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5.1l.5.6. Virtues and Vices (Virtues and Vices on PhilPapers)

Aristotle, , Virtues and vices.   (Google | More links)
Aristotle, , Virtues and vices (greek and english).   (Google)
Maes, Hans (2001). Bescheidenheid en asymmetrie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93 (2).   (Google)
Denis, Lara (2006). Kant's Conception of Virtue. In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I explicate Kant’s theory of virtue and situate it within the context of theories of virtue before Kant (such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hume) and after Kant (such as Schiller and Schopenhauer). I explore Kant’s notions of virtue as a disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law, as moral strength in non-holy wills, as the moral disposition in conflict, and as moral self-constraint based on inner freedom. I distinguish between Kant’s notions of virtue and of the good will. I discuss Kant’s duties of virtue (and so particular virtues and vices), the relationships between virtue and happiness and virtue and the emotions, and Kant’s criticisms of his predecessors’ views of virtue. I close with a discussion of Kant and contemporary virtue ethics. Although the paper reflects my own interpretation of Kant, it strives less to argue for a particular thesis about Kant on virtue than to illuminate important aspects of Kant’s theory of virtue.
Denis, Lara (2006). Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent. In Raja Halwani (ed.), Sex and Ethics: Essays in Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good Life. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores how a virtuous Kantian agent would regard and express her sexuality. I argue both that Kant has a rich account of virtue, and that a virtuous Kantian agent should view her sexuality as a good thing–as an important aspect of her animal nature. On my view, the virtuous agent does not seek to suppress her sexuality, but rather to find modes and contexts for its expression that allow the agent to maintain her self-respect and to avoid degrading others. The paper begins by considering reasons, grounded in Kant’s texts, why one might reasonably think that Kant has a pejorative view of sexuality, and only the thinnest account of virtue, to offer. I then aim to correct this picture by more carefully and fully exploring Kant’s work, putting his apparently negative comments about sex, and apparently narrow account of virtue, in their proper context. I also dispute—based on Kant’s own principles—some of Kant’s claims about homosexual sex and masturbation as violations of duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Finally, I conclude the paper with an account of the virtuous Kantian agent’s proper attitude toward her sexuality.
Duff, R. A. (2006). The virtues and vices of virtue jurisprudence. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Foot, Philippa (1978). Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice
Green, Rosalie B. (1968). Virtues and vices in the chapter house vestibule in Salisbury. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 31:148-158.   (Google | More links)
Kawall, Jason (2006). On Complacency. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):343-55.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.
Margulies, Peter, The detainees' dilemma: The virtues and vices of mobilization strategies for human rights in the war on terror.   (Google)
Abstract:      The war on terror's excesses have tested both lawyers and the legal system. However, commentary on that test has not been comprehensive. Commentators have studied the courts' response to the detention and trial of suspected terrorists and the role of government lawyers such as John Yoo who offered advice authorizing government policies. In contrast, most commentators have ignored the war on terror's role as a catalyst for the creativity of human rights lawyers. The war on terror's restrictions on access to courts have produced innovations among detainee advocates familiar to those who have played the game of "whack-a-mole." Driven by Bush administration measures that made conventional advocacy difficult, lawyers for detainees have developed an alternative approach to lawyering that I call crossover advocacy. For crossover advocates, lawyering advocacy outside of court is often the main event. Crossover advocacy includes work with the media, foreign governments, and international forums, as well as scholarship by academic lawyers working for detainees and damage suits that drive mobilization campaigns independent of judicial outcomes. In the fluid world of "law in action," crossover advocacy has played a more significant role than the elite briefing and argument that inspires Supreme Court opinions. As in any legal regime trying to tamp down forces that keep reappearing from another direction, crossover effects in the war on terror yield both benefits and risks. Crossover advocates can amplify the voices of detainees and enhance the integrity and transparency of legal regimes in the war on terror. However, advocates are also susceptible to pervasive cognitive flaws such intertemporal and self-serving bias that generate three classes of adverse crossover effects. First, asymmetries in accountability between traditional judicial forums and crossover venues promote reckless advocacy, generate opportunity costs for clients, and encourage an echo chamber dynamic in which preaching to the converted prevails. Second, role conflicts in crossover advocacy undermine deliberation and candor. For example, the legal complaint drafted by lawyers at Yale Law School for a lawsuit against John Yoo may initially prompt the response that turnabout is fair play. However, the complaint's amorphous inconsistency fails as payback for Yoo's infamous legal advice. Crossover advocacy can also produce boomerang and backlash effects that injure the public interest. Deliberation about the virtues and costs of crossover advocacy requires a mobilization metric. The metric proposed here considers the innocence of the detainee, the fairness of procedures in place, and the gravity of the harm that can befall the client as indicia of a case's mobilization potential. An advocate should weigh that potential against the opportunity costs of crossover advocacy, including the neglect of traditional tactics such as the client's cooperation with the government. The advocate should also consider the prospect that the government will respond to pressure with measures that reduce the lawyer's leverage, such as extraordinary rendition. The mobilization metric will not vanquish all of the challenges faced by advocates who seek to represent detainees in the face of onerous government restrictions. Nevertheless, working through the metric will correct for cognitive flaws and clarify tactical choices. Resort to the metric will ensure that clients and the public derive the maximum benefit from mobilization strategies
McNamee, M. J. (2008). Sports, Virtues and Vices: Morality Plays. Routledge.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1981). Choice and virtue in the. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (4):405-423.   (Google)
Abstract: COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x 163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference?
Pring, Richard (2001). The virtues and vices of an educational researcher. Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (3):407–421.   (Google | More links)
Schofer, Jonathan Wyn (2008). Virtues and vices of relativism. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (4):709-715.   (Google)
Abstract: comment ▪  Subject: "Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison" Aaron Stalnaker Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September 2008) ▪  From: Jonathan Wyn Schofer Harvard Divinity School 45 Francis Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138
Dent, N. J. H. (1984). The Moral Psychology of the Virtues. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Tuve, Rosemond (1963). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 26 (3/4):264-303.   (Google | More links)
Tuve, Rosemond (1964). Notes on the virtues and vices. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (3/4):42-72.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, James D. (1978). Virtues and Vices. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Wertheimer, Roger (ed.) (2010). Empowering Our Military Conscience. Ashgate.   (Google)
Abstract: TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface, Roger Wertheimer; Introduction-A Great Awakening, Roger Wertheimer; Part I. Jus ad Bellum: (1) The Triumph of the Just War Tradition, and the Dangers of Success, Michael Walzer; (2) Methodological Anarchy: Arguing About Preventive War, George R. Lucas, Jr.; (3) Crossing Borders to Fight Injustice: The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, Richard Miller; Part II. Jus in Bello: (4) The Proper Role of Intention in Military Decision-Making, Thomas Scanlon; (5) Ethics for Calamities: How Strict is the Moral Rule Against Targeting Noncombatants?, Jeffrey Reiman; (6) Invincible Ignorance, Moral Equality, and Professional Obligation, Richard Schoonhoven; Part III. Jus ante Bellum (7) The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism, Roger Wertheimer; (8) The Morality of Military Ethics Education, Roger Wertheimer
Wertheimer, Roger (2010). The Morality of Military Ethics Education. In Roger Wertheimer (ed.), Empowering Our Military Conscience.   (Google)
Abstract: Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) must transmit and promote military professionalism, so it must continuously