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5.1l.6.6. Self-Deception (Self-Deception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Audi, Robert N. (1976). Epistemic disavowals and self-deception. Personalist 57:378-385.   (Google)
Audi, Robert N. (1982). Self-deception, action, and will. Erkenntnis 18 (September):133-158.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1981). An analysis of self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1985). More on self-deception: Reply to Hellman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (June):611-614.   (Google | More links)
Baier, Annette C. (1996). The vital but dangerous art of ignoring: Selective attention and self-deception. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Barnes, Annette (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias, and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Self-deception, intentions and contradictory beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):309-319.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bird, Alexander (1994). Rationality and the structure of self-deception. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Borge, Steffen (2003). The myth of self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brown, Rachel (2004). The emplotted self: Self-deception and self-knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. & Mcnally, Patrick (1961). Paradoxes of self-deception. Analysis 21 (June):140-144.   (Google)
Canfield, John V. & Gustavson, Don F. (1962). Self-deception. Analysis 23 (December):32-36.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1976). Double deception. Mind 85 (January):100-102.   (Google | More links)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1994). Deceit, deception and the self-deceiver. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):53-58.   (Google)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1979). Self-deception: A problem about autobiography. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:77-94.   (Google)
Christofidou, Andrea (1995). First person: The demand for identification-free self-reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cook, J. Thomas (1987). Deciding to believe without self-deception. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):441-446.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Cosentino, Dante A. (1980). Self-deception without paradox. Philosophy Research Archives 1388.   (Google)
Daniels, Charles B. (1974). Self-deception and interpersonal deception. Personalist 55:244-252.   (Google)
Factor, R. Lance (1977). Self-deception and the functionalist theory of mental processes. Personalist 58 (April):115-123.   (Google)
Fairbanks, Rick (1995). Knowing more than we can tell: Resolving the dynamic paradox of self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):431-459.   (Google)
Fairbanks, Rick (1999). The availability of self-deception. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):335-340.   (Google | More links)
Fingarette, Herbert (1969). Self-Deception. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 95 | Google | More links)
Fingarette, Herbert (1998). Self-deception needs no explaining. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1980). Rethinking self-deception. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (July):237-242.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Funkhouser, Eric (2005). Do the self-deceived get what they want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge
Gardiner, P. L. (1970). Error, faith and self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70:197-220.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Gendler, Tamar (2007). Self-deception as pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding self-deception in this way is highly natural. And it provides a non-
paradoxical characterization of the phenomenon that explains both its distinctive patterns of instability and its ordinary association with irrationality. Why, then, has this diagnosis been overlooked? I suggest that the oversight is due to a failure to recognize the philosophical significance of a crucial fact about the human mind, namely, the degree to which attitudes other than belief often play a central role in our mental and practical lives, both by “influenc[ing our]. . . passions and imagination,” and by “governing. . .our actions.”
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1997). The very idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some of these constraints. This second claim can best be brought out in the context of an examination of the idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception, but the conclusion is perfectly general: the idea that computers are believers, like the idea that computers could have self-knowledge or be self-deceived, is incompatible with the commonsense view. The significance of the argument lies in the choice it forces on us: whether to revise our notion of belief so as to accommodate the claim that computers are believers, or to give up on that claim so as to preserve our pretheoretic notion of the attitudes. We cannot have it both ways
Gozzano, Simone (1999). Davidson on rationality and irrationality. In Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Graham, George (1986). Russell's deceptive desires. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):223-229.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Haight, M. R. (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Hales, Steven D. (1994). Self-deception and belief attribution. Synthese 101 (2):273-289.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended
Hamlyn, David W. (1971). Self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:45-60.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hausman, Carl R. (1967). Creativity and self-deception. Journal of Existentialism 7:295-308.   (Google)
Hellman, Nathan (1983). Bach on self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (September):113-120.   (Google | More links)
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hirstein, William (2000). Self-deception and confabulation. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Holton, Richard (2001). What is the role of the self in self-deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The orthodox answer to my question is this: in a case of self-deception, the self acts to deceive itself. That is, the self is the author of its own deception. I want to explore an opposing idea here: that the self is rather the subject matter of the deception. That is, I want to explore the idea that self-deception is more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s deception by the self. The expression would thus be semantically comparable to expressions like ‘self-knowledge’ (which involves knowledge about the self) rather than to expressions like ‘self-control’ (which involves control by the self).1 On this approach, what goes wrong, when we are self-deceived, is that we lack self-knowledge; or, more accurately, since one can lack knowledge without falling into error, what goes wrong is that we have false beliefs about ourselves. Not any kind of false belief about oneself; I am not self-deceived when I mistake my shoe size. Rather, self-deception requires false beliefs about the kind of subject matter that, were one to get it right, would constitute self-knowledge. It is an interesting fact about current English that, though we talk freely of self-knowledge, we have no common term to designate its absence. Seventeenth century writers talked of self-ignorance; but the term has fallen from use. I suggest that ‘self-deception’ is the nearest we have
Hsieh, Diana M. (2004). Dursley duplicity: The morality and psychology of self-deception. In David Baggett, Shawn E. Klein & William Irwin (eds.), Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts. Chicago: Open Court.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Johnston, Mark (1995). Self-deception and the nature of mind. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Jones, David H. (1989). Pervasive self-deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:217-237.   (Google)
Jones, Ward E. (1998). Religious conversion, self-deception, and Pascal's Wager. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2).   (Google)
Keil, Geert (2000). Indexikalitat und infallibilitat. In Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.   (Google)
King-Farlow, John (1963). Self-deceivers and sartrian seducers. Analysis 23 (June):131-136.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kipp, David (1980). On self-deception. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (October):305-317.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Kirsch, Julie (online). Ethics and self-deception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Knight, Martha L. (1988). Cognitive and motivational bases of self-deception: Commentary on Mele's irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):179-188.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lazar, Ariela (1999). Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence. Mind 108 (430):265-290.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state of self-deception is taken to be a calculated outcome involving a person's intentional manipulation of her own thoughts. I argue that this answer is false and forms an impediment towards making sense of self-deception. I show that, contrary to philosophical prejudice, emotions and desires exert vast and systematic effects on the formation of beliefs. In this, and other, sections of the article, the results of experimental work are brought forward. Self-deception is portrayed here as resembling numerous instances of belief formation which are regularly affected by motivational factors. I argue that self-deceptive beliefs are direct expressions of the subject's wishes, fears and hopes. Qua beliefs which mostly correspond to such factors (rather than to evidence), self-deceptive states are a kind of fantasy
Lee, Byeong D. (2002). Shoemaker on second-order belief and self-deception. Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2004). Self-deception and moral responsibility. Ratio 17 (3):294-311.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Self-deception without thought experiments. In J. Fernandez & T. Bayne (eds.), Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation. Psychology Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict
Lockie, Robert (2003). Depth psychology and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Factor's functionalist account of self-deception. Personalist 60 (July):336-342.   (Google)
Martin, Thomas (1998). Self-deception and intentional forgetting: A reply to Whisner. Philosophia 26 (1-2):181-194.   (Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1979). Self-deception, self-pretence, and emotional detachment. Mind 88 (July):441-446.   (Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1996). On the very possibility of self-deception. In Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Emotion and desire in self-deception. Philosophy 52:163-179.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (ms). Real self-deception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to our control? What are the determinants of belief, and how does motivation bear upon belief? In what measure are widely shared psychological propensities products of evolution?
Mele, Alfred R. (1987). Recent work on self-deception. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (January):1-17.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1983). Self-deception. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (1988). Self-deception and akratic belief: A rejoinder. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):201-206.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1982). 'Self-deception, action, and will': Comments. Erkenntnis 18 (2):159-164.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the virtues of Professor Audi's paper are obvious and my time is limited, 1 shall restrict myself here to negative comments. I shall argue, first, that condition (1) - the unconscious true belief condition - in Audi's account of "clear cases of self-deception" is too strong and, second, that he does not succeed in justifying his limitation of the self-deceiver to sincere avowals of the proposition with respect to which he is in self-deception.
Mele, Alfred R. (2000). Self-deception and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires nor causally mediated by desires. It is argued that (1) is false and that (3) is defensible and more defensible than (2)
Mele, Alfred R. (2001). Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 90 | Google)
Abstract: Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
Mele, Alfred R. (1999). Twisted self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted self-deception and to show that promising approaches are consistent with a plausible position on straight self-deception
Mounce, H. O. (1971). Self-deception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Neil Van Leeuwen, D. S. (2007). The product of self-deception. Erkenntnis 67 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception
Nelkin, Dana K. (2002). Self-deception, motivation, and the desire to believe. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2003). Self-deception, interpretation and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Anthony J. (1979). Characterising self-deception. Mind 88 (January):45-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Patten, D. (2003). How do we deceive ourselves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):229-247.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand ourselves lead us to draw mistaken inferences about our own motives. People typically are influenced by various stereotypes in the way they view the actions of others. Similarly, our preconceptions about ourselves influence our interpretations of our own actions. Therefore, self-deception, according to the present thesis, is not necessarily motivated. The self-deceived does not necessarily have the belief about herself that she does because of a desire for that belief to be true, rather her belief is influenced by what she expects to believe
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Abstract: Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false beliefs. Mele argues briefly that Trivers's account is no more explanatory than a similar one that does not include the dual-belief requirement. I present a case describing Trivers' analysis, show how Mele might reply to it. After briefly explaining Mele's sufficient conditions for entering self-deception from Chapter 3 of SDU, I'll consider what it means to hold the dual-belief. I'll then consider what I take to be a class of cases of self-deception which rely on genetic determinism, which I take to satisfy the dual-belief condition.
Lockie, Robert (2003). Review of Mele, A: “Self-Deception Unmasked”. Philosophy 78 (304):296-300.   (Google)
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Abstract: In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self-deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self-deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self-deception
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Abstract:   This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self
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Solomon, Robert C. (1996). Self, deception, and self-deception in philosophy. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Statman, Daniel (1997). Hypocrisy and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby not only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our attitude toward hypocrites
Steffen, Lloyd H. (1986). Self-Deception And The Common Life. Lang.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1977). Fingarette on self-deception. Philosophical Papers 6 (May):21-30.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1974). Rorty on belief and self-deception. Inquiry 17:464-473.   (Google)
Szabados, Bela (1974). Self deception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):41-49.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Szabados, Bela (1973). Wishful thinking and self-deception. Analysis 33 (June):201-205.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Talbott, W. J. (1995). Intentional self-deception in a single coherent self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):27-74.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2008). Finite rational self-deceivers. Philosophical Studies 139 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational
van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.
Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil (2007). The spandrels of self-deception: Prospects for a biological theory of a mental phenomenon. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.   (Google)
Abstract: Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture. Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, 1988)
Whisner, William N. (1998). A further explanation and defense of the new model of self-deception: A reply to Martin. Philosophia 26 (1-2):195-206.   (Google | More links)
Whisner, William N. (1993). Self-deception and other-person deception: Toward a new conceptualization of self- deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.   (Google)
Wilson, Catherine (1980). Self-deception and psychological realism. Philosophical Investigations 3:47-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Yanal, Robert J. (2007). Self-deception and the experience of fiction. Ratio 20 (1):108-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sartre’s commentary on bad faith is the starting-point for an exploration of self-deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it’s always wrong. The proffered analysis of selfdeception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self-deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real