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5.1l.6. Moral States and Processes (Moral States and Processes on PhilPapers)

See also:

5.1l.6.1 Moral Imagination

Bernauer, James & Mahon, Michael (2006). Michel Foucault's ethical imagination. In Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Collier, Jane (forthcoming). The art of moral imagination: Ethics in the practice of architecture. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper addresses questions of ethics in the professional practice of architecture. It begins by discussing possible relationships between ethics and aesthetics. It then theorises ethics within concepts of ‘practice’, and argues for the importance of the context in architecture where narrative can be used to learn and to integrate past and present experience. Narrative reflection also takes in the future, and in the case of architecture there is a positive but not yet well accepted move (particularly within the ‘academy’) to realise the imperative nature of architecture’s responsibility with respect of global sustainability. Architects, more perhaps than other professions, use the faculty of imagination in their work, and this paper therefore maintains that architects as artists are uniquely qualified to exercise ‘moral imagination’ when it comes to situations where moral deliberation is needed. Pragmatism has given a new impetus to the importance of imagination in moral reflection, and I focus on John Dewey’s categories of ‘empathy’ and ‘dramatic rehearsal’ as descriptors of moral imagination as applied in situations. I argue in conclusion firstly that empathy between end-users and architects is an essential but not always realised part of morality in architecture, and secondly that ‘dramatic rehearsal’, when extended more widely that a given situation, may lead architects to question the social, political and ecological contexts of their work and thus motivate them to prioritise the ‘ethical’ in all the choices they make
De Vries, Raymond (2005). Framing neuroethics: A sociological assessment of the neuroethical imagination. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):25 – 27.   (Google)
Gedge, Elisabeth Boetzkes (2004). Collective moral imagination: Making decisions for persons with dementia. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (4):435 – 450.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Much debate concerning 'precedent autonomy' - that is, the authority of former, competent selves to govern the welfare of later, non-competent selves - has assumed a radical discontinuity between selves, and has overlooked the 'bridging' role of intimate proxy decision-makers. I consider a recent proposal by Lynn et al. (1999) that presents a provocative alternative, foregrounding an imagined dialogue between the formerly competent patient and her/his trusted others. I consider what standards must be met for such dialogues to have moral force, appealing to narrative and feminist ethics. I then critique the dualistic construction of selves implicit in much of the advance directive literature, noting the continuities of dependence, character, and body, as well as the social dimension of the construction of selves
Gorman, Michael E. (2005). Heuristics, moral imagination, and the future of technology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):551-551.   (Google)
Abstract: Successful application of heuristics depends on how a problem is represented, mentally. Moral imagination is a good technique for reflecting on, and sharing, mental representations of ethical dilemmas, including those involving emerging technologies. Future research on moral heuristics should use more ecologically valid problems and combine quantitative and qualitative methods
Heydt, Colin (2006). Narrative, imagination, and the religion of humanity in mill's ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper shows how the ethical benefits of Mill's Religion of HumanityÑa life imbued with purpose, an improved regard for others, and greater happiness for oneself from the pleasures of fellow-feelingÑare to be actualized through the imagination's creation of compelling narratives about humanity. Understanding the ethical importance of the Religion of Humanity therefore implies understanding the central role of imagination in Millian ethical life. This investigation serves to articulate a feature of Mill's utilitarianism that differentiates it from Bentham's, namely his commitment to the importance of a religious sensibility in the moral agent. It also raises the broader philosophical issue of what narratives a psychologically tenable humanist world-view requires
Johnson, Mark (1985). Imagination in moral judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (2):265-280.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, Mark (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Using path-breaking discoveries of cognitive science, Mark Johnson argues that humans are fundamentally imaginative moral animals, challenging the view that morality is simply a system of universal laws dictated by reason. According to the Western moral tradition, we make ethical decisions by applying universal laws to concrete situations. But Johnson shows how research in cognitive science undermines this view and reveals that imagination has an essential role in ethical deliberation. Expanding his innovative studies of human reason in Metaphors We Live By and The Body in the Mind, Johnson provides the tools for more practical, realistic, and constructive moral reflection
Kekes, John (2006). The Enlargement of Life: Moral Imagination at Work. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Mackenzie, Catriona & Scully, Jackie Leach (2007). Moral imagination, disability and embodiment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):335–351.   (Google | More links)
Magill, Gerard (1992). Theology in business ethics: Appealing to the religious imagination. Journal of Business Ethics 11 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: By appealing to the religious imagination Theology can make a distinctive contribution to business ethics. In the first part of the essay I examine what is entailed by appealing to the imagination to reason in ethics: through converging arguments the imagination enables us rationally to interpret reality and to infer obligations. In the following sections I consider the relevance of the religious imagination for business ethics. In the second part I explain the imagination''s use of religious metaphor to establish its theological distinctiveness in ethical inquiry. Then in the final part I illustrate Theology''s contribution to business ethics by studying the imagination''s use of religious metaphor with regard to profit and to third world debt
Malloy, David (2000). Patricia H. Werhane, moral imagination and management decision making. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4).   (Google)
Michael, E. Gorman; Patricia, H. Werhane & Nathan Swami, (2009). Moral imagination, trading zones, and the role of the ethicist in nanotechnology. Nanoethics 3 (3):185-195.   (Google)
Abstract: The societal and ethical impacts of emerging technological and business systems cannot entirely be foreseen; therefore, management of these innovations will require at least some ethicists to work closely with researchers. This is particularly critical in the development of new systems because the maximum degrees of freedom for changing technological direction occurs at or just after the point of breakthrough; that is also the point where the long-term implications are hardest to visualize. Recent work on shared expertise in Science & Technology Studies (STS) can help create productive collaborations among scientists, engineers, ethicists and other stakeholders as these new systems are designed and implemented. But collaboration across these disciplines will be successful only if scientists, engineers, and ethicists can communicate meaningfully with each other. The establishment of a trading zone coupled with moral imagination present one method for such collaborative communication
Moberg, Dennis & Caldwell, David F. (2007). An exploratory investigation of the effect of ethical culture in activating moral imagination. Journal of Business Ethics 73 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Moral imagination is a process that involves a thorough consideration of the ethical elements of a decision. We sought to explore what might distinguish moral imagination from other ethical approaches within a complex business simulation. Using a three-component model of moral imagination, we sought to discover whether organization cultures with a salient ethics theme activate moral imagination. Finding an effect, we sought an answer to whether some individuals were more prone to being influenced in this way by ethical cultures. We found that employees with strong moral identities are less influenced by such cultures than employees whose sense of self is not defined in moral terms
Nordgren, Anders (1998). Ethics and imagination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases
Stohr, Karen (2006). Practical wisdom and moral imagination in Sense and Sensibility. Philosophy and Literature 30 (2).   (Google)
Werhane, Patricia H. (2002). Moral imagination and systems thinking. Journal of Business Ethics 38 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Taking the lead from Susan Wolf's and Linda Emanuel's work on systems thinking, and developing ideas from Moberg's, Seabright's and my work on mental models and moral imagination, in this paper I shall argue that what is often missing in management decision-making is a systems approach. Systems thinking requires conceiving of management dilemmas as arising from within a system with interdependent elements, subsystems, and networks of relationships and patterns of interaction. Taking a systems approach and coupling it with moral imagination, now engaged on the organizational and systemic as well as individual levels of decision-making, I shall conclude, is a methodology that encourages managers and companies to think more imaginatively and to engage in integrating moral decision-making into ordinary business decisions. More importantly this sort of thinking is a means to circumvent what often appear to be intractable problems created by systemic constraints for which no individual appears to be responsible

5.1l.6.10 Moral States and Processes, Misc

5.1l.6.11 Courage

Balot, Ryan K. (2008). Socratic courage and athenian democracy. Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):49-69.   (Google)
Barash, Carol Isaacson (1996). Review essay : Ruth Hubbard, profitable promises: Essays on women, science and health (monroe, me, common courage press, 1995). Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (3).   (Google)
Bauhn, Per (2003). The Value of Courage. Nordic Academic Press.   (Google)
Baylis, Françoise (2007). Of courage, honor, and integrity. In Lisa A. Eckenwiler & Felicia Cohn (eds.), The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral Landscape. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Benson, Hugh H. (1994). On manly courage: A study of Plato's laches. Ancient Philosophy 14 (2):383-386.   (Google)
Bonevac, Daniel (ms). Laches, or courage.   (Google)
Abstract: Lys. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young
Chen, Lisheng (2010). Courage in the analects : A genealogical survey of the confucian virtue of courage. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The different meanings of “courage” in The Analects were expressed in Confucius’ remark on Zilu’s bravery. The typological analysis of courage in Mencius and Xunzi focused on the shaping of the personalities of brave persons. “Great courage” and “superior courage”, as the virtues of “great men” or “ shi junzi 士君子 (intellectuals with noble characters)”, exhibit not only the uprightness of the “internal sagacity”, but also the rich implications of the “external kingship”. The prototype of these brave persons could be said to be between Zengzi’s courage and King Wen’s courage. The discussion entered a new stage of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, when admiration for “Yanzi’s great valor” became the key of various arguments. The order of “the three cardinal virtues” was also discussed because it concerned the relationship between “finished virtue” and “novice virtue”; hence, the virtue of courage became internalized as an essence of the internal virtuous life. At the turn of the 20 th century, when China was trembling under the threat of foreign powers, intellectuals remodeled the tradition of courage by redefining “Confucius’ great valor”, as Liang Qichao did in representative fashion in his book Chinese Bushido . Hu Shi’s Lun Ru 论儒 (On Ru ) was no more than a repetition of Liang’s opinion. In the theoretical structures of the modern Confucians, courage is hardly given a place. As one of the three cardinal virtues, bravery is but a concept. In a contemporary society where heroes and sages exist only in history books, do we need to talk about courage? How should it be discussed? These are questions which deserve our consideration
Daly, Mary (2006). Amazon Grace: Re-Calling the Courage to Sin Big. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: In her signature style, revolutionary Mary Daly takes you on a Quantum leap into a joyous future of victory for women. Daly, the groundbreaking author of such classics as Beyond God the Father and The Church and the Second Sex , explores the visions of Matilda Joslyn Gage, the great nineteenth-century philosopher, and reveals that her insights are stunningly helpful to twenty-first-century Voyagers seeking to overcome the fascism and life-hating fundamentalism that has infused current power structures. Daly shows us once again that Wild, Wise Women can learn to take charge of the current destructive patriarchal forces and use this as an Outlandish opportunity for change
Devereux, Daniel (1977). Courage and wisdom in Plato's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (2).   (Google)
Roger Duncan, (1978). Courage in Plato's protagoras. Phronesis 23 (3):216-228.   (Google)
Funk, Rainer (1982). Erich Fromm: The Courage to Be Human. Continuum.   (Google)
Hamilton, Alastair (2007). Obedient heretics: Mennonite identitities in Lutheran Hamburg and altona during the confessional age. By Michael D. driedger and 'Elisabeth's manly courage': Testimonials and songs of martyred anabaptist women in the low countries. Edited and translated by hermina Joldersma and Louis grijp. Heythrop Journal 48 (3):480–481.   (Google | More links)
Harris, Howard (2001). Content analysis of secondary data: A study of courage in managerial decision making. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Empirical studies in business ethics often rely on self-reported data, but this reliance is open to criticism. Responses to questionnaires and interviews may be influenced by the subject''s view of what the researcher might want to hear, by a reluctance to talk about sensitive ethical issues, and by imperfect recall. This paper reviews the extent to which published research in business ethics relies on interviews and questionnaires, and then explores the possibilities of using secondary data, such as company documents and newspaper reports, as a source for empirical studies in applied ethics. A specific example is then discussed, describing the source material, the method, the development of the research questions, and the way in which reliability and validity were established. In the example, content analysis was used to examine the extent to which the executive virtue of courage was observed or called for in items published in four international daily newspapers, and to explore the meaning which was attributed to "courage" in the papers
Harris, Howard (2003). Enhancing the independence of supervisory agencies: The development of courage. Business Ethics 12 (4):369–377.   (Google | More links)
Harle, Tim (2005). Serenity, courage and wisdom: Changing competencies for leadership. Business Ethics 14 (4):348–358.   (Google | More links)
Hobbs, Angela (2000). Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Plato's thinking on courage, manliness and heroism is both profound and central to his work, but these areas of his thought remain underexplored. This book examines his developing critique of the notions and embodiments of manliness prevalent in his culture (particularly those in Homer), and his attempt to redefine such notions in accordance with his ethical, psychological and metaphysical principles. It further seeks to locate the discussion within the framework of Plato's general approach to ethics
Im, Manyul (2004). Moral knowledge and self control in mengzi: Rectitude, courage, and qi. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):59 – 77.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind (xin). Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature (ren xing) as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of 'internal' justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi
Ives, Jonathan (2008). Does a belief in God lead to moral cowardice?: The difference between courage of moral conviction and acquisition. Think 7 (20):57-68.   (Google)
Leslie, E. Sekerka; Richard, P. Bagozzi & Richard Charnigo, (2009). Facing ethical challenges in the workplace: Conceptualizing and measuring professional moral courage. Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4).   (Google)
Mahoney, Jack (1998). Editorial adieu: Cultivating moral courage in business. Business Ethics 7 (4):187–192.   (Google | More links)
Müller, Jörn (2008). In war and peace : The virtue of courage in the writings of Albert the great and Thomas Aquinas. In István Pieter Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200 -1500. Brill.   (Google)
Mumbach, Mary (2010). The courage of reason and the scandal of education. In Bainard Cowan (ed.), Gained Horizons: Regensburg and the Enlargement of Reason. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Norris, Christopher (2001). 'Courage not under fire': Realism, anti-realism, and the epistemological virtues. Inquiry 44 (3):269 – 290.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article offers a critical perspective on two lines of thought in recent epistemology and philosophy of science, namely Michael Dummett?s anti-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and knowledge and Bas van Fraassen?s influential programme of ?constructive empiricism?. While not denying the salient differences between them (the one a metaphysical doctrine premised on logicolinguistic considerations, the other a thesis primarily concerned with the scope and limits of empirical inquiry) it shows how they converge on a sceptical outlook concerning the realist claim that truth might always transcend the restrictions of some given (or indeed some future best-possible) state of knowledge. The author puts the case that such sceptical arguments, if followed through consistently, must involve giving up all claim to account for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge. He also takes issue with Dummett?s idea of truth as nothing more than a matter of ?warranted assertibility? and with van Fraassen?s likewise verificationist conception of empirical warrant as the most we can have by way of epistemic justification. Thus it is wrong to suppose that the realist is merely indulging in a display of ?courage not under fire? when she assumes ontological commitments in excess of the observational data. This disavowal of realism in favour of a theory which ?saves the (empirical) appearances? has a less-than-distinguished prehistory in the range of compromise strategies adopted by upholders of a dominant metaphysics or world-view, starting out with the orthodox Catholic attempt to defuse the implications of the heliocentric hypothesis advanced by Copernicus and Galileo. Such theological motives are nowadays not so prominent although ? it is suggested fithey do emerge at certain points in Dummett?s writing. More constructively, this article presents a case for objectivism with regard to scientific truth and also for inference to the best causal explanation on both the micro- and the macrophysical scale as the only approach with an adequate claim to make sense of the history of advancements in scientific knowledge to date
O'Connell, Robert J. (1997). William James on the Courage to Believe. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: William James’ celebrated lecture on “The Will to Believe” has kindled spirited controversy since the day it was delivered. In this lively reappraisal of that controversy, Father O’Connell contributes some fresh contentions: that James’ argument should be viewed against his indebtedness to Pascal and Renouvier; that it works primarily to validate our “over-beliefs” ; and most surprising perhaps, that James envisages our “passional nature” as intervening, not after, but before and throughout, our intellectual weighing of the evidence for belief
Penner, Terry (1992). What laches and nicias miss-and whether socrates thinks courage merely a part of virtue. Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):1-27.   (Google)
Pfau, Michael (2007). Who's afraid of fear appeals? Contingency, courage and deliberation in rhetorical theory and practice. Philosophy and Rhetoric 40 (2).   (Google)
Putman, Daniel (2001). The emotions of courage. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):463–470.   (Google | More links)
Pybus, Elizabeth (1991). Human Goodness: Generosity and Courage. Harvester Wheatsheaf.   (Google)
Rabieh, Linda R. (2006). Plato and the Virtue of Courage. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Plato and the Virtue of Courage canvasses contemporary discussions of courage and offers a new and controversial account of Plato's treatment of the concept. Linda R. Rabieh examines Plato's two main thematic discussions of courage, in the Laches and the Republic, and discovers that the two dialogues together yield a coherent, unified treatment of courage that explores a variety of vexing questions: Can courage be separated from justice, so that one can act courageously while advancing an unjust cause? Can courage be legitimately called a virtue? What role does wisdom play in courage? What role does courage play in wisdom? Based on Plato's presentation, Rabieh argues that a refined version of traditional heroic courage, notwithstanding certain excesses to which it is prone, is worth honoring and cultivating for several reasons. Chief among these is that, by facilitating the pursuit of wisdom, such courage can provide a crucial foundation for the courage most deserving of the name
Sacksteder, William (1958). A senator looks at courage. Ethics 68 (2):137-139.   (Google | More links)
Sekerka, Leslie E.; Bagozzi, Richard P. & Charnigo, Richard (forthcoming). Facing ethical challenges in the workplace: Conceptualizing and measuring professional moral courage. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Sekerka, Leslie E. & Bagozzi, Richard P. (2007). Moral courage in the workplace: Moving to and from the desire and decision to act. Business Ethics 16 (2):132–149.   (Google | More links)
Sekerka, Leslie & Zolin, Roxanne (2005). Professional courage in the military: Regulation fit and establishing moral intent. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 24 (4):27-50.   (Google)
Stout, Robert (1923). The need of courage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):77 – 83.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A brave man leaveth not the battle, He who flieth from it is no true warrior, In the field of this body a great war is toward Against Passion, Hunger, Pride and Greed, It is for the Kingdom of Truth, of Contentment and of Purity that this battle is raging: And the sword that ringeth most loudly is the sword Of His name. —KABIR, Hindu Poet
Tillich, Paul (2000). The Courage to Be. Yale University Press.   (Google)
Walton, Douglas N. (1990). Courage, relativism and practical reasoning. Philosophia 20 (1-2).   (Google)
Waterfield, Robin (2007). Plato and the virtue of courage. By Linda R. rabieh. Heythrop Journal 48 (6):992–993.   (Google | More links)
Weiss, Roslyn (1985). Courage, confidence, and wisdom in the protagoras. Ancient Philosophy 5 (1):11-24.   (Google)
Woodruff, Paul (2007). Socrates and political courage. Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):289-302.   (Google)
Yuen, Shirley (2005). Three Virtues of Effective Parenting: Lessons From Confucius on the Power of Benevolence, Wisdom, and Courage. Tuttle Pub..   (Google)

5.1l.6.12 Hypocrisy

Aikin, Scott F. (ms). Tu quoque arguments and the siginificance of hypocrisy.   (Google)
Abstract:      Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent's proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will term tu quoque judo
Aikin, Scott F. (ms). What is the significance of al Gore's purported hypocrisy?   (Google)
Abstract:      This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case
Bailey, Cathryn (2007). "Africa begins at the pyrenees": Moral outrage, hypocrisy, and the spanish bullfight. Ethics and the Environment 12 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : The long history of criticism directed at bullfighting usually suggests that there is something especially morally noxious about it. I analyze the claims that bullfighting is distinctively immoral, comparing it to more widely accepted practices such as the slaughtering of animals for food. I conclude that, while bullfighting is horrific, the emphasis on it as especially "uncivilized" may serve to disguise the similarities that it has with other practices that also depend on animal suffering. I conclude that, for many, the hypocritical maintenance of a self-image as "civilized," despite great moral crimes committed against animals, seems to be facilitated by a focus on this especially dramatic example of animal cruelty
Batson, C. Daniel; Collins, Elizabeth & Powell, Adam A. (2006). Doing business after the fall: The virtue of moral hypocrisy. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Moral hypocrisy is motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral. In business, moral hypocrisy allows one to engender trust, solve the commitment problem, and still relentlessly pursue personal gain. Indicating the power of this motive, research has provided clear and consistent evidence that, given the opportunity, many people act to appear fair (e.g., they flip a coin to distribute resources between themselves and another person) without actually being fair (they accept the flip only if it favors themselves). New evidence also indicates the power of moral hypocrisy in a situation more obviously relevant to business, resource allocation when one party has information about relative resource value that the other does not. Characteristics of modern business situations likely to encourage moral hypocrisy are outlined. We conclude that moral hypocrisy is not only a pragmatic virtue in modern business but is also fast becoming a prescriptive one
Bouwsma, William J. (1987). Calvin and the dilemma of hypocrisy. In Peter De Klerk (ed.), Calvin and Christian Ethics: Papers and Responses Presented at the Fifth Colloquium on Calvin & Calvin Studies Sponsored by the Calvin Studies Society Held at the Calvin Theological Seminary, Grand Rapids, Michigan, on May 8 and 9, 1985. Calvin Studies Society.   (Google)
Foote, Dorothy (2001). The question of ethical hypocrisy in human resource management in the U.k. And irish charity sectors. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Whilst there is a growing volume of literature exploring the ethical implications of organisational change for HRM and the ethical aspects of certain HRM activities, there have been few published U.K. studies of how HR managers actually behave when faced with ethical dilemmas in their work. This paper seeks to enhance the foundations of such knowledge through an examination of the influence of organisational values on the ethical behaviour of Human Resource Managers within a sample of charities in the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland. A qualitative research design is adopted utilising semi-structured interviews. Findings highlight ethical inconsistency in people management in the charity sector arising from the clear application of strong and explicit organisational values to external client groups but their limited influence on people management strategies and practices within the organisation. Many of the ethical issues faced by HRM professionals in both countries arise from this inconsistency. In their handling of ethical dilemmas, the HRM professionals exhibit a combination of a care ethic and a concern for justice but it is also clear that in situations of management intransigence, a desire to be conscience driven often gives way to a contingent approach. Whilst respondents considered it inappropriate for the HRM function to be the conscience of the organisation, it is seen to have a key role in providing management with advice on ethical action. However, the ability of HRM to influence ethical behaviour is highly dependent on the status of the function within the organisation
Friedman, R. Z. (1986). Hypocrisy and the highest good: Hegel on Kant's transition from morality to religion. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (4).   (Google)
Ginzburg, Benjamin (1922). Hypocrisy as a pathological symptom. International Journal of Ethics 32 (2):160-166.   (Google | More links)
Grant, Ruth Weissbourd (1997). Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Questioning the usual judgements of political ethics, Ruth W. Grant argues that hypocrisy can actually be constructive while strictly principled behavior can be destructive. Hypocrisy and Integrity offers a new conceptual framework that clarifies the differences between idealism and fanaticism while it uncovers the moral limits of compromise. "Exciting and provocative. . . . Grant's work is to be highly recommended, offering a fresh reading of Rousseau and Machiavelli as well as presenting a penetrating analysis of hypocrisy and integrity."--Ronald J. Terchek, American Political Science Review "A great refreshment. . . . With liberalism's best interests at heart, Grant seeks to make available a better understanding of the limits of reason in politics."--Peter Berkowitz, New Republic
Maes, Hans (2004). Modesty, asymmetry, and hypocrisy. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4).   (Google)
Mckinnon, Christine (forthcoming). Hypocrisy, cheating, and character possession. Journal of Value Inquiry.   (Google)
McKinnon, Christine (2006). Hypocrisy: Ethical lnvestigations. Dialogue 45 (2):395-398.   (Google)
Naso, Ronald C. (2010). Hypocrisy Unmasked: Dissociation, Shame, and the Ethics of Inauthenticity. Jason Aronson.   (Google)
Abstract: The paradox of hypocrisy -- The call of conscience -- Perversion and moral reckoning -- Compromises of integrity -- Beneath the mask -- Youthful indiscretions -- Dissociation as self-deception -- Multiplicity and moral ambiguity.
Palmer, Erin Louise, U.s. Hypocrisy in the treatment of non-state actors in the war on terror.   (Google)
Abstract:      This article begins by discussing various classifications of individuals under international humanitarian law, such as combatants, civilians, and mercenaries, in an attempt to determine which classification is appropriate for non-state actors involved in the "war on terror." Part II of this article details the classification of members of Al-Qaeda under international humanitarian law. The classification of certain individuals as "enemy combatants" is evidence of the limitations of the traditional law of war paradigm. The United States has relied on the ambiguous rights and responsibilities of non-states actors under international humanitarian law to argue that "enemy combatants" do not fall within the scope of the Geneva Conventions. Part III of this article analyzes the classification of employees of PMCs under international humanitarian law and concludes that employees of PMCs are non-state actors engaged in armed combat. Part IV of this article details methods of holding employees of PMCs accountable under U.S. law for human rights violations and Part V analyzes the difficulties in ensuring liability. Although laws exist in the United States to prosecute employees of PMCs, the United States has failed to prosecute any of these individuals, implying that the government is contracting legal services to shield its own illegal actions. This article concludes that the United States' treatment of members of Al-Qaeda in comparison to the United States' treatment of employees of PMCs is hypocritical. By claiming that members of Al-Qaeda are non-state actors who are not entitled to the protections of the laws of war, the U.S. government can engage in questionable interrogation practices that are otherwise prohibited. Meanwhile, the United States contracts private companies, which are also non-state actors, to conduct its sometimes-illegal military activities abroad because these companies distance the United States from direct liability. Additionally, the United States fails to prosecute these individuals based on various legal loopholes and a lack of willpower, implying that such prosecutions would reveal U.S. involvement in illegal action
Statman, Daniel (1997). Hypocrisy and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby not only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our attitude toward hypocrites
Tierney, James Fallows, Sovereign power, human rights and hypocrisy costs.   (Google)
Tooley, James (2007). From Adam swift to Adam Smith: How the ‘invisible hand’ overcomes middle class hypocrisy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (4):727–741.   (Google | More links)
Tsipko, A. S. (1993). Intellectual hypocrisy of the “orthodoxes” or a long way to common sense. Studies in East European Thought 45 (1-2).   (Google)
Watson, George W. & Sheikh, Farooq (2008). Normative self-interest or moral hypocrisy?: The importance of context. Journal of Business Ethics 77 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: We re-examine the construct of Moral Hypocrisy from the perspective of normative self-interest. Arguing that some degree of self-interest is culturally acceptable and indeed expected, we postulate that a pattern of behavior is more indicative of moral hypocrisy than a single action. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that a significant majority of subjects (N = 136) exhibited fair behavior, and that ideals of caring and fairness, when measured in context of the scenario, were predictive of those behaviors. Moreover, measures of Individualism/Collectivism appear more predictive of self-interested behavior than out-of-context responses to moral ideals. Implications for research and practice are discussed

5.1l.6.13 Cruelty

5.1l.6.14 Hope

Andersson, Lynne M.; Giacalone, Robert A. & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2007). On the relationship of hope and gratitude to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 70 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   A longitudinal study of 308 white-collar U.S. employees revealed that feelings of hope and gratitude increase concern for corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, employees with stronger hope and gratitude were found to have a greater sense of responsibility toward employee and societal issues; interestingly, employee hope and gratitude did not affect sense of responsibility toward economic and safety/quality issues. These findings offer an extension of research by Giacalone, Paul, and Jurkiewicz (2005, Journal of Business Ethics, 58, 295-305)
Augustine, , Handbook on faith hope and love (outler translation).   (Google)
Baelz, Peter R. (1974). The Forgotten Dream: Experience, Hope and God. Mowbrays.   (Google)
Bell, Catharine D. (2009). John Dewey and the philosophy and practice of hope. Education and Culture 25 (1):pp. 66-70.   (Google)
Benz, Ernst (1966). Evolution and Christian Hope. Garden City, N.Y.,Doubleday.   (Google)
Benjamin, Andrew E. (1997). Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Present Hope is a compelling exploration of how we think philosophically about the present. Andrew Benjamin considers examples in philosophy, architecture and poetry to illustrate crucial themes of loss, memory, tragedy, hope and modernity. The book uses the work of Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger to illustrate the ways the notion of hope was weaved into their philosophies. Andrew Benjamin maintains that hope is a vital part of the present, rather than an expression only of the future. Present Hope shows how Judaism and philosophy interact; how the Holocaust provides an important link between modernity and the present. Benjamin's writings on the significance of the Jewish Museum in Berlin and the poetry of Paul Celan unite toward understanding the present
Beste, Jennifer (2005). Instilling hope and respecting patient autonomy: Reconciling apparently conflicting duties. Bioethics 19 (3):215–231.   (Google | More links)
Bloechl, Jeffrey; Smith, David L. & Martino, Daniel J. (eds.) (2004). The Phenomenology of Hope: The Twenty-First Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center: Lectures. Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University-Gumberg Library.   (Google)
Bloch, Ernst (1986). The Principle of Hope. Mit Press.   (Google)
Bovens, Luc (1999). The value of hope. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):667-681.   (Google | More links)
Browne, Craig (2005). Hope, critique, and utopia. Critical Horizons 6 (1):63-86.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper assesses the extent to which the category of hope assists in preserving and redefining the vestiges of utopian thought in critical social theory. Hope has never had a systematic position among the categories of critical social theory, although it has sometimes acquired considerable prominence. It will be argued that the current philosophical and everyday interest in social hope can be traced to the limited capacity of liberal conceptions of freedom to articulate a vision of social transformation apposite to contemporary suffering and indignity. The background to these experiences is the structural changes associated with the injustices of globalisation, the mobilisation of the capitalist imaginary and the uncertainties of the risk society. The category of hope could assist in sustaining the utopianism of critical theory through conjoining normative principles with a temporal orientation. Yet, the paradoxes of the current phase of capitalist modernisation have further denuded notions of progress. Since the theological background to the category of hope constitutes a major limitation, the utopian orientation of critique is clarified in relation to the antinomies of the turn to social hope and the potential of Habermas' discourse theory of democracy, law and morality. Despite Castoriadis' profound critique of the category of hope, its present usage in social analyses will be seen to have affinities with Honneth's conception of the struggle for recognition
Calian, Carnegie Samuel (1969). Berdyaev's Philosophy of Hope. Leiden, E. J. Brill.   (Google)
Carr, Steven A. (1990). Celebrate Life: Hope for a Culture Preoccupied with Death. Wolgemuth & Hyatt.   (Google)
Cobb, Henry V. (1941). Hope, fate, and freedom: A soliloquy. Ethics 52 (1):1-16.   (Google | More links)
Cooley, Aaron (2007). Democratic hope: Pragmatism and the politics of truth (review). Education and Culture 23 (2):pp. 76-79.   (Google)
Cooper, Steven H. (2000). Objects of Hope: Exploring Possibility and Limit in Psychoanalysis. Analytic Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Objects of Hope brings ranging scholarship and refreshing candor to bear on the knotty issue of what can and cannot be achieved in the course of psychoanalytic therapy. It will be valued not only as an exemplary exercise in comparative psychoanaly
Cousins, Norman (1974). The Celebration of Life: A Dialogue on Hope, Spirit, and the Immortality of the Soul. Bantam Books.   (Google)
Dauenhauer, Bernard P. (1986). The Politics of Hope. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Day, J. P. (1998). More about hope and fear. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1).   (Google)
Day, J. P. (1970). The anatomy of hope and fear. Mind 79 (315):369-384.   (Google | More links)
Dembski, William (ms). What can we reasonably hope for?   (Google)
Abstract: In a memorable scene from the movie The Graduate , Dustin Hoffman’s parents throw him a party to celebrate his graduation from college. The parents’ friends are all there congratulating him and offering advice. What should Hoffman do with his life? One particularly solicitous guest is eager to set him straight. He takes Hoffman aside and utters a single word-- plastics!
Dooley, Mark (2001). The civic religion of social hope: A reply to Simon Critchley. Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This article attempts to respond to Simon Critchley's claim in a recent debate with Richard Rorty, that the latter, by not fully recognizing its indebtedness to Levinas, misunderstands the political import of the work of Jacques Derrida. I maintain, pace Critchley, that trying to push the Derrida-Levinas connection too far will not only further compound Rorty's view of Derrida as a thinker devoid of political efficacy, but that it will moreover serve to obscure the significant differences which exist between Levinas and Derrida - differences which cannot be overlooked in any serious discussion of the two thinkers in question. In the second half, I try to convince Critchley that what separates Derrida from Levinas is precisely what hooks him up with Rorty at a political level. Both, I argue, are committed to a civic religion of social hope. In so doing, I try to convince Rorty that his caricature of Derrida as a private writer without political consequence, ought now to be seriously reconsidered. Key Words: community • Critchley • democracy • Derrida • ethics • justice • law • Levinas • politics • religion • Rorty • sentiment • singularity • social hope
Downie, R. S. (1963). Hope. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (2):248-251.   (Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2009). Comments on Jonathan Lear's radical hope (harvard: 2006). Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Duncan, Stewart (ms). Hope, fantasy, and commitment1 Adrienne M. Martin adrm@sas.upenn.Edu.   (Google)
Abstract: The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for S is no more and no less than to desire S while believing S is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature or function of hope: that hope helps one resist the temptation to despair;2 that hope engages the sophisticated capacities of human agency, such as planning;3 or that hope involves the imagination in ways desire need not.4 Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope, and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting
Feldman, Fred (2002). The good life: A defense of attitudinal hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The students and colleagues of Roderick Chisholm admired and respected Chisholm. Many were filled not only with admiration, but with affection and gratitude for Chisholm throughout the time we knew him. Even now that he is dead, we continue to wish him well. Under the circumstances, many of us probably think that that wish amounts to no more than this: we hope that things went well for him when he lived; we hope that he had a good life
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1968). Dialectical theology and hope, I. Heythrop Journal 9 (2):143–163.   (Google | More links)
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1968). Dialectical theology and hope, II. Heythrop Journal 9 (4):384–399.   (Google | More links)
Fiorenza, Francis P. (1969). Dialectical theology and hope, III. Heythrop Journal 10 (1):26–42.   (Google | More links)
Fromm, Erich (1968). The Revolution of Hope. New York, Harper & Row.   (Google)
Gedney, Mark D. (2006). The hope of remembering. Research in Phenomenology 36 (1):317-327.   (Google)
Gelven, Michael (2001). Judging Hope: A Reach to the True and the False. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Geoghegan, Vincent (2008). Pandora's box: Reflections on a myth. Critical Horizons 9 (1):24-41.   (Google)
Abstract: The article seeks to consider the relationship between hope and utopianism by looking at the ancient Greek myth of Pandora's Box, with its enigmatic figure of hope. It begins by considering Hesiod's influential formulation of the myth, before examining a range of modern interpretations in which diverse conceptions of hope are to be found. Using the work of Spinoza, Hume and Day an alternative conception of hope is proposed that conjoins hope with fear. This is followed by an exploration of the utopian, using this time another figure associated with the myth, Prometheus. An attempt is then made to differentiate the frequently conflated concepts of hope and the utopian. Finally, in the spirit of recent post-secularism, the two concepts are brought to bear on the nature of religion
Geras, Norman (2008). Social hope and state lawlessness. Critical Horizons 9 (1):90-98.   (Google)
Abstract: Hope is a precious resource. But, deluded, not based on a sober appraisal of the relevant realities, hope can also be lethal. One kind of hope is utopian hope. It does not exhaust what social hope is, or should be, about. The hope of remedying the most terrible injustices makes an urgent call on our attention. The world has travelled some way from the time when tyrannical governments could act with impunity in dealing with those under their jurisdiction. But it has not travelled far enough. There remain a number of deficits in the system of international law: "thresholds of inhumanity"
Giacalone, Robert A.; Paul, Karen & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2005). A preliminary investigation into the role of positive psychology in consumer sensitivity to corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Research on positive psychology demonstrates that specific individual dispositions are associated with more desirable outcomes. The relationship of positive psychological constructs, however, has not been applied to the areas of business ethics and social responsibility. Using four constructs in two independent studies (hope and gratitude in Study 1, spirituality and generativity in Study 2), the relationship of these constructs to sensitivity to corporate social performance (CSCSP) were assessed. Results indicate that all four constructs significantly predicted CSCSP, though only hope and gratitude interacted to impact CSCSP. Discussion focuses upon these findings, limitations of the study, and future avenues for research
Godfrey, Joseph J. (1987). A Philosophy of Human Hope. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Gravlee, G. Scott (2000). Aristotle on hope. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4).   (Google)
Grady, J. E. (1970). Marcel: Hope and ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1).   (Google)
Halpin, David (2003). Hope and Education: The Role of the Utopian Imagination. Routledgefalmer.   (Google)
Abstract: In this uplifting book, David Halpin suggests ways of putting the hope back into education, exploring the value of and need for utopian thinking in discussions of the purpose of education and school policy
Huskey, Rebecca Kathleen (2010). Paul Ricoeur on Hope: Expecting the Good. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Defining hope for Ricoeur -- Hope as a capacity of expectation for the powers of thinking, doing, and feeling : fallible man -- The contribution of time and narrative to hope -- Hope is active, working towards a future good for self and others -- Oneself as another and conditions for the possibility of hope -- Ricoeur's symbolism of evil as an outline for the symbolism of good and the conditions for the possibility of hope -- Religion, atheism, hope -- The worlds of Ricoeur's texts.
Insole, Christopher (2008). The irreducible importance of religious hope in Kant's conception of the highest good. Philosophy 83 (3):333-351.   (Google)
Kabumba, Ijuka (2001). On Hope, and Other Essays. Nyonyi Pub. Co. Ltd..   (Google)
Kemp-Pritchard, Ilona (1981). Peirce on philosophical hope and logical sentiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (1):75-90.   (Google | More links)
Kleingeld, Pauline (1995). What Do the Virtuous Hope For?: Re-reading Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good. In Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995. Marquette University Press.   (Google)
Küng, Hans (2009). Afterword: A vision of hope : Religious peace and a global ethic. In Hans Küng (ed.), How to Do Good & Avoid Evil: A Global Ethic From the Sources of Judaism. Skylight Paths Pub..   (Google)
Koopman, Colin (2006). Pragmatism as a philosophy of hope: Emerson, James, Dewey, Rorty. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (2).   (Google)
Koopman, Colin (2009). Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: What pragmatism does -- Transitionalism, meliorism, and cultural criticism -- Transitionalism in the pragmatist tradition -- Three waves of pragmatism -- Knowledge as transitioning -- Ethics as perfecting -- Politics as progressing -- Critical inquiry as genealogical pragmatism.
Lalami, Laila (2005). Hope & Other Dangerous Pursuits; Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill.   (Google)
Langford, Thomas A. (1968). Intellect and Hope. Durham, N.C.,Published for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics by the Duke University Press.   (Google)
Lash, Nicholas (1981). A Matter of Hope: A Theologian's Reflections on the Thought of Karl Marx. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Lear, Jonathan (2006). Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: After this, nothing happened -- Ethics at the horizon -- Critique of abysmal reasoning.
Levitas, Ruth (2004). Hope and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 38 (2):269–273.   (Google | More links)
Liebman, Joshua Loth (1966). Hope for Man. New York, Simon and Schuster.   (Google)
Lynch, William F. (1974). Images of Hope. Notre Dame [Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Lynch, William F. (1965). Images of Hope. Baltimore, Helicon.   (Google)
Magee, Bryan (2002). What I believe. Philosophy 77 (3):407-419.   (Google)
Abstract: The ultimate survival or annihilation of each one of us is in question. Will my death be the end of me completely, or shall I survive it in some way? No one knows the answers to these questions, and many philosophers since Kant have contended that the answers are inherently unknowable. If this is so, the supreme challenge that faces us is to live in a way that permanently acknowledges and confronts this ignorance, not seeking to finesse it by pretending to ourselves that we really do know, or by embracing a faith, or by evading thinking about it. This, easy to say, is very hard to do
Marett, R. R. (1932). Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion. New York,B. Blom.   (Google)
Abstract: All rights reserved no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to...
Martin, Adrienne M., Hopes and dreams.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a commonplace in both the popular imagination and the philosophical literature that hope has a special kind of motivational force. This commonplace underwrites the conviction that hope alone is capable of bolstering us in despairinducing circumstances, as well as the strategy of appealing to hope in the political realm. In section 1, I argue that, to the contrary, hope’s motivational essence is not special or unique—it is simply that of an endorsed desire. The commonplace is not entirely mistaken, however, because standard ways of expressing hope do have motivational influence that is different in kind from that of desire. In sections 2 through 4, I examine one of these ways of expressing hope, fantasizing, and argue that fantasies can present us with reasons to modify our goals and projects in multiple ways
Martin, Adrienne (2008). Hope and exploitation. Hastings Center Report 38 (5):49--55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we encourage patients to be hopeful without exploiting their hope? A medical researcher or a pharmaceutical company can take unfair advantage of someone's hope by much subtler means than simply giving misinformation. Hope shapes deliberation, and therefore can make deliberation better or worse, by the deliberator's own standards of deliberation
Martin, Adrienne, Hope, fantasy, and commitment1 Adrienne M. Martin adrm@sas.upenn.Edu.   (Google)
Abstract: The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for S is no more and no less than to desire S while believing S is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature or function of hope: that hope helps one resist the temptation to despair;2 that hope engages the sophisticated capacities of human agency, such as planning;3 or that hope involves the imagination in ways desire need not.4 Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope, and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting
Martin, Adrienne (ms). Hope must be a minefield.   (Google)
Abstract: Hesiod wrote of Pandora: Ere this the tribes of men lived on earth remote and free from ills and hard toil and heavy sickness. But the woman took off the great lid of the cask with her hands and scattered all these and her thought caused sorrow and mischief to men. Only Hope remained there in an unbreakable home under the lid of the great cask, and did not fly out; for ere that, the lid of the cask stopped her. But the rest, countless plagues, wander amongst men; for earth is full of evils and the sea is full. Of themselves diseases come upon men continually by day and by night, bringing mischief to mortals silently. (Works and Days) Hope enters the scene in company of disease, and it is unclear from Hesiod’s account whether hope is just one of many evils, or something added in a moment of mercy to help us endure “ills and hard toil and heavy labor.” I offer an account of hope grounded in an examination of how it functions in the medical care and research settings. I argue that hope is a stance taken toward our desires and aims in light of uncertainty and limited control. As such, it is deeply connected to well-functioning human agency and a key factor in our ability to endure hardship and to work our way in a world we have limited ability to shape. Yet I also argue that hope is not without hazard. Hope makes us vulnerable to harms from within in the form of attentional deficits and from without in the form of exploitation by those perceived to control the object of hope. In short, hope is a good, but a good with dangers. I conclude by addressing how medical professionals can take both of these aspects into account when responding to hopeful patients and research subjects
Marcel, Gabriel (2009). Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope. St. Augustine's Press.   (Google)
Martin, Wayne (2009). Ought but cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):103-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I assess a series of arguments intended to show that 'ought' implies 'can'. Two are rooted in uses of 'ought' in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources of deontic logic. I show that, in each case, the arguments leave scope for forms of infinite moral consciousness—forms of moral consciousness in which a moral obligation retains its authority even in the face of the conviction that the obligation is impossible to fulfil. In this respect the paper sides with Martin Luther against Erasmus and Kant
Martin, Adrienne, The intricacies of hope.   (Google)
Abstract: Many people believe hope’s most important function is to bolster us in despairinducing circumstances. A related but less dramatic view is that instilling or reinforcing hope for a state of affairs is a good way to get people to act to promote that state of affairs. I propose that we conceive of hope as, most paradigmatically, the expression of desire in imagination. I then trace through the implications of this conception for, first, how hope influences motivation and, second, what forms of hope are rational
Mason, Gail (2006). Fear and hope: Author’s response. Hypatia 21 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: : This response seeks to pick up on the key questions and concerns raised by Nancy C. M. Hartsock and Karen Houle in their critiques of The Spectacle of Violence. I mold my response around two emotions that are never far from the question of violence: fear and hope. Is it fear of ambiguity that stops us from delicately blending the experiential with the discursive, the nodal with the circular, the corporeal with the epistemic, or the oppressive with the constitutive? If so, we can only hope that the power of such ambivalence lies in its ability to unsettle these treasured lines of force
McGeer, Victoria (2008). Trust, hope and empowerment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):237 – 254.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and social scientists have focussed a great deal of attention on our human capacity to trust, but relatively little on the capacity to hope. This is a significant oversight, as hope and trust are importantly interconnected. This paper argues that, even though trust can and does feed our hopes, it is our empowering capacity to hope that significantly underwrites—and makes rational—our capacity to trust
Meisenhelder, Thomas (1982). Hope: A phenomenological prelude to critical social theory. Human Studies 5 (1).   (Google)
Meirav, Ariel (2009). The nature of hope. Ratio 22 (2):216-233.   (Google)
Abstract: Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in terms of attitudes that a hoper bears towards a hoped-for prospect, such as desire and probability assignment. I argue that all of these accounts misidentify cases of despair as cases of hope, and so misconstrue the nature of hope. I show that a more satisfactory view is arrived at by noticing that in addition to the aforementioned attitudes, hope involves a characteristic attitude towards an external factor, on whose operation the hoper takes the prospect's realization to depend causally
Mohammed, Ovey N. (ed.) (1999). Giving an Account of Our Hope: Religious Foundations for Hope Facing a New Millenium. Campion College.   (Google)
Mohrmann, Margaret E. (1995). Medicine as Ministry: Reflections on Suffering, Ethics, and Hope. Pilgrim Press.   (Google)
Murray, Michael J. (2002). Review of Peter Geach, Truth and Hope: The Furst Franz Josef Und Furstin Gina Lectures Delivered at the International Academy of Philosophy, 1998. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (2).   (Google)
Muskens, Reinhard (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R.E. Asher & J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
Muyskens, James L. (1979). The Sufficiency of Hope: The Conceptual Foundations of Religion. Temple University Press.   (Google)
Myers, David G. (1980). The Inflated Self: Human Illusions and the Biblical Call to Hope. Seabury Press.   (Google)
Nadler, Steven (2005). Hope, fear, and the politics of immortality. In Tom Sorell & G. A. J. Rogers (eds.), Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Norris, Andrew (2008). Becoming who we are: Democracy and the political problem of hope. Critical Horizons 9 (1):77-89.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I argue that hope is rightly numbered by Hesiod among the evils, as hope cannot be separated from an awareness of the inadequacy of one's current state. Political hope for democrats in particular is tied to the awareness that we have not yet realized ourselves, that, to paraphrase Pindar, we have not yet become who we are. I argue that, although Rorty comes close to articulating this in his book Achieving Our Country, his emphasis on pride ultimately obscures more than it reveals. I conclude that Thoreau's anguished reflection in Walden on the failures of his fellow citizens is a better place to look for instruction on the question of political hope
Northcott, Michael (2008). The metaphysics of hope and the transfiguration of making in the market empire. In Adrian Pabst & Christoph Schneider (eds.), Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word. Ashgate Pub. Ltd..   (Google)
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O'Donnell, John J. (1983). Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Oliver, Harold H. (1974). Hope and knowledge: The epistemic status of religious language. Philosophy and Social Criticism 2 (1).   (Google)
O'Neill, Shane (2008). Philosophy, social hope and democratic criticism: Critical theory for a global age. Critical Horizons 9 (1):60-76.   (Google)
Abstract: The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Affection Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism
Page, Cameron (2007). Hope. Hastings Center Report 37 (6).   (Google)
Pieper, Josef (1969). Hope and History. New York]Herder and Herder.   (Google)
Pieper, Josef (1967). Hope and History. London, Burns & Oates.   (Google)
Pojman, Louis (ms). Faith, hope and doubt.   (Google)
Abstract: For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various creedal statements contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked upon as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for salvation. This causes great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of the importance of belief in religion and in life in general. It is a question that has been neglected in philosophy of religion and Christian theology. In this paper I shall explore the question of the importance of belief as a religious attitude and suggest that there is at least one other attitude which may be adequate for religious faith even in the absence of belief, that attitude being hope. I shall develop a concept of faith as hope as an alternative to the usual notion that makes prepositional belief that God exists a necessary condition for faith, as Plantinga implies in the quotation above. For simplicity’s sake I shall concentrate on the most important proposition in Western religious creeds, that which states that God exists (defined broadly as a benevolent, supreme Being, who is responsible for the creation of the universe), but the analysis could be applied mutatis mutandis to many other important propositions in religion (e.g., the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity)
Roman, Eric (1975). Will, hope, and the noumenon. Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):59-77.   (Google | More links)
Rooney, Margaret M. (1980). What do we hope for: Some puzzles involving propositional hoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:75-92.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. Penguin Books.   (Google)
Sacks, Jonathan (1997). The Politics of Hope. Jonathan Cape.   (Google)
Schumacher, Bernard N. (2003). A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Schuster, Ekkehard (1999). Trotzdem Hoffen. English; Hope Against Hope : Johann Baptist Metz and Elie Wiesel Speak Out on the Holocaust. Paulist Press.   (Google)
Schwartz, Robert H. & Post, Frederick R. (2002). The unexplored potential of hope to level the playing field: A multilevel perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 37 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A multilevel view of social change is presented in which socially responsible organizations, society, and high-hope individuals interact in support of hopefulness – thereby leveling the playing field. Suggestions are made about future research and the roles of organizations and society in eliciting hope in organizational and societal cultures
Shade, Patrick (2001). Habits of Hope: A Pragmatic Theory. Vanderbilt University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Patrick Shade makes a strong argument for the necessity of hope in a cynical world that too often rejects it as foolish. While most accounts of hope situate it in a theological context, Shade presents a theory rooted in the pragmatic thought of such American philosophers as C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey
Simpson, Christy (2004). When hope makes us vulnerable: A discussion of patient–healthcare provider interactions in the context of hope. Bioethics 18 (5):428–447.   (Google | More links)
Smith, Nicholas H. (2008). Analysing hope. Critical Horizons 9 (1):5-23.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper contrasts two approaches to the analysis of hope: one that takes its departure from a view broadly shared by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, another that fits better with Aquinas's definition of hope. The former relies heavily on a sharp distinction between the cognitive and conative aspects of hope. It is argued that while this approach provides a valuable source of insights, its focus is too narrow and it rests on a problematic rationalistic psychology. The argument is supported by a discussion of hope understood as a stance and by a consideration of the phenomenological contrast between expectation and anticipation. The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between hope and illusion and the idea of responsible hope
Smith, Nicholas H. (2005). Hope and critical theory. Critical Horizons 6 (1):45-61.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part of the paper I consider the relative neglect of hope in the tradition of critical theory. I attribute this neglect to a low estimation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral value of hope, and to the strong—but, I argue, contingent—association that holds between hope and religion. I then distinguish three strategies for thinking about the justification of social hope; one which appeals to a notion of unfulfilled or frustrated natural human capacities, another which invokes a providential order, and a third which questions the very appropriateness of justification, turning instead to a notion of ungroundable hope. Different senses of ungroundable hope are distinguished and by way of conclusion I briefly consider their relevance for the project of critique today
Smith, Nicholas H. (2005). Rorty on religion and hope. Inquiry 48 (1):76 – 98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The article considers how Richard Rorty's writings on religion dovetail with his views on the philosophical significance of hope. It begins with a reconstruction of the central features of Rorty's philosophy of religion, including its critique of theism and its attempt to rehabilitate religion within a pragmatist philosophical framework. It then presents some criticisms of Rorty's proposal. It is argued first that Rorty's "redescription" of the fulfilment of the religious impulse is so radical that it is hard to see what remains of its specifically religious content. This casts doubt on Rorty's claim to have made pragmatism and religion compatible. The article then offers an analysis of Rorty's key notion of "unjustifiable hope". Different senses of unjustifiable hope are distinguished, in the course of which a tension between the "romantic" and "utilitarian" aspects of Rorty's pragmatist philosophy of religion comes into view
Steinbock, Anthony J. (2007). The phenomenology of despair. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):435 – 451.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the experience of hope by focusing on experiences that seem to rival hope, namely, disappointment, desperation, panic, hopelessness, and despair. I explore these issues phenomenologically by examining five kinds of experiences that counter hope (or in some instances, seem to do so): first, by noting the cases in which hope simply is not operative, then by treating the significance of both desperation and pessimism, next by examining the experience of hopelessness, and finally, by treating the experience of despair. Here despair is shown to constitute the most profound challenge to hope among these experiences and to be foundational for the others, even though it is disclosed ultimately as founded in hope
Stitzlein, Sarah M. (2009). Reviving social hope and pragmatism in troubled times. Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):657-663.   (Google)
Strolz, Walter (1967). Human Existence: Contradiction and Hope: Existential Reflections Past and Present. Notre Dame, Ind.University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Stratton-Lake, Philip (1993). Reason, appropriateness and hope: Sketch of a Kantian account of a finite rationality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (1):61 – 80.   (Google)
Stuhr, John J. (2008). A terrible love of hope. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 22 (4):pp. 278-289.   (Google)
Tallis, Raymond (1997). Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Perceptive, passionate, and often controversial, Raymond Tallis's latest debunking of Kulturkritik delves into a host of ethical and philosophical issues central to contemporary thought, raising questions we cannot afford to ignore. After reading Enemies of Hope , those minded to misrepresent mankind in ways that are almost routine among humanist intellectuals may be inclined to think twice. By clearing away the "hysterical humanism" of the present century this book frees us to start thinking constructively about the way forward for humanity in the next
Thompson, Allen (forthcoming). Radical hope for living well in a warmer world. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Environmental changes can bear upon the environmental virtues, having effects not only on the conditions of their application but also altering the concepts themselves. I argue that impending radical changes in global climate will likely precipitate significant changes in the dominate world culture of consumerism and then consider how these changes could alter the moral landscape, particularly culturally thick conceptions of the environmental virtues. According to Jonathan Lear, as the last principal chief of the Crow Nation, Plenty Coups exhibited the virtue of “radical hope,” a novel form of courage appropriate to a culture in crisis. I explore what radical hope may look like today, arguing how it should broadly affect our environmental character and that a framework for future environmental virtues will involve a diminished place for valuing naturalness as autonomy from human interference
Tillar, Elizabeth K. (2003). Critical remembrance and eschatological hope in Edward Schillebeeckx's theology of suffering for others. Heythrop Journal 44 (1):15–42.   (Google | More links)
Todorov, Tzvetan (2003). Mémorie Du Mal, Tentation Du Bien. English; Hope and Memory : Lessons From the Twentieth Century. Princeton University Press.   (Google)
Tutu, Desmond (1983). Hope and Suffering : Sermons and Speeches. W.B. Eerdmans, 1984.   (Google)
Veit-Brause, Irmline (2008). Maintaining the future of hope. History and Theory 47 (2):249–260.   (Google | More links)
Waterworth, Jayne M. (2003). A Philosophical Analysis of Hope. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite the familiarity of hope in human experience, it is a phenomenon infrequently considered from a philosophical point of view. This book charts the centrality of hope in thought and action from first, second and third person perspectives. From everyday situations to extreme circumstances of trail and endings in life, the contours of hope are given a phenomenological description and subjected to conceptual analysis. This consistently secular account of hope sheds a different light on questions of agency and meaning
Westbrook, Robert B. (2005). Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Whelan, Joseph P. (ed.) (1971). The God Experience: Essays in Hope. New York,Newman Press.   (Google)
White, Patricia (1991). Hope, confidence and democracy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 25 (2):203–208.   (Google | More links)
Zournazi, Mary (2003). Hope: New Philosophies for Change. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: How is hope to be found amid the ethical and political dilemmas of modern life? Writer and philosopher Mary Zournazi brought her questions to some of the most thoughtful intellectuals at work today. She discusses "joyful revolt" with Julia Kristeva, the idea of "the rest of the world" with Gayatri Spivak, the "art of living" with Michel Serres, the "carnival of the senses" with Michael Taussig, the relation of hope to passion and to politics with Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. A dozen stimulating minds weigh in with their visions of a better social and political order. The result is a collaboration - of writing, of thinking, and of politics - that demonstrates more clearly than any single-authored project could how ideas encountering one another can produce the vision needed for social change

5.1l.6.15 Envy

Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1992). Envy and inequality. Journal of Philosophy 89 (11):551-581.   (Google | More links)
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen (2004). Talent, slavery and envy in Dworkin's equality of resources. Utilitas 16 (3):267-287.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I argue against Ronald Dworkin's rejection of the labour auction in his ‘Equality of Resources’. I criticize Dworkin's claims that the talented would envy the untalented in such an auction, and that the talented in particular would be enslaved by it. I identify some ways in which the talent auction is underdescribed and I compare the results for the condition of the talented of different further descriptions of it. I conclude that Dworkin's deviation from the ‘envy test’ criterion results in an inequality between the talented and the untalented which cannot be justified in egalitarian terms. Correspondence:c1 m.christofidis@ucl.ac.uk
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen (2004). Talent, slavery, and envy. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna (online). Envy as an empathic emotion (2003). Abstract for Conn.   (Google)
Abstract: (2003). Abstract for Consciousness and Experiential Psychology conference (Oxford)
Cooper, David E. (1982). Equality and envy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 16 (1):35–47.   (Google | More links)
D'Arms, Justin (online). Envy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Goldberg, David E., Engineering rigor and its discontents: Philosophical reflection as curative to math-physics envy.   (Google)
Abstract: This extended abstract critically exams the use of the terms "rigorous" and "soft" in the context of engineering modeling. Common usage of the terms is contrasted with Toulmin's notion of "reasonableness" and Schoen's notion of "reflective practice." The abstract continues by considering an economic model of models in engineering, suggesting that overly "rigorous" engineering practice may box itself into being unable to afford the models it values, thereby presenting a conundrum for the practice and teaching engineering that demands relaxation
Heath, Joseph, Envy and efficiency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Joseph Heath1 The Pareto principle states that if a proposed change in the condition of society makes at least one person better off, and does not make anyone else worse off, then that change should be regarded as an improvement. This principle forms the conceptual core of modern welfare economics, and exercises enormous influence in contemporary discussions of justice and equality. It does, however, have an Achilles’ heel. When an individual experiences envy, it means that improvements in the condition of others may worsen the condition of that individual. As a result, envy has the potential to block a vast range of changes that we might intuitively be inclined to regard as Pareto improvements. (Or more precisely, envy results in too many states getting classified as Pareto-optimal, not because, intuitively, they cannot be improved upon, but because no one’s condition can be improved upon without making someone else envious.) For example, a market exchange between two people might not wind up being classified as a Pareto improvement if the benefits produced for the two parties generated envy in some otherwise uninvolved third
Horne, Thomas A. (1981). Envy and commercial society: Mandeville and Smith on "private vices, public benefits". Political Theory 9 (4):551-569.   (Google | More links)
Joseph, Sarah, Human rights and the world trade organisation: Not just a case of regime envy.   (Google)
Abstract:      The World Trade Organization has faced many criticisms from human rights and social justice advocates. And yet it is difficult to identify direct clashes between WTO obligations and human rights obligations. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this article, the concerns of WTO critics are justifiable, for example in the areas of the organisation's democratic deficit, the effect of its rules on developing States, and in the arena of labour rights. The criticisms are not, as it were, manifestations of mere 'regime envy' by social justice constituencies. Indeed, the present imbalance in effectiveness between international economic institutions and international social justice institutions must be redressed. Comments are welcome - Please either use SSRN comments or email to the author
La Caze, Marguerite (2001). Envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):31 – 45.   (Google)
Abstract: Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life
La Caze, Marguerite (2002). Revaluing envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):155 – 158.   (Google)
Norman, Richard (2002). Equality, envy, and the sense of injustice. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (1):43–54.   (Google | More links)
Otsuka, Michael (2004). Liberty, equality, envy, and abstraction. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Purshouse, Luke (2004). Jealousy in relation to envy. Erkenntnis 60 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions
Schutte, Ofelia (1983). Envy and the dark side of alienation. Human Studies 6 (1).   (Google)
Silver, Maury & Sabini, John (1978). The social construction of envy. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (3):313–332.   (Google | More links)
Tomlin, Patrick (2008). Envy, facts and justice: A critique of the treatment of envy in justice as fairness. Res Publica 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed
Ulmer, Gregory L. (1977). The Legend of Herostratus: Existential Envy in Rousseau and Unamuno. University Presses of Florida.   (Google)
Van Hooft, Stan (2002). La caze on envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):141 – 147.   (Google)
Abstract: Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances
Young, Robert (1987). Egalitarianism and envy. Philosophical Studies 52 (2).   (Google)
Zuckert, Rachel (2003). Awe or envy: Herder contra Kant on the sublime. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (3):217–232.   (Google | More links)

5.1l.6.16 Gratitude

Andersson, Lynne M.; Giacalone, Robert A. & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2007). On the relationship of hope and gratitude to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 70 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   A longitudinal study of 308 white-collar U.S. employees revealed that feelings of hope and gratitude increase concern for corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, employees with stronger hope and gratitude were found to have a greater sense of responsibility toward employee and societal issues; interestingly, employee hope and gratitude did not affect sense of responsibility toward economic and safety/quality issues. These findings offer an extension of research by Giacalone, Paul, and Jurkiewicz (2005, Journal of Business Ethics, 58, 295-305)
Berger, Fred R. (1975). Gratitude. Ethics 85 (4):298-309.   (Google | More links)
Fitzgerald, Patrick (1998). Gratitude and justice. Ethics 109 (1).   (Google | More links)
Gerber, Rona M. (1990). Gratitude and the duties of grown children towards their aging parents. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):29-34.   (Google)
Klosko, George (1989). Political obligation and gratitude. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):352-358.   (Google | More links)
Knowles, Dudley (2002). Gratitude and good government. Res Publica 8 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I attempt to show that it is notphilosophically incompetent to ground politicalobligation in feelings of gratitude. But theargument needs to be stated carefully.Gratitude must be distinguished fromreciprocity. It applies only to good governmentwhich provides benefits to citizens for whichthey ought to feel grateful. It applies only tocitizens who accept that their feelings ofgratitude are properly demonstrated by anacceptance on their part of the duties ofcitizenship. It does not apply to citizenswhose benefits are purchased at the expense ofthe unjust treatment of fellow citizens
Richardson, John T. (1954). The Virtue of Gratitude According to the Mind of Saint Thomas. Washington.   (Google)
Smilansky, Saul (2004). Gratitude, contribution, and ethical theory. In Jonathan Seglow (ed.), The Ethics of Altruism. F. Cass Publishers.   (Google)
Stewart-Robertson, Charles (1990). The rhythms of gratitude: Historical developments and philosophical concerns. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):189 – 205.   (Google)
Walker, A. D. M. (1989). Obligations of gratitude and political obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):359-364.   (Google | More links)
Walker, A. D. M. (1988). Political obligation and the argument from gratitude. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (3):191-211.   (Google | More links)
Wellman, Christopher Heath (1999). Gratitude as a virtue. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):284–300.   (Google | More links)

5.1l.6.17 Guilt and Shame

Chamarette, Jenny & Higgins, Jennifer (eds.) (2010). Guilt and Shame: Essays in French Literature, Thought and Visual Culture. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Dost, Ayfer & Yagmurlu, Bilge (2008). Are constructiveness and destructiveness essential features of guilt and shame feelings respectively? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):109–129.   (Google | More links)
Karlsson, Gunnar & Sjöberg, Lennart Gustav (2009). The experiences of guilt and shame: A phenomenological–psychological study. Human Studies 32 (3):335-355.   (Google)
Abstract: This study aims at discovering the essential constituents involved in the experiences of guilt and shame. Guilt concerns a subject’s action or omission of action and has a clear temporal unfolding entailing a moment in which the subject lives in a care-free way. Afterwards, this moment undergoes a reconstruction, in the moment of guilt, which constitutes the moment of negligence. The reconstruction is a comprehensive transformation of one’s attitude with respect to one’s ego; one’s action; the object of guilt and the temporal-existential experience. The main constituents concerning shame are its anchorage in the situation to which it refers; its public side involving the experience of being perceptually objectified; the exclusion of social community; the bodily experience; the revelation of an undesired self; and the genesis of shame in terms of a history of frozen now-ness. The article ends with a comparison between guilt and shame
OlwenBedford, & Kwang-KuoHwang, (2003). Guilt and shame in chinese culture: A cross-cultural framework from the perspective of morality and identity. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (2):127–144.   (Google | More links)
Rodogno, Raffaele (2009). Shame, guilt, and punishment. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):429-464.   (Google)
Abstract: The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I␣contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state’s act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual

5.1l.6.18 Happiness

Ahmed, Sara (2010). The Promise of Happiness. Duke University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: why happiness, why now? -- Happy objects -- Feminist killjoys -- Unhappy queers -- Melancholic migrants -- Happy futures -- Conclusion: happiness, ethics, possibility.
Akam, J. B. (1995). The Oracle of Wisdom: Towards Philosophic Equipoise. Snaap Press Limited.   (Google)
Alexandrova, Anna (2008). First-person reports and the measurement of happiness. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.   (Google)
Abstract: First-person reports are central to the study of subjective well-being in contemporary psychology, but there is much disagreement about exactly what sort of first-person reports should be used. This paper examines an influential proposal to replace all first-person reports of life satisfaction with introspective reports of affect. I argue against the reasoning behind this proposal, and propose instead a new strategy for deciding what measure is appropriate
Alexander, William; Anderson, Keith; Harris, Jane; Ingram, Julian; Nelson, Tom; Woods, Katherine & Svensen, Judy, On good and bad: Whether happiness is the highest good.   (Google)
Abstract: ON GOOD AND BAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i..
Allmark, Peter (2005). Health, happiness and health promotion. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):1–15.   (Google | More links)
Almeder, Robert F. (2000). Human Happiness and Morality: A Brief Introduction to Ethics. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Andreou, Chrisoula (2010). A shallow route to environmentally friendly happiness: Why evidence that we are shallow materialists need not be bad news for the environment(alist). Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1):1 – 10.   (Google)
Abstract: It is natural to assume that we would not be willing to compromise the environment if the conveniences and luxuries thereby gained did not have a substantial positive impact on our happiness. But there is room for skepticism and, in particular, for the thesis that we are compromising the environment to no avail in that our conveniences and luxuries are not having a significant impact on our happiness, making the costs incurred for them a waste. One way of defending the no-avail thesis fits neatly with what I will call the exalted view , according to which the key to human happiness lies in the mental (or spiritual) realm rather than in the material realm. After considering this familiar approach to defending the no-avail thesis, I sketch out a very different approach—one that will, I hope, appeal to those who have doubts about the familiar line of defense. The alternative and novel approach builds on a strand of empirical research on (self-reports concerning) happiness that suggests that we are, in a way, quite shallow, and that our happiness depends on whether we are keeping up with the Joneses. I call this view concerning happiness the worldly view . My reasoning suggests that even if the current rift between exalted pictures of human nature and happiness, on the one hand, and worldly pictures of human nature and happiness, on the other, cannot be repaired, it need not hinder agreement on the plausibility of the no-avail thesis; rather, with the rift come two different routes to the same thesis. I conclude that we should take the no-avail thesis very seriously, and that evidence that we are shallow materialists need not be bad news for the environment(alist)
Annas, Julia (1987). Epicurus on pleasure and happiness. Philosophical Topics 15 (2):5-21.   (Google)
Annas, Julia (1993). The Morality of Happiness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Ancient ethical theories, based on the notions of virtue and happiness, have struck many as an attractive alternative to modern theories. But we cannot find out whether this is true until we understand ancient ethics--and to do this we need to examine the basic structure of ancient ethical theory, not just the details of one or two theories. In this book, Annas brings together the results of a wide-ranging study of ancient ethical philosophy and presents it in a way that is easily accessible to anyone with an interest in ancient or modern ethics. She examines the fundamental notions of happiness and virtue, the role of nature in ethical justification and the relation between concern for self and concern for others. Her careful examination of the ancient debates and arguments shows that many widespread assumptions about ancient ethics are quite mistaken. Ancient ethical theories are not egoistic, and do not depend for their acceptance on metaphysical theories of a teleological kind. Most centrally, they are recognizably theories of morality, and the ancient disputes about the place of virtue in happiness can be seen as akin to modern disputes about the demands of morality
Armstrong, Charles Wicksteed (1951). Road to Happiness. London, Watts.   (Google)
Atherton, John R.; Graham, Elaine L. & Steedman, Ian (eds.) (2010). The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.   (Google)
Austin, Michael W. (2007). Chasing happiness together : Running and Aristotle's philosophy of friendship. In Michael W. Austin (ed.), Running and Philosophy: A Marathon for the Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Avramenko, Richard (2007). The wound and salve of time: Augustine's politics of human happiness. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):779-811.   (Google)
Barron, Robert (2007). A brief history of happiness. Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):167-169.   (Google)
Barrotta, Pierluigi (2008). Why economists should be unhappy with the economics of happiness. Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):145-165.   (Google)
Becker, Gary (ms). Evolutionary efficiency and happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: We model happiness as a measurement tool used to rank alternative actions. Evolution favors a happiness function that measures the individual’s success in relative terms. The optimal function, in particular, is based on a time-varying reference point –or performance benchmark –that is updated over time in a statistically optimal way in order to match the individual’s potential. Habits and peer comparisons arise as special cases of such updating process. This updating also results in a volatile level of happiness that continuously reverts to its long-term mean. Throughout, we draw a parallel with a problem of optimal incentives, which allows us to apply statistical insights from agency theory to the study of happiness
Benditt, Theodore (1974). Happiness. Philosophical Studies 25 (1).   (Google)
Berry, Narendra Kumar (1994). Everlasting Happiness. International Foundation for Education of Cosmological Spititualism.   (Google)
Berkovski, Sandy (ms). Happiness, ignorance, and externalism.   (Google)
Abstract: A natural view of happiness is based on ‘internalism’. One of its components is the claim about the supervenience of happiness over experiences. A change from one’s happiness to unhappiness is necessarily accompanied by a change in one’s experiences. Another component is the supreme authority of the subject. An agent must be regarded as the best judge of his own happiness. Any third person judgment which may be passed on his happiness depends on how the agent himself values his condition
Bett, Richard (2005). Nietzsche, the greeks, and happiness (with special reference to Aristotle and epicurus). Philosophical Topics 33 (2):45-70.   (Google)
Birmingham, P. (2003). The pleasure of your company: Arendt, Kristeva, and an ethics of public happiness. Research in Phenomenology 33 (1):53-74.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, I examine Arendt's and Kristeva's account of the archaic event of natality, arguing that each attempts to show how this event is the source of our pleasure in the company of others. I first examine Arendt's understanding of natality, showing that in her early writings, specifically in The Origin of Totalitarianism, the event of natality carries with it a capacity for violence that Arendt does not continue to develop in her later formulations. This lack of development leaves her later thought, specifically her notion of "public happiness" strangely light-minded on the topic of domination, unable to give an account of how violence can be part and parcel of our appearance in the public space itself. I then turn to Kristeva's understanding of the event of natality, arguing that her account, specifically the "violence beneath our desires" contributes significantly to Arendt's account of natality, allowing us to understand how pleasure in the company of others is possible despite such violence. I argue that Kristeva locates our capacity for public happiness in the aspect of natality Arendt abandons in her later thought. I conclude by showing how Kristeva's account of natality provides a foundation for Arendt's understanding of public happiness
Blackson, Thomas (2009). On Feldman's theory of happiness. Utilitas 21 (3):393-400.   (Google)
Bogen, James & Farrell, Daniel M. (1978). Freedom and happiness in mill's defence of liberty. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (113):325-338.   (Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (ed.) (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are the questions people ask themselves when they stop and think about how they feel, how their lives are going, and how they would be going if different choices had been made or different values had been prioritized. These are the questions that contributors to this volume begin to answer, adopting different methodologies, among which the analysis of widespread intuitions about imaginary and real-life scenarios, and reflection on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence emerging from psychology and economics.
Boyer, C. V. (1923). Self-expression and happiness: A study of Matthew Arnold's idea of perfection. International Journal of Ethics 33 (3):263-290.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Christopher (2009). Friendship in heaven : Aquinas on supremely perfect happiness and the communion of the saints. In Kevin Timpe (ed.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump. Routledge.   (Google)
Brown, Malcolm (2010). Happiness isn't working, but it should be. In John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.), The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.   (Google)
Brown, Eric, Wishing for fortune, choosing activity: Aristotle on external goods and happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: In Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN),1 Aristotle seeks to identify the human good, which he also calls eudaimonia2 or happiness (I 4, 1095a14-20) and which he explains as that for the sake of which one should do everything one does (I 7, 1097a22-24 and 1097a25- b21). After introducing the idea (in chapters one through three) and surveying some received accounts of it (in chapters four through six), he seems to give his definition in the seventh chapter, where he appeals to the human function and concludes that "the human good is activity of the [rational] soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are multiple virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue" (I 7, 1098a16-18).3 This account is sketchy, as Aristotle admits (I 7, 1098a20-22): he needs to say what virtuous activity is, how many virtues there are, and whether some one virtue is best and most complete. But the account has enough content to suit Aristotle's initial purposes (I 7, 1098a22-b8) and to court interpretive controversy. Perhaps the most obvious controversy is this: Does Aristotle really mean that the human good is just virtuous rational activity? Are health and wealth, not to mention friends and lovers, not part of the goal for the sake of which one should do everything one does? Many readers think that Aristotle does not intend such a narrow account. Some point to what he says about happiness before he comes to the human function argument, or to what he says about the good..
Bruni, Luigino (2007). Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Burns, J. H. (2005). Happiness and utility: Jeremy Bentham's equation. Utilitas 17 (1):46-61.   (Google)
Abstract: Doubts about the origin of Bentham's formula, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, were resolved by Robert Shackleton thirty years ago. Uncertainty has persisted on at least two points. (1) Why did the phrase largely disappear from Bentham's writing for three or four decades after its appearance in 1776? (2) Is it correct to argue (with David Lyons in 1973) that Bentham's principle is to be differentially interpreted as having sometimes a ‘parochial’ and sometimes a ‘universalist’ bearing? These issues are reopened here with particular reference to textual evidence overlooked in earlier discussions and contextual evidence on the development of Bentham's radicalism in the last two decades of his life. In conclusion some broader issues are raised concerning the character of Bentham's understanding of ‘happiness’ itself
Bush, Stephen S. (2008). Divine and human happiness in nicomachean ethics. Philosophical Review 117 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: presents a puzzle as to whether Aristotle views morally virtuous activity as happiness, as book 1 seems to indicate, or philosophical contemplation as happiness, as book 10 seems to indicate. The most influential attempts to resolve this issue have been either monistic or inclusivist. According to the monists, happiness consists exclusively of contemplation. According to the inclusivists, contemplation is one constituent of happiness, but morally virtuous activity is another. In this essay I will examine influential defenses of monism. Finding these accounts superior to inclusivism, but still deficient, I will present and defend a dualistic account of happiness in which two different types of happiness, one divine and one human, are present in Nicomachean Ethics. When Aristotle commends contemplation as a happiness that humans can attain, he is careful to specify that this activity corresponds to a capacity (nous) that is not, properly speaking, human, even though humans can exercise it. Contemplation, the divine good, is the highest good that humans can obtain, but it is not the characteristic human good. The characteristic human good corresponds to the specifically and merely human function, which is an activity of the compound of human reason and emotions
Bush, Vannevar (1961). Education, Wisdom & Happiness. [Cambridge, Centennial Committee, Massachusetts Insitute of Technology.   (Google)
Cahn, Steven M. & Murphy, Jeffrie G. (2009). Happiness and immorality. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Ethics: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Cahn, Steven M. & Vitrano, Christine (eds.) (2007). Happiness: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Camcastle, Cara (2008). Beccaria's luxury of comfort and happiness of the greatest number. Utilitas 20 (1):1-20.   (Google)
Chang, Jiang (2009). Happiness, harmony, wisdom and elegance : A perspective of contemporary eudemonism. In Jinfen Yan & David E. Schrader (eds.), Creating a Global Dialogue on Value Inquiry: Papers From the Xxii Congress of Philosophy (Rethinking Philosophy Today). Edwin Mellen Press.   (Google)
Chen, Shaoming (2010). On pleasure: A reflection on happiness from the confucian and daoist perspectives. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):179-195.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the structural relationship between ideals on pleasure and pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon in Chinese thought. It describes the psychological phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches by pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. It also analyzes its development in Song and Ming Confucianism. Finally, in the conclusion, the issue is transferred to a general understanding of happiness, so as to demonstrate the modern value of the classical ideological experience
Claremont, Claude A. (1947). Psychic conditions of social happiness. Synthese 6 (3-4).   (Google)
Cooper, John M. (1987). Contemplation and happiness: A reconsideration. Synthese 72 (2).   (Google)
Cooper, Review author[s]: John M. (1995). Eudaimonism and the appeal to nature in the morality of happiness: Comments on Julia Annas, the morality of happiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):587-598.   (Google | More links)
Cowan, J. L. (1989). Why not happiness? Philosophical Studies 56 (2).   (Google)
Crisp, Roger (1996). Mill on virtue as a part of happiness. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):367 – 380.   (Google)
Cupitt, Don (2005). The Way to Happiness: A Theory of Religion. Polebridge Press.   (Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (1981). A theory of happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Davis, Wayne (1981). Pleasure and happiness. Philosophical Studies 39 (3).   (Google)
Davenport, John J. (2007). Will as Commitment and Resolve: An Existential Account of Creativity, Love, Virtue, and Happiness. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us
Dearden, R. F. (1968). Happiness and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 2 (1):17–29.   (Google | More links)
Dolan, Albert Harold[from old catalog] (1942). More Friends of Happiness. And Chicago, Ill.,The Carmelite Press.   (Google)
Donougho, Martin (2009). Review of Alexander Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).   (Google)
Dougherty, Jude P. (2007). The difficult good: A thomistic approach to moral conflict and human happiness. Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):430-432.   (Google)
Dutt, Amitava Krishna & Radcliff, Benjamin (eds.) (2009). Happiness, Economics and Politics: Towards a Multi-Disciplinary Approach. Edward Elgar.   (Google)
Eardley, P. S. (2006). Conceptions of happiness and human destiny in the late thirteenth century. Vivarium 44 (s 2-3):276-304.   (Google)
Abstract: Medieval theories of ethics tended on the whole to regard self-perfection as the goal of human life. However there was profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century, over how exactly this was to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famously argued that human perfection lay primarily in coming to know the essence of God in the next life. Voluntarists such as the Franciscan John Peckham, by contrast, argued that ultimate perfection was to be achieved in patria through the act of loving God. The present article argues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defended a different sort of voluntarism with respect to the final destiny of human beings. Rather than claiming that the goal of human life lay in the perfection of the self, they argued instead that ultimate union with God was to be achieved mystically through an act of self-transcendence, which occurred through ecstasy or quasi-deification
Ebenstein, Alan O. (1991). The Greatest Happiness Principle: An Examination of Utilitarianism. Garland.   (Google)
Ehrmann, Max (1948). The Desiderata of Happiness: A Collection of Philosophical Poems. Crown Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: In a uniform format with Desiderata and The Desiderata of Love (with all-new illustrations and a fresh new jacket), this is a collection of life-affirming poems by a writer who has inspired and comforted countless readers. Line drawings
Epictetus, (1940). Give Yourself Happiness Says Epictetus. San Francisco, Kohnke Printing Co..   (Google)
Epicurus, (1994). Letter on Happiness. Chronicle Books.   (Google)
Abstract: A best-seller in Europe following its original publication in 1993, this littel book takes on a big subject, offering enduring guidelines from the Greek philosopher Epicurus for achieving lasting happiness. In a letter to his friend Menoecceus, Epicurus gives sound advice on increasing life's pleasures, not through hedonistic pursuits, as commonly assumed, but through intelligence, morality, and decency. Based on a new translation of Epicurus to Menoecceus and complete with the original Greek text, Letter on Happiness expounds upon basic philosophical inquiries concerning pleasure, longevity, death, and desire that are as relevant today as they were in ancient Greece, all in a compact, attractive package that makes a thoughtful gift for any occasion
Epictetus, (2003). Virtue and Happiness: The Manual of Epictetus. Shambhala Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Claude Mediavilla brings to the Greek text his training as both a painter and calligrapher, marrying modern variants of both medium and style with classical forms in a way that brings Epictetus’ words to life with beauty and startling immediacy. Calligraphy (from the Greek for "beautiful writing") is an art where word and image meet, where the artist strives to give visual expression to the meaning of words in a way that transcends the text while remaining completely faithful to it. It is a discipline that has been invested with spiritual significance wherever it has arisen--and it has arisen throughout the world in every age, in virtually every language, culture, and religion. The Shambhala Calligraphy series is a collection of books devoted to contemporary expressions of this "art of the word," featuring contemporary calligraphers' striking new interpretations of texts that have been traditional subjects for calligraphic interpretation. Whether in Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, Latin, or Chinese pictographs, the characters, words, and sentences are brought to life anew here in a choreography of mind, hand, and heart by which letter and spirit fuse in a single stroke
Erber, Georg, The principle of greatest happiness in western economic thought and its relation to buddhist economics.   (Google)
Abstract:      Western economic thinkers in the 19th century rediscovered the principle of greatest happiness (PGH). However, as Eastern philosophical and religious thinking shows it was part of common knowledge in Buddhism and Hinduism over the past millennia. PGH did not have the same agenda as later on utilitarism of John Stanley Jevons, with the utility maximization principle (UMP) of individuals disconnected from the rest of the society. The UMP was more an outcome of a fusion between moral ethical thinking as a social phenomenon with the Newtonian principles of mechanics based on differential calculus. The huge success of natural sciences in the 19th century during the industrial revolution was too tempting not to imitate its methodologies and concepts in the social sciences as social physics (SP). This kind of approach still has many followers unsurprisingly in the natural science community nowadays. The paper studies these interconnections between these different strands of Western thinking which lead after a century to the neoclassical paradigm in economics which took the UMP as its foundation for economic analysis. Richard Layard, an English labour economist, pointed out among others by empirical research that wellbeing or happiness is not significantly correlated with an ever increasing material wealth. Here might emerge a bridge between Buddhist economics and the recent rediscovery of the PGH in modern Western economics. The paper will close with the suggestion of some first possible corrections necessary for UMP to obtain a PGH consistentwith the current challenges to the global society
Estlund, David M. (1990). Mutual benevolence and the theory of happiness. Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):187-204.   (Google | More links)
Evans, Jonathan & Murphy, Peter (2008). Authenticity or happiness? Michael Scott and the ethics of self-deception (us). In Jeremy Wisnewski (ed.), The Office and Philosophy: Scenes From the Unexamined Life. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Feldman, Fred (2004). Cahn on foot on happiness. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1):3–7.   (Google | More links)
Feldman, Fred (ms). Happiness and subjective desire satisfaction: Wayne Davis's theory of happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: There is a lively debate about the descriptive concept of happiness. What do we mean when we say (using the word to express this descriptive concept) that a person is “happy”? One prominent answer is subjective local desire satisfactionism. On this view, to be happy at a time is to believe, with respect to the things that you want to be true at that time, that they are true. Wayne Davis developed and defended an interesting and sophisticated version of this view in a series of papers. I present, explain, and attempt to refute his version of the theory. I then sketch what I take to be a better theory of happiness -- a form of intrinsic attitudinal hedonism
Feldman, Fred, Happiness: Empirical research; philosophical conclusions.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years there has been a tremendous surge of academic interest in happiness. It seems that just about every week there is an announcement of a new book on the nature of happiness, or the measurement of happiness2, or the causes of happiness, or the history of happiness3. Some of these books have been written by philosophers. Others have been written by psychologists, economists, sociologists, and other empirical scientists.4 The surge of interest in happiness is truly interdisciplinary.5 Everybody wants to get into the act
Feldman, Fred (2008). Whole life satisfaction concepts of happiness. Theoria 74 (3):219-238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The most popular concepts of happiness among psychologists and philosophers nowadays are concepts of happiness according to which happiness is defined as "satisfaction with life as a whole". Such concepts are "Whole Life Satisfaction" (WLS) concepts of happiness. I show that there are hundreds of non-equivalent ways in which a WLS conception of happiness can be developed. However, every precise conception either requires actual satisfaction with life as a whole or requires hypothetical satisfaction with life as a whole. I show that a person can be "happy" (in any familiar sense that might be relevant to eudaimonism) at a time even though he is not actually satisfied with his life as a whole at that time. I also show that a person can be "happy" at a time even though it is not correct to say that if he were to think about his life at that time, he would be satisfied with it as a whole. My thesis is that if you think that happiness is the Good, you should avoid defining happiness as whole life satisfaction
Francis, Leslie (2010). Religion and happiness : Perspectives from the psychology of religion, positive psychology and empirical theology. In John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.), The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.   (Google)
Freed, Lan (1944). Morality and Happiness. London, Williams and Norgate Ltd..   (Google)
Gaskin, Richard (1995). Julia Annas: The morality of happiness. Mind 104 (416).   (Google)
Gauthier, David P. (1967). Progress and happiness: A utilitarian reconsideration. Ethics 78 (1):77-82.   (Google | More links)
Gendler, Tamar, Five ancient secrets to modern happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: – develop self-knowledge [Socrates] – cultivate internal harmony [Plato] – foster virtue through habit [Aristotle] – cultivate and appreciate true friendship [Cicero] – recognize what is and is not in your control [Epictetus]
Godwin, William (1798). Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness. Penguin.   (Google)
Godwin, William (1946). Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness. University of Toronto Press.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1-2. Text -- v. 3. Critical introduction and notes.
Goldstein, Irwin (1973). Happiness:The Role of Non-hedonic Criteria in Its Evaluation. International Philosophical Quarterly:523-534.   (Google)
Abstract: “Happiness” is an evaluative, not a value-neutral psychological, concept.
Goldworth, Amnon (1969). The meaning of Bentham's greatest happiness principle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (3).   (Google)
Gosling, J. C. B. (1982). The Greeks on Pleasure. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Provides a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories on the nature of pleasure, and of its value and rolein human lfie, from the ealriest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics
Graham, Elaine (2010). The "virtuous circle" : Religion and the practices of happiness. In John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.), The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.   (Google)
Grenholm, Carl-Henric (2010). Happiness, welfare and capabilities. In John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.), The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.   (Google)
Greene, Theodore M. (1956). Life, value, happiness. Journal of Philosophy 53 (10):317-330.   (Google | More links)
Gregg, Susan (2003). Mastering the Toltec Way: A Daily Guide to Happiness, Freedom, and Joy. Red Wheel.   (Google)
Abstract: By the light of the moon -- Seeing -- Going inside -- Our magical bodies -- And then there were words -- Awakening -- Beyond the mists -- Heaven on earth -- What would love do? -- Circle of light -- The love and the laughter -- Life is but a dream -- Mirror, mirror on the wall.
Greenberg, Allan (1955). On a concept of happiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (2):286-287.   (Google | More links)
Grinde, Bjørn (2005). Darwinian happiness: Can the evolutionary perspective on well-being help us improve society? World Futures 61 (4):317 – 329.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of Darwinian Happiness was coined to help people take advantage of knowledge on how evolution has shaped the brain; as processes within this organ are the main contributors to well-being. Fortuitously, the concept has implications that may prove beneficial for society: Compassionate behavior offers more in terms of Darwinian Happiness than malicious behavior; and the probability of obtaining sustainable development may be improved by pointing out that consumption beyond sustenance is not important for well-being. It is difficult to motivate people to act against their own best interests. Darwinian Happiness offers a concept that, to some extent, combines the interests of the individual with the interests of society
Griffin, James (1979). Is unhappiness morally more important than happiness? Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):47-55.   (Google | More links)
Guriev, Sergei M. & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V. (ms). (Un)happiness in transition.   (Google)
Abstract:      Despite the strong growth performance in transition countries in the last decade, residents of transition countries report abnormally low levels of life satisfaction. Using data from multiple sources including a recent survey in 28 post-communist countries, we study various explanations of this phenomenon. We find that deterioration in public goods provision, an increase in macroeconomic volatility, and a mismatch of human capital explain a great deal of the difference in life satisfaction between transition countries and other countries with similar income. The rest of the gap is explained by the difference in the quality of the samples. As in other countries, life satisfaction in transition is strongly related to income; but due to a higher non-response of high-income individuals in transition countries, the effect of GDP growth on the increase in life satisfaction estimated using survey data is biased downwards. The evidence suggests that if the region keeps growing at current rates, the life satisfaction in transition countries will catch up with the normal level in the near future
Guyer, Paul (2000). Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant is often portrayed as the author of a rigid system of ethics in which adherence to a formal and universal principle of morality - the famous categorical imperative - is an end itself, and any concern for human goals and happiness a strictly secondary and subordinate matter. Such a theory seems to suit perfectly rational beings but not human beings. The twelve essays in this collection by one of the world's preeminent Kant scholars argue for a radically different account of Kant's ethics. They explore an interpretation of the moral philosophy according to which freedom is the fundamental end of human action, but an end that can only be preserved and promoted by adherence to moral law. By radically revising the traditional interpretation of Kant's moral and political philosophy and by showing how Kant's coherent liberalism can guide us in current debates, Paul Guyer will find an audience across moral and political philosophy, intellectual history, and political science
Hadot, Pierre (2009). The Present Alone is Our Happiness: Conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold I. Davidson. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Tied to the apron strings of the church -- Researcher, teacher, philosopher -- Philosophical discourse -- Interpretation, objectivity and nonsense -- Unitary experience and philosophical life -- Philosophical discourse as spiritual exercise -- Philosophy as life and as a quest for wisdom -- From Socrates to Foucault : a long tradition -- Inacceptable? -- The present alone is our happiness.
Hagberg, Garry (1984). Understanding happiness. Mind 93 (372):589-591.   (Google | More links)
Hallett, Garth (1971). Happiness. Heythrop Journal 12 (3):301–303.   (Google | More links)
Hall, Cheryl (2010). The habitual route to environmentally friendly (or unfriendly) happiness. Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1):19 – 22.   (Google)
Abstract: I agree with Andreou that people are 'highly adaptable when it comes to material goods.' But I would supplement her point about the influence of social comparisons on experiences of happiness with a point about the influence of habit. Andreou does briefly mention habituation, arguing that 'a good will give one less happiness once one has gotten used to having it.' While this may be true, though, it is also true that one's sense of how necessary a good is to one's happiness actually increases once one has gotten used to having it. One becomes accustomed to having that good in one's life, incorporating it into one's routines, such that it becomes difficult to imagine life without it anymore. This phenomenon complicates Andreou's argument that being happy with less is possible if everyone has less: being happy with less also depends on (re)creating habits adapted to living with less
Haybron, Dan (ms). Do we know how happy we are?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility—one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or “affective ignorance.” For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block’s controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways
Haybron, Daniel M. (2009). Economics and happiness: Framing the analysis , edited by Luigino Bruni and Pier Luigi porta. Cambridge university press, 2005, XII + 366 pages. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):217-223.   (Google)
Haybron, Daniel M. (2001). Happiness and pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness
Haybron, Dan (2008). Happiness, the self and human flourishing. Utilitas 20 (1):21-49.   (Google)
Abstract: It may even be held that [the intellect] is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than himself. Moreover . . . that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man
Haybron, Dan (ms). Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed. For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values
Haybron, Dan (online). Theories of happiness overview.   (Google)
Haybron, Dan (ms). Two philosophical problems in the study of happiness.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss two philosophical issues that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that ‘happiness’, as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods
Haybron, Daniel M., What do we want from a theory of happiness?   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I defend a methodology for theorizing about happiness conceived as a type of psychological state. I reject three methods: conceptual or linguistic analysis; scientific naturalism—deferring to our best scientific theories of happiness; and what I call the “pure normative adequacy” approach, according to which the best conception of happiness is the one that best fulfills a particular role in moral theory (e.g., utility). The concept of happiness is foremost a folk notion employed by laypersons who have various practical interests in the matter, and theories of happiness should respect this fact. I identify four such interests in broad terms and then argue for a set of seven desiderata that any theory of happiness ought to satisfy. Though happiness is a psychological kind, its practical character means that the theory of happiness falls within the province of ethics. It should, however, be viewed as autonomous and not merely secondary to moral theory
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Abstract: This paper has two goals. First, I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s puzzling claims about will to power. I argue that the will to power thesis is a version of constitutivism. Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of agency; in particular, constitutivism rests on the idea that all actions are motivated by a common, higher-order aim, whose presence generates a standard of assessment for actions. Nietzsche’s version of constitutivism is based on a series of subtle claims about the psychology of willing and the nature of satisfaction, which imply that all actions aim at encountering and overcoming resistance (this is what Nietzsche means by “will to power”). Second, I argue that Nietzsche’s theory, thus interpreted, generates a new, a posteriori version of constitutivism that is not vulnerable to certain familiar objections. If this is right, then we can deploy Nietzschean ideas in order to make a substantive contribution to issues that are currently at the forefront of ethics and action theory.
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Abstract: Alexander Nehamas calls beauty a ‘promise of happiness’ and claims that it is an object of love. While this approach appealingly places beauty at the center of both artistic passion and everyday life, it also renders it riskily personal. This discussion raises two main questions to Nehamas. The first question regards the role of happiness in the concept of beauty, for many beautiful artworks seem to acknowledge the inevitability of sorrow rather than its opposite. The second question concerns how beauty may be both personal and grounded in factors sufficiently outside the self to safeguard it against the instability of individual preferences. To explore the latter issue, Nehamas's ideas are compared to those of another Platonist, Iris Murdoch. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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Abstract: Incommensurability and tragic conflict -- The business of order -- The real thing -- Virtue and the twofold order -- Practical reason and final ends -- Natural hierarchy and moral obligation -- Conflict -- The virtues of conflict.
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Abstract: Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects.
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Abstract: Neither art nor philosophy was kind to beauty during the twentieth century. Much modern art disdains beauty, and many philosophers deeply suspect that beauty merely paints over or distracts us from horrors. Intellectuals consigned the passions of beauty to the margins, replacing them with the anemic and rarefied alternative, "aesthetic pleasure." In Only a Promise of Happiness , Alexander Nehamas reclaims beauty from its critics. He seeks to restore its place in art, to reestablish the connections among art, beauty, and desire, and to show that the values of art, independently of their moral worth, are equally crucial to the rest of life. Nehamas makes his case with characteristic grace, sensitivity, and philosophical depth, supporting his arguments with searching studies of art and literature, high and low, from Thomas Mann's Death in Venice and Manet's Olympia to television. Throughout, the discussion of artworks is generously illustrated. Beauty, Nehamas concludes, may depend on appearance, but this does not make it superficial. The perception of beauty manifests a hope that life would be better if the object of beauty were part of it. This hope can shape and direct our lives for better or worse. We may discover misery in pursuit of beauty, or find that beauty offers no more than a tantalizing promise of happiness. But if beauty is always dangerous, it is also a pressing human concern that we must seek to understand, and not suppress
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Abstract: Departing on a demonstration which aims to show to young Cleinias how one ought to care about wisdom and virtue, Socrates asks at 278e2 whether people want to do well (ευ πραττειν). Eυ πραττειν is ambiguous. It can mean being happy and prospering, or doing what is right and doing it well. Socrates will later exploit this ambiguity, but at this point he uses this expression merely to announce his conviction that every human being (pathological cases aside, perhaps) desires to be happy (278e2-7). He does not examine how this desire figures in the psychology of action. Instead, and more fundamentally, he seeks to identify the things that would make us happy, or the good things as he calls them (279a2-4). In this passage, only those things are said to be good that make their possessor happy. Socrates does not present his view on what it is to be happy. But he goes on to advance confidently controversial claims about which things are good for us to possess and which are not. In and of itself, this implies that he has a view on happiness which enables him to identify these things, even though he does not offer an explicit statement of it. Here, I attempt to articulate the conception of happiness that is presupposed by Socrates in this passage. Since he does not reveal it explicitly, I will have to use the information he offers in which it is revealed implicitly. More precisely, I am going to ask what sort of a conception of happiness and unhappiness we need to attribute to Socrates in order to explain adequately his claims about what makes us happy and unhappy. To test the adequacy of the articulation I develop, I examine whether it can help us make sense of these claims and his defence for them. The same test of adequacy I apply also to some influential interpretations already on offer
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Abstract: While there is much common ground between the writings of Amartya Sen and John Stuart Mill – particularly in their advocacy of freedom and gender equality – one is a critic, while the other is an advocate, of utilitarianism. In spite of this contrast, there are strong echoes of Sen's capability approach in Mill's writings. Inasmuch as Mill sees the capability to be happy as important he holds a form of capability approach. He also thinks of happiness as constituted by the exercise of certain capabilities (including the higher faculties). Furthermore, Mill addresses the possibility that people can adapt to limited opportunity, which is central to Sen's critique of some ‘utility’-based views. By contrasting contentment and happiness Mill suggests one way in which a utilitarian might address cases of adaptation. His discussions of capabilities and of adaptation are consistent with his utilitarianism. (Published Online February 16 2006)
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Abstract: Historical introduction -- Human being -- Identity and human incompletion in Sartre -- Identity and human incompletion in Aquinas -- Human understanding -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Sartre -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Aquinas -- Human freedom -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Sartre -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Aquinas -- Human fulfillment -- The possibility of human happiness in Sartre -- The possibility of human happiness in Aquinas.
Wang, Stephen (2006). Human incompletion, happiness, and the desire for God in Sartre's being and nothingness. Sartre Studies International 12 (1):1-17.   (Google)
Abstract: Jean-Paul Sartre argues that human beings are fundamentally incomplete. Self-consciousness brings with it a presence-to-self. Human beings consequently seek two things at the same time: to possess a secure and stable identity, and to preserve the freedom and distance that come with self-consciousness. This is an impossible ideal, since we are always beyond what we are and we never quite reach what we could be. The possibility of completion haunts us and we continue to search for it even when we are convinced it can never be achieved. Sartre suggests that we have to continue seeking this ideal in the practical sphere, even when our philosophical reflection shows it to be an impossibility. Sartre puts this existential dilemma in explicitly theological terms. 'God' represents an ideal synthesis of being and consciousness which remains a self-contradictory goal. This dilemma remains unresolved in his thinking
Warner, Richard (1987). Freedom, Enjoyment, and Happiness: An Essay on Moral Psychology. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Werner, Louis (1973). A note about Bentham on equality and about the greatest happiness principle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (2).   (Google)
White, Nicholas (1995). Conflicting parts of happiness in Aristotle's ethics. Ethics 105 (2):258-283.   (Google | More links)
White, Stephen A. (1992). Sovereign Virtue: Aristotle on the Relation Between Happiness and Prosperity. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The central subject of Aristotle's ethics is happiness or living well. Most people in his day (as in ours), eager to enjoy life, impressed by worldly success, and fearful of serious loss, believed that happiness depends mainly on fortune in achieving prosperity and avoiding adversity. Aristotle, however, argues that virtuous conduct is the governing factor in living well and attaining happiness. While admitting that neither the blessings not the afflictions of fortune are unimportant, he maintains that the virtuous find life more satisfying than other people do and, with only modest good fortune, they lead happy, enjoyable lives. Combining philological precision with philosophical analysis, the author reconstructs Aristotle's defense of these bold claims. By examining how Aristotle develops his position in response to the prevailing hopes and anxieties of his age, the author shows why Aristotle considers happiness important for ethics and why he thinks it necessary to revise popular and traditional views. Paying close attention throughout to the internalist dimension of Aristotle's approach - his emphasis on how the virtuous view their own lives and actions - the author advances new interpretations of Aristotle's accounts of several major virtues, including temperance, courage, liberality, and 'greatness of soul'. This work sets Aristotle in the broader cultural context of his time, tracing his attemps to accommodate and amend rival views. The author examines literary and historical sources as well as philosophical texts, showing the inherited values and traditional ideals that inform Aristotle's discussions and provide some of the basis for his conclusions. Presupposing no knowledge of Greek or specialized philosophical terminology, the book is designed to be accessible to all students of philosophy or classical antiquity. All quotations from ancient texts are translated
Wike, Victoria S. (1987). The role of happiness in kant'sgroundwork. Journal of Value Inquiry 21 (1).   (Google)
Wilkinson, Will (2007). In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for Policy? Cato Institute Policy Analysis 590.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: "Happiness research" studies the correlates of subjective well-being, generally through survey methods. A number of psychologists and social scientists have drawn upon this work recently to argue that the American model of relatively limited government and a dynamic market economy corrodes happiness, whereas Western European and Scandinavian-style social democracies promote it. This paper argues that happiness research in fact poses no threat to the relatively libertarian ideals embodied in the U.S. socioeconomic system. Happiness research is seriously hampered by confusion and disagreement about the definition of its subject as well as the limitations inherent in current measurement techniques. In its present state happiness research cannot be relied on as an authoritative source for empirical information about happiness, which, in any case, is not a simple empirical phenomenon but a cultural and historical moving target. Yet, even if we accept the data of happiness research at face value, few of the alleged redistributive policy implications actually follow from the evidence. The data show that neither higher rates of government redistribution nor lower levels of income inequality make us happier, whereas high levels of economic freedom and high average incomes are among the strongest correlates of subjective well-being. Even if we table the damning charges of questionable science and bad moral philosophy, the American model still comes off a glowing success in terms of happiness.
Wilson, Fred (1982). Mill's proof that happiness is the criterion of morality. Journal of Business Ethics 1 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers the converse of the principle that ought implies can, namely, the principle that must implies ought. It argues that this principle is the central premiss for Mill's argument that happiness is desirable (worthy of desire), and it examines the sense of must that is relevant and the implications it has for Mill's moral philosophy
Williams, Garrath (2010). 'Who are we to judge?' – On the proportionment of happiness to virtue. Philosophy 85 (1):47-66.   (Google)
Winston, Joe (2009). Only a promise of happiness: The place of beauty in a world of art (review). Journal of Aesthetic Education 43 (4):pp. 124-129.   (Google)
Woods, Anderson (1925). The greatest happiness regardless of number. International Journal of Ethics 35 (4):413-425.   (Google | More links)
Wright, William K. (1908). Happiness as an ethical postulate. Philosophical Review 17 (5):518-528.   (Google | More links)

5.1l.6.19 Tolerance

Bok, Sissela (1982). Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dees, Richard H. (2004). Trust and Toleration. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book outlines the social, conceptual, and psychological preconditions for toleration.By looking closely at the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France and England and at contemporary controversies about the rights of homosexuals, Richard Dees demonstrates how trust between the opposing parties is needed first, but in just these cases, distrust is all-too-rational. Ultimately, that distrust can only be overcome if the parties undergo a fundamental shift of values - a conversion. Only then can they accept some form of toleration
Horton, John & Mendus, Susan (eds.) (1985). Aspects of Toleration: Philosophical Studies. Methuen.   (Google)
Mendus, Susan & Edwards, David (eds.) (1987). On Toleration. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Is toleration a requirement of morality or a dictate of prudence? What limits are there to toleration? What is required of us if we are to promote a truly tolerant society? These themes--the grounds, limits, and requirements of toleration--are central to this book, which presents the W.B. Morrell Memorial Lectures on Toleration, given in 1986 at the University of York. Covering a wide range of practical and theoretical issues, the contributors--including F.A. Hayek, Maurice Cranston, and Karl Popper--consider the philosophical difficulties inherent in the concept as well as the practical problems of implementing a policy of toleration. Although the contributors differ in their conclusions about the grounds of toleration, they all share a belief in the importance of the concept both historically and in modern society
Miller, Connie Colwell (2006). Tolerance. Capstone Press.   (Google)
Osborn, Kevin (1990). Tolerance. Rosen Pub. Group.   (Google)
Pryor, Kimberley Jane (2008). Tolerance. Marshall Cavendish Benchmark.   (Google)
Abstract: Values -- Tolerance -- Tolerant people -- Being tolerant of family -- Being tolerant of friends -- Being tolerant of neighbours -- Ways to be tolerant -- Being aware of others -- Respecting different kinds of families -- Accepting other cultures -- Including others -- Learning from others -- Being patient -- Personal set of values.
Roberts, Cynthia (2008). Tolerance. Child's World.   (Google)
Roger, Dominique; Parinaud, André & Parinaud, Claudine (eds.) (1996). Tolerance. Unesco Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Machine generated contents note: 1. -- War on war, by Lewis Thomas -- 2. -- Silent genocide, by Abdus Salam -- 3. -- Error: a stage of knowledge, by Paulo Freire -- 4. -- Doing without a revolution?, by Tahar Ben Jelloun -- 5. -- Stop torture, by Manfred Nowak -- 6. -- Truth, force and law, by Rabindranath Tagore -- 7. -- Violence is an insult to the human being, by Federico Mayor -- 8. -- Totalitarianism banishes politics, by Vaclav Havel -- 9. -- No one will stop us. , by Desmond Tutu -- 10. -- Colonialism and the youth bomb, by Joseph Ki-Zerbo -- 11. -- The shedding of blood -- 12. -- Letter from Nagasaki, by Takashi Nagai -- 13. -- Down with exclusion!, by Herbert de Souza -- 14. -- The nower to sav 'no'. bv loan Martin-Brown -- 15. -- Inquiry into a taboo, by Ouassila Si Saber -- 16. -- The illusions of rationalism, by Ernesto Sabato -- 17. -- The 'poisonous weed', by Ba Jin -- 18. -- Humanity, an ongoing creation, by Ali Ahmad Said Esber (Adonis) -- 19. -- Image, writing and the vandal, by Alberto Moravia -- 20. -- The charms of calumny, by Andres Bello -- 21. -- On the threshold of eternity, by the Abbe Pierre -- 22. -- The control of force, by Karl Jaspers -- 23. -- The nature of force, by Simone Weil -- 24. -- The debt of justice, by Martin Luther King -- 25. -- Democracy and barbarism, by Sergei S. Averintsev -- 26. -- If all the animals should disappear, by Richard Fitter -- 27. -- Irony and compassion, by Octavio Paz -- 28. -- Against all hatred, by Aime Cesaire -- 29. -- Creating differences, by Daniel J. Boorstin -- 30. -- I dislike the word 'tolerance', by Mahatma Gandhi.
Sainsbury, Howard (1970). Tolerance and the Clash of Ideologies. Harlow,Longmans.   (Google)

5.1l.6.2 Moral Perception

McGrath, Sarah (2004). Moral knowledge by perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else’’(1977,p.38).But wehavenosuchspecialfaculty.So,wehavenomoralknowledge. Following Mackie, let us distinguish two questions: Q1: Assuming that we have moral knowledge, how do we have it? Q2: Do we in fact have any moral knowledge? In response to the first question, I argue that if we have moral knowledge, we have some of it in the same way we have knowledge of our immediate environment: by perception. Many people think that this answer leads to moral skepticism, because they think that we obviously cannot have moral knowledge by perception. But I will argue that this is incorrect. The plan for the paper is as follows. In Sections 2–4, I work up to my answer to Q1 by considering rivals. In Section 5, I explain what marks my answer to Q1 as a distinctive view, and defend it. In Section 6, I briefly discuss how this answer to Q1 affects what we say in response to Q2
Väyrynen, Pekka (2008). Some good and bad news for ethical intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics

5.1l.6.20 Alienation

Feuerlicht, Ignace (1978). Alienation: From the Past to the Future. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Kim, Chu-yŏn (ed.) (1976). Hyŏndae Munhwa Wa Sooe.   (Google)
Morris, Warren Frederick (2002). Escaping Alienation: A Philosophy of Alienation and Dealienation. University Press of America.   (Google)
Murchland, Bernard (1972). The New Iconoclasm. Garden City, N.Y.,Doubleday.   (Google)
Rotenstreich, Nathan (1989). Alienation: The Concept and its Reception. E.J. Brill.   (Google)
Schmitt, Richard (2003). Alienation and Freedom. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Drawing from existentialism, feminism, the thought of Karl Marx and novelists like Dostoevsky, Richard Schmitt looks at modern capitalist societies to understand what it is that might be wrong for individuals. His concern focuses specifically on those who are alienated-- those persons who have difficulty finding meaning in their lives, who lack confidence in themselves and trust in others and, finally, who are constantly distracted by consumer society. He explores how and why alienation occurs. From friendship, love, and work, Alienation and Freedom touches on issues meaningful to us all
Shoham, S. Giora (1983). The Violence of Silence: The Impossibility of Dialogue. Science Reviews.   (Google)

5.1l.6.21 Moral Phenomenology

Björnsson, Gunnar (ms). 'Objectivist' traits of moral phenomenology and moral discourse don't support moral objectivism.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral objectivists hold that there are answers to moral questions, answers that are correct independently of who is asking the question. And they often think that traits of moral phenomenology and discourse support their understanding of moral thinking and moral language, creating a strong presumption against relativist, non-cognitivist and nihilist accounts. This paper questions that assumption, developing an argument of a type that has been alluded to more or less explicitly by proponents of non-cognitivism, relativism and nihilism. If the argument is successful, the existence of widespread and deep moral disagreement prevents objectivism from explaining or making sense of apparently objectivist traits of morality in a straightforward way. The fact that moral discourse and moral thinking seem to be concerned with objective matters gives us no straightforward reason to accept objectivism. Support for objectivism would have to come from a different source
Brown, Mark W. (2010). The Life-world as Moral World: Vindicating the Life-world en route to a Phenomenology of the Virtues. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 6 (3):1-25.   (Google)
Abstract: Clarifying the essential experiential structures at work in our everyday moral engagements promises both (1) to provide a perspicacious self-understanding, and (2) to significantly contribute to theoretical and practical matters of moral philosophy. Since the phenomenological enterprise is concerned with revealing the a priori structures of experience in general, it is then well positioned to discern the essential structures of moral experience specifically. Phenomenology can therefore significantly contribute to matters pertaining to moral philosophy. In this paper I would like to contribute to the relatively small yet burgeoning field of phenomenological ethics. I endea­vour to do so by first identifying and consolidating the basic level of sense-bestowal, and then outlining the a priori structures of volition in order to demonstrate how such phenomenologically discerned structures are required for moral experience. Specifically, in section one I locate moral experience as at the level of meaning that is phenomenologically identified as the life-world, and then vindicate the life-world by illustrating how it is immune to naturalistic rationalisation. By thus both securing the level of meaning that is of concern and importantly delimiting the scope of our analysis, I proceed in section two to relate the volitional analyses of Aristotle, Husserl, and Heidegger. This relation is achieved thanks to a conceptual point of con­tinuity: ‘prohairesis’. By examining the function of this concept (as an intentional structure) and its phenomenological continuity, the ground is then prepared for further phenomenological analyses of the virtues.
Drummond, John (2008). Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “phenomenology” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “moral phenomenology.”
Garfield, Jay, What is it like to be a bodhisattva? Moral phenomenology in íåntideva's bodhicaryåvatåra.   (Google)
Abstract: Bodhicaryåvatåra was composed by the Buddhist monk scholar Íåntideva at Nalandå University in India sometime during the 8th Century CE. It stands as one the great classics of world philosophy and of Buddhist literature, and is enormously influential in Tibet, where it is regarded as the principal source for the ethical thought of Mahåyåna Buddhism. The title is variously translated, most often as A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life or Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, translations that follow the canonical Tibetan translation of the title of the book (Byang chub sems pa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa) and the commentarial tradition of Tibet. But that translation itself is a bit of a gloss on the original Sanskrit, and I think that a more natural English rendering of the Sanskrit title is simply How to Lead an Awakened Life, and that indeed describes the content of the text admirably. Taking this as the title of the text might also issue in a kind of gestalt shift in our view of the text, allowing us to see it not so much as a characterization of the extraordinary moral life of a saint, but as a guide to moral development open to any of us. So, let’s take that as the English title for now
Gill, Michael B. (2009). Moral phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (4):pp. 569-594.   (Google)
Gill, Michael (2008). Variability and moral phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard
Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (2010). Mandelbaum on moral phenomenology and moral realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge.   (Google)
Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (2005). Moral phenomenology and moral theory. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):56–77.   (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (2008). What does moral phenomenology tell us about moral objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.   (Google)
Kleinberg-Levin, David (1998). Tracework: Myself and Others in the Moral Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):345-392.   (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):1-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction
Levin, David Michael (2009). Experience and description in the moral phenomenology of Merleau-ponty and Levinas. In Robert Vallier, Wayne Jeffrey Froman & Bernard Flynn (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Levin, David Michael (1998). Tracework: Myself and others in the moral phenomenology of Merleau-ponty and Levinas. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):345 – 392.   (Google)
Abstract: In this study, I examine the significance of the trace and its legibility in the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, showing that this trope plays a more significant role in Merleau-Ponty's thinking than has been recognized heretofore and that it constitutes a crucial point of contact between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. But this point of contact is also, in both their philosophies, a site where their thinking is compelled to confront its limits and the enigmas involved in the description of the topography of a hermeneutical flesh. It is argued that the significance of the trace consists in its alterity, its registering and inscribing in the very matter of the flesh an imperative spiritual assignment: the morally binding hold of the other person on my capacity to be responsive to the other's needs and bear responsibility for the other's welfare. The retrieval or recuperation of the trace, which, I argue, is inscribed as a certain predisposition in what, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, we might call the prepersonal topology of the flesh, would thus constitute a task of the utmost importance for the formation of the moral self. However, given the paradoxical temporality of the trace and the hermeneutical nature of its legibility, the retrieval of the trace is not actually possible. Nevertheless, the attempt to retrieve it - one's commitment to retrieving it - is an absolutely imperative existential task, determining the character of the moral self. In both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, however, the problematic nature of this recuperative project is manifested in the ambiguous, equivocal modality of their rhetoric, supposedly engaged in the phenomenological description of the primordial 'inscription', but oscillating, in fact, undecidably between descriptive and prescriptive, constative and performative, literal and metaphorical modes of discourse. It is argued that this, far from being a fault, is necessitated by the hermeneutic nature of the trace, which requires that the description be invocative and evocative, provoking a deep transformation in experience that would make the description true. It accordingly becomes clear that and why the moral phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, depending as they must on a metaphorical interaction between language and experience, cannot function within the framework of the traditional correspondence theory of truth
Scarre, Geoffrey (1998). Understanding the moral phenomenology of the third Reich. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the issue of German moral responsibility for the Holocaust in the light of the thesis of Daniel Goldhagen and others that inherited negative stereotypes of Jews and Jewishness were prime causal factors contributing to the genocide. It is argued that in so far as the Germans of the Third Reich were dupes of an ''hallucinatory ideology,'' they strikingly exemplify the ''paradox of moral luck'' outlined by Thomas Nagel, that people are not morally responsible for what they are and are not responsible for. The implications of this paradox for the appraisal of German guilt are explored in relation to the views of a number of recent writers on the Holocaust
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2008). Is moral phenomenology unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of morality

5.1l.6.22 Jealousy

Murphy, Jeffrie G. (2002). Jealousy, shame, and the rival. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract:   This essay is a critique of the two chapters on jealousy in Jerome Neu's book A Tear is an Intellectual Thing. The rival — as anobject of both fear and hatred — is of central importance in romantic jealousy, but it is here argued that the role of the rival cannot be fully understood in Neu's account of jealousy and that shame (not noted by Neu) must be seen as central to the concept of jealousy if the role of the rival is to be fully understood
Purshouse, Luke (2004). Jealousy in relation to envy. Erkenntnis 60 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions
Wreen, Michael J. (1989). Jealousy. Noûs 23 (5):635-652.   (Google | More links)

5.1l.6.23 Kindness

Ascione, Frank R. (2004). Children and Animals: Exploring the Roots of Kindness and Cruelty. Purdue University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Animal abuse has been an acknowledged problem for centuries, but only within the past few decades has scientific research provided evidence that the maltreatment of animals often overlaps with violence toward people. The perpetrators of such inhumane trea
Cullity, Garrett (1994). International aid and the scope of kindness. Ethics 105 (1):99-127.   (Google | More links)
Meyer, Michelle N. (2008). The kindness of strangers: The donative contract between subjects and researchers and the non-obligation to return individual results of genetic research. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (11):44 – 46.   (Google)
Newkirk, Ingrid (2009). The Peta Practical Guide to Animal Rights: Simple Acts of Kindness to Help Animals in Trouble. St. Martin's Griffin.   (Google)
Abstract: With more than two million members and supporters, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is the world’s largest animal-rights organization, and its founder and president, Ingrid Newkirk, is one of the most well-known and most effective activists in America. She has spearheaded worldwide efforts to improve the treatment of animals in manufacturing, entertainment, and elsewhere. Every day, in laboratories, food factories, and other industries, animals by the millions are subjected to inhumane cruelty. In this accessible guide, Newkirk teaches readers hundreds of simple ways to stop thoughtless animal cruelty and make positive choices. For each topic, Newkirk provides hard facts, personal insight, inspiration, ideas, and resources, including: • How to eat healthfully and compassionately • How to adopt animals rather than support puppy mills • How to make their vote count and change public opinion • How to switch to cruelty-free cosmetics and clothing • How to choose amusements that protect rather than exploit animals. With public concern for the well-being of animals greater than ever—particularly among young people—this timely, practical book offers exciting and easy ways to make a difference
Shannon, Thomas A. (2001). The kindness of strangers: Organ transplantation in a capitalist age. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : The topic of organ transplantation is examined from the perspective of three authors: Robert Bellah, Jeremy Rifkin, and Margaret Jane Radin. Introduced by reflections on the development of the justification of organ transplantation within the Roman Catholic community and the various themes raised by the historical study in Richard Titmuss's The Gift Relationship, the paper examines how and in what ways the possible commodification of organs will affect our society and the impacts this may have on the supply of organs

5.1l.6.24 Moral Deliberation

Anderson, Elizabeth (2005). Moral heuristics: Rigid rules or flexible inputs in moral deliberation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):544-545.   (Google)
Abstract: Sunstein represents moral heuristics as rigid rules that lead us to jump to moral conclusions, and contrasts them with reflective moral deliberation, which he represents as independent of heuristics and capable of supplanting them. Following John Dewey's psychology of moral judgment, I argue that successful moral deliberation does not supplant moral heuristics but uses them flexibly as inputs to deliberation. Many of the flaws in moral judgment that Sunstein attributes to heuristics reflect instead the limitations of the deliberative context in which people are asked to render judgments
Glasgow, Joshua M., Expanding the limits of universalization: Kant’s duties and Kantian moral deliberation.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite all the attention given to Kant’s universalizability tests, one crucial aspect of Kant’s thought is often overlooked. Attention to this issue, I will argue, helps us resolve two serious problems for Kant’s ethics. Put briefly, the first problem is this: Kant, despite his stated intent to the contrary, doesn’t seem to use universalization in arguing for duties to oneself, and, anyway, it is not at all clear why duties to oneself should be grounded on a procedure that envisions a world in which everyone wills the contrary of those duties. The second, more global problem is that if we follow Barbara Herman in holding that Kantian ethics can provide a structure for moral deliberation, we need an interpretation of the universalization procedure that unproblematically allows it to generate something like prima facie duties to guide that deliberation; but it is not at all clear that we have such an interpretation. I argue here that if we expand our limited way of thinking about universalization, we can solve the first problem and work towards a solution to the second. We can begin by recalling that Kant’s ‘Law of Nature’ formulation (FLN) of the Categorical Imperative obligates us to ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (G, 421)
Gouinlock, James (1978). Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. Ethics 88 (3):218-228.   (Google | More links)
Isaacs, Tracy & Jeske, Diane (1997). Moral deliberation, nonmoral ends, and the virtuous agent. Ethics 107 (3):486-500.   (Google | More links)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (1999). Stories and cases: Discernment and inference in moral deliberation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (3).   (Google)
Louise, Jennie (2009). I won't do it! Self-prediction, moral obligation and moral deliberation. Philosophical Studies 146 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction
Magnell, Thomas (2000). The mistake of the century and moral deliberation. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (1).   (Google)
Stone, M. W. F. (2004). The scope and limits of moral deliberation. In Lodi Nauta & Detlev Pätzold (eds.), Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Peeters.   (Google)
Väyrynen, Pekka (2006). Ethical theories and moral guidance. Utilitas 18 (3):291-309.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Let the Guidance Constraint be the following norm for evaluating ethical theories: Other things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance. I offer an account of why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are. We can explain central facts about adequate moral guidance, and their relevance to ethical theory, by appealing to certain forms of autonomy and fairness. This explanation is better than explanations that feature versions of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In closing, I address the objection that my account is questionable because it makes ethical theories subject not merely to purely theoretical but also to morally substantive norms. (Published Online August 21 2006)
Väyrynen, Pekka (2008). Usable moral principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: One prominent strand in contemporary moral particularism concerns the claim of "principle abstinence" that we ought not to rely on moral principles in moral judgment because they fail to provide adequate moral guidance. I argue that moral generalists can vindicate this traditional and important action-guiding role for moral principles. My strategy is to argue, first, that, for any conscientious and morally committed agent, the agent's acceptance of (true) moral principles shapes their responsiveness to (right) moral reasons and, second, that if so, then those principles can contribute non-trivially to some reliable strategy for acting well that is available for use in the agent's practical thinking. My defense of these two claims appeals to an account of moral principles as a kind of hedged principles which I defend elsewhere, but my general line of argument should be acceptable to many other forms of generalism as well. I defend the epistemic significance of hedged principles in moral deliberation, and argue that the need for sensitivity to particulars in moral judgment doesn't supplant principles in moral guidance. I finish by arguing that the generalist model of moral guidance developed here isn't undermined by evidence from cognitive science about how we make moral judgments in actual practice, and that it compares favorably to particularism with respect to its capacity to offer adequate moral guidance
Wilson, Donald (2009). Moral deliberation and desire development: Herman on alienation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 283-308.   (Google)

5.1l.6.25 Moral Intuition

Audi, Robert (2008). Intuition, inference, and rational disagreement in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do not take to be self-evident, and basic moral principles, which they typically do take to be self-evident in a sense explicated in the paper. This explanation is accomplished in part by drawing some analogies between moral and perceptual judgments in the light of a developmental conception of knowledge. The final section of the paper presents a partial account of rational disagreement and indicates how the kind of intuitionist view defended can allow for rational disagreement between apparent epistemic peers
Davis, John K. (2007). Intuition and the junctures of judgment in decision procedures for clinical ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition
Huemer, Michael (2008). Revisionary intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.   (Google)
Tersman, Folke (2008). The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general
Väyrynen, Pekka (2008). Some good and bad news for ethical intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics
Woodward, James & Allman, John (ms). Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance.   (Google)
Abstract: We use the phrase ‘‘moral intuition” to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates for moral intuition include fronto-insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices and associated subcortical structure such as the septum, basil ganglia and amygdala. Understanding the role of these structures undercuts many philosophical doctrines concerning the status of moral intuitions, but vindicates the claim that they can sometimes play a legitimate role in moral decision-making

5.1l.6.3 Resentment

5.1l.6.4 Forgiveness

Carse, Alisa L. & Tirrell, Lynne (2010). Forgiving Grave Wrongs. In Christopher Allers & Marieke Smit (eds.), Forgiveness In Perspective. Rodopi Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We introduce what we call the Emergent Model of forgiving, which is a process-based relational model conceptualizing forgiving as moral and normative repair in the wake of grave wrongs. In cases of grave wrongs, which shatter the victim’s life, the Classical Model of transactional forgiveness falls short of illuminating how genuine forgiveness can be achieved. In a climate of persistent threat and distrust, expressions of remorse, rituals and gestures of apology, and acts of reparation are unable to secure the moral confidence and trust required for moral repair, much less for forgiveness. Without the rudiments of a shared moral world — a world in which, at the very least, the survivor’s violation can be collectively recognized as a violation, and her moral status and authority collectively acknowledged and respected — expressions of remorse, gestures and rituals of apology, or promises of compensation have no authority as meaningful communicative acts with reparative significance. Accordingly, we argue that repair in the wake of traumatic violence involves ‘world-building,’ which supports the ability of survivors to move from despair to hope, from radical and disabling distrust to trust and engagement, and thus from impotence to effective agency. Our Emergent Model treats forgiveness as a slowly developing outcome of a series of changes in a person’s relationship to the trauma and its aftermath, in which moral agency is regained. We argue that forgiveness after grave wrongs and world-shattering harm, when it occurs, emerges from other phenomena, such as cohabitation within a community, gestures of reconciliation, working on shared projects, the developing of trust. On this view, forgiveness is an emergent phenomenon; it entails taking and exercising normative power—coming to claim one’s own moral authority in relation to oneself, one’s assailant, and one’s community. The processes that ultimately constitute forgiving are part and parcel of normative repair more broadly construed.
Griswold, Charles L. (2007). Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Nearly everyone has wronged another. Who among us has not longed to be forgiven? Nearly everyone has suffered the bitter injustice of wrongdoing. Who has not struggled to forgive? Charles Griswold has written the first comprehensive philosophical book on forgiveness in both its interpersonal and political contexts, as well as its relation to reconciliation. Having examined the place of forgiveness in ancient philosophy and in modern thought, he discusses what forgiveness is, what conditions the parties to it must meet, its relation to revenge and hatred, when it is permissible and whether it is obligatory, and why it is a virtue

5.1l.6.5 Schadenfreude

5.1l.6.6 Self-Deception

Audi, Robert N. (1976). Epistemic disavowals and self-deception. Personalist 57:378-385.   (Google)
Audi, Robert N. (1982). Self-deception, action, and will. Erkenntnis 18 (September):133-158.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1981). An analysis of self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1985). More on self-deception: Reply to Hellman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (June):611-614.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette C. (1996). The vital but dangerous art of ignoring: Selective attention and self-deception. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Barnes, Annette (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias, and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Self-deception, intentions and contradictory beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):309-319.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bird, Alexander (1994). Rationality and the structure of self-deception. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Borge, Steffen (2003). The myth of self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brown, Rachel (2004). The emplotted self: Self-deception and self-knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. & Mcnally, Patrick (1961). Paradoxes of self-deception. Analysis 21 (June):140-144.   (Google)
Canfield, John V. & Gustavson, Don F. (1962). Self-deception. Analysis 23 (December):32-36.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1976). Double deception. Mind 85 (January):100-102.   (Google | More links)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1994). Deceit, deception and the self-deceiver. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):53-58.   (Google)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1979). Self-deception: A problem about autobiography. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:77-94.   (Google)
Christofidou, Andrea (1995). First person: The demand for identification-free self-reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cook, J. Thomas (1987). Deciding to believe without self-deception. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):441-446.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Cosentino, Dante A. (1980). Self-deception without paradox. Philosophy Research Archives 1388.   (Google)
Daniels, Charles B. (1974). Self-deception and interpersonal deception. Personalist 55:244-252.   (Google)
Factor, R. Lance (1977). Self-deception and the functionalist theory of mental processes. Personalist 58 (April):115-123.   (Google)
Fairbanks, Rick (1995). Knowing more than we can tell: Resolving the dynamic paradox of self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):431-459.   (Google)
Fairbanks, Rick (1999). The availability of self-deception. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):335-340.   (Google | More links)
Fingarette, Herbert (1969). Self-Deception. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 95 | Google | More links)
Fingarette, Herbert (1998). Self-deception needs no explaining. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1980). Rethinking self-deception. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (July):237-242.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Funkhouser, Eric (2005). Do the self-deceived get what they want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge
Gardiner, P. L. (1970). Error, faith and self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70:197-220.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Gendler, Tamar (2007). Self-deception as pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding self-deception in this way is highly natural. And it provides a non-
paradoxical characterization of the phenomenon that explains both its distinctive patterns of instability and its ordinary association with irrationality. Why, then, has this diagnosis been overlooked? I suggest that the oversight is due to a failure to recognize the philosophical significance of a crucial fact about the human mind, namely, the degree to which attitudes other than belief often play a central role in our mental and practical lives, both by “influenc[ing our]. . . passions and imagination,” and by “governing. . .our actions.”
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1997). The very idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some of these constraints. This second claim can best be brought out in the context of an examination of the idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception, but the conclusion is perfectly general: the idea that computers are believers, like the idea that computers could have self-knowledge or be self-deceived, is incompatible with the commonsense view. The significance of the argument lies in the choice it forces on us: whether to revise our notion of belief so as to accommodate the claim that computers are believers, or to give up on that claim so as to preserve our pretheoretic notion of the attitudes. We cannot have it both ways
Gozzano, Simone (1999). Davidson on rationality and irrationality. In Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Graham, George (1986). Russell's deceptive desires. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):223-229.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Haight, M. R. (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Hales, Steven D. (1994). Self-deception and belief attribution. Synthese 101 (2):273-289.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended
Hamlyn, David W. (1971). Self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:45-60.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hausman, Carl R. (1967). Creativity and self-deception. Journal of Existentialism 7:295-308.   (Google)
Hellman, Nathan (1983). Bach on self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (September):113-120.   (Google | More links)
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hirstein, William (2000). Self-deception and confabulation. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Holton, Richard (2001). What is the role of the self in self-deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The orthodox answer to my question is this: in a case of self-deception, the self acts to deceive itself. That is, the self is the author of its own deception. I want to explore an opposing idea here: that the self is rather the subject matter of the deception. That is, I want to explore the idea that self-deception is more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s deception by the self. The expression would thus be semantically comparable to expressions like ‘self-knowledge’ (which involves knowledge about the self) rather than to expressions like ‘self-control’ (which involves control by the self).1 On this approach, what goes wrong, when we are self-deceived, is that we lack self-knowledge; or, more accurately, since one can lack knowledge without falling into error, what goes wrong is that we have false beliefs about ourselves. Not any kind of false belief about oneself; I am not self-deceived when I mistake my shoe size. Rather, self-deception requires false beliefs about the kind of subject matter that, were one to get it right, would constitute self-knowledge. It is an interesting fact about current English that, though we talk freely of self-knowledge, we have no common term to designate its absence. Seventeenth century writers talked of self-ignorance; but the term has fallen from use. I suggest that ‘self-deception’ is the nearest we have
Hsieh, Diana M. (2004). Dursley duplicity: The morality and psychology of self-deception. In David Baggett, Shawn E. Klein & William Irwin (eds.), Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts. Chicago: Open Court.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Johnston, Mark (1995). Self-deception and the nature of mind. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Jones, David H. (1989). Pervasive self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:217-237.   (Google)
Jones, Ward E. (1998). Religious conversion, self-deception, and Pascal's Wager. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2).   (Google)
Keil, Geert (2000). Indexikalitat und infallibilitat. In Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.   (Google)
King-Farlow, John (1963). Self-deceivers and sartrian seducers. Analysis 23 (June):131-136.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kipp, David (1980). On self-deception. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (October):305-317.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Kirsch, Julie (online). Ethics and self-deception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Knight, Martha L. (1988). Cognitive and motivational bases of self-deception: Commentary on Mele's irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):179-188.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lazar, Ariela (1999). Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence. Mind 108 (430):265-290.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state of self-deception is taken to be a calculated outcome involving a person's intentional manipulation of her own thoughts. I argue that this answer is false and forms an impediment towards making sense of self-deception. I show that, contrary to philosophical prejudice, emotions and desires exert vast and systematic effects on the formation of beliefs. In this, and other, sections of the article, the results of experimental work are brought forward. Self-deception is portrayed here as resembling numerous instances of belief formation which are regularly affected by motivational factors. I argue that self-deceptive beliefs are direct expressions of the subject's wishes, fears and hopes. Qua beliefs which mostly correspond to such factors (rather than to evidence), self-deceptive states are a kind of fantasy
Lee, Byeong D. (2002). Shoemaker on second-order belief and self-deception. Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2004). Self-deception and moral responsibility. Ratio 17 (3):294-311.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Self-deception without thought experiments. In J. Fernandez & T. Bayne (eds.), Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation. Psychology Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict
Lockie, Robert (2003). Depth psychology and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Factor's functionalist account of self-deception. Personalist 60 (July):336-342.   (Google)
Martin, Thomas (1998). Self-deception and intentional forgetting: A reply to Whisner. Philosophia 26 (1-2):181-194.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Self-deception, self-pretence, and emotional detachment. Mind 88 (July):441-446.   (Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1996). On the very possibility of self-deception. In Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Emotion and desire in self-deception. Philosophy 52:163-179.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (ms). Real self-deception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to our control? What are the determinants of belief, and how does motivation bear upon belief? In what measure are widely shared psychological propensities products of evolution?
Mele, Alfred R. (1987). Recent work on self-deception. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (January):1-17.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1983). Self-deception. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (1988). Self-deception and akratic belief: A rejoinder. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):201-206.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1982). 'Self-deception, action, and will': Comments. Erkenntnis 18 (2):159-164.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the virtues of Professor Audi's paper are obvious and my time is limited, 1 shall restrict myself here to negative comments. I shall argue, first, that condition (1) - the unconscious true belief condition - in Audi's account of "clear cases of self-deception" is too strong and, second, that he does not succeed in justifying his limitation of the self-deceiver to sincere avowals of the proposition with respect to which he is in self-deception.
Mele, Alfred R. (2000). Self-deception and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires nor causally mediated by desires. It is argued that (1) is false and that (3) is defensible and more defensible than (2)
Mele, Alfred R. (2001). Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 90 | Google)
Abstract: Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
Mele, Alfred R. (1999). Twisted self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted self-deception and to show that promising approaches are consistent with a plausible position on straight self-deception
Mounce, H. O. (1971). Self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Nachson, Israel (1999). Self-deception in neurological syndromes. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (2):117-132.   (Google)
Neil Van Leeuwen, D. S. (2007). The product of self-deception. Erkenntnis 67 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception
Nelkin, Dana K. (2002). Self-deception, motivation, and the desire to believe. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2003). Self-deception, interpretation and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Anthony J. (1979). Characterising self-deception. Mind 88 (January):45-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Paluch, Stanley (1967). Self-deception. Inquiry 10 (1-4):268-278.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Palmer, Anthony J. (1979). Self-deception: A problem about autobiography. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-76.   (Google)
Patten, D. (2003). How do we deceive ourselves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):229-247.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand ourselves lead us to draw mistaken inferences about our own motives. People typically are influenced by various stereotypes in the way they view the actions of others. Similarly, our preconceptions about ourselves influence our interpretations of our own actions. Therefore, self-deception, according to the present thesis, is not necessarily motivated. The self-deceived does not necessarily have the belief about herself that she does because of a desire for that belief to be true, rather her belief is influenced by what she expects to believe
Pataki, Tamas (1997). Self-deception and wish-fulfilment. Philosophia 25 (1-4):297-322.   (Google | More links)
Pears, David F. (1991). Self-deceptive belief-formation. Synthese 89 (3):393-405.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Pears, David F. (1974). The paradoxes of self-deception. Teorema 1:7-24.   (Google)
Peterman, James (1983). Self-deception and the problem of avoidance. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21:565-574.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pugmire, David R. (1969). 'Self'-deception. Inquiry 12:339-361.   (Google)
Putman, Daniel A. (1987). Virtue and self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:549-557.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Radden, Jennifer (1984). Defining self-deception. Dialogue 23 (March):103-120.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Reilly, Richard (1976). Self-deception: Resolving the epistemological paradox. Personalist 57:391-394.   (Google)
Robinson, Robert C. (2007). An Evolutionary Explanation of Self-Deception. Falsafeh 35 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false beliefs. Mele argues briefly that Trivers's account is no more explanatory than a similar one that does not include the dual-belief requirement. I present a case describing Trivers' analysis, show how Mele might reply to it. After briefly explaining Mele's sufficient conditions for entering self-deception from Chapter 3 of SDU, I'll consider what it means to hold the dual-belief. I'll then consider what I take to be a class of cases of self-deception which rely on genetic determinism, which I take to satisfy the dual-belief condition.
Lockie, Robert (2003). Review of Mele, A: “Self-Deception Unmasked”. Philosophy 78 (304):296-300.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1972). Belief and self-deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self-deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self-deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self-deception
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg & McLaughlin, Brian P. (1989). Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.   (Google)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1996). User friendly self-deception: A traveler's manual. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Russell, John M. (1978). Saying, feeling, and self-deception. Behaviorism 6:27-43.   (Google)
Sahdra, Baljinder & Thagard, Paul R. (2003). Self-deception and emotional coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self
Saunders, John T. (1975). The paradox of self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (June):559-570.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Scheer, Richard K. (1999). The extent of self-deception. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):330-334.   (Google | More links)
Sheldon Davies, Paul (2005). Unmasking self-deception. Philosophia 32 (1-4).   (Google)
Siegler, Frederick A. (1968). An analysis of self-deception. Noûs 2 (May):147-164.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Siegler, Frederick A. (1962). Demos on lying to oneself. Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):469-474.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Siegler, Frederick A. (1963). Self-deception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):29-43.   (Google | More links)
Siegler, Frederick A. (1963). Self-deception and other deception. Journal of Philosophy 60 (November):759-763.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smith, Barbara Herrnstein (1996). Unloading the self-refutation charge. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (1996). Self, deception, and self-deception in philosophy. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Statman, Daniel (1997). Hypocrisy and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby not only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our attitude toward hypocrites
Steffen, Lloyd H. (1986). Self-Deception And The Common Life. Lang.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1977). Fingarette on self-deception. Philosophical Papers 6 (May):21-30.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1974). Rorty on belief and self-deception. Inquiry 17:464-473.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1974). Self deception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):41-49.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Szabados, Bela (1973). Wishful thinking and self-deception. Analysis 33 (June):201-205.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Talbott, W. J. (1995). Intentional self-deception in a single coherent self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):27-74.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2008). Finite rational self-deceivers. Philosophical Studies 139 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational
van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.
Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2007). The spandrels of self-deception: Prospects for a biological theory of a mental phenomenon. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.   (Google)
Abstract: Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture. Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, 1988)
Whisner, William N. (1998). A further explanation and defense of the new model of self-deception: A reply to Martin. Philosophia 26 (1-2):195-206.   (Google | More links)
Whisner, William N. (1993). Self-deception and other-person deception: Toward a new conceptualization of self- deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.   (Google)
Wilson, Catherine (1980). Self-deception and psychological realism. Philosophical Investigations 3:47-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Yanal, Robert J. (2007). Self-deception and the experience of fiction. Ratio 20 (1):108-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sartre’s commentary on bad faith is the starting-point for an exploration of self-deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it’s always wrong. The proffered analysis of selfdeception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self-deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real

5.1l.6.7 Anger

Anger, Suzy (2005). Victorian Interpretation. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Victorian scriptural hermeneutics : history, intention, and evolution -- Intertext 1 : Victorian legal interpretation -- Carlyle : between biblical exegesis and romantic hermeneutics -- Intertext 2 : Victorian science and hermeneutics : the interpretation of nature -- George Eliot's hermeneutics of sympathy -- Intertext 3 : Victorian literary criticism -- Subjectivism, intersubjectivity, and intention : Oscar Wilde and literary hermeneutics.
Armstrong, David (2008). Be angry and sin not" : Philodemus versus the stoics on natural bites and natural emotions. In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge.   (Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Campbell, Anne & Muncer, Steven (1987). Models of anger and aggression in the social talk of women and men. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (4):489–511.   (Google | More links)
Coope, Christopher (1993). Sisterly assistance and the feminism of anger. Cogito 7 (1):58-62.   (Google)
Dent, Nicholas J. H. (2000). 'Anger is a short madness': Dealing with anger in émile's education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 34 (2):313–325.   (Google | More links)
Donskis, Leonidas (2007). David Ost, the defeat of solidarity: Anger and politics in pOstcommunist europe. Studies in East European Thought 59 (3).   (Google)
Fish, Jeffrey (2004). Anger, philodemus' good King, and the Helen episode of aeneid 2.567-589 : A new proof of authenticity from herculaneum. In David Armstrong (ed.), Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans. University of Texas Press.   (Google)
Haydon, Graham (1999). 7. is there virtue in anger? Journal of Philosophy of Education 33 (1):59–66.   (Google | More links)
Hubbard, Julie A. (2005). Eliciting and measuring children's anger in the context of their Peer interactions: Ethical considerations and practical guidelines. Ethics and Behavior 15 (3):247 – 258.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ecologically valid procedures for eliciting and measuring children's anger are needed to enhance researchers' theories of children's emotional competence and to guide intervention efforts aimed at reactive aggression. The purpose of this article is to describe a laboratory-based game-playing procedure that has been used successfully to elicit and measure children's anger across observational, physiological, and self-report channels. Steps taken to ensure that participants are treated ethically and fairly are discussed. The article highlights recently published data that emphasize the importance of provoking and assessing children's anger across multiple channels using laboratory-based procedures. Finally, it presents preliminary data that suggest that the safeguards taken to protect children were successful in making both children and their parents feel well treated and comfortable
Indelli, Giovanni (2004). The vocabulary of anger in philodemus' de Ira and Vergil's aeneid. In David Armstrong (ed.), Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans. University of Texas Press.   (Google)
Ker, James (2009). Seneca on self-examination : Rereading on anger 3.36. In Shadi Bartsch & David Wray (eds.), Seneca and the Self. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Kristjánsson, Kristján (2005). Can we teach justified anger? Journal of Philosophy of Education 39 (4):671–689.   (Google | More links)
Leighton, Stephen (2002). Aristotle's account of anger: Narcissism and illusions of self-sufficiency. Ratio 15 (1):23–45.   (Google | More links)
Long, Roderick T., Thinking our anger.   (Google)
Abstract: (to table of contents of archives) This talk was delivered at the Auburn Philosophical Society’s Roundtable on Hate, 5 October 2001, convened in response to the September 11 attacks a month earlier. The events of September 11th have occasioned a wide variety of responses, ranging from calls to turn the other cheek, to calls to nuke half the Middle East—and every imaginable shade of opinion in between. At a time when emotions run high, how should we go about deciding on a morally appropriate response? Should we allow ourselves to be guided by our anger, or should we put our anger aside and make an unemotional decision?
Micka, Ermin Francis (1943). The Problem of Divine Anger in Arnobius and Lactantius. Washington, D.C.,The Catholic University of America Press.   (Google)
Potegal, Michael (2005). Characteristics of anger: Notes for a systems theory of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):215-216.   (Google)
Abstract: Although emotion may subserve social function, as with anger-maintaining dominance, emotions are more than variant cognitions. Anger promotes risk-taking, attention-narrowing, and cognitive impairment. The proposition that appraised “blameworthiness” is necessary for anger excludes young children's anger as well as adults' pain-induced anger. To be complete, any systems model of anger must account for its temporal characteristics, including escalation and persistence
Rabel, Robert J. (2004). Restraining rage: The ideology of anger control in classical antiquity, by William V. Harris. Ancient Philosophy 24 (1):238-244.   (Google)
Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg (1998). The political sources of emotions: Greed and anger. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3).   (Google)
Rota, Michael (2007). The moral status of anger: Thomas Aquinas and John Cassian. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):395-418.   (Google)
Abstract: Is anger at another person ever a morally excellent thing? Two competing answers to this question can be found in the Christian intellectual tradition. JohnCassian held that anger at another person is never morally virtuous. Aquinas, taking an Aristotelian line, maintained that anger at another person is sometimes morally virtuous. In this paper I explore the positions of Cassian and Aquinas on this issue. The core of my paper consists in a close examination of two arguments given by Aquinas in support of his view. The first involves the usefulness of anger in the moral life; the second focuses on the nature of the human being as a composite of soul and body
Saunders, Trevor J. (1973). Plato on killing in anger: A reply to professor Woozley. Philosophical Quarterly 23 (93):350-356.   (Google | More links)
Sherman, Nancy (2007). Virtue and a warrior's anger. In Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Stout, Rowland (2010). Seeing the anger in someone's face. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):29-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product
Swaine, Lucas A. (1996). Blameless, constructive, and political anger. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):257–274.   (Google | More links)
Teschner, George (1992). Anxiety, anger and the concept of agency and action in the bhagavad git. Asian Philosophy 2 (1):61 – 77.   (Google)
Underwood, Marion K. (2005). Observing anger and aggression among preadolescent girls and boys: Ethical dilemmas and practical solutions. Ethics and Behavior 15 (3):235 – 245.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To understand how children manage anger and engage in various forms of aggression, it is important to observe children responding to peer provocation. Observing children's anger and aggression poses serious ethical and practical challenges, especially with samples of older children and adolescents. This article describes 2 laboratory methods for observing children's responses to peer provocation: 1 involves participants playing a game with a provoking child actor, and the other involves a pair of close friends responding to an actor posing as a difficult play partner. Both methods are described in detail, ethical safeguards are discussed, and evidence is presented to show that children understand their research rights in these types of investigations
Vernezze, Peter (2008). Moderation or the middle way: Two approaches to anger. Philosophy East and West 58 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : Most of us tend to be Aristotelians when it comes to anger. While admitting that uncontrolled anger is harmful and ought to be avoided, we reject as undesirable a state of being that would not allow us to express legitimate outrage. Hence, we seem to find a compelling moral attitude in Aristotle’s belief that we should get angry at the right time and for the right reasons and in the right way. Buddhism and Stoicism, however, carve out a position on the issue of anger that stands in marked contrast to the Aristotelian conception. This article considers the similarities between these two views of anger, contrasts the Buddhist with the much more common (at least in the West) Aristotelian one, and, finally, considers the objections of a prominent Western scholar to this shared Buddhist/Stoic conception
Westlund, Andrea (ms). Anger, faith, and forgiveness.   (Google)
Abstract: Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated. Now I think I see that forgiveness is more of integrating the experience into my life in a controlled way, rather than letting it go or escaping it
Woozley, A. D. (1972). Plato on killing in anger. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):303-317.   (Google | More links)
Zagacki, Kenneth S. & Boleyn-Fitzgerald, Patrick A. (2006). Rhetoric and anger. Philosophy and Rhetoric 39 (4).   (Google)

5.1l.6.8 Sympathy

Aboulafia, Mitchell (2008). W.e.B. Du Bois : Double-consciousness, Jamesian sympathy, and the critical turn. In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abramson, Kate (2001). Sympathy and the project of Hume's second enquiry. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 83 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: More than two hundred years after its publication, David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is still widely regarded as either a footnote to the more philosophically interesting third book of the Treatise, or an abbreviated, more stylish, version of that earlier work. These standard interpretations are rather difficult to square with Hume's own assessment of the second Enquiry. Are we to think that Hume called the EPM “incomparably the best” of all his writings only because he preferred that later style of exposition? Or worse, should we take his preference for the second Enquiry as a sign of aging literary vanity? Does Hume's stated preference for the EPM in no way speak to its philosophical content?
Ainslie, George (2006). Cruelty may be a self-control device against sympathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):224-225.   (Google)
Abstract: Dispassionate cruelty and the euphoria of hunting or battle should be distinguished from the emotional savoring of victims' suffering. Such savoring, best called negative empathy, is what puzzles motivational theory. Hyperbolic discounting theory suggests that sympathy with people who have unwanted but seductive traits creates a threat to self-control. Cruelty to those people may often be the least effortful way of countering this threat
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1978). Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. Philosophia 7 (2).   (Google)
Bouwsma, O. K. (1942). Stace's "the primacy of sympathy". Journal of Philosophy 39 (23):631-635.   (Google | More links)
Bradley, F. H. (1883). Sympathy and interest. Mind 8 (32):573-575.   (Google | More links)
Bray, Michael (2007). Sympathy, disenchantment, and authority: Adam Smith and the construction of moral sentiments. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28 (1):159-193.   (Google)
Broadie, Alexander (2006). Sympathy and the impartial spectator. In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Bryant, Sophie (1895). Antipathy and sympathy. Mind 4 (15):365-370.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1999). Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Chismar, Douglas (1988). Empathy and sympathy: The important difference. Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4).   (Google)
Cullity, Garrett (2004). Sympathy, discernment, and reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):37–62.   (Google | More links)
Darwall, Stephen (1998). Empathy, sympathy, care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3).   (Google)
Debes, Remy (2007). Has anything changed? Hume's theory of association and sympathy after the treatise. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):313 – 338.   (Google)
Debes, Remy (2007). Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume's second enquiry. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1):27 – 57.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John A. (1987). Taking sympathy seriously: A defense of our moral psychology toward animals. Environmental Ethics 9 (3):197-215.   (Google)
Abstract: Sympathy for animals is regarded by many thinkers as theoretically disreputable. Against this I argue that sympathy appropriately underlies moral concern for animals. I offer an account of sympathy that distinguishes sympathy with from sympathy for fellow creatures, and I argue that both can be placed on an objective basis, if we differentiate enlightened from folk sympathy. Moreover, I suggest that sympathy for animals is not, as some have claimed, incompatible with environmentalism; on the contrary, it can ground environmental concern. Finally, I show that the traditional concept of anthropomorphism has no coherent basis, and I argue that the attempt to prove that animals lack thoughts is both unsuccessful and irrelevant to sympathy for languageless creatures
Frierson, Patrick R. (2006). Adam Smith and the possibility of sympathy with nature. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):442–480.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith's moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith's "all important emotion of sympathy" (Callicott, 2001, p. 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in "History of Astronomy and Physics," I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature
Frierson, Patrick (ms). Adam Smith and the possibility of sympathy with nature Patrick R. Frierson.   (Google)
Abstract: As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith’s moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith’s “all important emotion of sympathy” (Callicott 2001: 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments , as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in “History of Astronomy and Physics,” I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature
Glassford, John (2007). Sympathy and spectatorship in scottish writing after Hume. The Monist 90 (2):213-232.   (Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. Ethics 105 (4):727-742.   (Google | More links)
Griseri, Paul (1994). FOCUS: Consistency and sympathy changing attitudes through moral theories. Business Ethics 3 (4):201–206.   (Google | More links)
Hausman, Daniel M. (2005). Sympathy, commitment, and preference. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.   (Google)
Abstract: While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need for analysis of the multiple factors that determine ‘preference’ so conceived
Heath, Eugene (1995). The commerce of sympathy: Adam Smith on the emergence of morals. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3).   (Google)
Hunt, Lester H. (2004). Sentiment and sympathy. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (4):339–354.   (Google | More links)
James, Susan (2005). Sympathy and comparison : Two principles of human nature. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2007). The problem with trust and sympathy. Hastings Center Report 37 (2).   (Google)
Kennett, Jeanette (2002). Autism, empathy and moral agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy characterized in the literature, and how crucial is empathy, so described, to moral understanding and agency? I argue that an examination of moral thinking in high-functioning autistic people supports a Kantian rather than a Humean account of moral agency.
Kirby, Brian (2003). Hume, sympathy, and the theater. Hume Studies 29 (2):305-325.   (Google)
Levy, David M. & Peart, Sandra J. (2004). Sympathy and approbation in Hume and Smith: A solution to the other rational species problem. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):331-349.   (Google)
Abstract: David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract. Footnotes1 An earlier version was presented at the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society, Arlington meeting in June 2001. We benefited from conversations with and comments from Gordon Schochet, Roger Emerson and Silvia Sebastiana. A letter from Leon Montes helped sharpen the argument. The readers for the journal contributed to the output. We remain responsible for the errors and omissions
Lipkin, Robert J. (1987). Altruism and sympathy in Hume's ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):18 – 32.   (Google | More links)
MacKay, Alfred F. (1986). Extended sympathy and interpersonal utility comparisons. Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):305-322.   (Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi (online). Feeling for others: Empathy and sympathy as sources of moral motivation.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the Humean theory of motivation, we only have a reason to act if we have both a belief and a pro-attitude. When it comes to moral reasons, it matters a great deal what that pro-attitude is; pure self-interest cannot combine with a belief to form a moral reason. A long tradition regards empathy and sympathy as moral motivators, and recent psychological evidence supports this view. I examine what I take to be the most plausible version of this claim: empathy or sympathy is necessary for someone to be motivated not to harm others. I argue that one can be motivated not to harm others even if one cannot feel either empathy or sympathy. The evidence comes from the clinical population of people with frontal lobe damage. In addition, if empathy is a moral motivator, we have a conflict with moral autonomy. Either empathy morally motivates, but agents are not autonomous, or agents are autonomous and need not be motivated by empathy. Sympathy suffers from two shortcomings as a moral motivator: it is unlikely that we must sympathize with ourselves in order to feel obligated not to harm ourselves, and there appears to be many other considerations that motivate us not to harm others: fear of harming ourselves, reluctance to add to the cycle of violence, and so on. These considerations are more self-centered than empathy or sympathy, but, perhaps for that very reason, they do not conflict with moral autonomy
McGill, V. J. (1942). Scheler's theory of sympathy and love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2 (3):273-291.   (Google | More links)
McKinnon, C. (2002). Desire-frustration and moral sympathy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):401 – 417.   (Google)
Mercer, Philip (1972). Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's Treatise. Oxford,Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Morrow, Glenn R. (1923). The significance of the doctrine of sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith. Philosophical Review 32 (1):60-78.   (Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1988). Sympathy, empathy, and the stream of consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.   (Google | More links)
Paul, L. A. (ms). The worm at the root of the passions: Poetry and sympathy in JS mill's utilitarianism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper explores J.S. Mill's theory of poetry and experience and its relation to his utilitarianism. It's probably one of my best papers, but for reasons I hesitate to speculate upon it's been largely ignored
Richerson, Peter (ms). Darwinian evolutionary ethics: Between patriotism and sympathy.   (Google)
Abstract: Darwin believed that his theory of evolution would stand or fall on its ability to account for human behavior. No species could be an exception to his theory without imperiling the whole edifice. One of the most striking features of human behavior is our very elaborate social life involving cooperation with large numbers of other people. The evolution of the ethical sensibilities and institutions of humans was thus one of his central concerns. Darwin made four main arguments regarding human morality: (1) that it is a product of group selection; (2) that an immense difference existed between human moral systems and those of other animals; (3) that the human social instincts were “primeval” and essentially the same in all modern humans; and (4) that moral progress was possible based on using the instinct of sympathy as the basis for inventing and favoring the spread of improved social institutions. Modern studies of cultural evolution suggest that Darwin’s arguments about the evolution of morality are largely correct in their essentials
Silver, John Sabini Andmaury & Sabini, John (1985). On the captivity of the will: Sympathy, caring, and a moral sense of the human. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):23–36.   (Google | More links)
Smith, K. K. (1998). Storytelling, sympathy and moral judgment in american abolitionism. Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (4):356–377.   (Google | More links)
Sugden, Robert (2002). Beyond sympathy and empathy: Adam Smith's concept of fellow-feeling. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):63-87.   (Google)
Taylor, C. (1999). Sympathy. Journal of Ethics 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I examine an example of sympathy -- the actions of one woman who rescued Jews during their persecution in Nazi Europe. I argue that this woman''s account of her actions here suggests that sympathy is a primitive response to the suffering of another. By primitive here I mean: first, that these responses are immediate and unthinking; and second, that these responses are explanatorily basic, that they cannot be explained in terms of some more fundamental feature of human nature -- such as some particular desire or sentiment that we possess. My conclusion is then that our sympathetic responses are themselves partially constitutive of our conception of what is to be a human being
Taylor, Craig (2002). Sympathy: A Philosophical Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends
Taylor, Paul C. (2004). Silence and sympathy: Dewey's whiteness. In George Yancy (ed.), What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question. Routledge.   (Google)
Tietzel, Manfred (1980). Sympathy for the devil. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 11 (2).   (Google)
Torre, Pablo S. & Torre, Sison, Sympathy for the devil? Child homicide, victim characteristics, and the sentencing preferences of the american conscience.   (Google)
Abstract:      The act of killing a child holds the distinction of attracting a deluge of attention in the media but a relative drip of sociological literature. This thesis deconstructs American views of child homicide and conducts the first experimental test of the effects of victim characteristics like age on sentencing recommendations in four different homicide scenarios: accidental, drunken, impulsive, and premeditated. The findings illuminate the link between social norms and sentencing severity. Ultimately, three conclusions may be drawn: first, child sympathy does not appear to vary by the respondent's demographic traits; second, child killers are sentenced more harshly than the killers of adults, but only when criminal intent is evident; and third, while there is a positive relationship between youth of the victim and the severity of punishment assigned to the offender, the effects for child and teen homicide are not so dissimilar as to contradict existing legal statutes in the United States
Turco, Luigi (1999). Sympathy and moral sense: 1725-1740. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):79 – 101.   (Google)
Vitz, Rico (2004). Sympathy and benevolence in Hume's moral psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3).   (Google)
Wand, Bernard (1955). A note on sympathy in Hume's moral theory. Philosophical Review 64 (2):275-279.   (Google | More links)
Weinstein, Jack (2006). Sympathy, difference, and education: Social unity in the work of Adam Smith. Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):79-111.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I examine Adam Smith's theory of the ways individuals in society bridge social and biological difference. In doing so, I emphasize the divisive effects of gender, race, and class to see if Smith's account of social unity can overcome such fractious forces. My discussion uses the metaphor of “proximity” to mean both physical and psychological distance between moral actors and spectators. I suggest that education – both formal and informal in means – can assist moral judgment by helping agents minimize the effects of proximity, and, ultimately, learn commonality where difference may otherwise seem overwhelming. This article uses the methods of the history of philosophy in order to examine an issue within contemporary discourse. While I seek to offer an authentic reading of Smith representative of his eighteenth-century perspective, I do so with an eye towards determining the extent to which Smith anticipated central issues in modern multiculturalism. (Published Online April 18 2006) Footnotes1 I would like to thank Luc Bovens, Kim Donehower, David Levy, Elizabeth Sund, and Leah M. McClimans, for their help on previous drafts of this article
Whittaker, John H. (2005). Sympathy: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1).   (Google)
Wolfe, A. B. (1923). The rôle of sympathy and ethical motivation in scientific social research. Journal of Philosophy 20 (9):225-234.   (Google | More links)
Woods, Kerri (2009). Suffering, sympathy, and (environmental) security: Reassessing Rorty's contribution to human rights theory. Res Publica 15 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by considering the idea of a dual approach to human rights, combining Rorty’s emphasis on sentiment with an analysis of patterns of responsibility for the underfulfilment of human rights

5.1l.6.9 Trust

Abramov, Igor (forthcoming). Building peace in fragile states – building trust is essential for effective public–private partnerships. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Increasingly, the private sector is playing a greater role in supporting peace building efforts in conflict and post-conflict areas by providing critical expertise, know-how, and capital. However, reports of the corrupt practices of both governments and businesses have plagued international peace building efforts, deepening the distrust of stricken communities. Businesses are perceived as being selfish and indifferent to the impact their operations may have on the social and political development of local communities. Additionally, the corruption of local governments has been cited as interfering with the creation of stability in conflict areas. Within this framework, multinational Public–Private Partnerships can exert two forms of influence: they can either exacerbate these problems, or they can become part of the solution. Without a relationship of trust among local businesses, government, and the private sector, peace building efforts will at best be mixed, and could possibly perpetuate violence in fragile states. Public and private interests are better served when Public–Private Partnerships are based upon collaboration and assist in establishing principles of good governance in conflict areas. This in turn can help build trust and regain the credibility of both sectors among local communities, which are essential in making Public–Private Partnerships more effective
Acton, H. B. (1974). The Idea of a Spiritual Power: Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture, Delivered on 15 May 1973 at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Athlone Press.   (Google)
Adler, Jonathan E. (1994). Testimony, trust, knowing. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.   (Google | More links)
Andersen, Jon Aarum (2005). Trust in managers: A study of why swedish subordinates trust their managers. Business Ethics 14 (4):392–404.   (Google | More links)
Andreassen, R.i.x. & Rod, Det Etiske (1990). The importance of knowledge and trust in the definition of death. Bioethics 4 (3):232–236.   (Google | More links)
Argandoña, Antonio (1999). Sharing out in alliances: Trust and ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 21 (2-3).   (Google)
Abstract: Alliances are relatively new forms of relationships between businesses which allow cooperation in some areas of activity while maintaining competition in others, even in those areas where cooperation is the established procedure. Logically, this demands a mutual trust on the basis of which the cooperation can be established. The nature of this relationship is, furthermore, dynamic inasmuch as it develops over a period of time and generates new conditions which either enhance or destroy trust.This article reviews the general issues of alliances and, in particular, the special relationships between the parties. The discussion of the creation and development of trust in an alliance describes both what technical, psychological, sociological and, particularly, ethical conditions make an alliance possible and the ethical nature of the necessary step which must be taken as trust is transformed from mere possibility into the actual fact of placing trust in a partner
Atkins, Kim (2002). Friendship, trust and forgiveness. Philosophia 29 (1-4).   (Google)
Audi, Robert (2008). Some dimensions of trust in business practices: From financial and product representation to licensure and voting. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is an examination of the role of trust in the previous seven papers in this issue of the Journal. Trust and trustworthiness are briefly characterized; their importance in business itself and in business ethics is briefly described; and each paper is discussed in relation to how trust figures in the ethical issues it raises. The overall discussion brings out the need for further work on the nature of trust and on the elements in business, such as transparency, that apparently help to sustain it
Ayios, Angela (2003). Competence and trust guardians as key elements of building trust in east-west joint ventures in russia. Business Ethics 12 (2):190–202.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette (1986). Trust and antitrust. Ethics 96 (2):231-260.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette C. (2007). Trust, suffering, and the aesculapian virtues. In Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Baker, Reviewed by Judith (2000). Martin Hollis, trust within reason. Ethics 110 (2).   (Google)
Baurmann, Michael & Brennan, Geoffrey (2009). What should the voter know? Epistemic trust in democracy. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):159-186.   (Google)
Abstract: Alvin Goldman develops the concept of “core voter knowledge” to capture the kind of knowledge that voters need to have in order that democracy function successfully. As democracy is supposed to promote the people's goals, core voter knowledge must, according to Goldman, first and foremost answer the question which electoral candidate would successfully perform in achieving that voter's ends. In our paper we challenge this concept of core voter knowledge from different angles. We analyse the dimensions of political trustworthiness and their relevance for the voter; we contrast two alternative orientations that the voter might take—an “outcome-orientation” and a “process-orientation”; and we discuss how an expressive account of voting behaviour would shift the focus in regard to the content of voter knowledge. Finally, we discuss some varieties of epistemic trust and their relevance for the availability, acquisition and dissemination of voter knowledge in a democracy
Becker, Lawrence C. (1996). Trust as noncognitive security about motives. Ethics 107 (1):43-61.   (Google | More links)
Bellingham, Richard (2003). Ethical Leadership: Rebuilding Trust in Corporations. Hrd Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Creating an ethical culture -- Winning through people -- Winning with customers -- Winning for the community -- Action steps and strategies -- Summary -- Appendix A: An ETHICS evaluation tool: ethics assessment and goal-setting -- Appendix B: Debate and guidance: the literature and best practices.
Bell, Geoffrey G.; Oppenheimer, Robert J. & Bastien, Andre (2002). Trust deterioration in an international buyer-supplier relationship. Journal of Business Ethics 36 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Despite an abundance of research on inter-organizational trust, researchers are only beginning to understand the process of trust deterioration as an inter-organizational phenomenon. This paper presents a case study examining the deteriorating relationship between two international high-tech firms. We surveyed respondents from the supplier firm to identify major elements that reduced the supplier's trust in its customer, using the dimensions of trust identified by Mayer et al. (1995). While violations of ability, integrity, and benevolence all contributed to trust reduction, early violations of trustee benevolence contributed importantly to trust deterioration. Over time, the relationship became "sensitive," and respondents reported many incidents of trust violation. Managers reported primarily integrity- and benevolence-related incidents, while no pattern emerged among operations personnel. We examine the results in light of Hosmer's (1995) ethically-based trust principles. The supplier and customer would likely differ in their opinion of whether the customer was acting "ethically." This suggests that scholars need to examine how many principles can be violated before trust is eliminated, and whether any of the principles are particularly salient in business relationships
Bernasek, Anna (2010). The Economics of Integrity: From Dairy Farmers to Toyota, How Wealth is Built on Trust and What That Means for Our Future. Harperstudio.   (Google)
Bicchieri, Cristina; Duffy, John & Tolle, and Gil (2004). Trust among strangers. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a "trust and reciprocate" norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions
Bicchieri, Cristina; Xiao, Erte & Muldoon, Ryan (forthcoming). Trust if you wish, always reciprocate. Politics, Philosophy and Economics.   (Google)
Abstract: Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for non-compliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most people believe that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger or friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing the norm of reciprocating trust, we find that there is no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.
Bicchieri, Cristina; Lev-On, Azi & Chavez, Alex (forthcoming). The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment
Bird, Stephanie J. & Housman, David E. (1995). Trust and the collection, selection, analysis and interpretation of data: A scientist's view. Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:  Trust is a critical component of research: trust in the work of co-workers and colleagues within the scientific community; trust in the work of research scientists by the non-research community. A wide range of factors, including internally and externally generated pressures and practical and personal limitations, affect the research process. The extent to which these factors are understood and appreciated influence the development of trust in scientific research findings
Birmingham, Robert L. (1969). The prisoner's dilemma and mutual trust: Comment. Ethics 79 (2):156-158.   (Google | More links)
Bishop, Nicole (1996). Trust is not enough: Classroom self-disclosure and the loss of private lives. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (3):429–439.   (Google | More links)
Blois, Keith (2003). Is it commercially irresponsible to trust? Journal of Business Ethics 45 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers a recent U.K. legal dispute where a supplier sued a large organization, which had been a long-term customer, for breach of implied contract. It uses this case to discuss aspects of the nature of trust between organizations. The discussion encompasses a consideration of the distinction between trust and reliability; and, why the concept of blanket trust is not helpful. In conclusion, by contrasting business-to-business and personal relationships, the paper suggests that firms in their relationships with other institutions should never follow an unquestioning form of strong trust
Bluhm, Louis H. (1987). Trust, terrorism, and technology. Journal of Business Ethics 6 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: The development of civilization implies an evolution of complex trust mechanisms which integrate the social system and form bonds which allow individuals to interact, even if they are strangers. Key elements of trust are predictability of consequences and an evaluation of consequences in terms of self-interest or values. Values, ethics, and norms enhance predictability. The terrorist introduces an unpredictable event which has negative consequences, thus destroying trust. However, terrorist-like situations occur in day-to-day activities. Technology itself makes the world more interdependent and less predictable. Furthermore, technological accidents and disasters, which are also unpredictable and negative, may prompt individuals to perceive technology as if it were a terrorist
Bolton, Jonathan (2000). Trust and the healing encounter: An examination of an unorthodox healing performance. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Just why a patient should trust a particular healer isa question that has not been adequately explored inthe literature on healing. This ethnographiccase-report examines the healing performance of achiropractor and proposes that it contains fourintrinsic claims to trustworthiness: he claims to bea qualified and sincere healer who is inpossession of knowledge and techniques that derivetheir power from their truth content and whichempower him to make beneficial changes in thepatient. Taking each claim in turn I described thenature of the claim, how it might be adequatelyvalidated, ways in which his healing performance mightvalidate it and how he might be assisted by thepatient, and how their actual validation may bedistorted by the healer and patient. It is suggestedthat while unusual in many regards, this unorthodoxhealing performance may be a foil by which toexamine other more orthodox healing performances
Boudreau, Cheryl; McCubbins, Mathew D. & Coulson, Seana (ms). Knowing when to trust others: An ERP study of decision-making after receiving information from unknown people.   (Google)
Abstract:      To address the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving information from an anonymous individual, reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related brain potentials (Experiment 2) were recorded as participants played 3 variants of the Coin Toss game. In this game, participants guess the outcomes of unseen coin tosses, and a person in another room (dubbed "the reporter") observes the coin toss outcomes and then sends reports (which may or may not be truthful) to participants about whether the coins landed on heads or tails. Participants knew that the reporter's interests either were aligned with their own (Common Interests), opposed to their own (Conflicting Interests), or opposed to their own but that the reporter was penalized every time he or she sent a false report about the coin toss outcome (Penalty for Lying). In the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, participants followed the reporter's reports over 90% of the time, in contrast to less than 59% of the time in the Conflicting Interests condition. Reaction time results indicated that participants took similar amounts of time to respond in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions and that they were reliably faster than in the Conflicting Interests condition. Event-related potentials (ERPs) timelocked to the reporter's reports revealed a larger P2, P3, and LPC response in the Common Interests condition than in the other two, suggesting that participants' brains processed the reporter's reports differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two conditions. Results suggest that even when people behave as if they trust information, they consider communicative efforts of individuals whose interests are aligned with their own to be slightly more informative than those of individuals who are made trustworthy by an institution, such as a penalty for lying
Brien, Andrew (1998). Professional ethics and the culture of trust. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The cause of ethical failure in organisations often can be traced to their organisational culture and the failure on the part of the leadership to actively promote ethical ideals and practices. This is true of all types of organisations, including the professions, which in recent years have experienced ongoing ethical problems. The questions naturally arise: what sort of professional culture promotes ethical behaviour? How can it be implemented by a profession and engendered in the individual professional? The answers to these questions are of interest to business ethicists since the causes of ethical problems in business are often the same and the professions, as ethically challenged organisations, make useful and informative analogues for the measures to be adopted or avoided when the attempt is made to raise the ethical standards of business.Given this focus on the professions, it will be argued that the usual, direct attempts to control unethical behaviour by using codes of ethics, legislation and self-regulatory regimes, are not successful
Brownlie, Julie (2008). Conceptualizing trust and health. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Brom, Frans W. A. (2000). Food, consumer concerns, and trust: Food ethics for a globalizing market. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The use of biotechnology in food productiongives rise to consumer concerns. The term ``consumerconcern'' is often used as a container notion. Itincludes concerns about food safety, environmental andanimal welfare consequences of food productionsystems, and intrinsic moral objections againstgenetic modification. In order to create clarity adistinction between three different kinds of consumerconcern is proposed. Consumer concerns can be seen assigns of loss of trust. Maintaining consumer trustasks for governmental action. Towards consumerconcerns, governments seem to have limitedpossibilities for public policy. Under current WTOregulations designed to prevent trade disputes,governments can only limit their policies to 1) safetyregulation based upon sound scientific evidence and 2)the stimulation of a system of product labeling. Ananalysis of trust, however, can show that ifgovernments limit their efforts in this way, they willnot do enough to avoid the types of consumer concernsthat diminish trust. The establishment of a technicalbody for food safety – although perhaps necessary –is in itself not enough, because concerns that relatedirectly to food safety cannot be solved by ``pure''science alone. And labeling can only be a good way totake consumer concerns seriously if these concerns arerelated to consumer autonomy. For consumer concernsthat are linked to ideas about a good society,labeling can only provide a solution if it is seen asan addition to political action rather than as itssubstitution. Labeling can help consumers take uptheir political responsibility. As citizens, consumershave certain reasonable concerns that can justifiableinfluence the market. In a free-market society, theyare, as buyers, co-creators of the market, andsocietal steering is partly done by the market.Therefore, they need the information to co-create thatmarket. The basis of labeling in these cases, however,is not the good life of the individual but thepolitical responsibility people have in their role asparticipants in a free-market. Then, public concernsare taken seriously. Labeling in that case does nottake away the possibilities of reaching politicalgoals, but it adds a possibility
Brownlie, Julie; Greene, Alexandra & Howson, Alexandra (eds.) (2008). Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: There is currently a lively debate about the nature of trust and the conditions necessary to establish and sustain it. Yet, to date, there has been little systematic exploration of these issues. While social scientists are beginning to tease out the nature of trust, there are few published accounts exploring these themes through empirical work There is thus a need for empirically based research, which intelligently unravels this complexity to support all stakeholders in the health arena. This multidisciplinary volume addresses this gap by contributing substantively to the exploration of trust in the experience, practice and organization of health. The authors examine a range of significant conceptual themes in relation to trust, including trust and auditing, consent, expert knowledges and social capital. Through reflecting on these emergent themes, the collection is a landmark contribution to the theoretical and empirical work on trust
Bruni, Luigino & Sugden, Robert (2000). Moral canals: Trust and social capital in the work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):21-45.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a truism that a market economy cannot function without trust. We must be able to rely on other people to respect our property rights, and on our trading partners to keep their promises. The theory of economics is incomplete unless it can explain why economic agents often trust one another, and why that trust is often repaid. There is a long history of work in economics and philosophy which tries to explain the kinds of reasoning that people use when they engage in practices of trust: this work develops theories of trust. A related tradition in economics, sociology and political science investigates the kinds of social institution that reproduce whatever habits, dispositions or modes of reasoning are involved in acts of trust: this work develops theories of social capital. A recurring question in these literatures is whether a society which organizes its economic life through markets is capable of reproducing the trust on which those markets depend. In this paper, we look at these themes in relation to the writings of three eighteenth-century philosopher-economists: David Hume, Adam Smith, and Antonio Genovesi
Buchanan, Allen (2000). Trust in managed care organizations. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : Two basic criticisms of managed care are that it erodes patient trust in physicians and subjects physicians to incentives and pressures that compromise the physician's fiduciary obligation to the patient. In this article, I first distinguish between status trust and merit trust, and then argue (1) that the value of status trust in physicians is probably over-rated and certainly underdocumented; (2) that erosion of status trust may not be detrimental if accompanied by an increase in well-founded merit trust; and (3) that under conditions of managed care the physician's commitment to traditional medical ethics cannot serve as an adequate basis for merit trust. Next, drawing on an analogy between managed care organizations and polities, I argue that (4) the most appropriate basis for merit trust in managed care is a conception of organizational legitimacy that includes procedural justice, empowerment of constructive criticism within the organization, and organizational accommodation of the noninstrumental commitment to patient well-being that is distinctive of medical professionalism. I then explore the conditions necessary for robust competition for merit trust among managed care organizations and indicate the kinds of public policies needed to facilitate such competition. Finally, I show how the account of organization-based merit trust can accommodate the special fiduciary obligation of medical professionals, without indulging in the delusion that it is the physician's fiduciary obligation always to provide all care that is expected to be of any net benefit to the patient
Bueno, Otávio & Azzouni, Jody (2005). Donald Mac kenzie. Mechanizing proof: Computing, risk, and trust. Cambridge, mass.: Mit press, 2001. Pp. XI + 427. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3).   (Google)
Burri, Regula Valérie (2007). Deliberating risks under uncertainty: Experience, trust, and attitudes in a swiss nanotechnology stakeholder discussion group. NanoEthics 1 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Scientific knowledge has not stabilized in the current, early, phase of research and development of nanotechnologies creating a challenge to ‘upstream’ public engagement. Nevertheless, the idea that the public should be involved in deliberative discussions and assessments of emerging technologies at this early stage is widely shared among governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. Many forums for public debate including focus groups, and citizen juries, have thus been organized to explore public opinions on nanotechnologies in a variety of countries over the past few years. In Switzerland the Centre for Technology Assessment (TA-Swiss) organized such a citizen panel in fall 2006. Drawing from an ethnographic study of this panel called ‘publifocus on nanotechnologies, health, and environment’ this paper looks at the ways members of a stakeholder group deal with the epistemic uncertainty in their deliberation of nanotechnologies. By exploring the statements of the participants in the stakeholder discussion group, this paper reconstructs the narratives that constitute the epistemic foundations of the participants’ evaluations of nanotechnologies
Caldwell, Cam; Hayes, Linda A.; Bernal, Patricia & Karri, Ranjan (2008). Ethical stewardship – implications for leadership and trust. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Great leaders are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from followers. In this paper, we propose that perceptions about the trustworthiness of leader behaviors enable those leaders to be perceived as ethical stewards. We define ethical stewardship as the honoring of duties owed to employees, stakeholders, and society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation. Our model of relationship between leadership behaviors, perceptions of trustworthiness, and the nature of ethical stewardship reinforces the importance of ethical governance in dealing with employees and in creating organizational systems that are congruent with espoused organizational values
Caldwell, Cam & Dixon, Rolf D. (2010). Love, forgiveness, and trust: Critical values of the modern leader. Journal of Business Ethics 93 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In a world that has become increasingly dependent upon employee ownership, commitment, and initiative, organizations need leaders who can inspire their␣employees and motivate them individually. Love, forgiveness, and trust are critical values of today’s organization leaders who are committed to maximizing value for organizations while helping organization members to become their best. We explain the importance of love, forgiveness, and trust in the modern organization and identify 10 commonalities of these virtues
Caldwell, Cam & Karri, Ranjan (2005). Organizational governance and ethical systems: A covenantal approach to building trust. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3).   (Google)
Abstract: . American businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem the loss of public confidence. Public criticism, increased government controls, and growing expectations for improved financial performance and accountability have accompanied this decline in trust. Traditional approaches to corporate governance, typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory, have been expensive to direct and have focused on short-term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results. We explain why the organizational governance theories are fundamentally, inadequate to build trust. We advance a conceptual framework based on stewardship theory characterized by “covenantal relationships” and argue that design of governance mechanisms using a covenantal approach is more effective in building trust in organizations. A covenantal relationship is a specialized form of a relational contract between an employee and his or her organization. We argue that regardless of incentives and control mechanisms carefully designed through contractual mechanisms, in the absence of covenantal relationships it is extremely difficult to build trust within organizations. We propose that organizations are more likely to build trust – both at the organizational level and at the interpersonal level – when they create reinforcing and integrated systems that honor implied duties of “covenantal relationships.”
Caldwell, Cam; Davis, Brian & Devine, James A. (forthcoming). Trust, faith, and betrayal: Insights from management for the wise believer. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Cam Caldwell, Linda; A. Hayes, Patricia Bernal & Ranjan Karri, (forthcoming). Ethical stewardship – implications for leadership and trust. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Great leaders are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from followers. In this paper, we propose that perceptions about the trustworthiness of leader behaviors enable those leaders to be perceived as ethical stewards. We define ethical stewardship as the honoring of duties owed to employees, stakeholders, and society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation. Our model of relationship between leadership behaviors, perceptions of trustworthiness, and the nature of ethical stewardship reinforces the importance of ethical governance in dealing with employees and in creating organizational systems that are congruent with espoused organizational values
Carusi, Annamaria (2008). Scientific visualisations and aesthetic grounds for trust. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The collaborative ‹Big Science’ approach prevalent in physics during the mid- and late-20th century is becoming more common in the life sciences. Often computationally mediated, these collaborations challenge researchers’ trust practices. Focusing on the visualisations that are often at the heart of this form of scientific practice, the paper proposes that the aesthetic aspects of these visualisations are themselves a way of securing trust. Kant’s account of aesthetic judgements in the Third Critique is drawn upon in order to show that the image-building capability of imagination, and the sensus communis, both of which are integral parts of aesthetic experience, play an important role in building and sustaining community in these forms of science. Kant’s theory shows that the aesthetic appeal of scientific visualisations is not isolated from two other dimensions of the visualisations: the cognitive-epistemic, aesthetic-stylistic and interpersonal dimensions, and that in virtue of these inter-relationships, visualisations contribute to building up the intersubjectively shared framework of agreement which is basic for trust
Castaldo, Sandro; Perrini, Francesco; Misani, Nicola & Tencati, Antonio (2009). The missing link between corporate social responsibility and consumer trust: The case of fair trade products. Journal of Business Ethics 84 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper investigates the link between the consumer perception that a company is socially oriented and the consumer intention to buy products marketed by that company. We suggest that this link exists when at least two conditions prevail: (1) the products sold by that company comply with ethical and social requirements; (2) the company has an acknowledged commitment to protect consumer rights and interests. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a survey among the clients of retail chains offering Fair Trade products. The results show that socially oriented companies can successfully leverage their reputation to market products with high symbolic values
Castaldo, Sandro; Premazzi, Katia & Zerbini, Fabrizio (forthcoming). The meaning(s) of trust. A content analysis on the diverse conceptualizations of trust in scholarly research on business relationships. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Scholarly research largely converges on the argument that trust is of paramount importance to drive economic agents toward mutually satisfactory, fair, and ethically compliant behaviors. There is, however, little agreement on the meaning of trust, whose conceptualizations differ with respect to actors, relationships, behaviors, and contexts. At present, we know much better what trust does than what trust is . In this article, we present an extensive review and analysis of the most prominent articles on trust in market relationships. Using computer-aided content analysis and network analysis methods, we identify key, recurring dimensions that guided the conceptualization of trust in past research, and show how trust can be developed as a multifaceted and layered construct. Our results are an important contribution to a convergence of research toward a shared and common view of the meaning of trust. This process is important to ensure the body of trust research’s internal theoretical consistency, and to provide reliable and common principles for the management of business relationships – a context in which opportunism and imperfect information may induce economic actors to cheat and stray from fair and ethically compliant behaviors
Chan, Marjorie (2003). Corporate espionage and workplace trust/distrust. Journal of Business Ethics 42 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The central focus of this research is: The growing corporate espionage activities due to fierce competition lead to highly controlling security measures and intensive employee monitoring which bring about distrust in the workplace. The paper examines various research works on trust and distrust. It highlights the conflictful demands managers face. They have to deter espionage activities, but at the same time, build trusting relationships in the workplace. The paper also describes various operations, personnel, physical and technical countermeasuresto combat corporate espionage together with three espionage case examples which illustrate the importance of some of these countermeasures. Various authors'' trust and distrust arguments are used to assess the cases. The paper ends with suggestions for future research
Chen, Yu-Shan (2010). The drivers of green brand equity: Green brand image, green satisfaction, and green trust. Journal of Business Ethics 93 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article proposed four novel constructs – green brand image, green satisfaction, green trust, and green brand equity, and explored the positive relationships between green brand equity and its three drivers – green brand image, green satisfaction, and green trust. The object of this research study was information and electronics products in Taiwan. This research employed an empirical study by use of the questionnaire survey method. The questionnaires were randomly mailed to consumers who had the experience of purchasing information and electronics products. The results showed that green brand image, green satisfaction, and green trust are positively related to green brand equity. Furthermore, the positive relationship between green brand image and green brand equity is partially mediated by green satisfaction and green trust. Hence, investing on resources to increase green brand image, green satisfaction, and green trust is helpful to enhance green brand equity
Chiou, Jyh-Shen & Pan, Lee-Yun (2008). The impact of social darwinism perception, status anxiety, perceived trust of people, and cultural orientation on consumer ethical beliefs. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This study intends to explore the effects of political, social and cultural values on consumers’ ethical beliefs regarding questionable consumption behaviors. The variables examined include status anxiety, social Darwinism perception, perceived trust of people, and cultural orientation. Based on a field survey in Taiwan, the results showed that consumers with low ethical beliefs have higher perception of social Darwinism and status anxiety than consumers possess neutral and high ethical beliefs. The result also showed that the neutral ethics group had higher trust on people than the low ethics groups. Finally, the high ethics group expressed significantly higher perception of vertical collectivism than those consumers of the low and neutral ethics group
Choi, Chong Ju; Eldomiaty, Tarek Ibrahim & Kim, Sae Won (2007). Consumer trust, social marketing and ethics of welfare exchange. Journal of Business Ethics 74 (1).   (Google)
Clarke, Simon (ms). A trust-based argument against paternalism.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay addresses the role of trust in political philosophy. In particular, it examines the idea that trust is necessary for a particular type of government action — paternalistic action — to be justified. Liberal theory and liberal democratic practice are characterized by a large degree of anti-paternalism, understanding paternalism to be the restriction of individual liberty for a person’s good, instead of to protect or benefit others. It would be a mistake to think that liberal democracies have no paternalism; seatbelt, motorcycle helmet, and drug prohibition laws, for example, are probably at least partly motivated by paternalistic reasons. But it is easy to imagine more pervasive paternalism. Society could, and does in some cultures, restrict people’s choices of occupation, marriage partners, and where to live, with the rationale that these restrictions are for people’s good. Many people believe that the liberal position is the correct one, that more pervasive paternalism would be unjustified, but what is the philosophical justification for anti-paternalism?
Clark, Chalmers C. (2002). Trust in medicine. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):11 – 29.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Trust relations in medicine are argued to be a requisite response to the special vulnerability of persons as patients. Even so, the problem of motivating trust remains a vital concern. On this score, it is argued that a strong motivation can be found in recognizing that professional self-interest actually entails cultivation of patient trust as a means to maintain professional self-governance. And while the initial move to restore trust must be provoked from such narrow concerns, the process of sustaining trust will require educational initiatives aimed at restoring attitudes and skills suggestive of Percival's concept of empathic care. By including such initiatives, future waves of medical professionals are apt to sustain trust with deepened commitments to character, care, and trust as constitutive properties of their professional mission
Cleeremans, Axel, Is it better to think unconsciously or to trust your first impression? A reassessment of unconscious thought theory.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), complex decisions are best made after a period of distraction assumed to elicit “unconscious thought”. Here, we suggest instead that the superiority of decisions made after distraction results from the fact that conscious deliberation can deteriorate impressions formed online during information acquisition. We found that participants instructed to form an impression made better decisions after distraction than after deliberation, thereby replicating earlier findings. However, decisions made immediately were just as good as decisions made after distraction, which suggests (1) that people had already made their decision during information acquisition, (2) that deliberation-without-attention does not occur during distraction, and (3) that ruminating about one's first impression can deteriorate decision quality. Strikingly, in another condition that should have favored unconscious thought even more, deliberated decisions were better than immediate or distracted decisions. These findings were replicated in a field study
Clément, Fabrice; Koenig, Melissa & Harris, Paul (2004). The ontogenesis of trust. Mind and Language 19 (4):360–379.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Psychologists have emphasized children's acquisition of information through firsthand observation. However, many beliefs are acquired from others' testimony. In two experiments, most 4yearolds displayed sceptical trust in testimony. Having heard informants' accurate or inaccurate testimony, they anticipated that informants would continue to display such differential accuracy and they trusted the hitherto reliable informant. Yet they ignored the testimony of the reliable informant if it conflicted with what they themselves had seen. By contrast, threeyearolds were less selective in trusting a reliable informant. Thus, young children check testimony against their own experience and increasingly recognise that some informants are more trustworthy than others
Conces, Rory J. (1997). Contract, Trust, and Resistance in the 'Second Treatise'. The Locke Newsletter (28):117-33.   (Google)
Cook, Karen S. & Stepanikova, Irena (2008). The health care outcomes of trust: A review of empirical evidence. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Craig, Robin Kundis, A comparative guide to the western states' public trust doctrines: Public values, private rights, and the evolution toward an ecological public trust.   (Google)
Abstract: This companion article to the Fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines – emphasis on the plural – in the 19 western states. In so doing, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust doctrine, especially regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, have a federal law basis, the details of how public trust principles actually apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of the particular histories, perceived needs, and perceived problems of each state. This Article notes that, in the West, four factors have been most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine; (2) subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water; (3) clear and explicit perceptions of shortages of water, submerged lands, and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to raise water and other environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two important trends in western states’ public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the extension of public rights based on states’ ownership of the water itself; and (2) an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species, ecosystems and the public values that they provide. The Article includes an extensive Appendix that summarizes each of the 19 states’ public trust doctrines. These summaries include relevant constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and cases
Croonen, Evelien (2010). Trust and fairness during strategic change processes in franchise systems. Journal of Business Ethics 95 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A very important challenge for franchisors is adapting the strategies of their franchise systems to new threats and opportunities. During such strategic change processes (SCPs) franchisees are often required to make major financial investments and/or adjustments in their trade practices without any guarantee of positive benefits. It is, therefore, important that franchisees trust their franchisors during such change processes and that they perceive the change process as fair. This article aims to generate theory on franchisees’ perceptions of trust and fairness during SCPs. On the basis of case studies regarding eight change processes in four Dutch drugstore franchise systems, this article distinguishes different levels of franchisee trust and discusses five instruments that franchisors can “institutionalize” in their franchise systems to influence their franchisees’ trust and fairness perceptions
Cytowic, Richard (2003). The clinician's paradox: Believing those you must not trust. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google)
Daukas, Nancy (2006). Epistemic trust and social location. Episteme 3 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: : Epistemic trustworthiness is defined as a complex character state that supervenes on a relation between first- and second-order beliefs, including beliefs about others as epistemic agents. In contexts shaped by unjust power relations, its second-order components create a mutually supporting link between a deficiency in epistemic character and unjust epistemic exclusion on the basis of group membership. In this way, a deficiency in the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness plays into social/epistemic interactions that perpetuate social injustice. Overcoming that deficiency and, along with it, normalized practices of epistemic exclusion, requires developing a self-critical perspective on the partial, socially-located character of one's perspective and the consequent epistemic value of inclusiveness
Davies, A. C. L. (ms). Don't trust me, I'm a doctor: Medical regulation and the 1999 NHS reforms.   (Google)
Abstract:      This article examines recent developments in the regulation of the medical profession in England, with particular reference to doctors working in the National Health Service (NHS). It is argued that the Health Act 1999 and associated government policies are bringing about a shift from a 'light touch', self-regulatory paradigm to a government-driven, interventionist approach. It is suggested that the reason for the change is not simply a governmental concern with the quality and nature of care provided by doctors, but more significantly, a concern with the cost of that care. The article offers a critique of the new regime, drawing on the socio-legal literature on regulation. Some aspects of the reforms ignore the need to persuade doctors to comply, and may therefore result in cheating or 'creative compliance'; other aspects of the reforms provide doctors with opportunities to 'neutralize' their impact. It concludes with an examination of the wider significance of the change in regulatory paradigm, and of the agenda for future research in this field
Dees, Richard H. (1998). Trust and the rationality of toleration. Noûs 32 (1):82-98.   (Google | More links)
Dees, Richard H. (2004). Trust and Toleration. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book outlines the social, conceptual, and psychological preconditions for toleration.By looking closely at the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France and England and at contemporary controversies about the rights of homosexuals, Richard Dees demonstrates how trust between the opposing parties is needed first, but in just these cases, distrust is all-too-rational. Ultimately, that distrust can only be overcome if the parties undergo a fundamental shift of values - a conversion. Only then can they accept some form of toleration
de Laat, Paul B. (forthcoming). How can contributors to open-source communities be Trusted? On the assumption, inference, and substitution of trust. Ethics and Information Technology.   (Google)
Abstract: Open-source communities that focus on content rely squarely on the contributions of invisible strangers in cyberspace. How do such communities handle the problem of trusting that strangers have good intentions and adequate competence? This question is explored in relation to communities in which such trust is a vital issue: peer production of software (FreeBSD and Mozilla in particular) and encyclopaedia entries (Wikipedia in particular). In the context of open-source software, it is argued that trust was inferred from an underlying ‘hacker ethic’, which already existed. The Wikipedian project, by contrast, had to create an appropriate ethic along the way. In the interim, the assumption simply had to be that potential contributors were trustworthy; they were granted ‘substantial trust’. Subsequently, projects from both communities introduced rules and regulations which partly substituted for the need to perceive contributors as trustworthy. They faced a design choice in the continuum between a high-discretion design (granting a large amount of trust to contributors) and a low-discretion design (leaving only a small amount of trust to contributors). It is found that open-source designs for software and encyclopaedias are likely to converge in the future towards a mid-level of discretion. In such a design the anonymous user is no longer invested with unquestioning trust
de Laat, Paul B. (2008). Online diaries: Reflections on trust, privacy, and exhibitionism. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Trust between transaction partners in cyberspace has come to be considered a distinct possibility. In this article the focus is on the conditions for its creation by way of assuming, not inferring trust. After a survey of its development over the years (in the writings of authors like Luhmann, Baier, Gambetta, and Pettit), this mechanism of trust is explored in a study of personal journal blogs. After a brief presentation of some technicalities of blogging and authors’ motives for writing their diaries, I try to answer the question, ‘Why do the overwhelming majority of web diarists dare to expose the intimate details of their lives to the world at large?’ It is argued that the mechanism of assuming trust is at play: authors simply assume that future visitors to their blog will be sympathetic readers, worthy of their intimacies. This assumption then may create a self-fulfilling cycle of mutual admiration. Thereupon, this phenomenon of blogging about one’s intimacies is linked to Calvert’s theory of ‘mediated voyeurism’ and Mathiesen’s notion of ‘synopticism’. It is to be interpreted as a form of ‘empowering exhibitionism’ that reaffirms subjectivity. Various types of ‘synopticon’ are distinguished, each drawing the line between public and private differently. In the most ‘radical’ synopticon blogging proceeds in total transparency and the concept of privacy is declared obsolete; the societal gaze of surveillance is proudly returned and nullified. Finally it is shown that, in practice, these conceptions of blogging are put to a severe test, while authors often have to cope with known people from ‘real life’ complaining, and with ‘trolling’ strangers
de Laat, Paul B. (2005). Trusting virtual trust. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Can trust evolve on the Internet between virtual strangers? Recently, Pettit answered this question in the negative. Focusing on trust in the sense of ‘dynamic, interactive, and trusting’ reliance on other people, he distinguishes between two forms of trust: primary trust rests on the belief that the other is trustworthy, while the more subtle secondary kind of trust is premised on the belief that the other cherishes one’s esteem, and will, therefore, reply to an act of trust in kind (‘trust-responsiveness’). Based on this theory Pettit argues that trust between virtual strangers is impossible: they lack all evidence about one another, which prevents the imputation of trustworthiness and renders the reliance on trust-responsiveness ridiculous. I argue that this argument is flawed, both empirically and theoretically. In several virtual communities amazing acts of trust between pure virtuals have been observed. I propose that these can be explained as follows. On the one hand, social cues, reputation, reliance on third parties, and participation in (quasi-) institutions allow imputing trustworthiness to varying degrees. On the other, precisely trust-responsiveness is also relied upon, as a necessary supplement to primary trust. In virtual markets, esteem as a fair trader is coveted while it contributes to building up one’s reputation. In task groups, a hyperactive style of action may be adopted which amounts to assuming (not: inferring) trust. Trustors expect that their virtual co-workers will reply in kind while such an approach is to be considered the most appropriate in cyberspace. In non-task groups, finally, members often display intimacies while they are confident someone else ‘out there’ will return them. This is facilitated by the one-to-many, asynchronous mode of communication within mailing lists
DeVille, Kenneth & Kopelman, Loretta M. (2003). Diversity, trust, and patient care: Affirmative action in medical education 25 years after Bakke. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (4):489 – 516.   (Google)
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal 1978 Bakke decision, now 25 years old, has an ambiguous and endangered legacy. Justice Lewis Powell's opinion provided a justification that allowed leaders in medical education to pursue some affirmative action policies while at the same time undermining many other potential defenses. Powell asserted that medical schools might have a "compelling interest" in the creation of a diverse student body. But Powell's compromise jeopardized affirmative action since it blocked many justifications for responding to increases in political opposition and legal challenges. The Bakke decision and itsmoral background and legal legacy are traced and analyzed. Despite recent legal setbacks, the framework sketched by Powell can be used to defend diversity inmedical education bothmorally and legally as a "compelling state interest." Because trust is a central component of the physician-patient relationship and a prerequisite to the profession's ability to provide effectivemedical care, the state has a compelling interest in training physicians with whom patients can feel comfortable and safe if the population is (1) distrustful; (2) underserved; (3) faces significant discrimination in the allocation of benefits, goods and services and (4) affirmative action programs would be likely to promote their trust in the system. Similar narrowly-tailored arguments could be used in other professions and for other groups. Bakke is an important background for the pending Grutter case
Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina P.; Simon, Eszter & Fischer, Alex, Political trust and initial conditions: The effect of varieties of socialism.   (Google)
Abstract:      We introduce and test new hypotheses about the determinants of political trust, a key lever of democratic participation. We stipulate that trust in government is significantly determined by historical legacy: socialist versus non-socialist past, and type of socialist regime. Utilizing individual-level data from an institutional survey, which focuses on future political elites, our empirical analysis finds strong support in favour of our theory
Dimock, S. (1997). Retributivism and trust. Law and Philosophy 16 (1):37-62.   (Google | More links)
Dostal, Robert J. (1987). The world never lost: The hermeneutics of trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):413-434.   (Google | More links)
Doyal, Len & Colvin, Brian (2002). The clinical ethics committee at barts and the London NHS trust: Rationale, achievements, and difficulties. HEC Forum 14 (1).   (Google)
Elgin, Catherine Z. (2004). Richard Foley's intellectual trust in oneself and others. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):724–734.   (Google | More links)
Elia, John (2009). Transparency rights, technology, and trust. Ethics and Information Technology 11 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Information theorists often construe new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as leveling mechanisms, regulating power relations at a distance by arming stakeholders with information and enhanced agency. Management theorists have claimed that transparency cultivates stakeholder trust, distinguishes a business from its competition, and attracts new clients, investors, and employees, making it key to future growth and prosperity. Synthesizing these claims, we encounter an increasingly common view: If corporations voluntarily adopted new ICTs in order to foster transparency, trust, and growth, while embracing the redistributions of power they bring about, both corporations and stakeholders would benefit. The common view is short-sighted, however. In order to realize mutual benefit, transparency can not be conceived merely as efficient or economical. The implementation and use of new ICTs will be morally unsatisfactory unless they stably protect stakeholders. Moreover, without such protections, transparency is unlikely to produce lasting trust and growth. More specifically, corporate disclosures ought to be guided by a theory of stakeholder rights to know about threats or risks to stakeholders’ basic interests. Such rights are necessary moral protections for stakeholders in any business environment. Respect for transparency rights is not simply value added to a corporation’s line of goods and services, but a condition of a corporation’s justifiable claim to create value rather than harm, wrong, or injustice in its dealings
Ely, Richard T. (1900). The nature and significance of monopolies and trust. International Journal of Ethics 10 (3):273-288.   (Google | More links)
Englund, Tomas (forthcoming). The potential of education for creating mutual trust: Schools as sites for deliberation. Educational Philosophy and Theory.   (Google)
Abstract: Is it possible to look at schools as spaces for encounters? Could schools contribute to a deliberative mode of communication in a manner better suited to our own time and to areas where different cultures meet? Inspired primarily by classical (Dewey) and modern (Habermas) pragmatists, I turn to Seyla Benhabib, posing the question whether she supports the proposition that schools can be sites for deliberative communication. I argue that a school that engages in deliberative communication, with its stress on mutual communication between different moral perspectives, gives universalism a procedurally oriented meaning, serving as an arena for encounters that represents a weak public sphere. An interactive universalism of this kind attaches importance to developing an ability and willingness to reason on the basis of the views of others and to change perspectives. In that respect, the institutional arrangements of schools are potential parts of the political dimension of cosmopolitanism, as well as its moral dimension, in terms of the obligations and responsibilities we develop through our institutions and in our actions as human beings towards one another
Entrikin, J. Nicholas (2003). Placing trust. Ethics, Place and Environment 6 (3):259 – 271.   (Google | More links)
Fleck, Leonard M. (2007). Can we trust "democratic deliberation"? Hastings Center Report 37 (4).   (Google)
Fleckenstein, Marilynn P. & Bowes, John C. (2000). When trust is betrayed: Religious institutions and white collar crime. Journal of Business Ethics 23 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In 1990, the comptroller of the Catholic Diocese of Buffalo was charged with the embezzlement of eight million dollars of money belonging to the Diocese, He was subsequently convicted and served several years in state prison. Using this case as a starting point, this paper looks at several examples of white-collar crime and religious institutions. Should justice or mercy be the operative virtue in dealing with such criminals?
Flynn, Jennifer (2004). Self-trust and reproductive autonomy. Dialogue 43 (3):619-621.   (Google)
Follesdal, Andreas (2002). Constructing a european civic society – vaccination for trust in a fair, multi-level europe. Studies in East European Thought 54 (4).   (Google)
Foley, Richard (2001). Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the center of intellectual trust
Foley, Richard, Universal intellectual trust.   (Google)
Abstract: All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We acquire opinions from family and close acquaintances but also from strangers. We get directions from and heed the warnings of individuals we’ve never met, and likewise read books and articles and listen to television and radio reports authored by individuals we don’t know personally. Moreover, we undertake inquiries in groups in which the group relies on the conclusions of the individuals making up the group. In some of these collective efforts everyone knows one another, for example, a set of neighbors taking a census of birds in the neighborhood. But others, such as the effort to understand gravity, are not so nearly self-contained. Indeed, many of the most impressive human intellectual accomplishments are the collective products of individuals far removed from another in location (and sometimes even over time) who rely on each other’s conclusions without feeling the need to re-confirm them
Fox, Mark D. (2003). Stewards of a public trust: Responsible transplantation. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (1):5 – 7.   (Google)
Fox, Mark D. & Allee, Margaret R. (2005). Values, policies, and the public trust. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (4):1 – 3.   (Google)
Friend, Celeste M. (2001). Trust and the presumption of translucency. Social Theory and Practice 27 (1):1-18.   (Google)
Friedman, Paul J. (2002). The impact of conflict of interest on trust in science. Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  Conflicts of interest have an erosive effect on trust in science, damaging first the attitude of the public toward scientists and their research, but also weakening the trusting interdependence of scientists. Disclosure is recognized as the key tool for management of conflicts, but rules with sanctions must be improved, new techniques for avoidance of financial conflicts by alternative funding of evaluative research must be sought, and there must be new thinking about institutional conflicts of interest. Our profession is education, and both the public and research professionals of all ages would benefit from greater understanding of how science should and does work
Galston, William A. (1999). Social capital in America : Civil society and civic trust. In Josef Janning, Charles Kupchan & Dirk Rumberg (eds.), Civic Engagement in the Atlantic Community. Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.   (Google)
García-Marzá, Domingo (2005). Trust and dialogue: Theoretical approaches to ethics auditing. Journal of Business Ethics 57 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: . The aim of this paper is to put forward an ethical framework for the conceptualization and development of ethics audits, here understood as a catalyst for company dialogue and in general, for management of ethics in the company. Ethics auditing is understood as the opportunity and agreement to devise a system to inform on ethical corporate behavior. This system essentially aims to increase the transparency and credibility of the companys commitment to ethics. At the same time, the process of elaborating this system allows us to introduce the moral dimension into company actions and decisions, thereby completing a key dimension of the production, maintenance and development of trust capital. To this end, the following four steps are taken. First, we analyze the relation between ethics auditing and trust as a basic moral resource in the dialogue between the company and its various stakeholders. Second, we examine the social balance sheet as a precursor to ethics auditing and focus on what prevents it from going further. Third, we attempt to reconstruct the basic moral assumptions underlying the companys social responsibility from the discourse ethics approach. Finally, we present a methodological framework from which to carry out our proposal, which embraces two basic theoretical perspectives stakeholder theory and the values derived from discourse ethics as a normative framework
Gelfert, Axel (2005). Richard Foley: Intellectual trust in oneself and others. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8:220-227.   (Google)
Abstract: In his previous books, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (1987) and Working Without a Net (1993), Richard Foley presented a highly influential account of what it means for one’s beliefs and belief-forming practices to be rational. Developing a positive new account of epistemic rationality, however, has never been Foley’s sole concern. His project is metaepistemological in character as much as it is epistemological. Put crudely, questions such as ‘What makes some beliefs knowledge?’ are of equal importance to Foley as such questions as ‘How is scepticism possible?’. Indeed, given the way in which philosophical debates tend to be shaped, it may be the more fruitful way of tackling a philosophical problem to start from questions of the latter type and work one’s way backward to the fundamental questions that gave rise to the debate in the first place. Such an approach need not be strictly historical; rather, it will be meta-epistemological in that it probes deeply into the possibility of an epistemological theory, its prospective subject matter as well as its limitations. Given the difficulty of constructing a coherent epistemological theory and defending it against the various objections that are standardly run against such theories, it should often prove more viable to illustrate the general meta-epistemological ‘lessons’ by way of referring to previous epistemological theories and the long-standing debates that surround them. Hence, a metaepistemological approach naturally gives rise to an historically informed outlook
Gibbs, Paul T. (2004). Trusting in the University: The Contribution of Temporality and Trust to a Praxis of Higher Learning. Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: The world changes and we are encouraged to change with it, but is all change good? This book asks us to stop and consider whether the higher education we are providing, and engaging in, for ourselves and our societies is what we ought to have, or what commercial interests want us to have. In claiming that there is a place for a higher education of learning, such as the university, amongst our array of tertiary options the book attempts to explore what this might be. Drawing from the existential literature and in particular Heidegger, the book investigates the case for such a form of higher education and settles on existential trust as the ground upon which the community of scholars that ought to be the university can flourish. This book is written for those who are concerned about the trends towards performativity and for those who are not yet so concerned! It offers a controversial and, some might say, idealistic view of what might be but makes no apology for that since the book proposes that higher education is becoming evermore unacceptable for those who value democracy, tolerance and learning
Gingras, Jacqui (2005). Evoking trust in the nutrition counselor: Why should we be Trusted? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The virtue of trust is often spoken of as central to the work of dietitians working in nutrition counseling, especially in the context of disordered eating/eating disorders nutrition therapy. Indeed, dietitians are purported to be the most trusted source of information on nutrition and food by professional associations such as Dietitians of Canada. Here trust is explored through educational, relational, and virtue theory in order to elucidate trusts meaning and relevance to dietitians work and interactions with each other, including the general public. If dietitians are to continue to be trusted during times of skepticism in expert knowledge, reflexivity, active contestation, and moral testing in the context of our socio-political milieu need be employed so that we as a profession may respond to clients in respectful, authentic, meaningful ways; practices worthy of our trust
Goering, Sara (2009). Postnatal reproductive autonomy: Promoting relational autonomy and self-trust in new parents. Bioethics 23 (1):9-19.   (Google)
Abstract: New parents suddenly come face to face with myriad issues that demand careful attention but appear in a context unlikely to provide opportunities for extended or clear-headed critical reflection, whether at home with a new baby or in the neonatal intensive care unit. As such, their capacity for autonomy may be compromised. Attending to new parental autonomy as an extension of reproductive autonomy, and as a complicated phenomenon in its own right rather than simply as a matter to be balanced against other autonomy rights, can help us to see how new parents might be aided in their quest for competency and good decision making. In this paper I show how a relational view of autonomy – attentive to the coercive effects of oppressive social norms and to the importance of developing autonomy competency, especially as related to self-trust – can improve our understanding of the situation of new parents and signal ways to cultivate and to better respect their autonomy
Goel, Sanjay; Bell, Geoffrey G. & Pierce, Jon L. (2005). The perils of pollyanna: Development of the over-trust construct. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3).   (Google)
Abstract: . Management scholars and practitioners often believe that individuals and organizations benefit by trusting their work contacts. (Husted, 1998; Sonnenberg, 1994) Trust is generally viewed as “good” and imperative to a modern functioning economy (Blau, 1964; Hosmer, 1995; Zucker, 1986) Consequently, scholars and practitioners have given scant attention to the “downside” of trust, despite the fact that trust involves taking risk under conditions of uncertainty (Rousseau et al., 1998) Recent corporate scandals show that people suffer when they misplace trust in untrustworthy organizations and individuals. This paper develops a model of the causes and consequences of “over-trust,” which we define as a state where a trustor’s trust exceeds that which is warranted given the conditions. The antecedents of overtrust related to characteristics of the trustee, the trustor, and situational characteristics. We examine the role played by self-monitoring and perceived power base of the trustee as two key trustee characteristics. Among trustor characteristics, we examine the role (played by trustor’s core evaluation, core values). based on cultural affiliation), prior experiences with trustees, and use of habitual thinking behavior. Under characteristics of the situation, we examine the role played by uncertainty inherent in the situation, perceived threat from the context, degree of task interdependence, and organizational systems and routines. Next, we examine three consequences of over-trust – leniency in judging the trustee, delay in perceiving exploitation, and increased risk-taking. We conclude our paper by developing a set of guidelines that organizational members may employ to avoid over-trust
Goldman, Alvin I. (2001). Experts: Which ones should you trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.   (Google | More links)
Govier, Trudy & Verwoerd, Wilhelm (2002). Trust and the problem of national reconciliation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2).   (Google)
Grabner-Kraeuter, Sonja (2002). The role of consumers' trust in online-shopping. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Many consumers are sceptical or suspicious about the functional mechanisms of electronic commerce, its intransparent processes and effects, and the quality of many products that are offered online. This paper analyses the role of consumer trust as a foundation for the diffusion and acceptance of electronic commerce. Starting from a functional perspective trust is seen as distinct but potentially coexisting mechanism for reducing the uncertainty and complexity of transactions and relationships in electronic markets. The analysis focuses on conditions of e-commerce transactions that are relevant for the formation of trust problems. Drawing on the theory of information two types of uncertainty are described: system-dependent and transaction-specific uncertainty. Finally different activities and instruments are described and categorized that Internet firms can use to establish and maintain trust
Greenwood, Michelle & Buren, I. I. I. (forthcoming). Trust and stakeholder theory: Trustworthiness in the organisation–stakeholder relationship. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Trust is a fundamental aspect of the moral treatment of stakeholders within the organization–stakeholder relationship. Stakeholders trust the organization to return benefit or protections from harm commensurate with their contributions or stakes. However, in many situations, the firm holds greater power than the stakeholder and therefore cannot necessarily be trusted to return the aforementioned duty to the stakeholder. Stakeholders must therefore rely on the trustworthiness of the organization to fulfill obligations in accordance to Phillips’ principle of fairness ( Business Ethics Quarterly 7 (1), 1997 , 51–66), particularly where low-power stakeholders may not be fully consenting (Van Buren III, Business Ethics Quarterly 11 (3), 2001 , 481–499). The construct of organizational trustworthiness developed herewith is presented as a possible solution to the problem of unfairness in organization–stakeholder relations. While organizational trustworthiness does not create an ethical obligation where none existed before, stakeholders who lack power will likely be treated fairly when organizational trustworthiness is present
Greene, Alexandra; McKiernan, Peter & Greene, Stephen (2008). The nature of reciprocity and the spirit of the gift: Balancing trust and governance in long term illness. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Greene, Mark (2006). To restore faith and trust: Justice and biological access to cellular therapies. Hastings Center Report 36 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : Stem cell therapies should be available to people of all ethnicities. However, most cells used in the clinic will probably come from lines of cells stored in stem cell banks, which may end up benefiting the majority group most. The solution is to seek additional funding, earmarked for lines that will benefit minorities and offered as a public expression of apology for past discrimination
Grinnell, Frederick (1999). Ambiguity, trust, and the responsible conduct of research. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  Ambiguity associated with everyday practice of science has made it difficult to reach a consensus on how to define misconduct in science. This essay outlines some of the important ambiguities of practice such as distinguishing data from noise, deciding whether results falsify a hypothesis, and converting research into research publications. The problem of ambiguity is further compounded by the prior intellectual commitments inherent in choosing problems and in dealing with the skepticism of one's colleagues. In preparing a draft code of ethics for the American Society of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (ASBMB), an attempt was made to take into account the ambiguities of practice. Also, the draft code adopted trust as its leading principle, specifically the importance of trust as a condition necessary for there to be science. During revision of the code, the focus on trust was changed. The new orientation was on trust as a consequence of carrying out science responsibly. By addressing the obligations necessary to engender trust, the ASBMB ethics code not only sets professional standards, but also makes a clear statement of public accountability
Gustafsson, Clara (2005). Trust as an instance of asymmetrical reciprocity: An ethics perspective on corporate brand management. Business Ethics 14 (2):142–150.   (Google | More links)
Guthrie, Bruce (2008). Trust and asymmetry in general practitioner-patient relationships in the united kingdom. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Hackley, Chris (2000). Review article: In trusts we trust. Business Ethics 9 (2):119–121.   (Google | More links)
Haddow, Gill & Cunningham-Burley, Sarah (2008). Tokens of trust or token trust? Public consultation and "generation Scotland". In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Hanfling, Oswald (2008). How we trust one another. Philosophy 83 (2):161-177.   (Google)
Hardin, Russell (2002). Trust: A sociological theory, Piotr Sztompka. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):183-204.   (Google)
Hardin, Russell (1999). Trudy gover, social trust and human communites. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3).   (Google)
Hardwig, John (1991). The role of trust in knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.   (Google | More links)
Harris, Paul L. & Richert, Rebekah A. (2008). William James, 'the world of sense' and trust in testimony. Mind and Language 23 (5):536-551.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract:  William James argued that we ordinarily think of the objects that we can observe—things that belong to 'the world of sense'—as having an unquestioned reality. However, young children also assert the existence of entities that they cannot ordinarily observe. For example, they assert the existence of germs and souls. The belief in the existence of such unobservable entities is likely to be based on children's broader trust in other people's testimony about objects and situations that they cannot directly observe for themselves
Hausman, Daniel (online). Fairness and trust in game theory.   (Google)
Abstract: an unpublished paper written in 1998-1999
Hausman, Daniel M. (2004). Trust and trustworthiness, by Russell Hardin. Russell Sage foundation, 2002, XXI + 234 pages. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):240-246.   (Google)
Hayes, Barbara (2010). Trust and distrust in cpr decisions. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Trust is essential in human relationships including those within healthcare. Recent studies have raised concerns about patients’ declining levels of trust. This article will explore the role of trust in decision-making about cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). In this research thirty-three senior doctors, junior doctors and division 1 nurses were interviewed about how decisions are made about providing CPR. Analysis of these interviews identified lack of trust as one cause for poor understanding of treatment decisions and lack of acceptance of medical judgement. Two key implications emerged from the analysis. First, before embarking on a discussion about CPR it is essential to establish trust between the doctor and the patient/family. Secondly, it is essential that the CPR discussion itself does not undermine trust and cause harm to the patient
Held, Virginia (1968). On the meaning of trust. Ethics 78 (2):156-159.   (Google | More links)
Herder, Matthew & Brian, Jennifer Dyck (2008). Canada's stem cell corporation: Aggregate concerns and the question of public trust. Journal of Business Ethics 77 (1).   (Google)
Hertzberg, Lars (1988). On the attitude of trust. Inquiry 31 (3):307 – 322.   (Google)
Hertsman, Elḥanan Yosef (1978). One, the Essence of the Jewish Home: Reflections on the Respect and Trust That Make a Family. [S.N.].   (Google)
Hieronymi, Pamela (2008). The reasons of trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response
Hinchman, Edward (2005). Advising as inviting to trust. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):355-386.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How can you give your interlocutor a reason to act? One way is by manipulating his deliberative context through threats, flattery, or other incentives. Another is by addressing him in the way distinctive of reasoning with him. I aim to account for the possibility of this non-manipulative form of address by showing how it is realized through the performance of a specific illocutionary act, that of advising as inviting to trust. I argue that exercise of a capacity for reasonable trust can give us reasons that are not grounded in our motivational susceptibilities. Here I echo Kant on moral motivation. But this rational faculty assesses not principles but persons. Here I echo Hume on the moral virtues. We can thus agree with Kant about the motivational efficacy of practical reasons dispensed through advice but agree with Hume about the form of intelligence needed to put ourselves in touch with them.
Hinchman, Edward (forthcoming). Assurance and warrant. Philosophers' Imprint.   (Google)
Abstract: It seems undeniable that such second-personal speech acts as promising A to φ and telling A that p serve at least in part to give an assurance to the addressee. Whatever your other aims, part of what you’re doing when you promise or tell A is inviting A, whether sincerely or insincerely, to take you at your word.1 Though you may despair of getting A to accept it, since you may know that A does not regard you as worthy of his trust, the invitation seems to include an assurance that he can rely on you in some respect – or, hypothetically, that he could, if only he’d get over his mistrust.2 Promisings and tellings differ, of course, in the content of the assurance. When you promise A to φ, you give A the assurance that you’ll φ and thereby that he has a reason to perform (or not to avoid performing) acts that depend on your φing. But what is the content of your assurance when you tell A that p? Exactly how do you suppose he might rely on you? And how, if at all, is the reliance epistemic as opposed to merely practical?
Hinchman, Edward (2009). Receptivity and the will. Noûs 43 (3):395-427.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends an internalist view of agency. The challenge for an internalist view of agency is to explain how an agent’s all-things-considered judgment has necessary implications for action, a challenge that lies specifically in the possibility of two species of akratic break: between judgment and intention, and between intention and action. I argue that the two breaks are not importantly different: in each case akrasia manifests a single species of irrational self-mistrust. I aim to vindicate internalism by showing how rational agency rests on our capacity for trusting receptivity to the verdict of judgment. To call the relation receptivity is to characterize it as fundamentally passive. To call it trusting receptivity is to ensure that the passivity is not incompatible with agency, since trust retains a crucial degree of control. I argue that the best way to meet the externalist argument from akrasia is to abandon the assumption that the will must be a locus of activity.
Hinchman, Edward (2003). Trust and diachronic agency. Noûs 37 (1):25–51.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some philosophers worry that it can never be reasonable to act simply on the basis of trust, yet you act on the basis of self-trust whenever you merely follow through on one of your own intentions. It is no more reasonable to follow through on an intention formed by an untrustworthy earlier self of yours than it is to act on the advice of an untrustworthy interlocutor. But reasonable mistrust equally presupposes untrustworthiness in the mistrusted, or evidence thereof. The concept of an intention, I argue, codifies the fact that practical reason rests on a capacity for reasonable trust.
Hinchman, Edward (2005). Telling as inviting to trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling give reasons directly. They give reasons by inviting the hearer’s trust. This yields a novel form of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. The status of testimony as a sui generis source of epistemic warrant is entailed by the nature of the act of telling. We can discover the nature of this illocution, and its epistemic role, by examining how it functions in the real world of human relations.
Hoffman, W. Michael (ed.) (1996). The Ethics of Accounting and Finance: Trust, Responsibility, and Control. Quorum Books.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (1994). Deciding to trust, coming to believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we decide to trust? Sometimes, yes. And when we do, we need not believe that our trust will be vindicated. This paper is motivated by the need to incorporate these facts into an account of trust. Trust involves reliance; and in addition it requires the taking of a reactive attitude to that reliance. I explain how the states involved here differ from belief. And I explore the limits of our ability to trust. I then turn to the idea of trusting what others say. I suggest that we sometimes decide to trust people to be sincere and knowledgeable; and that having taken this attitude towards them, we come to believe what they say. I spell out some consequences that this has for an account of testimony, and for van Fraassen's decision theoretic principle of Reflection.
Hornsby, Karen L. (2005). Autonomy and trust in bioethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (2).   (Google)
Horsburgh, H. J. N. (1962). Trust and collective security. Ethics 72 (4):252-265.   (Google | More links)
Horsburgh, H. J. N. (1961). Trust and social objectives. Ethics 72 (1):28-40.   (Google | More links)
Horstman, Klasien (2000). Technology and the management of trust in insurance medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article deals with the question how technologycontributed to the performing of objective assessmentsof health risks and to the public trust in theinsurance institution. Many authors have pointed tothe relevance of medical or statistical technologywith regard to the constitution of objectivity,because these technologies should be capable ofdiminishing the influence of social interactions – the``human element'' – on the process of producingknowledge about health risks. However, in this articleit is shown that the constitution of objective riskassessments and public trust cannot be seen as theproduct of one particular type of technology, but thatit is the product of a socio-technical network, inwhich several heterogeneous elements becomeinterrelated and interdependant. The historicalreconstruction of this network also sheds a new lighton the role of `the human element' in the constitutionof objectivity and trust. It shows that elements inthe network which regulate the social interactionbetween the subjects involved are of no lessimportance to generate trust than technologies whichtend to abstract from this interaction. In otherwords, objective and subjective elements areintertwined much more than is often recognized, andpublic trust is to a fairly large degree depends onconventions in social interaction
Horsburgh, H. J. N. (1960). The ethics of trust. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (41):343-354.   (Google | More links)
Howard, R. Moskowitz; Gillie Gabay, Jacqueline Beckley & Hollis Ashman, , In God we trust: What the God phrase does to relieve anxiety.   (Google)
Abstract: Thus far, measurement barriers inhibited researchers from studying the link between the god concept or image, a special case of spirituality, and anxiety. This study examined the impact of spirituality, mainly of God phrases, as an ameliorator of anxiety. In 15 separate experiments, different groups each rated statistically designed vignettes dealing with various anxiety-provoking situations. Each experiment dealt with one specific anxiety-provoking situation. The ratings for each respondent generated a model showing the basic level of anxiety and the part-worth contribution of each spirituality element to either increasing or reducing that basic anxiety. We used psychophysical methods and statistically designed experiments. This approach allowed the measurement of the God image and promises a powerful, experimentation-oriented way to understand the concept of God, allowing future research to study the link between spirituality and stress reduction at the workplace
Howard, Michael W. (2001). The rationality of ethnic conflict and of positive solidarity: Russell Hardin's one for all: The logic of group conflict and Martin Hollis's trust within reason. Radical Philosophy Review 3 (2):196-206.   (Google)
Huby, Guro (2008). Accountability and trust in integrated teams for care of older people and people with chronic mental health problems. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Hummels, Harry & Roosendaal, Hans E. (2001). Trust in scientific publishing. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Trust is an important phenomenon to reduce organisational complexity and uncertainty. In the literature many types of trust are distinguished. An important framework to understand the variety and development of trust in organisations is provided by Zucker. She distinguishes three types of trust: process-based trust
Illingworth, Patricia (2002). Trust: The scarcest of medical resources. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):31 – 46.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I claim that the doctor-patient relationship can be viewed as a vessel of trust. Nonetheless, trust within the doctor-patient relationship has been impaired by managed care. When we conceive of trust as social capital, focusing on the role that it plays in individual and social well-being, trust can be viewed as a public good and a scarce medical resource. Given this, there is a moral obligation to protect the doctor-patient relationship from the cost-containment mechanisms that compromise its ability to produce trust
Ingenhoff, Diana & Sommer, Katharina (forthcoming). Trust in companies and in ceos: A comparative study of the main influences. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Carusi, Annamaria (2009). Implicit Trust in the Space of Reasons. Journal of Social Epistemology 23 (1):25-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Pila (2009) has criticised the recommendations made by requirements engineers involved in the design of a grid technology for the support of distributed readings of mammograms made by Jirotka et al. (2005). The disagreement between them turns on the notion of “biographical familiarity” and whether it can be a sound basis for trust for the performances of professionals such as radiologists. In the first two sections, this paper gives an interpretation of the position of each side in this disagreement and their recommendation for the design of technology for distributed reading, and in the third the underlying reasons for this is agreement are discussed. It is argued that Pila, in attempting to make room for mistrust as well as trust, brings to the fore the question of having and reflecting upon reasons for trust or mistrust. Pila holds that biographical familiarity is not a sound reason for trust/mistrust, as it seems to obliterate the possibility of mistrust. In response to her proposal, an analysis is proposed of the forms of trust involved in biographical familiarity. In particular, implicit trust is focused upon — as a form of trust in advance of reasons, and as a form of trust contained (in the logical sense) within other reasons. It is proposed that implicit trust has an important role in establishing an intersubjectively shared world in which what counts as a reason for the acceptability of performances such as readings of X-rays is established. Implicit trust, therefore, is necessary for professionals to enter into a “space of reasons”. To insist upon judgements made in the absence of the form of implicit trust at play in biographical familiarity is to demand that radiologists (and other relevantly similar professionals) make judgements regarding whether to trust or mistrust on the basis of reasons capable of being reflected upon, but at the same time leave them without reasons upon which to reflect.
Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8).   (Google)
Jackson, Jennifer C. (2001). Truth, Trust and Medicine. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Truth, Trust and Medicine investigates the notion of trust and honesty in medicine, and questions whether honesty and openness are of equal importance in maintaining the trust necessary in doctor-patient relationships. Jackson begins with the premise that those in the medical profession have a basic duty to be worthy of the trust their patients place in them. Yet questions of the ethics of withholding information and consent and covert surveillance in care units persist. This book boldly addresses these questions which disturb our very modern notions of a patient's autonomy, self-determination and informed consent
Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2003). Why trust the subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10).   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Johnson, Peter (1993). Frames of Deceit: A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Frames of Deceit is a philosophical investigation of the nature of trust in public and private life. It examines how trust originates, how it is challenged, and how it is recovered when moral and political imperfections collide. In politics, rulers may be called upon to act badly for the sake of a political good, and in private life intimate attachments are formed in which the costs of betrayal are high. This book asks how trust is tested by human goods, moral character, and power relations. It explores whether an individual's experience of betrayal differs totally from that of a community when it loses and then seeks to recover a vital public trust. Although this is a work of political philosophy it is distinctive in examining three literary texts--Sophocles' Philoctetes, Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida, and Zola's The;rèse Raquin--in order to deepen our understanding of the place of trust in morality and politics
Jones, Ward E. (2002). Dissident versus loyalist: Which scientists should we trust? Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4).   (Google)
Jones, Karen (1999). Second-hand moral knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):55-78.   (Google | More links)
Jones, Karen (1996). Trust as an affective attitude. Ethics 107 (1):4-25.   (Google | More links)
Jones, Karen (2004). Trust and Terror. In Peggy DesAutels & Margaret Urban Walker (eds.), Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Google)
Josh Gullett, Loc Do; Maria Canuto-Carranco, Mark Brister & Shundricka Turner, Cam Caldwell (forthcoming). The buyer–supplier relationship: An integrative model of ethics and trust. Journal of Business Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: The buyer–supplier relationship is the nexus of the economic partnership of many commercial transactions and is founded upon the reciprocal trust of the two parties that participate in this economic exchange. In this article, we identify how six ethical elements play a key role in framing the buyer–supplier relationship, incorporating a model articulated by Hosmer (The ethics of management, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2008 ). We explain how trust is a behavior, the relinquishing of personal control in the expectant hope that the other party will honor the duties of a psychological contract. Presenting information about six factors of organizational trustworthiness, we offer insights about the relationship between ethics and trust in the buyer–supplier relationship
Justo, Luis (2005). Trust, understanding and utopia in the research setting. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (1):56 – 58.   (Google)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2007). The problem with trust and sympathy. Hastings Center Report 37 (2).   (Google)
Kahneman, Daniel (2009). Can we trust our intuitions? In Alex Voorhoeve (ed.), Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Karri, Ranjan; Caldwell, Cam; Antonacopoulou, Elena P. & Naegle, Daniel C. (2005). Building trust in business schools through ethical governance. Journal of Academic Ethics 3 (2-4).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents conceptual arguments to suggest that trust within organizations and trustworthiness of organizations are built through ethical governance mechanisms. We ground our analysis of trust, trustworthiness, and stewardship in the business literature and provide the context of business school governance as the focus of our paper. We present a framework that highlights the importance of knowledge, resources, performance focus, transparency, authentic caring, social capital and citizenship expectations in creating a basis for the ethical governance of organizations
Kerler, William A. & Killough, Larry N. (2009). The effects of satisfaction with a client's management during a prior audit engagement, trust, and moral reasoning on auditors' perceived risk of management fraud. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The recent accounting scandals have raised concerns regarding the closeness of auditor–client relationships. Critics argue that as the relationship lengthens a bond develops and auditors’ professional skepticism may be replaced with trust. However, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 states that auditors “should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity” (AICPA 2002, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, paragraph 13, p. 10). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors develop trust in a client’s management and whether this trust affects auditors’ decisions. Specifically, this study examines whether auditors’ satisfaction with a client’s management during a prior audit engagement affects auditors’ self-reported trust in that client’s management and whether that trust affects their fraud risk assessment. The decision to trust a client’s management should be an ethical decision because excessive trust may impair auditors’ skepticism, which auditors are required to maintain by their professional responsibilities. We therefore also investigate whether auditors’ trust is affected by their moral reasoning. An experimental case was completed by 89 professional auditors, all with experience assessing the risk of fraud. The results suggest auditors’ satisfaction with the client affects their trust in the client (higher satisfaction associated with higher trust and lower satisfaction associated with lower trust). Further, after an overall unsatisfying experience, auditors’ trust affects their fraud risk assessments. However, after an overall satisfying experience, their trust does not affect their fraud risk assessments. The results indicate auditors are able to maintain their professional skepticism after satisfying past experiences with the client regardless of their beliefs about the honesty and trustworthiness of the client’s management. Lastly, auditors’ moral reasoning was not related to their trust in the client’s management
Kickul, Jill; Gundry, Lisa K. & Posig, Margaret (2005). Does trust matter? The relationship between equity sensitivity and perceived organizational justice. Journal of Business Ethics 56 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: . The present research study was designed to extend our knowledge about issues of relevance for business ethics by examining the role of equity sensitivity and perceived organizational trust on employees perceptions of procedural and interactional justice. A model was developed and tested, and results revealed that organizational trust and respect mediated the relationship between an employees equity sensitivity and perceptions of procedural, interactional, and social accounts fairness. A discussion of issues related to perceptions of trust and fairness is presented, as well as recommendations for leaders and future scholarship
King, Jonathan (1999). The scientific endeavor is based on vigilance, not trust. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2).   (Google)
Knight, Chris (2003). The secret of lateralisation is trust. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):231-232.   (Google)
Abstract: Human right-handedness does not originate in vocalisation as such but in selection pressures for structuring complex sequences of digital signals internally, as if in a vacuum. Cautious receivers cannot automatically accept signals in this way. Biological displays are subjected to contextual scrutiny on a signal-by-signal basis – a task requiring coordination of both hemispheres. In order to explain left cerebral dominance in human manual and vocal signalling, we must therefore ask why it became adaptive for receivers to abandon caution, processing zero-cost signals rapidly and on trust
Koehn, Daryl (1998). Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Rethinking Feminist Ethics bridges the gap between women theorists disenchanted with aspects of traditional theories that insist upon the need for some ethical principles. The book raises the question of whether the female conception of ethics based on care, trust and empathy can provide a realistic alternative to the male ethics based on duty and rule bound conception of ethics developed from Kant, Mill and Rawls. Koehn concludes that it cannot, showing how problems for respect of the individual arise also in female ethics because it privileges the caregiver over the cared for. Drawing on Socrates' Crito , she shows how an ethic of dialogue can instill a critical respect for the view of the other and the ethical principles absent from the female ethic
Kohn, Marek (2008). Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2003). The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 22 (6):561-575.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Punishment stands in need of justification because it involves intentionally harming offenders. Trust-based retributivists attempt to justify punishment by appeal to the offender’s violation of the victim’s trust, maintaining that the state is entitled to punish offenders as a means of restoring conditions of trust to their pre-offense levels. I argue that trust-based retributivism fails on two counts. First, it entails the permissibility of punishing the legally innocent and fails to justify the punishment of some offenders. Second, it cannot satisfactorily explain why it is morally permissible for the government to intentionally harm offenders.
Lahno, Bernd (1999). Olli Lagerspetz: Trust. The tacit demand. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (4).   (Google)
Lahno, Bernd (2001). On the emotional character of trust. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude
Latta, Margaret Macintyre & Buck, Gayle (2008). Enfleshing embodiment: 'Falling into trust' with the body's role in teaching and learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (2):315-329.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Embodiment as a compelling way to rethink the nature of teaching and learning asks participants to see fundamentally what is at stake within teaching/learning situations, encountering ourselves and our relations to others/otherness. Drawing predominantly on the thinking of John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty the body's role within teaching and learning is enfleshed through the concrete experiences of one middle-school science teacher attempting to teach for greater student inquiry. Personal, embodied understandings of the lived terms of inquiry enable the science teacher to seek out the lived terms of inquiry in her classroom alongside students. Theories are taken up as working notions for the teacher to examine as philosophical/theoretical/pragmatic processes to be worked with, and concomitantly, working as dynamic practice at the core of the teacher's thinking and experiences. The theory/practice conjuncture of inquiry is thus enfleshed, gaining embodied understandings. Embodiment as the medium enhancing comprehension is evidenced as holding worthy implications for teacher education. Teacher education must fall into trust with the body's role in teaching and learning
Lathangue, Robin (2007). Yielding actuality: Trust and reason in Gillian rose's vision of community. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):117-127.   (Google)
Abstract: This article explores the conviction that the durability of communities is contingent, at least in part, on the conception of reason in play. It proposes that prospects for building and sustaining community areenhanced to the degree that rationalistic theories of rationality are rejected. The resulting equivocation in the processes of rule-making, moral thinking, analysis, and critique, while problematic, will bepreferable to the alternative and caricatured approaches premised on a strong division between reason and its so-called others. This desirable equivocation involves an analysis of the role of trust in human relations and a revised conception of reason developed by philosopher and social critic Gillian Rose (1947–1995). Through an analysis of Rose’s commentary on the folk legend of Camelot and the phenomenology of friendship, this article tries to show how relations constrained by alterity can be transformed
Lautrup, B. & Zinkernagel, H. (1999). G-2 and the trust in experimental results. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 30 (1):85-110.   (Google)
Law, Alex (2008). The elixir of social trust: Social capital and cultures of challenge in health movements. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (2005). Book review the european republic: Reflections on the political economy of a future constitution by Stefan collignon. London: The federal trust, 2003, 212 pp. Journal of Ethics 8 (4).   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1997). Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eminent philosopher Keith Lehrer offers an original and distinctively personal view of central aspects of the human condition, such as reason, knowledge, wisdom, autonomy, love, consensus, and consciousness. He argues that what is uniquely human is our capacity for evaluating our own mental states (such as beliefs and desires), and suggests that we have a system for such evaluation which allows the resolution of personal and interpersonal conflict. The keystone in this system is self-trust, on which reason, knowledge, and wisdom are grounded
Leith, Valerie M. Sheach (2008). Restoring trust? Trust and informed consent in the aftermath of the organ retention scandal. In Julie Brownlie, Alexandra Greene & Alexandra Howson (eds.), Researching Trust and Health. Routledge.   (Google)
Lenard, Patti Tamara (2010). Rebuilding trust in an era of widening wealth inequality. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (1):73-91.   (Google)
Levy, Ron, Judicial selection: Trust and reform.   (Google)
Abstract:      The Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada held unprecedented public hearings in advance of the appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Court. The author assesses the work of the Committee using the interdisciplinary literature on assorted institutional design models and their effects on public trust and decision-maker trustworthiness. This literature can inform efforts to ensure that judicial selectors select, or aspire to select, new justices impartially. The Committee adopted a comparatively ineffective and risky model of democratization that relies on accountability tools such as political party dýtente. Past examples suggest that an alternative approach is preferable: Reforms should focus not on increasing accountability for selections but on building trust and trustworthiness in selections. The author offers specific recommendations to enhance trust and trustworthiness in the selection process using a permanent Supreme Court of Canada appointments body. The body proposed can enable robust rather than token levels of public involvement while preserving or broadening judicial independence
Levick, David; Woog, Robert & Knox, Kel (2007). Trust and goodwill as attractors: Reflecting on a complexity-informed inquiry. World Futures 63 (3 & 4):250 – 264.   (Google)
Abstract: This article discusses a complexity-informed review and evaluation project. Complexity-informed methods and techniques are used to fashion understanding of the relationships and processes implicated between the service agencies constituting the Youth Accommodation Interagency - Nepean (YAIN) and their Resource Worker, the influence of these relationships and processes on the achievement of desired and required goals, and the potential for replication of these relationships and processes elsewhere. The article concludes with critical reflection regarding what was learnt from utilizing complexity in this qualitative inquiry
Lin, Chieh-Peng (2010). Modeling corporate citizenship, organizational trust, and work engagement based on attachment theory. Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This study proposes a research model based on attachment theory, which examines the role of corporate citizenship in the formation of organizational trust and work engagement. In the model, work engagement is directly influenced by four dimensions of perceived corporate citizenship, including economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary citizenship, while work engagement is also indirectly affected by perceived corporate citizenship through the mediation of organizational trust. Empirical testing using a survey of personnel from 12 large firms confirms most of our hypothesized effects. Finally, theoretical and managerial implications of our findings are discussed
Liu, Hung-En & Tai, Terence Hua (2009). Public trust, commercialisation, and benefit sharing : Towards a trustworthy biobank in taiwan. In Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner (ed.), Human Genetic Biobanks in Asia: Politics of Trust and Scientific Advancement. Routledge.   (Google)
Lämsä, Anna-Maija & Pučėtaitė, Raminta (2006). Development of organizational trust among employees from a contextual perspective. Business Ethics 15 (2):130–141.   (Google | More links)
Loewen, Nancy (2003). How Could You?: Kids Talk About Trust. Reibeling Picture Window Books.   (Google)
Loeben, Greg (2006). Understanding futility: Why trust and disparate impact matter as much as what works. American Journal of Bioethics 6 (5):38 – 39.   (Google)
Lubell, Mark (ms). Familiarity breeds trust: Collective action in a policy domain.   (Google)
Abstract:      Researchers are currently refining the concept and theory of trust to focus on identifying the bases of trust within specific domains. This paper examines the development of trust within the domain of agricultural water policy, where trust is a critical resource for solving collective action problems. The analysis uses data from a mail survey of farmers in agricultural water policy to integrate three theoretical frameworks: the conventional generalized trust perspective, Levi's transaction cost theory of trust, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework. The results demonstrate that while there is a close relationship between the attitude of trust and beliefs about the behavior of policy actors, the dynamics of trust within policy domains should be understood within the context of institutional structures and competing political values
Luxon, Nancy (2004). Truthfulness, risk, and trust in the late lectures of Michel Foucault. Inquiry 47 (5):464 – 489.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Foucault's late, unpublished lectures present a model for evaluating those ethical authorities who claim to speak truthfully. In response to those who argue that claims to truth are but claims to power, I argue that Foucault finds in ancient practices of parrhesia (fearless speech) a resource by which to assess modern authorities' claims in the absence of certain truth. My preliminary analytic framework for this model draws exclusively on my research of his unpublished lectures given at the Collège de France between 1982-84. I argue that this model proceeds in three stages: the truth-teller is first established as independently authoritative, he is subsequently tested under conditions of risk, and the encounter concludes by generating trust and a relation of 'care' with the audience. Foucault's model results in an 'aesthetics of existence' organized around a set of ethical practices, and thus offers an alternative to other forms of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, this model also critiques the place for risk in liberal political institutions
Macrae, Donald Gunn (1973). Ages and Stages: Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lectures, Delivered on 18 November 1971 at the London School of Economics and Political Science. London,Athlone Press.   (Google)
Magill, Gerard (2007). A church that can and cannot change: The development of catholic moral teaching. By John T. Noonan jr, social traps and the problem of trust. By bo Rothstein, living together & Christian ethics. By Adrian Thatcher and more lasting unions: Christianity, the family, and society. By Stephen G. post. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):647–649.   (Google | More links)
Maitland, F. W. (1995). Trust and corporation (extracts). In Julia Stapleton (ed.), Group Rights: Perspectives Since 1900. Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Marty, Martin E. (2010). Building Cultures of Trust. W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co..   (Google)
Abstract: To build cultures of trust -- Seven levels where risk and trust meet -- Scripted resources -- Humanistic reflections -- Correcting "category mistakes" -- Conversation and "what it means to be human" -- Where science and religion meet : public life -- How to build cultures of trust : relating science, religion, and public life.
Marcel, Anthony J. (2003). Introspective report - trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.   (Google)
Mastroianni, Anna C. (2008). Sustaining public trust: Falling short in the protection of human research participants. Hastings Center Report 38 (3):pp. 8-9.   (Google)
Masui, Tohru (2009). Trust and the creation of biobanks : Biobanking in japan and the uk. In Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner (ed.), Human Genetic Biobanks in Asia: Politics of Trust and Scientific Advancement. Routledge.   (Google)
McCullough, Laurence B. (1999). Moral authority, power, and trust in clinical ethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (1):1 – 3.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Moral concerns about the authority, power, and trustworthiness of physicians have become important topics in clinical ethics during the past three decades. These concerns have come to greater prominence with the increasing involvement of large-scale private institutions in the organization and delivery of medical services, especially managed care organizations, and with the increasing involvement of government in the payment for and organization and delivery of medical services. When physicians act as the agents of large institutions or governments, the power of physicians over their patients increases. The purposes of this article are (1) to reflect briefly on the historical origins of the moral problem of physicians' power in medicine, and (2) to introduce the articles in the 1999 annual number of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy on topics in clinical ethics
McCullough, Laurence B. (2002). Power, integrity, and trust in the managed practice of medicine: Lessons from the history of medical ethics. Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):180-211.   (Google)
Mccullough, Laurence B. (2002). Trust, moral responsibility, the self, and well-ordered societies: The importance of basic philosophical concepts for clinical ethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):3 – 9.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the work of clinical ethics is intensely practical, it employs and presumes philosophical concepts from the central branches of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy. This essay introduces this issue in the Journal on clinical ethics by considering how the papers and book reviews included in it illuminate four such concepts: trust, moral responsibility, the self and well-ordered societies
McDowell, Ashley (2002). Trust and information: The role of trust in the social epistemology of information science. Social Epistemology 16 (1):51 – 63.   (Google)
Mcgeer, Victoria (2002). Developing trust. Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):21 – 38.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines developing trust in two related senses: (1) rationally overcoming distrust, and (2) developing a mature capacity for trusting/distrusting. In focussing exclusively on the first problem, traditional philosophical discussions fail to address how an evidence- based paradigm of rationality is easily co-opted by (immature) agents in support of irrational distrust (or trust) - a manifestation of the second problem. Well-regulated trust requires developing a capacity to tolerate the uncertainties that chracterise relationships among fully autonomous self-directed agents. Early relationships lack this uncertainty since care-givers take primary responsibility for determining a child's interests, reducing the scope (if not the intensity) of potential conflict between self and other. Once agents recognize that adulthood demands foregoing the security embedded in such relationships of dependency, they are free to embrace a more appropriate paradigm of rationality for guiding their thought and action in interactions with others
McGeer, Victoria (2008). Trust, hope and empowerment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):237 – 254.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and social scientists have focussed a great deal of attention on our human capacity to trust, but relatively little on the capacity to hope. This is a significant oversight, as hope and trust are importantly interconnected. This paper argues that, even though trust can and does feed our hopes, it is our empowering capacity to hope that significantly underwrites—and makes rational—our capacity to trust
McLeod, Carolyn (online). Trust. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
McNamee, Mike (1998). Celebrating trust : Virtues and rules in the ethical conduct of sports coaches. In M. J. McNamee & S. J. Parry (eds.), Ethics and Sport. E & Fn Spon.   (Google)
Meijboom, Franck L. B.; Visak, Tatjana & Brom, Frans W. A. (2006). From trust to trustworthiness: Why information is not enough in the food sector. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: The many well-publicized food scandals in recent years have resulted in a general state of vulnerable trust. As a result, building consumer trust has become an important goal in agri-food policy. In their efforts to protect trust in the agricultural and food sector, governments and industries have tended to consider the problem of trust as merely a matter of informing consumers on risks. In this article, we argue that the food sector better addresses the problem of trust from the perspective of the trustworthiness of the food sector itself. This broad idea for changing the focus of trust is the assumption that if you want to be trusted, you should be trustworthy. To provide a clear understanding of what being trustworthy means within the food sector, we elaborate on both the concept of trust and of responsibility. In this way we show that policy focused on enhancing transparency and providing information to consumers is crucial, but not sufficient for dealing with the problem of consumer trust in the current agri-food context
Meijboom, Franck L. B. (2007). Trust, food, and health. Questions of trust at the interface between food and health. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The food sector and health sector become more and more intertwined. This raises many possibilities, but also questions. One of them is the question of what the implication is for public trust in food and health issues. In this article, I argue that the products on the interface between food and health entails some serious questions of trust. Trust in food products and medical products is often based upon a long history of rather clear patterns of mutual expectations, yet these expectations are not similar in both sectors. As long as the food sector and health sector remain distinct, these differences will not lead to problems of trust, yet when new products are introduced, like functional foods or personalized dietary advices, trust can be threatened. To prevent this, we need clarity with regard to what we can expect of these new products and of whom to expect what in this situation. This requires not␣only adequate information on operating procedures, but also a profound debate␣on responsibilities and the explication and interpretation of moral values and norms
Mellema, Gregory (1999). Adam B. seligam, the problem of trust. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2).   (Google)
Michalos, Alex C. (1990). The impact of trust on business, international security and the quality of life. Journal of Business Ethics 9 (8).   (Google)
Abstract: The theses supported in this essay are that the world is to some extent constructed by each of us, that it can and ought to be constructed in a more benign way, that such construction will require more trust than most people are currently willing to grant, and that most of us will be better off if most of us can manage to be more trusting in spite of our doubts
Miller, Paul B. & Weijer, Charles (2008). Beyond consent : The trust-based obligations of physicians to patients in clinical research. In Oonagh Corrigan (ed.), The Limits of Consent: A Socio-Ethical Approach to Human Subject Research in Medicine. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Miller, Jessica (2007). The other side of trust in health care: Prescribing drugs with the potential for abuse. Bioethics 21 (1):51–60.   (Google | More links)
Misztal, Barbara A. (2001). Normality and trust in Goffman's theory of interaction order. Sociological Theory 19 (3):312-324.   (Google | More links)
Möllering, Guido (2006). Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: What makes trust such a powerful concept? Is it merely that in trust the whole range of social forces that we know play together? Or is it that trust involves a peculiar element beyond those we can account for? While trust is an attractive and evocative concept that has gained increasing popularity across the social sciences, it remains elusive, its many facets and applications obscuring a clear overall vision of its essence. In this book, Guido Möllering reviews a broad range of trust research and extracts three main perspectives adopted in the literature for understanding trust. Accordingly, trust is presented as a matter of reason, routine or reflexivity. While all these perspectives contribute something to our understanding of trust, Möllering shows that they imply, but cannot explain, ‘suspension’ – the leap of faith that is typical of trust. He therefore proposes a new direction in trust research that builds on existing perspectives but places the suspension of uncertainty and vulnerability at the heart of the concept of trust. Beyond a purely theoretical line of argument, the author discusses implications for empirical studies of trust and presents original case material that captures the experience of trust in terms of reason, routine, reflexivity and suspension. Möllering concludes by suggesting how the new approach can enhance the relevance of trust research and its contributions to broader research agendas concerning the constitution of positive expectations in the face of prevalent uncertainty and change at various levels in our economies and societies. The book is essential reading for anyone who wants to gain a thorough understanding of trust. It can serve as a general introduction for advanced students and scholars in the social sciences, especially in economics, sociology, psychology and management. For more experienced researchers, it is a challenging and provocative critique of the field and a new approach to understanding trust
Morrow, Jason D. (2003). O'Neill, Onora. Autonomy and trust in bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24 (3).   (Google)
Mullin, Amy (2005). Trust, social norms, and motherhood. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (3):316–330.   (Google | More links)
Munnichs, Geert (2004). Whom to trust? Public concerns, late modern risks, and expert trustworthiness. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article discusses the conditions under which the use of expert knowledge may provide an adequate response to public concerns about high-tech, late modern risks. Scientific risk estimation has more than once led to expert controversies. When these controversies occur, the public at large – as a media audience – faces a paradoxical situation: on the one hand it must rely on the expertise of scientists as represented in the mass media, but on the other it is confused by competing expert claims in the absence of any clear-cut standard to judge these claims. The question then arises, what expertise can the public trust? I argue that expert controversies cannot be settled by appealing to neutral, impartial expertise, because each use of expert knowledge in applied contexts is inextricably bound up with normative and evaluative assumptions. This value-laden nature of expert contributions, however, does not necessarily force us to adopt a relativist conception of expert knowledge. Nor does it imply active involvement of ordinary citizens in scientific risk estimation – as some authors seem to suggest. The value-laden, or partisan, nature of expert statements rather requires an unbiased process of expert dispute in which experts and counter-experts can participate. Moreover, instead of being a reason for discrediting expert contributions, experts'' commitment may enhance public trustworthiness because it enlarges the scope of perspectives taken into account, to include public concerns. Experts who share the same worries as (some of) the public could be expected to voice these worries at the level of expert dispute. Thus, a broadly shaped expert dispute, that is accessible to both proponents and opponents, is a prerequisite for public trust
Murray, Thomas H. & Johnston, Josephine (eds.) (2010). Trust and Integrity in Biomedical Research: The Case of Financial Conflicts of Interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Myskja, Bjørn K. (2008). The categorical imperative and the ethics of trust. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Trust can be understood as a precondition for a well-functioning society or as a way to handle complexities of living in a risk society, but also as a fundamental aspect of human morality. Interactions on the Internet pose some new challenges to issues of trust, especially connected to disembodiedness. Mistrust may be an important obstacle to Internet use, which is problematic as the Internet becomes a significant arena for political, social and commercial activities necessary for full participation in a liberal democracy. The Categorical Imperative lifts up trust as a fundamental component of human ethical virtues – first of all, because deception and coercion, the antitheses of trust, cannot be universalized. Mistrust is, according to Kant, a natural component of human nature, as we are social beings dependent on recognition by others but also prone to deceiving others. Only in true friendships can this tendency be overcome and give room for unconditional trust. Still we can argue that Kant must hold that trustworthy behaviour as well as trust in others is obligatory, as expressions of respect for humanity. The Kantian approach integrates political and ethical aspects of trust, showing that protecting the external activities of citizens is required in order to act morally. This means that security measures, combined with specific regulations are important preconditions for building online trust, providing an environment enabling people to act morally and for trust-based relationships
Nagasawa, Yujin (ms). I trust you, you're a doctor.   (Google)
Abstract: In his very interesting article Steve Clarke (1999) examines various views about a patient’s trust of a doctor, including Edwin R. DuBose’s view (1995), according to which trust in medicine is closely related to religious faith. Clarke finds them unconvincing and provides his own, more elaborate view of trust. In this short reply to Clarke’s paper I argue that his view is not compelling because it faces a difficulty that is similar to the one he believes DuBose’s view inherits
Nelson, James Lindemann (2005). Trust and transplants. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (4):26 – 28.   (Google)
Nickel, Philip J. (2007). Trust and obligation-ascription. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, trust held among amoral persons on the basis of amoral grounds. It is also compatible with trust adopted on purely predictive grounds. Then, defending the thesis against a challenge of motivational inefficacy, I argue that obligation-ascription can motivate people to act even in the absence of definite, mutually-known agreements. I end by explaining, briefly, the advantages of this sort of moral account of trust over a view based on reactive attitudes such as resentment
Nickel, Philip J., Trust, staking, and expectations.   (Google)
Abstract: Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person’s performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust, according to which trust implies a moral expectation. The content of the moral expectation is this: W hen A trusts B to do x, A ascribes an obligation to B to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This moral expectation account throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians’ defensive behavior to illustrate this final point
Nygaard, Stian & Russo, Angeloantonio (2008). Trust, coordination and knowledge flows in r&d projects: The case of fuel cell technologies. Business Ethics 17 (1):23–34.   (Google | More links)
Oakes, G. (1990). The sales process and the paradoxes of trust. Journal of Business Ethics 9 (8).   (Google)
Abstract: This essay explores a major ethical variable in personal sales: trust. By analyzing data drawn from life insurance sales, the essay supports the thesis that the role of the agent and the exigencies of personal sales create certain antinomies of trust that compromise the sales process. As a result, trust occupies a problematic and apparently paradoxical position in the sales process. On the one hand, success in personal sales is held to depend upon trust. On the other hand, because the techniques required to form trust in personal sales nullify the conditions under which trust is possible, these instruments of trust formation are self-defeating
Offe, Claus (2001). Political liberalism, group rights, and the politics of fear and trust. Studies in East European Thought 53 (3).   (Google)
Olekalns, Mara & Smith, Philip L. (2009). Mutually dependent: Power, trust, affect and the use of deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation
O'Neill, Onora (2002). Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Why has autonomy been a leading idea in philosophical writing on bioethics, and why has trust been marginal? In this important book, Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy so widely relied on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine rather than support relations of trust. She shows how Kant's non-individualistic view of autonomy provides a stronger basis for an approach to medicine, science and biotechnology, and does not marginalize untrustworthiness, while also explaining why trustworthy individuals and institutions are often undeservingly mistrusted. Her arguments are illustrated with issues raised by practices such as the use of genetic information by the police or insurers, research using human tissues, uses of new reproductive technologies, and media practices for reporting on medicine, science and technology. Autonomy and Trust in Bio