel throughout the organization. Another crucial role for organizational ethics is to regain lost trust and to recover the confidence of our communities, whether we are discussing the business community or the health care community. Corporate America and organizations in health care need to win back the respect of skeptical customers, disheartened patients, and distrusting communities. But this task can be accomplished properly only when organizations and their business practices have a renewed commitment to ethics. The essay discusses how organizational ethics can permeate the entire organization in order to instill trust and confidence among its constituencies. Although the focus of the essay is upon the role of organizational ethics in health care, the argument also applies to the renewal of business practices in corporations across the nation
Martin, Daniel E.; Rao, Asha & Sloan, Lloyd R. (2009). Plagiarism, integrity, and workplace deviance: A criterion study. Ethics and Behavior 19 (1):36 – 50.   (Google)
Abstract: Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime
Markovits, Daniel (2008). The architecture of integrity stories and self-conceptions. In Daniel Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams. Routledge.   (Google)
Mason, Mark (2001). The ethics of integrity: Educational values beyond postmodern ethics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (1):47–69.   (Google | More links)
McCann, Jack & Holt, Roger (2009). Ethical leadership and organizations: An analysis of leadership in the manufacturing industry based on the perceived leadership integrity scale. Journal of Business Ethics 87 (2).   (Google)
McCullough, Laurence B. (2002). Power, integrity, and trust in the managed practice of medicine: Lessons from the history of medical ethics. Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):180-211.   (Google)
McFall, Lynne (1987). Integrity. Ethics 98 (1):5-20.   (Google | More links)
McLeod, Carolyn (2004). Integrity and self-protection. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):216–232.   (Google | More links)
Mentkowski, Marcia (1988). Paths to integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Miller, Franklin G. & Brody, Howard (2005). Enhancement technologies and professional integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):15 – 17.   (Google)
Miller, Alexander (1997). Lenin's anticipation of Bernard Williams's integrity objection to utilitarianism. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4).   (Google)
Mitcham, Carl (2003). Co-responsibility for research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  To enlarge the discussion of scientific responsibility for research integrity, this paper offers two historico-philosophical observations. First, in the broad history of ideas, modern ethics replaces social role responsibility with appeals to abstract principles; by contrast, discussions within the scientific community of responsibility for research integrity constitute a rediscovery of the continuing vitality of role responsibility. This is a rediscovery from which philosophy itself may benefit. Second, within the context of scientists’ concerns, the idea of role responsibility has undergone significant evolution from “collective responsibility” to the notion of responsibility resting with a “trans-scientific community.” Further challenges nevertheless remain in order to relate scientific role responsibility for scientific integrity to the relationship between science and society. To promote a notion of integrity not just in science but in the science-society relationship, it may be useful to think in terms of a “co-responsibility” for scientific integrity
Miya, Pamela A. & Pinch, Winifred J. (1993). Should academic ethics committees be available to review lapses in scientific integrity? Yes. HEC Forum 5 (1).   (Google)
Moland, Lydia L. (2006). Moral integrity and regret in nursing. In Sioban Nelson & Suzanne Gordon (eds.), The Complexities of Care: Nursing Reconsidered. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Montefiore, Alan & Vines, David (eds.) (1999). Integrity in the Public and Private Domains. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Integrity is one of the most hotly debated topics in applied philosophy today. In this new work, men and women of varied practical and theoretical experience engage in rigorous debate in an effort to better understand the specific demands of integrity in their respective professions
Morito, Bruce (1999). Examining ecosystem integrity. Environmental Ethics 21 (1):59-73.   (Google)
Abstract: Attempts to come to grip with what appears to be the autonomy of nature have developed into several schools of thought. Among the most influential of these schools is the ecosystem integrity approach to environmental ethics, management and policy. The philosophical arm of the approach has been spearheaded by Laura Westra and her work in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics. The emphasis that this school places on pristine wilderness to model ecosystem integrity and the arguments Westra devises to justify the application of what she calls the “principle of integrity,” although clear in its goal and object of inquiry, could very well retrench dualistic thinking of the sort that environmental thinkers have been trying to undermine. More importantly, I argue that Westra misses an important implication for the way in which ecosystem integrity could be used to help develop an ethic not so confined by problems of justification in attaching values to facts and descriptions to prescriptions
Morrison, Allen (2001). Integrity and global leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 31 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses the role of integrity in global leadership. It reviews the philosophy of ethics and suggests that both contractarianism and pluralism are particularly helpful in understanding ethics from a global leadership perspective. It also reviews the challenges to integrity that come through interactions that are both external and internal to the company. Finally, the paper provides helpful suggestions on how global leaders can define appropriate ethical standards for themselves and their organizations
Morton, I. W. (1900). Is commercial integrity increasing? International Journal of Ethics 11 (1):47-59.   (Google | More links)
Mumford, Michael D.; Murphy, Stephen T.; Connelly, Shane; Hill, Jason H.; Antes, Alison L.; Brown, Ryan P. & Devenport, Lynn D. (2007). Environmental influences on ethical decision making: Climate and environmental predictors of research integrity. Ethics and Behavior 17 (4):337 – 366.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that early career experiences influence ethical behavior. One way early career experiences might operate is to influence the decisions people make when presented with problems that raise ethical concerns. To test this proposition, 102 first-year doctoral students were asked to complete a series of measures examining ethical decision making along with a series of measures examining environmental experiences and climate perceptions. Factoring of the environmental measure yielded five dimensions: professional leadership, poor coping, lack of rewards, limited competitive pressure, and poor career direction. Factoring of the climate inventory yielded four dimensions: equity, interpersonal conflict, occupational engagement, and work commitment. When these dimensions were used to predict performance on the ethical decision-making task, it was found that the environmental dimensions were better predictors than the climate dimensions. The implications of these findings for research on ethical conduct are discussed
Murray, David J. & Kucia, Marek (1995). Business integrity in transitional economies: Central & eastern europe. Business Ethics 4 (2):76–82.   (Google | More links)
Murray, Thomas H. & Johnston, Josephine (eds.) (2010). Trust and Integrity in Biomedical Research: The Case of Financial Conflicts of Interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Musschenga, Albert W. (2001). Education for moral integrity. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (2):219–235.   (Google | More links)
, Unknown, Why moral theory is boring and corrupt.   (Google)
Abstract: Contemporary academic moral theory is a territory partitioned between a number of highly professionalised and (on the face of it) fiercely opposed schools of thought—consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, contractualism, natural law theory, sentimentalism and others. Not every academic ethicist is aligned with any of these schools, but most are, and all face insistent pressure to become aligned. (For example, appointing committees for ethics jobs often ask “What sort of ethicist are you?”, and tend, both intentionally and unintentionally, to penalise complex or unusual answers.)
Noggle, Robert (1999). Integrity, the self, and desire-based accounts of the good. Philosophical Studies 96 (3).   (Google)
Novitz, David (1990). The integrity of aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (1):9-20.   (Google | More links)
O'Dea, Jane (1997). Integrity and the feminist teacher. Journal of Philosophy of Education 31 (2):267–282.   (Google | More links)
Ortiz, Gavrell & Elizabeth, Sara (2004). Beyond welfare: Animal integrity, animal dignity, and genetic engineering. Ethics and the Environment 9 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : Bernard Rollin argues that it is permissible to change an animal's telos through genetic engineering, if it doesn't harm the animal's welfare. Recent attempts to undermine his argument rely either on the claim that diminishing certain capacities always harms an animal's welfare or on the claim that it always violates an animal's integrity. I argue that these fail. However, respect for animal dignity provides a defeasible reason not to engineer an animal in a way that inhibits the development of those functions that a member of its species can normally perform, even if the modification would improve the animal's welfare
Pagon, Milan (ed.) (2000). Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Ethics, Integrity, and Human Rights. College of Police and Security Studies.   (Google)
Parry, Ken W. & Proctor-Thomson, Sarah B. (2002). Perceived integrity of transformational leaders in organisational settings. Journal of Business Ethics 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The ethical nature of transformational leadership has been hotly debated. This debate is demonstrated in the range of descriptors that have been used to label transformational leaders including narcissistic, manipulative, and self-centred, but also ethical, just and effective. Therefore, the purpose of the present research was to address this issue directly by assessing the statistical relationship between perceived leader integrity and transformational leadership using the Perceived Leader Integrity Scale (PLIS) and the Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). In a national sample of 1354 managers a moderate to strong positive relationship was found between perceived integrity and the demonstration of transformational leadership behaviours. A similar relationship was found between perceived integrity and developmental exchange leadership. A systematic leniency bias was identified when respondents rated subordinates vis-à-vis peer ratings. In support of previous findings, perceived integrity was also found to correlate positively with leader and organisational effectiveness measures
Pascal, Chris B. (1999). The history and future of the office of research integrity: Scientific misconduct and beyond. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This paper looks at the issues and controversies that led to creation of the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) and that dominated its agenda in the early years. The successes and failures of ORI are described and new problems identified. This paper then looks ahead to the future, considering what issues will dominate ORI’s agenda and affect the research institutions, individual scientists, and the scientific community in the next several years
Pascalev, Assya (2003). You are what you eat: Genetically modified foods, integrity, and society. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 16 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: Thus far, the moral debateconcerning genetically modified foods (GMF) hasfocused on extrinsic consequentialist questionsabout the health effects, environmental impacts,and economic benefits of such foods. Thisextrinsic approach to the morality of GMF isdependent on unsubstantiated empirical claimsand fails to account for the intrinsic moralvalue of food and food choice and theirconnection to the agent's concept of the goodlife. I develop a set of objections to GMFgrounded in the concept of integrity andmaintain that food and food choice can beintimately connected to the agent's personalintegrity. I argue that due to the constitutionof GMF and the manner in which they areproduced, such foods are incompatible with thefundamental values and integrity of certainindividual moral agents or groups. I identifythree types of integrity that are threatened byGMF: religious, consumer, and integrity basedon certain other moral or metaphysical grounds.I maintain that these types of integrity aresufficiently important to provide justificationfor political and societal actions to protectthe interests of those affected. I conclude byproposing specific steps for handling GMFconsistent with the moral principles ofinformed consent, non-maleficence, and respectfor the integrity of all members of society.They include mandatory labeling of GMF, theimplementation of a system for control andregulations concerning such foods, andguaranteed provision of conventional foods
Petrick, Joseph A. & Quinn, John F. (2001). The challenge of leadership accountability for integrity capacity as a strategic asset. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: The authors identify the challenge of holding contemporary business leaders accountable for enhancing the intangible strategic asset of integrity capacity in organizations. After defining integrity capacity and framing it as part of a strategic resource model of sustainable global competitive advantage, the stakeholder costs of integrity capacity neglect are delineated. To address this neglect issue, the authors focus on the cultivation of judgment integrity to handle behavioral, moral and hypothesized economic complexities as key dimensions of integrity capacity. Finally, the authors recommend two leadership practices to build competence in business leaders to enhance integrity capacity as an organizational strategic asset
Petrick, Joseph A. & Quinn, John F. (2000). The integrity capacity construct and moral progress in business. Journal of Business Ethics 23 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The authors propose the integrity capacity construct with its four dimensions (process, judgment, development and system dimensions) as a framework for analyzing and resolving behavioral, moral and legal complexity in business ethics' issues at the individual and collective levels. They claim that moral progress in business comes about through the increase in stakeholders who regularly handle moral complexity by demonstrating process, judgment, developmental and system integrity capacity domestically and globally
PhD, Florence Myrick RN (2004). Pedagogical integrity in the knowledge economy. Nursing Philosophy 5 (1):23–29.   (Google | More links)
Pimple, Kenneth D. (1999). Commentary on “the history and future of the office of research integrity: Scientific misconduct and beyond” (c. pascal). Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Pitman, Michael M. (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.   (Google | More links)
Poff, Deborah C. (2004). Challenges to integrity in university administration: Bad faith and loyal agency. Journal of Academic Ethics 2 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses a small but important subset of the challenges to ethical behaviour that face senior university administrators in their daily work, namely, errors in moral judgment which arise from over-identification and loyalty to the institution. The domain and precipitating factors are not unique to universities but may be more intensely experienced due to two features of the traditional public and private not-for-profit university that are unique. These features include the historical nature and purpose of a university and the role of the university professor in the production and dissemination of knowledge
Postema, Gerald J. (2004). Integrity : Justice in workclothes. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Prottas, David J. (2008). Perceived behavioral integrity: Relationships with employee attitudes, well-being, and absenteeism. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Relationships between the behavioral integrity of managers as perceived by employees and employee attitudes (job satisfaction and life satisfaction), well-being (stress and health), and behaviors (absenteeism) were tested using data from the 2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce (n = 2,820). Using multivariate and univariate analysis, perceived behavioral integrity (PBI) was positively related to job and life satisfaction and negatively related to stress, poor health, and absenteeism. The effect size for the relationship with job satisfaction was medium-to-large while the effect sizes with respect to the other variables were small-to-medium. There was no support for the hypotheses that women would perceive lower levels of behavioral integrity and that the strength of the relationships between PBI and the outcomes variables would be stronger among women than among men
Pugmire, David (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? What distinguishes good feeling from (just) feeling good? Is there such a distinction at all? The answer to these questions becomes clearer if we realize that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It may be that good feeling depends on feeling truly if we are to be really moved, moved in the way that avoids the need for constant, fretful replenishment and reinforcement. To be sound, emotions may need to be capable of genuineness, depth, and other kinds of integrity. And that, in turn, may require certain virtues of mind, such as truthfulness, temperateness, and even courage, that are more familiar at the level of action. The governing aim of this book is to demonstrate that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions and the emotional life
Rajczi, Alex (2009). Consequentialism, integrity, and ordinary morality. Utilitas 21 (3):377-392.   (Google)
Ramsay, Hayden (1997). Beyond Virtue: Integrity and Morality. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Virtue ethics or natural law? Most contemporary accounts treat these as rival approaches. This book argues both are necessary since virtue is commitment to objective human goods. It also argues integrity is planning one's life by commitment to reasonableness, rejects traditional natural law and virtue ethics for more deontological accounts of the human good and virtue, and explains human personhood accordingly. Part 2 then analyses Aquinas's accounts of emotion, the body and happiness in terms of integrity
Raz, Joseph (2004). Speaking with one voice : On Dworkinian integrity and coherence. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Ridge, Michael, Agent-neutral consequentialism from the inside-out: Concern for integrity without self-indulgence.   (Google)
Abstract: Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses
RN, M. A. (2004). Integrity and moral residue: Nurses as participants in a moral community. Nursing Philosophy 5 (2):127–134.   (Google | More links)
Rollin, Bernard E. (2003). Ethics and species integrity. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):15 – 17.   (Google)
Rossouw, Deon (2008). Practising applied ethics with philosophical integrity: The case of business ethics. Business Ethics 17 (2):161–170.   (Google | More links)
Rosenstein, Leon (1976). The ontological integrity of the art object from the ludic viewpoint. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (3):323-336.   (Google | More links)
Russell, Barbara (forthcoming). Reflections on 'autistic integrity'. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Autism, particularly its moderate to severe forms, has prompted considerable scientific study and clinical involvement because the associated behaviours imply disconnections with valued features of a 'good' life, such as close relationships, enjoyment, and adaptability. Proposed causes of autism involve potent philosophical concepts including consciousness, identity, mind, and relationality. The concept of autistic integrity is used by Barnbaum in The Ethics of Autism: Among Them, But Not of Them to help provide moral justification to stop efforts to cure adults with autism, especially if the cause is presumed to be a lack of a theory of mind. 1 This article has two goals: (1) to apply four familiar definitions or characterizations of integrity to the case of moderate to severe autism, and (2) to examine whether autistic integrity does provide the moral justification Barnbaum seeks
Ryan, Christopher James (2009). Out on a limb: The ethical management of body integrity identity disorder. Neuroethics 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration of other treatment options
Ryan, Christopher James (2009). The ethical management of body integrity identity disorder: Reply to pies. Neuroethics 2 (3).   (Google)
Sabine, M. (2009). Body integrity identity disorder (biid)—is the amputation of healthy Limbs ethically justified? American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):36 – 43.   (Google)
Abstract: The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in analogy to the desire of transsexuals for surgical sex reassignment. Medical ethicists discuss the controversy about elective amputations of healthy limbs: on the one hand the principle of autonomy is used to deduce the right for body modifications; on the other hand the autonomy of BIID patients is doubted. Neurological results suggest that BIID is a brain disorder producing a disruption of the body image, for which parallels for stroke patients are known. If BIID were a neuropsychological disturbance, which includes missing insight into the illness and a specific lack of autonomy, then amputations would be contraindicated and must be evaluated as bodily injuries of mentally disordered patients. Instead of only curing the symptom, a causal therapy should be developed to integrate the alien limb into the body image
Sales, Bruce D. & Shuman, Daniel W. (1993). Guest editorial: Reclaiming the integrity of science in expert witnessing. Ethics and Behavior 3 (3 & 4):223 – 229.   (Google)
Abstract: Explores the impact of expert witnessing on the integrity of forensic scientific information. Complaints on the behavior of expert witnesses; Factors stimulating the susceptibility of experts to abandon their scientific integrity; Implications of the reliance of expert witnesses on ethics codes
Schilbrack, Kevin (2003). Thomas P. Kasulis, intimacy or integrity: Philosophy and cultural difference. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (1).   (Google)
Self, Donnie J. (1995). Moral integrity and values in medicine: Inaugurating a new section. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 16 (3).   (Google)
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine (2004). Preserving integrity against colonization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Genuine reconciliation between first- and third-person methodologies and knowledge requires respect for both phenomenological and scientific epistemologies. Recent pragmatic, theoretical, and verbal attempts at reconciliation by cognitive scientists compromise phenomenological method and knowledge. The basic question is thus: how do we begin reconciling first- and third-person epistemologies? Because life is the unifying concept across phenomenological and cognitive disciplines, a concept consistently if differentially exemplified in and by the phenomenon of movement, conceptual complementarities anchored in the animate properly provide the foundation for reconciliation. Research by people in neuroscience and in dynamic systems theory substantiate this thesis, providing fundamental examples of conceptual complementarity between phenomenology and science
Silverman, Henry J. (2000). Organizational ethics in healthcare organizations: Proactively managing the ethical climate to ensure organizational integrity. HEC Forum 12 (3).   (Google)
Smith, Dale (2006). The many faces of political integrity. In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (1999). A Better Way to Think About Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Is business ethics a contradiction in terms? Absolutely not, says Robert Solomon. In fact, he maintains that sound ethics is a necessary precondition of any long-term business enterprise, and that excellence in business must exist on the foundation of values that most of us hold dear. Drawing on twenty years of experience consulting with major corporations on ethics, Solomon clarifies the difficult ethical choices all people in business are faced with from time to time. He takes an "Aristotelian" approach to ethical questions, reminding readers that a corporation--like an individual--is embedded in a community, and that corporate values such as fairness and honesty are meaningless until transformed into action. Values--coupled with action--become virtues, and virtues make possible any good business corporate relationship. Without a base of shared values, trust and mutual benefits, today's national and international business world will fall apart. In keeping with his conviction that virtue and profit must thrive together, Solomon both examines the ways in which deficient values actually destroy businesses, and debunks the pervasive myths that encourage unethical business practices. Complete with a working catalog of virtues designed to illustrate the importance of integrity in any business situation, this compelling handbook contains a goldmine of wisdom for either the small business manager or the corporate executive struggling with ethical issues
Solomon, Robert C. (1992). Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The Greek philosopher Aristotle, writing over two thousand years before Wall Street, called people who engaged in activities which did not contribute to society "parasites." In his latest work, renowned scholar Robert C. Solomon asserts that though capitalism may require capital, but it does not require, much less should it be defined by the parasites it inevitably attracts. Capitalism has succeeded not with brute strength or because it has made people rich, but because it has produced responsible citizens and--however unevenly--prosperous communities. It cannot tolerate a conception of business that focuses solely on income and vulgarity while ignoring traditional virtues of responsibility, community, and integrity. Many feel that there is too much lip-service and not enough understanding of the importance of cooperation and integrity in corporate life. This book rejects the myths and metaphors of war-like competition that cloud business thinking and develops an "Aristotelean" theory of business. The author's approach emphasizes several core concepts: the corporation as community, the search for excellence, the importance of integrity and sound judgment, as well as a more cooperative and humane vision of business. Solomon stresses the virtues of honesty, trust, fairness, and compassion in the competitive business world, and confronts the problem of "moral mazes" and what he posits as its solution--moral courage
Spier, Raymond E. (2007). Some thoughts on the 2007 world conference on research integrity. Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4).   (Google)
Srivastva, Suresh (ed.) (1988). Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: Shows that executive integrity is not merely a moral trait but a dynamic process of making empathetic, responsible, and sound decisions. Describes key features of executive integrity including effective social interaction, open dialogue, and responsive leadershipand explains how integrity can be developed and practiced in today's organizations
Srivastva, Suresh & Barrett, Frank J. (1988). Foundations for executive integrity. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Steneck, Nicholas H. (2002). Institutional and individual responsibilities for integrity in research. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (4):51 – 53.   (Google)
Stearns, S. A. (2001). The student-instructor relationship's effect on academic integrity. Ethics and Behavior 11 (3):275 – 285.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this study, I surveyed students' evaluative perceptions of instructor behavior and their possible influence on academic dishonesty. Slightly over 20% of 1,369 student respondents admitted to academic dishonesty in at least 1 class during 1 term at college. Students who admitted to acts of academic dishonesty had lower overall evaluations of instructor behavior than students who reported not committing academic dishonesty. Implications for student learning and the enhancement of academic integrity in the classroom are discussed
student, Bryan Donnelly Doctoral (2008). Work and integrity: The crisis and promise of professionalism in America. World Futures 64 (3):222 – 225.   (Google)
Thomas, Alan (ms). Consequentialism, integrity and demandingness.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I will develop the argument that a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons is the only approach that can sustain a non-alienated relation to one’s character and ethical commitments. [Thomas, 2005] As a corollary of this claim, I will argue that moral reasons must be understood as reasonably partial. A view of this kind can, nevertheless, recognise the existence of general and positive obligations to humanity. Doing so does not undermine the view by leading to a highly demanding view of morality. Indeed, it offers a defence against the view that an analogy between obligations of immediate rescue to particular individuals and general and positive obligations to humanity leads to the conclusion that morality is highly demanding. The plan of this paper is as follows. The first section sets out the main elements of a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons. The second applies it to the test case of an argument that claims that one way in which one seeks to lead a non-alienated ethical life, a life of integrity, is incompatible with the requirements of consequentialism given certain very general facts about the moral state of the world. [Ashford, 2000] My..
Tichy, Noel M. & McGill, Andrew R. (eds.) (2003). The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead with Unyielding Integrity. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: The Enron debacle, the demise of Arthur Andersen, questionable practices at Tyco, Qwest, WorldCom, and a seemingly endless list of others have pushed public regard for business and business leaders to new lows. The need for smart leaders with vision and integrity has never been greater. Things need to change-- and it will not be easy. We can take a first step toward producing better business leaders by changing some of our own ideas about what it means to "win." Noel M. Tichy and Andrew R. McGill have brought together a stellar group of contributors from a variety of perspectives-- including General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, and renowned management gurus Robert Quinn and C. K. Prahalad, among others-- to offer insights that will help build better leaders, communities, and organizations. They show how to present a "Teachable Point of View" about business ethics that will help all leaders within an organization: Internalize core values Build a values-based culture across the organization Become engaged to teach the same values lessons to their staff Take action and raise the ethical bar Successful business leaders must be able to articulate their own unique Teachable Point of View on business ethics and drive it through their organization to ensure that everyone knows the ethical line and is neither shy nor silent if others risk crossing it
Trianosky, Gregory W. (1986). Moral integrity and moral psychology: A refutation of two accounts of the conflict between utilitarianism and integrity. Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (4).   (Google)
Van Bueren, Edith T. Lammerts & Struik, Paul C. (2005). Integrity and rights of plants: Ethical notions in organic plant breeding and propagation. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: In addition to obviating the use of synthetic agrochemicals and emphasizing farming in accordance with agro-ecological guidelines, organic farming acknowledges the integrity of plants as an essential element of its natural approaches to crop production. For cultivated plants, integrity refers to their inherent nature, wholeness, completeness, species-specific characteristics, and their being in balance with their (organically farmed) environment, while accomplishing their “natural aim.” We argue that this integrity of plants has ethical value, distinguishing integrity of life, plant-typic integrity, genotypic integrity, and phenotypic integrity. We have developed qualitative criteria to ethically evaluate existing practices and have applied these criteria to assess whether current plant breeding and propagation techniques violate the integrity of crop plants. This process has resulted in a design of a holistic, scientific approach of organic plant breeding and seed production. Our evaluation has met considerable criticism from mainstream (crop) scientists. We respond to the following questions: (1). Can ethics be incorporated into objective crop sciences? (2). What is the nature of the intrinsic value of plants in organic farming? We argue that criteria to take integrity into account can only be assessed from a holistic perspective and we show that a holistic approach is needed to design such ethical notions in a consistent way. The ethical notions have been further elaborated by formulating human responsibility and respect towards crop plants. Responsibility and respect can only be shown by providing crop plants the right to be nurtured and to express natural behavior at all levels of integrity
van Willigenburg, Theo (2000). Moral compromises, moral integrity and the indeterminacy of value rankings. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs
Verhezen, Peter (forthcoming). Giving voice in a culture of silence. From a culture of compliance to a culture of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Wamala, Edward (2008). Status to contract society: Africa's integrity crisis. Journal of Global Ethics 4 (3):195 – 205.   (Google)
Waters, James A. (1988). Integrity management. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Watson, Charles E. (1991). Managing with Integrity: Insights From America's Ceos. Praeger.   (Google)
Weber, James & Green, Sharon (1991). Principled moral reasoning: Is it a viable approach to promote ethical integrity? Journal of Business Ethics 10 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: In response to recent recommendations for the teaching of principled moral reasoning in business school curricula, this paper assesses the viability of such an approach. The results indicate that, while business students' level of moral reasoning in this sample are like most 18- to 21-year-olds, they may be incapable of grasping the concepts embodied in principled moral reasoning. Implications of these findings are discussed
Westra, Laura (2000). Living in integrity: A global ethic to restore a fragmented earth. Environmental Ethics 22 (1):101-103.   (Google)
Westra, Laura (1997). Post-normal science, the precautionary principle and the ethics of integrity. Foundations of Science 2 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Present laws and regulations even in democratic countries are not sufficient to prevent the grave environmental threats we face. Further, even environmental ethics, when they remain anthropocentric cannot propose a better approach. I argue that, taking in considerations the precautionary principle, and adopting the perspective of post-normal science, the ethics of integrity suggest a better way to reduce ecological threats and promote the human good globally
Whitley, Bernard E. & Keith-Spiegel, Patricia (2001). Academic integrity as an institutional issue. Ethics and Behavior 11 (3):325 – 342.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Academic dishonesty among students is not confined to the dynamics of the classrooms in which it occurs. The institution has a major role in fostering academic integrity. Ways that institutions can have a significant impact on attitudes toward and knowledge about academic integrity as well as reducing the incidence of academic dishonesty are described. These include the content of an effective academic honesty policy, campus-wide programs designed to foster integrity, and the development of a campus-wide ethos that encourages integrity
Whicher, Ian (1999). On the integrity of the yoga darśana: A response to Larson's review. International Journal of Hindu Studies 3 (2).   (Google)
White, Darin W. & Lean, Emily (2008). The impact of perceived leader integrity on subordinates in a work team environment. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Over the last decade, the increased use of work teams within organizations has been one of the most influential and far-reaching trends to shape the business world. At the same time, corporations have continued to struggle with increased unethical employee behavior. Very little research has been conducted that specifically examines the developmental aspects of employee ethical decision-making in a team environment. This study examines the impact of a team leader’s perceived integrity on his or her subordinates’ behavior. The results, which came from a survey of 245 MBA students functioning for 2 years in a work team environment, indicate an interaction between leader integrity and team member ethical intentions
Wijsbek, Henri (forthcoming). 'To thine own self be true': On the loss of integrity as a kind of suffering. Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the requirements in the Dutch regulation for euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the doctor must be satisfied 'that the patient's suffering is unbearable, and that there is no prospect of improvement.' In the notorious Chabot case, a psychiatrist assisted a 50 year old woman in suicide, although she did not suffer from any somatic disease, nor strictly speaking from any psychiatric condition. In Seduced by Death, Herbert Hendin concluded that apparently the Dutch regulation now allows physicians to assist anyone in suicide simply because he or she is unhappy. In this paper, I reject Hendin's conclusion and in particular his description of Mrs Boomsma as someone who was 'simply unhappy.' After a detailed narration of her lifestory, I turn to the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt's account of volitional incapacity and love for a more accurate characterization of her suffering. Having been through what she had, she could only go on living as another person than the one she had been when she was a happy mother. That would have violated her integrity, and that she could not bring herself to do
Williams, Bernard (1988). Consequentialism and integrity. In Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Wildes, Kevin Wm (1997). Institutional identity, integrity, and conscience. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: : Bioethics has focused on the areas of individual ethical choices--patient care--or public policy and law. There are, however, important arenas for ethical choices that have been overlooked. Health care is populated with intermediate arenas such as hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, and health care systems. This essay argues that bioethics needs to develop a language and concepts for institutional ethics. A first step in this direction is to think about institutional conscience
Winch, Peter (1968). Moral Integrity: Inaugural Lecture in the Chair of Philosophy Delivered at King's College, London, 9 May 1968. Oxford, Blackwell.   (Google)
Wolfe, Donald M. (1988). Is there integrity in the bottom line. In Suresh Srivastva (ed.), Executive Integrity: The Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Youngner, J. S. (2003). Promoting research integrity at the american society for microbiology. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  The American Society for Microbiology addresses issues of research integrity in several ways. There is a Code of Ethics for Society members and an Ethics Committee, a Publications Board has editorial oversight of ethical issues involved in Society journals and other publications, and the Public and Scientific Affairs Board is involved in ethical issues and scientific policies at the national level. In addition, the Society uses meetings and publications to inform and educate members about research integrity
Zeng, Weiqin & Resnik, David (forthcoming). Research integrity in china: Problems and prospects. Developing World Bioethics.   (Google)
Abstract: In little more than 30 years, China has recovered from the intellectual stagnation brought about by the Cultural Revolution to become a global leader in science and technology. Like other leading countries in science and technology, China has encountered some ethical problems related to the conduct of research. China's leaders have taken some steps to respond to these problems, such as developing ethics policies and establishing oversight committees. To keep moving forward, China needs to continue to take effective action to promote research integrity. Some of the challenges China faces include additional policy development, promoting education in responsible conduct of research, protecting whistle-blowers, and cultivating an ethical research environment

5.1l.5.4 Moral Sainthood

5.1l.5.5 Skepticism about Character

Alfano, Mark (forthcoming). Virtues, intelligences, and situations. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.   (Google)
Alzola, Miguel (2008). Character and environment: The status of virtues in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Using evidence from experimental psychology, some social psychologists, moral philosophers and organizational scholars claim that character traits do not exist and, hence, that the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics is empirically inadequate and should dispose of the notion of character to accommodate the empirical evidence. In this paper, I systematically address the debate between dispositionalists and situationists about the existence, status and properties of character traits and their manifestations in human behavior, with the ultimate goal of responding to the question whether virtue ethicists need to abandon the very enterprise of building a character-based moral theory in business ethics and organizational behavior. In the course of this paper, I shall defend the claim that the situationist argument relies on a misinterpretation of the experimental evidence
Appiah, Anthony (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Appiah explores how the new empirical moral psychology relates to philosophical ethics. He elaborates a vision of naturalism that resists both temptations and traces an intellectual genealogy of the burgeoning discipline of 'experimental philosophy'.
Athanassoulis, Nafsika (2000). A response to Harman: Virtue ethics and character traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):215–221.   (Google)
Badhwar, Neera K. (forthcoming). The Milgram experiments, learned helplessness, and character traits. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects
Besser-jones, Lorraine (2008). Social psychology, moral character, and moral fallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):310–332.   (Google | More links)
Doris, John M. (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character that date back to Aristotle. John Doris draws on behavioral science, especially social psychology, to argue that we misattribute the causes of behavior to personality traits and other fixed aspects of character rather than to the situational context. More often than not it is the situation not the nature of the personality that really counts. The author elaborates the philosophical consequences of this research for a whole array of ethical theories and shows that, once rid of the misleading conception of motivation, moral psychology can support more robust ethical theories and more humane ethical practices
Doris, John M. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Noûs 32 (4):504-530.   (Google | More links)
Fleming, Diana (2006). The character of virtue: Answering the situationist challenge to virtue ethics. Ratio 19 (1):24–42.   (Google | More links)
Goldman, Alvin I. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103 (2):337-360.   (Google | More links)
Harman, Gilbert (forthcoming). Skepticism about character traits. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people’s conceptions of personality and character rather than on the accuracy of these conceptions). Similarly, the political theorist R. Hardin has argued for situational explanations of bloody social disputes in the former Yugoslavia and in Africa, rather than explanations in terms of ethnic hatred for example. A version of virtue ethics might identify virtues as characteristics of acts rather than character traits, as traits consisting in actual regularities in behavior, or as robust dispositions that would manifest themselves also in counterfactual situations
Harman, Gilbert (2000). The nonexistence of character traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):223–226.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (2003). Three trends in moral and political philosophy. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3).   (Google)
Hennig, Boris (2008). Tugenden und absichten. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1):165-182.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychological experiments show that human behavior is often determined by features of the situation rather than general and persistent character traits of the agent. Therefore, it may seem naive to suppose that someone with a virtuous character will in general act virtuously. This is at least true if a character trait is taken to be a persistent characteristic or property that reliably causes certain behavior. On the basis of the conception of agency developed by Anscombe in Intention, I will argue against the assumption that virtues are such persistent traits. Rather, I will suggest that virtues stand in a conceptual relation to ways of acting in kinds of contexts in the same way in which intentions are not causes of actions but stand in a conceptual relation to them.
Hurka, Thomas (2006). Virtuous act, virtuous dispositions. Analysis 66 (289):69–76.   (Google | More links)
Hutton, Eric L. (2006). Character, situationism, and early confucian thought. Philosophical Studies 127 (1).   (Google)
Kamtekar, Rachana (2004). Situationism and virtue ethics on the content of our character. Ethics 114 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Situationist social psychologists tell us that information about people’s distinctive character traits, opinions, attitudes, values, or past behavior is not as useful for determining what they will do as is information about the details of their situations.1 One would expect, they say, that the possessor of a given character trait (such as helpfulness) would behave consistently (helpfully) across situations that are similar in calling for the relevant (helping) behavior, but under experimental conditions, people’s behavior is not found to be cross-situationally consistent (the likelihood that a person who has behaved helpfully on one occasion will behave helpfully on the next is hardly above chance).2 Instead, across a range of situations, the person’s behavior tends to converge on the behavioral norm for those situations. So situationists reason that people’s situations, rather than their characters, are the explanatorily powerful factors in determining why different people behave differently. They add that if behavior does not covary with character traits, then ordinary people, “folk psychologists” who try to explain and predict..
Kupperman, Joel J. (2001). The indispensability of character. Philosophy 76 (2):239-250.   (Google)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman has argued that it does not make sense to ascribe character traits to people. The notion of morally virtuous character becomes particularly suspect. How plausible this is depends on how broad character traits would have to be. Views of character as entirely invariant behavioural tendencies offer a soft target. This paper explores a view that is a less easy target: character traits as specific to kinds of situation, and as involving probabilities or real possibilities. Such ascriptions are not undermined by Harman's arguments, and it remains plausible that the agent's character often is indispensable in explanation of behaviour. Character is indispensable also as processes of control that impose reliability where it really matters
Kupperman, Joel J. (forthcoming). Virtue in virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001 ). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures
Merritt, Maria (2000). Virtue ethics and situationist personality psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems
Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics 7 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the line of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to briefly sketching a positive account of character trait possession
Miller, Christian (forthcoming). Social psychology, mood, and helping: Mixed results for virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and then examine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencing compassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim that many people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping traits fall well short of exhibiting certain central features of compassion
Montmarquet, James (2003). Moral character and social science research. Philosophy 78 (3):355-368.   (Google)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman and John Doris (among others) have maintained that experimental studies of human behaviour give good grounds for denying the very existence of moral character. This research, according to Harman and Doris, shows human behaviour to be dependent not on character but mainly on one's ‘situation.’ My paper develops a number of criticisms of this view, among them that social science experiments are ill-suited to study character, insofar as they do not estimate the role of character in continuously shaping the direction of one's life—including what situations one is apt to get into in the first place
Nelkin, Dana K. (2005). Freedom, responsibility and the challenge of situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
Prinz, Jesse (forthcoming). The normativity challenge: Cultural psychology provides the real threat to virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are virtuous, and our ideals of what qualifies as well-being. If virtues and well-being are culturally constructed ideals, then the standard strategy for grounding the normativity of virtue ethics in human nature is undermined
Russell, Daniel C. (2009). Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Practical intelligence and the virtues : an aristotelian approach -- Deliberation -- Phronesis -- The phronesis controversy -- Phronesis, virtue, and right action -- Right action for virtue ethics -- Right action and serious practical concerns -- Two constraints on right action -- Must virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Can virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Right action and virtuous motives -- The structure of agent-based virtue ethics -- Virtuous acts and virtuous motivations -- Why virtues are virtues -- Reasons for virtue -- Right action and 'the virtuous person' -- Doing without 'the virtuous person' -- 'Virtuous enough' -- Ideals and aspirations -- Virtues, persons, and 'the virtuous person' -- Representing 'the virtuous person' -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem : an introduction -- Enumeration and overall virtuous actions -- Enumeration and overall virtuous persons -- Enumeration and naturalism -- Individuating the virtues -- From individuation to enumeration -- 'The same reasons' -- Reasons, individuation, and cardinality -- Implications for hard virtue ethics -- Magnificence, generosity, and subordination -- Magnificence as a virtue -- Subordination, specialization, and cardinality -- Alternatives to the subordination view -- Situations, dispositions, and virtues -- Situations and broad-based dispositions -- Situationism and dispositionism -- Situationism and personality -- Idiographic predictions of consistency -- Situations and dispositions : examining the evidence -- How to test broad-based dispositions for cross-situational consistency -- Putting dispositions to the test : four representative experiments -- Interpreting the findings -- From situationism to virtue theory -- Situationism : from empirical to philosophical psychology -- Situationism and virtue theory : normative adequacy -- From common sense to virtue theory? -- Out-sourcing the empirical work? -- A cognitive-affective approach to the virtues -- Defending hard virtue theory -- Phronesis and the unity of the virtues -- The unity of which virtues? -- Attributive and model theses -- Responsibility for character -- Depth, self-construction, and responsibility -- On responsibility and ultimate responsibility for character -- What is critical distance? -- From critical distance to responsibility -- Objections to the critical distance view.
Sabini, John & Silver, Maury (2005). Lack of character? Situationism critiqued. Ethics 115 (3).   (Google)
Snow, Nancy E. (2010). Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- In search of global traits -- Habitual virtuous actions and automaticity -- Social intelligence and why it matters -- Virtue as social intelligence -- Philosophical situationism revisited -- Conclusion.
Solomon, Robert C. (2005). What's character got to do with it? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):648–655.   (Google | More links)
Sosa, Ernest (online). A defense of virtue theory against situationist objections.   (Google)
Sreenivasan, Gopal (2008). Character and consistency: Still more errors. Mind 117 (467).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper continues a debate among philosophers concerning the implications of situationist experiments in social psychology for the theory of virtue. In a previous paper (2002), I argued among other things that the sort of character trait problematized by Hartshorne and May's (1928) famous study of honesty is not the right sort to trouble the theory of virtue. Webber (2006) criticizes my argument, alleging that it founders on an ambiguity in "cross-situational consistency" and that Milgram's (1974) obedience experiment is immune to the objections I levelled against Hartshorne and May. Here I respond to his criticisms. The most important error in Webber's argument is that it overlooks a distinction between "one time performance" experiments and "iterated trial" experiments. I explain why the former cannot begin to trouble the theory of virtue. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
Sreenivasan, Gopal (forthcoming). Disunity of virtue. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed
Sreenivasan, Gopal (2002). Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution. Mind 111 (441).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory—specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute this conclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data—the data themselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone's character trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject's own construal of the situation. Second, they include behaviour that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third, they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given these inadequacies in situationism's operationalized conception of a ‘character trait’, I argue that situationism does not really address the proposition that people have ‘character traits’, properly understood. A fortiori, the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimental evidence in favour of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism
Upton, Candace L. (2005). A contextual account of character traits. Philosophical Studies 122 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Character traits have several vital functions. They should enable us to assess others morally, inform us of others’ behavioral tendencies, and accurately explain and predict others’ behavior. But traits of character, as they have traditionally been understood, cannot adequately serve these purposes. For character traits are traditionally thought to be context-insensitive. The Contextual Account of Character Traits, which I here develop and defend, posits traits that are context-sensitive. Context-sensitive character traits are more receptive to the complexity of human psychology and behavior and, hence, they not only adequately, but excellently, satisfy their theoretic and pragmatic functions
Upton, Candace L. (2009). Situational Traits of Character: Dispositional Foundations and Implications for Moral Psychology and Friendship. Lexington Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Global traits of character -- Traits as dispositions -- Situational traits of character -- Situational traits and social psychology -- Situational traits and the friendly consequentialist.
Upton, Candace L. (forthcoming). The structure of character. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations
Upton, Candace L. (forthcoming). Virtue ethics and moral psychology: The situationism debate. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Vranas, Peter B. M. (forthcoming). Against moral character evaluations: The undetectability of virtue and vice. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend the epistemic thesis that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. (1) Because most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations), one’s prior probability that any given person is fragmented should be high. (2) Because one’s information about specific people does not reliably distinguish those who are fragmented from those who are not, one’s posterior probability that any given person is fragmented should be close to one’s prior—and thus should also be high. (3) Because being fragmented entails being indeterminate (neither good nor bad nor intermediate), one’s posterior probability that any given person is indeterminate should also be high—and the epistemic thesis follows. (1) and (3) rely on previous work; here I support (2) by using a mathematical result together with empirical evidence from personality psychology
Vranas, Peter B. M. (2005). The indeterminacy paradox: Character evaluations and human psychology. Noûs 39 (1):1–42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) fragmentation entails indeterminacy. I support (1) by examining psychological experiments in which most participants behave deplorably (e.g., by maltreating “prisoners” in a simulated prison) or admirably (e.g., by intervening in a simulated theft). I support (2) by arguing that, according to certain plausible conceptions, character evaluations presuppose behavioral consistency (lack of fragmentation). Possible reactions to the paradox include: (a) denying that the experiments are relevant to character; (b) upholding conceptions according to which character evaluations do not presuppose consistency; (c) granting that most people are indeterminate and explaining why it appears otherwise. I defend (c) against (a) and (b)
Webber, Jonathan (2007). Character, common-sense, and expertise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people’s behaviour, difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations between them must be based on more objective data
Webber, Jonathan (2006). Character, consistency, and classification. Mind 115 (459).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: John Doris has recently argued that since we do not possess character traits as traditionally conceived, virtue ethics is rooted in a false empirical presupposition. Gopal Sreenivasan has claimed, in a paper in Mind, that Doris has not provided suitable evidence for his empirical claim. But the experiment Sreenivasan focuses on is not one that Doris employs, and neither is it relevantly similar in structure. The confusion arises because both authors use the phrase ‘cross-situational consistency’ to describe the aspect of character traits that they are concerned with, but neither defines this phrase, and it is ambiguous: Doris uses it in one sense, Sreenivasan in another. Partly for this reason, the objections Sreenivasan raises fail to block the argument Doris provides. In particular, the most reliable data Doris employs, Milgram’s famous study of authority, is entirely immune to Sreenivasan’s objections. Sreenivasan has not shown, therefore, that Doris provides unsuitable evidence for his claim
Webber, Jonathan (2007). Character, global and local. Utilitas 19 (4):430-434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An individual’s behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational feature, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features. The data cited by these philosophers supports their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We should not adopt the former conception, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not revise our understanding of character in this way
Webber, Jonathan (2006). Virtue, character and situation. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have recently argued that traditional discussions of virtue and character presuppose an account of behaviour that experimental psychology has shown to be false. Behaviour does not issue from global traits such as prudence, temperance, courage or fairness, they claim, but from local traits such as sailing-in-rough-weather-with-friends-courage and office-party-temperance. The data employed provides evidence for this view only if we understand it in the light of a behaviourist construal of traits in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the light of the more traditional construal in terms of inner events such as inclinations. More recent experiments have shown this traditional conception to have greater explanatory and predictive power than its behaviourist rival. So we should retain the traditional conception, and hence reject the proposed alteration to our understanding of behaviour. This discussion has further implications for future philosophical investigations of character and virtue. Key Words: character traits • situationism • social psychology • virtue ethics
Wielenberg, Erik J. (2006). Saving character. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In his recent book Lack of Character, Jon Doris argues that people typically lack character (understood in a particular way). Such a claim, if correct, would have devastating implications for moral philosophy and for various human moral projects (e.g. character development). I seek to defend character against Doris's challenging attack. To accomplish this, I draw on Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant to identify some of the central components of virtuous character. Next, I examine in detail some of the central experiments in social psychology upon which Doris's argument is based. I argue that, properly understood, such experiments reveal differences in the characters of their subjects, not that their subjects lack character altogether. I conclude with some reflections on the significance of such experiments and the importance of character
Winter, Michael & Tauer, John (2006). Virtue theory and social psychology. Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (1).   (Google)

5.1l.5.6 Virtues and Vices

Aristotle, , Virtues and vices.   (Google | More links)
Aristotle, , Virtues and vices (greek and english).   (Google)
Maes, Hans (2001). Bescheidenheid en asymmetrie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93 (2).   (Google)
Denis, Lara (2006). Kant's Conception of Virtue. In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I explicate Kant’s theory of virtue and situate it within the context of theories of virtue before Kant (such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hume) and after Kant (such as Schiller and Schopenhauer). I explore Kant’s notions of virtue as a disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law, as moral strength in non-holy wills, as the moral disposition in conflict, and as moral self-constraint based on inner freedom. I distinguish between Kant’s notions of virtue and of the good will. I discuss Kant’s duties of virtue (and so particular virtues and vices), the relationships between virtue and happiness and virtue and the emotions, and Kant’s criticisms of his predecessors’ views of virtue. I close with a discussion of Kant and contemporary virtue ethics. Although the paper reflects my own interpretation of Kant, it strives less to argue for a particular thesis about Kant on virtue than to illuminate important aspects of Kant’s theory of virtue.
Denis, Lara (2006). Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent. In Raja Halwani (ed.), Sex and Ethics: Essays in Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good Life. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores how a virtuous Kantian agent would regard and express her sexuality. I argue both that Kant has a rich account of virtue, and that a virtuous Kantian agent should view her sexuality as a good thing–as an important aspect of her animal nature. On my view, the virtuous agent does not seek to suppress her sexuality, but rather to find modes and contexts for its expression that allow the agent to maintain her self-respect and to avoid degrading others. The paper begins by considering reasons, grounded in Kant’s texts, why one might reasonably think that Kant has a pejorative view of sexuality, and only the thinnest account of virtue, to offer. I then aim to correct this picture by more carefully and fully exploring Kant’s work, putting his apparently negative comments about sex, and apparently narrow account of virtue, in their proper context. I also dispute—based on Kant’s own principles—some of Kant’s claims about homosexual sex and masturbation as violations of duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Finally, I conclude the paper with an account of the virtuous Kantian agent’s proper attitude toward her sexuality.
Duff, R. A. (2006). The virtues and vices of virtue jurisprudence. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Foot, Philippa (1978). Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice
Green, Rosalie B. (1968). Virtues and vices in the chapter house vestibule in Salisbury. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 31:148-158.   (Google | More links)
Kawall, Jason (2006). On Complacency. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):343-55.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.
Margulies, Peter, The detainees' dilemma: The virtues and vices of mobilization strategies for human rights in the war on terror.   (Google)
Abstract:      The war on terror's excesses have tested both lawyers and the legal system. However, commentary on that test has not been comprehensive. Commentators have studied the courts' response to the detention and trial of suspected terrorists and the role of government lawyers such as John Yoo who offered advice authorizing government policies. In contrast, most commentators have ignored the war on terror's role as a catalyst for the creativity of human rights lawyers. The war on terror's restrictions on access to courts have produced innovations among detainee advocates familiar to those who have played the game of "whack-a-mole." Driven by Bush administration measures that made conventional advocacy difficult, lawyers for detainees have developed an alternative approach to lawyering that I call crossover advocacy. For crossover advocates, lawyering advocacy outside of court is often the main event. Crossover advocacy includes work with the media, foreign governments, and international forums, as well as scholarship by academic lawyers working for detainees and damage suits that drive mobilization campaigns independent of judicial outcomes. In the fluid world of "law in action," crossover advocacy has played a more significant role than the elite briefing and argument that inspires Supreme Court opinions. As in any legal regime trying to tamp down forces that keep reappearing from another direction, crossover effects in the war on terror yield both benefits and risks. Crossover advocates can amplify the voices of detainees and enhance the integrity and transparency of legal regimes in the war on terror. However, advocates are also susceptible to pervasive cognitive flaws such intertemporal and self-serving bias that generate three classes of adverse crossover effects. First, asymmetries in accountability between traditional judicial forums and crossover venues promote reckless advocacy, generate opportunity costs for clients, and encourage an echo chamber dynamic in which preaching to the converted prevails. Second, role conflicts in crossover advocacy undermine deliberation and candor. For example, the legal complaint drafted by lawyers at Yale Law School for a lawsuit against John Yoo may initially prompt the response that turnabout is fair play. However, the complaint's amorphous inconsistency fails as payback for Yoo's infamous legal advice. Crossover advocacy can also produce boomerang and backlash effects that injure the public interest. Deliberation about the virtues and costs of crossover advocacy requires a mobilization metric. The metric proposed here considers the innocence of the detainee, the fairness of procedures in place, and the gravity of the harm that can befall the client as indicia of a case's mobilization potential. An advocate should weigh that potential against the opportunity costs of crossover advocacy, including the neglect of traditional tactics such as the client's cooperation with the government. The advocate should also consider the prospect that the government will respond to pressure with measures that reduce the lawyer's leverage, such as extraordinary rendition. The mobilization metric will not vanquish all of the challenges faced by advocates who seek to represent detainees in the face of onerous government restrictions. Nevertheless, working through the metric will correct for cognitive flaws and clarify tactical choices. Resort to the metric will ensure that clients and the public derive the maximum benefit from mobilization strategies
McNamee, M. J. (2008). Sports, Virtues and Vices: Morality Plays. Routledge.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1981). Choice and virtue in the. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (4):405-423.   (Google)
Abstract: COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x 163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference?
Pring, Richard (2001). The virtues and vices of an educational researcher. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (3):407–421.   (Google | More links)
Schofer, Jonathan Wyn (2008). Virtues and vices of relativism. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (4):709-715.   (Google)
Abstract: comment ▪  Subject: "Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison" Aaron Stalnaker Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September 2008) ▪  From: Jonathan Wyn Schofer Harvard Divinity School 45 Francis Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138
Dent, N. J. H. (1984). The Moral Psychology of the Virtues. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Tuve, Rosemond (1963). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 26 (3/4):264-303.   (Google | More links)
Tuve, Rosemond (1964). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (3/4):42-72.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, James D. (1978). Virtues and Vices. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Wertheimer, Roger (ed.) (2010). Empowering Our Military Conscience. Ashgate.   (Google)
Abstract: TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface, Roger Wertheimer; Introduction-A Great Awakening, Roger Wertheimer; Part I. Jus ad Bellum: (1) The Triumph of the Just War Tradition, and the Dangers of Success, Michael Walzer; (2) Methodological Anarchy: Arguing About Preventive War, George R. Lucas, Jr.; (3) Crossing Borders to Fight Injustice: The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, Richard Miller; Part II. Jus in Bello: (4) The Proper Role of Intention in Military Decision-Making, Thomas Scanlon; (5) Ethics for Calamities: How Strict is the Moral Rule Against Targeting Noncombatants?, Jeffrey Reiman; (6) Invincible Ignorance, Moral Equality, and Professional Obligation, Richard Schoonhoven; Part III. Jus ante Bellum (7) The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism, Roger Wertheimer; (8) The Morality of Military Ethics Education, Roger Wertheimer
Wertheimer, Roger (2010). The Morality of Military Ethics Education. In Roger Wertheimer (ed.), Empowering Our Military Conscience.   (Google)
Abstract: Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) must transmit and promote military professionalism, so it must continuously

5.1l.5.7 Moral Character, Misc

Denis, Lara (2008). Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper situates abortion in the context of women’s duties to themselves. I argue that Kant’s fundamental moral requirement (found in the formula of humanity) to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kant’s view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women’s agency and moral character without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required. I first sketch Kant’s account to duties to oneself, highlighting duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Next, I discuss pregnancy and the challenges it poses to women’s self-preservation, development, and efficacy as rational human agents. I then give my main argument: that abortion is morally problematic because it is antagonistic to an important subset of morally useful emotions that we have self-regarding duties to protect and cultivate. I argue that self-regarding moral considerations ground a rebuttable deliberative presumption against maxims of abortion for inclination-based ends. Finally, I consider three objections to this account of abortion: that it rests on implausible assumptions about the effects of abortion on women’s morally useful sentiments; that it portrays the virtuous agent’s reasoning about abortion as objectionably self-regarding; and that it fails adequately to recognize the moral significance of the fetus as a potential rational being.
Hardwig, John (1983). Action from duty but not in accord with duty. Ethics 93 (2):283-290.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In thc Foundations, Kant draws a distinction bctwccn action which is in accord with duty and action which is done from the motive of duty. This is 21 famous distinction, of course, and thcrc arc many interesting issues concerning it and its implications for ethical thcory. In this paper, I wish t0 focus on just 0nc noteworthy feature of K2mt’s usc of this distinction. Likc any distinction bctwccn logical compatiblcs, this 0nc yields four logically possible classes of action: (1) actions which are both in accord with duty and from duty; (2) actions which arc neither from duty nor in accord with duty; (3) actions which are in accord with duty but not from duty; and (4) actions which are from duty but not in accord with duty. What intcrcsts mc about these four possibilities is that, to thc best of my knowledge, Kant never considers or even mentions the last 0f these possibilities: action from duty but not in accord with duty. This is perhaps surprising in a philosopher with Kant’s intcrcst in logic and passion for thoroughness. Onc would have thought that hc would mention this logical possibility, cvcn if only in order to discount it as not really possible. Beginning with the idea that there arc cases of action from duty but not in accord with duty, I argue in this paper that Kant could not have admitted that thcrc can be actions of this kind, for their cxistcncc un-
Jauss, Steven A. (2008). What's wrong with moralism? Edited by C. A. J. Coady. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):251–256.   (Google | More links)
LaFollette, Hugh (2005). Living on a slippery slope. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their most common usage, it would be prudent to avoid them in moral and political debate. They are often fallacious and have often been used for ill. They are normally used to defend the moral status quo. Even when they are cogent, we can always find an alternate way to capture their insights. Finally, by accepting that the moral roads on which we travel are slippery, we become better able to successfully navigate them
O’Hagan, Emer (2009). Moral self-knowledge in Kantian ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics
Perrett, Roy W. (2002). Evil and Human Nature. The Monist 85:304-19.   (Google)
Ware, Owen (2009). The duty of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self-deception (§2). Finding none of Kant's solutions to the problem of self-deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self-knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3)