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5.1l.6.15. Envy (Envy on PhilPapers)

Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2002). Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1992). Envy and inequality. Journal of Philosophy 89 (11):551-581.   (Google | More links)
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen (2004). Talent, slavery and envy in Dworkin's equality of resources. Utilitas 16 (3):267-287.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I argue against Ronald Dworkin's rejection of the labour auction in his ‘Equality of Resources’. I criticize Dworkin's claims that the talented would envy the untalented in such an auction, and that the talented in particular would be enslaved by it. I identify some ways in which the talent auction is underdescribed and I compare the results for the condition of the talented of different further descriptions of it. I conclude that Dworkin's deviation from the ‘envy test’ criterion results in an inequality between the talented and the untalented which cannot be justified in egalitarian terms. Correspondence:c1
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen (2004). Talent, slavery, and envy. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Colombetti, Giovanna (online). Envy as an empathic emotion (2003). Abstract for Conn.   (Google)
Abstract: (2003). Abstract for Consciousness and Experiential Psychology conference (Oxford)
Cooper, David E. (1982). Equality and envy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 16 (1):35–47.   (Google | More links)
D'Arms, Justin (online). Envy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Goldberg, David E., Engineering rigor and its discontents: Philosophical reflection as curative to math-physics envy.   (Google)
Abstract: This extended abstract critically exams the use of the terms "rigorous" and "soft" in the context of engineering modeling. Common usage of the terms is contrasted with Toulmin's notion of "reasonableness" and Schoen's notion of "reflective practice." The abstract continues by considering an economic model of models in engineering, suggesting that overly "rigorous" engineering practice may box itself into being unable to afford the models it values, thereby presenting a conundrum for the practice and teaching engineering that demands relaxation
Heath, Joseph, Envy and efficiency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Joseph Heath1 The Pareto principle states that if a proposed change in the condition of society makes at least one person better off, and does not make anyone else worse off, then that change should be regarded as an improvement. This principle forms the conceptual core of modern welfare economics, and exercises enormous influence in contemporary discussions of justice and equality. It does, however, have an Achilles’ heel. When an individual experiences envy, it means that improvements in the condition of others may worsen the condition of that individual. As a result, envy has the potential to block a vast range of changes that we might intuitively be inclined to regard as Pareto improvements. (Or more precisely, envy results in too many states getting classified as Pareto-optimal, not because, intuitively, they cannot be improved upon, but because no one’s condition can be improved upon without making someone else envious.) For example, a market exchange between two people might not wind up being classified as a Pareto improvement if the benefits produced for the two parties generated envy in some otherwise uninvolved third
Horne, Thomas A. (1981). Envy and commercial society: Mandeville and Smith on "private vices, public benefits". Political Theory 9 (4):551-569.   (Google | More links)
Joseph, Sarah, Human rights and the world trade organisation: Not just a case of regime envy.   (Google)
Abstract:      The World Trade Organization has faced many criticisms from human rights and social justice advocates. And yet it is difficult to identify direct clashes between WTO obligations and human rights obligations. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this article, the concerns of WTO critics are justifiable, for example in the areas of the organisation's democratic deficit, the effect of its rules on developing States, and in the arena of labour rights. The criticisms are not, as it were, manifestations of mere 'regime envy' by social justice constituencies. Indeed, the present imbalance in effectiveness between international economic institutions and international social justice institutions must be redressed. Comments are welcome - Please either use SSRN comments or email to the author
La Caze, Marguerite (2001). Envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):31 – 45.   (Google)
Abstract: Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life
La Caze, Marguerite (2002). Revaluing envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):155 – 158.   (Google)
Norman, Richard (2002). Equality, envy, and the sense of injustice. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (1):43–54.   (Google | More links)
Otsuka, Michael (2004). Liberty, equality, envy, and abstraction. In Ronald Dworkin & Justine Burley (eds.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Purshouse, Luke (2004). Jealousy in relation to envy. Erkenntnis 60 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions
Schutte, Ofelia (1983). Envy and the dark side of alienation. Human Studies 6 (1).   (Google)
Silver, Maury & Sabini, John (1978). The social construction of envy. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (3):313–332.   (Google | More links)
Tomlin, Patrick (2008). Envy, facts and justice: A critique of the treatment of envy in justice as fairness. Res Publica 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed
Ulmer, Gregory L. (1977). The Legend of Herostratus: Existential Envy in Rousseau and Unamuno. University Presses of Florida.   (Google)
Van Hooft, Stan (2002). La caze on envy and resentment. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):141 – 147.   (Google)
Abstract: Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances
Young, Robert (1987). Egalitarianism and envy. Philosophical Studies 52 (2).   (Google)
Zuckert, Rachel (2003). Awe or envy: Herder contra Kant on the sublime. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (3):217–232.   (Google | More links)